Bechorot Daf 13 (בכורות דף י״ג)
Daf: 13 | Amudim: 13a – 13b | Date: Loading...
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (13a)
Segment 1
TYPE: גמרא
Rav Sheshet completes 12b’s timing question: thirty days marks when one begins to transgress
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַב שֵׁשֶׁת אָמַר: לוֹמַר שֶׁאֵינוֹ עוֹבֵר עָלָיו.
English Translation:
Rav Sheshet says: The mitzva of redeeming a firstborn donkey takes effect immediately after it is born, as is stated in the first baraita. The second baraita, which states that it applies only after thirty days, means to say that until that time, one does not transgress a prohibition if he has not yet performed the redemption. After thirty days, though, one transgresses a prohibition if he still has not redeemed his firstborn donkey.
קלאוד על הדף:
The sugya carried over from the previous daf ends here. Rav Nachman had read לאלתר as a statement of bedieved validity; Rav Sheshet offers a different reconciliation entirely. The obligation takes effect at birth, exactly as the first baraita says, and the thirty days of the second baraita mark not the onset of the mitzvah but the onset of liability — before thirty days one has simply not yet acted, after thirty days one is transgressing. The distinction is between when a duty arises and when delay becomes a breach.
Key Terms:
- רַב שֵׁשֶׁת = a Babylonian amora of the third generation, noted for his command of baraitot
- אֵינוֹ עוֹבֵר עָלָיו = he does not transgress on account of it
- לְאַלְתַּר = immediately — the first baraita’s ruling on the timing of the redemption
Segment 2
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Rami bar Chama objects from a baraita; the answer reads it as a mitzvah to redeem, not to wait
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מֵתִיב רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא: מִצְוָתוֹ כׇּל שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם, מִכָּאן וְאֵילָךְ — אוֹ פּוֹדֵהוּ אוֹ עוֹרְפוֹ. מַאי לָאו מִצְוָה לְשַׁהוֹתוֹ כׇּל שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם? לָא, מִצְוָה לִפְדּוֹתוֹ כׇּל שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם.
English Translation:
Rami bar Ḥama raises an objection to Rav Sheshet from a baraita: The mitzva of a firstborn donkey applies throughout the period of thirty days from its birth; from that point forward he must either redeem it immediately or break its neck. What, does it not mean that there is a mitzva to wait to redeem it until all thirty days have passed? The Gemara answers: No, it means that there is a mitzva to redeem it throughout the period of thirty days, and after that point one has transgressed a prohibition.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rami bar Chama produces a baraita whose phrasing seems to defeat Rav Sheshet: מצותו כל שלשים יום, its mitzvah is all thirty days, and from then on either he redeems it or he breaks its neck. If the thirty days are the mitzvah’s own period, that sounds like a positive instruction to wait rather than a grace period before liability. The proposed answer rereads the phrase: the mitzvah is to redeem it at some point within the thirty days, and only afterwards has a line been crossed.
Key Terms:
- רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא = a Babylonian amora of the fourth generation
- מֵתִיב = he raises an objection from a tannaitic source
- מִצְוָתוֹ כׇּל שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם = its mitzvah is throughout the thirty days
Segment 3
TYPE: קושיא / תירוץ
The phrasing still fails — Rava resolves the whole conflict as a machloket tannaim
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִי הָכִי, ״מִכָּאן וְאֵילָךְ אוֹ פּוֹדֵהוּ אוֹ עוֹבֵר עָלָיו״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ! אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: לָא קַשְׁיָא, הָא רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר דְּמַקֵּשׁי, הָא רַבָּנַן דְּלָא מַקְּשִׁי.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: If so, it should have stated: From that point forward, either he redeems it or he transgresses a prohibition, rather than stating: From that point forward he must either redeem it or break its neck. Rather, Rava says: The contradiction between the two baraitot is not difficult, as this baraita, which states that the redemption is performed after thirty days, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who compares the redemption of a firstborn donkey to the redemption of a woman’s firstborn son, where it is stated: “From a month old shall you redeem them” (Numbers 18:16). That baraita, which states that one must perform the mitzva immediately, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who do not compare the two mitzvot of redemption.
קלאוד על הדף:
The rereading does not survive a close look at the baraita’s own words. If the point were that delay past thirty days constitutes transgression, the baraita should have said או פודהו או עובר עליו — either he redeems or he transgresses. Instead it says או פודהו או עורפו, either he redeems or he breaks its neck, which describes two live options rather than a duty and its breach. Rava therefore abandons reconciliation and assigns the two baraitot to two tannaim: the thirty-day baraita is R’ Eliezer, who applies a hekesh to the firstborn son and his מבן חדש תפדה; the immediate baraita is the Rabbanan, who make no such comparison.
Key Terms:
- אוֹ פּוֹדֵהוּ אוֹ עוֹרְפוֹ = either he redeems it or he breaks its neck
- דְּמַקֵּשׁ / דְּלָא מַקֵּשׁ = who makes the hekesh / who does not make it
- מִבֶּן חֹדֶשׁ תִּפְדֶּה = from a month old you shall redeem (Bamidbar 18:16)
Segment 4
TYPE: משנה
The closing mishna of perek 1: redemption takes precedence over arifa
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְנִי׳ לֹא רָצָה לִפְדּוֹתוֹ — עוֹרְפוֹ מֵאֲחוֹרָיו וְקוֹבְרוֹ. מִצְוַת הַפְּדִיָּיה קוֹדֶמֶת לְמִצְוַת עֲרִיפָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״אִם לֹא תִפְדֶּה וַעֲרַפְתּוֹ״.
English Translation:
MISHNA: If one did not wish to redeem the firstborn donkey, he breaks its neck from behind and buries it. The mitzva of redeeming the firstborn donkey takes precedence over the mitzva of breaking the neck, as it is stated: “If you will not redeem it, then you shall break its neck” (Exodus 13:13).
קלאוד על הדף:
The perek ends with a short anthology of precedence rules, and the first is its own subject. If the owner declines to redeem, he breaks the neck from behind and buries the carcass; but the mishna is emphatic that this is the second choice. Its proof is the verse’s own word order — אם לא תפדה וערפתו, if you do NOT redeem it, then you shall break its neck. Arifa is framed by Scripture as the consequence of a failure, and that grammatical subordination is read as establishing halachic priority. The same reading technique governs the three rules that follow.
Key Terms:
- מִצְוַת הַפְּדִיָּיה קוֹדֶמֶת = the mitzvah of redemption takes precedence
- עֲרִיפָה = breaking the neck from behind, the alternative to redemption
- אִם לֹא תִפְדֶּה וַעֲרַפְתּוֹ = if you do not redeem it, then you shall break its neck (Shemot 13:13)
Segment 5
TYPE: משנה
יעוד before redemption in the case of a Hebrew maidservant
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מִצְוַת יְעִידָה קוֹדֶמֶת לְמִצְוַת הַפְּדִיָּיה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״אֲשֶׁר לֹא יְעָדָהּ וְהֶפְדָּהּ״.
English Translation:
The mishna proceeds to enumerate other mitzvot in which one option takes precedence over another. The mitzva of designating a Hebrew maidservant to be betrothed to her master takes precedence over the mitzva of redeeming the maidservant from her master with money, as it is stated: “If she does not please her master, who has not betrothed her to himself, then he shall let her be redeemed” (Exodus 21:8).
קלאוד על הדף:
The second rule moves to an entirely different area of law. A father who sold his daughter as an אמה עבריה leaves her with two possible futures: the master may designate her in marriage (יעוד), or her family may redeem her by paying out the remainder of her term. The mishna rules that designation comes first, on the same grammatical basis — אשר לא יעדה והפדה, who has not designated her, then he shall let her be redeemed. Redemption appears in the verse as what follows when designation has not happened.
Key Terms:
- יְעִידָה / יִעוּד = designation of a Hebrew maidservant in marriage to her master or his son
- אָמָה עִבְרִיָּה = a Hebrew maidservant
- אֲשֶׁר לֹא יְעָדָהּ וְהֶפְדָּהּ = who has not designated her, then he shall let her be redeemed (Shemot 21:8)
Segment 6
TYPE: משנה
Yibbum before chalitza — and the Sages’ reversal in their own day
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מִצְוַת הַיִּיבּוּם קוֹדֶמֶת לְמִצְוַת חֲלִיצָה, בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה שֶׁהָיוּ מִתְכַּוְּונִין לְשֵׁם מִצְוָה, וְעַכְשָׁיו שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּוְּונִין לְשֵׁם מִצְוָה, אָמְרוּ: מִצְוַת חֲלִיצָה קוֹדֶמֶת לְמִצְוַת יִבּוּם.
English Translation:
The mitzva of levirate marriage takes precedence over the mitzva of ḥalitza, which dissolves the levirate bond, as it is stated: “And if the man does not wish to take his brother’s wife” (Deuteronomy 25:7). The mishna adds: This was the case initially, when people would intend that their performance of levirate marriage be for the sake of the mitzva. But now that they do not intend that their performance of levirate marriage be for the sake of the mitzva, but rather for reasons such as the beauty of the yevama or for financial gain, the Sages said that the mitzva of ḥalitza takes precedence over the mitzva of levirate marriage.
קלאוד על הדף:
The third rule is the mishna’s most remarkable, because it records the rule and then records its overturning. Scripture places yibbum first — ואם לא יחפץ האיש, and if the man does not wish, chalitza follows — so levirate marriage is the primary mitzvah. But the mishna continues with a candid historical observation: בראשונה, in earlier times, people performed yibbum לשם מצוה, for the sake of the mitzvah; ועכשיו, now that they do so out of attraction to the yevama or for financial advantage, the Sages ruled that chalitza takes precedence instead. A change in the intentions with which a mitzvah is performed changes which mitzvah should be performed.
Key Terms:
- יִבּוּם = levirate marriage, where a brother marries the childless widow of his deceased brother
- חֲלִיצָה = the ceremony dissolving the levirate bond
- לְשֵׁם מִצְוָה = for the sake of the mitzvah
- יְבָמָה = the widow subject to the levirate bond
Segment 7
TYPE: משנה
The owner’s precedence in redeeming a consecrated non-kosher animal
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מִצְוַת הַגְּאוּלָּה בָּאָדוֹן, הוּא קוֹדֵם לְכׇל אָדָם, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְאִם לֹא יִגָּאֵל וְנִמְכַּר בְּעֶרְכֶּךָ״.
English Translation:
With regard to a non-kosher animal that was consecrated to the Temple, the mitzva of redemption by the owner who consecrated it takes precedence over redemption by any other person, as it is stated: “And if it is of a non-kosher animal…and if it is not redeemed, it shall be sold according to your valuation” (Leviticus 27:27).
קלאוד על הדף:
The final rule of the perek concerns hekdesh. One who consecrated a non-kosher animal to the Temple may redeem it back, and the mishna establishes that he has first claim ahead of any other buyer — again from the verse’s sequence, ואם לא יגאל ונמכר בערכך, and if it is not redeemed, then it shall be sold at your valuation. The sale to others is what happens when the owner has not acted. With this the perek closes, having gathered four distinct areas of law under one formal principle of reading.
Key Terms:
- גְּאוּלָּה = redemption of consecrated property
- בָּאָדוֹן = by the owner, i.e. the one who consecrated it
- בְּעֶרְכֶּךָ = at your valuation (Vayikra 27:27)
Segment 8
TYPE: הדרן
Perek 1, HaLokeach Ubar Chamoro, concludes
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ הַלּוֹקֵחַ עוּבַּר חֲמוֹרוֹ.
English Translation:
HADRAN: We shall return to you, Perek HaLokeach Ubar Chamoro — the first chapter of Bechorot concludes here.
קלאוד על הדף:
The hadran marks the close of the first perek: הדרן עלך הלוקח עובר חמורו — we shall return to you, chapter One Who Buys the Fetus of His Donkey. The formula is recited on completing a unit of study and is not a farewell but a promise of return, expressing the traditional conviction that learning is never finished with a text. The perek it closes has run from daf 2 through here, covering the whole law of פטר חמור: who is obligated, what the redeeming seh must be, what it must be worth, and what happens when the redemption fails.
Key Terms:
- הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ = we shall return to you — the formula recited on completing a chapter
- הַלּוֹקֵחַ עוּבַּר חֲמוֹרוֹ = One Who Buys the Fetus of His Donkey — the name of perek 1
- פֶּרֶק = a chapter of the Mishna and its Gemara
Segment 9
TYPE: משנה
Perek 2 opens: five arrangements with a gentile that exempt from bechora
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְנִי׳ הַלּוֹקֵחַ עוּבַּר פָּרָתוֹ שֶׁל נׇכְרִי, וְהַמּוֹכֵר לוֹ, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ רַשַּׁאי, וְהַמִּשְׁתַּתֵּף לוֹ, וְהַמְקַבֵּל מִמֶּנּוּ, וְהַנּוֹתֵן לוֹ בְּקַבָּלָה — פָּטוּר מִן הַבְּכוֹרָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל״, אֲבָל לֹא בַּאֲחֵרִים.
English Translation:
MISHNA: With regard to one who purchases the fetus of a cow that belongs to a gentile; one who sells the fetus of his cow to a gentile, even though one is not permitted to sell a large animal to a gentile; one who enters into a partnership with a gentile with regard to a cow or its fetus; one who receives a cow from a gentile to tend to it in exchange for partnership in its offspring; and one who gives his cow to a gentile in receivership, so that the gentile owns a share of the cow’s offspring; in all of these cases, one is exempt from the obligation of redeeming the firstborn offspring, as it is stated: “I sanctified to Me all the firstborn in Israel, both man and animal” (Numbers 3:13), indicating that the mitzva is incumbent upon the Jewish people, but not upon others. If the firstborn belongs even partially to a gentile, the sanctity of firstborn does not apply to it.
קלאוד על הדף:
The new perek turns from the non-kosher firstborn to the kosher one, whose sanctity is קדושת הגוף and which in Temple times was offered on the altar. Its opening mishna sets a boundary condition: the sanctity attaches only to an animal wholly owned by a Jew. Five arrangements are listed — buying a gentile’s fetus, selling one’s own to a gentile, partnership, and receivership in each direction — and every one exempts. The derivation is a single word, בישראל, in Israel and אבל לא באחרים, not in others. The mishna’s aside that selling a large animal to a gentile is not permitted is characteristic: the sale is improper, and the exemption holds anyway.
Key Terms:
- עוּבָּר = a fetus
- הַמִּשְׁתַּתֵּף = one who enters into partnership
- בְּקַבָּלָה = in receivership — tending another’s animal for a share of the offspring
- אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ רַשַּׁאי = even though he is not permitted to do so
Segment 10
TYPE: משנה
Kohanim and levi’im are obligated in the firstborn of a kosher animal
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הַכֹּהֲנִים וְהַלְוִיִּם חַיָּיבִים, שֶׁלֹּא נִפְטְרוּ מִבְּכוֹר בְּהֵמָה טְהוֹרָה, אֶלָּא מִפִּדְיוֹן הַבֵּן וּמִפֶּטֶר חֲמוֹר.
English Translation:
The mishna continues: The priests and the Levites are obligated in the mitzva, i.e., their animals have firstborn sanctity, as they were not exempted from the mitzva of the male firstborn of a kosher animal; rather, they were exempted only from redemption of the firstborn son and from the redemption of the firstborn donkey.
קלאוד על הדף:
The mishna’s second clause corrects an assumption that might easily be formed. Kohanim and levi’im are exempt from two firstborn obligations — pidyon haben and peter chamor — and one might generalize from that to a blanket exemption. The mishna denies it: their kosher animals bear firstborn sanctity like anyone else’s. The logic is that those two exemptions concern payments made to a kohen, which a kohen would be making to himself, whereas the bechor of a kosher animal is a sanctified offering rather than a transfer, and sanctity does not care who owns the flock.
Key Terms:
- בְּכוֹר בְּהֵמָה טְהוֹרָה = the firstborn of a kosher animal, which carries inherent sanctity
- פִּדְיוֹן הַבֵּן = the redemption of a firstborn son
- לְוִיִּם = Levites
Segment 11
TYPE: גמרא
Why did the tanna teach the donkey before the cow?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גְּמָ׳ מַאי אִירְיָא דְּתָנֵי עוּבַּר חֲמוֹרוֹ בְּרֵישָׁא, וַהֲדַר תָּנֵי עוּבַּר פָּרָתוֹ? לִיתְנֵי בְּרֵישָׁא עוּבַּר פָּרָתוֹ, דִּקְדוּשַּׁת הַגּוּף הוּא, וַהֲדַר לִיתְנֵי עוּבַּר חֲמוֹרוֹ, דִּקְדוּשַּׁת דָּמִים הוּא.
English Translation:
GEMARA: The first chapter of this tractate began with the halakhot pertaining to a firstborn donkey. The Gemara asks: Why does the tanna specifically teach the halakhot of the fetus of his donkey first, and only then teach the halakhot of the fetus of his cow? Let him first teach the halakhot of the fetus of his cow, as it is a case of inherent sanctity, i.e., the animal cannot be redeemed and is sacrificed upon the altar, and let him then teach the halakhot of the fetus of his donkey, as it is a case of sanctity that inheres in its value.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara opens the perek with an editorial question about the tractate’s own arrangement. The firstborn of a kosher animal carries קדושת הגוף, inherent sanctity that cannot be redeemed away and that brings the animal to the altar; the firstborn donkey carries only קדושת דמים, sanctity attaching to value and discharged by a lamb. By any ordinary ranking the weightier subject should come first, and yet Bechorot opened with the donkey and only now reaches the cow.
Key Terms:
- קְדוּשַּׁת הַגּוּף = inherent sanctity of the body, which cannot be transferred away
- קְדוּשַּׁת דָּמִים = sanctity attaching to value, dischargeable by redemption
- מַאי אִירְיָא = why specifically — the Gemara’s question about an arrangement
Segment 12
TYPE: גמרא
Two answers from Eretz Yisrael: affection, and economy of treatment
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמְרִי בְּמַעְרְבָא: אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא, אַיְּידֵי דַּחֲבִיבָא לֵיהּ, כִּדְרַבִּי חֲנִינָא, וְאִי בָּעֵית אֵימָא, אַיְּידֵי דְּזוּטְרָן מִילֵּיהּ דִּבְהֵמָה טְמֵאָה, פָּסֵיק וְשָׁדֵי לַהּ.
English Translation:
They said in the West, Eretz Yisrael: If you wish, say that the halakhot of a firstborn donkey were taught first since they are dear to the tanna, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina (5b) that donkeys helped the Jews when they departed from Egypt, as the Jews loaded their gold and silver on donkeys. And if you wish, say that these halakhot were taught first since the matters pertaining to a non-kosher animal are relatively few, and therefore the tanna completes its treatment and sets it aside.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara reports two answers circulating in the West. The first is unexpectedly warm — איידי דחביבא ליה, because it is dear to him, invoking R’ Chanina’s teaching on 5b that donkeys served Israel at the Exodus by carrying out the gold and silver of Egypt. The tractate opens with the donkey out of gratitude rather than rank. The second is a matter of editorial method: איידי דזוטרן מיליה, since the non-kosher animal’s laws are few, the tanna disposes of them and sets them aside before beginning the larger subject.
Key Terms:
- אָמְרִי בְּמַעְרְבָא = they say in the West, i.e. in Eretz Yisrael
- אַיְּידֵי דַּחֲבִיבָא לֵיהּ = since it is dear to him
- פָּסֵיק וְשָׁדֵי לַהּ = he concludes it and sets it aside
- רַבִּי חֲנִינָא = the amora whose teaching about the donkeys of the Exodus is cited from 5b
Segment 13
TYPE: גמרא
The central ruling: R’ Oshaya on acquisition between a Jew and a gentile
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק בַּר נַחְמָנִי אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי אוֹשַׁעְיָא: יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁנָּתַן מָעוֹת לְגוֹי בִּבְהֶמְתּוֹ בְּדִינֵיהֶם, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא מָשַׁךְ — קָנָה, וְחַיֶּיבֶת בִּבְכוֹרָה. וְגוֹי שֶׁנָּתַן מָעוֹת לְיִשְׂרָאֵל בִּבְהֶמְתּוֹ בְּדִינֵיהֶם, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא מָשַׁךְ — קָנָה, וּפָטוּר מִן הַבְּכוֹרָה.
English Translation:
With regard to the mishna’s discussion of sales involving Jews and gentiles, Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Naḥmani says that Reish Lakish said in the name of Rabbi Oshaya: In the case of a Jew who gave money to a gentile to buy the gentile’s animal from him according to their laws, as explained further on, even though the Jew did not pull the animal in the manner of a formal acquisition, as required by halakha, he has legally acquired it, and the Jewish owner is obligated to give the animal’s firstborn offspring to a priest. And in the case of a gentile who gave money to a Jew to buy the Jew’s animal from him according to their laws, even though the gentile did not pull the animal he has acquired it, and the Jew is therefore exempt from giving the animal’s firstborn offspring to a priest.
קלאוד על הדף:
R’ Yitzchak bar Nachmani transmits, through Reish Lakish, a ruling of R’ Oshaya that governs the rest of the daf. Between two Jews a sale is completed by משיכה, the buyer drawing the item; money alone does not finish it. R’ Oshaya rules that where a gentile stands on either side of the transaction, money alone does acquire — a Jew who pays a gentile owns the animal at once and its firstborn is holy, and a gentile who pays a Jew owns it at once and its firstborn is not. The phrase בדיניהם, by their laws, is the crux, and the next twelve segments are devoted to establishing what it means.
Key Terms:
- מְשִׁיכָה = pulling — the act of drawing an item that completes an acquisition
- בְּדִינֵיהֶם = by their laws — the phrase the Gemara will analyse at length
- קָנָה = he has acquired it
- רַבִּי אוֹשַׁעְיָא = an amora of Eretz Yisrael of the first generation
Segment 14
TYPE: גמרא
The first half restated for analysis
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר מָר: יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁנָּתַן מָעוֹת לְגוֹי בְּדִינֵיהֶם, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא מָשַׁךְ — קָנָה וְחַיֶּיבֶת בִּבְכוֹרָה.
English Translation:
The Master said: In the case of a Jew who gave money to a gentile to buy the gentile’s animal from him according to their laws, even though he did not pull the animal he has legally acquired it, and the Jew is obligated to give the animal’s firstborn offspring to a priest.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara restates the opening clause of R’ Oshaya’s ruling in order to interrogate it — אמר מר, the Master said, is the standard formula for reopening a statement just cited. The claim under examination is that a Jew’s payment of money to a gentile completes the acquisition without meshicha, with the practical consequence that the animal’s firstborn now carries sanctity. Everything turns on where such a rule could come from.
Key Terms:
- אָמַר מָר = the Master said — the formula reopening a cited statement for analysis
- חַיֶּיבֶת בִּבְכוֹרָה = it is obligated in the firstborn, i.e. its offspring is sanctified
Segment 15
TYPE: הוה אמינא
A first proposal: derive it from the law of acquiring a gentile as a slave
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַאי ״בְּדִינֵיהֶם״? אִי נֵימָא בְּדִינֵיהֶם דְּגוּפֵיהּ, דְּאָתֵי בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר: אִם גּוּפֵיהּ קָנֵי לֵיהּ יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּכֶסֶף, דִּכְתִיב ״לָרֶשֶׁת אֲחוּזָּה״,
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: What is meant by: According to their laws? If we say that it is referring to the laws relating to the purchase of a gentile’s person as a slave, i.e., the halakhot of purchasing gentiles themselves rather than the methods by which gentiles can acquire property, this must be based on the assumption that the halakha with regard to the purchase of a gentile’s animal is derived by the following a fortiori inference: If a gentile’s person is acquired by a Jew as a Canaanite slave through payment of money, as it is written: “And you may make them an inheritance for your children after you, to hold for an ancestral possession” (Leviticus 25:46), the same halakha should apply to acquiring a gentile’s property.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara’s first suggestion is that בדיניהם refers to the law governing the acquisition of a gentile’s person. A Canaanite slave is acquired with money, and if a gentile’s person can be acquired that way, a kal vachomer would suggest his property can be too. The derivation for the slave itself runs through לרשת אחוזה (Vayikra 25:46), which compares such a slave to an ancestral holding — and that comparison is about to create trouble for the proposal.
Key Terms:
- עֶבֶד כְּנַעֲנִי = a Canaanite slave, acquired by money, document or possession
- קַל וָחוֹמֶר = an a fortiori inference from a lesser case to a greater
- לָרֶשֶׁת אֲחוּזָּה = to hold as an ancestral possession (Vayikra 25:46)
Segment 16
TYPE: גמרא
The comparison to land spelled out
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הִקִּישׁוֹ הַכָּתוּב לַאֲחוּזָּה, מָה אֲחוּזָּה נִקְנֵית בְּכֶסֶף וּבִשְׁטָר וּבַחֲזָקָה, אַף עֶבֶד כְּנַעֲנִי נִקְנֶה בְּכֶסֶף. מָמוֹנוֹ — לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן הוּא?
English Translation:
The Gemara elaborates: The verse thereby compares a gentile slave to an ancestral possession, i.e., land: Just as an ancestral possession is acquired by the transfer of money, or with a bill of sale, or through taking possession, so too, a Canaanite slave is acquired by the transfer of money. If this is the halakha with regard to a gentile’s person, is it not all the more so reasonable that a gentile’s property is acquired through the transfer of money?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara sets out the derivation in full so that its implications are visible. Land is acquired בכסף ובשטר ובחזקה — by money, by document, or by taking possession — and because Scripture likens the Canaanite slave to an ancestral holding, the slave is acquired the same ways, money among them. The proposed kal vachomer then runs: if his person can be bought with money, surely his mere property can. The argument looks clean, and the next segment shows it is not.
Key Terms:
- בְּכֶסֶף וּבִשְׁטָר וּבַחֲזָקָה = by money, by document and by taking possession — the three modes of acquiring land
- הִקִּישׁוֹ הַכָּתוּב = Scripture compared it
- לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן = how much more so
Segment 17
TYPE: קושיא
Two refutations: the comparison proves too much, and ישראל מישראל disproves it
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִם כֵּן, אֲפִילּוּ בִּשְׁטָר וּבַחֲזָקָה נָמֵי! וְעוֹד, יִשְׂרָאֵל מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל יוֹכִיחַו, דְּגוּפֵיהּ קָנֵי לֵיהּ בְּכֶסֶף, מָמוֹנוֹ בִּמְשִׁיכָה!
English Translation:
The Gemara rejects this conclusion: If so, then according to halakha it should be possible to acquire a gentile’s property even with a bill of sale or by taking possession, which is not so. The Gemara adds: And furthermore, the halakha pertaining to a Jew purchasing goods from a Jew proves that the entire premise of the a fortiori inference is false, as he acquires a Jew’s person with money alone, but he acquires his property only by pulling. It is therefore evident that the ability to acquire one’s person with money does not indicate that his property can be purchased in the same manner.
קלאוד על הדף:
The proposal fails twice over. First, it proves too much: if the slave’s modes of acquisition transfer to property, then a gentile’s property should be acquirable by document and by possession as well, which is not the law. Second, and more fundamentally, the kal vachomer’s premise is false — ישראל מישראל יוכיח, the case of a Jew and a Jew proves otherwise. A Hebrew servant’s person is acquired with money while his property requires meshicha, which demonstrates directly that the mode of acquiring a person implies nothing about the mode of acquiring his goods.
Key Terms:
- יִשְׂרָאֵל מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל יוֹכִיחַ = the case of a Jew from a Jew will prove it — a counterexample refuting an inference
- שְׁטָר וַחֲזָקָה = document and taking possession
- וְעוֹד = and furthermore — introducing a second, independent objection
Segment 18
TYPE: תירוץ
Abaye: בדיניהם means the modes Scripture prescribed, from או קנה מיד עמיתך
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: בְּדִינֵיהֶם שֶׁפָּסְקָה לָהֶם תּוֹרָה, ״אוֹ קָנֹה מִיַּד עֲמִיתֶךָ״ — מִיַּד עֲמִיתֶךָ הוּא דְּבִמְשִׁיכָה, הָא מִיַּד גּוֹי בְּכֶסֶף.
English Translation:
Rather, Abaye says that the term: Their laws, is referring to their laws that the Torah prescribed for their methods of purchase, by stating: “Or buy of your counterpart’s hand” (Leviticus 25:14), which teaches that it is only from the hand of your counterpart, i.e., a Jew, that property is acquired by the formal act of acquisition of pulling. This indicates that acquiring property from the hand of a gentile is accomplished through payment of money.
קלאוד על הדף:
Abaye supplies the answer that stands. בדיניהם does not refer to any system of gentile law but to the modes of acquisition the Torah itself assigned. The verse says או קנה מיד עמיתך, or buy from the hand of your fellow (Vayikra 25:14), and the specification עמיתך is read restrictively: it is from your fellow that acquisition is by meshicha — הא מיד גוי בכסף, but from a gentile, by money. The whole rule is generated by one limiting word.
Key Terms:
- אוֹ קָנֹה מִיַּד עֲמִיתֶךָ = or buy from the hand of your fellow (Vayikra 25:14)
- עֲמִיתֶךָ = your fellow — read as restricting a rule to fellow Jews
- אַבָּיֵי = a Babylonian amora of the fourth generation, head of the academy at Pumbedita
Segment 19
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
First alternative rejected: perhaps no acquisition from a gentile at all
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאֵימָא: מִיַּד גּוֹי — כְּלָל כְּלָל לָא! אָמְרִי: לָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ, קַל וָחוֹמֶר הוּא — אִם גּוּפוֹ קוֹנֶה, מָמוֹנוֹ לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?
English Translation:
The Gemara raises an objection: But one can say that it should be inferred from the verse that one cannot purchase anything at all from the hand of a gentile. The Sages said in response: That cannot enter your mind, as there is an a fortiori inference which indicates otherwise: If a Jew can purchase a gentile’s person as a slave, is it not all the more so reasonable that he can purchase a gentile’s property?
קלאוד על הדף:
A restrictive reading invites the most extreme alternative: perhaps עמיתך excludes the gentile entirely, so that no mode whatever acquires from him. The Gemara refuses this on grounds of basic coherence, using the slave comparison now as a floor rather than as a derivation — if a Jew can acquire a gentile’s very person, it cannot be that his goods are wholly unacquirable. The kal vachomer that failed as a source survives as a sanity check.
Key Terms:
- כְּלָל כְּלָל לָא = not at all, in any manner whatsoever
- לָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ = it cannot enter your mind — a proposal rejected as untenable
Segment 20
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Second and third alternatives rejected: both acts, or either act
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאֵימָא: מִיַּד גּוֹי — עַד דְּאִיכָּא תַּרְתֵּי! אָמְרִי: וְלָאו קַל וָחוֹמֶר הוּא? גּוּפוֹ בְּאַחַת, מָמוֹנוֹ בִּשְׁתַּיִם?! וְאֵימָא: אוֹ בְּהָא אוֹ בְּהָא, דּוּמְיָא דַּ״עֲמִיתֶךָ״.
English Translation:
The Gemara raises another objection: But one can say that the verse teaches that whereas a Jew’s property is acquired through pulling, property purchased from the hand of a gentile is not acquired until two formal acts of acquisition have been performed, both pulling and payment of money. The Sages said in response: Isn’t it indicated otherwise by an a fortiori inference: If his person is acquired through only one act of acquisition, could it be that his property must be acquired through two acts? The Gemara further suggests: But one can say that it is derived from the verse that one can acquire property from a gentile either through this method of pulling or through that method of money. The Gemara explains: The halakha derived from the phrase “of your counterpart” must be similar to an acquisition from your counterpart:
קלאוד על הדף:
Two further readings are tested and dismissed. Perhaps a gentile transaction requires both money and meshicha — refuted by kal vachomer, since it would be perverse for his person to require one act and his goods two. And perhaps either act suffices — refuted by the requirement that the derived rule be דומיא דעמיתך, formally parallel to the case it was derived from. Since acquisition from a fellow Jew is by one specified act, acquisition from a gentile must likewise be by one specified act.
Key Terms:
- עַד דְּאִיכָּא תַּרְתֵּי = until there are two, i.e. requiring both acts
- אוֹ בְּהָא אוֹ בְּהָא = either by this or by that
- דּוּמְיָא דְּ = similar to — a derived rule must parallel its source in form
Segment 21
TYPE: מסקנא
The conclusion: one act there, one act here
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מָה ״עֲמִיתֶךָ״ בַּחֲדָא, אַף גּוֹי נָמֵי בַּחֲדָא.
English Translation:
Just as from the hand of your counterpart it is with one act, with pulling, so too, from the hand of a gentile, it is also with one act, with money.
קלאוד על הדף:
The principle is stated in its final form. Just as acquisition from a fellow Jew is accomplished with a single act — meshicha — so acquisition from a gentile is accomplished with a single act, and that act is the payment of money. The structural parallel has done the work that the kal vachomer could not, and the first half of R’ Oshaya’s ruling is established.
Key Terms:
- בַּחֲדָא = with one, i.e. by a single act of acquisition
- כֶּסֶף = money, the acquiring act where a gentile is party
Segment 22
TYPE: גמרא
The second half restated: a gentile acquiring from a Jew
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר מָר: וְגוֹי שֶׁנָּתַן מָעוֹת לְיִשְׂרָאֵל בִּבְהֶמְתּוֹ בְּדִינֵיהֶן, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא מָשַׁךְ — קָנָה, וּפָטוּר מִן הַבְּכוֹרָה. מַאי בְּדִינֵיהֶן? אִילֵּימָא בְּדִינֵיהֶן דְּגוּפֵיהּ, מִשּׁוּם דְּאָתֵי בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר: אִם גּוּפוֹ יִשְׂרָאֵל קָנֵי לֵיהּ בְּכֶסֶף, דִּכְתִיב ״מִכֶּסֶף מִקְנָתוֹ״, מָמוֹנוֹ לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?
English Translation:
The Gemara discusses the statement of Rabbi Oshaya. The Master said: And a gentile who gave money to a Jew to buy the Jew’s animal from him according to their laws, even though the gentile did not pull the animal he has acquired it, and the Jew is therefore exempt from giving the animal’s firstborn offspring to a priest. The Gemara clarifies: What is the meaning of according to their laws? If we say that it means: According to their laws of the person of the Jew himself, i.e., the manner in which he purchases the person of a Jew with money, and it is reasonable to say so, as it may be derived through an a fortiori inference: If a gentile acquires the body of a Jew with money, as it is written in that regard: “From the money of his purchase” (Leviticus 25:51), then with regard to the property of a Jew, is it not all the more so reasonable that the gentile can acquire it with money?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara now turns to the mirror case and reopens it with the same אמר מר. A gentile who pays a Jew for his animal acquires it without meshicha, with the consequence that the Jew no longer owns it and its firstborn is exempt. The first proposal is again the slave-based kal vachomer, this time from the other direction: a gentile acquires a Hebrew servant’s person with money, per מכסף מקנתו, so surely his property too.
Key Terms:
- מִכֶּסֶף מִקְנָתוֹ = from the money of his purchase (Vayikra 25:51)
- פָּטוּר מִן הַבְּכוֹרָה = exempt from the firstborn obligation
Segment 23
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
The same refutation, and Abaye’s parallel derivation from וכי תמכרו
Hebrew/Aramaic:
יִשְׂרָאֵל מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל יוֹכִיחַו, דְּגוּפוֹ קָנֵי בְּכֶסֶף, מָמוֹנוֹ בִּמְשִׁיכָה! אֶלָּא אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: בְּדִינֵיהֶם שֶׁפָּסְקָה לָהֶם תּוֹרָה, ״וְכִי תִמְכְּרוּ מִמְכָּר לַעֲמִיתֶךָ״ — לַעֲמִיתֶךָ בִּמְשִׁיכָה, הָא לְגוֹי בְּכֶסֶף.
English Translation:
This can be rejected, as the acquisition of a Jew from a Jew will prove that the inference is not valid, as the person of a Hebrew slave one acquires with money, while the property of a Jew can be acquired only by pulling. Rather, Abaye said: That which it states, that a gentile purchases an animal with money according to their laws, means: With the acts of acquisition that the Torah prescribed to gentiles, the manner in which they acquire items from Jews, i.e., with money, as it is stated: “And if you sell a sale item to your counterpart” (Leviticus 25:14), from which it may be inferred: To your counterpart, i.e., a Jew, property is acquired by pulling, but property from the hand of a gentile is acquired with money.
קלאוד על הדף:
ישראל מישראל יוכיח refutes this version exactly as it refuted the first: a Hebrew servant’s person goes for money while his property goes by meshicha, so the inference is unsound in either direction. Abaye then supplies the matching source. The same verse has a selling clause as well as a buying clause — וכי תמכרו ממכר לעמיתך — and the restrictive עמיתך does the same work: to your fellow, by meshicha; הא לגוי בכסף, but to a gentile, by money. Two halves of one verse generate two halves of one rule.
Key Terms:
- וְכִי תִמְכְּרוּ מִמְכָּר לַעֲמִיתֶךָ = and if you sell a sale item to your fellow (Vayikra 25:14)
- לְגוֹי בְּכֶסֶף = to a gentile, by money
Segment 24
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
First alternative rejected again: perhaps a gentile acquires nothing from a Jew
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאֵימָא: לְגוֹי כְּלָל כְּלָל לָא! אָמְרִי: לָאו קַל וָחוֹמֶר הוּא? אִם גּוּפוֹ קָנָה, מָמוֹנוֹ לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?
English Translation:
The Gemara suggests: But say that the inference should be: To a gentile, not at all, i.e., neither with money nor with pulling can a gentile acquire an item from a Jew. The Sages said in response: But isn’t it an a fortiori inference to the contrary: If a gentile can purchase a Jew’s person as a slave, then is it not all the more so reasonable that he can purchase the Jew’s property?
קלאוד על הדף:
The three-objection sequence now runs a second time, in the same order and with the same answers, which is itself a deliberate feature of the sugya’s construction. The first alternative — that a gentile can acquire nothing at all from a Jew — falls to the same kal vachomer from the slave case: if he can acquire a Jew’s person, he can certainly acquire a Jew’s goods.
Key Terms:
- לְגוֹי כְּלָל כְּלָל לָא = to a gentile, not at all
- אִם גּוּפוֹ קָנָה = if he acquires his person
Segment 25
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Second alternative rejected: requiring two acts
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֵימָא: לְגוֹי עַד דְּאִיכָּא תַּרְתֵּי! לָאו קַל וָחוֹמֶר הוּא? גּוּפוֹ בְּאֶחָד, מָמוֹנוֹ בִּשְׁתַּיִם?!
English Translation:
The Gemara suggests: Say and infer as follows: To your counterpart you sell with pulling, but to a gentile you do not sell until two formal acts of acquisition have been performed: Pulling and money. The Sages said in response: But isn’t it an a fortiori inference to the contrary: If the person of a Jew is acquired with one act of acquisition, is it reasonable that his property is acquired with two acts?
קלאוד על הדף:
The suggestion that a gentile’s purchase from a Jew requires both meshicha and money is dismissed by the same asymmetry argument as before — a person acquired with one act, property requiring two, is an inversion no derivation would support. The parallelism between the two halves of the sugya is exact down to the wording of the objection.
Key Terms:
- גּוּפוֹ בְּאֶחָד, מָמוֹנוֹ בִּשְׁתַּיִם = his person with one act, his property with two?
- מָמוֹנוֹ = his property, as against his person
Segment 26
TYPE: קושיא
The third alternative raised, and the answer runs into 13b
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאֵימָא: אוֹ בְּהָא אוֹ בְּהָא, דּוּמְיָא דַּ״עֲמִיתֶךָ״;
English Translation:
The Gemara further suggests: But say that a gentile acquires property from a Jew either with this act of pulling or with that act of paying money. The Gemara explains: The acquisition of the gentile must be similar to the acquisition of your counterpart, from which it is derived:
קלאוד על הדף:
The last of the three alternatives is put: perhaps a gentile may acquire from a Jew by either method, meshicha or money. The Gemara begins its answer with the same formal requirement invoked earlier — the derived case must be דומיא דעמיתך, parallel in form to the source case — and the sentence breaks off at the turn of the amud, completing at the top of 13b.
Key Terms:
- דּוּמְיָא דַּעֲמִיתֶךָ = similar to the case of your fellow
- וְאֵימָא = and say — introducing an alternative reading for testing
Amud Bet (13b)
Segment 1
TYPE: מסקנא
The completion: one act there, one act here
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מָה ״עֲמִיתֶךָ״ בְּאַחַת, אַף גּוֹי נָמֵי בְּאַחַת.
English Translation:
Just as property is acquired from your counterpart through only one act of acquisition, i.e., pulling, so too, property is acquired from a gentile through only one act of acquisition, i.e., payment of money.
קלאוד על הדף:
The sentence finishes and the second half of R’ Oshaya’s ruling is secured on the same footing as the first. Acquisition from a fellow Jew takes one act, so acquisition involving a gentile takes one act, and in the gentile’s case that act is money. With both halves established, the Gemara turns to a dissenting view.
Key Terms:
- מָה עֲמִיתֶךָ בְּאַחַת = just as with your fellow it is by one act
- אַף גּוֹי נָמֵי בְּאַחַת = so too with a gentile it is by one act
Segment 2
TYPE: גמרא
Ameimar holds the opposite: משיכה בגוי קונה
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמְרִי: וּלְאָמֵימָר דְּאָמַר מְשִׁיכָה בְּגוֹי קוֹנָה, הָנִיחָא אִי סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן דְּאָמַר: דְּבַר תּוֹרָה מָעוֹת קוֹנוֹת, מְשִׁיכָה לֹא, אַהֲנִי ״לַעֲמִיתֶךָ״ — לַעֲמִיתֶךָ בְּכֶסֶף, לְגוֹי בִּמְשִׁיכָה.
English Translation:
The Sages said: And according to the opinion of Ameimar, who says that pulling effects acquisition in the case of a gentile, this works out well if he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says: By Torah law, money effects acquisition, but pulling does not. If Ameimar accepts Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion, then it can be derived from the phrase “of your counterpart” that transactions with your counterpart, i.e., a Jew, are effected through payment of money, whereas transactions with a gentile are effected by pulling.
קלאוד על הדף:
Ameimar rules that pulling does effect acquisition where a gentile is a party — the reverse of what the sugya has just derived. The Gemara tests whether his position can be held coherently, and finds that it depends on a prior dispute about meshicha’s own status. If Ameimar follows R’ Yochanan, who holds that by Torah law money acquires and meshicha does not, then עמיתך can be read to assign money to the fellow Jew and meshicha to the gentile — the mirror image of Abaye’s reading, and internally consistent.
Key Terms:
- אָמֵימָר = a Babylonian amora of the sixth generation
- דְּבַר תּוֹרָה מָעוֹת קוֹנוֹת = by Torah law money effects acquisition
- הָנִיחָא = this works out well — a position that holds on one premise but not another
Segment 3
TYPE: קושיא
But on Reish Lakish’s view, עמיתך would be redundant
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא אִי סָבַר לַהּ כְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, דְּאָמַר: מְשִׁיכָה מְפוֹרֶשֶׁת מִן הַתּוֹרָה, לַעֲמִיתֶךָ בִּמְשִׁיכָה, וּלְגוֹי בִּמְשִׁיכָה, ״לַעֲמִיתֶךָ״ לְמָה לִי?
English Translation:
But if Ameimar holds in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish, who says: The act of acquisition of pulling is explicit in the Torah, then the halakha is that transactions with your counterpart are effected by pulling, and transactions with a gentile are also effected by pulling. Accordingly, why do I need the phrase “of your counterpart”?
קלאוד על הדף:
The difficulty arises on the other premise. Reish Lakish holds משיכה מפורשת מן התורה, that pulling is explicit in the Torah; on that view both a fellow Jew and a gentile would acquire by meshicha, the two cases would be identical, and the restrictive word עמיתך would be teaching nothing at all. The Gemara does not tolerate an idle word in a verse, so a different function must be found for it.
Key Terms:
- מְשִׁיכָה מְפוֹרֶשֶׁת מִן הַתּוֹרָה = pulling is explicit in the Torah
- לְמָה לִי = why do I need it — the objection that a word would be purposeless
Segment 4
TYPE: תירוץ / קושיא
עמיתך teaches the law of ona’ah — but that seems already known
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמְרִי: לַעֲמִיתֶךָ אַתָּה מַחְזִיר אוֹנָאָה, וְאִי אַתָּה מַחֲזִיר אוֹנָאָה לְגוֹי. לְגוֹי — מֵ״אַל תּוֹנוּ אִישׁ אֶת אָחִיו״ נָפְקָא!
English Translation:
The Sages said in explanation: The phrase “of your counterpart” does not teach a halakha with regard to the method of acquisition. Rather, it is referring to the latter part of the verse: “And if you make a sale to your counterpart, or buy of your counterpart’s hand, a man shall not exploit his brother” (Leviticus 25:14). The verse is derived as follows: You must return the sum of exploitation to your counterpart, but you do not need to return the sum of exploitation to a gentile. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: The exemption from returning the sum of exploitation to a gentile is derived from the latter part of the verse alone: “A man shall not exploit his brother.” A gentile is not included in the category of “his brother.” Accordingly, the phrase “of your counterpart” remains extraneous.
קלאוד על הדף:
The answer relocates עמיתך to the second half of its own verse, which concludes אל תונו איש את אחיו. Read that way, the word teaches a rule about אונאה, overcharging: one returns the excess to a fellow Jew but not to a gentile. An immediate objection follows — that exclusion is already available from אחיו, his brother, which on its face does not include a gentile. So עמיתך still appears to be doing no work.
Key Terms:
- אוֹנָאָה = overcharging beyond the fair price, which must normally be returned
- אַל תּוֹנוּ אִישׁ אֶת אָחִיו = let no man wrong his brother (Vayikra 25:14)
- מַחְזִיר אוֹנָאָה = he returns the overcharge
Segment 5
TYPE: תירוץ
Two exclusions are needed: one for a gentile and one for hekdesh
Hebrew/Aramaic:
חַד בְּגוֹי, וְחַד בְּהֶקְדֵּשׁ, וּצְרִיכִי, דְּאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא חַד — הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: לְגוֹי הוּא דְּאֵין לוֹ אוֹנָאָה, אֲבָל הֶקְדֵּשׁ — יֵשׁ לוֹ אוֹנָאָה, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: One phrase is required to exclude a gentile, and one serves to exclude consecrated property. And both derivations are necessary, as, had the Merciful One written only one exclusionary phrase, I would say: It is with regard to transactions with a gentile that one is not subject to the prohibition of exploitation; but with regard to transactions involving consecrated property, one is subject to the prohibition of exploitation. Therefore, the other derivation teaches us that one is not subject to the prohibition of exploitation with regard to transactions involving consecrated property either.
קלאוד על הדף:
The resolution is that the verse contains two restrictive terms because two exclusions are required, and וצריכי — both are necessary. One excludes the gentile, the other excludes הקדש, consecrated property. Without the second, one might have reasoned that only a gentile falls outside the law of ona’ah while transactions involving the Temple treasury remain subject to it. Each term forecloses an inference the other would have permitted.
Key Terms:
- הֶקְדֵּשׁ = property consecrated to the Temple
- וּצְרִיכִי = and both are necessary — neither could be inferred from the other
- חַד בְּגוֹי וְחַד בְּהֶקְדֵּשׁ = one for a gentile and one for consecrated property
Segment 6
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
The derivation is needed only on one view of גזילו של גוי
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר גְּזֵילוֹ אָסוּר — הַיְינוּ דְּאִצְטְרִיךְ קְרָא לְמִישְׁרֵי אוֹנָאָה, אֶלָּא אִי סָבַר לַהּ כְּמַאן דְּאָמַר גְּזֵילוֹ שֶׁל גּוֹי מוּתָּר, אוֹנָאָה מִיבַּעְיָא? אָמְרִי: אִי סָבַר לַהּ כְּמַאן דְּאָמַר גְּזֵילוֹ מוּתָּר — עַל כּוּרְחָיךְ כְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן סְבִירָא לֵיהּ.
English Translation:
The Gemara remarks: This works out well according to the one who says that his robbery, i.e., robbing a gentile, is prohibited, as this is the reason that a verse is necessary to permit keeping the sum of the exploitation obtained from a gentile. But if Ameimar holds in accordance with the opinion of the one who says that his robbery is permitted, is it necessary to state that one may keep the sum of the exploitation obtained from a gentile? The Gemara accepts this reasoning: The Sages said: If Ameimar holds in accordance with the opinion of the one who says that his robbery is permitted, perforce he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan that money effects acquisition by Torah law, and therefore the difficulty does not arise.
קלאוד על הדף:
A sharper difficulty follows. A verse permitting one to retain an overcharge from a gentile is intelligible only if robbing a gentile were otherwise forbidden; for one who holds גזילו של גוי מותר, the lesser case of ona’ah would need no verse at all. The Gemara accepts the force of this and draws the consequence: anyone holding that position must, על כורחיך, be following R’ Yochanan, on whose premises עמיתך is occupied with acquisition and never needed to teach ona’ah in the first place.
Key Terms:
- גְּזֵילוֹ שֶׁל גּוֹי = robbery of a gentile — itself the subject of a dispute
- עַל כּוּרְחָיךְ = perforce, of necessity
- מִיבַּעְיָא = is it necessary to state — the objection that a ruling is superfluous
Segment 7
TYPE: ברייתא
An objection from the baraita of גרוטאות
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מֵיתִיבִי: הַלּוֹקֵחַ גְּרוּטָאוֹת מִן הַגּוֹיִם, וּמָצָא בָּהֶן עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה — אִם עַד שֶׁלֹּא נָתַן מָעוֹת מָשַׁךְ — יַחֲזִיר, וְאִם מִשֶּׁנָּתַן מָעוֹת מָשַׁךְ — יוֹלִיךְ הֲנָאָה לְיָם הַמֶּלַח.
English Translation:
The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion that property is acquired from a gentile by monetary payment. It is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who buys broken vessels [gerutaot] made of gold or silver from the gentiles and finds among them an object of idol worship, if he pulled the object of idol worship, thereby performing an act of acquisition, before he gave the money to the gentile, he may return the object of idol worship to the gentile. But if he pulled it after he gave the money to the gentile, he may not return it. Since the idol’s status was not revoked, he must take it and cast it into the Dead Sea.
קלאוד על הדף:
A baraita is raised against the principle that money acquires from a gentile. One who buys scrap gold and silver vessels from gentiles and finds among them an item of avodah zarah is governed by two rulings that turn on sequence: if he pulled before paying, he may return it; if he pulled after paying, he may not, and must instead take the value and cast it into the Dead Sea. The ruling makes the act of pulling decisive, which is exactly what R’ Oshaya’s principle denies.
Key Terms:
- גְּרוּטָאוֹת = broken or scrap vessels of gold and silver
- עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה = an idolatrous object, from which benefit is forbidden
- יוֹלִיךְ הֲנָאָה לְיָם הַמֶּלַח = he shall carry the benefit to the Dead Sea, i.e. destroy its value
Segment 8
TYPE: גמרא
A first reconstruction: the gentile accepted Jewish law, and pulling remains decisive
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ מָעוֹת קוֹנוֹת, מְשִׁיכָה לְמָה לִּי? הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן — שֶׁקִּיבֵּל עָלָיו לָדוּן בְּדִינֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל. אִי הָכִי, מָעוֹת לְמָה לִי? הָכִי קָאָמַר: אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנָּתַן מָעוֹת, אִי מָשֵׁיךְ — אִין, וְאִי לָא — לָא.
English Translation:
The Gemara explains the difficulty: And if you say that payment of money acquires items from gentiles, why do I need pulling in order to effect the Jew’s acquisition of the idol? The Gemara answers: Here we are dealing with a case where the gentile accepted upon himself to have this transaction adjudicated by Jewish law. The Gemara raises an objection: If so, why do I need the payment of money in order to effect the Jew’s acquisition of the idol? Pulling alone should be enough, in accordance with halakha. The Gemara explains that this is what the baraita means: Even though the Jew gave money to the gentile, the halakha still depends on the act of pulling: If he pulled the broken vessels, yes, he has acquired them, and if not, he has not acquired them.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara’s opening move is to remove the case from the scope of R’ Oshaya’s rule altogether by positing that the gentile agreed to have the transaction judged by Jewish law, under which meshicha governs. That raises the reverse question — why then does the baraita mention payment at all? The answer is that the baraita is making a point about insufficiency: even though he paid, the outcome still depends on whether he pulled.
Key Terms:
- קִיבֵּל עָלָיו לָדוּן בְּדִינֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל = he accepted upon himself to be judged by Jewish law
- אִי מָשֵׁיךְ אִין וְאִי לָא לָא = if he pulled, yes; and if not, no
Segment 9
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
The reisha is then difficult; Abaye invokes מקח טעות and Rava objects
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִי הָכִי, קַשְׁיָא רֵישָׁא! אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: רֵישָׁא מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא מִקָּח טָעוּת. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: רֵישָׁא מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא מִקָּח טָעוּת, סֵיפָא לֵיכָּא מִקָּח טָעוּת?
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: If so, then the first clause of the baraita is difficult, as it states: If he pulled the object of idol worship before he gave the money to the gentile, he may return the object of idol worship to the gentile. Evidently, pulling alone does not effect acquisition. Abaye said in explanation: The halakha in the first clause is ruled as it is because there is a mistaken transaction, as the Jew did not wish to purchase the idol. Rava said to Abaye: You maintain that the halakha of the first clause is ruled as it is because there is a mistaken transaction. Is that to say that in the latter clause there is no mistaken transaction? After all, the Jew does not wish to purchase the idol in either case.
קלאוד על הדף:
The reconstruction founders on the first clause, which allows return even after the buyer pulled — if meshicha acquires, the item should be his. Abaye answers that the first clause is a מקח טעות, a mistaken transaction, since the buyer never intended to purchase such an item and a sale made in error does not bind. Rava objects immediately and decisively: the second clause involves exactly the same mistake, and yet there return is refused. The category cannot by itself distinguish the two.
Key Terms:
- מִקָּח טָעוּת = a mistaken transaction, void because the buyer did not consent to what he received
- רֵישָׁא / סֵיפָא = the first clause / the latter clause of a source
Segment 10
TYPE: תירוץ
Rava’s answer: the difference lies in how the possession appears
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: רֵישָׁא וְסֵיפָא מִקָּח טָעוּת, רֵישָׁא דְּלָא יָהֵיב זוּזֵי — לָא מִיחְזֵי כַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה בְּיַד יִשְׂרָאֵל, סֵיפָא דְּיָהֵיב זוּזֵי — מִיחְזֵי כַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה בְּיַד יִשְׂרָאֵל.
English Translation:
Rather, Rava said: The purchase in the first clause and the purchase in the latter clause are both a mistaken transaction, but in the case presented in the first clause, where the Jew did not pay him the dinars, it does not appear as though there is an object of idol worship in the possession of a Jew, and so he may return it. By contrast, in the latter clause, where the Jew did pay him the dinars, it appears as though there is an object of idol worship in the possession of a Jew, and therefore he must cast away the object rather than return it.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava concedes that both clauses are mistaken transactions and locates the distinction elsewhere — in appearances rather than in the law of sale. Where no money has changed hands, the item’s presence with the Jew does not look like possession, and he may simply hand it back. Where he has paid, it does look as though a Jew possesses such an item, and that appearance cannot be cured by returning it to the seller; the value must be destroyed instead. The ruling turns on the impression created rather than on who legally owns what.
Key Terms:
- מִיחְזֵי = it appears, it looks as though
- דְּיָהֵיב זוּזֵי = where he gave the money
- בְּיַד יִשְׂרָאֵל = in the possession of a Jew
Segment 11
TYPE: תירוץ
Abaye’s counter-answer: after paying, he should have inspected
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאַבַּיֵּי אָמַר לָךְ: רֵישָׁא מִקָּח טָעוּת, דְּלָא יָדַע, דְּהָא לָא יְהַיב לֵיהּ זוּזֵי. סֵיפָא לָאו מִקָּח טָעוּת הוּא, דְּכֵיוָן דִּיהַיב זוּזֵי, כִּי קָא מָשֵׁיךְ — אִיבְּעִי לְעַיּוֹנֵי וַהֲדַר מִימְשָׁךְ.
English Translation:
And Abaye could have said to you: The first clause involves a mistaken transaction, as he did not know that the idol was included, as he did not give him the dinars and therefore had not yet inspected the property being purchased. Conversely, the latter clause is not a case of a mistaken transaction, as since he already gave the dinars to the seller, when he came to pull it, he should have inspected the property and then pulled it. Since the Jew did not bother to inspect the property even after paying, the transaction is valid.
קלאוד על הדף:
Abaye defends his own reading by distinguishing the two clauses on the buyer’s diligence. In the first he genuinely did not know what he was acquiring, since without having paid he had no occasion to examine the goods — a true mistake. In the second he had already paid, and a buyer who pays should inspect before drawing the goods to himself. Having failed to look, he cannot afterwards plead error: the transaction stands, and the item is his to dispose of.
Key Terms:
- דְּלָא יָדַע = that he did not know
- אִיבְּעִי לְעַיּוֹנֵי וַהֲדַר מִימְשָׁךְ = he should have inspected and then pulled
Segment 12
TYPE: גמרא
Rav Ashi: meshicha acquires in neither clause; the seifa says ‘pulled’ only by parallel
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: מִדְּרֵישָׁא מְשִׁיכָה אֵינָהּ קוֹנָה, סֵיפָא נָמֵי מְשִׁיכָה אֵינָהּ קוֹנָה, וְאַיְּידֵי דִּתְנָא רֵישָׁא ״מָשַׁךְ״, תְּנָא סֵיפָא נָמֵי ״מָשַׁךְ״.
English Translation:
The Gemara cites two more interpretations of the baraita. Rav Ashi says: The baraita is in fact discussing a case where the transaction was subject to gentile law, according to which only monetary payment effects acquisition, and as for the aforementioned difficulty raised to the opinion of Rabbi Oshaya from the latter clause: If so, why do I need pulling in order to effect the Jew’s acquisition of the idol; pulling is not in fact required. Rather, from the fact that in the first clause, pulling does not effect acquisition, in the latter clause too, pulling does not effect acquisition. But since the first clause taught the word: Pulled, in order to teach that this method is ineffective, the latter clause also taught the word: Pulled, despite the fact that its mention is unnecessary.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Ashi resolves the baraita in the direction of R’ Oshaya’s principle. The case is governed by the rule that money alone acquires, and meshicha is legally inert throughout. The reisha mentions pulling in order to teach that it does not help; the seifa then repeats the word איידי, merely because the first clause used it, and nothing should be inferred from its presence there. The word is carried along by style rather than by substance.
Key Terms:
- אַיְּידֵי = since, in passing — a term repeated for parallelism rather than for legal effect
- מְשִׁיכָה אֵינָהּ קוֹנָה = pulling does not effect acquisition
- רַב אָשֵׁי = head of the academy at Sura and a principal redactor of the Talmud
Segment 13
TYPE: גמרא
Ravina: meshicha acquires in both, and יחזור means a verbal retraction
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רָבִינָא אָמַר: מִדְּסֵיפָא מְשִׁיכָה קוֹנָה, רֵישָׁא נָמֵי מְשִׁיכָה קוֹנָה, וְרֵישָׁא הָכִי קָאָמַר: אִם לֹא נָתַן וְלֹא מָשַׁךְ — יַחְזוֹר. מַאי יַחְזוֹר? יַחְזוֹר בִּדְבָרִים.
English Translation:
Ravina said: The baraita is discussing a case where it was agreed that the transaction would be subject to Jewish law. From the fact that in the latter clause, pulling effects acquisition, in the first clause too, pulling effects acquisition. And as for the difficulty with regard to the first clause, which states that the Jew may return the item even though he already pulled it, this is what the baraita is saying: If the buyer did not give the money to the gentile and also did not pull the item, he returns the item to the seller. The Gemara adds: What does the term: Returns, mean in this context? It means that the Jew returns, i.e., reneges, on his verbal commitment. In other words, he is not required to complete the purchase despite the fact he initially agreed to do so.
קלאוד על הדף:
Ravina reads the baraita in the opposite direction, taking it as a case governed by Jewish law throughout, where meshicha acquires in both clauses. To make the reisha work he rereads it: the buyer neither paid nor pulled, and יחזור does not mean he returns an object at all but that he retracts — יחזור בדברים, he goes back on his word. Nothing had yet been acquired, so nothing can be returned; what is at stake is only a spoken undertaking.
Key Terms:
- רָבִינָא = a Babylonian amora, among the redactors of the Talmud
- יַחְזוֹר בִּדְבָרִים = he retracts in words, i.e. goes back on a verbal commitment
- מִדְּסֵיפָא = from the fact that the latter clause is so
Segment 14
TYPE: מסקנא
מחוסרי אמנה — and why the principle does not reach this case
Hebrew/Aramaic:
קָסָבַר: דְּבָרִים יֵשׁ בָּהֶם מִשּׁוּם מְחוּסְּרֵי אֲמָנָה, וְהָנֵי מִילֵּי — יִשְׂרָאֵל מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל, דְּקָיְימִי בְּדִבּוּרַיְיהוּ, אֲבָל יִשְׂרָאֵל מִגּוֹיִם, דְּאִינְהוּ לָא קָיְימִי בְּדִבּוּרַיְיהוּ — לָא.
English Translation:
The Gemara elaborates: It was necessary for the tanna to teach this explicitly, as he holds: Reneging on a verbal commitment that was unaccompanied by an act of acquisition constitutes an act of bad faith between two parties. And he holds that this statement applies only to a case where a Jew purchases an item from another Jew, as they are assumed to uphold their verbal commitments. But in a case of a Jew who purchases an item from gentiles, as they are not assumed to uphold their verbal commitments, reneging on one’s word does not constitute an act of bad faith between the parties, since neither party relies upon the commitment of the other in the first place.
קלאוד על הדף:
The daf closes with the reason Ravina’s rereading needed stating at all. Reneging on a verbal commitment is ordinarily a failure of good faith — דברים יש בהם משום מחוסרי אמנה — and one might have thought no permission to retract could be recorded. Ravina answers that the principle presupposes a mutual expectation: it applies ישראל מישראל, where both parties are presumed to stand by their word and each therefore relies on the other. Where that presumption does not hold on both sides, neither party was relying, and walking away breaks nothing. The rule protects trust that actually existed rather than imposing it where it did not.
Key Terms:
- מְחוּסְּרֵי אֲמָנָה = lacking in faithfulness — the failing of one who reneges on a verbal commitment
- דְּקָיְימִי בְּדִבּוּרַיְיהוּ = who stand by their word
- דְּבָרִים = words, i.e. a verbal undertaking unaccompanied by an act of acquisition