Chullin Daf 83 (חולין דף פ״ג)
Daf: 83 | Amudim: 83a – 83b | Date: Loading...
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (83a)
Segment 1
TYPE: ברייתא (המשך)
The notar baraita concludes: the positive mitzva to burn the leftovers removes lashes — proving Rabbi Yehuda validates uncertain forewarning
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בָּא הַכָּתוּב לִיתֵּן עֲשֵׂה אַחַר לֹא תַּעֲשֶׂה, לוֹמַר שֶׁאֵין לוֹקִין עָלָיו, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה.
English Translation:
The verse comes to provide a positive mitzva to burn the leftovers, in the second part of the verse that states: “But that which remains of it until morning you shall burn with fire.” This positive mitzva is stated after the prohibition against leaving it over was stated in the first part of the verse, to say that one is not flogged for transgressing the prohibition. This is because any prohibition that can be rectified by the performance of a positive mitzva does not carry a punishment of lashes. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. If not for this reason, Rabbi Yehuda evidently would hold that he receives lashes. The forewarning given in this case is uncertain, as he must be forewarned before morning, and at that time he might still consume it.
קלאוד על הדף:
This completes the baraita begun at the end of 82b. The verse about the Paschal offering pairs the prohibition of leaving meat over with a positive command to burn what remains, and Rabbi Yehuda explains that the Torah placed the aseh after the lav to teach that no lashes are administered — a prohibition rectified by a positive mitzva (lav hanitak la’aseh) carries no malkot. The inference is the whole point: only the burning-mitzva blocks lashes, meaning that otherwise Rabbi Yehuda would flog for notar — even though any forewarning for notar is inherently uncertain (the person might still eat the meat before morning). This is the ‘other tanna’ who holds Rabbi Yehuda validates hatra’at safek, vindicating the Gemara’s deflection of the proof for Sumchos.
Key Terms:
- לָאו הַנִּיתָּק לַעֲשֵׂה = a prohibition ‘detached’ by a positive command — the Torah supplies a mitzva that rectifies the violation, and no lashes are administered
- נוֹתָר = sacrificial meat left beyond its permitted eating time, which must be burned
Segment 2
TYPE: ברייתא (דעה חולקת)
Rabbi Yaakov: the exemption is not for that reason, but because notar involves no action
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב אוֹמֵר: לֹא מִן הַשֵּׁם הוּא זֶה, אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵה לֵיהּ לָאו שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה, וְכׇל לָאו שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה – אֵין לוֹקִין עָלָיו.
English Translation:
Rabbi Ya’akov says: This is not for that reason [hashem]. Rather, it is because it is a prohibition that does not involve an action. The transgression is simply the failure to consume all the meat during the allotted time rather than the performance of an action. And one is not flogged for the violation of any prohibition that does not involve an action.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yaakov accepts the bottom line — no lashes for notar — but rejects the reasoning: ‘lo min hashem hu zeh,’ the ruling does not flow from that principle. Rather, notar is a lav she’ein bo ma’aseh: the transgression is pure omission, failing to finish the meat in time, and halacha never administers lashes for a prohibition violated without a physical act. On Rabbi Yaakov’s reading the baraita yields no evidence about uncertain forewarning at all — but for the sugya’s purposes, the first opinion (Rabbi Yehuda’s own stated reason) stands as a tannaitic witness that he validates hatra’at safek.
Key Terms:
- לֹא מִן הַשֵּׁם הוּא זֶה = ‘this is not for that reason’ — the ruling is correct but the stated rationale is wrong
- לָאו שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה = a prohibition violated without an action — by omission — for which lashes are never administered
Segment 3
TYPE: תא שמע
A final proof attempt: two sciatic nerves from two different animals — eighty lashes; Rabbi Yehuda says forty
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תָּא שְׁמַע: אָכַל שְׁנֵי גִידִין מִשְּׁתֵּי יְרֵכוֹת מִשְּׁתֵּי בְהֵמוֹת – סוֹפֵג שְׁמוֹנִים; רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אֵינוֹ סוֹפֵג אֶלָּא אַרְבָּעִים. הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה וּבִשְׁתֵּי הַתְרָאוֹת – מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה דְּאָמַר: אַרְבָּעִים וְתוּ לָא? אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא בְּבַת אַחַת וּבַחֲדָא הַתְרָאָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution with regard to the opinion of Sumakhos from a baraita discussing the sciatic nerve: If one ate two sciatic nerves from two thighs of two different animals, he incurs the penalty of eighty lashes; Rabbi Yehuda says: He incurs only forty lashes. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances in this case? If we say that he ate them one after the other and with two separate forewarnings, what is the reasoning of the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: The violator receives forty lashes and nothing more? After all, he violates two separate prohibitions with two separate forewarnings. Rather, it is obvious that he ate them at the same time and with a single forewarning.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara makes one last attempt to source Sumchos’s global principle, from a baraita: one who ate two sciatic nerves from two thighs of two different animals incurs eighty lashes; Rabbi Yehuda says forty. The initial analysis eliminates the sequential reading: if he ate them one after the other with two forewarnings, why would Rabbi Yehuda stop at forty? Here both nerves are definitely forbidden — with two animals there is no right-thigh/left-thigh uncertainty for him — so each forewarning is certain. Rather, it seems obvious that he ate both at once under a single forewarning, and the first tanna still doubles the lashes.
Key Terms:
- שְׁנֵי גִידִין מִשְּׁתֵּי בְהֵמוֹת = two sciatic nerves from two different animals — each certainly forbidden, removing Rabbi Yehuda’s usual uncertainty
Segment 4
TYPE: קושיא
Whose is the first opinion? Not the Rabbis, by the familiar a fortiori — so apparently Sumchos
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַאן תַּנָּא קַמָּא? אִילֵימָא רַבָּנַן דִּפְלִיגִי עֲלֵיהּ דְּסוֹמְכוֹס – וּמָה הָתָם, דְּגוּפִין מוּחְלָקִין, פָּטְרִי רַבָּנַן, הָכָא לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן? אֶלָּא לָאו סוֹמְכוֹס הִיא!
English Translation:
Who is the first tanna, who holds that in such a case one receives eighty lashes? If we say that it is the Rabbis who disagree with Sumakhos in the mishna about: Itself and its offspring, that would contradict their opinion: Now, if there, in that mishna in a case where there are various animals that are separate entities, the Rabbis deem him exempt from a second set of lashes, here, in the baraita about two sciatic nerves, which are not separate entities, should they not all the more so deem him exempt from a second set of lashes? Rather, is it not Sumakhos who is the first tanna? Consequently, in his opinion one who eats the same prohibited item, such as an olive-bulk of forbidden fat, twice after a single forewarning receives two sets of lashes.
קלאוד על הדף:
The same identification argument as on 82b returns: the first tanna cannot be the Rabbis. In the oto v’et bno mishna, where the animals are separate entities, the Rabbis nevertheless exempt from a second set of lashes; here, where the two nerves are consumed in a single act under one forewarning and are not separate entities in the relevant sense, all the more so should they exempt. The conclusion presses itself: the first tanna must be Sumchos, and his principle that repeated violation under one forewarning multiplies the lashes would finally have a tannaitic source.
Key Terms:
- מַאן תַּנָּא קַמָּא = ‘who is the first tanna?’ — the recurring move of identifying the anonymous opinion to test whose principle it embodies
Segment 5
TYPE: דחייה ומסקנא
Deflected: the case is sequential, and Rabbi Yehuda’s forty is because one nerve lacked an olive-bulk
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לְעוֹלָם בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה, וּדְקָאָמְרַתְּ: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה? כְּגוֹן דְּלֵית בֵּיהּ כְּזַיִת, דְּתַנְיָא: אֲכָלוֹ וְאֵין בּוֹ כְּזַיִת – חַיָּיב, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: עַד שֶׁיְּהֵא בּוֹ כְּזַיִת.
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: Actually, he ate the two sciatic nerves one after the other with separate forewarnings, incurring two sets of lashes even according to the Rabbis who disagree with Sumakhos in the mishna about: Itself and its offspring. And as for that which you say: What is the reason of Rabbi Yehuda who holds that the transgressor incurs only a single set of lashes? This is a case where the volume of one of the sciatic nerves is not even an olive-bulk, and Rabbi Yehuda follows his line of reasoning, as it is taught in a baraita: If one ate the entire sciatic nerve, and its volume is not even an olive-bulk, he is liable to incur forty lashes; Rabbi Yehuda says: He is not liable unless it has a volume of at least an olive-bulk.
קלאוד על הדף:
The proof collapses one final time. The case is actually sequential eating with two forewarnings — eighty lashes even according to the Rabbis, since the nerves are separate entities and separately forewarned. And Rabbi Yehuda’s forty follows his own known position: one of the nerves lacked an olive-bulk, and as the baraita records, the first tanna holds one is liable for eating an entire sciatic nerve of any size (it is a beriya, a complete entity), while Rabbi Yehuda requires an olive-bulk. So Rabbi Yehuda flogs only for the full-sized nerve. With this, every attempted proof for attributing the global doubling principle to Sumchos has been deflected, and Rav Yosef’s answer to Abaye rests on his own authority alone.
Key Terms:
- בְּרִיָּה = a complete entity — eating a whole forbidden creature or unit entails liability even below the olive-bulk threshold
- כְּזַיִת = an olive-bulk, the standard minimum volume for eating prohibitions
Segment 6
TYPE: משנה
On four occasions a year, one who sells an animal must inform the buyer that he sold its mother or offspring that day
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְנִי׳ בְּאַרְבָּעָה פְּרָקִים בַּשָּׁנָה, הַמּוֹכֵר בְּהֵמָה לַחֲבֵירוֹ צָרִיךְ לְהוֹדִיעוֹ: ״אִמָּהּ מָכַרְתִּי לִשְׁחוֹט״, ״בִּתָּהּ מָכַרְתִּי לִשְׁחוֹט״. וְאֵלּוּ הֵן: עֶרֶב יוֹם טוֹב הָאַחֲרוֹן שֶׁל חַג, וְעֶרֶב יוֹם טוֹב הָרִאשׁוֹן שֶׁל פֶּסַח, וְעֶרֶב עֲצֶרֶת, וְעֶרֶב רֹאשׁ הַשָּׁנָה. וּכְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי, אַף עֶרֶב יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים בַּגָּלִיל.
English Translation:
MISHNA: On four occasions during the year one who sells an animal to another is required to inform him: I sold the mother of this animal today for the buyer to slaughter it,or: I sold the daughter of this animal today for the buyer to slaughter it. And those four occasions are: The eve of the last day of the festival of Sukkot, the eve of the first day of the festival of Passover, and the eve of Shavuot, and the eve of Rosh HaShana. And according to the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, the eve of Yom Kippur in the Galilee is included as well.
קלאוד על הדף:
A new mishna legislates for the marketplace. On four festival eves, when everyone slaughters for the holiday meal, a seller must tell the buyer: ‘I sold the mother today for slaughter’ or ‘I sold the daughter today for slaughter’ — otherwise both buyers may unwittingly slaughter mother and offspring on the same day. The four occasions: the eve of the last day of Sukkot (Shemini Atzeret), the eve of the first day of Pesach, the eve of Shavuot, and the eve of Rosh Hashana; Rabbi Yosei HaGelili adds the eve of Yom Kippur in the Galilee, where the custom was to feast lavishly before the fast. The disclosure duty is calibrated to reality: on these days it is a near-certainty that a purchased animal is going straight to the knife.
Key Terms:
- אַרְבָּעָה פְּרָקִים = the four occasions of the year — festival eves when meat purchases universally mean same-day slaughter
- עֶרֶב עֲצֶרֶת = the eve of Shavuot — Atzeret is the Sages’ standard name for Shavuot
Segment 7
TYPE: משנה (המשך)
Rabbi Yehuda limits the duty to same-day sales — but concedes in the case of a groom and a bride
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: אֵימָתַי – בִּזְמַן שֶׁאֵין לוֹ רֶיוַח, אֲבָל יֵשׁ לוֹ רֶיוַח – אֵין צָרִיךְ לְהוֹדִיעוֹ. וּמוֹדֶה רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בְּמוֹכֵר אֶת הָאֵם לֶחָתָן וְאֶת הַבַּת לַכַּלָּה – שֶׁצָּרִיךְ לְהוֹדִיעוֹ, בְּיָדוּעַ שֶׁשְּׁנֵיהֶם שׁוֹחֲטִין בְּיוֹם אֶחָד.
English Translation:
Rabbi Yehuda said: When must he inform the buyer on those days? He must do so at a time when the seller has no interval between the sale of the mother and the offspring, as they were both sold on that day. But if the seller has an interval between the sales, he does not need to inform the buyer, as presumably each buyer purchased the animal to slaughter it on the day he purchased it. And Rabbi Yehuda concedes that in a case where one sells the mother animal to the groom and the offspring to the bride, that even if he did not sell them on the same day, he must inform the buyer, as it is obvious that they are both planning to slaughter their animal on one day, for their wedding feast.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yehuda qualifies: the seller must inform only ‘when there is no interval’ — when he sold both animals on the same day, so that both buyers face the same slaughtering day. If the sales were spaced, each buyer presumably slaughtered on his own purchase day, and no warning is needed. But Rabbi Yehuda concedes that one who sells the mother to a groom and the daughter to a bride must inform even across an interval: the two animals are obviously destined for a single wedding feast, and both households will slaughter on the same day.
Key Terms:
- רֶיוַח = an interval — a gap between the two sales that makes same-day slaughter unlikely
- חָתָן וְכַלָּה = groom and bride — the paradigm case where separate purchases converge on one day of slaughter
Segment 8
TYPE: משנה (סיום)
On those four occasions the butcher is compelled to slaughter, and a paid dinar’s worth binds the buyer even without an act of acquisition
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בְּאַרְבָּעָה פְּרָקִים אֵלּוּ מַשְׁחִיטִין אֶת הַטַּבָּח בְּעַל כׇּרְחוֹ, אֲפִילּוּ שׁוֹר שָׁוֶה אֶלֶף דִּינָרִים וְאֵין לוֹ לְלוֹקֵחַ אֶלָּא דִּינָר – כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ לִשְׁחוֹט. לְפִיכָךְ, אִם מֵת – מֵת לַלּוֹקֵחַ. אֲבָל בִּשְׁאָר יְמוֹת הַשָּׁנָה אֵינוֹ כֵּן, לְפִיכָךְ אִם מֵת – מֵת לַמּוֹכֵר.
English Translation:
On those four occasions, one compels the butcher to slaughter animals even against his will; even if there is a bull worth one thousand dinars and the buyer has only one dinar worth of meat, i.e., he already paid the butcher for one dinar’s worth of meat, one compels him to slaughter the animal and give him a dinar’s worth of meat. Therefore, if the bull dies before slaughter, although no act of acquisition was performed, it dies at the expense of the buyer, and he loses his dinar. But during the rest of the days of the year it is not so. On other days, until the buyer performs the act of pulling to assume ownership of the portion of the bull that he is purchasing, the bull remains in the butcher’s possession. Therefore, if the bull dies before the transaction is complete, it dies at the expense of the seller, who returns the buyer’s money.
קלאוד על הדף:
The mishna adds a monetary rule for the same four days: the butcher is compelled to slaughter even against his will. Even if the ox is worth a thousand dinars and the buyer has paid for only one dinar’s worth of meat, we force the slaughter — and therefore, if the ox dies first, it dies at the buyer’s expense and he loses his dinar, even though he never performed an act of acquisition. During the rest of the year the opposite holds: until the buyer pulls the animal (meshicha), it remains the seller’s, and if it dies, the seller bears the loss and refunds the money. The Gemara will probe what mechanism makes the buyer an owner on the four occasions.
Key Terms:
- מַשְׁחִיטִין אֶת הַטַּבָּח בְּעַל כׇּרְחוֹ = the butcher is compelled to slaughter against his will — an extraordinary consumer protection for festival needs
- מְשִׁיכָה = pulling — the standard rabbinic act of acquisition for movable property
Segment 9
TYPE: גמרא
If the seller failed to inform, the buyer may slaughter without hesitation
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גְּמָ׳ תָּנָא, אִם לֹא הוֹדִיעוֹ – הוֹלֵךְ וְשׁוֹחֵט וְאֵינוֹ נִמְנָע.
English Translation:
GEMARA: The mishna teaches that on the four occasions mentioned it is the seller’s responsibility to inform the purchaser that the mother or offspring of the animal he is purchasing was sold that day. With regard to this it is taught: Consequently, the purchaser has no obligation to clarify the situation, and if the seller did not inform him, the purchaser may go and slaughter the animal he has purchased and need not refrain from doing so.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara’s first note places the burden squarely on the seller: it is taught that if the seller did not inform him, the buyer simply goes and slaughters and need not refrain. The buyer has no duty to investigate whether the animal’s mother or offspring was sold that day; the disclosure obligation of the mishna is the seller’s alone, and silence entitles the buyer to assume there is no problem.
Key Terms:
- הוֹלֵךְ וְשׁוֹחֵט וְאֵינוֹ נִמְנָע = ‘he goes and slaughters and need not refrain’ — the buyer may rely on the seller’s silence
Segment 10
TYPE: גמרא (דיוק)
Why specify mother to the groom and daughter to the bride? A lesson in proper conduct taught in passing
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אֵימָתַי. לְמָה לִי לְמִיתְנֵי אֶת הָאֵם לֶחָתָן וְאֶת הַבַּת לַכַּלָּה? מִלְּתָא אַגַּב אוֹרְחֵיהּ קָמַשְׁמַע לַן, דְּאוֹרַח אַרְעָא לְמִטְרַח בֵּי חַתְנָא טְפֵי מִבֵּי כַלְּתָא.
English Translation:
The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yehuda says: When must he inform the buyer on those days? It then teaches: And Rabbi Yehuda concedes that in a case where one sold the mother animal to the groom and the offspring to the bride, even if he did not sell them on the same day, he must inform the buyer. The Gemara asks: Why do I need to teach that the butcher sold specifically the mother animal to the groom and the offspring to the bride? It could have taught: He sold one to the groom and the other to the bride. The Gemara answers: It teaches us a related matter in passing, that it is proper conduct for the groom’s household to exert more effort than the bride’s household in the marriage preparations. Therefore, the groom purchases the mother, the larger animal, while the bride purchases the smaller animal, the offspring.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara notices a needless detail in Rabbi Yehuda’s concession: why say the mother went to the groom and the daughter to the bride, rather than simply ‘one to each’? The answer: the mishna teaches derech eretz in passing — it is proper conduct for the groom’s household to exert itself more in the wedding preparations than the bride’s household. Hence the groom buys the mother, the larger and costlier animal, and the bride the smaller offspring. A halachic technicality carries an etiquette lesson about who shoulders the wedding’s burdens.
Key Terms:
- אוֹרַח אַרְעָא = proper conduct (derech eretz) — here, that the groom’s side takes on the greater share of wedding preparations
Segment 11
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
How is the buyer liable when he never pulled the animal? Rav: the case is where he pulled — but then the year-round clause fails
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בְּאַרְבָּעָה פְּרָקִים אֵלּוּ, וְהָא לֹא מָשַׁךְ! אָמַר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב: כְּשֶׁמָּשַׁךְ. אִי הָכִי, אֵימָא סֵיפָא: אֲבָל בִּשְׁאָר יְמוֹת הַשָּׁנָה אֵינוֹ כֵּן, לְפִיכָךְ אִם מֵת – מֵת לַמּוֹכֵר, וְהָא מָשַׁךְ!
English Translation:
§ The mishna teaches: On those four occasions, one compels the butcher to slaughter animals even against his will, and even if there is a bull worth one thousand dinars and the buyer has paid for only one dinar’s worth of meat, one compels him to slaughter the animal. Therefore, if the bull dies before slaughter, it dies at the expense of the buyer. The Gemara challenges: But the buyer did not yet pull the animal to effect acquisition; consequently, although he paid the seller, the animal is not his. Rav Huna said that Rav said: The case is where he pulled it, and thereby acquired it. The Gemara asks: If so, say the latter clause: But during the rest of the days of the year it is not so. Therefore, if the bull dies, it dies at the expense of the seller, who returns the buyer’s money. But according to Rav, didn’t the buyer pull the animal? If so, why is its death at the expense of the seller?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara challenges the mishna’s monetary rule: the buyer paid but never pulled the animal, and money alone does not acquire movables — so why does the ox die at his expense? Rav Huna quotes Rav: the mishna speaks of a case where he did pull it. But this answer immediately collides with the latter clause: during the rest of the year the ox dies at the seller’s expense — yet on Rav’s reading the buyer pulled it, so it should be his loss all year round! Rav’s harmonization saves the first clause at the cost of the second.
Key Terms:
- וְהָא לֹא מָשַׁךְ = ‘but he did not pull!’ — payment without meshicha does not acquire movable property by rabbinic law
Segment 12
TYPE: תירוץ
Rabbi Shmuel bar Rav Yitzchak: acquisition via a third party — a benefit on the four occasions, a liability the rest of the year
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַבִּי שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר רַב יִצְחָק: לְעוֹלָם שֶׁלֹּא מָשַׁךְ, וּכְגוֹן שֶׁזִּיכָּה לוֹ עַל יְדֵי אַחֵר, בְּאַרְבָּעָה פְּרָקִים אֵלּוּ דִּזְכוּת הוּא לוֹ – זָכִין לְאָדָם שֶׁלֹּא בְּפָנָיו, בִּשְׁאָר יְמוֹת הַשָּׁנָה דְּחוֹב הוּא לוֹ – אֵין חָבִין לָאָדָם שֶׁלֹּא בְּפָנָיו.
English Translation:
Rabbi Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak said: Actually, the case in the mishna is one where the buyer did not pull the animal, and it is a case where the seller transfers ownership to the customer by means of another person, i.e., by instructing another to acquire a dinar’s worth of the ox’s meat on the customer’s behalf, without having obtained the customer’s consent. Therefore, on those four occasions, where it is for the customer’s benefit, as he wants meat for the Festival, the principle: One can act in a person’s interest in his absence, applies. By contrast, during the rest of the days of the year, where it is to the customer’s disadvantage to acquire the meat before the bull is slaughtered, as he does not want to incur avoidable expenses, one cannot act to the disadvantage of another person in his absence. Therefore, if the bull dies, it is at the expense of the seller.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Shmuel bar Rav Yitzchak reads the whole mishna without meshicha: the seller transferred ownership to the buyer through a third party, instructing another person to acquire the dinar’s worth of meat on the buyer’s behalf. On the four occasions this is a pure benefit — the buyer needs meat for the festival — so the principle ‘one may acquire for a person in his absence’ (zachin l’adam shelo befanav) applies, and the buyer owns his portion, bearing the loss. The rest of the year, acquiring meat before slaughter is a liability — avoidable expense and risk — and ‘one may not obligate a person in his absence,’ so no acquisition occurred and the seller bears the loss.
Key Terms:
- זָכִין לְאָדָם שֶׁלֹּא בְּפָנָיו = one may acquire on a person’s behalf in his absence — valid only where the acquisition is a clear benefit
- אֵין חָבִין לָאָדָם שֶׁלֹּא בְּפָנָיו = one may not impose an obligation on a person in his absence
Segment 13
TYPE: תירוץ נוסף
Rabbi Yochanan: on the four occasions the Sages restored Torah law — money acquires
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: בְּאַרְבָּעָה פְּרָקִים אֵלּוּ הֶעֱמִידוּ חֲכָמִים דִּבְרֵיהֶם עַל דִּין תּוֹרָה.
English Translation:
Rabbi Elazar says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says that there is a different explanation: On those four occasions the Sages based their statement on the Torah law that giving money effects acquisition, and therefore, the payment of the buyer acquires the meat for him with no need for pulling.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Elazar transmits Rabbi Yochanan’s elegant alternative: on these four occasions the Sages ‘stood their words on Torah law.’ By Torah law payment itself acquires movable property; the requirement of meshicha is only a rabbinic enactment. For the festival eves the Sages let the Torah rule stand — the buyer’s dinar acquires his portion outright, which is why the ox dies at his expense and why the butcher can be compelled to slaughter what is now partly the buyer’s animal.
Key Terms:
- הֶעֱמִידוּ חֲכָמִים דִּבְרֵיהֶם עַל דִּין תּוֹרָה = the Sages based their ruling on Torah law — suspending their own enactment and letting the deoraita rule operate
Segment 14
TYPE: מימרא
The underlying principle: by Torah law money acquires; meshicha is a decree lest the seller say ‘your wheat burned in the loft’
Hebrew/Aramaic:
דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: דְּבַר תּוֹרָה – מָעוֹת קוֹנוֹת, וּמָה טַעַם אָמְרוּ מְשִׁיכָה קוֹנָה – גְּזֵירָה שֶׁמָּא יֹאמַר לוֹ ״נִשְׂרְפוּ חִטֶּיךָ בַּעֲלִיָּה״.
English Translation:
As Rabbi Yoḥanan says: By Torah law, giving money effects the acquisition of movable property with no need for pulling. And what is the reason that the Sages said that pulling effects acquisition? It is a rabbinic decree lest the seller, once he receives the money, be unconcerned about the welfare of the movable property that he has sold, and, for example, not protect it from fire, so that he will say to the buyer: Your wheat was burned in the upper story of my house and I have no responsibility for it. For the benefit of rejoicing on the Festival, the Sages ordained that Torah law remains in effect on those four occasions and the buyer’s money effects acquisition, and one compels the butcher to slaughter animals even against his will.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara cites Rabbi Yochanan’s famous principle in full: by Torah law, maot konot — money effects acquisition of movables. Why did the Sages institute meshicha? A protective decree: once paid, a seller might stop guarding goods still sitting in his premises, and if fire broke out he would tell the buyer ‘your wheat burned in the upper story’ — your loss, not mine. Requiring the buyer to physically take the goods keeps responsibility aligned with possession. On the four festival eves, the Sages waived their decree for the sake of festival joy, letting the buyer’s coin acquire his meat immediately.
Key Terms:
- דְּבַר תּוֹרָה מָעוֹת קוֹנוֹת = by Torah law, payment acquires movable property
- נִשְׂרְפוּ חִטֶּיךָ בַּעֲלִיָּה = ‘your wheat burned in the upper story’ — the feared shrug of a paid seller no longer guarding the goods
Segment 15
TYPE: משנה
‘One day’ means the day follows the night — Ben Zoma’s verbal analogy from Creation
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְנִי׳ ״יוֹם אֶחָד״ הָאָמוּר בְּאוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ – הַיּוֹם הוֹלֵךְ אַחַר הַלַּיְלָה. אֶת זוֹ דָּרַשׁ רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן זוֹמָא: נֶאֱמַר בְּמַעֲשֵׂה בְרֵאשִׁית ״יוֹם אֶחָד״, וְנֶאֱמַר בְּאוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ ״יוֹם אֶחָד״ – מָה ״יוֹם אֶחָד״ הָאָמוּר בְּמַעֲשֵׂה בְרֵאשִׁית הַיּוֹם הוֹלֵךְ אַחַר הַלַּיְלָה, אַף ״יוֹם אֶחָד״ הָאָמוּר בְּאוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ הַיּוֹם הוֹלֵךְ אַחַר הַלַּיְלָה.
English Translation:
MISHNA: With regard to the phrase “one day” that is stated with regard to the prohibition against slaughtering an animal itself and its offspring, the day follows the night. Therefore, one may slaughter an animal during the day and slaughter its offspring that night, but one may not slaughter an animal at night and slaughter its offspring the following day. Rabbi Shimon ben Zoma derived this by means of a verbal analogy. It is stated in the act of Creation: “One day” (Genesis 1:5), and it is stated with regard to the slaughter of an animal itself and its offspring: “One day” (Leviticus 22:28). Just as concerning the phrase “one day” that is stated in the act of Creation, the day follows the night, so too concerning the phrase “one day” that is stated with regard to the slaughter of an animal itself and its offspring, the day follows the night.
קלאוד על הדף:
The perek’s final mishna defines the ‘one day’ of oto v’et bno: the day follows the night, i.e., the halachic day runs from nightfall to nightfall. One may therefore slaughter an animal by day and its offspring that evening — a new day has begun — but not slaughter one at night and its offspring the following afternoon, which is the same day. Rabbi Shimon ben Zoma grounds this in a gezeira shava: ‘one day’ appears in the Creation account (Bereishit 1:5, ‘and there was evening and there was morning, one day’) and in our verse (Vayikra 22:28); just as in Creation the day follows the night, so here.
Key Terms:
- הַיּוֹם הוֹלֵךְ אַחַר הַלַּיְלָה = the day follows the night — the calendar day begins at nightfall, as in Creation
- בֶּן זוֹמָא = Rabbi Shimon ben Zoma, the tanna who supplies the verbal analogy
Segment 16
TYPE: ברייתא
Why the analogy is needed: the passage speaks of sacrificial animals, whose ‘day’ runs day-then-night
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גְּמָ׳ תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: אֶת זוֹ דָּרַשׁ רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן זוֹמָא, לְפִי שֶׁכׇּל הָעִנְיָן כּוּלּוֹ אֵינוֹ מְדַבֵּר אֶלָּא בְּקָדָשִׁים, וּבְקָדָשִׁים לַיְלָה הוֹלֵךְ אַחַר הַיּוֹם, יָכוֹל אַף זֶה כֵּן? נֶאֱמַר כָּאן ״יוֹם אֶחָד״, וְנֶאֱמַר בְּמַעֲשֵׂה בְרֵאשִׁית ״יוֹם אֶחָד״, מָה ״יוֹם אֶחָד״ הָאָמוּר בְּמַעֲשֵׂה בְרֵאשִׁית – הַיּוֹם הוֹלֵךְ אַחַר הַלַּיְלָה, אַף יוֹם הָאָמוּר בְּאוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ – הַיּוֹם הוֹלֵךְ אַחַר הַלַּיְלָה.
English Translation:
GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Zoma taught this explanation: Because the entire section of the Torah where the prohibition: Itself and its offspring, appears speaks only about sacrificial animals, and with regard to sacrificial animals the night follows the day, one might have thought that even with regard to this prohibition it is so. Therefore, the following derivation is required: It is stated here, with regard to the slaughter of an animal and its offspring: “One day,” and it is stated in the act of Creation: “One day.” Just as concerning the phrase “one day” that is stated in the act of Creation, the day follows the night, so too concerning the phrase “one day” that is stated with regard to the slaughter of an animal itself and its offspring, the day follows the night.
קלאוד על הדף:
The baraita explains what makes Ben Zoma’s derivation necessary rather than obvious. The entire Torah passage of oto v’et bno appears amid the laws of sacrificial animals, and for kodashim the night follows the day — the eating time of an offering runs through the night after its day of slaughter. One might therefore have thought the ‘one day’ of oto v’et bno also runs day-then-night. The gezeira shava from Creation forecloses this: for oto v’et bno, as for the ordinary calendar, the day follows the night. The prohibition thus tracks civil days, not the sacrificial clock — even though its source-context is sacrificial law.
Key Terms:
- בְּקָדָשִׁים לַיְלָה הוֹלֵךְ אַחַר הַיּוֹם = for sacrificial foods the night follows the day — an offering’s eating time extends into the night after its slaughter day
Amud Bet (83b)
Segment 1
TYPE: ברייתא (המשך)
Rebbi: ‘one day’ means the special day, which requires a proclamation — the source of the four occasions
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: ״יוֹם אֶחָד״ – יוֹם הַמְיוּחָד טָעוּן כָּרוֹז, מִכָּאן אָמְרוּ: בְּאַרְבָּעָה פְּרָקִים בַּשָּׁנָה הַמּוֹכֵר בְּהֵמָה לַחֲבֵירוֹ צָרִיךְ לְהוֹדִיעוֹ.
English Translation:
§ Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The verse: “You shall not slaughter it and its offspring both in one day” (Leviticus 22:28), is referring to a special day, and it indicates that a special day requires a proclamation to prevent buyers from slaughtering an animal together with its offspring on that day. From here is derived that which is stated in the mishna: On four occasions during the year, which are special days, one who sells an animal to another must inform him: I sold its mother for slaughter, or: I sold its offspring for slaughter.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi mines the same phrase for a different teaching: ‘one day’ alludes to the special day, a day that ‘requires a proclamation’ (karoz). On the four festival eves the seller must proclaim — inform the buyer — that the animal’s mother or offspring was sold that day for slaughter. This midrashic reading supplies the scriptural anchor for the earlier mishna’s four occasions: the disclosure duty is not mere market regulation but an extension of the verse itself, protecting buyers from stumbling into oto v’et bno on precisely the days when everyone slaughters.
Key Terms:
- יוֹם הַמְיוּחָד = ‘the special day’ — Rebbi’s reading of ‘one day’ as the singular festival-eve day
- כָּרוֹז = a proclamation — the required public notice, realized as the seller’s duty to inform
Segment 2
TYPE: הדרן
The fifth perek, Oto V’et Beno, concludes
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ.
English Translation:
We will return to you, Perek Oto V’et Beno.
קלאוד על הדף:
With Rebbi’s derasha the fifth perek of Chullin closes, and the traditional formula is recited: hadran alach — ‘we shall return to you, Oto V’et Beno.’ The perek began (78a) with the scope of the prohibition and ends having defined its unit of time, its penalties, and its marketplace safeguards. The masechet now turns from the laws governing which animals may be slaughtered together to a mitzva that follows the act of slaughter itself: kisui hadam, the covering of the blood.
Key Terms:
- הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ = ‘we shall return to you’ — the traditional formula marking the completion of a perek, expressing the hope to review it
Segment 3
TYPE: משנה
The new perek opens: the mitzva of covering the blood — where, when, and for which animals it applies
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְנִי׳ כִּסּוּי הַדָּם נוֹהֵג בָּאָרֶץ וּבְחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ, בִּפְנֵי הַבַּיִת וְשֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי הַבַּיִת, בְּחוּלִּין אֲבָל לֹא בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁין, וְנוֹהֵג בַּחַיָּה וּבָעוֹף, בִּמְזוּמָּן וּבְשֶׁאֵינוֹ מְזוּמָּן, וְנוֹהֵג בְּכוֹי מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא סָפֵק.
English Translation:
MISHNA: The mitzva of covering the blood after slaughter is in effect both in Eretz Yisrael and outside of Eretz Yisrael, both in the presence, i.e., the time, of the Temple and not in the presence of the Temple. And it is in effect with regard to non-sacred animals, but it is not in effect with regard to sacrificial ones. And it is in effect with regard to the slaughter of an undomesticated animal and a bird, with regard to animals and birds that are readily available in his home, and with regard to those that are not readily available and are hunted in the wild. And it is in effect with regard to a koy, because it is uncertain whether a koy is a domesticated animal and one is exempt from the covering of its blood or whether it is an undomesticated animal and one is obligated to cover it.
קלאוד על הדף:
The sixth perek opens with a comprehensive mishna mapping the mitzva of kisui hadam (Vayikra 17:13): after slaughtering an undomesticated animal or a bird, one must cover its blood with earth. The mitzva applies in the Land of Israel and outside it, during the Temple era and after it, to non-sacred animals (chullin) but not to sacrificial ones (mukdashin). It covers both the chaya (undomesticated animal) and the bird, whether readily available at home (mezuman) or hunted in the wild, and it applies to the koy — because the koy’s status is uncertain, possibly a domesticated animal (exempt) and possibly undomesticated (obligated), so its blood is covered out of doubt.
Key Terms:
- כִּסּוּי הַדָּם = covering the blood — the mitzva to cover the blood of a slaughtered undomesticated animal or bird with earth (Vayikra 17:13)
- כּוֹי = a creature of uncertain classification — possibly domesticated, possibly undomesticated — treated stringently in both directions
- מְזוּמָּן = readily available — an animal kept at home, as opposed to one hunted in the wild
Segment 4
TYPE: משנה (המשך)
A koy is not slaughtered on a Festival; if slaughtered, its blood is not covered until afterward
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאֵין שׁוֹחֲטִין אוֹתוֹ בְּיוֹם טוֹב, וְאִם שְׁחָטוֹ – אֵין מְכַסִּין אֶת דָּמוֹ.
English Translation:
And one may not slaughter a koy on a Festival, because covering its blood entails the performance of prohibited labor that is permitted only if there is a definite obligation to cover the blood. And if one slaughtered a koy on a Festival after the fact, one does not cover its blood until after the Festival.
קלאוד על הדף:
Because the koy’s obligation is only doubtful, one may not slaughter it on a Festival ab initio: covering blood involves labor (digging or handling earth) that is permitted on Yom Tov only for a definite obligation, and one may not create a situation of doubtful mitzva that would entail possibly needless labor. And if one did slaughter a koy on the Festival, its blood is not covered that day — the covering waits until after the Festival.
Key Terms:
- יוֹם טוֹב = a Festival day, on which labor is permitted only for definite needs — a doubtful mitzva does not override it
Segment 5
TYPE: גמרא
Why are sacrificial animals excluded? The first suggestion: Rabbi Zeira’s rule that earth is required below as well as above
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גְּמָ׳ מוּקְדָּשִׁין מַאי טַעְמָא לָא? אִילֵּימָא מִשּׁוּם דְּרַבִּי זֵירָא, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: הַשּׁוֹחֵט צָרִיךְ שֶׁיִּתֵּן עָפָר לְמַטָּה וְעָפָר לְמַעְלָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְשָׁפַךְ אֶת דָּמוֹ וְכִסָּהוּ בֶּעָפָר״ – ״עָפָר״ לֹא נֶאֱמַר, אֶלָּא ״בְּעָפָר״, מְלַמֵּד שֶׁהַשּׁוֹחֵט צָרִיךְ שֶׁיִּתֵּן עָפָר לְמַטָּה וְעָפָר לְמַעְלָה.
English Translation:
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the reason one is not obligated to cover the blood of sacrificial birds? If we say it is because of the statement of Rabbi Zeira, that is difficult. As Rabbi Zeira says: One who slaughters a bird or an undomesticated animal must place earth beneath the blood and earth above it, as it is stated: “And he shall pour out its blood and cover it with earth” (Leviticus 17:13). It is not stated: Cover it with earth, but rather, “in earth,” indicating that the blood must be concealed inside the earth. The verse teaches that one who slaughters a bird or undomesticated animal must place earth beneath the blood and earth above the blood.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara probes the mishna’s exclusion of mukdashin. The first suggestion invokes Rabbi Zeira’s teaching: one who slaughters must place earth beneath the blood and earth above it, for the verse says ‘and cover it be’afar’ — ‘in earth,’ not ‘with earth’ — teaching that the blood must be enveloped in earth on both sides. Perhaps sacrificial birds are excluded because their blood is destined for the altar, where an under-layer of earth is impossible.
Key Terms:
- עָפָר לְמַטָּה וְעָפָר לְמַעְלָה = earth below and earth above — the blood must rest within earth, not merely under it
- בֶּעָפָר = ‘in earth’ — the preposition that generates the two-layer requirement
Segment 6
TYPE: המשך
Earth on the altar is impossible: nullified earth adds to the structure, against the divinely given blueprint
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהָכָא לָא אֶפְשָׁר, הֵיכִי לֶיעְבֵּיד? לִיתֵּיב וְלִיבַטְּלֵיהּ – קָמוֹסֵיף אַבִּנְיָן, וּכְתִיב: ״הַכֹּל בִּכְתָב מִיַּד ה׳ עָלַי הִשְׂכִּיל״.
English Translation:
The Gemara continues: And here, with regard to a bird offering, whose blood is presented on the altar, it is not possible for one to cover the blood with earth from beneath it. As how should one perform the covering of the blood? If one suggests that he should place earth on the altar and nullify that earth to the altar such that it will never be removed from there, this is unfeasible, since by nullifying the earth to the altar, he is adding to the structure of the altar. And it is written with regard to the construction of the Temple: “All was in writing, from the hand of the Lord, which He gave me to understand” (I Chronicles 28:19), indicating that the dimensions of the Temple and all the vessels within were given prophetically and are therefore not subject to change.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara explains why an under-layer cannot be arranged on the altar. If one places earth there and nullifies it to the altar — making it a permanent part — he has added to the altar’s structure, and Scripture insists the Temple’s design is fixed: ‘All was in writing, from the hand of Hashem upon me He made me understand’ (Divrei HaYamim I 28:19) — the dimensions were given prophetically and may not be altered.
Key Terms:
- קָמוֹסֵיף אַבִּנְיָן = he adds to the structure — permanently annexed material illegitimately enlarges the altar
- הַכֹּל בִּכְתָב = ‘all was in writing’ — the Temple’s design is divinely fixed and unalterable
Segment 7
TYPE: המשך
And un-nullified earth is an interposition between the blood and the altar
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לָא לִיבַטְּלֵיהּ – קָא הָוֵי חֲצִיצָה.
English Translation:
And if one suggests that he should not nullify the earth to the altar, this too is problematic, as the earth constitutes an interposition between the blood of the bird and the altar.
קלאוד על הדף:
The alternative fares no better: if the earth is not nullified to the altar, it remains a foreign substance, and it constitutes a chatzitza — an interposition — between the bird’s blood and the altar surface, invalidating the presentation of the blood. Either way, an under-layer of earth on the altar is impossible; the service and the two-layer covering cannot coexist.
Key Terms:
- חֲצִיצָה = an interposition — a foreign layer that separates and invalidates, here between the blood and the altar
Segment 8
TYPE: קושיא
Granted the layer below is impossible — but a covering above is possible; let him do that much
Hebrew/Aramaic:
נְהִי דִּלְמַטָּה לָא אֶפְשָׁר, לְמַעְלָה אֶפְשָׁר, לֶיעְבֵּיד כִּסּוּי!
English Translation:
The Gemara explains why this statement of Rabbi Zeira does not sufficiently explain why one is not required to cover the blood of sacrificial birds. Granted that it is impossible to place earth beneath the blood of the bird, but it is possible to place earth above the blood of the bird. If so, let him perform a covering of the blood from above.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara now turns this explanation against itself: granted that earth beneath the blood is impossible on the altar, earth above it is perfectly feasible. If Rabbi Zeira’s two-layer rule were the only obstacle, let the slaughterer at least perform the upper covering. The exclusion of mukdashin must rest on something more.
Key Terms:
- נְהִי דִּלְמַטָּה לָא אֶפְשָׁר = ‘granted that below is impossible’ — conceding half the difficulty while pressing the feasible half
Segment 9
TYPE: ברייתא
Proof that covering applies without an under-layer: one who slaughtered a domesticated animal and then an undomesticated one must cover
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מִי לָא תַּנְיָא, רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן בֶּן יוֹסֵף אוֹמֵר: שָׁחַט חַיָּה וְאַחַר כָּךְ שָׁחַט בְּהֵמָה – פָּטוּר מִלְּכַסּוֹת, בְּהֵמָה וְאַחַר כָּךְ חַיָּה – חַיָּיב לְכַסּוֹת.
English Translation:
The Gemara explains this suggestion: Isn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosef says: If one slaughtered an undomesticated animal, whose blood requires covering, and thereafter slaughtered a domesticated animal, whose blood does not require covering, in the same location as the undomesticated animal, he is exempt from the obligation to cover the blood of the undomesticated animal, as it is covered with the blood of the domesticated animal. But if one slaughtered a domesticated animal and thereafter slaughtered an undomesticated animal he is obligated to cover the latter’s blood despite the fact that there is no earth, but rather blood of the domesticated animal, beneath it. It is evident from this baraita that the mitzva of covering the blood applies even when earth cannot be placed beneath the blood.
קלאוד על הדף:
Support that a missing under-layer does not cancel the mitzva: Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosef taught that if one slaughtered a chaya (requiring covering) and then a beheima (not requiring it) in the same spot, he is exempt — the domesticated animal’s blood itself covers the first blood. But if he slaughtered the beheima first and then the chaya, he must cover the chaya’s blood — even though beneath it lies not earth but the beheima’s blood. Evidently the covering obligation survives where earth below is impossible.
Key Terms:
- חַיָּה = an undomesticated animal (deer, gazelle, etc.), whose blood requires covering
- בְּהֵמָה = a domesticated animal (cattle, sheep, goats), whose blood does not require covering
Segment 10
TYPE: תירוץ
The resolution: ‘whatever is suitable for mixing’ — where proper fulfillment was once possible, the mitzva persists; for sacrificial birds it never was
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כִּדְרַבִּי זֵירָא, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: כׇּל הָרָאוּי לְבִילָּה – אֵין בִּילָּה מְעַכֶּבֶת בּוֹ, וְכֹל שֶׁאֵינוֹ רָאוּי לְבִילָּה – בִּילָּה מְעַכֶּבֶת בּוֹ.
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: The exclusion of sacrificial birds from the mitzva of covering the blood, even from above, is in accordance with another statement of Rabbi Zeira, as Rabbi Zeira says with regard to meal offerings: For any measure of flour that is suitable for mixing with oil in a meal offering, the lack of mixing does not invalidate the meal offering. Even though there is a mitzva to mix the oil with the flour ab initio, the meal offering is fit for sacrifice even if the oil and the flour are not mixed together. And for any measure of flour that is not suitable for mixing with oil in a meal offering, the lack of mixing invalidates the meal offering. Similarly, if one slaughtered a domesticated animal and thereafter an undomesticated animal, since it was possible to cover the blood of the former before slaughtering the latter, which would allow the proper fulfillment of the mitzva of covering the blood, one is still obligated to cover the blood from above. By contrast, it is always impossible to properly perform the mitzva in the case of sacrificial birds.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara answers with Rabbi Zeira’s own principle from the laws of meal offerings: ‘whatever is suitable for mixing, the absence of mixing does not invalidate it; and whatever is not suitable for mixing, the absence of mixing invalidates it.’ A mincha whose flour could have been mixed with its oil is valid even unmixed; one that never could be is invalid. So too here: when a chaya’s blood falls on a beheima’s blood, proper two-layer covering was possible in principle (he could have covered the first blood before the second slaughter), so the obligation persists and he covers from above. But for sacrificial birds, proper fulfillment is impossible in every case — so the mitzva never takes hold at all.
Key Terms:
- כׇּל הָרָאוּי לְבִילָּה אֵין בִּילָּה מְעַכֶּבֶת בּוֹ = ‘whatever is suitable for mixing, mixing does not invalidate it’ — capability in principle sustains validity even when the ideal act is omitted
Segment 11
TYPE: קושיא
Let him scrape the blood off the altar and cover it elsewhere — as with blood that spurted or remained on the knife
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְלִיגְרְרֵיהּ וְלִיכַסְּיֵהּ? מִי לָא תְּנַן: דָּם הַנִּיתָּז וְשֶׁעַל הַסַּכִּין חַיָּיב לְכַסּוֹת? אַלְמָא דְּגָרֵיר וּמְכַסֵּי לֵיהּ, הָכָא נָמֵי נִגְרוֹר וּנְכַסֵּי לֵיהּ!
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: Still, why is the mitzva of covering the blood not applicable to sacrificial birds? Let one scrape the blood off the altar and cover it elsewhere. Didn’t we learn in a mishna (87b): With regard to blood that spurts outside the pit in which the animal was slaughtered, and blood that remained on the slaughtering knife, one is obligated to cover it? Evidently, the halakha is that one may scrape off the blood and cover it in a location other than where it spilled out. Here too, let us scrape the blood of a sacrificial bird off the altar and cover it elsewhere.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara presses once more: even on the altar, why not scrape the blood off and cover it somewhere else? The mishna later in the perek (87b) teaches that blood which spurted beyond the slaughtering pit, or blood left on the knife, must be covered — evidently blood may be gathered up and covered away from where it fell. Here too, scrape the sacrificial bird’s blood from the altar and cover it in valid earth.
Key Terms:
- דָּם הַנִּיתָּז וְשֶׁעַל הַסַּכִּין = blood that spurted, and blood on the knife — covered elsewhere, proving relocation is legitimate
Segment 12
TYPE: תירוץ
The final answer: the mishna speaks of birds consecrated for Temple maintenance, whose slaughter yields wholly forbidden meat
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִי בְּקׇדְשֵׁי מִזְבֵּחַ – הָכִי נָמֵי, הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? בְּקׇדְשֵׁי בֶּדֶק הַבַּיִת.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: If the ruling of the mishna was dealing with items consecrated for the altar, indeed, the blood must be scraped off and covered elsewhere. But here we are dealing with items consecrated for Temple maintenance, i.e., birds donated to the Temple in order to be sold, the profits of which would be used for repairs. Such birds may not be slaughtered, and if one transgressed and slaughtered them it is prohibited to derive any benefit from them. The tanna of the mishna holds that the mitzva of covering the blood does not apply to a slaughtered animal that is forbidden for consumption.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara concedes and relocates the mishna’s case: if the birds were kodshei mizbeach — consecrated for the altar — then indeed one would scrape and cover. But the mishna speaks of kodshei bedek habayit, birds donated to the Temple treasury to be sold for maintenance funds. Such birds are not for offering; slaughtering them is a transgression, and the slaughtered bird is forbidden for all benefit. The tanna holds that kisui hadam applies only to a slaughter that permits the animal for consumption — a slaughter that yields wholly forbidden meat carries no covering obligation. The theme of shechita she’einah re’uya, which dominated the previous perek, thus opens this one as well, and the discussion continues on 84a.
Key Terms:
- קׇדְשֵׁי מִזְבֵּחַ = items consecrated for the altar — destined to be offered
- קׇדְשֵׁי בֶּדֶק הַבַּיִת = items consecrated for Temple maintenance — assets of the treasury, never valid offerings; slaughtering them is a transgression