Chullin Daf 82 (חולין דף פ״ב)
Daf: 82 | Amudim: 82a – 82b | Date: Loading...
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (82a)
Segment 1
TYPE: גמרא
Reish Lakish explains Rabbi Shimon’s view on the red heifer; Rabbi Yochanan responds that the clause is not part of the mishna
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ: אוֹמֵר הָיָה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, פָּרָה נִפְדֵּית עַל גַּבֵּי מַעֲרַכְתָּהּ. אָמַר רַב שֶׁמֶן בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: פָּרַת חַטָּאת אֵינָהּ מִשְׁנָה.
English Translation:
And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says in explanation of Rabbi Shimon’s statement: Rabbi Shimon would say that the red heifer can be redeemed with money even once it has been slaughtered and placed upon its pyre in preparation for being burned. Therefore, Rabbi Shimon states that there could be a time when the heifer was fit for consumption, i.e., if it was redeemed. Why, then, does he deem one who slaughters it exempt from liability for transgressing the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring? Rav Shemen bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The statement with regard to the red heifer of purification is not considered part of the mishna, and Rabbi Shimon agrees that its slaughterer is liable for transgressing the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring.
קלאוד על הדף:
The daf opens mid-sugya, continuing from 81b: the mishna listed the para aduma (red heifer) among the cases where Rabbi Shimon exempts the slaughterer from the prohibition of oto v’et bno, because its slaughter is ‘unfit’ — it does not render the animal permitted for consumption. Reish Lakish undermines this: Rabbi Shimon himself holds the red heifer can be redeemed even after being slaughtered and placed on its pyre, so its slaughter could potentially lead to permitted meat — a fit slaughter. Rav Shemen bar Abba answers in Rabbi Yochanan’s name with a radical text-critical move: the red heifer clause ‘is not mishna’ — it is not an authentic part of the mishna’s text, and Rabbi Shimon in fact agrees that its slaughterer is liable.
Key Terms:
- פָּרָה נִפְדֵּית עַל גַּבֵּי מַעֲרַכְתָּהּ = ‘the heifer can be redeemed on its pyre’ — even after slaughter, the red heifer retains its redemption potential, so its slaughter could yet yield permitted meat
- אֵינָהּ מִשְׁנָה = ‘it is not mishna’ — the clause is declared inauthentic and carries no halachic weight
Segment 2
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
The same challenge is raised against the egla arufa clause, and the same answer is given in Rabbi Yannai’s name
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְעֶגְלָה עֲרוּפָה, לָאו שְׁחִיטָה רְאוּיָה הִיא? וְהָתְנַן: נִמְצָא הַהוֹרֵג עַד שֶׁלֹּא תֵּעָרֵף הָעֲגָלָה – תֵּצֵא וְתִרְעֶה בָּעֵדֶר. אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי יַנַּאי: עֶגְלָה עֲרוּפָה אֵינָהּ מִשְׁנָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: And is the slaughter of the heifer whose neck was to have been broken not considered an act of slaughter that is fit? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Sota 47a): If a heifer was set aside to have its neck broken to atone for the murder of an individual whose murderer was not known, and then the murderer was found before the heifer’s neck was broken, the heifer shall go out and graze among the flock, as it is not consecrated. Evidently, before its neck is broken, deriving benefit from it is not prohibited, and its slaughter would be one that is fit. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said in the name of Rabbi Yannai: The statement with regard to the heifer whose neck was to have been broken is not considered part of the mishna, and Rabbi Shimon agrees that its slaughterer is liable for violating the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring.
קלאוד על הדף:
The identical logic now attacks the mishna’s other case: the egla arufa, the heifer whose neck is broken to atone for an unsolved murder. The mishna in Sota proves that before the neck-breaking the heifer is entirely unconsecrated — if the murderer is found, it simply returns to graze with the flock. If so, slaughtering it before that point is a fit slaughter, and Rabbi Shimon should hold the slaughterer liable. Reish Lakish, citing Rabbi Yannai, answers with the same textual surgery: the egla arufa clause too ‘is not mishna.’
Key Terms:
- עֶגְלָה עֲרוּפָה = the heifer whose neck is broken in the rite for an untraceable murder (Devarim 21:1-9)
- תֵּצֵא וְתִרְעֶה בָּעֵדֶר = ‘it goes out and grazes with the flock’ — it is completely unconsecrated and permitted for all benefit
Segment 3
TYPE: קושיא
Can Rabbi Yannai have said this? He himself was unsure at what stage the heifer becomes forbidden
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּמִי אָמַר רַבִּי יַנַּאי הָכִי? וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי יַנַּאי: גְּבוּל שָׁמַעְתִּי בָּהּ, וְשָׁכַחְתִּי, וְנָסְבִין חַבְרַיָּא לוֹמַר: יְרִידָתָהּ לְנַחַל אֵיתָן אוֹסַרְתָּהּ.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yannai actually say so? But doesn’t Rabbi Yannai say: I heard the boundary, i.e., stage, beyond which the heifer is forbidden, but I have forgotten what it is; but the group of scholars were inclined to say that the heifer’s descent to a hard valley, where its neck is broken, is the action that renders it forbidden?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara tests the attribution. Rabbi Yannai elsewhere confessed: ‘I heard a boundary regarding it, but I have forgotten it’ — meaning he knew there is a defined stage at which the heifer becomes forbidden but could not recall which — and his colleagues inclined to say that the descent to the nachal eitan is what forbids it. If Rabbi Yannai entertained the view that the heifer only becomes forbidden at its descent, he had a far less drastic answer available than deleting a clause from the mishna.
Key Terms:
- גְּבוּל = boundary — the defined stage at which the prohibition of benefit sets in
- נַחַל אֵיתָן = the hard valley (or strongly flowing stream bed) where the heifer’s neck is broken
Segment 4
TYPE: המשך הקושיא
If descent forbids the heifer, Rabbi Yannai should simply have distinguished before and after descent
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאִם אִיתָא, לִישַׁנֵּי: כָּאן קוֹדֶם יְרִידָה, כָּאן לְאַחַר יְרִידָה.
English Translation:
And if it is so, let him resolve the contradiction by saying: Here, where deriving benefit from the heifer is permitted, and its slaughterer is liable for transgressing the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, it is referring to an act of slaughtering that is fit and is performed before the heifer’s descent, while there, in the mishna, where Rabbi Shimon holds that there is no liability for transgressing: Itself and its offspring, it is referring to slaughtering performed after its descent. At that time, deriving benefit from the heifer is already prohibited, and the slaughter is therefore not considered fit.
קלאוד על הדף:
The challenge is spelled out: rather than declaring the clause spurious, Rabbi Yannai could have harmonized the sources with the classic formula ‘here… there’: the Sota mishna, where the heifer returns to the flock, speaks of before its descent; our mishna, where its slaughter is deemed unfit, speaks of after its descent, when benefit is already forbidden. His failure to give this easy answer suggests the statement was never his.
Key Terms:
- כָּאן… כָּאן = ‘here… there’ — the standard Talmudic device of resolving contradictory sources by assigning them to different circumstances
Segment 5
TYPE: תירוץ וקושיא
Rav Pinchas re-attributes the statement to Reish Lakish himself; Rav Ashi reports that this too was found difficult
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב פִּנְחָס בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אַמֵּי: אֲנַן מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ מַתְנֵינַן לַהּ, עֶגְלָה עֲרוּפָה אֵינָהּ מִשְׁנָה. אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: כִּי הֲוֵינַן בֵּי רַב פַּפֵּי קַשְׁיָא לַן, מִי אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ הָכִי?
English Translation:
Rav Pineḥas, son of Rav Ami, said: We taught the statement in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish himself, not as a quote from Rabbi Yannai: The statement with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken is not considered part of the mishna. Rav Ashi said: When we were studying in the study hall of Rav Pappi, that statement was difficult for us: Did Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish actually say that it is not considered part of the mishna?
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Pinchas breih d’Rav Ami removes Rabbi Yannai from the chain of transmission: ‘we teach it’ in the name of Reish Lakish himself. But Rav Ashi recalls that in the study hall of Rav Pappi this version was also challenged: could Reish Lakish himself have said that the egla arufa clause is not mishna? The sugya is tracking a floating dictum through a series of possible authors, testing each attribution for internal consistency.
Key Terms:
- מַתְנֵינַן לַהּ = ‘we teach it’ — a report about the correct chain of transmission (girsa), not about the law itself
- בֵּי רַב פַּפֵּי = the study hall of Rav Pappi, where Rav Ashi studied
Segment 6
TYPE: קושיא
Reish Lakish elsewhere holds the leper’s birds become forbidden from the moment of designation
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהָא אִיתְּמַר, צִפּוֹרֵי מְצוֹרָע מֵאֵימָתַי נֶאֱסָרִין? רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: מִשְּׁעַת שְׁחִיטָה, וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ אָמַר: מִשְּׁעַת לְקִיחָה, וְאָמְרִינַן: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ?
English Translation:
But it was stated that amora’im engaged in a dispute concerning the following issue: From when is one prohibited from deriving benefit from the leper’s birds? Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One is prohibited from the moment of their slaughter; and Reish Lakish says: One is prohibited from the moment they are taken and designated to be a leper’s birds. And we say: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish?
קלאוד על הדף:
The contradiction is set up by citing a known dispute: from when is benefit from the metzora’s purification birds forbidden? Rabbi Yochanan says from the moment of slaughter; Reish Lakish says from the moment of their taking, i.e., their designation for the rite. The Gemara now probes the reasoning behind Reish Lakish’s position, because it will reveal that he cannot be the author of the statement deleting the egla arufa clause.
Key Terms:
- צִפּוֹרֵי מְצוֹרָע = the two birds used in the purification rite of a healed leper (Vayikra 14:4)
- מִשְּׁעַת לְקִיחָה = from the moment of taking — as soon as the birds are designated, before any rite is performed
Segment 7
TYPE: גזירה שוה
The verbal analogy kicha-kicha proves Reish Lakish holds the egla arufa is forbidden while still alive
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גָּמַר ״קִיחָה״ ״קִיחָה״ מֵעֶגְלָה עֲרוּפָה.
English Translation:
His reasoning is that he derives it via verbal analogy from the terms: “Taking [kiḥa]” (Leviticus 14:4), with regard to the birds, and: “Taking [kiḥa]” (Deuteronomy 21:3), with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken. Consequently, just as deriving benefit from the heifer whose neck is broken is prohibited from the time of its selection, so too must deriving benefit from these birds be prohibited from the time of their selection. Clearly, then, Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish holds that deriving benefit from the heifer whose neck is broken is prohibited while it is still alive. Therefore, its slaughter is one that does not render the animal fit for consumption. Accordingly, Rabbi Shimon would exempt its slaughterer from the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, as is taught in the mishna.
קלאוד על הדף:
Reish Lakish’s source is a gezeira shava: the word ‘taking’ appears both by the leper’s birds (Vayikra 14:4) and by the egla arufa (Devarim 21:3), teaching that both become forbidden from the time of selection. But the analogy only works if the egla arufa itself is forbidden from designation — while still alive. If so, its slaughter can never yield permitted meat and is inherently unfit, and Rabbi Shimon’s exemption in the mishna is perfectly coherent. Reish Lakish therefore had no reason whatsoever to declare the clause inauthentic — the attribution to him collapses.
Key Terms:
- גְּזֵרָה שָׁוָה = verbal analogy — identical terms in two passages transfer laws from one context to the other
- שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה = an unfit slaughter — one that cannot render the animal permitted for consumption; Rabbi Shimon holds such slaughter is not ‘slaughter’ for liability purposes
Segment 8
TYPE: מסקנא
The statement is definitively re-attributed to Rabbi Yochanan
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: עֶגְלָה עֲרוּפָה אֵינָהּ מִשְׁנָה.
English Translation:
Rather, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The statement with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken is not considered part of the mishna, and this resolution of the difficulty was articulated by Rabbi Yoḥanan rather than Reish Lakish.
קלאוד על הדף:
The resolution: Rabbi Chiyya bar Abba transmitted the dictum in the name of Rabbi Yochanan. This fits perfectly. Rabbi Yochanan holds the leper’s birds — and by extension the egla arufa — become forbidden only at slaughter, so for him the heifer’s slaughter before its descent is a fit slaughter, and the only way to reconcile the mishna with Rabbi Shimon’s principle is to declare the clause inauthentic. Each Amora now emerges holding a self-consistent position, and the sugya’s careful attribution work is complete.
Key Terms:
- אֵינָהּ מִשְׁנָה = the excision of a clause as inauthentic — one of the strongest text-critical tools in the Talmud’s arsenal, used sparingly
Segment 9
TYPE: משנה
Two purchasers of a cow and its offspring: the first buyer has the right to slaughter first
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְנִי׳ שְׁנַיִם שֶׁלָּקְחוּ פָּרָה וּבְנָהּ, אֵיזֶה שֶׁלָּקַח רִאשׁוֹן יִשְׁחוֹט רִאשׁוֹן, וְאִם קָדַם הַשֵּׁנִי – זָכָה.
English Translation:
MISHNA: With regard to two people who purchased a cow and its offspring, where each purchased one of the animals, whoever purchased his animal first shall slaughter it first, and the second one must wait until the next day to slaughter his animal, so as not to violate the prohibition of: It and its offspring. But if the second one preceded him and slaughtered his animal first, he benefitted, and the one who purchased the animal first may not slaughter it until the next day.
קלאוד על הדף:
A new mishna turns to a practical conflict. Two people separately bought a mother animal and her offspring — say, from the same seller — and each wants to slaughter today, but the second slaughter of the day would violate oto v’et bno. The rule: whoever purchased first slaughters first, and the other waits until tomorrow. But if the second buyer preempted and slaughtered first, ‘he prevailed’ — the accomplished fact stands, and it is now the first buyer who must wait.
Key Terms:
- אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ = ‘it and its offspring’ (Vayikra 22:28) — the prohibition against slaughtering a mother animal and her offspring on the same day
- זָכָה = ‘he prevailed’ — his completed act stands, and the halachic consequence (waiting a day) shifts to the other party
Segment 10
TYPE: גמרא
Rav Yosef: the first buyer’s priority is only a matter of court judgment; the preemptor is ‘diligent and rewarded’
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: לְעִנְיַן דִּינָא תְּנַן, תְּנָא: אִם קָדַם הַשֵּׁנִי – הֲרֵי זֶה זָרִיז וְנִשְׂכָּר, זָרִיז – דְּלָא עֲבַד אִיסּוּרָא, וְנִשְׂכָּר – דְּקָאָכֵיל בִּשְׂרָא.
English Translation:
GEMARA: Rav Yosef said: We learn in the mishna that the first purchaser is granted precedence only with regard to the matter of a court judgment, in case the two purchasers go to court each demanding to slaughter his animal first. But there is no prohibition against the second one slaughtering his animal first if no claim is brought to court. Likewise, a Sage taught in a baraita: If the second one preceded him and slaughtered his animal first, he is diligent and rewarded; he is diligent because he did not violate a prohibition, and he is rewarded because he eats meat already that day.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Yosef deflates the mishna’s rule considerably: the first buyer’s priority applies l’inyan dina — only as a matter of court adjudication. If the two come before a court, it awards precedence to the first purchaser; but no actual prohibition bars the second from slaughtering first on his own initiative. The baraita goes further and praises him: he is zariz v’niskar, diligent and rewarded — diligent because he violated nothing, rewarded because he eats meat today while his fellow waits until tomorrow.
Key Terms:
- לְעִנְיַן דִּינָא = as a matter of court judgment only — a priority enforced by the court, not a prohibition
- זָרִיז וְנִשְׂכָּר = ‘diligent and rewarded’ — the Talmudic category of one who acts swiftly, permissibly, and comes out ahead
Segment 11
TYPE: משנה
Lash counts for multiple violations: mother then two offspring is eighty lashes; two offspring then the mother is forty
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְנִי׳ שָׁחַט פָּרָה וְאַחַר כָּךְ שְׁנֵי בָּנֶיהָ – סוֹפֵג שְׁמוֹנִים, שָׁחַט שְׁנֵי בָּנֶיהָ וְאַחַר כָּךְ שְׁחָטָהּ – סוֹפֵג אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים, שְׁחָטָהּ וְאֶת בִּתָּהּ וְאֶת בַּת בִּתָּהּ – סוֹפֵג שְׁמוֹנִים.
English Translation:
MISHNA: If one slaughtered a cow and thereafter slaughtered its two offspring on the same day, he incurs eighty lashes for two separate actions violating the prohibition against slaughtering the mother and the offspring on the same day. If one slaughtered its two offspring and thereafter slaughtered the mother cow, he incurs the forty lashes, as he performed a single prohibited act. If one slaughtered the mother and its daughter, and, later that day, slaughtered its daughter’s daughter, he incurs eighty lashes, as he has performed the act of slaughtering a mother and its offspring twice.
קלאוד על הדף:
This mishna quantifies liability across multi-animal cases. Slaughtering the mother and then her two offspring on one day is two independent violations — each offspring is slaughtered on the day its mother was — so he incurs eighty lashes. Slaughtering the two offspring first and then the mother is a single prohibited act (one final slaughter closing the circle), so he incurs forty. Slaughtering the mother, then her daughter, then the daughter’s daughter also yields eighty: the daughter’s slaughter violates against her slaughtered mother, and the granddaughter’s slaughter violates against its own slaughtered mother, the daughter.
Key Terms:
- סוֹפֵג אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים = ‘absorbs the forty’ — receives the standard set of lashes (malkot), thirty-nine in practice
- שְׁמוֹנִים = eighty — two full sets of lashes for two separate violations
Segment 12
TYPE: משנה (מחלוקת)
Mother and granddaughter first, then the daughter: the Tanna Kamma rules forty lashes; Sumchos in Rabbi Meir’s name rules eighty
Hebrew/Aramaic:
שְׁחָטָהּ וְאֶת בַּת בִּתָּהּ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ שָׁחַט בִּתָּהּ – סוֹפֵג אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים. סוֹמְכוֹס אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי מֵאִיר: סוֹפֵג שְׁמוֹנִים.
English Translation:
But if one slaughtered the mother and its daughter’s daughter and thereafter slaughtered its daughter, he incurs the forty lashes, as he performed a single prohibited act. Sumakhos says in the name of Rabbi Meir: He incurs eighty lashes for slaughtering the daughter on the same day as its calf and its mother, as that act comprises two separate violations of the prohibition.
קלאוד על הדף:
Now the middle generation is slaughtered last. Slaughtering the grandmother and the granddaughter on one day violates nothing — the prohibition covers only mother and direct offspring. But the daughter, slaughtered last, offends in two directions at once: she is the offspring of the slaughtered mother and the mother of the slaughtered granddaughter. The Rabbis count one act of slaughter and impose forty lashes; Sumchos in Rabbi Meir’s name counts two violations embodied in the single act and imposes eighty. This machloket — does one act violating one prohibition twice generate one penalty or two — drives the entire amud bet.
Key Terms:
- סוֹמְכוֹס = Sumchos, a leading student of Rabbi Meir who transmits his teacher’s rulings
- בַּת בִּתָּהּ = her daughter’s daughter — the granddaughter, permitted on the same day as the grandmother
Segment 13
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Why is offspring-then-mother a violation at all? The Torah said ‘it and its offspring,’ not ‘its offspring and it’
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גְּמָ׳ אַמַּאי? ״אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא, וְלֹא בְּנוֹ וְאוֹתוֹ! לָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ, דְּתַנְיָא: ״אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ״ – אֵין לִי אֶלָּא אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ, אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת אִמּוֹ מִנַּיִן?
English Translation:
GEMARA: With regard to the statement in the mishna that if one slaughters two calves and thereafter slaughters their mother he incurs the forty lashes, the Gemara asks: Why does he receive lashes? After all, the phrase: “It and its offspring” (Leviticus 22:28), is what the Merciful One states in the Torah, and not: Its offspring and it. The Gemara answers: That thought should not enter your mind, as it is taught in a baraita: From the phrase “it and its offspring” I have derived only that the prohibition includes slaughtering the animal itself first and its offspring afterward. From where do I derive that the prohibition also includes the case of slaughtering the offspring itself first and its mother afterward?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara challenges the mishna’s middle clause: the Torah’s phrase is ‘it and its offspring’ — apparently prohibiting only the order mother-then-offspring. Why then does one who slaughters the two offspring first and their mother afterward incur lashes at all? The answer begins with a baraita: do not entertain that thought, for the baraita explicitly asks where the reverse order — ‘it and its mother’ — is derived from, and proceeds to supply the derivation.
Key Terms:
- רַחֲמָנָא = ‘the Merciful One’ — Talmudic shorthand for the Torah, or God as legislator
- אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת אִמּוֹ = ‘it and its mother’ — the reverse order, offspring first, which requires its own scriptural source
Segment 14
TYPE: ברייתא
The plural ‘lo tishchatu’ addresses two slaughterers; in the three-person case, the two latter ones are liable
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כְּשֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר ״לֹא תִשְׁחֲטוּ״ – הֲרֵי כָּאן שְׁנַיִם, הָא כֵּיצַד? אֶחָד הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַפָּרָה, וְאֶחָד הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת אִמָּהּ, וְאֶחָד הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת בְּנָהּ – שְׁנַיִם הָאַחֲרוֹנִים חַיָּיבִין.
English Translation:
It is derived in the following manner: When the verse states: “You shall not slaughter [tishḥatu] both in one day” (Leviticus 22:28), this is referring to two people who are prohibited from slaughtering on the same day, as the word “slaughter” is phrased in the plural. How so? If, during the course of a single day, there is one person who slaughters the cow and then another who slaughters that cow’s mother, and then there is another person who slaughters that cow’s offspring, the two latter people are liable, the first of them for slaughtering the mother after its offspring was slaughtered, and the second person for slaughtering the offspring after its mother was slaughtered.
קלאוד על הדף:
The baraita’s derivation: the verse’s verb ‘you shall not slaughter’ (tishchatu) is plural, addressing two different people. The illustrative case: one person slaughters a cow, a second slaughters its mother, and a third slaughters its offspring — the two latter people are liable. The second violated by slaughtering the mother after her offspring (the cow) was slaughtered, and the third by slaughtering the offspring after its mother (the same cow) was slaughtered. The case is engineered so that one of the liable parties slaughtered a mother after her offspring — proving that the order does not matter.
Key Terms:
- לֹא תִשְׁחֲטוּ = ‘you shall not slaughter’ (plural) — the grammatical anomaly on which the whole derivation hangs
- שְׁנַיִם הָאַחֲרוֹנִים חַיָּיבִין = the two latter slaughterers are liable — the first person violated nothing, since no relative of his animal had yet been slaughtered
Amud Bet (82b)
Segment 1
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
But the verse is needed for the basic prohibition itself! Answer: the Torah could have written the singular
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הַאי מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְגוּפֵיהּ? אִם כֵּן, לִיכְתּוֹב ״לֹא תִשְׁחוֹט״, מַאי ״לֹא תִשְׁחֲטוּ״?
English Translation:
The Gemara challenges: That verse is necessary for the prohibition itself, and it cannot be used to teach this additional halakha. The Gemara explains: If so, that the verse teaches only the prohibition against slaughtering an animal and its offspring in one day, let the Torah write: You shall not slaughter [tishḥot], in the singular. For what reason did the Torah write: “You shall not slaughter [tishḥatu]” (Leviticus 22:28), in the plural? It is to teach that two different people are prohibited from slaughtering, as explained earlier.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara challenges the baraita’s derivation: the verse is needed l’gufeih — for the basic prohibition of slaughtering an animal and its offspring in one day — so how can additional laws be piled onto it? The answer: had the Torah intended only the core prohibition, it would have written lo tishchot in the singular. The deliberate choice of the plural tishchatu is a signal carrying the additional teaching.
Key Terms:
- מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְגוּפֵיהּ = ‘it is needed for itself’ — the standard objection that a verse already assigned to its plain law cannot fund extra derivations
Segment 2
TYPE: קושיא
Still, the plural is genuinely needed — otherwise two people dividing the two slaughters might be permitted
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאַכַּתִּי מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ, דְּאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״לֹא תִשְׁחוֹט״ הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: חַד – אִין, תְּרֵי – לָא.
English Translation:
The Gemara challenges: But, nevertheless, the plural is necessary, as had the Merciful One written in the Torah: You shall not slaughter [tishḥot] in the singular, I would say: With regard to one person, yes, it is prohibited to slaughter an animal and its offspring in a single day, but with regard to two, it is not prohibited for one of them to slaughter the mother and the other to then slaughter the offspring on the same day.
קלאוד על הדף:
The challenge deepens: the plural form is not free for reinterpretation, because it does real work. Had the Torah written the singular, one might conclude that only a single person who slaughters both animals violates the prohibition — but if one person slaughters the mother and a different person then slaughters the offspring, neither would be liable. The plural forecloses exactly that misreading. If so, how can the baraita also extract the reversed-order law from it?
Key Terms:
- חַד אִין, תְּרֵי לָא = ‘one — yes; two — no’ — the erroneous reading the plural must exclude: that the prohibition binds only a lone actor
Segment 3
TYPE: תירוץ
Had that been the only point, the Torah would have written ‘lo yishchatu’ in the third person
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״לֹא תִשְׁחֲטוּ״, וַאֲפִילּוּ תְּרֵי! אִם כֵּן, לִכְתּוֹב ״לֹא יִשְׁחֲטוּ״!
English Translation:
Therefore, the Merciful One writes in the Torah: “You shall not slaughter [tishḥatu],” in the plural, indicating that even two individuals may not slaughter an animal and its offspring in a single day. The Gemara answers: If so, that only this is derived from the verse, let the Torah write: They shall not be slaughtered, indicating that whether by one individual or two, the slaughter of an animal and its offspring in a single day is prohibited, but only the one who slaughters the offspring has violated the prohibition.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara concedes the need but sharpens the grammatical analysis. If the plural served only to include the case of two slaughterers, the natural formulation would be lo yishchatu — ‘they shall not slaughter’ in the third person — covering any actors whatsoever while adding nothing more. The Torah’s actual choice of the second-person plural tishchatu is therefore doubly marked: it addresses multiple people and carries a further teaching besides.
Key Terms:
- לֹא יִשְׁחֲטוּ = ‘they shall not slaughter’ — the third-person alternative that would have sufficed for the two-person case alone
Segment 4
TYPE: מסקנא
From the doubly marked form, derive both teachings
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַאי ״לֹא תִשְׁחֲטוּ״? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ תַּרְתֵּי.
English Translation:
What is meant by: “You shall not slaughter,” which indicates that two different people are prohibited from slaughtering? Conclude two conclusions from it: Conclude that the prohibition applies even if two people perform the two acts of slaughter, and that two cases are prohibited: Slaughtering the offspring after the mother, and slaughtering the mother after the offspring.
קלאוד על הדף:
The conclusion: shema minah tartei — ‘derive two things from it.’ The anomalous second-person plural teaches both that the prohibition applies when two different people perform the two slaughters, and that both orders are prohibited — mother after offspring no less than offspring after mother. The mishna’s forty lashes for one who slaughtered the offspring first and the mother afterward now rest on a solid scriptural footing.
Key Terms:
- שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ תַּרְתֵּי = ‘derive two conclusions from it’ — a single textual anomaly can carry more than one law
Segment 5
TYPE: בעיא
Abaye asks Rav Yosef: what is the reasoning of Sumchos?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
שְׁחָטָהּ וְאֶת בַּת בִּתָּהּ, אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי לְרַב יוֹסֵף: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּסוֹמְכוֹס?
English Translation:
§ The mishna teaches: If one slaughtered the mother and its daughter’s daughter and thereafter slaughtered its daughter, he incurs the forty lashes. Sumakhos says in the name of Rabbi Meir: He incurs eighty lashes, because by slaughtering the daughter, he transgresses twice the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: What is the reasoning for the opinion of Sumakhos that the transgressor incurs eighty lashes?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara returns to the mishna’s closing dispute. Abaye asks Rav Yosef to identify what drives Sumchos’s ruling of eighty lashes for one who slaughtered the mother and granddaughter and then the daughter. The question is not idle curiosity: as the next segments unfold, it becomes a fundamental inquiry into how halacha counts repeated violations of a single prohibition — per act, per forewarning, or per prohibited object.
Key Terms:
- מַאי טַעְמָא = ‘what is the reason’ — a request to uncover the governing principle behind a ruling, not merely its source
Segment 6
TYPE: צד א’ של החקירה
Perhaps Sumchos holds globally that two olive-bulks of forbidden fat in one lapse of awareness generate two sin offerings
Hebrew/Aramaic:
קָא סָבַר סוֹמְכוֹס: אָכַל שְׁנֵי זֵיתֵי חֵלֶב בְּהֶעְלֵם אֶחָד – חַיָּיב שְׁתֵּי חַטָּאוֹת.
English Translation:
Does Sumakhos hold, in general, that if one unwittingly ate two olive-bulks of forbidden fat during one lapse of awareness he is liable to bring two sin offerings, since he transgressed the prohibition twice? If so, then in a case where one is forewarned that if he transgresses intentionally he will receive lashes and he then violates the same prohibition twice, as is the case in the mishna, he receives two sets of lashes.
קלאוד על הדף:
The first possibility: Sumchos holds a sweeping principle — even repeated violation of the very same prohibition within one lapse of awareness generates separate liabilities. The paradigm: one who unwittingly eats two olive-bulks of chelev in a single he’elem brings two sin offerings. Transposed to intentional violation, one who is forewarned once and transgresses twice receives two sets of lashes. On this reading, the eighty lashes in the mishna reflect a general theory of counting violations, not anything special about the animals involved.
Key Terms:
- הֶעְלֵם אֶחָד = one lapse of awareness — the unit that normally consolidates repeated unwitting violations into a single sin offering
- חֵלֶב = forbidden abdominal fat, the standard test case for counting repeated violations
Segment 7
TYPE: המשך הצד
On that reading, the mishna chose this case to showcase the far-reaching leniency of the Rabbis
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּבְדִין הוּא דְּלַישְׁמְעִינַן בְּעָלְמָא, וְהַאי דְּקָא מַשְׁמַע לַן בְּהָא, לְהוֹדִיעֲךָ כֹּחָן דְּרַבָּנַן, דְּאַף עַל גַּב דְּגוּפִין מוּחְלָקִין – פָּטְרִי רַבָּנַן.
English Translation:
And by right the mishna should have informed us of Sumakhos’s opinion in a general case, such as that of eating two olive-bulks of forbidden fat during a single lapse of awareness, but the reason that it teaches us this dispute in this situation, where one slaughters an animal and its daughter’s offspring and, later that day, slaughters its daughter, is to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of the Rabbis, that even though the two animals that caused the daughter to be forbidden are separate entities, the Rabbis still exempt the transgressor from a second set of lashes.
קלאוד על הדף:
If Sumchos’s principle is global, the mishna ought to have taught the dispute in the generic case of eating two olive-bulks of chelev. It chose the animal case instead to advertise kochan d’Rabbanan — the strength of the Rabbis’ position: even here, where the daughter’s double prohibition stems from two separate bodies (the slaughtered mother and the slaughtered granddaughter), the Rabbis still consolidate everything into a single set of lashes. The case is selected to make the Rabbis’ leniency, not Sumchos’s stringency, the surprising news.
Key Terms:
- גּוּפִין מוּחְלָקִין = separate bodies — distinct physical sources of prohibition, normally grounds to multiply liability
- לְהוֹדִיעֲךָ כֹּחָן דְּרַבָּנַן = ‘to inform you of the strength of the Rabbis’ — a mishna frames its case to highlight the more novel of the two positions
Segment 8
TYPE: צד ב’ ופשיטת הבעיא
Or is Sumchos’s ruling local to separate bodies? Rav Yosef answers: Sumchos holds the global principle
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אוֹ דִלְמָא קָסָבַר סוֹמְכוֹס: אָכַל שְׁנֵי זֵיתֵי חֵלֶב בְּהֶעְלֵם אֶחָד אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת, וְהָכָא הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא – הוֹאִיל וְגוּפִין מוּחְלָקִין? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִין, קָסָבַר אָכַל שְׁנֵי זֵיתֵי חֵלֶב בְּהֶעְלֵם אֶחָד חַיָּיב שְׁתֵּי חַטָּאוֹת.
English Translation:
Or perhaps, Sumakhos holds in general that if one ate two olive-bulks of forbidden fat during one lapse of awareness, he is liable to bring only one sin offering. If so, one who transgresses intentionally after being forewarned receives only one set of lashes even if he transgresses the same prohibition twice. But here, in the mishna, this is the reason that the transgressor receives two sets of lashes: It is that the two animals that caused the daughter to be prohibited are separate entities. Rav Yosef said to Abaye: Yes, Sumakhos holds in general that if one ate two olive-bulks of forbidden fat during one lapse of awareness he is liable to bring two sin offerings.
קלאוד על הדף:
The alternative reading: Sumchos generally agrees that one lapse of awareness yields only one sin offering, and he imposes eighty lashes here solely because the two animals generating the daughter’s prohibition are gufin muchlakin — separate entities, each grounding an independent violation. Rav Yosef answers decisively: yes to the first reading — Sumchos holds that two olive-bulks of chelev eaten in one lapse generate two sin offerings. The remainder of the amud tests whether any tannaitic source actually supports attributing this broad principle to him.
Key Terms:
- הוֹאִיל וְגוּפִין מוּחְלָקִין = ‘since the bodies are distinct’ — the narrower rationale that would confine Sumchos’s ruling to multi-animal cases
Segment 9
TYPE: ראיה
Rav Yosef’s proof: ‘one who sows kilayim, kilayim is flogged’ — the doubled word must mean two sets of lashes
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מִמַּאי? מִדִּתְנַן: הַזּוֹרֵעַ כִּלְאַיִם כִּלְאַיִם לוֹקֶה. מַאי לוֹקֶה? אִילֵּימָא לוֹקֶה אַחַת – פְּשִׁיטָא! וְעוֹד, מַאי כִּלְאַיִם כִּלְאַיִם? אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא שְׁתֵּי מַלְקִיּוֹת.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: From where does Rav Yosef derive this? He derives it from that which we learn in a baraita: One who sows diverse kinds, diverse kinds, i.e., he twice sows grain together with grape seeds, is flogged for violating the prohibition of diverse kinds. The Gemara asks: What is meant by: Is flogged? If we say it means that he is flogged one set of lashes, this is obvious. And additionally, if he receives only one set of lashes, what is the reason that the case of: Sowing diverse kinds twice, is mentioned, where he transgressed twice? Even if he transgressed only once, he receives lashes. Rather, it is obvious that he receives two sets of lashes.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Yosef’s source is a baraita: ‘one who sows diverse kinds, diverse kinds, is flogged.’ The Gemara unpacks the anomaly: if the ruling were a single set of lashes, it would be trivially obvious, and the strange doubling of the word kilayim would serve no purpose. The doubled word must describe a doubled act — two sowings — and the ruling must be two sets of lashes.
Key Terms:
- כִּלְאַיִם = forbidden mixtures — here kilei hakerem, sowing grain together with grape seeds (Devarim 22:9)
- לוֹקֶה = is flogged — receives malkot for an intentional, forewarned Torah violation
Segment 10
TYPE: בירור
Sequential sowing with two forewarnings is already known from the nazirite; the case must be simultaneous with one forewarning
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? אִילֵימָא בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה וּבִשְׁתֵּי הַתְרָאוֹת – תְּנֵינָא: נָזִיר שֶׁהָיָה שׁוֹתֶה יַיִן כׇּל הַיּוֹם אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת, אָמְרוּ לוֹ: ׳אַל תִּשְׁתֶּה!׳ וְהוּא שׁוֹתֶה, ׳אַל תִּשְׁתֶּה!׳ וְהוּא שׁוֹתֶה – חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת. אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא בְּבַת אַחַת וּבְהַתְרָאָה אַחַת.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: What are we dealing with? If we say that we are dealing with a case where one violates the prohibition twice, one time after the other and with two separate forewarnings, it is unnecessary for the baraita to teach this, as we already learn it in a mishna (Nazir 42a): A nazirite who was drinking wine all day is liable to receive only one set of lashes. If onlookers said to him: Do not drink, do not drink, forewarning him several times, and he drinks after each forewarning, he is liable to receive lashes for each and every drink. Rather, it is obvious that he violated the prohibition twice at the same time and with a single forewarning, i.e., after he was forewarned he sowed wheat together with a grape seed with one hand, and barley together with a grape seed with the other hand, and he receives two sets of lashes.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara narrows what the baraita can be teaching. If the two sowings were sequential, each with its own forewarning, doubled lashes are old news: the mishna in Nazir teaches that a nazirite who is forewarned before each cup of wine is liable for each and every one. The baraita must therefore describe two sowings at once — wheat with a grape seed in one hand, barley with a grape seed in the other — after a single forewarning, and it nevertheless imposes two sets of lashes. That looks exactly like Sumchos’s global principle.
Key Terms:
- הַתְרָאָה = forewarning — the formal warning a transgressor must receive immediately before the act for lashes to be administered
- בְּבַת אַחַת = simultaneously — in a single moment, under a single forewarning
Segment 11
TYPE: קושיא
Whose view can this baraita be? Not the Rabbis — by an a fortiori argument from the animal case
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַנִּי? אִילֵּימָא רַבָּנַן דִּפְלִיגִי עֲלֵיהּ דְּסוֹמְכוֹס – הַשְׁתָּא, וּמָה הָתָם דְּגוּפִין מוּחְלָקִין פָּטְרִי רַבָּנַן, הָכָא לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? If we say it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis who disagree with Sumakhos in the mishna, who hold that one who slaughters an animal and its daughter’s offspring and, later that day, slaughters its daughter receives only one set of lashes, that would not be reasonable: Now, if there, in the mishna, where there are animals that are separate entities, the Rabbis exempt him from a second set of lashes, since he violated a single prohibition with a single forewarning; here, in the baraita with regard to diverse kinds, where, unlike animals, seeds are not considered separate entities (see 83a), if one sows diverse kinds twice at the same time, should they not all the more so exempt him from a second set of lashes?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara identifies the author by elimination. The baraita cannot follow the Rabbis of our mishna: if they consolidate the lashes even where the sources of prohibition are separate animal bodies, then in kilayim — where the Gemara will explain (83a) that seeds are not considered separate entities — all the more so should they impose only one set of lashes. The kal vachomer seems to force the baraita into Sumchos’s camp.
Key Terms:
- קַל וָחוֹמֶר = a fortiori inference — if a stringency holds in a weaker case, it certainly holds in a stronger one
- מַנִּי = ‘whose view is this?’ — the standard move of identifying a source’s tannaitic author
Segment 12
TYPE: דחיית הראיה
The proof is deflected: the baraita may follow the Rabbis, with two forewarnings, and the doubling teaches two categories of kilayim
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא לָאו סוֹמְכוֹס הִיא? לָא, לְעוֹלָם רַבָּנַן, וּמִילְּתָא אַגַּב אוֹרְחֵיהּ קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּאִיכָּא תְּרֵי גַּוְונֵי כִּלְאַיִם.
English Translation:
Rather, is it not that the ruling of the baraita with regard to diverse kinds is in accordance with the opinion of Sumakhos and teaches that, even with a single entity, one who violates the same prohibition twice receives two sets of lashes? The Gemara responds: No, actually the baraita with regard to diverse kinds is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and he was forewarned before each act of sowing, which is why he receives two sets of lashes. And although this statement is redundant, by repeating the phrase: Diverse kinds, it teaches us a matter in passing: That there are two categories of the prohibition of diverse kinds: Sowing wheat together with grape seed and sowing barley together with grape seed.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rather than accept the proof for Sumchos, the Gemara reassigns the baraita’s case: the sowings were sequential, each with its own forewarning — perfectly consistent with the Rabbis, like the repeatedly forewarned nazirite. The doubled word kilayim then teaches a different lesson in passing: there are two distinct categories within the prohibition — wheat with grape seed, and barley with grape seed — each independently generating liability.
Key Terms:
- מִילְּתָא אַגַּב אוֹרְחֵיהּ קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן = ‘it teaches us a matter in passing’ — a secondary lesson embedded in the source’s phrasing
- תְּרֵי גַּוְונֵי כִּלְאַיִם = two categories of diverse kinds — each grain-plus-grape-seed pairing is its own violation
Segment 13
TYPE: המשך הדחייה
The baraita excludes Rabbi Yoshiya, who requires wheat, barley, and a grape seed sown in one hand-motion
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּלְאַפּוֹקֵי מִדְּרַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה: עַד שֶׁיִּזְרַע חִטָּה וּשְׂעוֹרָה וְחַרְצָן בְּמַפּוֹלֶת יָד, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּכִי זָרַע חִטָּה וְחַרְצָן וּשְׂעוֹרָה וְחַרְצָן נָמֵי מִחַיַּיב.
English Translation:
And the baraita serves to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiya, as Rabbi Yoshiya says: One who sows diverse kinds is not liable by Torah law until he sows wheat, and barley, and grape seed with a single hand motion, i.e., by sowing in the vineyard he violates the prohibition of diverse kinds that applies to seeds and to the vineyard simultaneously. Therefore, it teaches us that when one sows only wheat and grape seed, or only barley and grape seed, he is liable as well. Consequently, a source clarifying Sumakhos’s opinion in a case where one violates the same prohibition twice during a single lapse of awareness, or with only a single forewarning when one violated the prohibition intentionally, has not been found.
קלאוד על הדף:
The reframed baraita has a polemical target: Rabbi Yoshiya holds that Torah-level liability for sowing in a vineyard requires wheat, barley, and a grape seed cast together b’mapolet yad — in a single hand-motion. The baraita teaches otherwise: wheat with a grape seed alone, or barley with a grape seed alone, also generates liability. With the proof thus deflected, Rav Yosef’s attribution of the broad two-liabilities principle to Sumchos still lacks a source — and the Gemara must try again.
Key Terms:
- בְּמַפּוֹלֶת יָד = in one hand-motion — Rabbi Yoshiya’s condition that all three species be sown in a single cast
- וּלְאַפּוֹקֵי = ‘and to exclude’ — the source is read as rejecting a competing tannaitic view
Segment 14
TYPE: תא שמע
A new proof from the sciatic nerve mishna: two olive-bulks earn eighty lashes; Rabbi Yehuda says forty
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תָּא שְׁמַע: אָכַל מִזֶּה כְּזַיִת וּמִזֶּה כְּזַיִת – סוֹפֵג שְׁמוֹנִים. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אֵינוֹ סוֹפֵג אֶלָּא אַרְבָּעִים. הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה וּבִשְׁתֵּי הַתְרָאוֹת – מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה? הַתְרָאַת סָפֵק הִיא, וְשָׁמְעִינַן לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה דְּאָמַר: הַתְרָאַת סָפֵק לֹא שְׁמָהּ הַתְרָאָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution from a mishna with regard to the prohibition against eating from the sciatic nerve (96a): If one ate an olive-bulk from this sciatic nerve in the right leg of an animal, and an olive-bulk from that sciatic nerve in the left leg of the same animal, he incurs eighty lashes. Rabbi Yehuda says: He incurs only forty lashes. The Gemara analyzes the mishna: What are the circumstances? If we say that he ate them one after the other and with two separate forewarnings, what is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? According to Rabbi Yehuda, it is an uncertain forewarning, as Rabbi Yehuda is uncertain whether the prohibition against eating from the sciatic nerve applies to the sciatic nerve of the right thigh or that of the left thigh (see 90b). And we have heard that Rabbi Yehuda says: An uncertain forewarning is not considered a forewarning.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara attempts another proof, from the mishna about the gid hanasheh (96a): one who ate an olive-bulk from the sciatic nerve of the right leg and an olive-bulk from that of the left leg incurs eighty lashes; Rabbi Yehuda says only forty. The analysis begins by eliminating the sequential reading: if he ate them one after the other with two forewarnings, Rabbi Yehuda should exempt him entirely — for Rabbi Yehuda holds the prohibition may apply to only one of the two thighs (90b), making each forewarning a hatra’at safek, and Rabbi Yehuda famously holds an uncertain forewarning is no forewarning.
Key Terms:
- גִּיד הַנָּשֶׁה = the sciatic nerve, forbidden for consumption since the episode of Yaakov’s struggle (Bereishit 32:33)
- הַתְרָאַת סָפֵק = an uncertain forewarning — one given where it is not certain that the act will constitute a violation
Segment 15
TYPE: ברייתא
The source for Rabbi Yehuda’s position: one who is uncertain which of two men is his father
Hebrew/Aramaic:
דְּתַנְיָא: הִכָּה אֶת זֶה וְחָזַר וְהִכָּה אֶת זֶה, קִלֵּל אֶת זֶה וְחָזַר וְקִלֵּל אֶת זֶה, אוֹ שֶׁהִכָּה שְׁנֵיהֶם בְּבַת אַחַת, אוֹ שֶׁקִּלֵּל שְׁנֵיהֶם בְּבַת אַחַת – חַיָּיב.
English Translation:
As it is taught in a baraita: If one is uncertain which of two men is his father, and he struck this man and then struck that man, or cursed this man and then cursed that man, or struck both of them simultaneously, or cursed both of them simultaneously, in all these cases he is liable for violating the prohibition of: “And he that strikes his father, or his mother, shall be put to death” (Exodus 21:15), or that of: “And he that curses his father, or his mother, shall be put to death” (Exodus 21:17), as one of them is certainly his father.
קלאוד על הדף:
The baraita underlying that claim: a man is uncertain which of two men is his father. If he struck this one and then struck that one, cursed this one and then cursed that one, or struck or cursed both simultaneously — the first tanna holds him liable in all these cases, because one of the two is certainly his father, and the capital prohibitions of striking and cursing a parent (Shemot 21:15, 21:17) have certainly been violated.
Key Terms:
- מַכֶּה אָבִיו וּמְקַלְּלוֹ = striking or cursing one’s father — both capital prohibitions in the Torah
- בְּבַת אַחַת = simultaneously — e.g., striking both men with a single blow
Segment 16
TYPE: ברייתא (המשך) ומסקנת הבירור
Rabbi Yehuda: simultaneously he is liable, sequentially he is exempt — so the sciatic nerve case must be simultaneous with one forewarning
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בְּבַת אַחַת – חַיָּיב, בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה – פָּטוּר. אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא בְּבַת אַחַת וּבְהַתְרָאָה אַחַת.
English Translation:
Rabbi Yehuda says: Although if he struck or cursed both of them simultaneously he is liable, if he struck or cursed them one after the other, he is exempt, as each time he strikes or curses one of them he receives an uncertain forewarning, as perhaps this man is not his father, and one is liable only after receiving a definite forewarning. Consequently, if one was forewarned before eating from the sciatic nerve from the right leg, and afterward he was forewarned before eating from the sciatic nerve from the left leg, he would similarly be exempt as each of the forewarnings was uncertain. Rather, it is obvious that the case in the mishna is one where he partook of the two sciatic nerves simultaneously and with a single forewarning, and therefore, he incurs only forty lashes according to Rabbi Yehuda.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yehuda distinguishes: if he struck both simultaneously, he is liable — the forewarning certainly covered his father. But sequentially, each individual act carries only an uncertain forewarning — perhaps this particular man is not his father — and Rabbi Yehuda exempts. Applied to the sciatic nerves: had the eating been sequential with two forewarnings, Rabbi Yehuda would rule complete exemption, not forty lashes. It must be that the mishna’s case is eating both nerves simultaneously under a single forewarning — and Rabbi Yehuda imposes one set of lashes.
Key Terms:
- בְּבַת אַחַת חַיָּיב, בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה פָּטוּר = simultaneously — liable; one after the other — exempt, because each sequential forewarning is uncertain
Segment 17
TYPE: קושיא
Then who is the first tanna ruling eighty? Not the Rabbis, by a kal vachomer — so it must be Sumchos!
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּמַאן תַּנָּא קַמָּא? אִילֵימָא רַבָּנַן דִּפְלִיגִי עֲלֵיהּ דְּסוֹמְכוֹס – הַשְׁתָּא, וּמָה הָתָם דְּגוּפִין מוּחְלָקִין פָּטְרִי רַבָּנַן, הָכָא לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן? אֶלָּא לָאו סוֹמְכוֹס הִיא!
English Translation:
And who is the first tanna who holds that in such a case one receives eighty lashes? If we say that it is the Rabbis who disagree with Sumakhos in the mishna about the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, that would conflict with their opinion: Now, if there, in the case of the mishna that discusses various animals that are separate entities, the Rabbis deem him exempt from a second set of lashes, here, in the mishna that discusses the sciatic nerve, where there are no separate animals, should they not all the more so exempt him from a second set of lashes? Rather, is the mishna not in accordance with the opinion of Sumakhos? Consequently, in his opinion one who eats the same prohibited item, such as an olive-bulk of forbidden fat, twice after a single forewarning receives two sets of lashes.
קלאוד על הדף:
The identification closes in: if the case is simultaneous consumption under one forewarning, the first tanna’s eighty lashes cannot be the Rabbis of our mishna. They exempt from a second set of lashes even where the prohibiting sources are separate animal bodies; all the more so here, where both nerves belong to a single animal. The mishna seems forced into Sumchos’s camp — apparently at last proving Rav Yosef’s claim that Sumchos doubles liability even for repeated violation of one prohibition under one forewarning.
Key Terms:
- תַּנָּא קַמָּא = the first, anonymous opinion in a mishna, usually representing the majority view
Segment 18
TYPE: דחייה
Deflected again: the case may be sequential with two forewarnings, following the other version of Rabbi Yehuda
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לָא, לְעוֹלָם בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה, וְרַבָּנַן, וְהַאי תַּנָּא סָבַר לַהּ כְּאִידַּךְ תַּנָּא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: No, actually the case is one where he ate from the two sciatic nerves one after the other and received separate forewarnings, and the first opinion in that mishna is that of the Rabbis who disagree with Sumakhos with regard to: Itself and its offspring. And as for the difficulty that Rabbi Yehuda does not render one liable if the forewarning is an uncertain one, this tanna holds in accordance with the opinion of another tanna with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara escapes once more: the sciatic-nerve mishna may indeed describe sequential eating with separate forewarnings — in which case the eighty lashes are consistent even with the Rabbis, exactly like the repeatedly forewarned nazirite. As for the objection that Rabbi Yehuda invalidates uncertain forewarnings, the answer lies in pluralism within his own tradition: this tanna transmits Rabbi Yehuda in accordance with the other tanna, who reports that Rabbi Yehuda does consider an uncertain forewarning a valid forewarning.
Key Terms:
- כְּאִידַּךְ תַּנָּא = ‘like the other tanna’ — an alternative tradition of what Rabbi Yehuda actually held
Segment 19
TYPE: ברייתא
The source that Rabbi Yehuda validates uncertain forewarning: the verse of notar from the Paschal offering
Hebrew/Aramaic:
דְּאָמַר: הַתְרָאַת סָפֵק שְׁמָהּ הַתְרָאָה, דְּתַנְיָא: ״לֹא תוֹתִירוּ מִמֶּנּוּ עַד בֹּקֶר וְהַנֹּתָר מִמֶּנּוּ עַד בֹּקֶר בָּאֵשׁ תִּשְׂרֹפוּ״ –
English Translation:
As that other tanna says that Rabbi Yehuda holds: An uncertain forewarning is considered a forewarning, as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to the Paschal offering: “And you shall not leave any of it until morning; but that which remains of it until morning you shall burn with fire” (Exodus 12:10).
קלאוד על הדף:
The daf closes mid-citation of the supporting baraita: the Torah commands regarding the Paschal offering, ‘you shall not leave any of it until morning; but that which remains of it until morning you shall burn with fire’ (Shemot 12:10). The derivation — completed on 83a — will show that Rabbi Yehuda administers lashes for leaving over sacrificial meat despite the fact that any forewarning for notar is inherently uncertain (the person might still eat the meat before dawn), proving that in this version Rabbi Yehuda holds an uncertain forewarning is a valid forewarning.
Key Terms:
- נוֹתָר = sacrificial meat left beyond its permitted time for eating, which must be burned
- בָּאֵשׁ תִּשְׂרֹפוּ = ‘you shall burn it with fire’ — the positive command that frames the prohibition of leaving over