Chullin Daf 81 (חולין דף פ״א)
Daf: 81 | Amudim: 81a – 81b | Date: Loading...
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (81a)
Segment 1
TYPE: תירוץ
Rabbi Zeira’s answer completed: mechusar zman was transmuted into a positive commandment
Hebrew/Aramaic:
נִתְּקוֹ לַעֲשֵׂה. מַאי טַעְמָא? דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״מִיּוֹם הַשְּׁמִינִי וָהָלְאָה יֵרָצֶה״ – מִיּוֹם הַשְׁמִינִי אִין, מֵעִיקָּרָא לָא. לָאו הַבָּא מִכְּלַל עֲשֵׂה – עֲשֵׂה.
English Translation:
transmuted it from the standard prohibition of: It shall not be accepted, which is violated in the case of the other disqualifications, into a prohibition that stems from a positive mitzva. What is the reasoning by which this is derived? It is derived from that which the verse states: “From the eighth day and forward it may be accepted for an offering” (Leviticus 22:27), which teaches that from the eighth day after its birth, yes, it may be sacrificed as an offering, but initially, before the eighth day, no, it may not be sacrificed. Therefore, this is a prohibition that stems from a positive mitzva, which is not considered a negative prohibition for which one is flogged, but rather a positive mitzva.
קלאוד על הדף:
The daf opens by completing Rabbi Zeira’s answer from the end of daf 80: Scripture removed mechusar zman from the flogging rule of ‘lo yeratzeh’ by recasting it as a positive commandment (nitko la’aseh). The verse states ‘from the eighth day and forward it may be accepted’ (Vayikra 22:27) — from the eighth day yes, before it no. A prohibition inferred from a positive statement (lav haba miklal aseh) has the status of a positive mitzvah, and positive mitzvot carry no lashes. That is why the mishna assigned the second slaughterer no lashes for mechusar zman.
Key Terms:
- נִתְּקוֹ לַעֲשֵׂה = ‘It was transmuted into a positive commandment’ — removed from the category of flogged prohibitions
- לָאו הַבָּא מִכְּלַל עֲשֵׂה – עֲשֵׂה = ‘A prohibition inferred from a positive statement is a positive mitzvah’ — and carries no lashes
Segment 2
TYPE: קושיא
But that verse is needed for Rabbi Aptoriki’s derivation about the eighth night
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ לְכִדְרַבִּי אַפְטוֹרִיקִי, דְּרַבִּי אַפְטוֹרִיקִי רָמֵי: כְּתִיב ״וְהָיָה שִׁבְעַת יָמִים תַּחַת אִמּוֹ״, הָא לַיְלָה חֲזֵי, וּכְתִיב ״מִיּוֹם הַשְּׁמִינִי וָהָלְאָה יֵרָצֶה״ – מִיּוֹם הַשְּׁמִינִי וָהָלְאָה אִין, לַיְלָה לָא!
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: But this verse is required for the statement of Rabbi Aptoriki, as Rabbi Aptoriki raises a contradiction: It is written: “Then it shall be seven days with its mother” (Leviticus 22:27), indicating that on the night after the seventh day it is already fit to be sacrificed. But it is also written in that verse: “From the eighth day and forward it may be accepted,” indicating that from the eighth day forward, yes, it is fit, but on the night before it is not.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara challenges the derivation: the phrase ‘from the eighth day and forward’ is already spoken for. Rabbi Aptoriki noted an internal contradiction in the verse: ‘it shall be seven days with its mother’ implies the animal is fit from the night after the seventh day, while ‘from the eighth day and forward it may be accepted’ implies only from the daytime of the eighth. If the phrase resolves that contradiction, how can it also serve as the source for nitko la’aseh?
Key Terms:
- רָמֵי = ‘He raises a contradiction’ — juxtaposing two clauses of the same verse against each other
- לַיְלָה חֲזֵי = ‘The night is fit’ — the implication of ‘seven days with its mother’ that the eighth night already suffices
Segment 3
TYPE: תירוץ
The resolution: night for consecration, day for acceptance — and a second verse supplies the aseh
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָא כֵּיצַד? לַיְלָה לִקְדוּשָּׁה, יוֹם לְהַרְצָאָה. כְּתִיב קְרָא אַחֲרִינָא: ״כֵּן תַּעֲשֶׂה לְשֹׁרְךָ לְצֹאנֶךָ״.
English Translation:
How can these texts be reconciled? The night after the seventh day is fit for consecration, which is permitted at that time, while the eighth day is fit for effecting acceptance, and only then may it be sacrificed on the altar. The Gemara answers that another verse is also written that specifies this positive mitzva: “So shall you do with your ox and with your sheep; seven days shall it be with its mother; on the eighth day you shall give it to Me” (Exodus 22:29).
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Aptoriki resolved his contradiction: the eighth night is fit for consecration (kedushah) — the animal may be sanctified as an offering — while the eighth day is required for acceptance (hartza’ah) on the altar. Since the Vayikra verse is thus fully occupied, the Gemara supplies another verse for the positive commandment: ‘So shall you do with your ox and with your sheep; seven days it shall be with its mother; on the eighth day you shall give it to Me’ (Shemot 22:29). The nitko la’aseh structure stands on this second source.
Key Terms:
- לַיְלָה לִקְדוּשָּׁה, יוֹם לְהַרְצָאָה = ‘Night for consecration, day for acceptance’ — the two stages distinguished by the verse
- כֵּן תַּעֲשֶׂה לְשֹׁרְךָ לְצֹאנֶךָ = ‘So shall you do with your ox and your sheep’ (Shemot 22:29) — the alternative source for the positive mitzvah
Segment 4
TYPE: שמעתא
Rav Hamnuna: Rabbi Shimon would say oto v’et beno does not apply to kodashim at all
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב הַמְנוּנָא: אוֹמֵר הָיָה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: אֵין אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ נוֹהֵג בְּקׇדָשִׁים, מַאי טַעְמָא? כֵּיוָן דְּאָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה לֹא שְׁמָהּ שְׁחִיטָה, שְׁחִיטַת קֳדָשִׁים נָמֵי שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה הִיא.
English Translation:
The Gemara returns to discussing Rabbi Shimon’s opinion with regard to slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day. Rav Hamnuna says that Rabbi Shimon would say: The prohibition against slaughtering an animal itself and its offspring does not apply to sacrificial animals. What is the reason? The reason is that since Rabbi Shimon says that an act of slaughter that is unfit to permit consumption is not considered to have the halakhic status of an act of slaughter, the prohibition will not apply here. This case of slaughtering sacrificial animals is also considered slaughter that is unfit, in that the flesh may not be burned upon the altar or eaten until the blood has been presented.
קלאוד על הדף:
A new discussion of Rabbi Shimon’s position. Rav Hamnuna reports: Rabbi Shimon would say that the prohibition of oto v’et beno does not apply to sacrificial animals. The reasoning is the principle established on daf 80: an unfit slaughter is not a slaughter, and the slaughter of kodashim is ‘unfit’ at the moment of the act — the meat is permitted neither to the altar nor to man until the blood is sprinkled. If the first slaughter is no slaughter, the prohibition never engages.
Key Terms:
- אֵין אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ נוֹהֵג בְּקָדָשִׁים = ‘Oto v’et beno does not apply to kodashim’ — Rav Hamnuna’s initial formulation of Rabbi Shimon’s view
Segment 5
TYPE: מתיב
Rava objects from a baraita: Rabbi Shimon assigns the second animal a lo ta’aseh for outside slaughter
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מֵתִיב רָבָא: אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ קָדָשִׁים בַּחוּץ, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: שֵׁנִי בְּלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה, שֶׁהָיָה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: כׇּל הָרָאוּי לָבֹא לְאַחַר זְמַן – הֲרֵי הוּא בְּלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה וְאֵין בּוֹ כָּרֵת, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: כֹּל שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ כָּרֵת – אֵינוֹ בְּלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה.
English Translation:
Rava raises an objection from a baraita: If one slaughtered an animal itself and its offspring and both animals were sacrificial animals slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, Rabbi Shimon says: For slaughtering the second animal he transgresses a prohibition in slaughtering it outside the Temple, as Rabbi Shimon would say: With regard to any offering that is fit to come to the altar after a certain amount of time and is offered outside the Temple before that time, he who slaughters it transgresses a prohibition, but there is no liability to receive karet. And the Rabbis say: With regard to any offering slaughtered outside of the Temple for which there is no liability to receive karet because it is unfit to be an offering at that time, he who sacrifices it also does not transgress a prohibition.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava objects from a baraita: where both animals are kodashim slaughtered outside, Rabbi Shimon says the second slaughterer transgresses a prohibition (lo ta’aseh) — for Rabbi Shimon holds that any offering ‘fit to come after time’ that is slaughtered outside carries a prohibition without karet. The Chachamim hold the reverse: where there is no karet there is no prohibition at all. The baraita’s very structure will refute Rav Hamnuna’s formulation — but first the Gemara must repair the baraita itself.
Key Terms:
- כׇּל הָרָאוּי לָבֹא לְאַחַר זְמַן = ‘Whatever is fit to come after time’ — an offering merely deferred, not inherently unfit; per Rabbi Shimon its outside slaughter carries a lav
- מֵתִיב = ‘He raises an objection’ — from a tannaitic source against an amoraic formulation
Segment 6
TYPE: קושיא
The internal difficulty: on Rabbi Shimon’s own principle the second should incur karet
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְקַשְׁיָא לַן: קָדָשִׁים בַּחוּץ, שֵׁנִי בְּלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה? קַמָּא מִיקְטָל קְטַל, שֵׁנִי מִתְקַבֵּל בִּפְנִים הוּא, כָּרֵת נָמֵי לִיחַיַּיב!
English Translation:
And this statement in the baraita is difficult for us: If both animals were sacrificial animals slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, Rabbi Shimon says: For slaughtering the second animal he transgresses a prohibition for slaughtering outside the Temple. According to Rabbi Shimon, slaughter that is unfit for consumption is not considered slaughter. Therefore, with regard to the first animal, it is as if he has killed it without ritual slaughter, since its slaughter was unfit, and the second animal would be accepted inside the Temple upon the altar. Therefore, let one who slaughters it outside of the Temple be liable to receive karet as well.
קלאוד על הדף:
Before using the baraita, the Gemara notes its difficulty: if Rabbi Shimon holds an unfit slaughter is no slaughter, the first outside slaughter was mere killing — the second animal was never barred by oto v’et beno and remained fully acceptable inside. Its slaughter outside should then be complete shechutei chutz, bearing karet — not the mere lo ta’aseh the baraita assigns. The baraita as it stands cannot be Rabbi Shimon’s full position.
Key Terms:
- מִתְקַבֵּל בִּפְנִים = ‘Acceptable inside’ — an animal fit for the altar, whose outside slaughter carries karet
Segment 7
TYPE: חסורי מחסרא
Rava’s reconstruction begins: both outside — per the Rabanan, karet for the first, exemption for the second
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאָמַר רָבָא, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ כְּדִי: חַסּוֹרֵי מִיחַסְּרָא וְהָכִי קָתָנֵי: קָדָשִׁים שְׁנֵיהֶם בַּחוּץ, לְרַבָּנַן – רִאשׁוֹן עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת, שֵׁנִי פָּסוּל וּפָטוּר מִלָּאו דִּשְׁחוּטֵי חוּץ.
English Translation:
And Rava said, and some say it unattributed: The baraita is incomplete and this is what it is teaching: If one slaughters an animal and its offspring that are both sacrificial animals, and both of them are slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, the slaughter of the first animal is punishable by karet, while the second animal is disqualified as its time has not yet arrived, and therefore, for its slaughter one is exempt from punishment for violating the prohibition of offerings slaughtered outside the Temple.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava (some report it anonymously) declares the baraita incomplete (chasurei mechsara) and reconstructs it as three cases. Case one, both kodashim slaughtered outside, per the Rabanan: the first slaughterer is punished with karet — a full shechutei chutz; the second animal is disqualified as mechusar zman (barred by oto v’et beno from the first, valid slaughter), and its slaughterer is therefore exempt from the prohibition of outside slaughter — an unfit animal’s outside slaughter carries no liability.
Key Terms:
- חַסּוֹרֵי מִיחַסְּרָא וְהָכִי קָתָנֵי = ‘It is incomplete and this is what it teaches’ — the formula for reconstructing a defective baraita
Segment 8
TYPE: המשך
Per Rabbi Shimon: both slaughterers are punished with karet
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן – שְׁנֵיהֶם עֲנוּשִׁים כָּרֵת.
English Translation:
According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, the slaughter of both of them, including the second one alone, is punishable by karet. This is because the slaughter of the first is not considered slaughter, and therefore it does not disqualify the second through the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring.
קלאוד על הדף:
The same case per Rabbi Shimon: both are punished with karet. Since for him the first slaughter — unfit, being outside — is no slaughter at all, it never triggers oto v’et beno; the second animal therefore remained fully fit for the altar, and its outside slaughter is complete shechutei chutz with karet. The reconstruction shows Rabbi Shimon applying his unfit-slaughter principle consistently: it removes the mother-offspring bar and thereby intensifies the second slaughterer’s liability.
Key Terms:
- שְׁנֵיהֶם עֲנוּשִׁים כָּרֵת = ‘Both are punished with karet’ — Rabbi Shimon’s consistent application of his principle
Segment 9
TYPE: המשך
Second case — first outside, second inside: per Rabbi Shimon the second is fully fit
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶחָד בַּחוּץ וְאֶחָד בִּפְנִים: לְרַבָּנַן – רִאשׁוֹן עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת, שֵׁנִי פָּסוּל וּפָטוּר; לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן – שֵׁנִי כָּשֵׁר.
English Translation:
If an animal and its offspring that are sacrificial animals are slaughtered, the first one outside the Temple courtyard, and the second one inside the Temple courtyard, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, the slaughter of the first is punishable by karet, while the second animal is disqualified as its time has not yet arrived, and its slaughterer is exempt from punishment for its slaughter outside the Temple, because he slaughtered it inside the Temple. According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, the second animal is fit for the altar, and it is sacrificed, as the slaughter of the first animal is not considered slaughter, and therefore the slaughter of the second does not violate the prohibition of a mother and its offspring.
קלאוד על הדף:
Case two: the first animal slaughtered outside, the second inside. Per the Rabanan: the first bears karet; the second — though slaughtered in its proper place — is disqualified as mechusar zman and its slaughterer exempt. Per Rabbi Shimon: the second is kasher — fit for the altar and offered. The first slaughter was no slaughter, so no oto v’et beno bar ever arose; the second animal, slaughtered inside, is simply a valid offering. The gap between the two views is at its widest here: disqualified versus sacrificed.
Key Terms:
- שֵׁנִי כָּשֵׁר = ‘The second is fit’ — per Rabbi Shimon it is offered on the altar
Segment 10
TYPE: המשך
Third case — first inside, second outside: per Rabbi Shimon the second carries a lo ta’aseh
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶחָד בִּפְנִים וְאֶחָד בַּחוּץ: לְרַבָּנַן – רִאשׁוֹן כָּשֵׁר וּפָטוּר, שֵׁנִי פָּסוּל וּפָטוּר, לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן – שֵׁנִי בְּלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה.
English Translation:
If an animal and its offspring that are sacrificial animals are slaughtered, the first one inside the Temple courtyard and the second one outside the Temple courtyard, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, the first animal is fit for the altar, and one who slaughters it is exempt from any punishment, as its slaughter is perfectly legitimate. The second is unfit for the altar, as it was slaughtered outside the Temple, but its slaughterer is exempt from punishment for its slaughter outside the Temple because it is unfit for the altar, as its time has not yet arrived. According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, for slaughtering the second animal outside the Temple one transgresses a prohibition, as he holds that an offering whose time has not yet arrived that was slaughtered outside the Temple violates a prohibition.
קלאוד על הדף:
Case three: the first slaughtered inside (a valid offering — fit, and its slaughterer exempt), the second outside. Per the Rabanan: the second is disqualified and its slaughterer exempt even from the outside-slaughter prohibition, since the animal was mechusar zman and unfit. Per Rabbi Shimon: the second carries a lo ta’aseh — his stated principle that an offering merely deferred (‘fit to come after time’) still engages the prohibition of outside slaughter, though not karet. This is where the original baraita’s line belongs.
Key Terms:
- רָאוּי לָבֹא לְאַחַר זְמַן = Deferred but not unfit — enough, per Rabbi Shimon, for the outside-slaughter prohibition without karet
Segment 11
TYPE: סיום הקושיא
The objection lands: if oto v’et beno did not apply to kodashim, the second should incur karet
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ אֵין ״אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ״ נוֹהֵג בְּקָדָשִׁים, שֵׁנִי אַמַּאי בְּלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה וְתוּ לָא? כָּרֵת נָמֵי לִיחַיַּיב!
English Translation:
Rava now explains his objection: And if it enters your mind that the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, does not apply to sacrificial animals, then with regard to slaughtering the second animal outside the Temple, why does one transgress only a prohibition and nothing more? Let him be liable to receive karet as well, as since its slaughter does not violate the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, it would fit to be sacrificed inside the Temple. Therefore, it is clear that the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, does apply to sacrificial animals.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava now springs the trap. In the third case Rabbi Shimon assigns the second slaughterer only a lo ta’aseh — meaning the animal was genuinely barred from the altar that day. Barred by what? Only by oto v’et beno from the first, valid, inside slaughter. If the prohibition did not apply to kodashim, as Rav Hamnuna formulated, the second animal would have been fully acceptable inside, and its outside slaughter should carry karet. The baraita therefore proves that oto v’et beno does apply to sacrificial animals even per Rabbi Shimon.
Key Terms:
- כָּרֵת נָמֵי לִיחַיַּיב = ‘Let him also be liable to karet’ — the inference that refutes Rav Hamnuna’s broad formulation
Segment 12
TYPE: מסקנא
Rava’s reinterpretation: only the lashes of oto v’et beno do not apply to kodashim
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא, הָכִי קָא אָמַר רַב הַמְנוּנָא: אֵין מַלְקוֹת ״אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ״ נוֹהֵג בְּקָדָשִׁים,
English Translation:
Rather, Rava said: This is what Rav Hamnuna is saying: Though the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, does apply to sacrificial animals, the administering of lashes for violating the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, does not apply to sacrificial animals.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava re-reads Rav Hamnuna’s report: Rabbi Shimon means that the lashes of oto v’et beno do not apply to sacrificial animals — the prohibition itself does. The animal is genuinely barred from the altar (hence only a lo ta’aseh in the baraita’s third case), but the slaughterer cannot be flogged. The next segment supplies the mechanism.
Key Terms:
- אֵין מַלְקוֹת… נוֹהֵג בְּקָדָשִׁים = ‘The lashes do not apply to kodashim’ — the prohibition stands; only the punishment falls away
Segment 13
TYPE: טעמא
The mechanism: until the blood is sprinkled, the forewarning is only a hatra’at safek
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כֵּיוָן דְּכַמָּה דְּלָא זָרֵיק דָּם – לָא מִישְׁתְּרֵי בָּשָׂר, מֵעִידָּנָא דְּקָא שָׁחֵיט הָוֵאי הַתְרָאַת סָפֵק, וְהַתְרָאַת סָפֵק – לֹא שְׁמָהּ הַתְרָאָה.
English Translation:
The reason is that since as long as one has not sprinkled the blood, the flesh is not permitted to be burned on the altar or eaten, at the time that one slaughters the second animal, when he receives a forewarning that his action violates the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, it is an uncertain forewarning, because if the blood will not be sprinkled, the flesh will not be permitted, sparing him from violating the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring. And an uncertain forewarning is not considered a valid forewarning that renders one liable to receive lashes.
קלאוד על הדף:
Why no lashes? Because until the blood is sprinkled, the meat is not permitted — so at the moment one slaughters the second animal, the forewarning is uncertain: if the first animal’s blood is never sprinkled, its slaughter will retroactively be ‘unfit’ on Rabbi Shimon’s principle and no prohibition will have been violated. A forewarning contingent on a future event is a hatra’at safek, and an uncertain forewarning is not a forewarning. The doctrine that closed daf 80’s koy discussion now resolves the kodashim question as well.
Key Terms:
- הַתְרָאַת סָפֵק לֹא שְׁמָהּ הַתְרָאָה = ‘An uncertain forewarning is not a forewarning’ — no lashes where liability depends on a future contingency
Segment 14
TYPE: אזדא לטעמיה
Rava is consistent: non-sacred mother and shelamim offspring — the order determines liability
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאַזְדָּא רָבָא לְטַעְמֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר רָבָא: הִיא חוּלִּין וּבְנָהּ שְׁלָמִים, שָׁחַט חוּלִּין וְאַחַר כָּךְ שָׁחַט שְׁלָמִים – פָּטוּר.
English Translation:
And Rava follows his line of reasoning, as Rava says: According to Rabbi Shimon, who holds that one does not incur punishment for the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, for a slaughtering that is unfit, if she, the mother, is non-sacred, and her offspring is a peace offering, and one slaughtered the non-sacred mother, and afterward one slaughtered her offspring that is a peace offering on the same day, he is exempt for slaughtering the offspring. This is because the forewarning for slaughtering the offspring is uncertain as its blood might not be sprinkled, rendering the slaughter unfit.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava applies the principle consistently. If the mother is chullin and her offspring a shelamim (peace offering): slaughtering the chullin mother first and then the shelamim — exempt, for the shelamim’s own liability hangs on its future sprinkling, making the forewarning uncertain. But slaughtering the shelamim first (with its blood sprinkled) and then the chullin mother — liable: the second slaughter is of ordinary meat, immediately permitted, and the forewarning is definite.
Key Terms:
- הִיא חוּלִּין וּבְנָהּ שְׁלָמִים = A non-sacred mother and a peace-offering offspring — Rava’s test case for the forewarning principle
Segment 15
TYPE: המשך
The olah case begins: with a burnt offering even the reverse order is exempt
Hebrew/Aramaic:
שְׁלָמִים וְאַחַר כָּךְ חוּלִּין – חַיָּיב, וְאָמַר רָבָא: הִיא חוּלִּין וּבְנָהּ עוֹלָה, לָא מִיבַּעְיָא שָׁחַט חוּלִּין וְאַחַר כָּךְ שָׁחַט עוֹלָה דְּפָטוּר,
English Translation:
But if one slaughtered the offspring that is a peace offering first and sprinkled its blood, and afterward he slaughtered the non-sacred mother, he is liable to receive lashes for slaughtering the mother. Once the non-sacred mother is slaughtered, the meat is fit; therefore, the forewarning is definite. And Rava says: If she, the mother, is non-sacred, and her offspring is sacrificed as a burnt offering, and both are slaughtered on the same day, it is not necessary to state that if one slaughtered the non-sacred mother, and afterward he slaughtered her offspring as a burnt offering, that he is exempt.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava adds a stronger case: mother chullin, offspring an olah (burnt offering). It goes without saying that slaughtering the chullin first and the olah second exempts — the same uncertain forewarning. The chiddush is the reverse order, completed on the next amud: even slaughtering the olah first and the chullin second is exempt — for reasons unique to the burnt offering.
Key Terms:
- עוֹלָה = A burnt offering — entirely consumed on the altar, with no human consumption at all
Amud Bet (81b)
Segment 1
TYPE: המשך
The olah’s slaughter is ‘not a slaughter subject to eating’ — so the chullin slaughter is also exempt
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ שָׁחַט עוֹלָה וְאַחַר כָּךְ שָׁחַט חוּלִּין – פָּטוּר, שְׁחִיטָה קַמַּיְיתָא לָאו שְׁחִיטָה בַּת אֲכִילָה הִיא.
English Translation:
But even if one slaughtered the offspring as a burnt offering and sprinkled its blood, and afterward slaughtered the non-sacred mother, he is exempt. The reason is that the slaughter of the first animal is not an act of slaughter subject to consumption, as a burnt offering is entirely burned upon the altar, and according to Rabbi Shimon, it is an act of slaughter that is improper, in that it does not render the meat fit to be eaten, is not considered slaughter.
קלאוד על הדף:
The completion of Rava’s ruling: even where the olah was slaughtered first and its blood sprinkled, one who then slaughters the chullin mother is exempt. A burnt offering is wholly consumed on the altar — no person ever eats it — so on Rabbi Shimon’s principle its slaughter was never a ‘slaughter subject to eating’ and does not count as the first slaughter of oto v’et beno. The mother’s slaughter is then not a ‘second’ slaughter at all.
Key Terms:
- שְׁחִיטָה בַּת אֲכִילָה = ‘A slaughter subject to eating’ — Rava’s criterion: without human consumption, the olah’s slaughter never engages the prohibition
Segment 2
TYPE: שיטה חולקת
Rabbi Yaakov citing Rabbi Yochanan: consumption by the altar is consumption
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְרַבִּי יַעֲקֹב אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: אֲכִילַת מִזְבֵּחַ שְׁמָהּ אֲכִילָה. מַאי טַעְמָא? דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״וְאִם הֵאָכֹל יֵאָכֵל מִבְּשַׂר זֶבַח שְׁלָמָיו״.
English Translation:
And Rabbi Ya’akov says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Consumption by the altar is considered consumption. What is the reason? The reason is that the verse states with regard to an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it after its designated time [piggul]: “And if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings be at all eaten [he’akhol ye’akhel] on the third day, it shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 7:18).
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yaakov in the name of Rabbi Yochanan rejects Rava’s olah leniency: achilat mizbe’ach shemah achilah — the altar’s consumption is consumption. The olah’s flesh is ‘eaten’ by the altar’s fire, so its slaughter is a slaughter subject to eating, and one who slaughters the mother afterward is liable even per Rabbi Shimon. The dispute turns on whether ‘eating’ in Rabbi Shimon’s criterion means human eating specifically.
Key Terms:
- אֲכִילַת מִזְבֵּחַ שְׁמָהּ אֲכִילָה = ‘Consumption by the altar is called consumption’ — Rabbi Yochanan’s principle against Rava’s olah exemption
Segment 3
TYPE: מקור
The source: ‘he’achol ye’achel’ — Scripture speaks of two consumptions, man’s and the altar’s
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בִּשְׁתֵּי אֲכִילוֹת הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר, אֶחָד אֲכִילַת אָדָם וְאֶחָד אֲכִילַת מִזְבֵּחַ.
English Translation:
The repetitive expression “he’akhol ye’akhel” teaches that the verse is speaking of two types of consumption: One is human consumption, and the other one is consumption by the altar, and both are considered consumption with regard to piggul and other matters. Therefore, the slaughter of a burnt offering is considered slaughter that is fit for consumption, and the slaughter of a mother animal and its offspring, one of which is sacrificed as a burnt offering on the same day as the slaughter of the other, renders one liable to receive lashes even according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.
קלאוד על הדף:
The derivation: in the law of piggul the verse doubles the verb — ‘if any of the flesh of his peace offering he’achol ye’achel (be at all eaten) on the third day’ (Vayikra 7:18). The doubled infinitive teaches that Scripture speaks of two consumptions: human consumption and altar consumption, and both count as ‘eating’ throughout the Torah. On this reading the olah’s slaughter is fully ‘subject to eating,’ and Rava’s exemption in the olah-first case falls away.
Key Terms:
- הֵאָכֹל יֵאָכֵל = The doubled verb of Vayikra 7:18 — expounded as two consumptions, by man and by the altar
- פִּגּוּל = An offering slaughtered with intent to eat it beyond its time — the context of the derivation
Segment 4
TYPE: משנה
The new mishna: five unfit slaughters — Rabbi Shimon exempts, the Chachamim obligate
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְנִי׳ הַשּׁוֹחֵט וְנִמְצָא טְרֵפָה, הַשּׁוֹחֵט לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, וְהַשּׁוֹחֵט פָּרַת חַטָּאת, וְשׁוֹר הַנִּסְקָל, וְעֶגְלָה עֲרוּפָה – רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן פּוֹטֵר, וַחֲכָמִים מְחַיְּיבִין.
English Translation:
MISHNA: With regard to one who slaughters an animal and its offspring and one of them is discovered to be an animal with a wound that would have caused it to die within twelve months [tereifa] and may not be eaten, or one who slaughters one of the animals for the sake of idol worship, from which deriving benefit is prohibited, or one who slaughters the red heifer of purification, or an ox that was to have been stoned, or a heifer whose neck was to have been broken, all of which are animals from which deriving benefit is prohibited, Rabbi Shimon deems one who slaughters them exempt from lashes for the slaughter of a mother and its offspring, as in his opinion, slaughter that does not render the animal fit for consumption is not considered slaughter and does not violate the prohibition. And the Rabbis deem him liable, as the slaughter need not render the animal fit for consumption in order to violate the prohibition.
קלאוד על הדף:
The mishna generalizes the Rabbi Shimon dispute into five cases of slaughter that does not permit the meat: one of the pair is found to be a tereifah; one is slaughtered for idol worship (benefit prohibited); the parah adumah (red heifer); an ox condemned to stoning; and the eglah arufah (the heifer whose neck is broken) — all animals from which benefit is prohibited. Rabbi Shimon exempts the slaughterer from oto v’et beno lashes — unfit slaughter is not slaughter; the Chachamim obligate — the prohibition needs a shechitah, not an edible outcome.
Key Terms:
- טְרֵפָה = An animal with a fatal defect — its meat forbidden despite valid slaughter
- פָּרַת חַטָּאת = The red heifer of purification — benefit-prohibited, its slaughter permitting nothing
- שׁוֹר הַנִּסְקָל / עֶגְלָה עֲרוּפָה = The stoned ox and the heifer of the broken neck — further benefit-prohibited animals
Segment 5
TYPE: משנה
The agreed cases: a botched slaughter, stabbing, and tearing out the simanim are no slaughter at all
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הַשּׁוֹחֵט וְנִתְנַבְּלָה בְּיָדוֹ, וְהַנּוֹחֵר, וְהַמְעַקֵּר – פָּטוּר מִשּׁוּם ״אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ״.
English Translation:
All agree that one who slaughters an animal and it becomes a carcass by his hand because the slaughter was invalid, or one who stabs an animal, or one who uproots the windpipe and the gullet, is exempt with regard to the prohibition against slaughtering a mother and its offspring, as it is written: “You shall not slaughter it and its offspring both in one day” (Leviticus 22:28), and in these cases, no ritual slaughter was performed.
קלאוד על הדף:
The mishna’s second clause states the common ground: one whose slaughter was botched and the animal became a neveilah in his hand, one who stabs (nocher), and one who tears out the windpipe and gullet (me’aker) — all are exempt from oto v’et beno. The Torah said ‘you shall not slaughter’ (lo tishchatu): where no act of shechitah occurred at all, even the Chachamim agree the prohibition is not violated. The dispute concerns only a real shechitah with an inedible outcome.
Key Terms:
- נִתְנַבְּלָה בְּיָדוֹ = The animal became a neveilah in his hand — an invalid slaughter that is no shechitah
- נוֹחֵר / מְעַקֵּר = One who stabs / one who tears out the windpipe and gullet — killings that are not shechitah
Segment 6
TYPE: שמעתא
Reish Lakish limits the mishna: liability only when the idolatrous slaughter came first
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁשָּׁחַט רִאשׁוֹן לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה וְשֵׁנִי לְשֻׁלְחָנוֹ, אֲבָל רִאשׁוֹן לְשֻׁלְחָנוֹ וְשֵׁנִי לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה – פָּטוּר, דְּקָם לֵיהּ בִּדְרַבָּה מִינֵּיהּ.
English Translation:
GEMARA: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: The Rabbis in the mishna taught that one is liable when one of the animals is slaughtered for the sake of idol worship only when he slaughtered the first animal for the sake of idol worship and the second animal for his own table. But if he slaughtered the first animal for his own table and the second animal for the sake of idol worship, he is exempt from lashes for the second act of slaughter, as he receives only the greater punishment, that for idol worship, which is death.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara opens on the idol-worship case. Reish Lakish limits the Chachamim’s ruling: they obligate lashes only where the first animal was slaughtered for idol worship and the second for one’s own table. But first for the table and second for idol worship — exempt from lashes, by the rule of kam lei bidraba minei: one who incurs the greater penalty (death, for idolatrous slaughter) does not also receive the lesser (lashes for oto v’et beno).
Key Terms:
- קָם לֵיהּ בִּדְרַבָּה מִינֵּיהּ = ‘He stands under the greater of them’ — one act incurring two penalties receives only the more severe
Segment 7
TYPE: תגובה
Rabbi Yochanan: schoolchildren know that rule — the mishna must teach a liable case
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: זוֹ, אֲפִילּוּ תִּינוֹקוֹת שֶׁל בֵּית רַבָּן יוֹדְעִין אוֹתָהּ! אֶלָּא, פְּעָמִים שֶׁאֲפִילּוּ שָׁחַט רִאשׁוֹן לְשֻׁלְחָנוֹ וְשֵׁנִי לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה – חַיָּיב.
English Translation:
Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Even schoolchildren know this halakha, that one who is liable to receive two punishments receives only the greater punishment. Rather, sometimes, even if he slaughtered the first for his own table and the second for the sake of idol worship, he is liable to receive lashes for the second act of slaughter.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yochanan retorts: ‘Even the schoolchildren know that one!’ — kam lei bidraba minei is elementary, and the mishna would not come to teach it. Rather, the mishna means that sometimes one is liable to lashes even when the second slaughter was for idol worship. The next segment gives the scenario.
Key Terms:
- תִּינוֹקוֹת שֶׁל בֵּית רַבָּן = ‘The schoolchildren’ — Rabbi Yochanan’s barb: the proposed reading teaches nothing new
Segment 8
TYPE: ביאור המחלוקת
The scenario: forewarned for oto v’et beno but not for idol worship — and the two views
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כְּגוֹן דְּאַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ מִשּׁוּם ״אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ״, וְלֹא אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ מִשּׁוּם עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה. וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ אָמַר: כֵּיוָן דְּכִי אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ – פָּטוּר, כִּי לָא אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ נָמֵי – פָּטוּר.
English Translation:
This occurs, for example, where the witnesses forewarned him before the second act of slaughter with regard to the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, but they did not forewarn him with regard to idol worship. Since he is not punished for performing idol worship, he receives lashes for the less severe transgression. And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: Since, had they forewarned him with regard to idol worship he would have been exempt from lashes; therefore, even if they did not forewarn him with regard to idol worship, he is also exempt from lashes.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yochanan’s case: the witnesses forewarned the slaughterer for oto v’et beno but not for idol worship. Without forewarning there is no court death penalty, so the death sentence never engages — and the lashes for the lesser prohibition stand. Reish Lakish disagrees: since had they forewarned him for idol worship he would be exempt from lashes, he is exempt even when they did not — the potential death liability itself displaces the lashes.
Key Terms:
- אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ = ‘They forewarned him’ — the formal warning without which corporal and capital penalties cannot be imposed
Segment 9
TYPE: אזדו לטעמייהו
The consistent dispute: Rav Dimi’s report on capital or lashes liability alongside a monetary claim
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאָזְדוּ לְטַעְמַיְיהוּ, דְּכִי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי אָמַר: חַיָּיבֵי מִיתוֹת שׁוֹגְגִין, וְחַיָּיבֵי מַלְקוֹת שׁוֹגְגִין, וְדָבָר אַחֵר – רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אוֹמֵר: חַיָּיב, וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אוֹמֵר: פָּטוּר.
English Translation:
The Gemara notes: And they each follow their known lines of reasoning in this matter. As when Rav Dimi came to Babylonia from Eretz Yisrael he said: With regard to those who unwittingly performed a transgression for which one is liable to receive the death penalty if one performed it intentionally, or those who unwittingly performed a transgression for which one is liable to receive lashes, and that transgression also involved another matter, monetary payment, and they were forewarned with regard to the monetary penalty but not with regard to the lashes or the death penalty, Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is liable to pay; and Reish Lakish says: He is exempt.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara shows both amoraim consistent. Rav Dimi reported their dispute in the general case: one who unwittingly commits a capital or lashes offense that also carries a monetary payment (davar acher) — Rabbi Yochanan obligates the payment, Reish Lakish exempts. The structure is identical: does an unpunished greater liability still displace the lesser one?
Key Terms:
- חַיָּיבֵי מִיתוֹת שׁוֹגְגִין = Those who unwittingly commit capital offenses — the general case of the same dispute
- דָּבָר אַחֵר = ‘Another matter’ — the accompanying monetary liability at stake
Segment 10
TYPE: ביאור
The rationales: no forewarning means no displacement (R’ Yochanan); potential displacement suffices (Reish Lakish)
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אוֹמֵר: חַיָּיב, דְּהָא לָא אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ; וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אוֹמֵר: פָּטוּר, דְּכֵיוָן דְּכִי אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ פָּטוּר – כִּי לָא אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ נָמֵי פָּטוּר.
English Translation:
The Gemara clarifies the rationales for their statements. Rabbi Yoḥanan says that he is liable; since they did not forewarn him with regard to the severe transgression, he sinned unwittingly, and he remains liable only to pay the monetary payment. And Reish Lakish says that he is exempt; since had they forewarned him with regard to the severe transgression, he would have been exempt from the monetary payment, when they did not forewarn him, he is also exempt.
קלאוד על הדף:
The reasoning of each: Rabbi Yochanan obligates because without forewarning the greater penalty is never actually imposed — the act is judged as unwitting, and the monetary liability survives. Reish Lakish exempts because the exemption follows the act’s character, not the court’s ability to punish: an act that would displace the lesser liability when forewarned displaces it equally when not forewarned.
Key Terms:
- כִּי לָא אַתְרוֹ בֵּיהּ נָמֵי פָּטוּר = ‘Even without forewarning he is exempt’ — Reish Lakish’s principle that displacement is inherent in the act
Segment 11
TYPE: צריכותא
Why both disputes are needed — the first direction
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּצְרִיכָא, דְּאִי אַשְׁמוֹעִינַן בְּהָא – בְּהָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ, אֲבָל בְּהָא – אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן.
English Translation:
The Gemara notes: And it is necessary to state their disagreement with regard to both of these cases. As, if it were taught to us only about this case where one slaughters the mother for his private use and afterward slaughters its offspring for idol worship, perhaps only in this case involving the death penalty and lashes does Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish say that even if they did not forewarn the transgressor with regard to idol worship, he is still exempt from lashes for the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, because the death penalty and lashes are similar in that they are both corporal punishments, and so the obligation of lashes does not take effect at all when the death penalty is potentially applicable. But in that case, involving the death penalty or lashes together with a monetary payment, say that he agrees with Rabbi Yoḥanan that the transgressor is liable to pay the monetary payment.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara justifies recording the dispute twice. Had it been stated only in the slaughter case (death penalty versus lashes), one might say Reish Lakish exempts only there — both are corporal punishments, so the greater naturally displaces the lesser — but where the lesser liability is monetary, he might concede to Rabbi Yochanan that payment survives.
Key Terms:
- וּצְרִיכָא = ‘And it is necessary’ — the formula justifying apparent redundancy between parallel disputes
Segment 12
TYPE: צריכותא
The second direction: perhaps Rabbi Yochanan concedes where both penalties are corporal
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאִי אִיתְּמַר בְּהָא, בְּהָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, אֲבָל בְּהָא אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ, צְרִיכָא.
English Translation:
And if the disagreement was stated only with regard to that case, where one unwittingly performed a transgression involving the death penalty or lashes together with a transgression bearing a monetary payment, perhaps only in that case does Rabbi Yoḥanan say that he is liable to pay the monetary payment. But in this case, where one slaughtered an animal and its offspring, and the second animal was slaughtered for the sake of idol worship, which involves the death penalty and lashes, but without a forewarning with regard to the death penalty, say that he agrees with Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish that one is exempt from lashes. Therefore, it is necessary to state their disagreement with regard to both cases.
קלאוד על הדף:
And had the dispute been stated only in the monetary case, one might say Rabbi Yochanan obligates only there — a monetary payment is not a punishment of the body, so it survives alongside an unimposed death penalty — but where both liabilities are corporal (death and lashes), perhaps he concedes to Reish Lakish that the greater displaces the lesser even unimposed. Hence the dispute must be recorded in both cases.
Key Terms:
- אֵימָא מוֹדֵי = ‘Say that he concedes’ — the hypothetical concession that makes each formulation necessary
Segment 13
TYPE: קושיא
Back to the red heifer: Rabbi Shimon himself says it had a moment of fitness
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּפָרַת חַטָּאת שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה הִיא? וְהָתַנְיָא: רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: פָּרָה מְטַמְּאָה טוּמְאַת אֳכָלִין, הוֹאִיל וְהָיְתָה לָהּ שְׁעַת הַכּוֹשֶׁר.
English Translation:
The mishna teaches that Rabbi Shimon deems one who slaughters the red heifer of purification exempt from punishment for the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, as that act of slaughter does not render the animal fit for consumption. The Gemara asks: And is the slaughter of the red heifer of purification considered an act of slaughter that is unfit for consumption? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon says: A red heifer, even if it has been slaughtered and it is therefore prohibited to derive benefit from it, is susceptible to the ritual impurity of food, since it had a time in which it was fit for consumption?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara turns back to the mishna’s red heifer: is its slaughter really a shechitah she’einah re’uyah? A baraita reports Rabbi Shimon himself saying that the parah is susceptible to the ritual impurity of food, since it had a moment of fitness (she’at hakosher) — a stage at which it could have been redeemed and eaten. If Rabbi Shimon grants the heifer a moment of edibility, its slaughter should count as fit — and his exemption in the mishna becomes the puzzle carried into daf 82.
Key Terms:
- שְׁעַת הַכּוֹשֶׁר = ‘A moment of fitness’ — a stage at which the heifer was fit for consumption, rendering it susceptible to food impurity
- טוּמְאַת אֳכָלִין = The ritual impurity of food — contractible only by what counts as food