Menachot Daf 57 (מנחות דף נ״ז)
Daf: 57 | Amudim: 57a – 57b | Date: 4 Adar I 5786
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (57a)
Segment 1
TYPE: קושיא
Challenge from Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling on roasting meat on Shabbat against Rabbi Ami’s ruling on passive leavening
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הִנִּיחַ בָּשָׂר עַל גַּבֵּי גֶּחָלִים – הִיפֵּךְ בּוֹ חַיָּיב, לֹא הִיפֵּךְ בּוֹ פָּטוּר.
English Translation:
that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In the case of one who placed meat on top of coals on Shabbat, if he subsequently turned over the meat to its other side, so that both sides were roasted, he is liable for cooking on Shabbat. But if he did not turn over the meat he is exempt, as the meat is considered cooked only if both sides were roasted. If so, the same should apply to one who places leaven on the dough of a meal offering: He should be liable only if he turns the dough over. This contradicts the ruling of Rabbi Ami.
קלאוד על הדף:
This segment continues the discussion from the end of the previous daf about Rabbi Ami’s ruling that one who passively places leaven on dough is liable. The Gemara now raises a challenge from Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling about Shabbat: placing meat on coals without turning it does not make one liable for cooking. If passive action is insufficient for Shabbat liability, it should similarly be insufficient for leavening a meal offering. This challenge highlights the tension between the standards applied to different prohibitions — does the Torah require active completion of a process, or is setting it in motion enough?
Key Terms:
- הִיפֵּךְ (hipekh) = Turned over; the act of flipping meat on coals to cook both sides
- פָּטוּר (patur) = Exempt from liability
Segment 2
TYPE: תירוץ
Rava resolves the contradiction between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Ami
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רָבָא: מַאי ״חַיָּיב״ נָמֵי דְּקָאָמַר? כְּמַעֲשֵׂה צָלִי שֶׁל שַׁבָּת.
English Translation:
Rava said: What does Rabbi Yoḥanan, as well, mean when he says: He is liable to receive lashes for it, similar to performing a prohibited action on Shabbat? He means that one who places leaven on the dough of a meal offering, even if he does not turn it over, is similar to one who performs a prohibited action of roasting on Shabbat, meaning that he is similar to one who turned over the roasting food on the coals.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava elegantly resolves the apparent contradiction by reinterpreting how the comparison works. Rather than using Rabbi Yoḥanan’s Shabbat ruling to challenge Rabbi Ami, Rava reads the comparison in the opposite direction: just as one who turns the meat on Shabbat is liable because both sides are now cooked, similarly one who places leaven on dough is liable even without turning it, because the leavening process affects the dough fully from one side. The analogy is about the result (full effect), not the method. This is a classic example of how the Gemara resolves contradictions by reframing the basis of comparison.
Key Terms:
- מַעֲשֵׂה צָלִי (ma’aseh tzeli) = The act of roasting; the prohibited labor of cooking on Shabbat
Segment 3
TYPE: גמרא
The Gemara analyzes the case of placing meat on coals on Shabbat in detail
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גּוּפָא, אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הִנִּיחַ בָּשָׂר עַל גַּבֵּי גֶּחָלִים, הִיפֵּךְ בּוֹ – חַיָּיב, לֹא הִיפֵּךְ בּוֹ – פָּטוּר. הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא דְּאִי לָא הִיפֵּךְ בֵּיהּ לָא בְּשִׁיל – פְּשִׁיטָא! אֶלָּא דְּאִי לָא מְהַפֵּיךְ לֵיהּ נָמֵי הֲוָה בְּשִׁיל, אַמַּאי לָא מִיחַיַּיב?
English Translation:
§ The Gemara discusses the matter itself. Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In the case of one who placed meat on top of coals on Shabbat, if he subsequently turned over the meat he is liable for cooking on Shabbat, and if he did not turn over the meat he is exempt. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this case? If we say that this was a situation where if he does not turn over the meat it would not cook, then it is obvious that if he does not turn it over he is exempt. Rather, it must be referring to a case where even if he does not turn over the meat it would nevertheless cook. But if so, why isn’t he liable for merely placing the meat on the coals, despite the fact that he did not turn it over?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara now returns to analyze Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling about Shabbat on its own terms (“gufah” — the matter itself). The question is precise: if the meat would have cooked anyway without turning, why is the person exempt when he doesn’t turn it? And if it wouldn’t cook without turning, the exemption is obvious. The Gemara is searching for the exact scenario that makes Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling both necessary and non-obvious — a hallmark of Talmudic analysis that seeks the precise legal space where a ruling adds new information.
Key Terms:
- גּוּפָא (gufah) = The matter itself; a formula introducing detailed analysis of a previously cited statement
- פְּשִׁיטָא (peshita) = It is obvious; used when a ruling seems to add no new information
Segment 4
TYPE: תירוץ
The case involves partial cooking to the level of “ma’akhal ben Derosai” on one side
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּאִי לָא הַפֵּיךְ בֵּיהּ – הֲוָה בְּשִׁיל מִצַּד אֶחָד כְּמַאֲכָל בֶּן דְּרוֹסַאי, וְכִי מְהַפֵּיךְ בֵּיהּ – בְּשִׁיל מִשְּׁנֵי צְדָדִין כְּמַאֲכָל בֶּן דְּרוֹסַאי, וְקָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּכֹל מִצַּד אֶחָד כְּמַאֲכָל בֶּן דְּרוֹסַאי – לָא כְּלוּם הוּא.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to state this halakha in a case where if he does not turn over the meat it would cook on one side only partially, roughly one-third of the ordinary process of cooking, like the food of ben Derosai. And now that he turns it over, it cooks on both sides like the food of ben Derosai. And Rabbi Yoḥanan teaches us that any meat roasted on only one side like the food of ben Derosai is nothing, i.e., this is not a violation of the prohibited labor of cooking on Shabbat. If it was roasted on both sides like the food of ben Derosai this is classified as cooking, and he is liable for cooking on Shabbat.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara identifies the precise scenario: the meat reaches the level of “ma’akhal ben Derosai” (approximately one-third cooked, the minimum threshold considered “food”) on one side only. The novel teaching is that one-sided partial cooking does not constitute the prohibited labor of cooking on Shabbat. Only when the meat is turned and reaches this threshold on both sides does it become “cooked” in the halakhic sense. Ben Derosai was reportedly a bandit who ate food barely cooked — his name became the standard for the minimum level of cooking that has legal significance.
Key Terms:
- מַאֲכָל בֶּן דְּרוֹסַאי (ma’akhal ben Derosai) = The food of ben Derosai; approximately one-third cooked, the minimum threshold of cooking for Shabbat liability
- מִצַּד אֶחָד (mi-tzad eḥad) = On one side; partial cooking on only one surface
Segment 5
TYPE: גמרא
Rava’s ruling on a fig-bulk roasted in one spot, and Ravina’s challenge from the mishna about drilling
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רָבָא: וְאִם נִצְלָה בּוֹ כִּגְרוֹגֶרֶת מִצַּד אֶחָד בִּמְקוֹם אֶחָד – חַיָּיב. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: בִּמְקוֹם אֶחָד – אִין, בִּשְׁנַיִם אוֹ שְׁלֹשָׁה מְקוֹמוֹת – לָא? וְהָתְנַן: הַקּוֹדֵחַ כׇּל שֶׁהוּא – חַיָּיב!
English Translation:
The Gemara continues to discuss the case of meat roasted on one side on Shabbat. Rava says: And if a quantity of that meat equivalent in volume to a fig-bulk was fully roasted on one side of the meat and the roasted area was in one spot on the piece of meat, while the rest of the meat remained raw, he is liable for cooking on Shabbat. Ravina said to Rav Ashi: It can be inferred from Rava’s statement that if the fig-bulk of meat that was roasted was in one spot, yes, he is liable, whereas if the amount of the fig-bulk was distributed over two or three separate spots he is not liable. But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Shabbat 102b): One who drills a hole of any size is liable for the labor of building or the labor of striking a blow with a hammer to complete the production process of a vessel?
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava introduces the minimum quantity for Shabbat liability: a fig-bulk (ki-groggeret) fully roasted in one concentrated spot on one side. Ravina challenges this limitation by drawing a creative analogy from a different Shabbat prohibition. If drilling a hole of any size makes one liable (even if tiny holes must be combined), then surely roasted portions in multiple spots should also combine. This cross-referencing between different categories of Shabbat labor demonstrates the Gemara’s method of testing whether principles from one domain of law apply in another.
Key Terms:
- כִּגְרוֹגֶרֶת (ki-groggeret) = Like a dried fig; the minimum measure of cooked food for Shabbat liability
- הַקּוֹדֵחַ (ha-kode’aḥ) = One who drills a hole; a prohibited labor on Shabbat
- צֵירוּף (tzeruf) = Combination; joining smaller quantities to reach the required measure
Segment 6
TYPE: תירוץ
The Gemara rejects the proof from drilling — a tiny hole serves as a keyhole
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אִילֵּימָא בְּמָקוֹם אֶחָד, כׇּל שֶׁהוּא לְמַאי חֲזֵי? אֶלָּא לָאו בִּשְׁנַיִם אוֹ שְׁלֹשָׁה מְקוֹמוֹת, דַּחֲזוֹ לְצֵירוּף? לָא, לְעוֹלָם בְּמָקוֹם אֶחָד, דַּחֲזוּ לְבָבָא דְּאַקְלִידָא.
English Translation:
The Gemara analyzes that mishna: What are the circumstances? If we say that the mishna is referring to one who drills a hole in one spot alone, why is he liable? For what purpose is a hole of any size, which includes a very small hole, fit to be used? Rather, is it not referring to one who drills holes in two or three different spots, and the reason he is liable is that these holes are fit to be joined? Builders who require a large hole will often start by drilling a few small holes which they later enlarge and join together. By the same logic, if the meat was roasted in a few spots he should be liable, as these can join together. The Gemara answers: No; actually the mishna is referring to one who drills in only one spot, as one can say that the hole is fit as an entrance [levava] for the placement of the tooth of a key [aklida], which is very small.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara deflects the proof by finding an alternative explanation for the mishna about drilling. Even the smallest hole in one spot has practical utility — it can serve as a keyhole for a tiny key tooth. Therefore, the mishna about drilling doesn’t prove that multiple spots combine, and Rava’s ruling that the roasted area must be concentrated in one spot remains intact. The mention of “bava de-aklida” (the entrance for the tooth of a key) provides a fascinating glimpse into ancient locking mechanisms and how practical knowledge informed halakhic reasoning.
Key Terms:
- בָּבָא דְּאַקְלִידָא (bava de-aklida) = The opening/entrance for the tooth of a key; a very small hole that has practical use
- לְצֵירוּף (le-tzeruf) = For joining together; combining smaller elements to reach the requisite measure
Segment 7
TYPE: גמרא
Alternative version: Rava holds one is liable even in two or three spots
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, אָמַר רָבָא: אֲפִילּוּ בִּשְׁנַיִם וּשְׁלֹשָׁה מְקוֹמוֹת. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: אַף אֲנַן נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא – הַקּוֹדֵחַ כׇּל שֶׁהוּא חַיָּיב. הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא בְּמָקוֹם אֶחָד – כׇּל שֶׁהוּא לְמַאי חֲזֵי? אֶלָּא לָאו בִּשְׁנַיִם וּשְׁלֹשָׁה מְקוֹמוֹת, דַּחֲזֵי לְצֵירוּף? לָא, לְעוֹלָם בְּמָקוֹם אֶחָד, דַּחֲזוּ לְבָבָא דְּאַקְלִידָא.
English Translation:
And there are those who say there is a different version of this discussion: Rava says: Even if the fig-bulk of the meat that was fully roasted on only one side was distributed over two or three separate spots, he is liable for cooking on Shabbat. Ravina said to Rav Ashi: We learn this halakha in the mishna as well: One who drills a hole of any size is liable. What are the circumstances? If we say that the hole is in one spot alone, why is he liable? For what purpose is a hole of any size fit to be used? Rather, is it not referring to one who drills holes in two or three different spots, and the reason he is liable is that these holes are fit to be joined? Similarly, in the case discussed by Rava, one is liable for the cooking of the meat in a few different spots which can join together. The Gemara answers: No; actually the mishna is referring to one who drills in only one spot, as one can say that it is fit as an entrance for the placement of the tooth of a key.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara presents an alternative version (ika de-amri) of Rava’s ruling, in which Rava takes the more lenient-in-theory but broader-in-application view: one is liable even when the roasted area is distributed across multiple spots. In this version, Ravina tries to support Rava from the drilling mishna, but the same refutation applies — the drilling mishna speaks of a single hole useful as a keyhole. The parallel structure of the two versions (lishna kamma vs. lishna batra) illustrates a textual uncertainty about Rava’s exact position, preserving both traditions.
Key Terms:
- אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי (ika de-amri) = There are those who say; introduces an alternative version of a teaching
- לִישְׁנָא קַמָּא / לִישְׁנָא בָּתְרָא (lishna kamma / lishna batra) = First version / second version
Segment 8
TYPE: ברייתא
Baraita expounding the prohibition against leavening meal offerings from Leviticus 2:11
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: אִילּוּ נֶאֱמַר ״אֲשֶׁר תַּקְרִיבוּ לַה׳ לֹא תֵעָשֶׂה חָמֵץ״, הָיִיתִי אוֹמֵר אֵין לִי בְּלֹא תֵעָשֶׂה חָמֵץ אֶלָּא קוֹמֶץ בִּלְבָד.
English Translation:
§ The Gemara returns to discussing the prohibition against leavening a meal offering. The Sages taught in a baraita: Concerning the deep-pan meal offering, the verse states: “No meal offering that you shall bring to the Lord shall be made with leaven; for any leaven, and any honey, you shall not burn any of it as an offering made by fire to the Lord” (Leviticus 2:11). The term “meal offering” is apparently superfluous, and therefore the baraita explains: If the verse had stated only: Nothing that you shall bring to the Lord shall be made with leaven, I would say: I have derived only that the handful removed from the meal offering for burning on the altar alone is included in the prohibition: “Shall not be made with leaven,” as only the handful is burned on the altar.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara shifts to a new topic — a detailed exegetical analysis of Leviticus 2:11, which prohibits leavening meal offerings. The baraita employs a common hermeneutical technique: examining what we would derive if the verse were shorter, and then explaining why the extra words are necessary. Without the word “minḥah” (meal offering), we might have limited the prohibition to just the handful (kometz) that is actually burned on the altar, since the verse’s context involves offering to God.
Key Terms:
- קוֹמֶץ (kometz) = The handful; the portion of a meal offering removed by the priest for burning on the altar
- חָמֵץ (ḥametz) = Leaven; leavened dough, prohibited in meal offerings
Segment 9
TYPE: גמרא
Deriving the scope of the leavening prohibition: “minḥah” and “kol ha-minḥah”
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מִנְחָה מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״מִנְחָה״. שְׁאָר מְנָחוֹת מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״כׇּל הַמִּנְחָה״.
English Translation:
From where is it derived that one is liable for the leavening of a meal offering whose handful has not yet been removed? The verse states: “Meal offering,” to teach that the prohibition includes a meal offering before the removal of its handful. The Gemara asks: Since this verse is stated in the context of the deep-pan meal offering, from where is it derived that one is liable for leavening the other meal offerings, which are not mentioned in this passage? Therefore, the verse states the inclusive phrase: “No meal offering,” to apply this halakha to other meal offerings.
קלאוד על הדף:
The baraita demonstrates an expanding scope of derivation. First, the word “minḥah” extends the prohibition from just the handful to the entire meal offering (even before the handful is removed). Then, “kol ha-minḥah” (every/all the meal offering) extends the prohibition to all types of meal offerings, not just the deep-pan offering mentioned in the immediate context. This layered exegesis — from the narrowest reading to progressively broader applications — is a typical pattern in tannaitic midrash halakha.
Key Terms:
- כׇּל הַמִּנְחָה (kol ha-minḥah) = “All/every meal offering”; the inclusive phrase that extends the leavening prohibition to all meal offering types
- מִנְחַת מַרְחֶשֶׁת (minḥat marḥeshet) = Deep-pan meal offering; the specific context of the verse
Segment 10
TYPE: גמרא
“That you shall bring” — the prohibition applies only to fit, not disqualified, offerings
Hebrew/Aramaic:
״אֲשֶׁר תַּקְרִיבוּ לַה׳״ – כְּשֵׁרָה, וְלֹא פְּסוּלָה. מִכָּאן אָמְרוּ: הַמְחַמֵּיץ אֶת הַכְּשֵׁירָה – חַיָּיב, וְאֶת הַפְּסוּלָה – פָּטוּר.
English Translation:
The baraita continues to expound the verse. The phrase: “That you shall bring to the Lord,” indicates that this prohibition applies only to a fit meal offering, but not to a disqualified meal offering, e.g., a meal offering that was taken outside the Temple or that was rendered ritually impure. From here the Sages stated that one who leavens a fit meal offering is liable to receive lashes, but one who leavens a disqualified meal offering is exempt.
קלאוד על הדף:
The phrase “asher takrivu” (that you shall bring) serves as a limiting qualifier: the leavening prohibition applies only to a meal offering that is actually fit to be brought as an offering. If the meal offering has already been disqualified — whether by leaving the Temple courtyard (yotze), becoming ritually impure, or some other disqualification — leavening it does not violate the prohibition. This principle has far-reaching implications: the Torah’s prohibitions relating to sacrificial service are tied to the offering’s fitness for its intended purpose.
Key Terms:
- כְּשֵׁרָה (kesheirah) = Fit; a valid meal offering eligible for sacrifice
- פְּסוּלָה (pesulah) = Disqualified; an offering invalidated by some defect or procedural error
Segment 11
TYPE: בעיא
Rav Pappa’s dilemma: leavening after leavening, with intervening disqualification
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בָּעֵי רַב פָּפָּא: חִימְּצָהּ וְיָצָאת, וְחָזַר וְחִימְּצָהּ – מַהוּ? כֵּיוָן דְּיָצָאת אִיפְּסִילָה לַהּ בְּיוֹצֵא, וְכִי הָדַר מְחַמֵּיץ לַהּ – לָא מִיחַיַּיב עֲלַהּ מִשּׁוּם מְחַמֵּיץ אַחֵר מְחַמֵּיץ.
English Translation:
With regard to the ruling that the prohibition against leavening does not apply to a disqualified meal offering, Rav Pappa raises a dilemma: If one leavened a meal offering when it was fit, and subsequently someone removed the meal offering and it emerged from the Temple courtyard and was thereby disqualified, and he again leavened it, what is the halakha? Is he liable for the second leavening as well? The Gemara explains the possibilities: Does one say that since it emerged it is disqualified in accordance with the status of a sacred item that emerges from its permitted area, and therefore when he again leavens it he is not liable for it due to the prohibition against leavening a meal offering after one who already leavened it?
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Pappa constructs a fascinating multi-layered dilemma. A meal offering is leavened (making the first person liable), then removed from the Temple courtyard (disqualifying it), then leavened again. The question involves two competing principles: (1) the second leavener should be exempt because the offering is now disqualified, and (2) the principle of “meḥametz aḥar meḥametz” (leavening after leavening) — perhaps the first leavening “locks” the offering into its prohibited status, preventing the disqualification from taking effect for purposes of the leavening prohibition.
Key Terms:
- יוֹצֵא (yotze) = An item that emerged from the Temple courtyard; a category of disqualification
- מְחַמֵּיץ אַחַר מְחַמֵּיץ (meḥametz aḥar meḥametz) = One who leavens after another has already leavened; the question of successive liability
Segment 12
TYPE: בעיא
Resolution: Teiku — the dilemma remains unresolved
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אוֹ דִילְמָא, כֵּיוָן דְּחִימְּצָהּ, פְּסוּל יוֹצֵא לָא מַהֲנֵי בַּיהּ, וְכִי הֲדַר מְחַמֵּיץ לַהּ – מִיחַיַּיב עֲלַהּ מִשּׁוּם מְחַמֵּיץ אַחֵר מְחַמֵּיץ? תֵּיקוּ.
English Translation:
Or perhaps, since one already leavened the meal offering, from this point forward the disqualification of a sacred item that emerges from its permitted area is ineffective with regard to removing it from the prohibition against leavening, as the prohibition against emerging from the Temple itself applies only to a fit meal offering. And therefore, when he again leavens it he is liable for it due to the prohibition against leavening a meal offering after one who already leavened it. No answer was found, and the Gemara states that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.
קלאוד על הדף:
The second side of the dilemma suggests a remarkable possibility: the initial act of leavening may “freeze” the offering’s status for purposes of the leavening prohibition, making it immune to subsequent disqualification. Since the disqualification of “yotze” (leaving the courtyard) itself applies only to fit offerings, and the offering has already been leavened (a form of disqualification), perhaps the yotze disqualification cannot take additional effect. The Gemara concludes with “teiku” — this irresolvable dilemma stands as testimony to the limits of legal reasoning when competing principles cannot be adjudicated.
Key Terms:
- תֵּיקוּ (teiku) = Let it stand; an unresolved halakhic dilemma
Segment 13
TYPE: בעיא
Rav Mari’s dilemma: leavening a meal offering atop the altar
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בָּעֵי רַב מָרִי: חִימְּצָהּ בְּרֹאשׁוֹ שֶׁל מִזְבֵּחַ, מַהוּ? ״אֲשֶׁר תַּקְרִיבוּ״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא, וְהָא אַקְרְבַהּ,
English Translation:
Rav Mari raises another dilemma concerning the leavening of a meal offering. If a priest leavened a meal offering while standing at the top of the altar, what is the halakha? The Gemara clarifies the possibilities: The Merciful One states in the Torah: “No meal offering that you shall bring to the Lord shall be made with leaven” (Leviticus 2:11), which indicates that this prohibition applies only to a meal offering that has not yet been brought to the Lord, i.e., to the altar. And therefore, as this meal offering has already been brought to the top of the altar, even though it has not yet been burned, perhaps it is not included in the prohibition.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Mari probes the spatial and temporal boundaries of the leavening prohibition. The verse says “that you shall bring” — implying the prohibition applies before the offering reaches the altar. But what if the offering is already physically on the altar but has not yet been burned? The dilemma hinges on whether “bringing” is defined by physical placement or by the completion of the sacrificial process (burning). This question explores the fundamental nature of an offering’s journey: is it “brought” when it arrives, or only when its purpose is fulfilled?
Key Terms:
- רֹאשׁ הַמִּזְבֵּחַ (rosh ha-mizbe’aḥ) = The top of the altar; the surface where offerings are burned
- אֲשֶׁר תַּקְרִיבוּ (asher takrivu) = “That you shall bring”; the phrase limiting the prohibition to offerings not yet fully offered
Segment 14
TYPE: בעיא
Resolution: Teiku — the dilemma about leavening atop the altar remains unresolved
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אוֹ דִלְמָא מְחוּסַּר הַקְטָרָה כִּמְחוּסַּר מַעֲשֶׂה דָּמֵי? תֵּיקוּ.
English Translation:
Or perhaps any offering whose burning has not yet been performed is considered like one whose action of sacrifice has not yet been performed, despite the fact that it has already been brought to the top of the altar. If so, this meal offering is included in the prohibition against leavening. No answer was found, and the Gemara states that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.
קלאוד על הדף:
The alternative possibility is that an offering lacking its burning (meḥusar haktarah) is considered as though its sacrificial action is incomplete, and therefore the leavening prohibition still applies. The principle “meḥusar ma’aseh dami” (it is as though [its] action is lacking) would mean the offering’s physical location is irrelevant — what matters is whether the sacrificial process has been completed. This second consecutive teiku underscores the genuine difficulty of determining when exactly an offering’s status changes during the sacrificial process.
Key Terms:
- מְחוּסַּר הַקְטָרָה (meḥusar haktarah) = Lacking burning; an offering that has not yet been burned on the altar
- מְחוּסַּר מַעֲשֶׂה (meḥusar ma’aseh) = Lacking action; an offering whose essential sacrificial act has not been completed
Segment 15
TYPE: גמרא
Dispute between Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and Rabbi Akiva: what does “that you shall bring” include?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהַשְׁתָּא דְּנָפְקָא לֵיהּ מִ״כׇּל הַמִּנְחָה״, ״אֲשֶׁר תַּקְרִיבוּ (לַה׳)״ לְמָה לִי? מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא: ״אֲשֶׁר תַּקְרִיבוּ״ – לְרַבּוֹת מִנְחַת נְסָכִים לְחִימּוּץ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: לְרַבּוֹת לֶחֶם הַפָּנִים לְחִימּוּץ.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: And now that the tanna of the baraita derives from the phrase: “No meal offering,” that the prohibition includes even a meal offering before the removal of its handful, why do I need the phrase: “That you shall bring,” in the same verse? The Gemara answers: It is necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “That you shall bring,” in order to include the meal offering brought with the libations that accompany certain animal offerings such as burnt offerings, peace offerings, and the sin offerings and guilt offerings of a leper in the prohibition against leavening. Unlike the standard meal offerings, from which a handful is removed, these are entirely burned upon the altar, and the additional derivation is necessary to include them in the prohibition against leavening. This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. Rabbi Akiva says: This phrase serves to include the shewbread in the prohibition against leavening.
קלאוד על הדף:
Since the phrase “kol ha-minḥah” already extends the prohibition to all meal offerings, the Gemara asks what additional purpose “asher takrivu” serves. The answer reveals a tannaitic dispute: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says it includes the meal offering accompanying libations (minḥat nesakhin), while Rabbi Akiva says it includes the shewbread (leḥem ha-panim). Both are special categories that might otherwise be excluded — the libation meal offering because it is entirely burned (no handful removal), and the shewbread because it is not burned at all but placed on the Table.
Key Terms:
- מִנְחַת נְסָכִים (minḥat nesakhin) = The meal offering brought with libations; entirely burned on the altar
- לֶחֶם הַפָּנִים (leḥem ha-panim) = The shewbread; twelve loaves placed on the Table in the Sanctuary weekly
Segment 16
TYPE: קושיא
Challenge: how can the libation meal offering leaven if it’s kneaded with fruit juice?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מִנְחַת נְסָכִים? מֵי פֵירוֹת הֵם!
English Translation:
The Gemara clarifies these opinions: With regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, the Gemara asks: How is it possible to leaven the meal offering brought with libations? This type of meal offering is kneaded only with olive oil, which is a type of fruit juice,
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara raises a sharp practical objection to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili’s position. The meal offering brought with libations is kneaded with olive oil, not water. Since fruit juices (mei peirot) do not cause leavening, why would the Torah need to prohibit leavening something that cannot leaven? This challenge assumes the well-established halakhic principle that only water-based dough undergoes leavening, not dough made solely with fruit juices. The resolution will come at the opening of amud bet.
Key Terms:
- מֵי פֵירוֹת (mei peirot) = Fruit juices; liquids other than water that do not cause dough to leaven
Amud Bet (57b)
Segment 1
TYPE: תירוץ
Reish Lakish resolves: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili allows kneading the libation meal offering with water
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּמֵי פֵירוֹת אֵין מַחְמִיצִין? אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: אוֹמֵר הָיָה רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי, מִנְחַת נְסָכִים מְגַבְּלָהּ בְּמַיִם וּכְשֵׁרָה.
English Translation:
and there is a principle that fruit juices do not leaven dough. Reish Lakish says that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili would say: Even though the oil of the meal offering brought with libations is plentiful, sometimes one might also knead a meal offering with some water, if he considers it necessary to add it, and it is fit. If so, it is possible for this meal offering to leaven due to the water, and therefore the verse: “That you shall bring,” teaches that the prohibition against leavening also applies to this type of meal offering.
קלאוד על הדף:
Reish Lakish resolves the challenge by revealing a unique position held by Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: the libation meal offering may be kneaded with water in addition to oil, and it remains fit. This is significant because other opinions might require it to be kneaded exclusively with oil. Since water can be added, leavening becomes a real possibility, and the verse’s extension is necessary. This answer demonstrates how a tannaitic dispute about the leavening prohibition is intimately connected to a separate question about the preparation method of the offering.
Key Terms:
- מְגַבְּלָהּ (megablah) = Knead it; the process of mixing flour with liquid
- כְּשֵׁרָה (kesheirah) = Fit; valid for use as a sacrifice
Segment 2
TYPE: קושיא
Challenge to Rabbi Akiva: the shewbread is measured in a dry-measure vessel, which Rabbi Akiva says is not consecrated
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לֶחֶם הַפָּנִים מִדַּת יָבֵשׁ הִיא, וּשְׁמַעְנָא לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא דְּאָמַר: מִדַּת יָבֵשׁ לֹא נִתְקַדְּשָׁה.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: With regard to Rabbi Akiva’s opinion, the vessel into which a tenth of an ephah of flour for baking the shewbread is placed in is a measuring vessel for dry items, and we have heard that Rabbi Akiva said: The measuring vessels for dry items were not consecrated as service vessels. This means the shewbread becomes consecrated only when it is placed on the Table in the Sanctuary, after it has been baked. If so, at this stage, the prohibition against leavening is not relevant.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara identifies an internal contradiction in Rabbi Akiva’s position. If Rabbi Akiva says the dry-measure vessels were never consecrated (and therefore cannot sanctify items placed in them), then the shewbread flour does not become sacred until the baked bread is placed on the Table. But by that point, the bread is already baked — so when would the leavening prohibition apply? The shewbread must be baked with some leaven, and if it’s not yet sacred when the dough is being prepared, the prohibition against leavening is irrelevant. This creates a logical problem for attributing the “shewbread” opinion to Rabbi Akiva.
Key Terms:
- מִדַּת יָבֵשׁ (middat yavesh) = A dry-measure vessel; used for measuring flour and other dry goods
- לֹא נִתְקַדְּשָׁה (lo nitkadshah) = Was not consecrated; the vessel does not have the status of a sacred service vessel
Segment 3
TYPE: תירוץ
Rabbi Reuven in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: reverse the attribution of the opinions
Hebrew/Aramaic:
שְׁלַח רַבִּי רְאוּבֵן מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כָּךְ הִיא הַצָּעָה שֶׁל מִשְׁנָה, וְאֵיפוֹךְ – ״אֲשֶׁר תַּקְרִיבוּ״ לְרַבּוֹת לֶחֶם הַפָּנִים לְחִימּוּץ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: לְרַבּוֹת מִנְחַת נְסָכִים לְחִימּוּץ.
English Translation:
In answer to this question, the Gemara states that Rabbi Reuven sent a letter from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, in which he cited a statement in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: This is the correct version [hetze’ah] of this baraita, and one should reverse the names of the Sages in it: The phrase “that you shall bring” serves to include the shewbread in the prohibition against leavening; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. Rabbi Akiva says: This phrase serves to include the meal offering brought with libations in the prohibition against leavening. Consequently, there is no contradiction between Rabbi Akiva’s statement here and his statement with regard to measuring vessels for dry items.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yoḥanan resolves the contradiction by an emendation (eipukh — “reverse!”), a textual correction that was communicated by letter from the Land of Israel to Babylonia. By swapping the names, Rabbi Akiva now holds the view about the libation meal offering (consistent with his position on dry-measure vessels), and Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds the view about the shewbread (consistent with his position that dry-measure vessels were indeed consecrated). This passage provides a rare glimpse into the transmission of Torah learning between the two major centers of Jewish scholarship, including the use of written correspondence to correct textual errors.
Key Terms:
- הַצָּעָה שֶׁל מִשְׁנָה (hatza’ah shel mishnah) = The correct version/arrangement of the tradition
- אֵיפוֹךְ (eipukh) = Reverse; a directive to swap the attributions of two sages in a baraita
Segment 4
TYPE: גמרא
Rabbi Yoḥanan’s consistency: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and Rabbi Yoshiya hold the same position
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאַזְדָּא רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לְטַעְמֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי וְאֶחָד מִתַּלְמִידֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אָמְרוּ דָּבָר אֶחָד, וּמַנּוּ רַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה.
English Translation:
The Gemara comments: And Rabbi Yoḥanan, who holds that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili is the one who maintains that the measuring vessels for dry items were consecrated, follows [ve’azda] his line of reasoning stated elsewhere. As Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and one of the students of Rabbi Yishmael both said the same thing. And who is that student of Rabbi Yishmael? It is Rabbi Yoshiya.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara demonstrates Rabbi Yoḥanan’s internal consistency. His reversal of the baraita aligns with his stated principle elsewhere: that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili agrees with Rabbi Yoshiya (a student of Rabbi Yishmael) that the dry-measure vessels were consecrated. This means Rabbi Yosei HaGelili believes the shewbread becomes sacred when measured, making the leavening prohibition relevant at that stage. The expression “azda le-ta’amei” (follows his reasoning) is a standard Talmudic formula for showing that a sage maintains consistent positions across different discussions.
Key Terms:
- אַזְדָּא לְטַעְמֵיהּ (azda le-ta’amei) = Follows his line of reasoning; maintains consistency across rulings
- רַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה (Rabbi Yoshiya) = A student of Rabbi Yishmael; holds that dry-measure vessels were consecrated on the inside
Segment 5
TYPE: ברייתא
Rabbi Yoshiya’s position: dry-measure vessels were anointed on the inside
Hebrew/Aramaic:
דְּתַנְיָא, ״וַיִּמְשָׁחֵם וַיְקַדֵּשׁ אֹתָם״. רַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה אוֹמֵר: מִדַּת הַלַּח נִמְשַׁח בֵּין מִבִּפְנִים בֵּין מִבַּחוּץ, מִדַּת יָבֵשׁ נִמְשְׁחוּ מִבִּפְנִים וְאֵין נִמְשְׁחוּ מִבַּחוּץ.
English Translation:
As it is taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to the consecration of the Tabernacle and its vessels before their inauguration: “And it came to pass on the day that Moses had made an end of setting up the Tabernacle, and had anointed it and sanctified it, and all its vessels, and the altar and all its vessels, and had anointed them and sanctified them” (Numbers 7:1). Rabbi Yoshiya says: The measuring vessels for liquid items, e.g., oil, and wine for libations, were anointed and thereby consecrated both on the inside and on the outside. The measuring vessels for dry items, such as the flour for meal offerings, were anointed and consecrated only on the inside, but were not anointed on the outside.
קלאוד על הדף:
This baraita presents the debate about the consecration of Temple vessels. Rabbi Yoshiya takes a middle position: liquid-measure vessels were anointed on both sides (fully consecrated), while dry-measure vessels were anointed only on the inside. Since they were anointed at least internally, they do have sanctifying power — items placed inside them become consecrated. This is significant for the shewbread: if the dry-measure vessel consecrates the flour when it is placed inside, then the leavening prohibition applies from that point, supporting Rabbi Yosei HaGelili’s position as understood by Rabbi Yoḥanan.
Key Terms:
- וַיִּמְשָׁחֵם וַיְקַדֵּשׁ אֹתָם (va-yimshaḥem va-yekaddesh otam) = “And he anointed them and sanctified them”; the verse describing Moses’s consecration of the Tabernacle vessels
- מִדַּת הַלַּח (middat ha-laḥ) = A liquid-measure vessel; used for oil and wine
Segment 6
TYPE: מחלוקת
Rabbi Yonatan: dry-measure vessels were not anointed at all — proof from the two loaves
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן אוֹמֵר: מִדַּת הַלַּח נִמְשְׁחוּ מִבִּפְנִים, וְאֵין נִמְשְׁחוּ מִבַּחוּץ, מִדּוֹת יָבֵשׁ לֹא נִמְשְׁחוּ כׇּל עִיקָּר. תֵּדַע לְךָ שֶׁהֲרֵי אֵין מְקַדְּשׁוֹת, דִּכְתִיב ״מִמּוֹשְׁבֹתֵיכֶם תָּבִיאּוּ לֶחֶם תְּנוּפָה שְׁתַּיִם שְׁנֵי עֶשְׂרֹנִים סֹלֶת תִּהְיֶינָה חָמֵץ תֵּאָפֶינָה בִּכּוּרִים לַה׳״. אֵימָתַי הֵן ״לַה׳״? לְאַחַר שֶׁנֶּאֱפוּ.
English Translation:
Rabbi Yonatan says: The measuring vessels for liquid items were anointed on the inside and were not anointed on the outside, whereas the measuring vessels for dry items were not anointed at all. Rabbi Yonatan cites a proof for his opinion: You can know that the measuring vessels for dry items were not consecrated at all, because it is taught that these vessels do not consecrate items placed inside them. As it is written: “You shall bring out of your dwellings two wave-loaves of two tenth-parts of a ephah. They shall be of fine flour; they shall be baked with leaven, for first produce to the Lord” (Leviticus 23:17). When are they considered consecrated to the Lord? Only after they are baked with leaven. This demonstrates that when the flour is placed into the tenth of an ephah measuring vessel the meal offering is not yet consecrated.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yonatan takes a more extreme position: dry-measure vessels were never anointed at all and have no sanctifying power. His proof is from the two loaves of Shavuot: the verse says they are “for the Lord” only after being baked, implying that placing the flour into the measuring vessel (an isaron) does not consecrate it. This three-way dispute (Rabbi Akiva — not consecrated at all; Rabbi Yoshiya — consecrated inside only; and the implication that liquid vessels are fully consecrated) reveals fundamental disagreements about how sanctity is transmitted through Temple vessels.
Key Terms:
- שְׁתֵּי הַלֶּחֶם (shtei ha-leḥem) = The two loaves; the public offering on Shavuot from new wheat, baked with leaven
- בִּכּוּרִים (bikkurim) = First produce; here referring to the first grain offerings of the new crop
Segment 7
TYPE: גמרא
The crux of the dispute: interpreting “them” in “and sanctified them”
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בְּמַאי קָא מִיפַּלְגִי? ״בְּאֹתָם״. רַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה סָבַר ״אֹתָם״ לְמַעוֹטֵי מִדַּת יָבֵשׁ בַּחוּץ, וְרַבִּי יוֹנָתָן סָבַר מִדַּת יָבֵשׁ חוֹל הוּא, וְלָא אִצְטְרִיךְ קְרָא לְמַעוֹטֵי, כִּי אִיצְטְרִיךְ קְרָא לְמַעוֹטֵי מִדַּת לַח מִבַּחוּץ.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do Rabbi Yoshiya and Rabbi Yonatan disagree? They disagree with regard to the interpretation of the word “them” in the phrase: “And sanctified them” (Numbers 7:1). Both tanna’im agree that the term “them” serves to exclude something from the anointing and consecration, but they disagree over what is excluded. Rabbi Yoshiya maintains that “them” serves to exclude the consecration of the measuring vessels for dry items on the outside, i.e., only the inside of the vessels is consecrated. And Rabbi Yonatan maintains that the measuring vessels for dry items are non-sacred, i.e., not consecrated at all, and therefore it is not necessary for the verse to exclude them. Where it was necessary for the verse to exclude something, it was with regard to measuring vessels used for liquid items, to teach that they are consecrated only on the inside but not on the outside.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara identifies the precise exegetical pivot of the dispute: the limiting word “otam” (them) in “and sanctified them.” Both sages agree this word excludes something from the consecration, but they differ on what is excluded. Rabbi Yoshiya uses the exclusion narrowly — only the outside of dry-measure vessels is excluded. Rabbi Yonatan uses it differently — the exclusion targets the outside of liquid-measure vessels, while dry-measure vessels need no exclusion because they were never included in the first place. This dispute exemplifies how a single word can generate fundamentally different legal structures.
Key Terms:
- אוֹתָם (otam) = “Them”; a limiting term that excludes something from the scope of the verse
- מִיעוּט (mi’ut) = Exclusion; the hermeneutical principle that a limiting word narrows the scope of a law
Segment 8
TYPE: גמרא
Why Rabbi Yoḥanan didn’t equate Rabbi Akiva with Rabbi Yonatan
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לֵימָא נָמֵי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא וְאֶחָד מִתַּלְמִידֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אָמְרוּ דָּבָר אֶחָד, וּמַנּוּ? רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן, מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא שָׁווּ בְּמִדַּת לַח לַהֲדָדֵי.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: Since the dispute between Rabbi Yoshiya and Rabbi Yonatan concerns the halakha of measuring vessels for dry items, let Rabbi Yoḥanan say also, as he did with regard to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and Rabbi Yoshiya: Rabbi Akiva and one of the students of Rabbi Yishmael both said the same thing, and who is that student? Rabbi Yonatan. The Gemara explains: Rabbi Yoḥanan did not say this due to the fact that their opinions are not the same with regard to measuring vessels used for liquid items: Rabbi Akiva maintains that these vessels are consecrated both on the inside and on the outside, whereas Rabbi Yonatan rules that they are consecrated only on the inside.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara tests whether Rabbi Yoḥanan should also have identified Rabbi Akiva with Rabbi Yonatan, since both hold that dry-measure vessels were not consecrated. The answer reveals an important methodological principle: Rabbi Yoḥanan would not equate two sages who agree on one point but disagree on another. Although Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yonatan agree about dry-measure vessels, they disagree about liquid-measure vessels — Rabbi Akiva says they are consecrated on both sides, while Rabbi Yonatan says only on the inside. This partial disagreement prevents Rabbi Yoḥanan from claiming they “said the same thing.”
Key Terms:
- לָא שָׁווּ לַהֲדָדֵי (la shavu lahadadi) = They are not the same as each other; their positions do not fully align
Segment 9
TYPE: קושיא
Rav Pappa’s challenge: the kneading trough is a liquid vessel and should consecrate the shewbread dough
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא לְאַבָּיֵי: וְהָא אִיכָּא בִּיסָא, דְּלַח הוּא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: כְּגוֹן שֶׁלָּשׁ עַל גַּבֵּי קַטְבֻלְיָא.
English Translation:
Rav Pappa said to Abaye: How can it be suggested, according to the opinion that the measuring vessels for dry items were not consecrated, that the shewbread is consecrated only when it is placed on the Table? But before that there is the stage in which the dough is placed into the receptacle [bisa] in which it is kneaded. Since this vessel is used for liquid items, the dough should be consecrated at that point. Abaye said to Rav Pappa: This is referring to a case where he kneaded the dough on top of a flat leather spread [katavliyya], which does not sanctify the dough.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Pappa identifies a potential flaw in the logic: even if the dry-measure vessel doesn’t consecrate, the kneading trough (bisa) in which the dough is mixed with water is a liquid vessel. Since liquid-measure vessels are consecrated, shouldn’t the dough become sacred at the kneading stage? Abaye answers with a practical workaround: the dough can be kneaded on a flat leather spread (katavliyya), which is not a consecrated vessel and therefore does not impart sanctity. This shows how Temple procedures could be adapted to navigate halakhic constraints.
Key Terms:
- בִּיסָא (bisa) = A kneading receptacle/trough; a vessel used for mixing dough with liquid
- קַטְבֻלְיָא (katavliyya) = A flat leather spread; a non-vessel surface used for kneading
Segment 10
TYPE: קושיא
Counter-challenge: if so, perhaps a non-sacred isaron was also used
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִי הָכִי, דְּקָאָמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן: תֵּדַע לְךָ שֶׁהֲרֵי אֵינָהּ מְקַדֶּשֶׁת, לֵימָא לֵיהּ: כְּגוֹן דְּכַיְילָא בְּעִשָּׂרוֹן דְּחוֹל.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to that which Rabbi Yonatan said to Rabbi Yoshiya as proof of his opinion, that you can know that it is so, as it is taught that these vessels do not consecrate items placed inside them, let Rabbi Yoshiya say to him in refutation of his claim: This is referring to a case where he measured the flour for the two loaves in a vessel used for measuring a tenth of an ephah, but it was a vessel that was non-sacred, and it is for this reason that the loaves are not consecrated.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara turns Abaye’s logic against Rabbi Yonatan’s proof. If we can assume the shewbread was kneaded on a leather spread to avoid consecration via a liquid vessel, then why can’t we similarly assume the two loaves were measured in a non-sacred isaron? If so, Rabbi Yonatan’s proof (that the loaves aren’t consecrated until baked) wouldn’t demonstrate that dry-measure vessels lack sanctifying power — it would merely reflect the use of a non-sacred substitute vessel. This challenge threatens to unravel Rabbi Yonatan’s entire argument.
Key Terms:
- עִשָּׂרוֹן דְּחוֹל (isaron de-ḥol) = A non-sacred tenth-of-an-ephah vessel; an unconsecrated measuring vessel
Segment 11
TYPE: תירוץ
The distinction: kneading trough is optional, but the Torah requires an isaron
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא? בִּשְׁלָמָא בִּיסָא – לָא כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא דְּלֶעֱבֵיד בִּיסָא לְמֵילַשׁ בֵּיהּ, כִּי לָשׁ לַהּ עַל גַּבֵּי קַטְבֻלְיָא – לֵית לַן בַּהּ. אֶלָּא עִשָּׂרוֹן, כֵּיוָן דְּאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא: עֲבֵיד עִשָּׂרוֹן וּכְיֵיל בֵּיהּ – שָׁבֵיק עִשָּׂרוֹן דְּקוֹדֶשׁ וְכָיֵיל בְּעִשָּׂרוֹן דְּחוֹל?!
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: How can these cases be compared? Granted, one can say that the shewbread was kneaded on a leather spread rather than in a receptacle, as the Merciful One does not write in the Torah that one should specifically use a receptacle to knead the shewbread. Therefore, when one kneads the dough of a meal offering on top of a leather spread, we have no problem with it. But in the case of the two loaves whose flour was measured in a vessel used for measuring a tenth of an ephah, since the Merciful One states explicitly to use a vessel of a tenth of an ephah and measure with it, can it be suggested that the one preparing the meal offering should leave aside the consecrated vessel for a tenth of an ephah and measure with a non-sacred vessel for a tenth of an ephah?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara draws a crucial distinction between required and optional vessels. A kneading trough is not mandated by the Torah — one can knead on any surface, so using a leather spread is perfectly acceptable. But the isaron (tenth of an ephah) measuring vessel is explicitly required by the Torah for measuring flour quantities. It would be absurd to suggest that the Temple would bypass its own consecrated measuring vessels and use non-sacred substitutes instead. Therefore, Rabbi Yonatan’s proof stands: since the Torah-mandated isaron must be the consecrated one, and the loaves aren’t sacred until baked, it proves that the consecrated dry-measure vessel doesn’t impart sanctity.
Key Terms:
- עֲבֵיד עִשָּׂרוֹן וּכְיֵיל בֵּיהּ (aveid isaron u-khyeil bei) = Make an isaron and measure with it; the Torah’s explicit requirement to use the sacred measuring vessel
Segment 12
TYPE: ברייתא
Baraita: the prohibition against offering up sacred items not meant for the altar
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: מִנַּיִן לְמַעֲלֶה מִבְּשַׂר חַטָּאת, וּמִבְּשַׂר אָשָׁם, וּמִבְּשַׂר קׇדְשֵׁי הַקֳּדָשִׁים, וּמִקֳּדָשִׁים קַלִּים, וּמִמּוֹתַר הָעוֹמֶר, וּמִמּוֹתַר שְׁתֵּי הַלֶּחֶם, וּמִלֶּחֶם הַפָּנִים, וּמִשְּׁיָרֵי מְנָחוֹת, שֶׁהוּא בְּלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה?
English Translation:
§ The Sages taught in a baraita: From where is it derived that one who offers up outside the Temple courtyard a portion of the meat of a sin offering, or a portion of the meat of a guilt offering, or a portion of the meat of offerings of the most sacred order, or a portion of the meat of offerings of lesser sanctity, or a portion of the surplus of the omer offering, or a portion of the leftover of the two loaves, i.e., the public offering on Shavuot of two loaves from the new wheat, or the shewbread, or the remainder of meal offerings, that in all these cases he violates a prohibition, although these items are not meant to be sacrificed on the altar?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara shifts to a new topic: the prohibition against burning on the altar items that are not designated for altar consumption. The baraita lists an extensive catalogue of sacred items — meat from various types of offerings, leftover portions of the omer and two loaves, shewbread, and meal offering remainders — none of which are meant to be burned on the altar. The question is: what biblical source prohibits placing these items on the altar? This introduces a principle that the altar’s sanctity imposes restrictions not just on what must go on it, but on what must not.
Key Terms:
- קׇדְשֵׁי הַקֳּדָשִׁים (kodshei kodashim) = Offerings of the most sacred order; e.g., sin offerings, guilt offerings, burnt offerings
- קֳדָשִׁים קַלִּים (kodashim kalim) = Offerings of lesser sanctity; e.g., peace offerings, firstborn animals
- שְׁיָרֵי מְנָחוֹת (shirayei menaḥot) = Remnants of meal offerings; the portion eaten by the priests
Segment 13
TYPE: גמרא
The source: “of it” — any item connected to the altar fires falls under the prohibition
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״כִּי כׇל שְׂאֹר וְכׇל דְּבַשׁ לֹא תַקְטִירוּ מִמֶּנּוּ אִשֶּׁה לַה׳״, כֹּל שֶׁהוּא מִמֶּנּוּ לָאִישִּׁים הֲרֵי הוּא בְּבַל תַּקְטִירוּ.
English Translation:
The baraita answers: The verse states: “For any leaven, and any honey, you shall not burn any of it as an offering made by fire to the Lord” (Leviticus 2:11). The extra term “of it” teaches that any item that has already had some part of it burned in the fire on the altar is included in the prohibition: Do not burn, stated in that verse explicitly with regard to honey and leaven.
קלאוד על הדף:
The derivation is ingenious: the word “mimenu” (of it/from it) in Leviticus 2:11 is read expansively. Rather than limiting the prohibition to leaven and honey themselves, “mimenu” extends it to any item that has some connection to the altar fires — meaning any offering that has had some portion burned on the altar. The remaining portions (which are eaten by priests or the owner) become subject to the prohibition against burning on the altar, even though they were never designated for that purpose. This creates a sweeping protective fence around altar worship.
Key Terms:
- מִמֶּנּוּ (mimenu) = “Of it” / “from it”; the key word expanding the prohibition to related offerings
- אִשֶּׁה (isheh) = An offering made by fire; items burned on the altar
- בַּל תַּקְטִירוּ (bal taktiru) = “Do not burn”; the prohibition against burning non-designated items on the altar
Segment 14
TYPE: קושיא
Challenge: the two loaves and shewbread have no part burned on the altar
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּשְׁתֵּי הַלֶּחֶם וְלֶחֶם הַפָּנִים, יֵשׁ מֵהֶן לָאִישִּׁים? וְהָתַנְיָא: יָצְאוּ שְׁתֵּי הַלֶּחֶם וְלֶחֶם הַפָּנִים שֶׁאֵין מֵהֶם לָאִישִּׁים!
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: And with regard to the two loaves and the shewbread, is there some part of them burned in the fire? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: A portion of every offering is sacrificed on the altar, except for the two loaves and the shewbread, as no part of them is burned in the fire?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara identifies a problem with the baraita’s list: if the prohibition depends on the offering having some part burned on the altar (“mimenu la-ishim”), how can it apply to the two loaves and shewbread? Neither has any part burned on the altar — the two loaves are entirely eaten by the priests, and the shewbread is similarly consumed. A second baraita explicitly states this exception, making the inclusion of these items in the first baraita’s list seem contradictory.
Key Terms:
- לָאִישִּׁים (la-ishim) = To the altar fires; referring to portions burned on the altar
Segment 15
TYPE: תירוץ
Rav Sheshet: they are connected to the altar fires through their accompanying offerings
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: אֵין מִגּוּפוֹ לָאִישִּׁים.
English Translation:
Rav Sheshet said: Although no part of the two loaves or the shewbread themselves is burned in the fire, nevertheless, they are included in the prohibition against offering them up to the altar, since they are not viewed as independent entities but rather as parts of larger offerings. The two loaves accompany the sheep sacrificed as burnt offerings on Shavuot, and are permitted for consumption only once those sheep have been burned on the altar. Similarly, the shewbread is permitted for consumption only after the bowls of frankincense that were on the Table with it have been burned on the altar.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Sheshet introduces a nuanced distinction: “ein mi-gufo la-ishim” — no part of the loaves themselves goes to the fire, but they are halakhically connected to the altar through their accompanying offerings. The two loaves are linked to the Shavuot burnt-offering sheep, and the shewbread is linked to the frankincense bowls. Since these connected items are burned on the altar, the loaves and shewbread are treated as though they too have a connection to the altar fires. This principle of halakhic connection (rather than physical identity) expands the scope of the prohibition.
Key Terms:
- אֵין מִגּוּפוֹ לָאִישִּׁים (ein mi-gufo la-ishim) = No part of its own substance goes to the altar fires; but connected through an accompanying offering
- בָּזִיכֵי לְבוֹנָה (bazikei levonah) = Bowls of frankincense; placed on the Table alongside the shewbread and burned on the altar
Segment 16
TYPE: מחלוקת
Amoraic dispute: liability for bringing offerings onto the ramp of the altar
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִיתְּמַר: הַמַּעֲלֶה מִכּוּלָּם עַל גַּבֵּי הַכֶּבֶשׁ, רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: חַיָּיב, רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אָמַר: פָּטוּר.
English Translation:
§ The Gemara discusses the prohibition against offering up on the altar parts of offerings after their sacrificial portions have already been burned. It was stated: With regard to one who brings up any part of any of the items listed in the baraita onto the ramp leading to the altar, but not to the altar itself, Rabbi Yoḥanan says he is liable and Rabbi Elazar says he is exempt.
קלאוד על הדף:
A new amoraic dispute opens the final section of the daf. The question: does the prohibition against burning non-designated items apply if one brings them only onto the ramp (kevesh) leading up to the altar, without reaching the altar surface itself? Rabbi Yoḥanan says yes — the ramp is treated as an extension of the altar for purposes of this prohibition. Rabbi Elazar says no — only the altar itself triggers the prohibition. This dispute has practical implications for the spatial boundaries of sacrificial prohibitions within the Temple compound.
Key Terms:
- כֶּבֶשׁ (kevesh) = The ramp; the inclined walkway leading up to the top of the altar
- הַמַּעֲלֶה (ha-ma’aleh) = One who brings up; the act of placing an item on the altar or ramp
Segment 17
TYPE: גמרא
Rabbi Yoḥanan’s source: “they shall not come up to the altar” includes the ramp
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר חַיָּיב, דְּתַנְיָא: ״הַמִּזְבֵּחַ״ – אֵין לִי אֶלָּא מִזְבֵּחַ, כֶּבֶשׁ מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״וְאֶל הַמִּזְבֵּחַ לֹא יַעֲלוּ לְרָצוֹן״.
English Translation:
The Gemara elaborates. Rabbi Yoḥanan says he is liable, as it is taught in a baraita: After the verse: “As any leaven and any honey, you shall not burn any of it as an offering made by fire to the Lord,” the next verse states: “As an offering of first fruits you may bring them to the Lord, but they shall not come up to the altar for a pleasing aroma” (Leviticus 2:12). I have derived only that this halakha applies to an item that is brought on the altar. From where is it derived that the same applies if it is brought to the ramp of the altar? The verse states: “But they shall not come up to the altar for a pleasing aroma,” to be accepted, and the ramp is the means to ascend to the altar.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yoḥanan supports his position from Leviticus 2:12. The verse uses the broader language “they shall not come up to the altar” (lo ya’alu), which includes the process of ascending — i.e., the ramp. The word “ya’alu” (come up) implies the entire ascent, not just arrival at the top. The additional phrase “for a pleasing aroma” (le-ratzon) further suggests the prohibition covers the entire pathway to the altar, as the ramp is the necessary means of “coming up” to the altar’s surface.
Key Terms:
- לֹא יַעֲלוּ לְרָצוֹן (lo ya’alu le-ratzon) = “They shall not come up for a pleasing aroma”; the verse prohibiting unauthorized ascent to the altar
- קׇרְבַּן רֵאשִׁית (korban reishit) = An offering of first produce; the category of offerings addressed in this verse
Segment 18
TYPE: גמרא
Rabbi Elazar’s source: the verse limits the ramp-as-altar principle to specific offerings
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אָמַר פָּטוּר, מַאי טַעְמָא? דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״שְׂאֹר וּדְבַשׁ … קׇרְבַּן רֵאשִׁית תַּקְרִיבוּ אֹתָם״.
English Translation:
And what is the reason that Rabbi Elazar says that one who brings up parts to the ramp is exempt? As the verse states: “For any leaven, and any honey, you shall not burn any of it as an offering made by fire to the Lord. As an offering of first produce you may bring them to the Lord, but they shall not come up to the altar for a pleasing aroma” (Leviticus 2:11–12).
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Elazar reads the same verses differently. He focuses on the term “otam” (them) in the phrase “you may bring them,” arguing that it creates a specific, limited category. Only those offerings explicitly called “korban reishit” (offerings of first produce) — namely, the first fruits and the two loaves — have the ramp treated like the altar. For all other items in the baraita’s list (sin offering meat, guilt offering meat, etc.), the ramp is not equivalent to the altar. This is a classic case of two Amoraim reading the same verse with different hermeneutical assumptions.
Key Terms:
- אוֹתָם (otam) = “Them”; a limiting term that restricts the law to a specific category
Segment 19
TYPE: גמרא
Explanation: “them” limits the ramp-as-altar principle to first-produce offerings only
Hebrew/Aramaic:
״אוֹתָם״ – הוּא דְּרַבִּי לְךָ כֶּבֶשׁ כְּמִזְבֵּחַ, אֲבָל מִידֵּי אַחֲרִינָא – לָא.
English Translation:
The Gemara explains: The term “them” indicates that this halakha applies only to those offerings that come from leaven or honey and which are called: “An offering of first produce.” This category consists of first fruits, which are brought from dates and other sweet fruit and which are called: “The choicest first fruits of your land” (Exodus 23:19), and the two loaves, which are leaven and are the first meal offerings brought from the new crop each year. In other words, it is with regard to this category that the verse amplifies for you the halakha that the ramp of the altar is considered like the altar itself. But with regard to other items, e.g., the meat of sin offerings and guilt offerings, the ramp of the altar is not treated like the altar itself.
קלאוד על הדף:
This final segment on the daf spells out Rabbi Elazar’s position fully. The word “otam” (them) is a limiting particle that restricts the ramp-as-altar equivalence to the specific categories mentioned in the verse: leaven-based offerings (the two loaves) and honey-based offerings (first fruits from sweet fruits). For everything else — the meat of sin and guilt offerings, meal offering remainders, the omer surplus — placing them on the ramp does not violate the prohibition. This dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Elazar about the scope of “otam” mirrors the pattern seen throughout this daf, where a single word in the verse determines the reach of an entire legal principle.
Key Terms:
- כֶּבֶשׁ כְּמִזְבֵּחַ (kevesh ke-mizbe’aḥ) = The ramp is like the altar; the principle that the ramp has the same legal status as the altar for certain prohibitions
- קׇרְבַּן רֵאשִׁית (korban reishit) = Offering of first produce; specifically the two loaves and first fruits