Menachot Daf 68 (מנחות דף ס״ח)
Daf: 68 | Amudim: 68a – 68b
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (68a)
Segment 1
TYPE: תירוץ
Rabba’s answer (continued): Atypical harvesting serves as a reminder not to eat the new grain
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מִתּוֹךְ שֶׁלֹּא הִיתַּרְתָּה לוֹ אֶלָּא עַל יְדֵי קִיטּוּף, זָכוּר הוּא.
English Translation:
Since before the omer you permitted one to harvest the crop only by picking it by hand and not in the typical manner, he will remember the prohibition and refrain from eating it. With regard to searching for leaven, there is no reminder.
קלאוד על הדף:
This continues Rabba’s resolution from the previous daf of the contradiction in Rabbi Yehuda’s position. Rabbi Yehuda approves of filling Jerusalem’s markets with new-crop grain before the omer (which risks someone eating the forbidden chadash), yet he is strict about searching for chametz on Passover itself (lest one eat what he finds). Rabba explains: the requirement to harvest by hand-picking (kituf) rather than normal reaping serves as a built-in reminder that the grain is still forbidden. The unusual process keeps the prohibition in the harvester’s mind, preventing accidental consumption. No such reminder exists when searching for chametz.
Key Terms:
- קִיטּוּף (kituf) = Picking grain by hand, an atypical harvesting method required before the omer
- זָכוּר הוּא (zakhur hu) = He will remember — the unusual method serves as a mnemonic
Segment 2
TYPE: קושיא
Abaye’s challenge: What about grinding and sifting, which seem to be performed normally?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: תִּינַח קְצִירָה, טְחִינָה וְהַרְקָדָה, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?
English Translation:
Abaye said to him: This works out well in explaining Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion with regard to picking the grain. But with regard to grinding and sifting, what can be said? Apparently, it is permitted to perform these acts in a typical manner. Why, then, is there no concern that one may eat the grain at that stage?
קלאוד על הדף:
Abaye accepts Rabba’s logic regarding harvesting but extends the challenge to later stages of grain processing. If the “reminder” theory depends on atypical methods, then what about grinding and sifting? If these are done normally, the person processing the grain has no built-in reminder that it is still forbidden new-crop grain. At those stages, the risk of accidental consumption would return.
Key Terms:
- טְחִינָה (techina) = Grinding grain into flour
- הַרְקָדָה (harkada) = Sifting flour through a sieve
Segment 3
TYPE: תירוץ
Grinding and sifting are also performed atypically before the omer
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָא לָא קַשְׁיָא, טְחִינָה – בְּרִיחְיָא דִּידָא, הַרְקָדָה – עַל גַּבֵּי נָפָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: This is not difficult, as one also performs grinding in an atypical manner. One must grind the grain before the sacrificing of the omer with a hand mill, not with a mill powered by an animal or by water. Likewise, sifting is performed unusually, not in the interior of the sifter. Instead, it is performed on top of the sifter. Since all of these actions are performed in an atypical manner, there is no concern that one might eat the grain.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara deflects Abaye’s challenge by revealing that grinding and sifting before the omer are also performed abnormally. Grinding must use a hand mill (rather than an animal- or water-powered mill), and sifting is done on the exterior surface of the sieve rather than through it. These modifications at every stage of processing maintain the “reminder” effect throughout the entire preparation chain. Each unusual step signals to the worker that this grain has a special, restricted status.
Key Terms:
- רִיחְיָא דִּידָא (richya d’yada) = A hand mill, as opposed to a larger mill powered by animals or water
- נָפָה (nafa) = A sieve or sifter used for flour
Segment 4
TYPE: קושיא
But irrigated fields allow normal harvesting — what reminder exists there?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בֵּית הַשְּׁלָחִין, דְּשַׁרְיָא קְצִירָה, דִּתְנַן: קוֹצְרִין בֵּית הַשְּׁלָחִין שֶׁבַּעֲמָקִים, אֲבָל לֹא גּוֹדְשִׁין – מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?
English Translation:
The Gemara raises another difficulty from the case of a field that requires irrigation, where typical harvesting is permitted, as we learned in a mishna (71a): One may harvest grain from an irrigated field and from fields in the valleys, as their grain ripens long before the omer is sacrificed, but one may not pile the produce. The use of the term: One may harvest, indicates that the grain was harvested in a typical manner, not by hand. In this case, what can be said? Why doesn’t Rabbi Yehuda issue a decree lest someone eat from the new grain?
קלאוד על הדף:
This is the decisive challenge to Rabba’s “reminder” theory. A mishna on 71a permits normal harvesting from irrigated fields (beit ha-shlachin) and valley fields before the omer, because their grain would otherwise spoil. Since normal harvesting methods are used, there is no atypical action to remind the person that the grain is forbidden. Yet Rabbi Yehuda apparently does not object to this practice. This undermines the entire premise that the “reminder” of unusual processing is what prevents accidental consumption.
Key Terms:
- בֵּית הַשְּׁלָחִין (beit ha-shlachin) = An irrigated field, as opposed to a rain-fed field
- גּוֹדְשִׁין (godshin) = Piling up harvested grain into sheaves
Segment 5
TYPE: תירוץ
Abaye’s alternative explanation: People distance themselves from chadash but not from chametz
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: חָדָשׁ – בָּדֵיל מִינֵּיהּ, חָמֵץ – לָא בָּדֵיל מִינֵּיהּ.
English Translation:
Rather, Abaye said: This difference between the cases of the omer and leaven is not based on the manner in which one harvests, grinds, or sifts. Instead, the reason for the different rulings is that one distances himself from new grain, as it is prohibited to eat the new grain all year until the omer is sacrificed. By contrast, one does not distance himself from leavened bread, as eating it is permitted during the rest of the year. Therefore, he is more likely to eat leavened bread unwittingly.
קלאוד על הדף:
Abaye abandons the “reminder through atypical methods” approach entirely and offers a psychological explanation. Chadash (new grain) is prohibited year-round until the omer — people are accustomed to treating it as forbidden and naturally maintain distance from it. Chametz, by contrast, is permitted eleven and a half months of the year. The brief Passover prohibition cannot override deeply ingrained habits of consuming bread freely. The risk of accidental consumption is therefore far higher for chametz than for chadash, justifying Rabbi Yehuda’s stricter stance on chametz searching.
Key Terms:
- בָּדֵיל מִינֵּיהּ (badeil mineih) = Distances himself from it — accustomed to avoiding it
- חָדָשׁ (chadash) = New grain, prohibited until the omer
Segment 6
TYPE: קושיא
Rava’s challenge: The Rabbis’ position also seems contradictory
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רָבָא: דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אַדְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה קַשְׁיָא, דְּרַבָּנַן אַדְּרַבָּנַן לָא קַשְׁיָא?
English Translation:
Rava said: Does the contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda and the other statement of Rabbi Yehuda pose a difficulty, while the contradiction between one statement of the Rabbis and the other statement of the Rabbis does not pose a difficult? There is also an apparent contradiction between the opinion of the Rabbis, who claim that the Sages issued a decree with regard to new grain but did not issue a decree with regard to leaven.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava points out that the discussion has focused exclusively on resolving the contradiction in Rabbi Yehuda’s position, but the Rabbis face the mirror-image problem. The Rabbis in our mishna hold that filling markets with new grain was not approved by the Sages (implying concern about accidental consumption), yet in Pesachim they permit searching for chametz even during Passover (showing no concern about eating what one finds). If accidental consumption is a concern for new grain, why not for chametz? This broadens the inquiry to ensure both positions are internally consistent.
Key Terms:
- רַבָּנַן אַדְּרַבָּנַן (Rabbanan ad’Rabbanan) = The contradiction between one ruling of the Rabbis and another
Segment 7
TYPE: תירוץ
Rava’s resolution for both: Intent matters — searching to burn vs. processing to eat
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אַדְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה לָא קַשְׁיָא, כִּדְשַׁנֵּינַן. דְּרַבָּנַן אַדְּרַבָּנַן לָא קַשְׁיָא: הוּא עַצְמוֹ מְחַזֵּר עָלָיו לְשׂוֹרְפוֹ, מֵיכַל אָכֵיל מִינֵּיהּ?!
English Translation:
Rather, Rava said that the contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda and the other statement of Rabbi Yehuda is not difficult, as we resolved it previously. The contradiction between one ruling of the Rabbis and the other ruling of the Rabbis is also not difficult: The Rabbis maintain that there is no need to issue a decree prohibiting searching for leaven after it becomes prohibited, as with regard to one who himself is seeking out leaven specifically in order to burn it, will he eat from it? By contrast, in the case of new grain he is processing the grain and preparing it for consumption. Consequently, there is a concern that he might eat it unwittingly.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava offers a brilliantly simple distinction that resolves the Rabbis’ apparent contradiction. The key is the person’s intent and mindset. When searching for chametz, the entire purpose is to find it and destroy it — a person actively looking for something to burn is psychologically oriented away from eating it. With new grain, however, the person is processing it specifically for the purpose of eventual consumption. The processing activities (grinding, sifting, parching) are inherently food-preparation acts, making accidental tasting far more likely. Intent and context shape the risk of transgression.
Key Terms:
- מְחַזֵּר עָלָיו לְשׂוֹרְפוֹ (mechazzer alav le-sorfo) = Actively seeking it in order to burn it — the intent to destroy prevents accidental eating
Segment 8
TYPE: תירוץ
Rav Ashi’s alternative: Only parched flour was prepared, which is not eaten without further processing
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אַדְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה לָא קַשְׁיָא, ״קֶמַח קָלִי״ תְּנַן.
English Translation:
Rav Ashi said: The contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda and the other statement of Rabbi Yehuda is not difficult, as the difficulty can be resolved in another manner. As we learned in the mishna that the markets of Jerusalem were filled with flour of parched grain. It is permitted to prepare only such foods before the omer, as they are not eaten without further preparation. Therefore, there is no concern lest one eat it unwittingly before the omer offering is sacrificed.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Ashi offers yet another resolution to the contradiction in Rabbi Yehuda. He focuses on the specific product mentioned in the mishna: kemach kali (flour of parched grain). This product requires additional preparation before it can be eaten, so there is no concern that someone would eat it raw. The markets were filled with an intermediate product, not a ready-to-eat food. This explanation relies on the precise wording of the mishna rather than broad psychological principles.
Key Terms:
- קֶמַח קָלִי (kemach kali) = Flour of parched grain — a product requiring further preparation before consumption
Segment 9
TYPE: דחיה
Rav Ashi’s explanation is rejected: What about earlier stages when the grain was edible?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהָא דְּרַב אָשֵׁי בְּרוּתָא הִיא, תִּינַח מִקָּלִי וְאֵילָךְ, עַד קָלִי מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?
English Translation:
The Gemara rejects this interpretation: And this statement of Rav Ashi is an error [baruta], as this suggestion can easily be refuted: That works out well with regard to the status of the grain from the point that it was processed into flour of parched grain and forward, as there is no concern that perhaps one will come to eat it. But with regard to its status initially, until it became parched grain, what can be said? There must have been a certain point when the grain kernels were edible before they were transformed into parched grain. Why is there no concern that one might eat the kernels at this earlier stage?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara harshly rejects Rav Ashi’s answer, calling it a “baruta” (error) — an unusually strong rebuke. The problem is logical: even if the final product (parched flour) requires further preparation, the grain must pass through an edible intermediate stage before being parched. At that point, someone handling the grain could easily eat the raw or partially processed kernels. Rav Ashi’s explanation only addresses the endpoint but ignores the process.
Key Terms:
- בְּרוּתָא (baruta) = An error; a statement that is fundamentally flawed and easily refuted
Segment 10
TYPE: דחיה
Final rejection of Rav Ashi: Even the “reminder” theory fails for irrigated fields
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְכִי תֵּימָא, הָכָא נָמֵי עַל יְדֵי קִיטּוּף, וְכִדְרַבָּה, בֵּית הַשְּׁלָחִין דְּשַׁרְיָא קְצִירָה מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? אֶלָּא, הָא דְּרַב אָשֵׁי בְּרוּתָא הִיא.
English Translation:
And if you would say that here too the grain is distinguished by the atypical manner in which it is harvested, through picking by hand, in accordance with the earlier statement of Rabba, nevertheless with regard to the difficulty raised to Rabba’s opinion from the case of an irrigated field, which is permitted to be harvested in the typical manner, what can be said? Rather, the Gemara rejects this explanation and concludes that this statement of Rav Ashi is an error.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara preempts any attempt to rescue Rav Ashi’s explanation by combining it with Rabba’s earlier “reminder” theory. Even if one argues that the early stages are covered by atypical harvesting (kituf), the previously established difficulty from irrigated fields — where normal harvesting is permitted — remains unanswered. The Gemara definitively concludes that Rav Ashi’s approach is flawed and accepts Abaye’s psychological distinction (people distance themselves from chadash but not chametz) or Rava’s intent-based resolution as the valid answers.
Key Terms:
- אֶלָּא (ela) = Rather — a term signaling the definitive rejection of the preceding approach
Segment 11
TYPE: משנה
New mishna: When does the omer permit the new crop? Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai’s post-Temple ordinance
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְנִי׳ מִשֶּׁקָּרַב הָעוֹמֶר הוּתַּר חָדָשׁ מִיָּד, הָרְחוֹקִים מוּתָּרִין מֵחֲצוֹת הַיּוֹם וּלְהַלָּן. מִשֶּׁחָרַב בֵּית הַמִּקְדָּשׁ, הִתְקִין רַבָּן יוֹחָנָן בֶּן זַכַּאי שֶׁיְּהֵא יוֹם הֶנֶף כּוּלּוֹ אָסוּר.
English Translation:
MISHNA: From the moment that the omer offering was sacrificed, the produce of the new crop was permitted immediately. For those distant from Jerusalem, the new crop is permitted from midday and beyond. From the time that the Temple was destroyed, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted that the day of waving the omer, the sixteenth of Nisan, is entirely prohibited, i.e., one may partake of the new crop only the next day.
קלאוד על הדף:
This mishna outlines the progression of the chadash prohibition across three situations. When the Temple stands: (1) those present in Jerusalem may eat the new crop immediately upon the omer sacrifice; (2) those far away may eat from midday, since they know the court would not delay. After the Temple’s destruction: Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai prohibited the entire sixteenth of Nisan. This ordinance, which will be debated at length in the Gemara, was designed to prevent confusion when the Temple is rebuilt.
Key Terms:
- יוֹם הֶנֶף (yom ha-henef) = The day of waving — the sixteenth of Nisan, when the omer is waved
- רַבָּן יוֹחָנָן בֶּן זַכַּאי = The leading Sage after the Temple’s destruction who instituted many post-Temple ordinances
Segment 12
TYPE: משנה
Rabbi Yehuda: The prohibition on the 16th of Nisan is from the Torah, not just rabbinic
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: וַהֲלֹא מִן הַתּוֹרָה הוּא אָסוּר, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״עַד עֶצֶם הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה״, מִפְּנֵי מָה הָרְחוֹקִים מוּתָּרִין מֵחֲצוֹת הַיּוֹם וּלְהַלָּן? מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהֵן יוֹדְעִין שֶׁאֵין בֵּית דִּין מִתְעַצְּלִין בּוֹ.
English Translation:
Rabbi Yehuda said: But isn’t it forbidden by Torah law, as it is stated: “And you shall eat neither bread, nor parched grain, nor fresh grain, until this selfsame day, until you have brought the offering of your God” (Leviticus 23:14)? This means that the new crop is prohibited on the day of the waving unless permitted by sacrifice of the offering. And if so, for what reason is it permitted for those distant to eat the new crop from midday and beyond, when the Temple is standing? It is due to the fact that they know that the members of the court are not indolent in its sacrifice, and certainly by midday the sacrifice of the omer offering has been completed.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with the premise that Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai’s ordinance is merely rabbinic. He argues the prohibition on the sixteenth of Nisan is from the Torah itself, based on the verse “until this selfsame day” (ad etzem ha-yom ha-zeh). He reads “etzem” as indicating the entire day is prohibited. In his view, even when the Temple stood, distant communities were only permitted to eat from midday because they could presume the court had already offered the omer by then — not because daybreak itself permitted the grain.
Key Terms:
- עַד עֶצֶם הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה (ad etzem ha-yom ha-zeh) = “Until this selfsame day” — the key verse in the dispute about whether the prohibition extends through the entire 16th of Nisan
- בֵּית דִּין (beit din) = The court — which would not be negligent in sacrificing the omer promptly
Segment 13
TYPE: גמרא
Rav and Shmuel: When the Temple stands, the omer permits; without the Temple, daybreak permits
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גְּמָ׳ רַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: בִּזְמַן שֶׁבֵּית הַמִּקְדָּשׁ קַיָּים – עוֹמֶר מַתִּיר, בִּזְמַן שֶׁאֵין בֵּית הַמִּקְדָּשׁ קַיָּים – הֵאִיר מִזְרָח מַתִּיר.
English Translation:
GEMARA: The opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as presented in the mishna, is that after the destruction of the Temple the new crop is prohibited throughout the entire sixteenth of Nisan by Torah law. With regard to the dissenting opinion that the new crop is permitted on the sixteenth of Nisan, Rav and Shmuel both say: When the Temple is standing, the sacrifice of the omer offering permits the new crop. When the Temple is not standing, the illumination of the eastern horizon on the sixteenth of Nisan permits it.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav and Shmuel present a view that splits the verse in Leviticus 23:14 into two operative clauses for two different eras. “Until you have brought the offering” applies when the Temple stands — the omer sacrifice is what permits the new grain. “Until this selfsame day” applies after the Temple’s destruction — daybreak on the sixteenth automatically permits the new grain. This elegant reading gives each clause independent significance, avoiding redundancy in the biblical text.
Key Terms:
- הֵאִיר מִזְרָח (he’ir mizrach) = The illumination of the eastern horizon — i.e., daybreak on the 16th of Nisan
Segment 14
TYPE: גמרא
Scriptural basis: Two clauses in the same verse serve different eras
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַאי טַעְמָא? תְּרֵי קְרָאֵי כְּתִיבִי: כְּתִיב ״עַד יוֹם הֲבִיאֲכֶם״, וּכְתִיב ״עַד עֶצֶם הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה״. הָא כֵּיצַד?
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: What is the reason? Two verses are written with regard to the new crop. More precisely, there are two clauses in the same verse: “And you shall eat neither bread, nor parched grain, nor fresh grain, until this selfsame day, until you have brought the offering of your God” (Leviticus 23:14). It is written that the new crop is prohibited “until you have brought the offering,” and it is also written that the new crop is prohibited only “until the selfsame day.” How so? How can these clauses be reconciled?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara identifies the apparent contradiction within a single verse. One clause conditions permission on the omer sacrifice (“until you have brought the offering”), while another sets a time-based trigger (“until this selfsame day”). If both are operative simultaneously, they conflict — is the new grain permitted by the sacrifice or by the date? The resolution assigns each clause to a different historical period.
Key Terms:
- תְּרֵי קְרָאֵי (trei kra’ei) = Two verses (or clauses) — the basis for the Gemara’s hermeneutical resolution
Segment 15
TYPE: תירוץ
Resolution: One clause for the Temple era, one for after its destruction
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כָּאן – בִּזְמַן שֶׁבֵּית הַמִּקְדָּשׁ קַיָּים, כָּאן – בִּזְמַן שֶׁאֵין בֵּית הַמִּקְדָּשׁ קַיָּים.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: Here, when the verse permits the new crop only after the sacrifice of the omer offering, it is referring to the period when the Temple is standing. There, when the verse permits the new crop immediately upon the sixteenth of Nisan, it is speaking of the period when the Temple is not standing.
קלאוד על הדף:
This resolution neatly assigns each clause to its appropriate era. When the Temple stands, the omer sacrifice is the trigger. Without the Temple, the date itself (daybreak on the sixteenth) serves as the trigger. This interpretation has significant practical implications: if the sixteenth of Nisan arrives and there is no Temple, people may eat the new grain immediately at dawn. This is the position against which Rabbi Yehuda strongly disagrees.
Key Terms:
- כָּאן… כָּאן (kan… kan) = Here… there — a standard Talmudic formula for resolving textual tensions by applying different parts to different contexts
Segment 16
TYPE: גמרא
Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish: Even when the Temple stands, daybreak permits
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: אֲפִילּוּ בִּזְמַן שֶׁבֵּית הַמִּקְדָּשׁ קַיָּים, הֵאִיר מִזְרָח מַתִּיר. וְהָכְתִיב: ״עַד הֲבִיאֲכֶם״! לְמִצְוָה.
English Translation:
Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish both say: Even when the Temple is standing, the illumination of the eastern horizon permits the new crop. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it written: “Until you have brought the offering,” which indicates that the new crop is not permitted at daybreak, but only after the omer offering is sacrificed? The Gemara answers: The verse means that one should wait to partake of the new crop until after the omer offering is brought ab initio, in order to fulfill the mitzva in the optimal fashion, but nevertheless it is permitted at daybreak.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish take an even more lenient position than Rav and Shmuel. They hold that daybreak on the sixteenth always permits the new grain — even when the Temple stands. The verse “until you have brought the offering” is understood as a recommendation (le-mitzva), not a strict condition. One should ideally wait for the omer sacrifice, but strictly speaking, the grain is permitted at dawn. This view has major implications for the understanding of Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai’s post-Temple ordinance.
Key Terms:
- לְמִצְוָה (le-mitzva) = For the optimal fulfillment of the commandment — as a recommendation rather than a strict requirement
Segment 17
TYPE: קושיא / תירוץ
Challenge from the mishna: “Once the omer was sacrificed, the new crop was permitted immediately” — answered: le-mitzva
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מִשֶּׁקָּרַב הָעוֹמֶר, הוּתַּר חָדָשׁ מִיָּד! לְמִצְוָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara raises another difficulty. The mishna states: From the moment that the omer offering was sacrificed, the produce of the new crop was permitted immediately. This indicates that the new crop is not permitted at the illumination of the eastern horizon. The Gemara again answers that the mishna means that one should wait to partake of the new crop until after the sacrifice of the omer offering in order to fulfill the mitzva in the optimal fashion, but it is permitted at daybreak.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara challenges Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish from our very mishna, which implies the omer sacrifice — not daybreak — is the trigger. The response is consistent: the mishna describes the ideal practice (le-mitzva), not the strict legal requirement. This interpretation reads the mishna as prescriptive guidance rather than definitional law.
Segment 18
TYPE: קושיא / תירוץ
Challenge from the next mishna about the omer permitting in the country — answered: le-mitzva
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָעוֹמֶר הָיָה מַתִּיר בַּמְּדִינָה, וּשְׁתֵּי הַלֶּחֶם בַּמִּקְדָּשׁ! לְמִצְוָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara raises yet another difficulty from the next mishna (68b): Sacrifice of the omer offering would permit consumption of the new crop in the rest of the country [bamedina] outside the Temple, and the two loaves offering permitted the sacrifice of the new crop in the Temple. Here, too, the Gemara answers: One should wait to partake of the new crop until after the sacrifice of the omer offering in order to fulfill the mitzva in the optimal fashion.
קלאוד על הדף:
A third challenge is brought from the next mishna (which appears on 68b), and the same answer is given: le-mitzva. The repeated application of this answer — three times in succession — is unusual and signals that the Gemara finds this view somewhat strained. The Gemara will shortly bring a more powerful challenge from Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai’s ordinance that cannot be easily dismissed with “le-mitzva.”
Key Terms:
- בַּמְּדִינָה (ba-medina) = In the rest of the country — outside Jerusalem and the Temple
Amud Bet (68b)
Segment 1
TYPE: קושיא
Critical challenge: Would Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai institute a whole-day prohibition just for a le-mitzva preference?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מִשֶּׁחָרַב בֵּית הַמִּקְדָּשׁ, הִתְקִין רַבָּן יוֹחָנָן בֶּן זַכַּאי שֶׁיְּהֵא יוֹם הֶנֶף כּוּלּוֹ אָסוּר. מַאי טַעְמָא? מְהֵרָה יִבָּנֶה בֵּית הַמִּקְדָּשׁ, וְיֹאמְרוּ: אֶשְׁתָּקַד מִי לֹא אָכַלְנוּ בְּהֵאִיר מִזְרָח? הַשְׁתָּא נָמֵי נֵיכוֹל!
English Translation:
The Gemara questions the claim that the purpose of waiting until the sacrifice of the omer is only in order to fulfill the mitzva in the most optimal fashion. The mishna teaches: From the time that the Temple was destroyed, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted that partaking from the new crop on the day of waving the omer, the sixteenth of Nisan, is completely prohibited and one may partake of the new crop only the next day. The Gemara analyzes this statement. What is the reason for this? It is that soon the Temple will be rebuilt, and people will say: Last year [eshtakad], when there was no Temple, didn’t we eat of the new crop as soon as the eastern horizon was illuminated, as the new crop was permitted immediately upon the advent of the morning of the sixteenth of Nisan? Now, too, let us eat the new grain at that time.
קלאוד על הדף:
This is the most powerful challenge to Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish’s position. Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai’s ordinance prohibits the new grain for the entire sixteenth of Nisan after the Temple’s destruction, specifically to prevent confusion when the Temple is rebuilt. The logic assumes that without this ordinance, people would eat at daybreak — and then continue doing so after the Temple is rebuilt, when they should actually wait for the omer. But if the omer requirement is merely le-mitzva (a preference), why would Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai institute a whole-day prohibition just to preserve a preference? A decree of such magnitude seems disproportionate for protecting a non-essential practice.
Key Terms:
- אֶשְׁתָּקַד (eshtakad) = Last year — a key term in the concern about future confusion
- מְהֵרָה יִבָּנֶה (mehera yibaneh) = Soon it will be rebuilt — the expectation of imminent Temple restoration
Segment 2
TYPE: קושיא
Continuation: Would a decree arise merely to protect optimal practice?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְלָא יָדְעִי, דְּאֶשְׁתָּקַד לָא הֲוָה עוֹמֶר, הֵאִיר מִזְרָח מַתִּיר, וְהַשְׁתָּא דְּאִיכָּא עוֹמֶר – עוֹמֶר מַתִּיר. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ לְמִצְוָה, מִשּׁוּם מִצְוָה לֵיקוּם וְלִיגְזוֹר?
English Translation:
And they would not know that last year, when there was no Temple, the illuminating of the eastern horizon permitted one to eat the new grain immediately, but now that the Temple has been rebuilt and there is an omer offering, it is the omer that permits the consumption of the new grain. When the Temple is standing, the new grain is not permitted until the omer offering has been sacrificed. The Gemara concludes its question: And if it enters your mind to say that one waits to partake of the new crop until the omer offering permits the new grain only in order to perform the mitzva in the optimal fashion, would we arise and decree that the entire sixteenth of Nisan is entirely prohibited only due to the performance of a mitzva in the optimal manner?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara sharpens the challenge: if daybreak truly permits the grain even when the Temple stands (and waiting for the omer is merely le-mitzva), then the worst-case scenario after the Temple is rebuilt is that people would eat at daybreak instead of waiting for the omer — a minor deviation from best practice. Would Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai have enacted such a sweeping prohibition — banning the new grain for an entire day — just to prevent people from missing an optimal-but-not-required practice? The severity of the decree implies the omer requirement is strict law, not mere preference.
Segment 3
TYPE: תירוץ
Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak: Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai follows Rabbi Yehuda’s view
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: רַבָּן יוֹחָנָן בֶּן זַכַּאי בְּשִׁיטַת רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אֲמָרָהּ, דְּאָמַר: מִן הַתּוֹרָה אָסוּר, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״עַד עֶצֶם הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה״ –
English Translation:
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai stated his ordinance in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that it is prohibited by Torah law to eat of the new grain until the seventeenth of Nisan, as it is stated: “And you shall eat neither bread nor parched grain, nor fresh stalks, until this selfsame [etzem] day, until you have brought the offering of your God” (Leviticus 23:14).
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak resolves the challenge by arguing that Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai’s ordinance is not actually a rabbinic decree at all — it reflects Torah law as interpreted by Rabbi Yehuda. Since Rabbi Yehuda reads “ad etzem ha-yom ha-zeh” as prohibiting the grain through the entirety of the sixteenth, Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai was merely publicizing what the Torah already requires. This allows Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish to maintain their position (that daybreak technically permits the grain) while acknowledging that Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai followed a different view.
Key Terms:
- בְּשִׁיטַת (be-shittat) = In accordance with the approach/opinion of
Segment 4
TYPE: גמרא
Rabbi Yehuda’s reading: “Until the essence of the day” means until the end of the sixteenth
Hebrew/Aramaic:
עַד עִיצּוּמוֹ שֶׁל יוֹם, וְקָסָבַר ״עַד״ וְעַד בַּכְּלָל.
English Translation:
This does not mean that it is permitted to eat the new grain on the morning of the sixteenth, when the eastern horizon is illuminated. Rather, it is prohibited until the essence [itzumo] of the day. And Rabbi Yehuda holds that when the verse says “until,” it means until and including, meaning that the grain is permitted only after the conclusion of the sixteenth. If so, by Torah law, eating the new grain is permitted only after the conclusion of the sixteenth, unless the omer offering was sacrificed, in which case it is permitted to eat the new grain immediately afterward.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yehuda’s interpretation turns on a word-play: “etzem” can mean both “selfsame” and “essence/bone.” He reads it as “until the itzumo (essence/entirety) of the day” — meaning the prohibition extends through the entire sixteenth. Combined with the principle that “ad” (until) means “until and including,” the new grain is forbidden until the conclusion of the sixteenth of Nisan. The only exception is when the omer is actually sacrificed, which overrides the time-based prohibition and permits the grain immediately.
Key Terms:
- עִיצּוּמוֹ שֶׁל יוֹם (itzumo shel yom) = The essence/entirety of the day
- עַד וְעַד בַּכְּלָל (ad ve-ad bi-khlal) = “Until” means until and including
Segment 5
TYPE: קושיא
But Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda in the mishna!
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּמִי סָבַר לַהּ כְּוָותֵיהּ? וְהָא מִיפְלָג פְּלִיג עֲלֵיהּ! דִּתְנַן: מִשֶּׁחָרַב בֵּית הַמִּקְדָּשׁ, הִתְקִין רַבָּן יוֹחָנָן בֶּן זַכַּאי שֶׁיְּהֵא יוֹם הֶנֶף כּוּלּוֹ אָסוּר. אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: וַהֲלֹא מִן הַתּוֹרָה הוּא אָסוּר, דִּכְתִיב ״עַד עֶצֶם הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה״!
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: And does Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? But he disagrees with him, as we learned in the mishna: From the time that the Temple was destroyed, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted that partaking from the new crop on the day of waving the omer, the sixteenth of Nisan, is entirely prohibited. Rabbi Yehuda says: But isn’t it forbidden by Torah law, as it is written: “Until this selfsame day”? This indicates that Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara challenges Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak’s harmonization. The structure of the mishna presents Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai and Rabbi Yehuda as disagreeing — Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai says he “instituted” (implying a rabbinic ordinance), and Rabbi Yehuda responds that no institution is necessary because the prohibition is from the Torah. If they agree, why does Rabbi Yehuda phrase his statement as a correction?
Segment 6
TYPE: תירוץ
It is Rabbi Yehuda who misunderstood — Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai actually agrees with him on Torah law
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הוּא דְּקָא טָעֵי, הוּא סָבַר רַבָּן יוֹחָנָן בֶּן זַכַּאי מִדְּרַבָּנַן קָאָמַר, וְלָא הִיא, מִדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא קָאָמַר. וְהָא ״הִתְקִין״ קָתָנֵי? מַאי ״הִתְקִין״? דָּרַשׁ וְהִתְקִין.
English Translation:
The Gemara rejects this. It is Rabbi Yehuda who is mistaken. He thought that Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai is saying that eating new grain on the sixteenth of Nisan is prohibited by rabbinic law. And that is not so; Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai is actually saying that it is prohibited by Torah law. The Gemara asks: But it is taught in the mishna that Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted, which indicates that it is a rabbinic ordinance. The Gemara answers: What is the meaning of the term: Instituted, in this context? It means that he interpreted the verses in the Torah and instituted public notice for the multitudes to conduct themselves accordingly.
קלאוד על הדף:
This is a remarkable Talmudic move: attributing error to a Tanna (Rabbi Yehuda) in reading the intention of another authority (Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai). The Gemara reinterprets “hitkein” (instituted) not as “enacted a rabbinic ordinance” but as “expounded and publicized” — darash ve-hitkein. Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai was teaching Torah law, not adding rabbinic legislation. He and Rabbi Yehuda actually agree on substance; Rabbi Yehuda simply misread Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai’s intent.
Key Terms:
- דָּרַשׁ וְהִתְקִין (darash ve-hitkein) = He interpreted [the Torah] and instituted public notice — redefining “hitkein” as publicizing a Torah ruling
Segment 7
TYPE: גמרא
Practical law: Rav Pappa and Rav Huna ate the new crop on the evening of the 16th leading into the 17th
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַב פָּפָּא וְרַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אָכְלִי חָדָשׁ בְּאוּרְתָּא דְּשִׁיתְּסַר נַגְהֵי שִׁבְסַר, קָסָבְרִי: חָדָשׁ בְּחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ דְּרַבָּנַן, וְלִסְפֵיקָא לָא חָיְישִׁינַן.
English Translation:
§ Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, ate from the new crop on the evening of the conclusion of the sixteenth of Nisan, leading into the seventeenth of Nisan. They held that the prohibition against eating the new crop outside Eretz Yisrael applies by rabbinic law. And therefore we are not concerned for the uncertainty that perhaps the day we think is the sixteenth of Nisan is really the fifteenth, due to the court proclaiming the previous month of Adar a full thirty days long.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara now shifts to practical law in Babylonia, where the exact calendar date was uncertain (since Nisan’s start depended on the court’s proclamation in Eretz Yisrael). Rav Pappa and Rav Huna held that the chadash prohibition outside Eretz Yisrael is only rabbinic. Since it is rabbinic, they apply the principle that we do not extend rabbinic prohibitions to doubtful cases, and they ate the new crop on the evening leading into the seventeenth — the earliest possible permissible time.
Key Terms:
- חָדָשׁ בְּחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ (chadash b’chutzah la-aretz) = The prohibition of new grain outside the Land of Israel
- לִסְפֵיקָא לָא חָיְישִׁינַן (li-sfeika lo chaishhinan) = We are not concerned for uncertainty — a principle applied to rabbinic prohibitions
Segment 8
TYPE: גמרא
The Sages of Rav Ashi’s academy ate on the morning of the 17th — holding chadash outside Israel is biblical
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְרַבָּנַן דְּבֵי רַב אָשֵׁי אָכְלִי בְּצַפְרָא דְּשִׁבְסַר, קָסָבְרִי: חָדָשׁ בְּחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא.
English Translation:
And conversely, the Sages of the study hall of Rav Ashi ate from the new crop only on the morning of the seventeenth. They held that the prohibition against eating the new crop outside Eretz Yisrael applies by Torah law. Consequently, they did entertain the concern that the day they thought was the sixteenth might actually be the fifteenth of Nisan, which would mean that the new crop is permitted only the following morning.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Sages in Rav Ashi’s academy took the stricter view that the chadash prohibition applies by Torah law even outside Eretz Yisrael. Since Torah-level prohibitions require consideration of calendrical doubt, they waited until the morning of the seventeenth to be safe. But they did not wait until the evening of the seventeenth (i.e., the eighteenth), because they held Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai’s whole-day prohibition was only rabbinic and did not apply to a day of uncertain status.
Segment 9
TYPE: גמרא
Explanation: Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai’s ordinance is rabbinic and was not extended to uncertain dates
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְרַבָּן יוֹחָנָן בֶּן זַכַּאי מִדְּרַבָּנַן קָאָמַר, וְכִי תַּקֵּין לְיוֹם הֶנֶף – לִסְפֵיקָא לָא תַּקֵּין.
English Translation:
This is problematic, as if there is a concern that the sixteenth is really the fifteenth of Nisan, then the seventeenth would be the sixteenth of Nisan. Accordingly, how could they eat from the new crop on that morning? Didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Zakkai institute that the new crop is prohibited the entire day? The Gemara explains that those Sages of the study hall of Rav Ashi held: And Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai is saying that eating new grain on the sixteenth of Nisan nowadays is prohibited by rabbinic law. And the Sages instituted this prohibition only for the actual day of waving the omer offering, whereas it was not instituted for a day with regard to which the real date is uncertain.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara anticipates a question: if the seventeenth might really be the sixteenth, shouldn’t the Sages of Rav Ashi’s academy have waited until evening due to Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai’s whole-day ban? The answer is that — contrary to the earlier passage which attributed Torah-law reasoning to Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai — the Sages of Rav Ashi’s academy understood his ordinance as merely rabbinic, applicable only to the definite sixteenth, not to a day of uncertain status. This shows that the interpretation of Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai’s ordinance was itself disputed.
Segment 10
TYPE: גמרא
Ravina’s family tradition: His father waited until the evening of the 17th into the 18th
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רָבִינָא: אָמְרָה לִי אֵם – אֲבוּךְ לָא הֲוָה אָכֵיל חָדָשׁ אֶלָּא בְּאוּרְתָּא דְּשִׁבְסַר נַגְהֵי תְּמָנֵיסַר, דְּסָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, וְחָיֵישׁ לִסְפֵיקָא.
English Translation:
Ravina said: My mother told me: Your father would eat from the new crop only on the evening at the conclusion of the seventeenth of Nisan, leading into the eighteenth. The reason for this was that he held in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda that nowadays it is prohibited to eat of the new crop on the sixteenth of Nisan by Torah law, and he was therefore concerned for the uncertainty that perhaps the sixteenth of Nisan was really the fifteenth, and consequently the seventeenth was really the sixteenth. Therefore he waited until the eve of the eighteenth, when he could be sure that there was no prohibition by Torah law against eating from the new crop.
קלאוד על הדף:
This poignant personal account from Ravina, transmitted through his mother, records the strictest practical position. Ravina’s father combined Rabbi Yehuda’s view (that the prohibition on the sixteenth is Torah-level) with concern for calendrical uncertainty. Since the seventeenth might be the actual sixteenth, and the Torah prohibits the entire sixteenth, he waited until the evening of the seventeenth — when even accounting for a one-day discrepancy, the prohibition would certainly have passed. This represents a practical stringency adopted by individuals who wanted to be careful about a Torah-level prohibition.
Key Terms:
- נַגְהֵי תְּמָנֵיסַר (naghei t’maneisar) = Leading into the eighteenth — the strictest possible timing
Segment 11
TYPE: משנה
New mishna: The omer permits in the country; the two loaves permit in the Temple
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְנִי׳ הָעוֹמֶר הָיָה מַתִּיר בַּמְּדִינָה, וּשְׁתֵּי הַלֶּחֶם בְּמִקְדָּשׁ. אֵין מְבִיאִין מְנָחוֹת, וּבִיכּוּרִים, וּמִנְחַת בְּהֵמָה קוֹדֶם לָעוֹמֶר, אִם הֵבִיא – פָּסוּל. קוֹדֶם לִשְׁתֵּי הַלֶּחֶם לֹא יָבִיא, אִם הֵבִיא – כָּשֵׁר.
English Translation:
MISHNA: Sacrifice of the omer offering would permit consumption of the new crop in the rest of the country outside the Temple, and the two loaves offering would permit the sacrifice of the new crop in the Temple. One may not bring meal offerings, or first fruits, or the meal offering brought with libations accompanying animal offerings, from the new crop prior to the sacrifice of the omer, and if he brought them from the new crop they are unfit. After the omer but prior to the two loaves one may not bring these offerings from the new crop, but if he brought them from the new crop, they are fit.
קלאוד על הדף:
This foundational mishna establishes a two-tier system for the new crop. The omer (offered on 16 Nisan) unlocks the new grain for ordinary consumption. The two loaves (offered on Shavuot) unlocks it for Temple use. Before the omer, any meal offering from new grain is invalid (pasul). Between the omer and the two loaves, such offerings should ideally not be brought from new grain, but if brought, they are valid (kasher). This asymmetry will be the subject of the Gemara’s analysis.
Key Terms:
- שְׁתֵּי הַלֶּחֶם (shtei ha-lechem) = The two loaves offering brought on Shavuot from new wheat
- בִּיכּוּרִים (bikkurim) = First fruits brought to the Temple
- מִנְחַת בְּהֵמָה (minchat behema) = The meal offering accompanying animal sacrifices (libations)
Segment 12
TYPE: גמרא
Rabbi Tarfon’s question: What distinguishes before the omer from before the two loaves?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גְּמָ׳ יָתֵיב רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן וְקָא קַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ: מָה בֵּין קוֹדֶם לָעוֹמֶר לְקוֹדֶם שְׁתֵּי הַלֶּחֶם?
English Translation:
GEMARA: The mishna teaches that meal offerings brought from the new crop prior to the sacrifice of the omer offering are unfit, whereas those brought after the omer but prior to the two loaves are fit. Rabbi Tarfon sat and posed the following difficulty: What is the difference between meal offerings brought before the omer and those brought before the two loaves?
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Tarfon asks a sharp structural question. If both the omer and the two loaves are prerequisites — one for ordinary consumption, one for Temple use — why does a meal offering from new grain fail before the omer but succeed (post facto) before the two loaves? The logic seems asymmetric: in both cases, the offering is brought before its prerequisite sacrifice. What makes the two loaves a weaker prerequisite than the omer?
Segment 13
TYPE: תירוץ
Yehuda ben Nehemya’s answer: Before the omer, the new crop is totally forbidden; between omer and two loaves, it is permitted to ordinary people
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר לְפָנָיו יְהוּדָה בַּר נְחֶמְיָה: לֹא, אִם אָמַרְתָּ קוֹדֶם לָעוֹמֶר, שֶׁכֵּן לֹא הוּתַּר מִכְּלָלוֹ אֵצֶל הֶדְיוֹט, תֹּאמַר קוֹדֶם לִשְׁתֵּי הַלֶּחֶם, שֶׁהוּתַּר מִכְּלָלוֹ אֵצֶל הֶדְיוֹט?
English Translation:
Rabbi Yehuda bar Neḥemya said before Rabbi Tarfon: No, one cannot compare the two situations. If you said that this is the halakha with regard to before the omer sacrifice, this is because at that stage there are no circumstances in which the new crop’s general prohibition was permitted, even with regard to an ordinary person; shall you also say that this is the halakha with regard to before the sacrifice of the two loaves, when the new crop’s general prohibition was permitted with regard to an ordinary person? The new crop ingredient in the meal offering is at least permitted in consumption after the omer is brought. Therefore, the meal offerings that were brought after the omer but before the two loaves are fit.
קלאוד על הדף:
Yehuda ben Nehemya provides a crucial halakhic distinction. Before the omer, the new grain is totally prohibited — no one may eat it under any circumstances. An offering from a universally prohibited substance is invalid. Between the omer and the two loaves, however, the grain is permitted for ordinary consumption — only its Temple use is restricted. Since the grain itself has “been permitted from its general prohibition” (huttar mi-klalo) for ordinary people, the Temple restriction is treated as a lesser barrier. If the offering is brought, it is valid post facto.
Key Terms:
- הוּתַּר מִכְּלָלוֹ (huttar mi-klalo) = Its general prohibition has been permitted — the grain is no longer universally forbidden
- הֶדְיוֹט (hedyot) = An ordinary person, a layperson (as opposed to Temple service)
Segment 14
TYPE: אגדתא
Rabbi Akiva warns Yehuda ben Nehemya for embarrassing an elder; he dies shortly after
Hebrew/Aramaic:
שָׁתַק רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן, צָהֲבוּ פָּנָיו שֶׁל רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן נְחֶמְיָה, אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: יְהוּדָה, צָהֲבוּ פָּנֶיךָ שֶׁהֵשַׁבְתָּ אֶת זָקֵן? תְּמֵהַנִי אִם תַּאֲרִיךְ יָמִים. אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בְּרַבִּי אִלְעַאי: אוֹתוֹ הַפֶּרֶק פְּרֹס הַפֶּסַח הָיָה, כְּשֶׁעָלִיתִי לָעֲצֶרֶת שָׁאַלְתִּי אַחֲרָיו: יְהוּדָה בֶּן נְחֶמְיָה הֵיכָן הוּא? וְאָמְרוּ לִי: נִפְטַר וְהָלַךְ לוֹ.
English Translation:
Rabbi Tarfon was silent, and Rabbi Yehuda ben Neḥemya’s face brightened. Rabbi Akiva said to him: Yehuda, has your face brightened because you answered the elder? I will be astonished if the days of your life will be lengthy. Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ilai, said: That period in which that interaction occurred was half a month before Passover. When I ascended again to the study hall for the festival of Shavuot, I asked about him: Where is Rabbi Yehuda ben Neḥemya? And they said to me: He passed away and left this world.
קלאוד על הדף:
This dramatic aggadic passage carries a profound ethical lesson. Yehuda ben Nehemya’s answer was halakhically correct — Rabbi Tarfon fell silent, acknowledging its force. But Yehuda’s visible pride (his face “brightened”) at having silenced an elder drew Rabbi Akiva’s sharp rebuke. The sin was not in answering correctly but in taking pride in besting a great Sage. Rabbi Akiva’s somber prediction — “I will be astonished if your life will be lengthy” — was fulfilled within weeks. Rabbi Yehuda bar Ilai’s testimony provides an eyewitness timeline: the exchange happened before Passover; by Shavuot (approximately seven weeks later), Yehuda ben Nehemya had died.
Key Terms:
- צָהֲבוּ פָּנָיו (tzahavu panav) = His face brightened — an expression of visible pride or satisfaction
- פְּרֹס הַפֶּסַח (peros ha-Pesach) = Approximately two weeks before Passover
Segment 15
TYPE: גמרא
Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak: Fruit libations brought before the omer should also be valid
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: לְדִבְרֵי יְהוּדָה בֶּן נְחֶמְיָה, נְסָכִים בִּיכּוּרִים שֶׁהִקְרִיבָם קוֹדֶם לָעוֹמֶר – כְּשֵׁירִין. פְּשִׁיטָא!
English Translation:
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: According to the statement of Rabbi Yehuda ben Neḥemya, libations from first fruits that one brought before the omer offering is sacrificed should be valid. The reason is that the prohibition of the new crop does not apply to fruits at all, and therefore they are never prohibited to ordinary people. When the mishna states that first fruits are prohibited it is referring to first fruits of grain, not the fruit of a tree. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that libations from first fruits brought before the omer offering are valid? Why would one think that they should not be valid?
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak extends Yehuda ben Nehemya’s logic. If the key factor is whether the substance “was permitted from its general prohibition for ordinary people,” then fruits — which are never subject to the chadash prohibition at all — should certainly be valid for Temple offerings even before the omer. The prohibition of chadash applies only to the five species of grain, not to fruits. The Gemara considers this obvious but will explain why it needed to be stated.
Segment 16
TYPE: גמרא
Clarification: Fruit libations are valid a fortiori — they were never prohibited at all
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: הָתָם הוּא דְּהוּתַּר מִכְּלָלוֹ אֵצֶל הֶדְיוֹט, אֲבָל הָכָא דְּלֹא הוּתַּר מִכְּלָלוֹ – לָא. קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן הָכָא, דְּלָא אִיתְּסַר כְּלָל.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers that Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak’s statement is necessary, lest you say: It is only there, in the case of the meal offering of grain brought after the omer sacrifice, that it is valid, as the new crop’s general prohibition was permitted with regard to an ordinary person. But here, since with regard to these fruits there are no circumstances in which its general prohibition was permitted, one might say that the libation should not be valid. Therefore, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak teaches us that the opposite is the case: All the more so here it is a valid offering, where the fruit was not prohibited at all.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara explains why the ruling needed to be stated despite seeming obvious. One might have argued that Yehuda ben Nehemya’s logic requires a specific “transition” — the substance must have been prohibited and then permitted. Fruits, which were never prohibited, lack this transition and might therefore fall into a different category. Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak teaches that the opposite is true: if something that was formerly prohibited and then permitted is valid for offerings, then something that was never prohibited at all is certainly valid — a kal va-chomer (a fortiori argument).
Key Terms:
- כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן (kol she-kein) = All the more so — an a fortiori argument
Segment 17
TYPE: בעיא
Rami bar Chama’s dilemma: Do the two loaves permit even when sacrificed out of order?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
(סֵדֶר הֲנָצָא גְּלֵי פִּיל סִימָן.) בָּעֵי רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא: שְׁתֵּי הַלֶּחֶם מַהוּ שֶׁיַּתִּירוּ שֶׁלֹּא כְּסִדְרָן?
English Translation:
§ The Gemara presents a mnemonic for the ensuing discussions in the Gemara: Order, sprouting, dung of, elephant. The mishna teaches that a meal offering using the new crop may not be brought prior to the omer sacrifice or the two loaves. Rami bar Ḥama raises a dilemma: With regard to the two loaves offering on Shavuot, what is the halakha as to whether they permit the new grain to be used in the Temple, if this sacrifice was performed out of their order? The sacrifice of the omer permits ordinary people to eat from the new grain, whereas the sacrifice of the two loaves permits the new grain to be used in the Temple. What is the halakha if a new crop sprouted after the omer offering was brought but before the two loaves were brought?
קלאוד על הדף:
Rami bar Chama introduces a fascinating theoretical question. Normally, the omer comes first (Passover) and the two loaves follow (Shavuot). But what if grain takes root between these two events? For such grain, the two loaves would be the first offering to “pass over” it, and the omer would come second (the following year). If this out-of-order sequence occurs, does the two loaves still permit this grain for Temple use, or must the offerings occur in their proper sequence (omer first, then two loaves)?
Key Terms:
- שֶׁלֹּא כְּסִדְרָן (she-lo ke-sidran) = Out of their proper order
- סִימָן (siman) = A mnemonic — memory aid for the sequence of topics
Segment 18
TYPE: גמרא
Elaboration of the scenario: Grain planted between omer and two loaves
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? כְּגוֹן דְּזַרְעִינְהוּ בֵּין הָעוֹמֶר לִשְׁתֵּי הַלֶּחֶם, וַחֲלֵיף עֲלַיְיהוּ שְׁתֵּי הַלֶּחֶם וְעוֹמֶר. מַאי? כְּסִדְרָן שַׁרְיָין, שֶׁלֹּא כְּסִדְרָן לָא שַׁרְיָין? אוֹ דִלְמָא שֶׁלֹּא כְּסִדְרָן נָמֵי שַׁרְיָין.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this case? The Gemara explains: This is referring to a case where they planted the grain in between the time of the sacrifice of the omer and the time of the two loaves offering. And therefore the sacrifice of two loaves passed by first, and then the time of the omer offering of the following year. What is the halakha in such a case? The Gemara explains the two possibilities: Does the sacrifice of the omer and two loaves permit the new grain to be used for meal offerings if sacrificed only in their proper order, whereas if sacrificed out of their order the sacrifice does not permit the new crop? Or perhaps they permit the new grain to be used for meal offerings even when sacrificed out of their order.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara spells out the case precisely: grain planted between Passover and Shavuot. The first offering to “pass over” this grain’s growth cycle is the two loaves on Shavuot, and the next omer comes the following Passover. So the two loaves precede the omer for this particular crop. The question is whether the permitting function of these offerings is sequence-dependent or cumulative.
Segment 19
TYPE: גמרא
Rabba’s proof from a baraita: The omer must come from barley
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַבָּה: תָּא שְׁמַע, ״וְאִם תַּקְרִיב מִנְחַת בִּכּוּרִים״ – בְּמִנְחַת הָעוֹמֶר הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר. מֵהֵיכָן בָּאָה? מִן הַשְּׂעוֹרִין. אַתָּה אוֹמֵר מִן הַשְּׂעוֹרִין, אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא מִן הַחִיטִּין?
English Translation:
Rabba said: Come and hear proof from a baraita: “And if you bring a meal offering of first fruits to the Lord, you shall bring for the meal offering of your first fruits grain in the ear parched with fire, even groats of the fresh ear” (Leviticus 2:14). The verse is speaking of the omer meal offering. From where, i.e., of which grain, is it brought? It is brought from barley. The baraita asks: Do you say that it is brought from barley, or perhaps it is only from wheat?
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabba begins building a proof to resolve Rami bar Chama’s dilemma. He introduces a baraita that discusses which grain the omer offering is made from. The baraita’s initial question — barley or wheat? — sets up proofs that will have implications not only for the omer’s composition but also for the two-loaves-out-of-order question.
Key Terms:
- שְׂעוֹרִין (se’orin) = Barley
- חִיטִּין (chittin) = Wheat
Segment 20
TYPE: גמרא
Rabbi Eliezer’s proof from the term “aviv” — barley was “in the ear” during the plague of hail
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: נֶאֱמַר ״אָבִיב״ בְּמִצְרַיִם, וְנֶאֱמַר ״אָבִיב״ לְדוֹרוֹת. מָה ״אָבִיב״ הָאָמוּר בְּמִצְרַיִם – שְׂעוֹרִין, אַף ״אָבִיב״ הָאָמוּר לְדוֹרוֹת – שְׂעוֹרִין.
English Translation:
Rabbi Eliezer says that it is stated “in the ear” with regard to the plague of hail in Egypt: “And the flax and the barley were smitten; for the barley was in the ear, and the flax was in bloom” (Exodus 9:31), and it is stated “in the ear” with regard to the mitzva of the new crop, which is for all generations. Just as the term “in the ear” that is stated with regard to plague of hail in Egypt is referring to barley, as is clear from the next verse: “But the wheat and the spelt were not smitten, for they ripen late” (Exodus 9:32), so too the term “in the ear” that is stated with regard to the new crop for all generations is referring to barley.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Eliezer proves the omer is from barley through a gezera shava (verbal analogy). The word “aviv” (in the ear) appears both in the description of the plague of hail in Egypt and in the omer commandment. In Egypt, the context makes clear that “aviv” refers to barley (since the verse explicitly says barley was destroyed while wheat survived). Therefore, the omer’s “aviv” also means barley.
Key Terms:
- אָבִיב (aviv) = In the ear; the stage when grain has formed heads but is not fully ripe
Segment 21
TYPE: גמרא
Rabbi Akiva’s proof: Community offerings should include both wheat and barley, just as individual offerings do
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: מָצִינוּ יָחִיד שֶׁמֵּבִיא חוֹבָתוֹ מִן הַחִיטִּין, וְחוֹבָתוֹ מִן הַשְּׂעוֹרִין.
English Translation:
The baraita cites another proof that the omer offering is brought from barley. And Rabbi Akiva says: We found an individual who brings his obligation of a meal offering from wheat, which is brought by a poor person for a false oath of testimony, a false oath of utterance, or for entering the Temple while ritually impure, and one who brings his obligation of a meal offering from barley, in the case of a sinner’s meal offering or the meal offering of a sota.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Akiva uses a structural symmetry argument. For individuals, the Torah provides for both wheat meal offerings (from the poor for certain sins) and barley meal offerings (the sotah’s offering, the sinner’s offering). The community should likewise have both. Since the two loaves on Shavuot are from wheat, there must be a communal barley offering — and that can only be the omer. If the omer were also from wheat, there would be no communal barley offering, breaking the symmetry.
Key Terms:
- סוֹטָה (sotah) = A woman suspected of infidelity, whose meal offering is from barley
Segment 22
TYPE: גמרא
Continuation: If omer were from wheat, there would be no communal barley offering
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְצִיבּוּר שֶׁמְּבִיאִין חוֹבָתָן מִן הַחִיטִּין, מְבִיאִין חוֹבָתָן מִן הַשְּׂעוֹרִין, וְאִם אַתָּה אוֹמֵר בָּא מִן הַחִיטִּין – לֹא מָצִינוּ צִיבּוּר שֶׁמֵּבִיא חוֹבָתוֹ מִן הַשְּׂעוֹרִין.
English Translation:
And we also found with regard to the community that they bring their obligation of a meal offering from wheat, in the case of the two loaves offering of Shavuot, and therefore, to keep the halakha of a community parallel to that of an individual there should be a case where the community brings their obligation of a meal offering from barley. And if you say that the omer offering comes from wheat, then we will not have found a case of a community that brings its obligation of a meal offering from barley. Consequently, it must be that the omer offering comes from barley.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Akiva completes his symmetry argument. The community has a wheat offering (two loaves) and must therefore also have a barley offering (omer). Without this, the individual-community parallel would be broken. This proof depends on an aesthetic/structural principle — that the Torah maintains a balanced typology of offerings across individuals and the community.
Segment 23
TYPE: גמרא
Rabbi Akiva’s alternative proof: If the omer were wheat, the two loaves would not be “first fruits”
Hebrew/Aramaic:
דָּבָר אַחֵר: אִם אַתָּה אוֹמֵר עוֹמֶר בָּא מִן הַחִיטִּין – אֵין שְׁתֵּי הַלֶּחֶם ״בִּיכּוּרִים״.
English Translation:
Rabbi Akiva suggests another proof: Alternatively, if you say that the omer offering comes from wheat, then the two loaves offering would not be from the first fruits. The verse states that the two loaves offering of Shavuot should come from the first fruits: “Also in the day of the first fruits, when you bring a new meal offering to the Lord in your feast of weeks” (Numbers 28:26). If the omer is from wheat, then the two loaves offering would not be the first offering of the first fruit, as the omer offering of Passover precedes it. Therefore, the omer offering must come from barley. This concludes the baraita.
קלאוד על הדף:
This is the proof that Rabba will use to resolve Rami bar Chama’s dilemma. The Torah calls the two loaves “bikkurim” (first fruits) in Numbers 28:26. If the omer were also from wheat, the two loaves would not be the first wheat offering of the year — the omer would have preceded them. For the two loaves to qualify as “bikkurim,” the omer must come from a different grain (barley). This proof assumes the two loaves must be genuinely “first” — the first wheat offering of the season.
Key Terms:
- בִּיכּוּרִים (bikkurim) = First fruits — a term the Torah applies to the two loaves offering
Segment 24
TYPE: גמרא
Rabba’s resolution: If out-of-order were valid, the two loaves could be “first fruits” even from wheat alongside a wheat omer
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאִם אִיתָא דִּשְׁתֵּי הַלֶּחֶם שֶׁלֹּא כְּסִדְרָן שַׁרְיָין, מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ דְּמַקְרֵיב עוֹמֶר מֵהָנָךְ דְּאַשְׁרוּשׁ קוֹדֶם לִשְׁתֵּי הַלֶּחֶם, וּבָתַר הָעוֹמֶר דְּאֶשְׁתָּקַד.
English Translation:
Rabba resolves Rami bar Ḥama’s dilemma from this last proof of Rabbi Akiva: And if it is so, that the two loaves sacrificed not in their proper order still permit the use of the new crop for meal offerings, you can in fact find a case where the two loaves are from the first fruits even though they are also brought from wheat, just like the omer offering. This is a case where the community sacrifices the current omer offering from these wheat grains that took root prior to the bringing of the two loaves offering but after the bringing of the omer offering of last year.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabba’s proof is elegant. If out-of-order offerings were valid, one could construct a scenario where both the omer and the two loaves are from wheat, yet the two loaves are still “first fruits.” How? Plant wheat between last year’s omer and two loaves. The two loaves would be this crop’s first offering (passing over it first), and next year’s omer would come from the same wheat. Both from wheat, yet the two loaves still qualify as “first.” Since Rabbi Akiva considered it necessary to prove the omer is from barley (to ensure the two loaves are “bikkurim”), he evidently assumed out-of-order is NOT valid — otherwise his proof would fail.
Segment 25
TYPE: גמרא
Continuation: The two loaves from grain that took root before the current omer but after last year’s two loaves
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּשְׁתֵּי הַלֶּחֶם מֵהָנָךְ דְּאַשְׁרוּשׁ קוֹדֶם לָעוֹמֶר דְּהַשְׁתָּא, וּבָתַר שְׁתֵּי הַלֶּחֶם דְּאֶשְׁתָּקַד.
English Translation:
And the current two loaves offering is brought from these grains that took root prior to the current omer offering and after the two loaves offering of last year. In this scenario, the two loaves come from wheat of this year’s crop and yet they are still called the first fruits, despite the fact that the omer offering also came from wheat, as that wheat is considered the previous year’s crop. Since this case is not mentioned in the baraita, evidently if the two loaves are not in the proper order with regard to a certain crop they do not permit that crop to be used in offerings in the Temple. This resolves Rami bar Ḥama’s dilemma.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabba completes the construction: the two loaves come from wheat planted after last year’s Shavuot but before this year’s Passover. Both offerings are wheat, yet each comes from a different crop-year. The two loaves would be the first offering from this year’s wheat, qualifying as “bikkurim.” If this scenario were possible (i.e., if out-of-order worked), Rabbi Akiva’s proof that the omer must be barley would be unnecessary. Since Rabbi Akiva felt the proof was necessary, he must have assumed out-of-order does not work — the two loaves require a preceding omer to be valid. This resolves Rami bar Chama’s dilemma: order matters.
Segment 26
TYPE: דחיה
The Gemara begins to reject Rabba’s proof
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מִי סָבְרַתְּ
English Translation:
In this manner Rabba has attempted to prove that the proper order of the omer offering followed by the two loaves is necessary to permit the new grain for use in meal offerings. The Gemara rejects the proof: Do you hold
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara begins to challenge Rabba’s proof but the text breaks off here, continuing on the next daf. This opening word signals that the rejection will question one of Rabba’s underlying assumptions — likely whether Rabbi Akiva’s proof truly assumes out-of-order is invalid, or whether there is another reason the omer must be barley. The continuation on the next daf will resolve this.