Arakhin 5:6-6:1
משנה ערכין ה:ו-ו:א
Seder: Kodashim | Tractate: Arakhin | Chapters: 5-6
📖 Mishna
Mishna 5:6
משנה ה:ו
Hebrew:
חַיָּבֵי עֲרָכִים, מְמַשְׁכְּנִין אוֹתָן. חַיָּבֵי חַטָּאוֹת וַאֲשָׁמוֹת, אֵין מְמַשְׁכְּנִין אוֹתָן. חַיָּבֵי עוֹלוֹת וּשְׁלָמִים, מְמַשְׁכְּנִין אוֹתָן אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ עַד שֶׁיִּתְרַצֶּה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ויקרא א), לִרְצוֹנוֹ, כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר, רוֹצֶה אָנִי. וְכֵן אַתָּה אוֹמֵר בְּגִטֵּי נָשִׁים, כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר, רוֹצֶה אָנִי:
English:
With regard to those obligated to pay valuations, the court repossesses their property to pay their debt to the Temple treasury. With regard to those obligated to bring sin offerings and guilt offerings, the court does not repossess their property; since one is obligated to bring them for atonement he would not delay bringing them. But with regard to those obligated to bring burnt offerings and peace offerings, the court repossesses their property; since these offerings are not obligatory for atonement, one might delay bringing them. Although one obligated to bring burnt offerings and peace offerings does not achieve atonement until he brings the offering of his own volition, as it is stated: “He shall bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting of his volition” (Leviticus 1:3), nevertheless the court coerces him until he says: I want to do so. And likewise, you say the same with regard to women’s bills of divorce. Although one divorces his wife only of his own volition, in any case where the Sages obligated a husband to divorce his wife the court coerces him until he says: I want to do so.
קלאוד על המשנה:
This mishna addresses a profound legal and philosophical question: How can the court enforce religious obligations that require voluntary consent?
The mishna first distinguishes between different types of Temple obligations. For valuations (ערכין), the court can seize property to collect payment—these are monetary debts like any other. For sin offerings and guilt offerings, no seizure is needed because a person desperate for atonement will naturally hurry to bring these offerings. But for burnt offerings and peace offerings, which aren’t required for atonement, a person might procrastinate indefinitely, so the court intervenes.
The truly remarkable principle emerges in the final section: The Torah requires offerings to be brought “of his volition” (לרצונו), yet the court can coerce someone until they say “I want to.” How is forced consent still consent?
The answer lies in a profound understanding of human psychology. The Sages understood that a Jew’s true inner will is to fulfill the Torah’s commands. External pressures—laziness, greed, stubbornness—obscure this deeper desire. Court-imposed pressure doesn’t create a false consent; it removes the obstacles that prevent the person’s authentic will from expressing itself. Once the resistance is overcome, the resulting “I want to” reflects genuine volition.
This same principle applies to divorce: when halakha requires a man to divorce his wife, the court coerces him until he “consents.” His superficial resistance is overcome to reveal his deeper commitment to living by Torah law.
Key Terms:
- ממשכנין (Memashkenin) = Repossessing/seizing property as collateral
- חטאות ואשמות (Chata’ot va’Ashamot) = Sin offerings and guilt offerings; brought for atonement
- עולות ושלמים (Olot u’Shlamim) = Burnt offerings and peace offerings; voluntary offerings
- לרצונו (Lirtzono) = Of his volition; the Torah’s requirement for voluntary intent
- כופין (Kofin) = We coerce; court-enforced pressure
- גיטי נשים (Gitei Nashim) = Women’s bills of divorce
Mishna 6:1
משנה ו:א
Hebrew:
שׁוּם הַיְתוֹמִים, שְׁלשִׁים יוֹם, וְשׁוּם הַהֶקְדֵּשׁ, שִׁשִּׁים יוֹם, וּמַכְרִיזִין בַּבֹּקֶר וּבָעָרֶב. הַמַּקְדִּישׁ נְכָסָיו וְהָיְתָה עָלָיו כְּתֻבַּת אִשָּׁה, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר, כְּשֶׁיְּגָרְשֶׁנָּה, יַדִּיר הֲנָאָה. רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר, אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ. כַּיוֹצֵא בוֹ אָמַר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, אַף הֶעָרֵב לָאִשָּׁה בִכְתֻבָּתָה וְהָיָה בַעְלָהּ מְגָרְשָׁהּ, יַדִּיר הֲנָאָה, שֶׁמָּא יַעֲשֶׂה קְנוּנְיָא עַל נְכָסָיו שֶׁל זֶה וְיַחֲזִיר אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ:
English:
One proclaims, i.e., publicly announces, the appraisal of the property inherited by minor orphans, which is being sold to repay their father’s debt, for thirty days, in order to receive the maximal price. And one proclaims the appraisal of consecrated property that is being sold by the Temple treasury for sixty days, and one proclaims it in the morning and in the evening. In the case of one who consecrates his property and there was the outstanding debt of the marriage contract of his wife, for whose repayment one’s property is liened, Rabbi Eliezer says: When he divorces her, he shall vow that benefit from her is forbidden to him. This is to prevent collusion, by which he divorces her, she collects payment from the consecrated property, and he then remarries her. Rabbi Yehoshua says: He need not do so. On a similar note, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: Even in the case of the guarantor of a woman for her marriage contract, and her husband was divorcing her and could not pay the debt, the husband shall vow that benefit from her is forbidden to him, lest he and his wife engage in collusion and collect payment from the property of that guarantor, and the husband will remarry his wife.
קלאוד על המשנה:
This mishna begins Chapter 6, which deals with the procedures for selling property that has been consecrated to the Temple. The opening establishes an important consumer protection principle: public auctions must be announced for a sufficient period to attract the best price.
The Announcement Periods: Orphans’ property gets 30 days of public announcement; Temple property gets 60 days. Why the difference? The Temple treasury can wait—it has resources. But orphans need their inheritance resolved relatively quickly. However, the Temple’s property requires more extensive announcement since it belongs to the sacred domain, and we want to ensure the best possible price is obtained. Announcements are made morning and evening to reach both early risers and those who come to the marketplace later.
The Collusion Problem: The second half addresses a clever scheme to defraud the Temple. Here’s how it might work: A husband consecrates all his property to the Temple. His wife has a ketubah (marriage contract) that is a lien on his property. He divorces her, she collects her ketubah payment from the consecrated property (since her claim predates the consecration), and then he remarries her—effectively recovering the property through his wife while the Temple gets nothing.
Rabbi Eliezer requires the husband to take a vow prohibiting any benefit from his ex-wife, making remarriage impossible. This safeguards Temple property. Rabbi Yehoshua trusts that courts can identify and prevent such fraud without requiring a vow.
Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel extends this concern to guarantors: if someone guaranteed a woman’s ketubah and the divorcing husband can’t pay, we worry the couple might collude to collect from the guarantor and then remarry. The vow prevents this fraud.
Key Terms:
- שום (Shum) = Appraisal; the assessed value for auction
- יתומים (Yetomim) = Orphans; minor children who inherited property
- הקדש (Hekdesh) = Consecrated property; belonging to the Temple
- כתובת אשה (Ketubbat Ishah) = Marriage contract; the financial settlement due to a wife upon divorce
- ידיר הנאה (Yadir Hana’ah) = He shall vow that benefit is forbidden; a formal prohibition
- קנוניא (Kinunya) = Collusion; a secret scheme to defraud
- ערב (Arev) = Guarantor; one who guarantees payment of another’s debt
