Keritot 3:7-8
משנה כריתות ג:ז-ח
Seder: Kodashim | Tractate: Keritot | Chapter: 3
📖 Mishna
Mishna 3:7
משנה ג:ז
Hebrew:
אָמַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, שָׁאַלְתִּי אֶת רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל וְאֶת רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בָּאִטְלִיס שֶׁל אֶמָּאוֹם, שֶׁהָלְכוּ לִקַּח בְּהֵמָה לְמִשְׁתֵּה בְנוֹ שֶׁל רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, הַבָּא עַל אֲחוֹתוֹ וְעַל אֲחוֹת אָבִיו וְעַל אֲחוֹת אִמּוֹ בְּהֶעְלֵם אֶחָד מַהוּ, חַיָּב אַחַת עַל כֻּלָּן, אוֹ אַחַת עַל כָּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת, וְאָמְרוּ לִי, לֹא שָׁמָעְנוּ. אֲבָל שָׁמַעְנוּ, הַבָּא עַל חָמֵשׁ נָשָׁיו נִדּוֹת בְּהֶעְלֵם אֶחָד, שֶׁהוּא חַיָּב עַל כָּל אַחַת וְאַחַת. וְרוֹאִין אָנוּ שֶׁהַדְּבָרִים קַל וָחֹמֶר:
English:
Rabbi Akiva said: I asked Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua in the meat market (itlis) in Emmaus, where they went to purchase an animal for the wedding feast of the son of Rabban Gamliel: In the case of one who unwittingly engages in intercourse with his sister, and the sister of his father, and the sister of his mother, during one lapse of awareness, what is the halakha? Is he liable to bring one sin offering for all three prohibitions, or is he liable to bring a separate sin offering for each and every one of the prohibitions? They said to Rabbi Akiva: We did not hear a ruling from our teachers about that case, but we heard the following ruling: One who engages in intercourse with each of his five wives while they are menstruating, during one lapse of awareness, we heard that he is liable to bring a separate sin offering for having engaged in intercourse with each and every one of them. And it appears to me that these matters can be derived from an a fortiori inference: If he is liable to bring separate sin offerings for having engaged in intercourse with five menstruating women, who are forbidden by one prohibition, he should certainly be liable to bring separate sin offerings for having engaged in intercourse with his sister, the sister of his father, and the sister of his mother, who are forbidden by three separate prohibitions.
Claude on the Mishna:
This mishna presents a fascinating methodological lesson: how the Sages used comparative cases and kal vachomer (a fortiori reasoning) when they lacked direct traditions.
The setting: Rabbi Akiva describes a memorable occasion - accompanying Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua to buy meat in Emmaus for Rabban Gamliel’s son’s wedding feast. Even during mundane errands, Torah scholars discussed complex halachic questions!
Rabbi Akiva’s question: If someone (through impossible but theoretical circumstances) had relations with:
- His sister
- His father’s sister
- His mother’s sister …all during one “lapse of awareness” - is that ONE sin offering or THREE?
The challenge: All three are technically violations of “sister” relationships:
- Sister = achot
- Father’s sister = achot av (his father’s sister)
- Mother’s sister = achot eim (his mother’s sister)
Maybe they’re all subcategories of ONE prohibition?
Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua’s response: “We didn’t hear a direct ruling, BUT we know this related case…”
The transmitted tradition: A man who had relations with FIVE of his wives while each was a niddah (menstruating), during one he’elem, brings FIVE sin offerings - one for each wife.
The kal vachomer inference:
- Five niddah wives = ONE prohibition (niddah), yet FIVE offerings
- Sister + father’s sister + mother’s sister = THREE distinct prohibitions
- Certainly THREE offerings!
If separate “bodies” (gufim) create separate liabilities even within ONE prohibition, then certainly separate PROHIBITIONS create separate liabilities!
Key Terms:
- אִטְלִיס (itlis) = Meat market (from Greek/Latin)
- אֶמָּאוֹם (Emmaus) = Town near Jerusalem
- אֲחוֹת אָבִיו (achot aviv) = Father’s sister
- אֲחוֹת אִמּוֹ (achot imo) = Mother’s sister
- קַל וָחֹמֶר (kal vachomer) = A fortiori argument
Mishna 3:8
משנה ג:ח
Hebrew:
וְעוֹד שְׁאָלָן רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא. אֵבָר הַמְדֻלְדָּל בִּבְהֵמָה, מַהוּ. אָמְרוּ לוֹ, לֹא שָׁמַעְנוּ. אֲבָל שָׁמַעְנוּ בְּאֵבָר הַמְדֻלְדָּל בְּאָדָם, שֶׁהוּא טָהוֹר. שֶׁכָּךְ הָיוּ מֻכֵּי שְׁחִין שֶׁבִּירוּשָׁלַיִם עוֹשִׂין, הוֹלֵךְ לוֹ עֶרֶב פֶּסַח אֵצֶל הָרוֹפֵא וְחוֹתְכוֹ עַד שֶׁהוּא מַנִּיחַ בּוֹ כִשְׂעֹרָה, וְתוֹחֲבוֹ בְסִירָה, וְהוּא נִמְשָׁךְ מִמֶּנּוּ, וְהַלָּה עוֹשֶׂה פִסְחוֹ, וְהָרוֹפֵא עוֹשֶׂה פִסְחוֹ. וְרוֹאִין אָנוּ שֶׁהַדְּבָרִים קַל וָחֹמֶר:
English:
And furthermore, Rabbi Akiva asked Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua in the meat market of Emmaus: What is the status of a dangling limb of an animal? Does it impart ritual impurity like a severed limb? They said to Rabbi Akiva: We have not heard a ruling from our teachers in that specific case, but we have heard with regard to a dangling limb of a person that it is ritually pure. And in this manner would the people afflicted with boils, whose limbs were dangling due to their affliction, act in Jerusalem: Each of them would go on Passover eve to the doctor, who would cut the affected limb almost completely until he would leave it connected by a hairbreadth of flesh, so that neither the doctor nor the afflicted would be rendered ritually impure by a severed limb. Then, the doctor would impale the limb on a thorn attached to the floor or the wall, and the afflicted would pull away from the thorn, thereby completely severing the limb. And that person afflicted with boils would perform the rite of his Paschal offering, and the doctor would perform the rite of his Paschal offering, as neither had come into contact with the limb once it was severed. In any case, as long as it was dangling, the limb did not impart impurity. And I consider that these matters can be derived from an a fortiori inference.
Claude on the Mishna:
This mishna shifts to a completely different topic - ritual impurity from severed limbs - but continues the methodological pattern of learning from related cases.
Rabbi Akiva’s question: Does a dangling limb from an ANIMAL (still attached by a thread of flesh) impart tumah like a fully severed limb?
Background on limb impurity:
- A severed limb from a living person (ever min hachai) imparts tumah
- A severed limb from a living animal (ever min hachai bebehemah) also imparts tumah (though lesser degree)
The response: “We didn’t hear about animal limbs, BUT we know about human limbs…”
The Jerusalem practice: People with severe boils whose limbs needed amputation before Pesach faced a dilemma:
- They needed the limb removed to participate in the Korban Pesach
- But touching a severed limb would make them tamei!
The clever solution:
- Doctor cuts the limb almost completely, leaving a “hair’s breadth” attached
- The limb (still “dangling”) is impaled on a thorn in the wall
- The patient pulls away - the limb tears off onto the thorn
- Neither doctor nor patient touched the SEVERED limb
- Both remain tahor and can bring their Pesach!
The principle: A dangling limb (not yet fully severed) does not impart tumah. Only once completely severed does it become metamei.
The kal vachomer:
- Human limbs = severe tumah when severed, yet NO tumah when dangling
- Animal limbs = lighter tumah when severed
- Certainly animal limbs have NO tumah when dangling!
Key Terms:
- אֵבָר הַמְדֻלְדָּל (ever hameduldalal) = Dangling/hanging limb
- מֻכֵּי שְׁחִין (mukei sh’chin) = Those afflicted with boils
- כִשְׂעֹרָה (kis’orah) = Like a barley grain’s width
- סִירָה (sirah) = Thorn
- פִסְחוֹ (pischo) = His Paschal offering