Menachot Daf 55 (מנחות דף נ״ה)
Daf: 55 | Amudim: 55a – 55b | Date: 2 Adar I 5786
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (55a)
Segment 1
TYPE: גמרא
Continuing Abba Elazar ben Gomel’s principle — generous giving applies to terumat ma’aser
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּבְמַחְשָׁבָה, מָה תְּרוּמָה גְּדוֹלָה בְּעַיִן יָפָה, אַף תְּרוּמַת מַעֲשֵׂר בְּעַיִן יָפָה.
English Translation:
and by thought. And this comparison also teaches that just as in the case of standard teruma one should give generously, so too, with regard to teruma of the tithe one should give generously. Therefore, one who separates teruma of the tithe from fresh figs for dried figs should do so generously, e.g., ten fresh figs for ninety dried ones, as though the volume of the dried figs was as large as that of fresh ones.
קלאוד על הדף:
This segment continues directly from the previous daf, completing Abba Elazar ben Gomel’s teaching. Just as teruma gedola may be separated by estimate and by mental designation, and should be given generously (ayin yafa), so too terumat ma’aser shares these leniencies. This explains why Rabbi Yosei could separate ten dried figs for ninety fresh ones — the generous approach treats the dried figs as if they had the volume of fresh ones.
Key Terms:
- עַיִן יָפָה (ayin yafa) = A generous eye — giving more than the minimum required
- בְּמַחְשָׁבָה (be’maḥshava) = By thought — mental designation without physical separation
Segment 2
TYPE: קושיא
Proof attempt — Rabbi Yosei’s practice supports “original state” measurement
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּמִינַּהּ, אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בַּר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: אַבָּא הָיָה נוֹטֵל עֶשֶׂר גְּרוֹגְרוֹת שֶׁבַּמַּקְצוּעַ עַל תִּשְׁעִים שֶׁבַּכַּלְכַּלָּה. אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא לִכְמוֹת שֶׁהֵן אָמְרִינַן – שַׁפִּיר, אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ כְּמוֹת שֶׁהֵן – בָּצַר לְהוּ.
English Translation:
The Gemara suggests: And from this statement of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, one can cite a proof for the opinion that food is to be measured in accordance with its initial size. As Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, said: Father would set aside ten dried figs that were in a vessel for ninety fresh figs that were in a basket. Granted, if you say that we say one measures food items as they were initially, it is well, as Rabbi Yosei apparently considers the dried figs set aside as tithes as though they were still fresh figs. But if you say that one measures foods as they are in their current state, then in a case where one separates ten dried figs for ninety fresh figs they are less than the requisite amount, as the volume of ten dried figs is less than the volume of ten fresh figs. This indicates that the measure of the food is determined according to its initial state.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara revisits the earlier measurement dispute from Daf 54, attempting to draw a proof from Rabbi Yosei’s practice. If Rabbi Yosei separated ten dried figs (small) for ninety fresh figs (large), the dried figs would be inadequate by current volume — unless we measure by original state (when the dried figs were also large and fresh). This would support the “original state” position of Shmuel, R. Shimon bar Rabbi, and Reish Lakish.
Key Terms:
- בָּצַר לְהוּ (batzer lehu) = They are less — the dried figs are insufficient by current volume
- גְּרוֹגְרוֹת (gerogrot) = Dried figs — smaller than fresh figs due to dehydration
Segment 3
TYPE: תירוץ
Refutation — dried figs are unique because they can be reconstituted
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כִּי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי, אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: שָׁאנֵי גְּרוֹגְרוֹת, הוֹאִיל וְיָכוֹל לְשׁוֹלְקָן וּלְהַחְזִירָן לִכְמוֹת שֶׁהֵן.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers that one cannot extrapolate from the example of dried figs to other cases. When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Elazar says the following reason for that particular halakha: Dried figs are different, since one can boil dried figs in water and return them to their previous state; in other words, as they were when they were fresh. Consequently, one may separate them for fresh figs as though they too were fresh. One cannot extrapolate from here a principle with regard to other items.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Dimi, transmitting from Eretz Yisrael, deflects the proof by distinguishing dried figs from other shrunken items. Since dried figs can be boiled and rehydrated to their original size, they are treated as if they still have their original volume — this is a unique characteristic, not a general principle. Therefore, Rabbi Yosei’s practice doesn’t prove that all items are measured by their original state. This preserves the debate as unresolved from this particular proof.
Key Terms:
- שָׁאנֵי (shani) = It is different — a technical term indicating that the case cannot be generalized
- לְשׁוֹלְקָן (lesholkan) = To boil them — the process of reconstituting dried figs
Segment 4
TYPE: ברייתא
Baraita — rules for separating teruma from fresh figs for dried figs
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: תּוֹרְמִין תְּאֵנִים עַל הַגְּרוֹגְרוֹת, בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁרְגִילִין לַעֲשׂוֹת תְּאֵנִים גְּרוֹגְרוֹת, וְלֹא גְּרוֹגְרוֹת עַל תְּאֵנִים, וַאֲפִילּוּ בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁרְגִילִין לַעֲשׂוֹת תְּאֵנִים גְּרוֹגְרוֹת.
English Translation:
§ The Gemara discusses the possibility of separating fresh figs as teruma for dried ones. The Sages taught in a baraita: One may separate teruma from fresh figs for dried figs by number, e.g., ten fresh figs for ninety dried ones, in a place where they are accustomed to make fresh figs into dried figs, and therefore the fresh figs can be preserved by processing them into dried figs. But one may not set aside teruma from dried figs for fresh figs even in a place where they are accustomed to make fresh figs into dried figs.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara shifts to a new baraita about the practical rules for separating teruma from fresh figs for dried figs. Two asymmetric rules emerge: fresh for dried is permitted (but only where dried figs are commonly produced), while dried for fresh is prohibited even in such a place. The logic centers on the teruma’s quality — the produce set aside as teruma must be appropriate for the priest’s use.
Key Terms:
- תּוֹרְמִין (tormin) = One may separate teruma
- בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁרְגִילִין = In a place where they are accustomed — a local custom that enables the practice
Segment 5
TYPE: גמרא
Analyzing the baraita — only where the custom exists
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר מָר: תּוֹרְמִין תְּאֵנִים עַל הַגְּרוֹגְרוֹת בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁרְגִילִין לַעֲשׂוֹת תְּאֵנִים גְּרוֹגְרוֹת. בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁרְגִילִין – אִין, בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין רְגִילִין – לָא.
English Translation:
The Gemara analyzes this baraita. The Master said: One may separate teruma from fresh figs for dried figs in a place where they are accustomed to make fresh figs into dried figs. This indicates that in a place where they are accustomed to make dried figs, yes, one may set aside teruma in this manner. But in a place where they are not accustomed to make dried figs, one may not separate from fresh figs for dried ones, as the fresh figs are liable to spoil before they can be used.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara highlights the precision of the baraita’s language: the limitation “in a place where they are accustomed” implies that in a place where dried figs are not commonly produced, one may not separate fresh figs for dried ones. The concern is practical: if the fresh figs cannot be preserved (by drying them), the teruma will spoil and become useless, disrespecting the sanctity of the priestly gift.
Key Terms:
- בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין רְגִילִין = In a place where they are not accustomed — where fresh figs would spoil rather than be dried
Segment 6
TYPE: קושיא
Challenge — if a priest is present, one should give the best quality
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דְּאִיכָּא כֹּהֵן, מָקוֹם שֶׁאֵינוֹ רָגִיל – אַמַּאי לָא? וְהָתְנַן: מְקוֹם שֶׁיֵּשׁ כֹּהֵן תּוֹרֵם מִן הַיָּפֶה!
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this case? If it is referring to a situation where there is a priest present, and the owner of the produce can give him the teruma without delay, then even in a place where he is not accustomed to make dried figs, why may he not set aside fresh figs for dried ones? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Terumot 2:4): In a place where there is a priest present, the owner of the produce separates teruma from the best-quality produce? In this case, the fresh figs are superior in quality to the dried ones, despite the fact that dried figs last longer.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara probes the circumstances of the baraita by introducing a key variable: whether a priest is present to receive the teruma immediately. If a priest is available, the priority is quality over durability — fresh figs are superior and should always be acceptable. This creates a logical problem: why would the baraita restrict fresh-for-dried figs to places where drying is customary, if the priest can eat them immediately?
Key Terms:
- תּוֹרֵם מִן הַיָּפֶה = Separate from the best quality — the rule when a priest is present
- אִיכָּא כֹּהֵן = There is a priest present — who can receive the teruma immediately
Segment 7
TYPE: גמרא
Extended analysis — the two clauses require different circumstances
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא דְּלֵיכָּא כֹּהֵן, אֵימָא סֵיפָא: וְלֹא גְּרוֹגְרוֹת עַל הַתְּאֵנִים, וַאֲפִילּוּ בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁרָגִיל לַעֲשׂוֹת תְּאֵנִים גְּרוֹגְרוֹת. וְאִי דְּלֵיכָּא כֹּהֵן, אַמַּאי לָא? וְהָתְנַן: מְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין כֹּהֵן – תּוֹרֵם מִן הַמִּתְקַיֵּים! אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא דְּאִיכָּא כֹּהֵן.
English Translation:
Rather, it is obvious that the baraita is referring to a situation where there is no priest present, and by the time a priest is found the fresh figs might spoil. If so, say the latter clause of that baraita: But one may not set aside teruma from dried figs for fresh figs even in a place where they are accustomed to make fresh figs into dried figs. And if this is referring to a situation where there is no priest present, why may one not set aside dried figs, which can be preserved for a lengthy period, for fresh ones? But didn’t we learn in the same mishna (Terumot 2:4): In a place where there is no priest present, the owner of the produce separates teruma from that which will endure, not from the best-quality produce? Rather, it is obvious that this clause is referring to a situation where there is a priest present.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara reveals a seeming contradiction between the two clauses of the baraita. The first clause (fresh for dried — permitted where customary) makes sense if no priest is present — you separate durable produce. But the second clause (dried for fresh — prohibited) only makes sense if a priest IS present — because with a priest available, you should give the best quality (fresh), not the durable (dried). This forces the conclusion that the two clauses discuss different circumstances.
Key Terms:
- תּוֹרֵם מִן הַמִּתְקַיֵּים = Separate from that which endures — the rule when no priest is present
- לֵיכָּא כֹּהֵן = There is no priest present — teruma must be preserved
Segment 8
TYPE: מסקנא
Resolution — the two clauses address different situations
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רֵישָׁא דְּלֵיכָּא כֹּהֵן, סֵיפָא דְּאִיכָּא כֹּהֵן? אִין, רֵישָׁא דְּלֵיכָּא כֹּהֵן, סֵיפָא דְּאִיכָּא כֹּהֵן.
English Translation:
The Gemara challenges: If so, the first clause of the baraita addresses a case where there is no priest present, whereas the latter clause addresses a case where there is a priest present. The Gemara explains: Yes, the first clause of the baraita addresses a case where there is no priest present, and the latter clause addresses a case where there is a priest present.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara acknowledges what appears to be an awkward interpretation: the two clauses of a single baraita address different factual scenarios. This is unusual — typically a baraita maintains consistent circumstances throughout. The Gemara accepts this interpretation, setting up Rav Pappa’s important methodological principle in the next segment.
Key Terms:
- רֵישָׁא (reisha) = The first clause of the baraita
- סֵיפָא (seifa) = The latter clause of the baraita
Segment 9
TYPE: מסקנא
Rav Pappa’s hermeneutical principle — prefer two reasons over two tanna’im
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ, דָּחֲקִינַן וּמוֹקְמִינַן מַתְנִיתִין בִּתְרֵי טַעְמֵי, וְלָא מוֹקְמִינַן בִּתְרֵי תַּנָּאֵי.
English Translation:
Rav Pappa said: Learn from this discussion that we exert ourselves and interpret the mishna according to two reasons, i.e., two different situations in accordance with the opinion of one tanna, but we do not interpret it as being in accordance with the opinions of two tanna’im. An interpretation that maintains a single authorship of a mishna is preferable even if it requires explaining the mishna as discussing two different situations.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Pappa extracts a crucial methodological principle from this discussion. Rather than attribute the baraita’s two seemingly contradictory clauses to different tanna’im (which would dissolve the difficulty but fragment the source), we prefer to maintain a single author and explain the two clauses as addressing different situations. This principle — preserving textual unity over ease of interpretation — reflects a deep commitment to the integrity of tannaitic sources and is applied widely throughout the Talmud.
Key Terms:
- דָּחֲקִינַן (daḥakinan) = We exert ourselves — we make extra interpretive effort
- בִּתְרֵי טַעְמֵי (bi’trei ta’amei) = According to two reasons/situations — explaining both clauses under one author
- בִּתְרֵי תַּנָּאֵי (bi’trei tanna’ei) = According to two tanna’im — attributing each clause to a different author
Segment 10
TYPE: משנה
New Mishna — meal offerings kneaded with lukewarm water; leavening prohibition
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְנִי׳ כׇּל הַמְּנָחוֹת נִילּוֹשׁוֹת בְּפוֹשְׁרִין, וּמְשַׁמְּרָן שֶׁלֹּא יַחְמִיצוּ, וְאִם הֶחְמִיצוּ שְׁיָרֶיהָ – עוֹבֵר בְּלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״כׇּל הַמִּנְחָה אֲשֶׁר תַּקְרִיבוּ לַה׳ לֹא תֵעָשֶׂה חָמֵץ״, וְחַיָּיב עַל לִישָׁתָהּ, וְעַל עֲרִיכָתָהּ, וְעַל אֲפִיָּיתָהּ.
English Translation:
MISHNA: All the meal-offerings that come as matza are to be kneaded with lukewarm water so that the dough will bake well, as only a small amount of oil is added. And one must watch over them to ensure that they do not become leaven while kneading and shaping them, and if a meal offering or even only its remainder becomes leaven, one violates a prohibition, as it is stated: “No meal offering that you shall bring to the Lord shall be made with leaven; as you shall burn no leaven nor any honey as an offering made by fire to the Lord” (Leviticus 2:11). And one is liable to be flogged for kneading the meal offering, and for shaping it, and for baking it, if the meal offering becomes leaven.
קלאוד על הדף:
This mishna introduces a new chapter’s core principles about meal offerings and leavening. Three key rules emerge: (1) meal offerings must be kneaded with lukewarm water (not hot, which would cook; not cold, which wouldn’t mix properly); (2) continuous guarding against leavening is required; (3) the prohibition against leavening applies at every stage of preparation — kneading (lisha), shaping (arikha), and baking (afiya) — each carrying separate liability for lashes. This “per-stage liability” is remarkable and unusual.
Key Terms:
- פוֹשְׁרִין (poshrin) = Lukewarm water — the ideal temperature for kneading meal offerings
- שְׁיָרֶיהָ (sheyareha) = Its remainder — the portion eaten by the priests after the handful is removed
- עֲרִיכָה (arikha) = Shaping — forming the dough into the required shape
Segment 11
TYPE: גמרא
Gemara — source for the prohibition on leavening the remainder
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גְּמָ׳ מְנָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי? אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״לֹא תֵאָפֶה חָמֵץ חֶלְקָם״, אֲפִילּוּ חֶלְקָם לֹא תֵאָפֶה חָמֵץ.
English Translation:
GEMARA: The mishna states that one who allows the remainder of a meal offering to become leavened violates a prohibition. The Gemara asks: From where is this matter derived? Reish Lakish said: The verse states: “It shall not be baked with leaven. I have given it as their portion of My offerings made by fire” (Leviticus 6:10). This section of the verse can be read as a single sentence, to indicate: Even their portion of meal offerings, i.e., the remainder eaten by priests after the removal of the handful to be burned on the altar, shall not be baked with leaven.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara begins its analysis of the mishna by seeking a scriptural source for the prohibition on leavening the priests’ portion (shirayim) of a meal offering. Reish Lakish reads Leviticus 6:10 as connecting two phrases: “shall not be baked with leaven” and “their portion” — teaching that the leavening prohibition extends to the priests’ share, not just the handful burned on the altar.
Key Terms:
- חֶלְקָם (ḥelkam) = Their portion — the priests’ share of the meal offering
- מְנָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי = From where are these matters derived? — a standard formula seeking scriptural basis
Segment 12
TYPE: קושיא
Challenge — the verse is already needed for a different derivation
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהַאי לְהָכִי הוּא דַּאֲתָא? הַאי מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא: ״לֹא
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: And does this verse come for this purpose? It cannot, as it is necessary as the source for a different halakha, for that which is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “It shall not
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara challenges Reish Lakish’s derivation: the same verse is needed as the source for a different halakha — namely, that one is liable for separate lashes for each stage of preparation. This challenge initiates the extended exegetical discussion that spans to amud bet, resolving how a single verse can teach multiple halachic principles.
Key Terms:
- מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ (miba’ei leih) = It is needed for him — the verse is already committed to a different derivation
Amud Bet (55b)
Segment 1
TYPE: גמרא
Baraita — “shall not be baked” teaches separate liability for each preparation stage
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תֵאָפֶה חָמֵץ״ – מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר? וַהֲלֹא כְּבָר נֶאֱמַר ״לֹא תֵעָשֶׂה חָמֵץ״! לְפִי שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״לֹא תֵעָשֶׂה חָמֵץ״, יָכוֹל לֹא יְהֵא חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת עַל כּוּלָּם? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לֹא תֵאָפֶה״.
English Translation:
be baked with leaven” (Leviticus 6:10). What is the meaning when the verse states this? Isn’t this requirement already stated earlier: “No meal offering that you shall bring to the Lord shall be made with leaven; as you shall burn no leaven nor any honey as an offering made by fire to the Lord” (Leviticus 2:11)? Rather, the phrase “it shall not be baked with leaven” serves to teach a different halakha. Since the prohibition concerning leaven is first stated in general terms: Shall not be made with leaven, without specification, one might have thought that one who causes a meal offering to become leaven will be liable to receive only one set of lashes for all of his actions, i.e., kneading, shaping, and baking the dough. Therefore, the verse states: “It shall not be baked with leaven,” which teaches that one who causes a meal offering to become leaven is liable separately for baking it, and for each stage of its preparation.
קלאוד על הדף:
This continuation of the baraita from 55a reveals the core exegetical problem. Leviticus 2:11 already prohibits making meal offerings chametz — so why does Leviticus 6:10 add “shall not be baked with leaven”? The baraita explains: without the additional verse, one who kneads, shapes, and bakes a meal offering with leaven would receive only one set of lashes for the entire process. The specific mention of “baking” teaches that each stage carries independent liability.
Key Terms:
- לֹא תֵעָשֶׂה חָמֵץ = Shall not be made with leaven — the general prohibition (Leviticus 2:11)
- לֹא תֵאָפֶה = Shall not be baked — the specific prohibition that teaches per-stage liability
Segment 2
TYPE: גמרא
Hermeneutical derivation — baking emerged from the general to teach about all stages
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲפִיָּיה בַּכְּלָל הָיָתָה, לָמָּה יָצָאת לְהַקִּישׁ אֵלֶיהָ? מָה אֲפִיָּיה מְיוּחֶדֶת שֶׁהִיא מַעֲשֶׂה יְחִידִי, וְחַיָּיבִין עָלֶיהָ בִּפְנֵי עַצְמָהּ, אַף אֲנִי אָבִיא לִישָׁתָהּ וַעֲרִיכָתָהּ.
English Translation:
The baraita explains this derivation: Baking leaven was included in the general prohibition incorporating all of the stages involved in preparing the meal offering. Why did it emerge from the generalization to be mentioned explicitly? It emerged in order to compare the other stages to it: Just as the act of baking is notable in that it is a single, i.e., separately defined, action, and one is liable to receive lashes for it by itself if the dough is leaven, so too, I will include the other stages of the preparation of a meal offering, i.e., kneading it and shaping it, and conclude that one is liable separately for each of these actions if the dough is leavened.
קלאוד על הדף:
The baraita uses the hermeneutical principle of “something included in a generalization that was singled out to teach.” Baking was already covered by the general “shall not be made,” yet the Torah mentioned it separately. This singling out isn’t merely to emphasize baking — it’s to establish a paradigm: just as baking is a distinct act that carries independent liability, so too every distinct act in the preparation process carries its own liability for lashes.
Key Terms:
- אֲפִיָּיה בַּכְּלָל הָיָתָה = Baking was included in the generalization — it was already covered by the broader prohibition
- מַעֲשֶׂה יְחִידִי (ma’aseh yeḥidi) = A single/distinct action — an independently definable act
Segment 3
TYPE: גמרא
Extension — smoothing the dough (kituf) also carries separate liability
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְכׇל מַעֲשֶׂה יְחִידִי שֶׁבָּהּ, לְאֵיתוֹיֵי קִיטּוּף, שֶׁהוּא מַעֲשֶׂה יְחִידִי, וְחַיָּיבִין עָלֶיהָ בִּפְנֵי עַצְמָהּ.
English Translation:
And the same applies to any single action involved in the preparation of a meal offering. This statement serves to include the act of smoothing the surface of the dough with water. The reason this act is included is that although it is not a significant stage in the preparation of the dough, it is a single, independent action, and therefore one is liable to receive lashes for it by itself. This baraita demonstrates that one cannot derive the prohibition against allowing the remainder of a meal offering to become leavened from the verse: “It shall not be baked with leaven,” as this verse is the source of a different halakha. If so, from where is that prohibition derived?
קלאוד על הדף:
The baraita extends the per-stage liability even further to include kituf — smoothing or moistening the dough’s surface — a relatively minor preparatory act. The broader phrase “any single action” encompasses even minor steps. The crucial conclusion is that the verse “shall not be baked” is fully committed to teaching per-stage liability and cannot simultaneously serve as the source for the prohibition on leavening the remainder. This returns the discussion to: where does the remainder-leavening prohibition come from?
Key Terms:
- קִיטּוּף (kituf) = Smoothing — moistening and smoothing the surface of the dough with water
Segment 4
TYPE: תירוץ
Resolution — the prohibition on leavening the remainder comes from “their portion”
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲנַן מֵ״חֶלְקָם״ קָאָמְרִינַן.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: The verse: “It shall not be baked with leaven,” is required for the principle stated earlier. We say that the prohibition against allowing the remainder of a meal offering to become leavened is derived from the subsequent phrase: “I have given it as their portion of My offerings made by fire” (Leviticus 6:10). The remainder is the portion of the meal offering eaten by the priests.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara resolves the challenge with elegant simplicity. Reish Lakish’s derivation doesn’t rely on the “shall not be baked” portion at all — it comes from the word “ḥelkam” (their portion). The leavening prohibition on the remainder is derived from “their portion” being placed adjacent to the baking prohibition, creating a textual link. This frees “shall not be baked” to serve the per-stage liability derivation.
Key Terms:
- חֶלְקָם (ḥelkam) = Their portion — the key word from which the remainder prohibition is derived
Segment 5
TYPE: קושיא
Challenge — maybe the entire verse serves only the remainder prohibition
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאֵימָא: כּוּלֵּיהּ לְהָכִי הוּא דַּאֲתָא?
English Translation:
The Gemara challenges: But once it has been determined that the term “their portion” teaches the prohibition against leavening the remainder of a meal offering, one can say this entire section of the verse comes only for this purpose, which would mean that there is no source for the halakha that one is liable separately for each stage of the preparation of a meal offering with leaven.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara raises a clever objection: if “their portion” teaches the remainder prohibition, perhaps the entire verse — including “shall not be baked with leaven” — is merely the context for this single teaching. If so, we lose the source for per-stage liability entirely. This challenge forces a closer examination of the verse’s word order.
Key Terms:
- כּוּלֵּיהּ (kulleih) = The entirety of it — the entire verse might serve a single purpose
Segment 6
TYPE: תירוץ
Resolution — the verse’s unusual word order teaches both halakhot
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִם כֵּן, לִכְתּוֹב ״חֶלְקָם לֹא תֵאָפֶה חָמֵץ״, מַאי ״לֹא תֵאָפֶה חָמֵץ חֶלְקָם״? שָׁמְעַתְּ מִינַּהּ תַּרְתֵּי.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: One cannot say that this teaches only the prohibition against leavening the remainder of a meal offering, as if so, let the verse write: Their portion shall not be baked with leaven. What is meant by the fact that the verse stated it in a different order: “Shall not be baked with leaven. I have given it as their portion”? This indicates that one should learn from this two halakhot, i.e., that there is a prohibition against leavening the remainder of a meal offering and that one is liable to receive a separate set of lashes for each stage of preparation performed with leavened dough.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara’s resolution turns on the verse’s syntax. If the sole point were the remainder prohibition, the Torah should have written “their portion shall not be baked with leaven” — placing “their portion” first. Instead, the Torah writes “shall not be baked with leaven — their portion,” separating the two phrases. This unusual order signals that each phrase teaches an independent halakha: “shall not be baked” teaches per-stage liability, while “their portion” teaches the remainder prohibition.
Key Terms:
- שָׁמְעַתְּ מִינַּהּ תַּרְתֵּי = Learn from it two halakhot — the verse yields dual teachings
Segment 7
TYPE: קושיא
Challenge — maybe only baking carries separate liability, not other stages
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאֵימָא: אֲפִיָּיה, דִּפְרַט בַּהּ רַחֲמָנָא, לִיחַיַּיב חֲדָא; אִינָךְ לִיחַיַּיב חֲדָא אַכּוּלְּהוּ! מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵה דָּבָר שֶׁהָיָה בַּכְּלָל וְיָצָא מִן הַכְּלָל לְלַמֵּד, לֹא לְלַמֵּד עַל עַצְמוֹ יָצָא, אֶלָּא לְלַמֵּד עַל הַכְּלָל כּוּלּוֹ יָצָא.
English Translation:
The Gemara raises another difficulty: But one can say that the act of baking is different, as the Merciful One specified it in the Torah, and therefore one should be liable to receive one set of lashes for baking the dough. As for the other stages in the preparation of a meal offering, i.e., kneading, shaping, and smoothing, which are not explicitly stated in the verse, let him be liable to receive one set of lashes for all of them. The Gemara answers that this cannot be the halakha, because baking is something that was included in a generalization but emerged from the generalization in order to teach a halakha. According to a hermeneutic principle, a case of this kind did not emerge to teach a halakha only about itself, but rather it emerged to teach a halakha about the entire generalization, in this case, about all the other stages in the preparation of a meal offering.
קלאוד על הדף:
This segment combines a challenge and its resolution. The challenge: perhaps baking is unique because the Torah mentioned it explicitly, but other stages (kneading, shaping) were not singled out and should carry only collective liability. The answer invokes the hermeneutical principle of “something that was in the general and emerged from it to teach” — when baking was singled out, it wasn’t to teach about baking alone, but to establish a paradigm that applies to all stages equally.
Key Terms:
- דָּבָר שֶׁהָיָה בַּכְּלָל וְיָצָא מִן הַכְּלָל לְלַמֵּד = Something included in a generalization that emerged to teach — a key hermeneutical principle
Segment 8
TYPE: קושיא
Challenge — apply the klal u’frat principle: only baking is included
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאֵימָא: ״לֹא תֵעָשֶׂה״ – כָּלַל, ״לֹא תֵאָפֶה״ – פָּרַט, כְּלָל וּפְרָט – אֵין בַּכְּלָל אֶלָּא מַה שֶּׁבַּפְּרָט; אֲפִיָּיה – אִין, מִידֵּי אַחֲרִינָא – לָא.
English Translation:
The Gemara further challenges: But one can say that the phrase: Shall not be made with leaven, is a generalization, as it does not mention any specific acts, and the phrase: “It shall not be baked with leaven,” is a detail, as it specifies one particular stage of the preparation; and there is another standard hermeneutic principle: When there is a generalization and a detail, the generalization is referring only to that which is specified in the detail. In this case, that would mean that baking, yes, is included in this prohibition, but other matters, e.g., kneading and shaping, are not included.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara proposes an alternative hermeneutical reading that would completely undermine the per-stage liability. If we treat “shall not be made” as a klal (generalization) and “shall not be baked” as a prat (detail), the standard klal u’frat rule limits the prohibition to only what the detail specifies — baking alone. Kneading, shaping, and smoothing would be entirely excluded from liability. This would radically narrow the prohibition.
Key Terms:
- כְּלָל וּפְרָט (klal u’frat) = Generalization and detail — a hermeneutical principle that limits the scope
- אֵין בַּכְּלָל אֶלָּא מַה שֶּׁבַּפְּרָט = The generalization includes only what is in the detail
Segment 9
TYPE: תירוץ
Rabbi Aptoriki — distant klal u’frat cannot be analyzed as such
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַבִּי אַפְטוֹרִיקִי: מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵי כְּלָל וּפְרָט הַמְרוּחָקִין זֶה מִזֶּה, וְכׇל כְּלָל וּפְרָט הַמְרוּחָקִין זֶה מִזֶּה – אֵין דָּנִין אוֹתָן בִּכְלָל וּפְרָט.
English Translation:
Rabbi Aptoriki said: That hermeneutic principle is not relevant here, because this is a case of a generalization and a detail that appear in the Torah distanced from one another, as the phrase: Shall not be made with leaven (Leviticus 2:11), is far from the expression: “It shall not be baked with leaven” (Leviticus 6:10). And for any instance of a generalization and a detail that appear in the Torah distanced from one another, one cannot derive a halakha from them by analyzing them as a generalization and a detail.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Aptoriki introduces an important limitation on the klal u’frat principle: it only applies when the generalization and detail appear in close proximity. Here, “shall not be made” (Leviticus 2:11) and “shall not be baked” (Leviticus 6:10) are separated by four chapters of the Torah. When the klal and prat are “distant” from each other, they cannot be analyzed as a single hermeneutical unit. This novel principle becomes the focus of the extended challenge that follows.
Key Terms:
- כְּלָל וּפְרָט הַמְרוּחָקִין = A generalization and detail that are distanced — separated in the text
- אֵין דָּנִין = One cannot derive — the hermeneutical principle does not apply
Segment 10
TYPE: קושיא
Challenge from Rav Adda — distanced klal u’frat IS applied elsewhere (sin offerings)
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מֵתִיב רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ כְּדִי: וּכְלָל וּפְרָט הַמְרוּחָקִין זֶה מִזֶּה אֵין דָּנִין אוֹתָן בִּכְלָל וּפְרָט? וְהָתַנְיָא: ״וְשָׁחַט אֹתוֹ בִּמְקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁחַט הָעֹלָה לִפְנֵי ה׳ חַטָּאת הוּא״ – הֵיכָן עוֹלָה נִשְׁחֶטֶת? בַּצָּפוֹן, אַף זֶה בַּצָּפוֹן.
English Translation:
Rav Adda bar Ahava raises an objection, and some says that this objection is unattributed [kedi]: And is it correct that in the case of a generalization and a detail that appear in the Torah distanced from one another, one cannot derive a halakha from them by analyzing them as a generalization and a detail? But isn’t it taught in a baraita with regard to a goat brought by a king as a sin offering: The verse states: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the goat, and slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering before the Lord; it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:24). Where is the burnt offering slaughtered? On the northern side of the Temple courtyard, as it is stated: “And he shall slaughter it on the side of the altar northward before the Lord” (Leviticus 1:11). This sin offering of a king must consequently also be slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Adda bar Ahava (or possibly an anonymous objector) launches a major challenge to Rabbi Aptoriki’s principle from the laws of sin offerings. The verse about the king’s sin offering (Leviticus 4:24) appears to be a “detail” of the general statement about all sin offerings (Leviticus 6:18) — and these verses are separated by two chapters, yet they are analyzed together. This threatens to disprove the claim that distant klal u’frat cannot be analyzed as such.
Key Terms:
- חַטָּאת (ḥatat) = Sin offering — must be slaughtered in the northern part of the Temple courtyard
- צָפוֹן (tzafon) = The north — the designated location for slaughtering certain offerings
Segment 11
TYPE: גמרא
The baraita’s analysis — why was the king’s sin offering singled out?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְכִי אָנוּ מִכָּאן לְמֵידִין? וַהֲלֹא כְּבָר נֶאֱמַר: ״בִּמְקוֹם אֲשֶׁר תִּשָּׁחֵט הָעֹלָה תִּשָּׁחֵט הַחַטָּאת״! הָא לְמָה זֶה יָצָא? לְקוֹבְעוֹ, שֶׁאִם לֹא שָׁחַט אוֹתוֹ בַּצָּפוֹן – פְּסָלוֹ.
English Translation:
The baraita asks: And do you learn this halakha from here? But isn’t it already stated: “Speak to Aaron and to his sons, saying: This is the law of the sin offering: In the place where the burnt offering is slaughtered shall the sin offering be slaughtered before God; it is most holy” (Leviticus 6:18)? If so, to what purpose was this singled out? Why does the Torah state explicitly that the sin offering of the king requires slaughter in the north? The baraita answers: It is to fix a place for it, that this is the only place where a sin offering may be slaughtered, teaching that if he did not slaughter it in the north of the Temple courtyard, he has disqualified it even after the fact.
קלאוד על הדף:
The baraita deepens the analysis. The general verse in Leviticus 6:18 already states that all sin offerings are slaughtered where the burnt offering is slaughtered (the north). So why does the Torah separately mention the king’s sin offering in Leviticus 4:24? The baraita answers: to teach that the northern location is not merely a preferable practice (le’khateḥila) but is essential — if the king’s sin offering was NOT slaughtered in the north, it is disqualified even after the fact (be’di’avad).
Key Terms:
- לְקוֹבְעוֹ (likvo’o) = To fix/establish it — making the requirement absolute, not optional
- פְּסָלוֹ (pesalo) = He has disqualified it — the offering is invalid even after the fact
Segment 12
TYPE: גמרא
Alternative reading — maybe only this sin offering requires the north
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אַתָּה אוֹמֵר לְכָךְ יָצָאת, אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא שֶׁזֶּה טָעוּן צָפוֹן וְאֵין אַחֵר טָעוּן צָפוֹן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״וְשָׁחַט אֶת הַחַטָּאת בִּמְקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁחַט אֶת הָעֹלָה״, זֶה בָּנָה אָב לְכׇל חַטָּאוֹת שֶׁטְּעוּנוֹת צָפוֹן.
English Translation:
The baraita asks: Do you say that it is singled out for this purpose, to teach that even after the fact a sin offering slaughtered anywhere other than in the north is disqualified? Or perhaps it is only to teach that this goat sin offering requires slaughter in the north, but no other goat sin offering requires slaughter in the north. The baraita answers: The verse states elsewhere: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the sin offering, and slaughter the sin offering in the place of burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:29), and this established a paradigm for all sin offerings, that they require slaughter in the north. Therefore, the additional verse stated with regard to the sin offering of a king teaches that if he did not slaughter it in the north it is disqualified.
קלאוד על הדף:
The baraita considers whether the king’s sin offering verse might serve to exclude other sin offerings from the northern requirement rather than establishing disqualification. It resolves this by pointing to Leviticus 4:29 — which states generally that “the sin offering” is slaughtered “in the place of the burnt offering” — establishing a binyan av (paradigmatic principle) that ALL sin offerings require the north. Therefore, the king’s sin offering verse must teach something else: the disqualification aspect.
Key Terms:
- בָּנָה אָב (bana av) = Established a paradigm — a principle case from which other cases are derived
Segment 13
TYPE: גמרא
The Gemara’s analysis — why would we have limited it to only this sin offering?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
טַעְמָא דִּכְתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״וְשָׁחַט אֶת הַחַטָּאת״, הָא לָאו הָכִי הֲוָה אָמֵינָא שֶׁזֶּה טָעוּן צָפוֹן, וְאֵין אַחֵר טָעוּן צָפוֹן. מַאי טַעְמָא?
English Translation:
The Gemara analyzes the baraita. The reason that all sin offerings must be slaughtered in the north is that the Merciful One wrote: “And slaughter the sin offering in the place of the burnt offering,” from which it can be inferred that if not for this verse I would say that only this sin offering, the male goat brought by a king, requires slaughter in the north, but no other type of sin offering requires slaughter in the north. What is the reason for this? After all, the verse: “In the place where the burnt offering is slaughtered shall the sin offering be slaughtered,” appears to be referring to all types of sin offerings.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara presses the baraita’s logic: the verse in Leviticus 6:18 speaks about “the sin offering” generally — all sin offerings, not just the king’s. So why would we have thought that only the king’s sin offering requires northern slaughter? This question connects back to the challenge against Rabbi Aptoriki — if the general statement clearly includes all sin offerings, how could we have limited it?
Key Terms:
- מַאי טַעְמָא = What is the reason? — pressing for the underlying logic
Segment 14
TYPE: קושיא
The challenge crystallized — this IS distanced klal u’frat being applied
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵה כְּלָל וּפְרָט, וְאַף עַל גַּב דִּמְרוּחָקִין זֶה מִזֶּה, דָּנִין אוֹתָן בִּכְלָל וּפְרָט.
English Translation:
Isn’t it because this verse is a generalization and a detail, as the verse first generalizes about all sin offerings, and then the verse concerning the sin offering of a king: “And slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering,” is a detail, as it is referring to a specific sin offering? And even though the verse concerning sin offerings and the verse concerning the sin offering of a king are distanced from one another, nevertheless we would derive a halakha from them by means of the principle of a generalization and a detail. This appears to disprove the explanation of Rabbi Aptoriki.
קלאוד על הדף:
The challenge reaches its sharpest point: the baraita assumes that without the additional verse in Leviticus 4:29, we would have applied klal u’frat to the distant verses — limiting the northern slaughter requirement to only the king’s sin offering. This directly contradicts Rabbi Aptoriki’s principle that distant klal u’frat cannot be analyzed as such. If the baraita’s assumption is correct, Rabbi Aptoriki’s entire foundation for the meal offering derivation collapses.
Key Terms:
- אַף עַל גַּב דִּמְרוּחָקִין = Even though they are distanced — the verses are separated in the Torah
Segment 15
TYPE: תירוץ
Rav Ashi — it’s actually a detail-then-generalization, not klal u’frat
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב אָשֵׁי: הַאי כְּלָל וּפְרָט הוּא?! פְּרָט וּכְלָל הוּא, וְנַעֲשָׂה כְּלָל מוֹסִיף עַל הַפְּרָט, (וְאִיתְרַבִּי) [וְאִיתְרַבּוֹ] לְהוּ כֹּל מִילֵּי.
English Translation:
Rav Ashi objects to this claim raised by Rav Adda bar Ahava: Is this a generalization and a detail? It is in fact a detail and a generalization, as the verse: “And slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:24), appears in the Torah earlier than the verse: “In the place where the burnt offering is slaughtered the sin offering shall be slaughtered” (Leviticus 6:18). A hermeneutic principle states that in this case the generalization adds to the detail, and includes all matters.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Ashi brilliantly defuses the challenge by recharacterizing the textual relationship. The specific verse about the king’s sin offering (Leviticus 4:24) comes BEFORE the general verse about all sin offerings (Leviticus 6:18) — making this a prat u’klal (detail-then-generalization), not klal u’frat. In prat u’klal, the generalization expands to include everything, which is why all sin offerings are included. Therefore, this case doesn’t disprove Rabbi Aptoriki’s principle about distant klal u’frat at all.
Key Terms:
- פְּרָט וּכְלָל (prat u’klal) = Detail and generalization — the reverse order of klal u’frat
- כְּלָל מוֹסִיף עַל הַפְּרָט = The generalization adds to the detail — including all matters
Segment 16
TYPE: גמרא
Alternative explanation — the word “it” (oto) caused the potential limitation
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא תַּנָּא, ״אֹתוֹ״ קָא קַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ, וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא שֶׁזֶּה טָעוּן צָפוֹן וְאֵין אַחֵר טָעוּן צָפוֹן, דִּכְתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״אֹתוֹ״.
English Translation:
Rather, the reason that if not for the specific textual derivation we would have thought that only a sin offering brought by a king requires slaughter in the north is that the word “it,” which is an exclusion, is difficult for the tanna of the baraita, as it is unclear what this term serves to exclude. And this is what the baraita is saying: Or perhaps the verse is teaching that only this sin offering requires slaughter in the north, but no other type of sin offering requires slaughter in the north, as the Merciful One writes “it,” which is an exclusion. Therefore, the additional verse: “And slaughter the sin offering in the place of the burnt offering,” teaches that this halakha applies to all burnt offerings.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Ashi provides an alternative explanation for why the baraita considered limiting the northern requirement to the king’s sin offering alone. It wasn’t because of distanced klal u’frat — it was because of the word “oto” (it) in the verse, which functions as an exclusionary term. The word “it” implies “this one, but not others.” The baraita’s question was what “oto” comes to exclude, and the additional verse overcame this potential limitation by establishing that all sin offerings require northern slaughter.
Key Terms:
- אֹתוֹ (oto) = It — a word that implies exclusion in halachic exegesis
Segment 17
TYPE: גמרא
New question — what does “oto” now exclude?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהַשְׁתָּא דְּנָפְקָא לֵיהּ מִ״וְשָׁחַט אֶת הַחַטָּאת״, ״אֹתוֹ״ לְמַעוֹטֵי מַאי? לְמַעוֹטֵי (נַחְשׁוֹן, וְשָׁחַט, עוֹף, בַּפֶּסַח סִימָן).
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: And now that the tanna of the baraita derives it from the phrase: “And slaughter the sin offering in the place of the burnt offering,” to exclude what does the term “it” serve? The Gemara answers: It serves to exclude the case that emerges from the following discussion, summarized by the mnemonic: Nahshon; and slaughter; bird; on Passover.
קלאוד על הדף:
Now that “oto” is freed from its original role (since the additional verse establishes the northern requirement for all sin offerings), the Gemara asks what “oto” actually excludes. The answer is introduced with a mnemonic summarizing four exclusions. The Gemara begins with the first: the goat offerings brought by Nahshon and the other tribal princes at the Tabernacle’s inauguration.
Key Terms:
- לְמַעוֹטֵי (lema’utei) = To exclude — the word “it” serves to limit the scope
- סִימָן (siman) = Mnemonic — a memory aid listing the excluded cases
Segment 18
TYPE: גמרא
First exclusion — Nahshon’s goat sin offering doesn’t require northern slaughter
Hebrew/Aramaic:
״אוֹתוֹ״ בַּצָּפוֹן, וְאֵין שָׂעִיר נַחְשׁוֹן בַּצָּפוֹן.
English Translation:
The Gemara explains the first suggestion: It, the goat sin offering of a king, is slaughtered in the north, but the goat offered by Nahshon, prince of the tribe of Judah, was not slaughtered in the north of the Tabernacle. He, along with all the other princes of the tribes, brought offerings to inaugurate the altar and the Tabernacle, as recorded in the Torah (see Numbers, chapter 7). The sin offerings brought at this time were unique because they were not brought to atone for any sin. The term “it” teaches that even though they had some characteristics of a sin offering, the offerings of the princes did not require slaughter in the north.
קלאוד על הדף:
The first exclusion from the word “oto” is the goat sin offering brought by Nahshon ben Aminadav and the other tribal princes during the inauguration of the Tabernacle (Numbers 7). These were unusual sin offerings — they were not brought for atonement but as inauguration gifts. The exclusion teaches that these unique offerings, despite bearing the name “sin offering,” did not require northern slaughter.
Key Terms:
- נַחְשׁוֹן (Naḥshon) = Nahshon ben Aminadav, prince of Judah — the first prince to bring inauguration offerings
- שְׂעִיר (se’ir) = A male goat — the animal brought as a sin offering
Segment 19
TYPE: גמרא
Why we might have included Nahshon’s offering — it requires semikha
Hebrew/Aramaic:
סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הוֹאִיל וְאִיתְרַבִּי לְעִנְיַן סְמִיכָה, לִיתְרַבֵּי נָמֵי לְעִנְיַן צָפוֹן, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
English Translation:
The Gemara explains: It might enter your mind to say that since the sin offerings of the princes are included in the requirement of placing hands, they are also included in the requirement to be slaughtered in the north. Therefore, the term “it” teaches us that there was no requirement of slaughter in the north for the goats brought as sin offerings by Nahshon and the other princes.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara justifies why the exclusion of Nahshon’s offering is necessary. Since the princes’ sin offerings DO require semikha (placing hands on the animal’s head — a requirement of regular sin offerings), one might logically extend all sin offering requirements to them, including northern slaughter. The word “oto” is needed to prevent this assumption: semikha yes, but northern slaughter no.
Key Terms:
- סְמִיכָה (semikha) = Placing hands — leaning on the animal’s head before slaughter
- סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ = It might enter your mind — the rejected reasoning
Segment 20
TYPE: מחלוקת
Source for semikha on Nahshon’s offering — R. Yehuda vs. R. Shimon
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּסְמִיכָה גּוּפַהּ מְנָלַן? דְּתַנְיָא: ״וְסָמַךְ יָדוֹ עַל רֹאשׁ הַשָּׂעִיר״ – לְרַבּוֹת שְׂעִיר נַחְשׁוֹן לִסְמִיכָה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר:
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that the requirement of placing hands on the head of the animal itself applies to the goats offered by Nahshon and the other princes? The Gemara answers: As it is taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to the sin offering of a king: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the goat, and slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering before the Lord; it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:24). The verse could have stated: Upon its head. The reason it adds “of the goat” is to include the goat brought as a sin offering by Nahshon in the requirement of placing hands on the head of an offering. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon says:
קלאוד על הדף:
The daf concludes with the source for semikha applying to Nahshon’s offering. Rabbi Yehuda derives it from the apparently superfluous phrase “upon the head of the goat” — the Torah could have simply said “upon its head.” The extra words “of the goat” serve to include the goats of the princes in the semikha requirement. The passage breaks mid-dispute with Rabbi Shimon, whose opposing view continues on the next daf.
Key Terms:
- עַל רֹאשׁ הַשָּׂעִיר = Upon the head of the goat — the textual basis for including Nahshon’s offering in the semikha requirement
- לְרַבּוֹת (lerabot) = To include — a term indicating the verse serves to expand a category