Menachot Daf 81 (מנחות דף פ״א)
Daf: 81 | Amudim: 81a – 81b | Date: 8 Shevat 5786
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (81a)
Segment 1
TYPE: קושיא
Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi challenges separating an animal as a leftover ab initio
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְכִי מַפְרִישִׁין תְּחִלָּה לְמוֹתָרוֹת?
English Translation:
Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi explains why: And does one separate an animal as a leftover ab initio?
קלאוד על הדף:
This brief but pointed challenge rejects a proposed remedy for the dilemma from the previous daf. The problem concerned a thanks offering (todah) and its substitute (temurah) that became intermingled, and then one of them died. The suggestion was to designate the new animal as a “leftover” of the original thanks offering, but Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi objects that one does not designate an animal as a leftover from the outset — leftovers arise naturally from the sacrificial process, not by deliberate designation.
Key Terms:
- מוֹתָרוֹת (Motarot) = Leftovers of consecrated offerings
Segment 2
TYPE: תירוץ
Rabbi Yitzchak bar Shmuel suggests a conditional stipulation remedy
Hebrew/Aramaic:
יָתֵיב רַבִּי יִצְחָק בַּר שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר מָרְתָא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן, וְיָתֵיב וְקָאָמַר: וְלַיְיתֵי בְּהֵמָה וְלֶחֶם, וְלֵימָא: אִי הָךְ דְּקָיְימָא תְּמוּרָה הִיא – הָא תּוֹדָה וְהָא לַחְמָהּ, וְאִי הָךְ דְּקָיְימָא תּוֹדָה הִיא – הָא לַחְמָהּ וְהָא תִּהְוֵי תְּמוּרָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara suggests another solution: Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Shmuel bar Marta was sitting before Rav Naḥman, and he was sitting and saying: And let him bring another animal with loaves and let him say: If this animal that is extant is the substitute, then let this be the thanks offering and these its loaves. And if this animal that is extant is the thanks offering, then let these be its loaves and this will be a substitute, as the substitute of a thanks offering is not sacrificed with loaves, and it may be consumed for the same duration as the thanks offering itself.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yitzchak proposes a creative conditional stipulation: bring a new animal with loaves and declare both possibilities. If the surviving original animal is the substitute, then the new animal serves as the todah with its loaves. If the surviving animal is the todah, then the loaves accompany it and the new animal becomes a substitute. This approach attempts to resolve the uncertainty by covering both scenarios simultaneously. However, this solution has a fatal flaw that Rav Nachman will immediately identify.
Key Terms:
- תְּמוּרָה (Temurah) = Substitute — an animal designated in exchange for a consecrated animal
- תּוֹדָה (Todah) = Thanks offering — a type of peace offering brought with forty loaves
Segment 3
TYPE: דחייה
Rav Nachman rejects the conditional substitute solution
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: עֲנִי מָרִי, אַרְבְּעִין בְּכַתְפֵּיהּ, וְכָשֵׁר?!
English Translation:
Rav Naḥman said to him: Answer me, my Master: The halakha is that one who separates a substitute is liable to receive forty lashes on his shoulders, and yet you say it is fit to separate a substitute ab initio?
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Nachman delivers a sharp rejection using colorful language: “forty on his shoulders” refers to the punishment of lashes (malkot) that one receives for designating a temurah. Although the Torah declares that a temurah is nonetheless holy (Leviticus 27:33), the act of making one is a prohibition. Therefore, we cannot instruct someone to create a conditional stipulation that may result in designating a substitute, since that would mean advising someone to commit a punishable act.
Key Terms:
- אַרְבְּעִין בְּכַתְפֵּיהּ = Forty [lashes] on his shoulders — the punishment for making a temurah
Segment 4
TYPE: תירוץ
Abaye and the Sages propose placing loaves outside the Temple courtyard
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַב עִילָּא חֲלַשׁ, עָל לְגַבֵּיהּ אַבָּיֵי וְרַבָּנַן, וְיָתְבִי וְקָא אָמְרִי: אִם אִיתַהּ לִדְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן דְּאָמַר: חוּץ לְחוֹמַת הָעֲזָרָה קָדוֹשׁ, לַיְיתֵי לֶחֶם וְלוֹתְבַהּ חוּץ לְחוֹמַת הָעֲזָרָה, וְלֵימָא: אִי הָךְ דְּקָיְימָא תּוֹדָה הִיא – הָא לַחְמָהּ, וְאִי לָא – לִיפּוֹק לְחוּלִּין.
English Translation:
The Gemara relates that Rav Ila took ill, and Abaye and the Sages went to visit him, and they were sitting and saying: If one accepts the ruling of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said: If the loaves of the thanks offering were within Jerusalem, i.e., the area of consumption of a thanks offering and its loaves, even if they were outside the wall of the Temple courtyard when the thanks offering was slaughtered they are consecrated, then let the owner bring loaves and set them outside the wall of the Temple courtyard and let him say: If this animal that is extant is the thanks offering, then let these be its loaves, and if it is not, let them go out and be consumed as non-sacred loaves.
קלאוד על הדף:
This passage paints a vivid scene of bikur cholim (visiting the sick) combined with Torah discussion. When Rav Ila fell ill, Abaye and the Rabbis visited him and continued their halakhic deliberations at his bedside. Their proposal leverages Rabbi Yochanan’s ruling that loaves become consecrated even when placed outside the azarah (Temple courtyard), as long as they are within Jerusalem’s walls. By placing the loaves outside the courtyard, if the surviving animal turns out not to be the todah, the loaves would simply remain non-sacred — avoiding the problem of bringing non-sacred food into the Temple courtyard.
Key Terms:
- חוּץ לְחוֹמַת הָעֲזָרָה = Outside the wall of the Temple courtyard
- חוּלִּין (Chullin) = Non-sacred items
Segment 5
TYPE: דחייה
The waving requirement makes this remedy impossible
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא אַרְבַּע לְהָנִיף, הֵיכִי לֶיעְבֵּיד? לַנְפִינְהוּ אַבָּרַאי? ״לִפְנֵי ה׳״ כְּתִיב! גַּוַּואי? קָא מְעַיֵּיל חוּלִּין לָעֲזָרָה! הִלְכָּךְ, לָא אֶפְשָׁר.
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: This too is not a valid remedy, because there are four loaves of the forty that one must wave. How would he perform the mitzva of waving them? Shall he wave them outside the Temple courtyard? He may not, since “waved for a wave offering before the Lord” (Leviticus 7:30) is written in the verse, and waving performed outside the Temple courtyard is not considered “before the Lord.” Shall he wave them inside the Temple courtyard? He will have brought non-sacred food into the Temple courtyard. Therefore, it is not possible.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara identifies a practical catch-22 in Abaye’s proposal. Four of the forty loaves must be waved as a tenufah (wave offering), and this must be done “before the Lord” — meaning inside the Temple courtyard. But if the loaves are potentially non-sacred (chullin), bringing them into the courtyard violates the prohibition against bringing non-sacred food into the sacred precinct. Waving them outside would not fulfill “before the Lord.” This elegant dilemma — cannot wave inside because they might be chullin, cannot wave outside because it would not be “before the Lord” — kills the proposal.
Key Terms:
- תְּנוּפָה (Tenufah) = Waving — a ritual requirement for certain offerings
- לִפְנֵי ה׳ = Before the Lord — denoting the Temple courtyard
Segment 6
TYPE: תירוץ
Rav Sheisha proposes using eighty loaves based on Chizkiyya’s ruling
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב שִׁישָׁא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִידִי: אִם אִיתַהּ לִדְחִזְקִיָּה, דְּאָמַר קָדְשׁוּ אַרְבָּעִים מִתּוֹךְ שְׁמוֹנִים – לַיְיתֵי בְּהֵמָה, וְלַיְיתֵי שְׁמוֹנִים בַּהֲדַהּ, וְלֵימָא: אִי הָךְ דְּקָיְימָא תּוֹדָה הִיא – הָא נָמֵי תֶּיהְוֵי תּוֹדָה, וְהָא שְׁמוֹנִים דְּתַרְוַיְיהוּ; אִי הָךְ דְּקָיְימָא תְּמוּרָה הִיא – הָא תּוֹדָה וְהָא לַחְמָהּ, וְלִיקְדְּשׁוּ לְהוּ אַרְבָּעִים מִתּוֹךְ שְׁמוֹנִים!
English Translation:
Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, objects to this: If one accepts the ruling of Ḥizkiyya, who said with regard to a thanks offering that one slaughtered accompanied by eighty loaves rather than the required forty: Forty of the eighty loaves are consecrated, then let the owner bring an animal and let him bring eighty loaves with it and say: If this animal that is extant is the thanks offering, then this additional animal should also be a thanks offering and these eighty loaves should be for both of them. And if this animal that is extant is the substitute, then let this additional animal be a thanks offering and these shall be its loaves, and let forty of the eighty be consecrated for it.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Sheisha proposes an elaborate scheme leveraging Chizkiyya’s ruling that when one brings eighty loaves instead of the required forty, forty of them become consecrated. Under one scenario, both animals are todah offerings and share eighty loaves (forty each). Under the other scenario, only one is a todah and forty of the eighty become its loaves. The advantage is that no temurah is created ab initio, and the loaves can enter the courtyard since they definitely serve a sacred purpose for at least one todah.
Key Terms:
- שְׁמוֹנִים = Eighty — double the required forty loaves
- קָדְשׁוּ אַרְבָּעִים מִתּוֹךְ שְׁמוֹנִים = Forty of the eighty become consecrated
Segment 7
TYPE: דחייה
The eighty-loaves solution is rejected due to consumption concerns
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מִשּׁוּם דְּקָא מְמַעֵט בַּאֲכִילָה דְּאַרְבָּעִים.
English Translation:
The Gemara rejects this: This is not a valid remedy, because it reduces the consumption of the forty additional loaves, as the priests may not be able to consume the four loaves given from the additional forty, and the owner cannot consume them because they may be the portion of the priest.
קלאוד על הדף:
This terse rejection highlights a practical problem: the terumah (priestly portion) must be separated from the consecrated loaves, but when the identity of which forty are sacred is uncertain, the four priestly loaves cannot be properly identified. This leads to the “reduction in consumption” — portions that neither the owner nor the priests can confidently eat, since neither party can be certain whether the loaves in their possession are sacred or non-sacred.
Key Terms:
- מְמַעֵט בַּאֲכִילָה = Reduces consumption — a halakhic concern about wasting food
Segment 8
TYPE: תירוץ
Rav Ashi proposes using a pregnant animal based on Rabbi Yochanan’s ruling
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אָשֵׁי לְרַב כָּהֲנָא: אִם אִיתָא לִדְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, דְּאָמַר: הִפְרִישׁ חַטָּאת מְעוּבֶּרֶת וְיָלְדָה – רָצָה בָּהּ מִתְכַּפֵּר, רָצָה בִּוְולָדָהּ מִתְכַּפֵּר, לַיְיתֵי בְּהֵמָה מְעוּבֶּרֶת וְיַמְתִּין לָהּ עַד שֶׁתֵּלֵד, וְלַיְיתֵי שְׁמוֹנִים בַּהֲדַהּ, וְלֵימָא: אִי הָךְ דְּקָיְימָא תְּמוּרָה הִיא – הָא וּוְלָדָהּ תּוֹדָה הִיא, וְהָא שְׁמוֹנִים דְּתַרְוַויְיהוּ; וְאִי הָךְ דְּקָיְימָא תּוֹדָה הִיא – הָא נָמֵי תּוֹדָה הִיא, וְהָא שְׁמוֹנִים דְּתַרְוַויְיהוּ הוּא, וְהַאי לֶיהֱוֵי מוֹתָר דְּתוֹדָה.
English Translation:
Rav Ashi said to Rav Kahana: If one accepts the ruling of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said: If one separated a pregnant animal as a sin offering and it gave birth, if he wants he can achieve atonement with it, and if he wants he can achieve atonement with its offspring; then let the owner bring a pregnant animal and wait until it gives birth, and let him bring eighty loaves with it and say: If this animal that is extant is the substitute, then this and its offspring are thanks offerings, and these eighty loaves should be for both of them. And if this animal that is extant is the thanks offering, then this mother should also be a thanks offering, and these eighty loaves should be for both of them, and let this offspring be the leftover of the thanks offering.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Ashi constructs the most elaborate proposal yet, combining the pregnant-animal ruling of Rabbi Yochanan with the eighty-loaves principle. The key innovation is that the offspring of a consecrated pregnant animal can itself serve as an offering. Under either scenario, both the mother and offspring have legitimate sacrificial roles, and the eighty loaves are distributed between two thanks offerings. The offspring either serves as a second todah or as a motar (leftover) of the todah — both of which are acceptable dispositions.
Key Terms:
- חַטָּאת מְעוּבֶּרֶת = Pregnant sin offering — a consecrated animal that was pregnant when dedicated
- שְׁבַח הֶקְדֵּשׁ = Enhancement of consecrated property — growth/offspring of a sanctified animal
Segment 9
TYPE: דחייה
Rav Kahana rejects the pregnant-animal solution
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאן לֵימָא לַן דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אִם שִׁיְּירוֹ מְשׁוּיָּיר? דִּלְמָא אִם שִׁיְּירוֹ אֵינוֹ מְשׁוּיָּיר, וְהַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, דְּאָמַר: אָדָם מִתְכַּפֵּר בִּשְׁבַח הֶקְדֵּשׁ.
English Translation:
Rav Kahana said to him: Who shall say to us that the reasoning of Rabbi Yoḥanan is that he said that the offspring is considered the property of the one who dedicated the pregnant mother, such that if he reserved it for a specific consecration it is considered reserved for that consecration? Perhaps Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that if he reserved it, it is not considered reserved, and this is the reason that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that one can achieve atonement with the offspring of a pregnant animal separated as a sin offering, as he said: A person achieves atonement with the enhancement of consecrated property, such as the offspring of an animal that was consecrated when pregnant.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Kahana dismantles Rav Ashi’s proposal by questioning its underlying assumption. Rav Ashi assumed that Rabbi Yochanan’s ruling about the offspring means the owner has full control to designate it for any specific purpose. But Rav Kahana suggests that Rabbi Yochanan’s reasoning may be entirely different: perhaps the offspring cannot be specifically “reserved” by the owner, and the only reason one can use it for atonement is the general principle that a person achieves atonement through the “enhancement” (shevach) of hekdesh. Under this reading, the conditional stipulation would not work because the offspring cannot be specifically designated.
Key Terms:
- אִם שִׁיְּירוֹ מְשׁוּיָּיר = If he reserved it, it is reserved — the owner can designate the offspring
- אָדָם מִתְכַּפֵּר בִּשְׁבַח הֶקְדֵּשׁ = A person achieves atonement with the enhancement of consecrated property
Segment 10
TYPE: תירוץ
Rav Dimi suggests a vow-based solution with a guarantee animal
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רָבִינָא אִיקְּלַע לְדַמְהַורְיָא, אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב דִּימִי בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב הוּנָא מִדַּמְהַורְיָא לְרָבִינָא: וְלַיְיתֵי בְּהֵמָה, וְלֵימָא ״הֲרֵי עָלַי״, וְלַיְיתֵי בְּהֵמָה אַחֲרִיתִי, וְלַיְיתֵי שְׁמוֹנִים בַּהֲדַהּ, וְלֵימָא: אִי הָךְ דְּקָיְימָא תְּמוּרָה הִיא – הָנֵי תַּרְתֵּי תּוֹדוֹת, וְהָא שְׁמוֹנִים דְּתַרְוַיְיהוּ; וְאִי הָךְ דְּקָיְימָא תּוֹדָה הִיא – וְהָא דְּאָמְרִי ״עֲלַי״ נָמֵי לֶיהֱוֵי תּוֹדָה, וְהָא שְׁמוֹנִים דְּתַרְוַיְיהוּ, וְאִידַּךְ תִּהְוֵי לְאַחְרָיוּת.
English Translation:
Ravina happened to come to Dimhorya. Rav Dimi, son of Rav Huna from Dimhorya, said to Ravina: And let the owner bring an animal and say: It is incumbent upon me to bring an animal for a thanks offering, and let him separate this animal in fulfillment of his vow, and then let him bring another animal, and let him bring eighty loaves with it and say: If this animal that is extant is the substitute, then these two additional animals are thanks offerings and these eighty loaves should be for both of them. And if this animal that is extant is the thanks offering, then this one for which I said: It is incumbent upon me, should also be a thanks offering, and these eighty loaves are for both of them, and let the other animal be for a guarantee, to be sacrificed if my thanks offering gets lost, and it does not require loaves.
קלאוד על הדף:
This final proposed remedy introduces a new element: taking a vow (“harei alai”) to create an obligation for a new todah, plus a second “backup” animal as acharayut (guarantee). Under one scenario, both additional animals are todah offerings sharing eighty loaves. Under the other, one serves as the todah and the other as a guarantee animal (which does not need loaves). The guarantee animal is a safety net in case the original todah is lost. This clever scheme avoids the temurah problem and the consumption problem — but introduces a new issue.
Key Terms:
- הֲרֵי עָלַי = It is incumbent upon me — language of a vow creating an obligation
- אַחְרָיוּת = Guarantee — a backup animal designated in case the offering is lost
Segment 11
TYPE: דחייה
Ravina rejects vowing ab initio based on Ecclesiastes
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הַתּוֹרָה אָמְרָה ״טוֹב אֲשֶׁר לֹא תִדֹּר מִשֶּׁתִּדּוֹר וְלֹא תְשַׁלֵּם״, וְאַתְּ אָמְרַתְּ: לֵיקוּם וְלִינְדּוֹר בַּתְּחִילָּה?!
English Translation:
Ravina said to him: The Torah said: “Better is it that you should not vow, than that you should vow and not pay” (Ecclesiastes 5:4), and you say: Let him rise up and vow ab initio? Taking a vow to bring an offering is not encouraged. As all possible remedies have been rejected, the statement of Rabbi Ḥiyya, that there is no remedy in a case where a thanks offering and its substitute were intermingled and one of them died, stands.
קלאוד על הדף:
Ravina delivers the final rejection with a verse from Kohelet (Ecclesiastes). The principle is that one should not take vows unnecessarily — it is better to avoid vows entirely than to risk failing to fulfill them. Since this proposed remedy requires taking a new vow ab initio as a legal maneuver, it violates this fundamental principle. With this, all five proposed solutions have been rejected, and the Gemara concludes that Rabbi Chiyya’s ruling stands: there is simply no remedy when a todah and its temurah become intermingled and one dies.
Key Terms:
- נֶדֶר (Neder) = Vow — a voluntary commitment to bring an offering
- טוֹב אֲשֶׁר לֹא תִדֹּר = Better that you should not vow — from Ecclesiastes 5:4
Segment 12
TYPE: משנה
Mishna: Vowing to bring a todah — the source of the offering and its loaves
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְנִי׳ הָאוֹמֵר ״הֲרֵי עָלַי תּוֹדָה״ – יָבִיא הִיא וְלַחְמָהּ מִן הַחוּלִּין.
English Translation:
MISHNA: One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering, must bring it and its loaves from non-sacred money in his possession and not second-tithe money. Since he said: It is incumbent upon me, bringing the offering is an obligation, and one may not fulfill an obligation with second-tithe money.
קלאוד על הדף:
This new mishna introduces a topic that will dominate the rest of the daf: the interplay between vows, todah offerings with their loaves, and the permissibility of using different sources of funds — specifically non-sacred money (chullin) versus second-tithe money (ma’aser sheni). The fundamental rule is that obligations (chovot) must be fulfilled from one’s own non-sacred funds. Since saying “harei alai” creates a personal obligation, both the animal and its forty loaves must come from chullin. Ma’aser sheni money, while it can be used for certain voluntary offerings in Jerusalem, cannot fulfill an obligation.
Key Terms:
- חוּלִּין (Chullin) = Non-sacred money/property — ordinary funds
- מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי (Ma’aser Sheni) = Second tithe — produce/money that must be consumed in Jerusalem
Amud Bet (81b)
Segment 1
TYPE: משנה
Continuation of the mishna: Various combinations of funding sources for todah and its loaves
Hebrew/Aramaic:
״תּוֹדָה עָלַי מִן הַחוּלִּין וְלַחְמָהּ מִן הַמַּעֲשֵׂר״ – יָבִיא הִיא וְלַחְמָהּ מִן הַחוּלִּין. ״תּוֹדָה מִן הַמַּעֲשֵׂר וְלַחְמָהּ מִן הַחוּלִּין״ – יָבִיא. ״הִיא וְלַחְמָהּ מִן הַמַּעֲשֵׂר״ – יָבִיא. וְלֹא יָבִיא מֵחִיטֵּי מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי, אֶלָּא מִמְּעוֹת מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי.
English Translation:
If one said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering from non-sacred money and its loaves from second-tithe money, he must bring the thanks offering and its loaves from non-sacred money. If one said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering from second-tithe money and its loaves from non-sacred money, he may bring it in that manner. Likewise, if one said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering and its loaves from second-tithe money, he may bring it in that manner. And he may not bring the loaves from second-tithe wheat; rather, he purchases the flour with second-tithe money.
קלאוד על הדף:
The mishna presents a detailed matrix of permutations. The key principle is that the loaves are an integral part of the todah, so if the todah must come from chullin (as in the first case), the loaves must too. But when the person specifies that the todah comes from ma’aser, the loaves from chullin arrangement is acceptable because the loaves are treated as a separate component fulfilling the todah obligation. The final clause adds an important distinction: even when ma’aser money may be used, one cannot use actual second-tithe wheat — only money from the second tithe, which is then used to purchase flour.
Key Terms:
- חִיטֵּי מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי = Second-tithe wheat — actual wheat designated as ma’aser sheni
- מְעוֹת מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי = Second-tithe money — money from redeeming the second tithe
Segment 2
TYPE: גמרא
Rav Huna: Vowing to bring loaves obligates a full todah
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: הָאוֹמֵר ״הֲרֵי עָלַי לַחְמֵי תוֹדָה״ – מֵבִיא תּוֹדָה וְלַחְמָהּ. מַאי טַעְמָא? מִידָּע יָדַע הַאי גַּבְרָא דְּלֶחֶם בְּלֹא תּוֹדָה לָא איקָרֵיב, וְהַאי תּוֹדָה וְלַחְמָהּ קָאָמַר, וְהַאי דְּקָאָמַר ״לַחְמֵי תוֹדָה״ – סוֹף מִילְּתָא נָקֵט.
English Translation:
GEMARA: With regard to the various ways in which one can take a vow to bring a thanks offering and its loaves, Rav Huna says: One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring loaves of a thanks offering, must bring a thanks offering and its loaves, even though he did not expressly take upon himself the obligation to bring the thanks offering itself. What is the reason? This man knows that loaves are not brought without a thanks offering, and by stating the vow in this manner, he was effectively saying: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering and its loaves. And the reason he stated his vow in this manner, namely, by saying: It is incumbent upon me to bring loaves of a thanks offering, was that he was citing the end of the matter, as the sacrifice of a thanks offering is completed with the bringing of the loaves.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Huna establishes an important interpretive principle for vow language. When someone mentions only the loaves, we interpret their words expansively because everyone knows that loaves cannot be offered alone. The phrase “sof milta nakat” (he cited the end of the matter) suggests that the person mentioned the final step of the process as shorthand for the entire obligation. This principle has wide-ranging implications for how we interpret the language of vows — do we read them literally or according to reasonable intent?
Key Terms:
- סוֹף מִילְּתָא נָקֵט = He cited the end of the matter — a principle of vow interpretation
- לַחְמֵי תוֹדָה = Loaves of a thanks offering
Segment 3
TYPE: קושיא
Challenge to Rav Huna from the mishna about todah from ma’aser
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תְּנַן: תּוֹדָה מִן הַמַּעֲשֵׂר וְלַחְמָהּ מִן הַחוּלִּין – יָבִיא כְּמָה שֶׁנָּדַר. וְאַמַּאי? כֵּיוָן דְּאָמַר ״לַחְמָהּ מִן הַחוּלִּין״ – יָבִיא הִיא וְלַחְמָהּ מִן הַחוּלִּין!
English Translation:
The Gemara raises a difficulty with the statement of Rav Huna from that which we learned in the mishna: If one said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering from second-tithe money and its loaves from non-sacred money, he may bring it as he vowed. The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rav Huna that one who takes a vow to bring the loaves of a thanks offering intends to bring the thanks offering as well, why does the mishna state that he may bring the thanks offering from second-tithe money? Since he said: Its loaves from non-sacred money, he should bring a thanks offering and its loaves from non-sacred money.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara challenges Rav Huna’s principle by pointing to a seeming inconsistency. If mentioning the loaves implies the entire todah obligation, then when someone says “todah from ma’aser and its loaves from chullin,” the mention of “loaves from chullin” should trigger the obligation to bring everything from chullin — since the loaves carry the implication of the entire offering. Yet the mishna permits the todah from ma’aser as stated. This challenges whether Rav Huna’s principle applies consistently.
Key Terms:
- כְּמָה שֶׁנָּדַר = As he vowed — he may fulfill the vow exactly as stated
Segment 4
TYPE: תירוץ
The loaves here serve as a subordinate vow, not a primary one
Hebrew/Aramaic:
שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּכֵיוָן דְּאָמַר ״תּוֹדָה מִן הַמַּעֲשֵׂר״, נַעֲשָׂה כְּאוֹמֵר ״הֲרֵי עָלַי לֶחֶם לִפְטוֹר תּוֹדָתוֹ שֶׁל פְּלוֹנִי״.
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: It is different there, in the case of the mishna, as since he said initially: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering from second-tithe money, and then said: And its loaves from non-sacred money, he is considered as one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring loaves to exempt the thanks offering of so-and-so. His vow to bring the loaves is not considered a new vow, but rather as a vow to bring loaves for the specific offering he vowed to bring.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara draws a subtle distinction. When the todah obligation is stated first (“todah from ma’aser”), that creates the primary obligation. The subsequent mention of loaves is then subordinate to and dependent on that existing obligation — as if he is providing loaves for “someone else’s” todah (i.e., the todah he already obligated himself to bring). The loaves here do not create an independent obligation that would “pull” the todah toward chullin. Rav Huna’s principle only applies when someone mentions only the loaves with no prior todah obligation.
Key Terms:
- לִפְטוֹר תּוֹדָתוֹ שֶׁל פְּלוֹנִי = To exempt the todah of so-and-so — bringing loaves for an already-existing obligation
Segment 5
TYPE: קושיא
Counter-challenge: The first clause should also be treated as subordinate
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִי הָכִי, רֵישָׁא דְּקָתָנֵי: תּוֹדָה מִן הַחוּלִּין וְלַחְמָהּ מִן הַמַּעֲשֵׂר – יָבִיא הִיא וְלַחְמָהּ מִן הַחוּלִּין, הָכָא נָמֵי נַעֲשָׂה כְּאוֹמֵר ״הֲרֵי עָלַי תּוֹדָה לִפְטוֹר לַחְמוֹ שֶׁל פְּלוֹנִי״!
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: If that is so, then with regard to the first clause of the mishna, which teaches that if one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering from non-sacred money and its loaves from second-tithe money, then he must bring the thanks offering and its loaves from non-sacred money, here too let it be said that he is considered as one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering to exempt the loaves of so-and-so, and he therefore should bring a thanks offering from second tithe. His initial vow to bring a thanks offering from non-sacred money should not include the bringing of the loaves.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara presses the distinction by applying the same logic in reverse. If the second part of a compound vow is treated as subordinate to the first, then when someone says “todah from chullin and loaves from ma’aser,” the todah should be seen as the subordinate element serving the loaves. If the loaves come from ma’aser, perhaps the todah should also be allowed from ma’aser? This symmetrical challenge tests whether the subordination principle works in both directions or only in one.
Key Terms:
- רֵישָׁא = The first clause — referring to the opening case in the mishna
Segment 6
TYPE: תירוץ
The asymmetry between loaves and todah resolves the challenge
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא? בִּשְׁלָמָא לֶחֶם לְמִיפְטַר תּוֹדָה אָתֵי, תּוֹדָה לְמִיפְטַר לֶחֶם מִי אָתְיָא?
English Translation:
The Gemara rejects this: How can these cases be compared? Granted, in a case where one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering from second-tithe money and its loaves from non-sacred money, it can be said that he intends that the loaves should be brought to complete the vow of one who is obligated to bring a thanks offering, because loaves come to exempt the thanks offering. But in a case where one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering from non-sacred money and its loaves from second-tithe money, it cannot be said that the thanks offering is meant to complete the vow of one who is obligated to bring the loaves of a thanks offering, as does a thanks offering come to exempt the loaves?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara resolves the symmetry challenge with a fundamental asymmetry in the todah-loaves relationship. Loaves “come to exempt” the todah — they are the completing component that enables the todah to be properly offered. But the todah does not “come to exempt” the loaves; rather, the loaves are subordinate to the todah. Therefore, loaves can be seen as a subsidiary vow fulfilling the todah, but a todah cannot be seen as a subsidiary vow fulfilling the loaves. This directional dependency explains why the cases in the mishna have different outcomes.
Key Terms:
- לֶחֶם לְמִיפְטַר תּוֹדָה אָתֵי = Loaves come to exempt the todah — the loaves complete the todah obligation
Segment 7
TYPE: ברייתא
Baraita: Vowing a todah without loaves or a sacrifice without libations
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תָּא שְׁמַע: הָאוֹמֵר ״הֲרֵי עָלַי תּוֹדָה בְּלֹא לֶחֶם״ וְ״זֶבַח בְּלֹא נְסָכִים״ – כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ, וּמֵבִיא תּוֹדָה וְלַחְמָהּ, זֶבַח וּנְסָכִים.
English Translation:
The Gemara continues to discuss the statement of Rav Huna that one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring loaves of a thanks offering, must bring a thanks offering and its loaves. Come and hear a proof from a baraita that contradicts the opinion of Rav Huna: In the case of one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering without loaves, or an animal offering without libations, the court coerces him, and he brings a thanks offering with its loaves, or an offering with its libations.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara introduces a baraita that seems to challenge Rav Huna’s expansive interpretation of vow language. The baraita discusses someone who explicitly attempts to separate the todah from its loaves (or a sacrifice from its libations). The court forces him to bring the complete offering. The implication the Gemara will draw is that coercion is necessary only because the person actually said “todah” — but if he had said only “loaves,” perhaps there would be no obligation at all.
Key Terms:
- כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ = The court coerces him — beit din forces compliance
- נְסָכִים (Nesachim) = Libations — wine and flour offerings accompanying animal sacrifices
Segment 8
TYPE: קושיא
Inference against Rav Huna: Only mentioning todah creates the obligation
Hebrew/Aramaic:
טַעְמָא דְּאָמַר, אֲבָל לָא אָמַר תּוֹדָה – לָא.
English Translation:
The Gemara infers: The reason that he is coerced to bring a thanks offering with its loaves is that he said that it is incumbent upon himself to bring a thanks offering. But if he did not say that it is incumbent upon himself to bring a thanks offering, but instead said that it is incumbent upon himself to bring the loaves of a thanks offering, he would not be coerced to bring a thanks offering with the loaves, in contradiction to the opinion of Rav Huna.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara draws a precise inference from the baraita’s language. The baraita specifically discusses someone who said “todah” — implying that only when the word “todah” is used does the obligation arise. If someone only mentioned “loaves,” the baraita’s rule would not apply. This would contradict Rav Huna, who holds that mentioning loaves alone creates a full todah obligation. The Gemara will need to defend Rav Huna against this textual inference.
Key Terms:
- טַעְמָא דְּאָמַר = The reason is that he said — indicating that the specific language matters
Segment 9
TYPE: תירוץ
Defense of Rav Huna: The baraita’s language is due to the parallel case of libations
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הוּא הַדִּין אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא אָמַר ״תּוֹדָה״, וְאַיְּידֵי דְּקָא בָּעֵי לְמִיתְנֵא ״זֶבַח בְּלֹא נְסָכִים״, דְּלָא מִתְּנֵי לֵיהּ ״נְסָכִים בְּלֹא זֶבַח״, תְּנָא נָמֵי ״תּוֹדָה״.
English Translation:
The Gemara rejects this: Actually, the same is true even if he did not say that it is incumbent upon himself to bring a thanks offering, but said only: It is incumbent upon me to bring the loaves. And this is the reason that the tanna of the baraita mentions specifically the case of one who renders himself obligated to bring a thanks offering without loaves: Since the tanna wants to teach the case of one who renders himself obligated to bring an animal offering without libations, concerning which he could not teach a case where one renders himself obligated to bring libations without an offering, because, unlike the loaves of a thanks offering, libations are in fact brought on their own and one can take a vow to bring them on their own, he therefore also taught the case of one who renders himself obligated to bring a thanks offering.
קלאוד על הדף:
This is a sophisticated defense of Rav Huna based on the stylistic choices of the tanna. The baraita pairs todah-without-loaves with sacrifice-without-libations. For the libations case, the reverse (“libations without a sacrifice”) would not work as a parallel because libations can indeed be offered independently. So the tanna could only teach “sacrifice without libations.” To maintain parallel structure, the tanna taught “todah without loaves” — but this does not exclude the possibility that “loaves without todah” would also create an obligation, as Rav Huna claims.
Key Terms:
- אַיְּידֵי = Since / on account of — introducing a stylistic explanation for the baraita’s formulation
Segment 10
TYPE: קושיא
New challenge: Why not dissolve the vow entirely as a “vow with its opening”?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אַמַּאי? נֶדֶר וּפִתְחוֹ עִמּוֹ הוּא!
English Translation:
The Gemara addresses the actual statement of the baraita and asks: Why is he coerced to bring a thanks offering and its loaves? Isn’t this an instance of a vow with its inherent opening? That is, the vow should be dissolved entirely on the grounds that the one who took the vow may claim that he thought it was possible to bring a thanks offering without loaves, and now that he has been made aware that he cannot, he regrets taking the vow.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara now raises a different challenge to the baraita itself. In vow law, a “neder u-fitcho imo” (a vow with its opening built in) is one where the basis for dissolution is inherent in the vow itself. If someone vowed to bring a todah without loaves, and then learns this is impossible, that ignorance should serve as the basis for dissolving the vow entirely — not for coercing him to bring a todah with loaves. The question is fundamental: why coerce rather than simply release him from the vow?
Key Terms:
- נֶדֶר וּפִתְחוֹ עִמּוֹ = A vow with its opening — a vow that contains within it the grounds for its own dissolution
Segment 11
TYPE: תירוץ
Chizkiyya: The baraita follows Beit Shammai — attend to the first statement
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר חִזְקִיָּה: הָא מַנִּי? בֵּית שַׁמַּאי הִיא, דְּאָמְרִי: תְּפוֹס לָשׁוֹן הָרִאשׁוֹן. דִּתְנַן: ״הֲרֵינִי נָזִיר מִן הַגְּרוֹגְרוֹת וּמִן הַדְּבֵלָה״ – בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: נָזִיר, וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: אֵינוֹ נָזִיר.
English Translation:
Ḥizkiyya said: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, who say: In the case of one who stated a declaration comprising two contradictory statements, attend to only the first statement. As we learned in a mishna (Nazir 9a): If one says: I am hereby a nazirite from dried figs and from pressed figs, which is a contradictory statement, as figs are not prohibited to a nazirite, Beit Shammai say: He is a full-fledged nazirite, as one attends only to the first statement, i.e., I am hereby a nazirite, and the second part is discounted. And Beit Hillel say: The second part of his statement is not discounted, and therefore he is not a nazirite, as he did not accept naziriteship upon himself.
קלאוד על הדף:
Chizkiyya resolves the difficulty by attributing the baraita to Beit Shammai. Their principle of “tefos lashon rishon” (attend to the first statement) means that when someone says “todah without loaves,” we focus only on the first part — “I accept upon myself a todah” — and ignore the contradictory qualifier “without loaves.” The nazir parallel is illuminating: when someone says “I am a nazir from figs,” Beit Shammai focus only on “I am a nazir” and disregard the impossible qualifier. This approach eliminates the “opening” for dissolution.
Key Terms:
- תְּפוֹס לָשׁוֹן הָרִאשׁוֹן = Attend to the first statement — Beit Shammai’s interpretive principle
- נָזִיר מִן הַגְּרוֹגְרוֹת = A nazirite from dried figs — an internally contradictory declaration
Segment 12
TYPE: תירוץ
Rabbi Yochanan: Even Beit Hillel agree when the person confirms intent
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא בֵּית הִלֵּל, בְּאוֹמֵר: אִילּוּ הָיִיתִי יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁאֵין נוֹדְרִין כָּךְ, לֹא הָיִיתִי נוֹדֵר כָּךְ, אֶלָּא כָּךְ. וּמַאי כּוֹפִין? דְּקָא בָּעֵי הָדַר בֵּיהּ.
English Translation:
Rabbi Yoḥanan says: You may even say that the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, and the ruling of the baraita is with regard to one who says: Had I known that one does not vow in this manner, i.e., to bring a thanks offering without loaves or an animal offering without libations, I would not have vowed in this manner but in that manner, i.e., I would have vowed to bring a thanks offering with its loaves. There is therefore no opening for a dissolution. And what does the baraita mean when it states that the court coerces him? Why would he require coercion if he says that he would have willingly taken the proper vow? The baraita is referring to a case where, despite the fact that he would have taken the proper vow initially, he now wants to retract his vow altogether.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yochanan offers an alternative explanation that even Beit Hillel would accept. The key is the person’s own statement: “Had I known the rules, I would have vowed properly.” This admission eliminates the “opening” for dissolution, since the person confirms they wanted to bring a todah — just with an incorrect understanding of the mechanics. The coercion is needed because, despite this admission, the person now wants to retract entirely. The court says: you yourself acknowledged you would have vowed properly, so you must fulfill the proper version of your vow.
Key Terms:
- אִילּוּ הָיִיתִי יוֹדֵעַ = Had I known — the person’s admission of intent
- הָדַר בֵּיהּ = Retract — wanting to withdraw from the vow entirely
Segment 13
TYPE: ברייתא
Second baraita: Coercion even when the person says “I would not have vowed at all”
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תָּא שְׁמַע: הָאוֹמֵר ״הֲרֵי עָלַי תּוֹדָה בְּלֹא לֶחֶם״, וְ״זֶבַח בְּלֹא נְסָכִים״, וְאָמְרוּ לוֹ: ״הָבֵא תּוֹדָה וְלַחְמָהּ״, וְ״זֶבַח וּנְסָכִים״, וְאוֹמֵר: ״אִילּוּ הָיִיתִי יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁכֵּן לֹא הָיִיתִי נוֹדֵר״ – כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ, וְאוֹמֵר לוֹ: ״שְׁמֹר וְשָׁמַעְתָּ״.
English Translation:
The Gemara cites a baraita in support of the response of Ḥizkiyya: Come and hear: In a case involving one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering without loaves, or: It is incumbent upon me to bring an animal offering without libations, and the Sages said to him: Bring a thanks offering with its loaves, or: Bring an animal offering with its libations, and he says: Had I known that such is the requirement I would not have vowed at all; the halakha is that the court coerces him, and says to him: “Observe and hear” (Deuteronomy 12:28).
קלאוד על הדף:
This second baraita is more explicit: even when the person claims he would not have vowed at all (not just that he would have vowed differently), the court still coerces him. The court invokes the verse “shamor ve-shamata” (observe and hear) from Deuteronomy as a scriptural basis for the obligation. This baraita supports Chizkiyya’s approach (that we follow Beit Shammai’s principle and attend to the first statement) more directly than Rabbi Yochanan’s approach, since the person here explicitly denies any intent to bring a proper offering.
Key Terms:
- שְׁמֹר וְשָׁמַעְתָּ = Observe and hear — Deuteronomy 12:28, cited as the basis for enforcing the vow
Segment 14
TYPE: גמרא
Resolution: Rabbi Yochanan concedes this baraita is Beit Shammai
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בִּשְׁלָמָא לְחִזְקִיָּה, נִיחָא לֵיהּ, אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן קַשְׁיָא! אָמַר לָךְ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הָא וַדַּאי בֵּית שַׁמַּאי הִיא.
English Translation:
The Gemara continues: Granted, this works out well according to Ḥizkiyya, who says that the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai that one attends only to the first statement, since this baraita can also be explained in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai. But according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says that the baraita discusses a case where the person who took the vow says: Had I known that one does not vow in this manner I would have vowed to bring a thanks offering with its loaves, this baraita presents a difficulty, as although the individual claims that he would not have taken any vow, he must still bring a thanks offering and its loaves. The Gemara responds: Rabbi Yoḥanan could have said to you: This latter baraita is certainly in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, but the previous baraita may still be explained in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara reaches a compromise between the two approaches. Rabbi Yochanan concedes that this second baraita — where the person explicitly says “I would not have vowed at all” and is still coerced — must follow Beit Shammai. However, he maintains his position regarding the first baraita (where the person says “I would have vowed differently”), which can be explained according to Beit Hillel as well. This leaves each authority with a defensible position, and the practical halakha would follow Beit Hillel as interpreted by Rabbi Yochanan.
Key Terms:
- בִּשְׁלָמָא = Granted — introducing a comparison between two approaches
- הָא וַדַּאי = This one certainly — a concession on a specific point
Segment 15
TYPE: גמרא
Interpreting “Observe and hear” — the dispute between Abaye and Rava
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַאי ״שְׁמֹר וְשָׁמַעְתָּ״? אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: ״שְׁמֹר״ – הָבֵא תּוֹדָה, ״וְשָׁמַעְתָּ״ – הָבֵא לַחְמָהּ. רָבָא אָמַר: ״שְׁמֹר״ – הָבֵא תּוֹדָה וְלַחְמָהּ, ״וְשָׁמַעְתָּ״ – שֶׁלֹּא תְּהֵא רָגִיל לַעֲשׂוֹת כֵּן.
English Translation:
The Gemara turns to analyze the baraita itself: What is the relevance of the phrase in the verse that says: “Observe and hear,” to one who vows to bring a thanks offering without its loaves? Abaye says: “Observe” means: Bring a thanks offering; “and hear” means: Bring its loaves. Rava says: “Observe” means: Bring a thanks offering and its loaves; “and hear” means that you should not act in this manner regularly.
קלאוד על הדף:
Abaye and Rava offer characteristically different readings of the verse. Abaye divides the two words of the verse between the two components of the offering: “shamor” corresponds to the todah and “shamata” to its loaves. Rava reads the verse as addressing two different dimensions: “shamor” is the immediate obligation (bring both), while “shamata” is a forward-looking admonition — do not make a habit of vowing improperly. Rava’s reading adds a pedagogical element: the court not only enforces the vow but also educates the person about proper vow-taking.
Key Terms:
- שְׁמֹר = Observe — interpreted as the obligation to bring the offering
- שָׁמַעְתָּ = Hear — interpreted differently by Abaye and Rava
Segment 16
TYPE: גמרא
Clarification: “He shall bring” from ma’aser is optional, not mandatory
Hebrew/Aramaic:
״תּוֹדָה הִיא וְלַחְמָהּ מִן הַמַּעֲשֵׂר״ – יָבִיא. יָבִיא? לָא סַגִּי דְּלָא מַיְיתֵי? רַב נַחְמָן וְרַב חִסְדָּא אָמְרִי: רָצָה מֵבִיא, לֹא רָצָה לֹא יָבִיא.
English Translation:
§ The mishna teaches that if one states: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering and its loaves from second-tithe money, he shall bring it in that manner. The Gemara asks: Why does the mishna teach: He shall bring, which suggests that he must bring the thanks offering and loaves from second-tithe money? Is it not sufficient to fulfill his vow even if he does not bring it from second-tithe money but from non-sacred money? In fact, it is preferable that he bring the offering from non-sacred money. Rav Naḥman and Rav Ḥisda say: The mishna does not mean that he must bring it specifically from second-tithe money; rather, if he wants, he brings it from second-tithe money, and if he does not want, he does not need to bring it from second-tithe money.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara clarifies an apparent stringency in the mishna’s language. “Yavi” (he shall bring) sounds mandatory, but Rav Nachman and Rav Chisda explain it as permissive: he may bring from ma’aser if he wants, but he can always upgrade to chullin. Since bringing from one’s own non-sacred funds is always preferable (it involves no restrictions of sanctity), the person who vowed to use ma’aser money is not locked into that choice. The mishna’s “yavi” merely validates the option, not mandates it.
Key Terms:
- רָצָה מֵבִיא = If he wants, he brings — indicating the ruling is permissive, not mandatory
Segment 17
TYPE: גמרא
Second-tithe wheat vs. wheat purchased with second-tithe money
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְלֹא יָבִיא מֵחִיטֵּי מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי, אֶלָּא מִמְּעוֹת מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי. רַב נַחְמָן וְרַב חִסְדָּא דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא מֵחִיטֵּי מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי, אֲבָל מֵחִיטִּין הַלְּקוּחוֹת מִמְּעוֹת מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי – יָבִיא.
English Translation:
§ The mishna teaches: And he may not bring the loaves from second-tithe wheat; rather, he purchases the flour with second-tithe money. With regard to this, Rav Naḥman and Rav Ḥisda both say: The mishna taught only that the loaves may not be brought from second-tithe wheat itself, but he may bring the loaves from wheat purchased with second-tithe money.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Nachman and Rav Chisda jointly clarify an important distinction in the mishna. Second-tithe wheat itself has inherent sanctity and cannot be used for todah loaves. However, wheat purchased with second-tithe money (money that was redeemed from the original tithed produce) may be used. The distinction lies in the nature of the sanctity: wheat that was originally designated as ma’aser sheni retains its first-order sanctity, while wheat bought with the redeemed money has a derivative, lesser level of sanctity that is compatible with use in offerings.
Key Terms:
- חִיטֵּי מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי = Second-tithe wheat — wheat with original ma’aser sheni sanctity
- חִיטִּין הַלְּקוּחוֹת מִמְּעוֹת מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי = Wheat purchased with second-tithe money
Segment 18
TYPE: מחלוקת
Rabbi Yirmeya vs. Rabbi Zeira: Can wheat purchased with ma’aser money be used?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
יָתֵיב רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי זֵירָא, וְיָתֵיב וְקָאָמַר: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא מֵחִיטֵּי מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי, אֲבָל מֵחִיטִּין הַלְּקוּחוֹת בִּמְעוֹת מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי – יָבִיא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: רַבִּי, אַתָּה אוֹמֵר כֵּן? אֲנִי אוֹמֵר אֲפִילּוּ מֵחִיטִּין הַלְּקוּחוֹת בִּמְעוֹת מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי לֹא יָבִיא. וְאֵימָא טַעְמָא דִידִי, וְאֵימָא טַעְמָא דִּידָךְ. אֵימָא טַעְמָא דִּידָךְ: תּוֹדָה מֵהֵיכָא קָא יָלְפַתְּ לַהּ? מִשְּׁלָמִים,
English Translation:
The Gemara relates: Rabbi Yirmeya was sitting before Rabbi Zeira, and he was sitting and saying: The mishna taught only that the loaves may not be brought from second-tithe wheat itself, but he may bring the loaves from wheat purchased from second-tithe money. Rabbi Zeira said to him: My teacher, do you say so? I say that he may not bring the loaves even from wheat purchased from second-tithe money. And I will say my reasoning and I will say your reasoning. I will say your reasoning first: From where do you derive that the loaves of a thanks offering may be brought from wheat purchased with second-tithe money? You derive it from the halakha of a peace offering. A thanks offering is a type of peace offering, as the verse states: “And the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings for thanks” (Leviticus 7:15), and a peace offering may be brought from second-tithe money.
קלאוד על הדף:
The daf concludes with a dispute between Rabbi Yirmeya and Rabbi Zeira about whether wheat purchased with ma’aser sheni money can be used for todah loaves. Rabbi Yirmeya (citing the same position as Rav Nachman and Rav Chisda) permits it. Rabbi Zeira disagrees and prohibits even this. Rabbi Zeira then begins a methodical analysis: “Let me explain your reasoning and mine.” Rabbi Yirmeya’s logic derives from the todah’s classification as a type of shelamim (peace offering), and since shelamim can be brought from ma’aser money, so too can the todah’s loaves. The continuation of this debate extends to the next daf.
Key Terms:
- שְׁלָמִים (Shelamim) = Peace offering — the broader category that includes the todah
- טַעְמָא דִידִי…טַעְמָא דִּידָךְ = My reasoning…your reasoning — a structured analytical debate