Menachot Daf 79 (מנחות דף ע״ט)
Daf: 79 | Amudim: 79a – 79b | Date: 29 Adar 5786
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (79a)
Segment 1
TYPE: ברייתא
R. Meir’s version: R. Eliezer and R. Yehoshua dispute about a blemished thanks offering
Hebrew/Aramaic:
שְׁחָטָהּ וְנִמְצֵאת בַּעֲלַת מוּם – רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: קָדַשׁ, רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר: לֹא קָדַשׁ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.
English Translation:
If one slaughtered the thanks offering and it was discovered that it is a blemished animal, Rabbi Eliezer says: The loaves were consecrated, and Rabbi Yehoshua says: The loaves were not consecrated. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir, consistent with the dispute appearing in the mishna.
קלאוד על הדף:
This segment opens a long baraita continuing from the previous daf, presenting R. Meir’s understanding of the famous dispute between R. Eliezer and R. Yehoshua. According to R. Meir, the Tannaim disagree about the case of a blemished animal: R. Eliezer holds the loaves were consecrated through slaughter despite the blemish, while R. Yehoshua holds they were not. This sets the stage for R. Yehuda’s alternative framing in the next segment.
Key Terms:
- בַּעֲלַת מוּם (Ba’alat mum) = A blemished animal, disqualified from being offered as a sacrifice
- קָדַשׁ (Kadash) = It was consecrated; here, whether the slaughter confers sanctity on the accompanying loaves
Segment 2
TYPE: ברייתא
R. Yehuda’s version: The dispute is about “outside its place” intent, not blemish
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: לֹא נֶחְלְקוּ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ עַל שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ וְנִמְצֵאת טְרֵיפָה – שֶׁלֹּא קָדַשׁ, וְעַל חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ – שֶׁקָּדַשׁ, וְעַל בַּעַל מוּם – שֶׁלֹּא קָדַשׁ. וְעַל מָה נֶחְלְקוּ? עַל חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ, שֶׁרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: קָדַשׁ, וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר: לֹא קָדַשׁ.
English Translation:
The baraita continues: Rabbi Yehuda said: Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua did not disagree with regard to a case where he slaughtered the thanks offering and it was discovered that it is a tereifa, as all agree that it was not consecrated; and they did not disagree with regard to a case where he slaughtered the thanks offering with the intent to partake of it or to burn the sacrificial portions beyond its designated time, as all agree that it was consecrated; and they did not disagree with regard to a case where he slaughtered the thanks offering and it was discovered that it is a blemished animal, as all agree that it was not consecrated. And with regard to what case did they disagree? They disagree with regard to a case where he slaughtered the thanks offering with the intent to partake of it or to burn the sacrificial portions outside its designated area, as Rabbi Eliezer says: It was consecrated, and Rabbi Yehoshua says: It was not consecrated.
קלאוד על הדף:
R. Yehuda presents a fundamentally different map of the dispute. He agrees with R. Meir on the undisputed cases (tereifa = not consecrated; beyond its time = consecrated; blemished = not consecrated) but identifies a different point of contention. According to R. Yehuda, the dispute centers on “outside its place” (hutz li-mkomo) intent — where the priest intends to eat or burn the offering in the wrong location. This is a crucial distinction: R. Meir places the blemish case in dispute, while R. Yehuda places the location-intent case in dispute.
Key Terms:
- חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ (Hutz li-zmano) = Beyond its designated time; intent to consume or burn the offering after its permitted timeframe, which renders it piggul
- חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ (Hutz li-mkomo) = Outside its designated area; intent to consume or burn the offering in the wrong place
Segment 3
TYPE: ברייתא
R. Eliezer’s reasoning: “Outside its place” is like “beyond its time” — both are intent-based
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: הוֹאִיל וְחוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ פָּסוּל, וְחוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ פָּסוּל, מָה חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ – קָדַשׁ, אַף חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ – קָדַשׁ. אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: הוֹאִיל וְחוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ פָּסוּל, וּבַעַל מוּם פָּסוּל, מָה בַּעַל מוּם – לֹא קָדַשׁ, אַף חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ – לֹא קָדַשׁ.
English Translation:
The baraita continues: In explanation of his opinion, Rabbi Eliezer said: Since an offering slaughtered with intent to partake of it beyond its designated time is disqualified and an offering slaughtered with intent to partake of it outside its designated area is disqualified, it is reasonable that just as in the case of intent to partake of it beyond its time the loaves were consecrated, so too in the case of intent to partake of it outside its area the loaves were consecrated. Rabbi Yehoshua said: Since an offering slaughtered with intent to partake of it outside its designated area is disqualified and an offering discovered to be a blemished animal is disqualified, it is reasonable that just as in the case of a blemished animal the loaves were not consecrated, so too in the case of intent to partake of it outside its area the loaves were not consecrated.
קלאוד על הדף:
The two Tannaim now present their competing analogies. R. Eliezer groups “outside its place” with “beyond its time” — both are disqualifications caused by improper intent (machshava), and since “beyond its time” consecrates the loaves, so should “outside its place.” R. Yehoshua groups “outside its place” with blemish — both disqualify the offering, and since a blemish does not consecrate the loaves, neither should “outside its place.” This is a classic Talmudic impasse: the same case can be compared to either of two precedents depending on which shared characteristics one emphasizes.
Key Terms:
- פְּסוּל מַחְשָׁבָה (P’sul machshava) = Disqualification due to improper intent
- פְּסוּל הַגּוּף (P’sul ha-guf) = Disqualification of the physical body of the offering
Segment 4
TYPE: ברייתא
R. Eliezer proposes to determine which analogy is correct
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: אֲנִי דִּמִּיתִיהוּ לְחוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, וְאַתָּה דִּמִּיתוֹ לְבַעַל מוּם, נִרְאֶה לְמִי דּוֹמֶה – אִם דּוֹמֶה לְחוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, נְדוּנֶנּוּ מֵחוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, אִם דּוֹמֶה לְבַעַל מוּם, נְדוּנֶנּוּ מִבַּעַל מוּם.
English Translation:
Rabbi Eliezer said to him: I compared an offering slaughtered with intent to partake of it outside its designated area to an offering slaughtered with intent to partake of it beyond its designated time, and you compared it to an offering discovered to be a blemished animal. Let us consider to which it is similar. If it is similar to an offering slaughtered with intent to partake of it beyond its designated time, we will deduce its halakha from that of an offering slaughtered with intent to partake of it beyond its designated time. If it is similar to an offering discovered to be a blemished animal, we will deduce its halakha from that of an offering discovered to be a blemished animal.
קלאוד על הדף:
R. Eliezer proposes a methodical resolution: rather than simply asserting our respective analogies, let us objectively determine which comparison is more apt. This is the standard Talmudic approach to resolving competing binyanim (analogical constructions): examine the shared characteristics between the subject and each potential source, and determine which comparison has more features in common. R. Eliezer is confident this examination will favor his position, as the next segment shows.
Key Terms:
- נִרְאֶה לְמִי דּוֹמֶה = “Let us see to which it is similar” — the standard formula for adjudicating competing analogies
Segment 5
TYPE: ברייתא
R. Eliezer argues: Intent-based disqualifications should be derived from each other
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הִתְחִיל רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר לָדוּן: דָּנִין פְּסוּל מַחְשָׁבָה מִפְּסוּל מַחְשָׁבָה, וְאֵין דָּנִין פְּסוּל מַחְשָׁבָה מִפְּסוּל הַגּוּף.
English Translation:
Rabbi Eliezer began to reason: We deduce the halakha with regard to a disqualification due to improper intention from that of a disqualification due to an improper intention, i.e., the halakha with regard to one who slaughters the animal with intent to partake of it outside its designated area should be deduced from the halakha with regard to one who slaughters it with the intent to partake of it outside its designated time. And we do not deduce the halakha with regard to a disqualification due to improper intention from that of a disqualification due to a blemish in the physical body of the offering.
קלאוד על הדף:
R. Eliezer’s argument is elegant in its simplicity: disqualifications should be classified by their nature — intent-based versus physical. Since “outside its place” and “beyond its time” are both intent-based (p’sul machshava), while blemish is a physical defect (p’sul ha-guf), the correct analogy is between the two intent-based cases. This principle — that like should be derived from like — is a fundamental hermeneutical axiom in Talmudic reasoning.
Key Terms:
- דָּנִין (Danin) = We derive/deduce — the verb for drawing halakhic conclusions by analogy
Segment 6
TYPE: ברייתא
R. Yehoshua’s counter: Compare cases without karet, and “not for its sake” proves his point
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הִתְחִיל רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ לָדוּן: דָּנִין פְּסוּל שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ כָּרֵת, מִפְּסוּל שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ כָּרֵת, וְאַל יוֹכִיחַ חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, שֶׁפְּסוּל שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ כָּרֵת. וְעוֹד, נְדוּנֶנּוּ מִשֶּׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ, שֶׁפְּסוּל מַחְשָׁבָה וְאֵין בּוֹ כָּרֵת.
English Translation:
Rabbi Yehoshua began to reason to the contrary: We deduce the halakha with regard to a disqualification that does not include liability for excision from the World-to-Come [karet], i.e., an offering slaughtered with intent to partake of it outside its designated area, from that of a disqualification that does not include liability for karet, i.e., an offering discovered to be a blemished animal. And the halakha with regard to an offering slaughtered with intent to partake of it beyond its designated time should not be brought as proof, as it is a disqualification that includes liability for karet. And furthermore, even according to Rabbi Eliezer, who says that we deduce the halakha from a disqualification due to improper intention, let us deduce the halakha from that of an offering slaughtered not for its sake, as it is a disqualification due to improper intention and it also does not include liability for karet, and the loaves of such an offering were not consecrated.
קלאוד על הדף:
R. Yehoshua delivers a devastating two-pronged counter-argument. First, he proposes a different classificatory principle: the severity of the disqualification. “Outside its place” does not carry karet, and neither does blemish — so these two should be grouped together. “Beyond its time” carries karet, making it a categorically different kind of disqualification. Second, and more powerfully, R. Yehoshua finds an intent-based disqualification that supports his position: “not for its sake” (shelo lishmo) is caused by improper intent (satisfying R. Eliezer’s criterion) and does not carry karet (satisfying R. Yehoshua’s criterion), and its loaves are not consecrated. This undermines R. Eliezer’s position from within his own framework.
Key Terms:
- כָּרֵת (Karet) = Excision, the most severe divine punishment for certain intentional transgressions
- שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ (Shelo lishmo) = Not for its sake; slaughtering an offering with the intent that it serve as a different type of offering
Segment 7
TYPE: ברייתא
R. Eliezer falls silent — conceding to R. Yehoshua
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְשָׁתַק רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר.
English Translation:
The baraita concludes: And Rabbi Eliezer was silent, conceding to Rabbi Yehoshua. In any event, it is clear in the baraita that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.
קלאוד על הדף:
R. Eliezer’s silence is a dramatic Talmudic moment. The “not for its sake” argument was the decisive blow: it simultaneously met R. Eliezer’s own criterion (intent-based) and R. Yehoshua’s (no karet), yet its loaves were not consecrated. R. Eliezer had no response. This concession will have far-reaching implications in the next sugya, where the Gemara applies this dispute to the question of whether disqualified offerings that ascended the altar must descend.
Key Terms:
- וְשָׁתַק (V’shatak) = And he was silent — in Talmudic discourse, silence indicates concession
Segment 8
TYPE: קושיא
Gemara challenges R. Meir: Why is tereifa different from blemish?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר, מַאי שְׁנָא שְׁחָטָהּ וְנִמְצֵאת טְרֵיפָה, דְּהָוֵי פְּסוּלוֹ קוֹדֶם שְׁחִיטָה, וּמַאי שְׁנָא שְׁחָטָהּ וְנִמְצֵאת בַּעֲלַת מוּם, דְּלָא הָוֵי פְּסוּלוֹ קוֹדֶם שְׁחִיטָה?
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that if the thanks offering was slaughtered and discovered to be a tereifa the loaves were not consecrated, but if it was discovered to be a blemished animal Rabbi Eliezer holds that the loaves were consecrated, what is different if he slaughtered it and it was discovered to be a tereifa such that it is considered a case where its disqualification precedes its slaughter, and the loaves were not consecrated; and what is different if he slaughtered it and it was discovered to be a blemished animal such that it is not considered a case where its disqualification precedes its slaughter, and the loaves were consecrated according to Rabbi Eliezer?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara probes an apparent inconsistency in R. Meir’s position. Both tereifa and blemish are physical disqualifications discovered after slaughter — why should one (tereifa) prevent the loaves from being consecrated while the other (blemish) allows it according to R. Eliezer? The distinction must lie in when the disqualification took effect: a tereifa condition existed before slaughter (the animal was always fatally defective), while the blemish in question may have been of a type where slaughter is still partially effective.
Key Terms:
- טְרֵיפָה (Tereifa) = An animal with a fatal organic defect that would have died within twelve months
- פְּסוּלוֹ קוֹדֶם שְׁחִיטָה (P’sulo kodem sh’hita) = Its disqualification precedes its slaughter
Segment 9
TYPE: תירוץ
Answer: The blemish is dukin she-ba-ayin (corneal spots) per R. Akiva
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בְּדוּקִּין שֶׁבָּעַיִן, וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, דְּאָמַר: אִם עָלוּ לֹא יֵרְדוּ. וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: כִּי אָמַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אִם עָלוּ לֹא יֵרְדוּ – בִּפְסוּלָא דְּגוּפֵיהּ, אֲבָל לְקַדּוֹשֵׁי לֶחֶם – לָא.
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: Rabbi Meir is referring to a blemish on the cornea of the eye, and his ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who said with regard to this type of blemish: Although animals with such a blemish are disqualified as an offering ab initio, if they ascended the altar they shall not descend, and they are sacrificed on the altar. The Gemara adds: And Rabbi Yehoshua, who holds that if the animal is discovered to be blemished the loaves are not consecrated, says: When Rabbi Akiva said that if they ascended the altar, they shall not descend, he was referring to the disqualification of the offering itself, i.e., that once it ascended it shall not descend. But with regard to the consecration of the loaves through the slaughter of such an animal, he did not say this.
קלאוד על הדף:
The resolution is precise: R. Meir refers to a specific type of blemish — dukin she-ba-ayin (corneal spots) — which R. Akiva treats with unusual leniency. Although such animals may not be offered ab initio, if they are placed on the altar they need not be removed. R. Eliezer extends this leniency to the consecration of loaves, while R. Yehoshua limits R. Akiva’s rule strictly to the offering itself on the altar, not to the collateral effect of consecrating accompanying loaves. This demonstrates how a narrow technical ruling (about corneal blemishes) generates a broader debate about the scope of altar sanctity.
Key Terms:
- דוּקִּין שֶׁבָּעַיִן (Dukin she-ba-ayin) = Corneal spots/membrane on the eye, a minor blemish with unique halakhic status
- אִם עָלוּ לֹא יֵרְדוּ (Im alu lo yerdu) = If they ascended [the altar], they shall not descend — R. Akiva’s principle
Segment 10
TYPE: מימרא
Dispute between Rabba and Rava: Does “outside its place” intent cause descent from the altar?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִיתְּמַר: חַטָּאת שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ חוּץ לִזְמַנָּהּ, אִם עָלְתָה – לֹא תֵּרֵד. חוּץ לִמְקוֹמָהּ, רָבָא אָמַר: תֵּרֵד, רַבָּה אָמַר: לֹא תֵּרֵד.
English Translation:
§ The Gemara continues to discuss the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua in the baraita: It was stated: With regard to a sin offering that one slaughtered with intent to partake of it beyond its designated time, if it ascended the altar it shall not descend. If one slaughtered it with intent to partake of it outside its designated area, Rava says: It shall descend and shall not be burned, and Rabba says: It shall not descend.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara now applies the Tannaitic dispute to a practical Amoraic question about altar law. Everyone agrees that “beyond its time” intent does not cause the offering to descend from the altar once placed there. The dispute concerns “outside its place” intent: Rava says it must descend (i.e., this disqualification is more severe — closer to blemish), while Rabba says it need not descend (closer to “beyond its time”). This directly mirrors the R. Eliezer / R. Yehoshua debate about the loaves, now transferred to the question of altar descent.
Key Terms:
- תֵּרֵד / לֹא תֵּרֵד (Tered / Lo tered) = It shall descend / It shall not descend — whether a disqualified offering placed on the altar must be removed
Segment 11
TYPE: גמרא
Rava follows R. Yehoshua; Rabba follows R. Eliezer
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רָבָא כְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ, וְרַבָּה כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר.
English Translation:
The Gemara suggests: Rava holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who deduces the halakha with regard to a thanks offering that was slaughtered with intent to partake of it outside its designated area from that of an offering discovered to have a blemish. Accordingly, just as a blemished sin offering descends from the altar even if it has already ascended, so too a sin offering that was slaughtered with intent to partake of it outside its designated area descends. And Rabba holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who deduces the halakha with regard to a thanks offering that was slaughtered with intent to partake of it outside its designated area from that of an offering that was slaughtered with intent to partake of it beyond its designated time. Accordingly, just as a sin offering that was slaughtered with intent to partake of it beyond its designated time does not descend from the altar, so too a sin offering that was slaughtered with intent to partake of it outside its designated area does not descend.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara makes explicit the alignment between the Amoraic and Tannaitic positions. Rava, who says the offering descends, follows R. Yehoshua’s logic: “outside its place” is comparable to blemish (a severe physical disqualification that even the altar cannot sanctify). Rabba, who says it does not descend, follows R. Eliezer’s logic: “outside its place” is comparable to “beyond its time” (both intent-based, and the altar accepts them). The Tannaitic theoretical debate now has practical Amoraic consequences.
Key Terms:
- כְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ / כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר = In accordance with R. Yehoshua / R. Eliezer — standard formula showing Amoraic-Tannaitic alignment
Segment 12
TYPE: גמרא
First version: Rabba retracts in favor of Rava
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וַהֲדַר בֵּיהּ רַבָּה לְגַבֵּיהּ דְּרָבָא, מִדַּהֲדַר בֵּיהּ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר לְגַבֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ.
English Translation:
And Rabba retracted his opinion in favor of the opinion of Rava and ruled that a sin offering slaughtered with intent to partake of it outside its designated area descends from the altar, since Rabbi Eliezer retracted his opinion in favor of the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, as the baraita teaches that he was silent and accepted the reasoning of Rabbi Yehoshua. Accordingly, the halakha with regard to an animal slaughtered with intent to partake of it outside its designated area should be deduced from that of an offering discovered to have a blemish.
קלאוד על הדף:
In the first version of the tradition, Rabba follows through on the logical implication of R. Eliezer’s concession. Since R. Eliezer was silent (conceding to R. Yehoshua), and Rabba’s position was aligned with R. Eliezer, Rabba similarly retracts. This is a striking example of how a Tannaitic concession can resolve an Amoraic dispute centuries later: the chain of reasoning flows from R. Eliezer’s silence to Rabba’s retraction.
Key Terms:
- וַהֲדַר בֵּיהּ (V’hadar bei) = And he retracted — indicating that a sage changed his position
Segment 13
TYPE: גמרא
Second version: Rabba does NOT retract — the “not for its sake” argument does not apply to altar descent
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: אַף עַל גַּב דַּהֲדַר בֵּיהּ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר לְגַבֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ, רַבָּה לְגַבֵּיהּ דְּרָבָא לָא הֲדַר בֵּיהּ. הָתָם הוּא דְּקָאָמַר לֵיהּ: נְדוּנֶנּוּ מִשֶּׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ, אֲבָל הָכָא, אִי דָּיְינַתְּ לֵיהּ מִשֶּׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ – אִם עָלְתָה לֹא תֵּרֵד.
English Translation:
And there are those who say: Even though Rabbi Eliezer retracted his opinion in favor of the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, Rabba did not retract his opinion in favor of the opinion of Rava, because there, with regard to the consecration of the loaves of the thanks offering, Rabbi Eliezer conceded to Rabbi Yehoshua because Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: Let us deduce its halakha from that of an offering slaughtered not for its sake. But here, if you deduce its halakha from that of an offering slaughtered not for its sake, then the halakha should be that if it ascended the altar it shall not descend.
קלאוד על הדף:
The second version preserves Rabba’s original position through a brilliant distinction. R. Eliezer conceded only because R. Yehoshua’s clinching argument was from “not for its sake” — which does not consecrate loaves. But in the context of altar descent, “not for its sake” actually supports Rabba’s position, because an offering slaughtered not for its sake that ascends the altar does NOT descend! The very argument that defeated R. Eliezer on loaves reinforces Rabba on descent. This shows that the same analogy can yield opposite results depending on the specific halakhic question being asked.
Key Terms:
- אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי (Ikka d’amri) = There are those who say — introducing an alternative version of an Amoraic tradition
Segment 14
TYPE: גמרא
Rav Pappa: Why list the ram of inauguration instead of the nazirite’s ram?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
שְׁחָטָהּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ [וְכוּ׳]. אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: שְׁבַק תַּנָּא דִידַן אֵיל נָזִיר דִּשְׁכִיחַ, וְנָקֵיט אֵיל הַמִּילּוּאִים? וְתַנָּא דִּידַן – עִיקַּר מִילְּתָא נָקֵט.
English Translation:
§ The mishna teaches: If one slaughtered the thanks offering not for its sake, and likewise, if one slaughtered the ram of inauguration not for its sake, and likewise, if one slaughtered the communal peace offering of two sheep that accompany the two loaves on Shavuot not for their sake, the loaves were not consecrated. Rav Pappa said in bewilderment: Why does the tanna of our mishna omit the case of the loaves of the nazirite’s ram, which is common and is also not consecrated if the ram was slaughtered not for its sake, and teach instead the ram of the inauguration of the Tabernacle, which was brought only by the Jewish people in the wilderness? The Gemara responds: And what is the reasoning of the tanna of our mishna? He taught the ram of the inauguration because it was the primary matter, i.e., it was the first offering to be brought with loaves.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Pappa raises a pedagogical question: the mishna lists the ram of inauguration (eil ha-milu’im), a one-time wilderness offering, rather than the nazirite’s ram (eil nazir), which is a common, ongoing obligation. The answer is instructive about Tannaitic methodology: the mishna teaches the “primary case” (ikkar milta) — the historical first. The inauguration ram was the first offering ever accompanied by loaves, making it the foundational precedent even if it is no longer practiced.
Key Terms:
- אֵיל נָזִיר (Eil nazir) = The nazirite’s ram, offered with loaves when a nazirite completes his vow
- אֵיל הַמִּילּוּאִים (Eil ha-milu’im) = The ram of inauguration, offered during the dedication of the Tabernacle
Segment 15
TYPE: משנה
New mishna: Libations sanctified in a vessel but the offering found unfit
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְנִי׳ הַנְּסָכִים שֶׁקָּדְשׁוּ בִּכְלִי וְנִמְצָא זֶבַח פָּסוּל, אִם יֵשׁ זֶבַח אַחֵר – יַקְרִיבוּ עִמּוֹ, וְאִם לָאו – יִפָּסְלוּ בְּלִינָה.
English Translation:
MISHNA: In a case where the libations that accompany the offerings were sanctified in a service vessel when the animal was slaughtered and the offering was discovered to be unfit, if there is another offering that was slaughtered and requires libations, the libations should be sacrificed with that offering; and if not, they should be disqualified by being left overnight, and then burned.
קלאוד על הדף:
This new mishna introduces a practical Temple-logistics problem: what happens when libations (wine and flour offerings that accompany animal sacrifices) have already been sanctified in a sacred vessel, but the animal offering they were meant to accompany turns out to be disqualified? The mishna gives two options: (1) if another valid offering is available, the libations accompany it instead; (2) if not, the libations are left overnight to become disqualified, then burned. This teaches that sanctified libations cannot simply be redeemed or returned to non-sacred status.
Key Terms:
- נְסָכִים (Nesakhim) = Libations — wine and flour offerings that accompany animal sacrifices on the altar
- לִינָה (Lina) = Remaining overnight — sacred items left past dawn become disqualified
Segment 16
TYPE: גמרא
Ze’eiri: Libations are sanctified only upon slaughter of the offering
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר זְעֵירִי: אֵין הַנְּסָכִים מִתְקַדְּשִׁין אֶלָּא בִּשְׁחִיטַת הַזֶּבַח. מַאי טַעְמָא? אָמַר קְרָא: ״זֶבַח וּנְסָכִים״.
English Translation:
GEMARA: With regard to statement of the mishna concerning a case where the libations of an animal offering were consecrated and the animal was then discovered to be unfit, Ze’eiri says: Libations are sanctified only upon the slaughter of the offering. What is the reason for this? The verse states: “To bring an offering made by fire unto the Lord, a burnt offering, and a meal offering, a sacrifice, and libations, each on its own day” (Leviticus 23:37), indicating that the libations complement the offering and are consecrated only upon its slaughter.
קלאוד על הדף:
Ze’eiri establishes an important principle: libations do not acquire full sanctity merely from being placed in a service vessel — they become fully sanctified only at the moment the animal is slaughtered. This is derived from the verse linking “sacrifice and libations” (zevah u-nesakim), which indicates their sanctity depends on the offering they accompany. This has a practical consequence: if the vessel sanctified them before slaughter, their sanctity is incomplete, and their status becomes complicated if the offering is subsequently disqualified.
Key Terms:
- זֶבַח וּנְסָכִים (Zevah u-nesakim) = Sacrifice and libations — the biblical pairing indicating their interdependence
- מִתְקַדְּשִׁין (Mitkaddshin) = Become sanctified — acquire full sacred status
Segment 17
TYPE: קושיא
Challenge to Ze’eiri from the mishna
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תְּנַן: הַנְּסָכִים שֶׁקָּדְשׁוּ בִּכְלִי וְנִמְצָא זֶבַח פָּסוּל – אִם יֵשׁ זֶבַח אַחֵר, יִקְרְבוּ עִמּוֹ; וְאִם לָאו – יִפָּסְלוּ בְּלִינָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara poses a difficulty to the statement of Ze’eiri from that which we learned in the mishna: In a case where the libations were sanctified in a service vessel when the animal was slaughtered and the offering was discovered to be unfit, if there is another offering that was slaughtered and requires libations, the libations should be sacrificed with that offering; and if not, they should be disqualified by being left overnight, and then burned.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara challenges Ze’eiri: if libations are only sanctified upon slaughter, and the offering was discovered to be unfit, then the slaughter was defective and the libations should never have been sanctified at all. If they were never sanctified, why must they be left overnight to be disqualified? They should simply be non-sacred! The fact that the mishna requires the lina procedure implies the libations did acquire some level of sanctity independent of the slaughter, seemingly contradicting Ze’eiri.
Key Terms:
- תְּנַן (Tenan) = We learned in a mishna — introducing a challenge from authoritative Mishnaic text
Segment 18
TYPE: תירוץ
Resolution: The offering became unfit through blood-sprinkling, not slaughter
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַאי לָאו דְּאִיפְּסִיל בִּשְׁחִיטָה? לָא, דְּאִיפְּסִיל בִּזְרִיקָה.
English Translation:
What, is it not so that the mishna is referring to a case where the offering became unfit through its slaughter, and consequently the libations were not sanctified by the slaughter of the offering? Why, then, must the libations be left overnight in order to disqualify them? Evidently, the libations are sanctified being placed in a service vessel and not upon the slaughter of the offering, in contradiction to the statement of Ze’eiri. The Gemara rejects this: No, the mishna is referring to an offering that became unfit through the sprinkling of the blood; the libations were sanctified upon the slaughter of the offering, and therefore they must be disqualified by being left overnight.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara saves Ze’eiri by reinterpreting the mishna: the offering did not become unfit at the moment of slaughter but rather later, during the blood-sprinkling (zerika) phase. Since the slaughter itself was valid, the libations were properly sanctified at that point. The subsequent disqualification during sprinkling left the libations in limbo — already sanctified but without a valid offering to accompany. Hence the need for lina to formally disqualify them.
Key Terms:
- זְרִיקָה (Zerika) = The sprinkling/casting of the blood on the altar — one of the four essential sacrificial rites
Segment 19
TYPE: גמרא
According to whom? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi — two permitting factors can each operate independently
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כְּמַאן? כְּרַבִּי, דְּאָמַר: שְׁנֵי דְּבָרִים הַמַּתִּירִין מַעֲלִין זֶה בְּלֹא זֶה.
English Translation:
The Gemara seeks to clarify: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who said: If an offering has two factors that permit it for consumption or for sacrifice, they can each elevate it to sanctified status without the other. Accordingly, although the slaughter of the animal and the sprinkling of its blood are both permitting factors for the libations, the libations were sanctified through the slaughter of the animal, despite the fact that the animal became unfit through the sprinkling of its blood.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara identifies the mishna’s underlying Tannaitic position: it follows Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi (simply called “Rabbi”), who holds that when an offering has two “permitting factors” (matirin) — here, slaughter and blood-sprinkling — each one independently confers sanctity. So even though the sprinkling went wrong, the slaughter alone was sufficient to sanctify the libations. This is a significant principle in sacrificial law: it means the failure of one step does not retroactively undo the sanctifying effect of a prior step.
Key Terms:
- שְׁנֵי דְּבָרִים הַמַּתִּירִין (Shnei devarim ha-mattirin) = Two permitting factors — the principle that each independently confers sanctity
- רַבִּי (Rabbi) = Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, the compiler of the Mishna
Segment 20
TYPE: תירוץ
Alternative: Even R. Elazar b. R. Shimon — blood collected but spilled, treated as if sprinkled
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – כְּגוֹן שֶׁקִּיבֵּל דָּמָן בְּכוֹס וְנִשְׁפַּךְ.
English Translation:
The Gemara rejects this: Even if you say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and holds that both permitting factors must be performed in order to confer sanctity upon the libations, the mishna can still be explained as follows: Here, we are dealing with a case where the priest collected its blood in the cup for the purpose of sprinkling it on the altar, but the blood spilled out of the cup and could not be sprinkled. Nevertheless, the libations were sanctified, as the blood was fit for sprinkling upon the altar.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara offers an alternative explanation that works even according to R. Elazar b. R. Shimon, who requires both permitting factors. The case is narrowed to one where the blood was properly collected in a sacred vessel but then accidentally spilled before sprinkling. Although the sprinkling never occurred, the blood was fit to be sprinkled, and according to R. Shimon’s principle (elaborated on the next amud), something that “stands to be sprinkled is considered as if sprinkled.” This elegant resolution harmonizes the mishna with both Tannaitic opinions.
Key Terms:
- קִיבֵּל דָּמָן בְּכוֹס (Kibbel daman b’kos) = Collected their blood in a cup — the proper procedure for receiving sacrificial blood
- נִשְׁפַּךְ (Nishpakh) = It spilled — the blood became unavailable for sprinkling
Amud Bet (79b)
Segment 1
TYPE: גמרא
R. Shimon’s principle: What stands to be sprinkled is considered as if sprinkled
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן סָבַר לַהּ כְּוָותֵיהּ דַּאֲבוּהּ, דְּאָמַר: כׇּל הָעוֹמֵד לִזְרוֹק כְּזָרוּק דָּמֵי.
English Translation:
And Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds in accordance with the opinion of his father in this matter, as Rabbi Shimon said: Any blood of an offering that stands fit to be sprinkled upon the altar is considered as if it were already sprinkled. Accordingly, although the blood was spilled after it was collected in the cup and was not actually sprinkled, it is nevertheless considered as if it were sprinkled.
קלאוד על הדף:
This is one of R. Shimon’s most famous legal fictions: “kol ha-omed lizrok k’zaruk damei” — anything that stands ready to be sprinkled is treated as if it has already been sprinkled. This principle applies retroactive legal effect to the potential fulfillment of a rite. Since the blood was properly collected and was fit for sprinkling at one point, the fact that it accidentally spilled does not undo its legal significance. R. Elazar b. R. Shimon inherits this principle from his father, allowing the mishna to work even under his stricter view of permitting factors.
Key Terms:
- כׇּל הָעוֹמֵד לִזְרוֹק כְּזָרוּק דָּמֵי = Whatever stands fit to be sprinkled is considered as if already sprinkled — R. Shimon’s principle of legal fiction
Segment 2
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
How can libations be transferred? Rav Hisda: Oil cannot be transferred! R. Yannai: “Lev beit din matneh” — tacit court stipulation
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר מָר: אִם יֵשׁ זֶבַח אַחֵר יִקְרְבוּ עִמּוֹ, וְהָא אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: שֶׁמֶן שֶׁהִפְרִישׁוֹ לְשׁוּם מִנְחָה זוֹ – פָּסוּל לְשׁוּם מִנְחָה אַחֶרֶת! אָמַר רַבִּי יַנַּאי: לֵב בֵּית דִּין מַתְנֶה עֲלֵיהֶם, אִם הוּצְרְכוּ – הוּצְרְכוּ, וְאִם לָאו – יְהוּ לְזֶבַח אַחֵר.
English Translation:
§ The Master said in the mishna: If there is another offering that was slaughtered and requires libations, the libations should be sacrificed with that offering. The Gemara asks: But didn’t Rav Ḥisda say that oil that one separated for the sake of this one meal offering is unfit to be brought for the sake of another meal offering? Likewise, shouldn’t libations separated for one offering be unfit for sacrifice with another offering? Rabbi Yannai says: The court tacitly stipulates concerning the libations that if they were required for the offering for which they were separated, they were required and are brought with that offering. But if not, e.g., where the offering was disqualified, they should be brought with another offering.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara identifies a major problem: Rav Hisda ruled that oil designated for one offering cannot be used for another. How, then, can the mishna allow libations to be transferred to a different offering? R. Yannai introduces the groundbreaking concept of “lev beit din matneh” (the court tacitly stipulates): when the court initially sanctifies libations, there is an implicit condition that if the designated offering becomes unfit, the libations may accompany another offering. This silent stipulation prevents the libations from being irrevocably bound to one specific offering. The concept is remarkable — it posits that the court’s intention at the moment of sanctification includes a contingency plan.
Key Terms:
- לֵב בֵּית דִּין מַתְנֶה (Lev beit din matneh) = The court tacitly stipulates — an assumed conditional intention by the court regarding sacrificial items
- שֶׁמֶן (Shemen) = Oil — an integral component of meal offerings
Segment 3
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Why not stipulate about oil too? Because oil is part of the offering itself
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִי הָכִי, שֶׁמֶן נָמֵי? שֶׁמֶן גּוּפַהּ דְּמִנְחָה הוּא.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: If that is so, then shouldn’t it be that the court tacitly stipulates concerning the oil as well? The Gemara responds: The oil is part of the meal offering itself and cannot be brought for the sake of another meal offering, whereas the libations merely accompany the offering and are not an integral part of it.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara draws a critical distinction: oil is an integral component (gufah) of the meal offering — it is mixed into the flour and becomes part of the offering’s physical substance. Libations, by contrast, are external accompaniments — they complement the animal sacrifice but are not part of it. The court can stipulate about external accompaniments because they retain a degree of independence, but it cannot stipulate about an intrinsic ingredient because that ingredient is inseparable from the offering’s identity.
Key Terms:
- גּוּפַהּ דְּמִנְחָה (Gufah d’minha) = Part of the meal offering itself — an integral component that cannot be redirected
Segment 4
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Why not stipulate that libations become non-sacred? Decree: lest people say items leave sacred vessels to become hullin
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְלַיתְנוֹ עֲלֵיהֶן דְּנִיפְּקוּ לְחוּלִּין? גְּזֵירָה שֶׁמָּא יֹאמְרוּ: מוֹצִיאִין מִכְּלֵי שָׁרֵת לַחוֹל.
English Translation:
The Gemara challenges: If it is so that the court tacitly stipulates concerning the libations, then let the court tacitly stipulate concerning them that if the offering they are meant to accompany is disqualified, they shall emerge to non-sacred status altogether. The Gemara responds: It is a rabbinic decree that the court does not tacitly make this stipulation, lest people who are unaware of such a stipulation see that an item that was previously sanctified has become non-sacred, and they will mistakenly say: One may remove sanctified items from service vessels to become non-sacred.
קלאוד על הדף:
This is an elegant application of mar’it ayin reasoning in the Temple context. The simplest solution would be for the court to stipulate that if the offering fails, the libations revert to non-sacred (hullin) status. But the Sages rejected this option because of appearances: onlookers might see sanctified libations being “desanctified” and mistakenly conclude that any item placed in a sacred vessel can be removed and returned to ordinary status. This would undermine the fundamental principle that sacred vessels confer irreversible sanctity. So the libations must remain sacred — either offered with another sacrifice or left overnight for formal disqualification.
Key Terms:
- כְּלֵי שָׁרֵת (Klei sharet) = Service vessels — sacred Temple utensils that confer sanctity on their contents
- חוּלִּין (Hullin) = Non-sacred, ordinary items
Segment 5
TYPE: קושיא
Counter-objection: Won’t people say libations can be transferred between offerings?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הַשְׁתָּא נָמֵי, גְּזֵירָה שֶׁמָּא יֹאמְרוּ: נְסָכִים שֶׁהִפְרִישָׁן לְשׁוּם זֶבַח זֶה – כְּשֵׁרִין לְשׁוּם זֶבַח אַחֵר!
English Translation:
The Gemara objects: If the Sages did not tacitly make such a stipulation because they were concerned that people might mistakenly conclude that items that were already consecrated in service vessels can become non-sacred, then now as well, where the court tacitly stipulates that the libations should be sacrificed with another offering, let there be a rabbinic decree against such a stipulation, lest people say: Libations that one separated for the sake of one offering are fit for the sake of a different offering ab initio.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara presses the logic further: if we are worried about appearances, isn’t it equally problematic that people will see libations transferred from one offering to another and conclude that libations can always be freely transferred between offerings? This would be a misconception — normally, libations designated for one offering cannot be used for another (just as Rav Hisda ruled about oil). The Gemara needs to explain why the appearance problem is less severe in this case.
Key Terms:
- הַשְׁתָּא נָמֵי (Hashta nami) = Now as well — formula for pressing a logical parallel
Segment 6
TYPE: תירוץ
Mattitya b. Yehuda: Only when another offering was slaughtered at the same time
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָתָנֵי מַתִּתְיָה בֶּן יְהוּדָה, כְּגוֹן שֶׁהָיָה זֶבַח זָבוּחַ בְּאוֹתָהּ שָׁעָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: Mattitya ben Yehuda teaches that the mishna is referring specifically to a case where there was another offering that was slaughtered at the same time. In such a case, there is no concern that people will reach this mistaken conclusion, as one who sees that the libations are sacrificed immediately with the other offering will simply assume that they were separated for the sake of that offering from the outset.
קלאוד על הדף:
Mattitya b. Yehuda resolves the appearance problem by narrowing the mishna’s case: the transfer is only permitted when another offering is being slaughtered simultaneously. In that scenario, bystanders will naturally assume the libations were always intended for the second offering. There is no visual indication of a “transfer” at all. This is a precise calibration of the mar’it ayin concern: the timing must be such that no observer could distinguish the transferred libations from originally designated ones.
Key Terms:
- מַתִּתְיָה בֶּן יְהוּדָה (Mattitya ben Yehuda) = A Tanna who adds a limiting condition to the mishna’s ruling
- זָבוּחַ בְּאוֹתָהּ שָׁעָה = Slaughtered at the same time
Segment 7
TYPE: קושיא
If limited to simultaneous slaughter, the mishna’s structure should be different
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲבָל אֵין זֶבַח זָבוּחַ בְּאוֹתָהּ שָׁעָה, מַאי? נִפְסָל בְּלִינָה? אַדְּתָנֵי סֵיפָא: אִם לָאו יִפָּסְלוּ בְּלִינָה, לִיפְלוֹג וְלִיתְנֵי בְּדִידַהּ: בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? שֶׁהָיָה זֶבַח זָבוּחַ בְּאוֹתָהּ שָׁעָה, אֲבָל אֵין זֶבַח זָבוּחַ בְּאוֹתָהּ שָׁעָה – לֹא.
English Translation:
The Gemara objects to this: According to the explanation of Mattitya ben Yehuda, it can be inferred from the mishna that if there is another offering that was slaughtered at the same time, then the libations are sacrificed with that offering; but if there is not another offering that was slaughtered at the same time, then what should be done with the libations? They should be disqualified by being left overnight. If so, rather than teaching in the latter clause of the mishna: And if there is not another offering that requires libations, they should be disqualified by being left overnight; let the tanna distinguish and teach the distinction within the case itself as follows: In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where there was another offering that was slaughtered at the same time. But if there is not another offering that was slaughtered at the same time, the libations are not sacrificed with another offering.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara raises a structural objection to Mattitya b. Yehuda’s reading. If the mishna’s key distinction is about simultaneous slaughter, the mishna should have stated this distinction within its first clause (using the “bameh devarim amurim” formula) rather than adding a separate clause about lina. The current structure of the mishna — first clause about having another offering, second clause about not having one — suggests a different distinction than the one Mattitya proposes.
Key Terms:
- לִיפְלוֹג וְלִיתְנֵי בְּדִידַהּ = Let the tanna distinguish and teach within [the first clause] itself — a Talmudic formula challenging the structure of a teaching
Segment 8
TYPE: תירוץ
Resolution: The mishna IS saying this — reread as “when the offering was slaughtered at the same time”
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָכִי נָמֵי קָא אָמַר: בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? שֶׁהָיָה זֶבַח זָבוּחַ בְּאוֹתָהּ שָׁעָה, אֲבָל אֵין זֶבַח זָבוּחַ בְּאוֹתָהּ שָׁעָה – נַעֲשָׂה כְּמִי שֶׁנִּפְסְלוּ בְּלִינָה, וּפְסוּלִין.
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: That is also what the tanna of the mishna is saying: In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where there was another offering that was slaughtered at the same time. But if there is not another offering that was slaughtered at the same time, the libations are immediately considered as if they were disqualified by being left overnight, and they are disqualified.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara reinterprets the mishna’s structure to align with Mattitya b. Yehuda’s reading: the second clause (“if not, they are disqualified by lina”) is indeed explaining the first clause’s condition. When no other offering is slaughtered simultaneously, the libations are treated as if they were already disqualified by lina — they do not need to actually wait overnight; their status is immediately equivalent to overnight disqualification. This reinterpretation harmonizes the mishna’s language with Mattitya’s limitation about simultaneous slaughter.
Key Terms:
- נַעֲשָׂה כְּמִי שֶׁנִּפְסְלוּ (Na’aseh k’mi she-nifselu) = Treated as if they were disqualified — an immediate legal status change without waiting
Segment 9
TYPE: קושיא
Does R. Shimon accept “lev beit din matneh”?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּמִי אִית לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר לֵב בֵּית דִּין מַתְנֶה עֲלֵיהֶן?
English Translation:
The Gemara explained above that the mishna is also in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, and that he holds in accordance with the opinion of his father that any blood that stands fit to be sprinkled is considered as if it has been sprinkled. The Gemara also explained that the mishna allows for the sacrifice of the libations with another offering because the court tacitly stipulates that the libations should be brought with another offering if the first offering becomes disqualified. In light of this, the Gemara asks: But does Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, i.e., the father of Rabbi Elazar, accept the principle that the court tacitly stipulates concerning the libations?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara raises a potential contradiction. The previous discussion established that the mishna can follow R. Elazar b. R. Shimon (using R. Shimon’s “as if sprinkled” principle). But the mishna also relies on “lev beit din matneh” (the court’s tacit stipulation) to allow transferring the libations. Does R. Shimon actually accept this principle? The question is important because elsewhere R. Shimon seems to reject such stipulations, which would undermine the harmonization proposed above.
Key Terms:
- מִי אִית לֵיהּ (Mi it lei) = Does he hold this view? — a formula questioning whether a sage accepts a particular principle
Segment 10
TYPE: קושיא
Proof that R. Shimon rejects tacit stipulation: Daily offerings not needed cannot be redeemed
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהָא אָמַר רַב אִידִי בַּר אָבִין, אָמַר רַב עַמְרָם, אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: תְּמִידִין שֶׁלֹּא הוּצְרְכוּ לַצִּיבּוּר – לְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אֵין נִפְדִּין תְּמִימִים, לְדִבְרֵי חֲכָמִים נִפְדִּין תְּמִימִים.
English Translation:
But didn’t Rav Idi bar Avin say that Rav Amram said that Rabbi Yitzḥak said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to animals that were designated as daily offerings but that in the end were not needed for use by the public, and have inherent sanctity, how shall they be redeemed? According to the statement of Rabbi Shimon, they may not be redeemed as long as they are unblemished, since they retain the status of offerings. But according to the statement of the Rabbis, they may be redeemed even when they are unblemished, as the court initially stipulates that if they are not needed they will not assume the status of an offering. Since Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the Rabbis, it may be inferred that according to Rabbi Shimon, one does not say that the court tacitly stipulates concerning the offerings.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara brings powerful evidence that R. Shimon rejects “lev beit din matneh.” Regarding daily communal offerings (temidim) that were designated but ultimately not needed, R. Shimon rules they cannot be redeemed while unblemished — they retain their sacred status permanently. The Rabbis disagree, saying the court’s original stipulation allows redemption. Since R. Shimon opposes the Rabbis on this, he apparently does not accept the principle of tacit stipulation. This would undermine the reading of the mishna as consistent with R. Elazar b. R. Shimon.
Key Terms:
- תְּמִידִין (Temidim) = Daily communal offerings — the twice-daily burnt offerings
- נִפְדִּין תְּמִימִים (Nifdin temimim) = Redeemed while unblemished — normally, sacred animals can only be redeemed after developing a blemish
Segment 11
TYPE: תירוץ
Resolution: Daily offerings have an alternative (grazing); libations do not, so even R. Shimon accepts the stipulation
Hebrew/Aramaic:
שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּאִית לְהוּ תַּקַּנְתָּא בִּרְעִיָּיה.
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: In general, Rabbi Shimon holds that the court stipulates concerning them. And it is different there, in the case of the daily offerings, because they have an alternative arrangement through which their total loss may be avoided, as they may be left in the field to graze until they develop a blemish, at which point they may be sold. Since there is no arrangement for the libations save for sacrificing them with another offering, even Rabbi Shimon holds that the court stipulates concerning them.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara resolves the contradiction with a practical distinction. Daily offerings that are no longer needed have an alternative: they can be sent to graze until they develop a blemish, then be redeemed. Because this “exit strategy” exists, there is no urgent need for a tacit stipulation, and R. Shimon does not employ one. Libations, however, have no alternative — once sanctified, they cannot graze or develop blemishes. Their only options are being offered or being disqualified through lina. Because the situation is more desperate, even R. Shimon agrees the court must have stipulated from the outset. Necessity drives the legal fiction.
Key Terms:
- רְעִיָּה (Re’iyah) = Grazing — the process by which unneeded sacred animals are sent to pasture until they develop a blemish
- תַּקַּנְתָּא (Takanta) = An alternative remedy or arrangement
Segment 12
TYPE: משנה
New mishna: Offspring, substitute, and replacement of todah do not require loaves
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְנִי׳ וְלַד תּוֹדָה וּתְמוּרָתָהּ, הִפְרִישׁ תּוֹדָה וְאָבְדָה וְהִפְרִישׁ אַחֶרֶת תַּחְתֶּיהָ – אֵינָהּ טְעוּנָה לֶחֶם, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְהִקְרִיב עַל זֶבַח הַתּוֹדָה״ – הַתּוֹדָה טְעוּנָה לֶחֶם, וְלֹא וְלָדָהּ וְלֹא חִילּוּפָהּ וְלֹא תְּמוּרָתָהּ טְעוּנִין לֶחֶם.
English Translation:
MISHNA: With regard to the offspring of an animal designated as a thanks offering, or an animal that is its substitute; or in a case where one separated an animal as a thanks offering and it was lost and he separated another in its stead, and the first animal was then found, in all three cases, the second animal, i.e., the offspring, the substitute, or the replacement, is sacrificed, but it does not require the bringing of accompanying loaves. This is as it is stated: “If he sacrifices it for a thanks offering, then he shall sacrifice with the thanks offering unleavened cakes mingled with oil, and unleavened wafers spread with oil, and cakes mingled with oil, of fine flour poached” (Leviticus 7:12). The verse indicates that the initial thanks offering requires loaves, but neither its offspring, nor its replacement, nor its substitute requires loaves.
קלאוד על הדף:
This mishna addresses a fundamentally different question: what about derivative animals connected to a thanks offering? Three categories are listed: (1) offspring — if a todah animal gives birth, (2) substitute (temura) — if the owner tries to exchange the sanctity, and (3) replacement — if the original was lost and a new one designated. All three are offered as sacrifices, but none require the forty loaves. The derivation is from the definite article in “ha-todah” — THE thanks offering (the original), not its derivatives. This ensures that the elaborate bread requirement is limited to the primary obligation.
Key Terms:
- תְּמוּרָה (Temura) = Substitute — an animal onto which one attempted to transfer the sanctity of an existing offering
- חִילּוּפָהּ (Hilufah) = Its replacement — an animal designated after the original was lost
Segment 13
TYPE: ברייתא
Baraita: Deriving from multiple phrases — both animals are fit, but only one requires loaves
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גְּמָ׳ תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: מַהוּ אוֹמֵר ״תּוֹדָה יַקְרִיב״? ״אִם עַל תּוֹדָה יַקְרִיב״ – מִנַּיִן לְמַפְרִישׁ תּוֹדָתוֹ וְאָבְדָה, וְהִפְרִישׁ אַחֶרֶת תַּחְתֶּיהָ, וְנִמְצֵאת הָרִאשׁוֹנָה, וַהֲרֵי שְׁתֵּיהֶן עוֹמְדוֹת – מִנַּיִן שֶׁאֵיזֶה מֵהֶן שֶׁיִּרְצֶה יַקְרִיב וְלַחְמָהּ עִמָּהּ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״הַתּוֹדָה יַקְרִיב״.
English Translation:
GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: What is it that the verse teaches when it states: He sacrifices for a thanks offering? The verse states: If he sacrifices for a thanks offering. From where is it derived that with regard to one who separated an animal as his thanks offering and it was lost and he separated another in its stead, and the first animal was then found, and now they both stand fit to be sacrificed, from where is it derived that he may sacrifice whichever one of them he wishes, and its loaves are brought along with it? The verse states that he shall sacrifice the thanks offering, i.e., as long as he sacrifices some thanks offering.
קלאוד על הדף:
The baraita begins a detailed exegetical analysis of the thanks offering verses. The first question: when someone designated a todah, it was lost, he designated a replacement, and then the original was found, which one does he offer? The verse “todah yakriv” (he shall sacrifice the thanks offering) teaches that he may choose whichever one he wants — either animal can serve as the primary todah with its accompanying loaves. The definite article “ha-todah” indicates the one he actually chooses to offer.
Key Terms:
- יַקְרִיב (Yakriv) = He shall sacrifice — the verb form indicating active choice
Segment 14
TYPE: ברייתא
“He sacrifices it” — only one requires loaves; offspring/substitutes are included for sacrifice but excluded from loaves
Hebrew/Aramaic:
יָכוֹל שֶׁתְּהֵא שְׁנִיָּה טְעוּנָה לֶחֶם? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״יַקְרִיבֶנּוּ״ – אֶחָד וְלֹא שְׁנַיִם. אַחַר שֶׁרִיבָּה הַכָּתוּב וּמִיעֵט, מִנַּיִן לְרַבּוֹת וְלָדוֹת וַחֲלִיפוֹת וּתְמוּרוֹת לְהַקְרָבָה? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״אִם עַל תּוֹדָה״. יָכוֹל יְהוּ טְעוּנוֹת לֶחֶם? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״וְהִקְרִיב עַל זֶבַח הַתּוֹדָה״ – תּוֹדָה טְעוּנָה לֶחֶם, וְלֹא וְלָדָהּ וְלֹא חִילּוּפָהּ וְלֹא תְּמוּרָתָהּ טְעוּנִין לֶחֶם.
English Translation:
The baraita continues: One might have thought that the second animal also requires loaves to be brought with it. Therefore, the verse states: “He sacrifices it,” indicating that only one thanks offering requires loaves, but not two. Since the verse included the second animal as fit for sacrifice and excluded it from the requirement to bring loaves with it, from where is it derived that the verse also includes a thanks offering’s offspring, replacements, and substitutes as fit for sacrifice? From the fact that the verse states: “If for a thanks offering,” one might have thought that they would require loaves to be brought with them. Therefore, the verse states: “Then he shall sacrifice with the thanks offering,” indicating that the initial thanks offering itself requires loaves, but neither its offspring, nor its replacement, nor its substitute requires loaves.
קלאוד על הדף:
The baraita presents a multi-stage exegetical argument using the classic ribbui-u-mi’ut (inclusion and exclusion) method. First, “yakrivennu” (he shall sacrifice IT — singular) limits the loaves requirement to one animal. Then, “im al todah” includes offspring, substitutes, and replacements as valid for sacrifice. Finally, “al zevah ha-todah” (with the sacrifice of THE thanks offering) restricts the loaves to the original primary todah. The result is a nuanced rule: derivatives may be sacrificed, but only the primary todah requires the elaborate accompaniment of forty loaves.
Key Terms:
- רִיבָּה הַכָּתוּב וּמִיעֵט (Ribbah ha-katuv u-mi’et) = The verse included and excluded — a hermeneutical pattern of expansion followed by limitation
- יַקְרִיבֶנּוּ (Yakrivennu) = He shall sacrifice IT — the singular suffix indicating limitation to one offering
Segment 15
TYPE: מימרא
R. Yohanan via Rav Hanina: Only after atonement do derivatives not require loaves; before atonement, they do
Hebrew/Aramaic:
שְׁלַח רַב חֲנִינָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא לְאַחַר כַּפָּרָה, אֲבָל לִפְנֵי כַפָּרָה – טְעוּנִין לֶחֶם.
English Translation:
§ With regard to the offspring, substitute, and replacement of a thanks offering, the Gemara relates: Rav Ḥanina sent a letter from Eretz Yisrael to the Sages in Babylonia containing the following statement in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: The mishna taught that the offspring, replacement, and substitute do not require loaves only in a case where they were sacrificed after the owner achieved atonement, i.e., where the initial thanks offering was already sacrificed with its loaves; but if they were sacrificed before he achieved atonement, they require loaves.
קלאוד על הדף:
R. Yohanan introduces a critical temporal distinction that refines the mishna’s ruling. The exemption from loaves applies only after the owner has already achieved atonement by sacrificing the original todah with its loaves. If the owner has not yet achieved atonement (the original todah was not yet offered), then whichever derivative animal he offers functions as the primary todah and therefore requires loaves. This makes logical sense: the exemption exists because the owner’s obligation has already been fulfilled. Before fulfillment, any animal from the todah group that he offers must carry the full requirements.
Key Terms:
- כַּפָּרָה (Kappara) = Atonement — the fulfillment of the obligation through proper sacrifice
- שְׁלַח (Shalah) = He sent — indicating a tradition transmitted by letter from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia
Segment 16
TYPE: קושיא
Rav Amram’s challenge: What is novel in R. Yohanan’s ruling?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָוֵי בַּהּ רַב עַמְרָם: אַהֵיָיא? אִילֵּימָא אַחֲלִיפֵי תּוֹדַת חוֹבָה – אִי לִפְנֵי כַפָּרָה, תְּנֵינָא! אִי לְאַחַר כַּפָּרָה, תְּנֵינָא!
English Translation:
Rav Amram discussed this halakha sent in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan and asked: To which halakha in the mishna is this referring? If we say that Rabbi Yoḥanan is referring to the replacement for an obligatory thanks offering, then there is no novelty in his statement. If his intention is to teach that where the thanks offering was found before the owner achieved atonement with its replacement, the replacement requires loaves, we already learned this in the baraita, as it states: He may sacrifice whichever one of them he wishes, and its loaves are brought along with it. And if his intention is to teach that where the thanks offering was found after the owner achieved atonement with the replacement, the thanks offering does not require loaves, this too we already learned in the baraita, as it teaches that only the first offering requires loaves.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Amram raises a penetrating question about the novelty of R. Yohanan’s statement. If R. Yohanan is speaking about the replacement of an obligatory todah, both halves of his statement are already known from the baraita: (1) before atonement, the owner can offer whichever animal he chooses with loaves — already taught; (2) after atonement, the remaining animal does not require loaves — also already taught. So what is R. Yohanan adding? The daf ends mid-question, leaving the identification of R. Yohanan’s novel teaching for the next daf.
Key Terms:
- הָוֵי בַּהּ (Havei bah) = He discussed it / pondered it — a formula for raising a difficulty about a teaching
- תְּנֵינָא (Teneina) = We already learned this — indicating the statement lacks novelty