Keritot 3:9-10
משנה כריתות ג:ט-י
Seder: Kodashim | Tractate: Keritot | Chapter: 3
📖 Mishna
Mishna 3:9
משנה ג:ט
Hebrew:
וְעוֹד שְׁאָלָן רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא. הַשּׁוֹחֵט חֲמִשָּׁה זְבָחִים בַּחוּץ בְּהֶעְלֵם אֶחָד, מַהוּ. חַיָּב אַחַת עַל כֻּלָּם, אוֹ אַחַת עַל כָּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת. אָמְרוּ לוֹ, לֹא שָׁמָעְנוּ. אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ, שָׁמַעְתִּי בְאוֹכֵל מִזֶּבַח אֶחָד בַּחֲמִשָּׁה תַמְחוּיִין בְּהֶעְלֵם אֶחָד, שֶׁהוּא חַיָּב עַל כָּל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד מִשּׁוּם מְעִילָה, וְרוֹאֶה אֲנִי שֶׁהַדְּבָרִים קַל וָחֹמֶר. אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, לֹא כָךְ שְׁאָלָן רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא. אֶלָּא, בְּאוֹכֵל נוֹתָר מֵחֲמִשָּׁה זְבָחִים בְּהֶעְלֵם אֶחָד, מַהוּ. חַיָּב אַחַת עַל כֻּלָּן, אוֹ אַחַת עַל כָּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת. אָמְרוּ לוֹ, לֹא שָׁמָעְנוּ. אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ, שָׁמַעְתִּי בְאוֹכֵל מִזֶּבַח אֶחָד בַּחֲמִשָּׁה תַמְחוּיִים בְּהֶעְלֵם אֶחָד, שֶׁהוּא חַיָּב עַל כָּל אַחַת וְאַחַת מִשּׁוּם מְעִילָה, וְרוֹאֶה אֲנִי שֶׁהַדְּבָרִים קַל וָחֹמֶר. אָמַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, אִם הֲלָכָה, נְקַבֵּל. וְאִם לָדִין, יֵשׁ תְּשׁוּבָה. אָמַר לוֹ, הָשֵׁב. אָמַר לוֹ, לֹא, אִם אָמַרְתָּ בִמְעִילָה שֶׁעָשָׂה בָהּ אֶת הַמַּאֲכִיל כָּאוֹכֵל וְאֶת הַמְהַנֶּה כַּנֶּהֱנֶה, צֵרַף הַמְּעִילָה לִזְמָן מְרֻבֶּה, תֹּאמַר בְּנוֹתָר, שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ אַחַת מִכָּל אֵלּוּ:
English:
And furthermore, Rabbi Akiva asked Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua: With regard to one who unwittingly slaughters five offerings outside the Temple during one lapse of awareness, what is the halakha? Is he liable to bring five sin offerings, one for each and every act of slaughter, or is he liable to bring one sin offering for all the acts of slaughter? They said to Rabbi Akiva: We have not heard a ruling from our teachers in that specific case. Rabbi Yehoshua said: I have heard with regard to one who eats meat from one offering from five different pots in which they were prepared, during one lapse of awareness, that he is liable to bring five guilt offerings, which are for the meat prepared in each and every pot, due to misuse of consecrated property. And I consider that these matters can be derived from an a fortiori inference. Rabbi Shimon said: It was not that question that Rabbi Akiva asked them. Rather, it was with regard to one who eats notar from five offerings during one lapse of awareness. What is the halakha? Is he liable to bring one sin offering for all the offerings from which he ate notar, or is he liable to bring five sin offerings, one for each and every one of the offerings from which he ate notar? They said to Rabbi Akiva: We have not heard a ruling from our teachers in that specific case. Rabbi Yehoshua said: I have heard with regard to one who eats meat from one offering that was prepared in five different pots, during one lapse of awareness, that he is liable to bring separate guilt offerings for the meat prepared in each and every pot, due to misuse of consecrated property. And I consider that these matters can be derived from an a fortiori inference. Rabbi Akiva said to Rabbi Yehoshua: If you are reporting a halakha that you received from your teachers with regard to one who eats notar from five offerings, we will accept it, but if it is based merely on the a fortiori inference from misuse of consecrated property, there is a response that refutes the inference. Rabbi Yehoshua said to Rabbi Akiva: Respond. Rabbi Akiva said: And no; one cannot derive the halakha of notar through an a fortiori inference from misuse of consecrated property: If you said with regard to misuse of consecrated property that one is liable to bring five guilt offerings, perhaps that is because there are additional stringent elements unique to misuse. As, with regard to misuse, the Torah established that the status of one who feeds another person sacrificial meat is like that of one who eats sacrificial meat, and the status of one who gives benefit to another from consecrated property that is not food is like that of one who derives benefit himself, in that each is liable to bring a guilt offering for misuse. In addition, the Torah joined the misuse of consecrated property that was performed over an extended period, i.e., if one derived benefit worth half a peruta one day and half a peruta the next, he is liable to bring a guilt offering for misuse. Would you say the same with regard to notar, which has none of these halakhot?
Claude on the Mishna:
This mishna presents a sophisticated debate about whether me’ilah (misuse of sacred property) can serve as a precedent for notar (leftover sacrificial meat).
The question (two versions):
| According to | Question was about |
|---|---|
| First version | Slaughtering 5 offerings outside the Temple |
| Rabbi Shimon | Eating notar from 5 offerings |
Rabbi Yehoshua’s precedent: Someone who ate from ONE offering prepared in FIVE pots brings FIVE guilt offerings for me’ilah - one for each pot! So certainly five SEPARATE offerings should require five offerings.
Rabbi Akiva’s crucial distinction: “If it’s a received halacha (tradition), we accept it. If it’s just logic (kal vachomer), there’s a refutation.”
Why me’ilah is uniquely stringent:
| Feature | Me’ilah | Notar |
|---|---|---|
| Feeding others = eating | Yes | No |
| Giving benefit = deriving benefit | Yes | No |
| Combining over extended time | Yes | No |
The stringencies of me’ilah:
- Ha’ma’achil k’ocheil - If you FEED someone Temple property, YOU are liable as if you ate it yourself
- Ha’mehaneh k’nehene - If you give someone BENEFIT from hekdesh, YOU are liable
- Tzeruf l’zman merubeh - Half a peruta today + half a peruta tomorrow = combine for liability
Notar has NONE of these features. Therefore, we cannot derive its rules from me’ilah through kal vachomer - me’ilah may be uniquely stringent.
Key Terms:
- שׁוֹחֵט בַּחוּץ (shochet bachutz) = Slaughtering outside the Temple
- תַמְחוּיִין (tamchuyin) = Pots/dishes
- מְעִילָה (me’ilah) = Misuse of consecrated property
- הַמַּאֲכִיל כָּאוֹכֵל (ha’ma’achil k’ocheil) = One who feeds is like one who eats
- צֵרוּף (tzeruf) = Combining/joining
Mishna 3:10
משנה ג:י
Hebrew:
אָמַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, שָׁאַלְתִּי אֶת רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, הָעוֹשֶׂה מְלָאכוֹת הַרְבֵּה בְּשַׁבָּתוֹת הַרְבֵּה מֵעֵין מְלָאכָה אַחַת, בְּהֶעְלֵם אֶחָד, מַה הוּא. חַיָּב אַחַת עַל כֻּלָּן, אוֹ אַחַת עַל כָּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת. אָמַר לִי, חַיָּב עַל כָּל אַחַת וְאַחַת, מִקַּל וָחֹמֶר, וּמָה אִם הַנִּדָּה, שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ תּוֹצָאוֹת הַרְבֵּה וְחַטָּאוֹת הַרְבֵּה, חַיָּב עַל כָּל אַחַת וְאַחַת, שַׁבָּת, שֶׁיֶּשׁ בָּהּ תּוֹצָאוֹת הַרְבֵּה וְחַטָּאוֹת הַרְבֵּה, אֵינוֹ דִין שֶׁיְּהֵא חַיָּב עַל כָּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת. אָמַרְתִּי לוֹ, לֹא, אִם אָמַרְתָּ בַנִּדָּה, שֶׁיֶּשׁ בָּהּ שְׁתֵּי אַזְהָרוֹת, שֶׁהוּא מֻזְהָר עַל הַנִּדָּה וְהַנִּדָּה מֻזְהֶרֶת עָלָיו, תֹּאמַר בַּשַּׁבָּת, שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ אֶלָּא אַזְהָרָה אֶחָת. אָמַר לִי, הַבָּא עַל הַקְּטַנּוֹת יוֹכִיחַ, שֶׁאֵין בָּהֶן אֶלָּא אַזְהָרָה אַחַת וְחַיָּב עַל כָּל אַחַת וְאַחַת. אָמַרְתִּי לוֹ, לֹא, אִם אָמַרְתָּ בַּבָּא עַל הַקְּטַנּוֹת, שֶׁאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין בָּהֶן עַכְשָׁיו, יֵשׁ בָּהֶן לְאַחַר זְמָן, תֹּאמַר בַּשַּׁבָּת, שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ לֹא עַכְשָׁיו וְלֹא לְאַחַר זְמָן. אָמַר לִי, הַבָּא עַל הַבְּהֵמָה יוֹכִיחַ. אָמַרְתִּי לוֹ, בְּהֵמָה כַשַּׁבָּת:
English:
Rabbi Akiva said: I asked Rabbi Eliezer with regard to one who performs multiple prohibited labors on several Shabbatot, and all those labors were subsumed as subcategories of one primary category of prohibited labor, and he performed them during one lapse of awareness. What is the halakha? Is he liable to bring one sin offering for unwitting performance of all these labors or is he liable to bring a sin offering for violation of each and every one of the labors? Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Akiva: He is liable to bring a sin offering for violation of each and every one of the labors, and this is derived from an a fortiori inference: Just as in the case of a menstruating woman, with regard to whom there are not multiple actions that result in transgression and that result in multiple sin offerings, but rather only the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with her, and nevertheless one is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each and every one of his acts of unwitting intercourse; in the case of Shabbat, with regard to which there are multiple primary categories and subcategories of labor that result in transgression and that result in multiple death penalties or sin offerings, is it not right that he will be liable to bring a sin offering for performance of each and every one of the prohibited labors? Rabbi Akiva continues: I said to Rabbi Eliezer that the inference is not valid: If you said one is liable to bring multiple sin offerings in the case of a menstruating woman, with regard to whom there are two prohibitions, as the man is prohibited from engaging in intercourse with the menstruating woman and the menstruating woman is prohibited from engaging in intercourse with him, would you say the same in the case of Shabbat, with regard to which there is only one prohibition? Rabbi Eliezer said to me: The halakha of one who engages in intercourse with minor menstruating girls will prove this refutation is not valid, as in that case there is only one prohibition, because the minor is exempt from the mitzvot, and nevertheless the man is liable to bring a separate sin offering for intercourse for each and every one of the acts of intercourse. Rabbi Akiva said: I said to Rabbi Eliezer that the cases of Shabbat and minor menstruating girls are not comparable. If you said in the case of minor girls that although it is not prohibited for them at present it is prohibited for them after the passage of time, when they reach majority, would you say the same in the case of Shabbat, with regard to which there are neither two prohibitions at present, nor will there be after the passage of time? Rabbi Eliezer said to me: The halakha of one who copulates with an animal will prove this refutation is not valid, as there are never two prohibitions in that case, and nevertheless the person is liable to bring a sin offering for each and every act. Rabbi Akiva said: I said to Rabbi Eliezer that no proof can be cited from the case of an animal, as in my opinion the case of the animal is like that of Shabbat; there is uncertainty with regard to both cases.
Claude on the Mishna:
This mishna presents a masterful debate between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Eliezer about Shabbat liability, demonstrating the rigorous back-and-forth of talmudic reasoning.
The question: Multiple subcategory labors (toladot) of ONE primary category (av), on MULTIPLE Shabbatot, during ONE he’elem = how many offerings?
Example: Plowing on three Shabbatot (all under the category of “plowing”) while continuously unaware = 1 or 3 offerings?
The debate structure:
| Round | R. Eliezer’s Proof | R. Akiva’s Refutation |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Niddah: multiple acts = multiple offerings | Niddah has TWO prohibitions (man + woman) |
| 2 | Minor girls: only ONE prohibition (girl exempt) | Minors will EVENTUALLY have two prohibitions |
| 3 | Animals: NEVER two prohibitions | Animal is just like Shabbat - uncertain! |
Rabbi Eliezer’s core argument: Niddah has only ONE type of prohibition, yet each ACT creates separate liability. Shabbat has MANY categories of prohibition - certainly each act should be separate!
Rabbi Akiva’s counter-arguments:
-
Niddah has two warnings - The man is warned and the woman is warned. Maybe TWO prohibitions create separate liabilities.
-
Minors will grow up - Even if minors aren’t currently obligated, they WILL be. This potential gives the act gravity.
-
Animals - An animal will NEVER be obligated. Rabbi Akiva says: “Behemah k’Shabbat” - the animal case is equally uncertain as Shabbat. No proof can come from an uncertain case!
The underlying issue: What creates separate liability - separate BODIES (gufim), separate TIMES (zmanim), or separate CATEGORIES of prohibition?
Key Terms:
- מְלָאכוֹת הַרְבֵּה (melachot harbei) = Multiple labors
- מֵעֵין מְלָאכָה אַחַת (me’ein melacha achat) = Subcategories of one primary category
- תּוֹצָאוֹת (totza’ot) = Outcomes/consequences
- אַזְהָרוֹת (azharot) = Prohibitions/warnings
- קְטַנּוֹת (ketanot) = Minor girls