Menachot Daf 58 (מנחות דף נ״ח)
Daf: 58 | Amudim: 58a – 58b | Date: 5 Adar I 5786
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (58a)
Segment 1
TYPE: קושיא
Challenge: What does R. Yoḥanan do with “otam”?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, הַאי ״אֹתָם״ מַאי עָבֵיד לֵיהּ?
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: And what does Rabbi Yoḥanan, who maintains that the prohibition against bringing leftover portions up to the ramp applies to all of the items listed in the baraita, do with this term: “Them,” in the verse: “As an offering of first produce you may bring them” (Leviticus 2:12), from which Rabbi Elazar learns that only first fruits and the two loaves are included in the prohibition?
קלאוד על הדף:
This segment picks up directly from the end of the previous daf’s discussion. Rabbi Elazar used the word “otam” (them) to limit the prohibition against bringing items up to the altar ramp to only two specific offerings — first fruits and the two loaves. Now the Gemara challenges Rabbi Yoḥanan, who applied the prohibition more broadly: if R. Yoḥanan doesn’t use “otam” for that limiting purpose, how does he interpret the word? Every word in the Torah must serve a purpose in Talmudic hermeneutics, so a competing interpretation must be found.
Key Terms:
- אֹתָם (otam) = “Them” — a limiting term in biblical hermeneutics, used to restrict applicability to specific items
Segment 2
TYPE: תירוץ
R. Yoḥanan uses “otam” to teach that individuals cannot bring two loaves as gift offerings
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא: יָכוֹל יְהֵא יָחִיד מִתְנַדֵּב וּמֵבִיא כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּהּ נְדָבָה, וְקוֹרֵא אֲנִי בָּהּ ״מוֹצֵא שְׂפָתֶיךָ תִּשְׁמֹר וְעָשִׂיתָ״?
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: He requires it for that which is taught in a baraita: One might have thought that an individual may donate and bring to the Temple a gift offering similar to those two loaves brought by the community, and in support I will read with regard to this offering the verse that deals with other gift offerings: “That which has gone out of your lips you shall observe and do; according to what you have vowed freely to the Lord your God, even that which you have promised with your mouth” (Deuteronomy 23:24), which would mean that the offering is consecrated and he must bring it as he declared.
קלאוד על הדף:
R. Yoḥanan uses “otam” for an entirely different derivation. The baraita considers whether an individual could voluntarily bring an offering modeled after the two loaves (shtei ha-lechem), which are normally a communal obligation on Shavuot. The logic is that if someone verbally commits to bringing such an offering, the general rule of “motza sefatekha” — that one must fulfill verbal commitments regarding offerings — might apply. This sets up a halakhic analysis of who may bring which types of offerings.
Key Terms:
- נְדָבָה (nedava) = Gift/voluntary offering — brought without obligation, purely from personal desire
- מוֹצֵא שְׂפָתֶיךָ (motza sefatekha) = “That which has gone out of your lips” — the obligation to fulfill verbal commitments to bring offerings
Segment 3
TYPE: גמרא
The verse’s plural form (“takrivu”) limits the two loaves to communal offerings only
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״קׇרְבַּן רֵאשִׁית תַּקְרִיבוּ״, צִיבּוּר אָמַרְתִּי לְךָ, וְלֹא יָחִיד.
English Translation:
Therefore, the verse states: “As an offering of first produce you may bring.” The phrase: “You may bring,” is written in the plural, meaning that it is addressed to the community. Therefore, it is interpreted to mean: I said to you that a community may consecrate and bring the two loaves, which are an offering of first produce, but an individual may not consecrate and bring two loaves of this nature.
קלאוד על הדף:
The baraita resolves the initial question by pointing to the plural form “takrivu” (you [plural] may bring). Since the verse addresses the community collectively rather than the individual, the two loaves — an offering of first produce — can only be brought by the community (tzibbur). An individual is excluded from voluntarily bringing this type of offering. This demonstrates the Talmudic principle that grammatical forms in the Torah carry halakhic significance.
Key Terms:
- צִיבּוּר (tzibbur) = The community/congregation — as opposed to an individual (yaḥid), referring to communal obligations
- תַּקְרִיבוּ (takrivu) = “You [plural] may bring” — the plural verb form that limits the offering to the community
Segment 4
TYPE: גמרא
“Otam” further excludes even communal gift offerings of two loaves
Hebrew/Aramaic:
יָכוֹל לֹא יְהֵא יָחִיד מֵבִיא, שֶׁאֵינוֹ מֵבִיא חוֹבָתוֹ כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּהּ, אֲבָל יְהֵא צִיבּוּר מֵבִיא שֶׁמֵּבִיא חוֹבָתוֹ כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּהּ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״אֹתָם״, וּמָה יֵשׁ לְךָ לְהָבִיא? שְׁתֵּי הַלֶּחֶם מִן הַשְּׂאוֹר, וּבִכּוּרִים מִן הַדְּבַשׁ.
English Translation:
The baraita continues: One might have thought that only an individual may not bring two loaves as a gift offering, as an individual does not bring his obligatory offering in a manner similar to those two loaves, i.e., perhaps specifically an individual, who never has an obligatory offering of two loaves, may not bring two loaves as a gift offering. But the community shall bring two loaves as a gift offering, as the community does bring its obligatory offering in a manner similar to those two loaves. Therefore, the verse states: “You may bring them,” to exclude the possibility of a communal gift offering of two loaves. The baraita concludes: And what is there left for you to bring as offerings that come from leaven and honey? The two loaves that comes from leaven, and the first fruits that come from honey, i.e., sweet fruits.
קלאוד על הדף:
This completes R. Yoḥanan’s use of “otam.” After excluding individuals from bringing two loaves voluntarily (from the plural “takrivu”), the baraita considers whether the community might still bring additional sets of two loaves beyond the obligatory Shavuot offering. The word “otam” closes this possibility — only those specific obligatory offerings may be brought. The conclusion is elegant: leaven and honey appear on the altar only in their designated forms — the two loaves (leaven) and first fruits (honey/sweet fruits) — and never as voluntary extras.
Key Terms:
- חוֹבָה (ḥova) = Obligation — a mandatory offering, as opposed to a voluntary one
- שְׁתֵּי הַלֶּחֶם (shtei ha-leḥem) = The two loaves — the communal leavened bread offering brought on Shavuot
- בִּכּוּרִים (bikkurim) = First fruits — produce from the seven species brought to the Temple
Segment 5
TYPE: קושיא
Challenge: Another baraita implies leaven was permitted as a gift offering in the Temple
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּשְׁתֵּי הַלֶּחֶם לֹא יִקְרְבוּ נְדָבָה? וְהָתַנְיָא: אִם נֶאֱמַר ״כׇּל שְׂאֹר״, לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר ״כׇּל דְּבַשׁ״? וְאִם נֶאֱמַר ״כׇּל דְּבַשׁ״, לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר ״כׇּל שְׂאֹר״? מִפְּנֵי שֶׁיֵּשׁ בַּשְּׂאוֹר מַה שֶּׁאֵין בַּדְּבַשׁ, וְיֵשׁ בַּדְּבַשׁ מַה שֶּׁאֵין בִּשְׂאוֹר.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: And may the two loaves not be sacrificed as communal gift offerings? But isn’t it taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “As any leaven, and any honey, you shall not burn any of it” (Leviticus 2:11): If it is stated: “Any leaven,” why is it stated: “Any honey”? And if it is stated: “Any honey,” why is it stated: “Any leaven”? In other words, why is it necessary for the verse to repeat the inclusive term “any,” from which it is derived that offering an insufficient quantity of honey or leaven is included in the prohibition? The baraita answers: Both of these terms had to be stated, because there is a halakha that applies to leaven that is not applicable to honey, and there is another halakha that applies to honey that is not applicable to leaven.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara now challenges the conclusion that two loaves cannot be brought as a communal gift offering. It cites a different baraita that discusses why the Torah separately prohibits both leaven and honey on the altar, using the inclusive term “kol” (any) for each. This baraita explains that a “tzad ha-shaveh” (common denominator) argument cannot derive one from the other because each has a unique leniency — setting up the discussion of what those unique leniencies are.
Key Terms:
- כׇּל (kol) = “Any” — an inclusive term used in biblical hermeneutics to expand the scope of a prohibition
- הוּתַּר מִכְּלָלוֹ (huttar mi-klalo) = “Its general prohibition was permitted” — when a general rule has a recognized exception
Segment 6
TYPE: ברייתא
Leaven’s prohibition was permitted in the Temple (two loaves), but honey’s was not
Hebrew/Aramaic:
שְׂאוֹר הוּתַּר מִכְּלָלוֹ בַּמִּקְדָּשׁ, דְּבַשׁ לֹא הוּתַּר מִכְּלָלוֹ בַּמִּקְדָּשׁ.
English Translation:
The baraita explains: In the case of leaven, although it may not be sacrificed on the altar, its general prohibition was permitted in certain circumstances in the Temple, as the two loaves and the bread of the thanks offering, i.e., the four loaves of the thanks offering that were eaten by the priests, are leavened bread. By contrast, with regard to honey, there are no circumstances in which its general prohibition was permitted in the Temple.
קלאוד על הדף:
This segment identifies the unique leniency of leaven: although generally prohibited on the altar, leaven appears in the Temple in the form of the two loaves of Shavuot and the leavened loaves of the thanksgiving offering (todah). These constitute a recognized exception — “huttar mi-klalo” — where the general rule against leaven was relaxed. Honey, by contrast, has no such exception in the Temple. This asymmetry is why the Torah needed to specify “kol” for both substances separately.
Key Terms:
- לֶחֶם הַתּוֹדָה (leḥem ha-todah) = Bread of the thanksgiving offering — includes four leavened loaves among the forty loaves accompanying the todah sacrifice
Segment 7
TYPE: ברייתא
Honey’s prohibition was permitted for the remainder of meal offerings, but leaven’s was not
Hebrew/Aramaic:
דְּבַשׁ הוּתַּר בִּשְׁיָרֵי מְנָחוֹת, שְׂאוֹר לֹא הוּתַּר בִּשְׁיָרֵי מְנָחוֹת. הָא מִפְּנֵי שֶׁיֵּשׁ בַּשְּׂאוֹר מַה שֶּׁאֵין בַּדְּבַשׁ, וְיֵשׁ בַּדְּבַשׁ מַה שֶּׁאֵין בִּשְׂאוֹר, הוּצְרַךְ לוֹמַר ״כׇּל שְׂאֹר״, וְהוּצְרַךְ לוֹמַר ״כׇּל דְּבַשׁ״.
English Translation:
There is a halakha that applies to honey but not to leaven, as the prohibition concerning honey is permitted in the case of the remainder of meal offerings, meaning that the priests may eat their portion of meal offerings with honey, whereas the prohibition concerning leaven is not permitted in the case of the remainder of meal offerings, since one may not leaven this remainder. The baraita summarizes: Due to the fact that there is a halakha that applies to leaven that is not applicable to honey, and there is a halakha that applies to honey that is not applicable to leaven, it was necessary for the verse to state: “Any leaven,” and it was also necessary for it to state: “Any honey.”
קלאוד על הדף:
This completes the symmetric comparison. While leaven is permitted in certain Temple offerings (two loaves, todah bread), honey has its own unique leniency: priests may eat their share of meal offerings (shirayei menachot) with honey, since the prohibition only covers burning honey on the altar, not eating it. But one may never leaven the priestly remainder of a meal offering. Since neither substance’s prohibition is a simple subset of the other, the Torah must explicitly include both with the inclusive term “kol.”
Key Terms:
- שִׁיָּרֵי מְנָחוֹת (shirayei menaḥot) = The remainder of meal offerings — the portion eaten by the priests after the kometz has been burned on the altar
Segment 8
TYPE: קושיא
Challenge: The “permitted leaven” in the Temple should mean two loaves can be a gift offering
Hebrew/Aramaic:
שְׂאוֹר דְּהוּתַּר מִכְּלָלוֹ בַּמִּקְדָּשׁ, מַאי נִיהוּ? לָאו שְׁתֵּי הַלֶּחֶם דְּקָרְבָה נְדָבָה? אָמַר רַב עַמְרָם: לָא, לִיקְרַב עִמָּהֶם.
English Translation:
The Gemara analyzes the baraita. When the baraita states concerning leaven that its general prohibition was permitted in certain circumstances in the Temple, what is this? Isn’t this referring to the halakha that the meal offering of the two loaves may be sacrificed by the community as a gift offering on the altar, as the two loaves of the communal offering themselves were not sacrificed on the altar? This would mean that two loaves may be brought as a gift offering by the community, which contradicts this claim of the previous baraita. Rav Amram said: No, the baraita is referring to the fact that the two loaves, which were leaven, are brought as an offering with the two lambs, which are brought up onto the altar as communal peace offerings. Since they are brought together, the two loaves and the two lambs are considered a single offering, and the lambs are sacrificed on the altar.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara identifies a potential contradiction. If leaven was “permitted” in the Temple through the two loaves, does that mean the community could bring two loaves as a voluntary gift offering — contradicting the previous baraita’s conclusion? Rav Amram resolves this by redefining what “permitted” means: the two loaves themselves are not placed on the altar’s fire; rather, they accompany the two lambs that are burned as peace offerings. The “permission” of leaven in the Temple is indirect — the leavened bread comes together with animal offerings that go on the altar. This is a critical distinction.
Key Terms:
- רַב עַמְרָם (Rav Amram) = A third-generation Babylonian Amora, student of Rav Naḥman
- לִיקְרַב עִמָּהֶם (likrav imahem) = “To be brought with them” — the two loaves accompany the lambs as part of a single offering
Segment 9
TYPE: קושיא
Challenge: By that logic, first fruits with fledglings should also count as “permitted honey”
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִי הָכִי, בִּכּוּרִים נָמֵי, דִּתְנַן: הַגּוֹזָלוֹת שֶׁעַל גַּבֵּי הַסַּלִּים הָיוּ עוֹלוֹת, וְהַסַּלִּים שֶׁבְּיָדָם נִיתָּנִין לַכֹּהֲנִים. הָנְהוּ לְעַטֵּר בִּכּוּרִים הוּא דְּאָתוּ.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: If so, in the case of first fruits also, the fruits should be considered part of the offering that was brought with them. As we learned in a mishna (Bikkurim 3:5): As for the fledglings that were placed on top of the baskets that contained the first fruits brought to the Temple, they would sacrifice these as burnt offerings, and the baskets themselves that were in the possession of those bringing the first fruits would be given to the priests. Accordingly, with regard to honey as well, its general prohibition was permitted in certain circumstances, as these first fruits containing honey are included with the sacrifice of burnt offerings. The Gemara answers: These fledglings came only to decorate the first fruits, despite the fact that they were later sacrificed as burnt offerings. Bringing the fledglings is not obligatory, and therefore cannot be considered part of the same offering as first fruits.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara tests Rav Amram’s principle with a counterexample. If leaven is considered “permitted” because the two loaves accompany the lambs, then honey should similarly be “permitted” because first fruits (which contain sweet fruits = “honey”) are brought together with fledgling birds that are sacrificed as burnt offerings. The Gemara distinguishes: the fledglings are merely decorative (le-ater bikkurim) and not an integral part of the first fruits offering, whereas the two loaves and the two lambs constitute a single unified offering. This distinction between ornamental accompaniments and halakhically linked components is significant.
Key Terms:
- גּוֹזָלוֹת (gozalot) = Fledgling birds/young pigeons — placed decoratively atop first-fruit baskets
- לְעַטֵּר בִּכּוּרִים (le-ater bikkurim) = To decorate the first fruits — the fledglings serve an aesthetic rather than halakhic purpose
Segment 10
TYPE: בעיא
Rami bar Ḥama’s dilemma: Is one liable for burning meat of a bird sin offering on the altar?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בָּעֵי רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא מֵרַב חִסְדָּא: הַמַּעֲלֶה מִבְּשַׂר חַטַּאת הָעוֹף עַל גַּבֵּי הַמִּזְבֵּחַ, מַהוּ?
English Translation:
§ The Gemara continues to discuss the prohibition against bringing leftover parts of offerings up to the altar after the sacrificial parts have been burned. Rami bar Ḥama asked Rav Ḥisda: With regard to one who offers up on the altar some of the meat of a bird sacrificed as a sin offering, which is meant to be eaten by the priests, what is the halakha? Is he liable to receive lashes for this action?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara now shifts to a new topic related to the prohibition of burning non-designated items on the altar. The bird sin offering (ḥatat ha-of) presents a unique case: unlike animal sin offerings where the fats are burned on the altar and the meat is eaten by priests, the bird sin offering has no parts that go to the altar fire at all — its blood is sprinkled and the entire body is eaten by the priests. The question is whether the prohibition against bringing non-designated items up to the altar (bal taktiru) applies even to an offering that never had any portion designated for the altar fire.
Key Terms:
- חַטַּאת הָעוֹף (ḥatat ha-of) = Bird sin offering — a bird (typically a turtledove or pigeon) brought as a sin offering, entirely consumed by priests
- רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא (Rami bar Ḥama) = A third-generation Babylonian Amora, known for his sharp analytical questions
Segment 11
TYPE: תירוץ
Rav Ḥisda answers: Any item called an offering is included in the prohibition
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כֹּל שֶׁמִּמֶּנּוּ לָאִישִּׁים, אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא, וְהַאי אֵין מִמֶּנּוּ לָאִישִּׁים? אוֹ דִלְמָא כֹּל שֶׁשְּׁמוֹ קׇרְבָּן, וְהַאי נָמֵי שְׁמוֹ קׇרְבָּן? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: כֹּל שֶׁשְּׁמוֹ קׇרְבָּן, וְהַאי נָמֵי שְׁמוֹ קׇרְבָּן.
English Translation:
The Gemara clarifies the possibilities: The Merciful One states with regard to any item that has already had some portion of it burned in the fire on the altar that one who sacrifices any leftover part of it violates the prohibition. And as no part of this bird sacrificed as a sin offering is burned in the fire on the altar, is he therefore exempt? Or perhaps, any item that is called an offering is included in the prohibition, and since this bird is also called an offering, one is liable. Rav Ḥisda said to Rami bar Ḥama: Any item that is called an offering is included in the prohibition, and this bird sacrificed as a sin offering is also called an offering.
קלאוד על הדף:
The dilemma hinges on the scope of the prohibition “lo ya’aleh” (do not bring up). One approach: only offerings that already have some portion burned on the altar (“mimenu la-ishim” — from it to the fires) are subject to the prohibition regarding their leftovers. The other approach: anything bearing the legal designation of “korban” (offering) falls under the prohibition, regardless of whether any part is burned. Rav Ḥisda rules for the broader interpretation — the name “offering” suffices. This has significant practical implications for what triggers the prohibition.
Key Terms:
- אִישִּׁים (ishim) = Altar fires — the term for the fire on the altar where sacrificial portions are burned
- מִמֶּנּוּ לָאִישִּׁים (mimenu la-ishim) = “From it to the fires” — the criterion that some part of the offering must be burned on the altar
Segment 12
TYPE: מחלוקת
Tannaitic dispute: R. Eliezer vs. R. Akiva on the scope of bal taktiru
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כְּתַנָּאֵי: רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: כֹּל שֶׁמִּמֶּנּוּ לָאִישִּׁים, רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: כֹּל שֶׁשְּׁמוֹ קׇרְבָּן.
English Translation:
The Gemara notes: Rami bar Ḥama’s dilemma is subject to a dispute between tanna’im, as is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer says: Only any item that has already had some portion of it burned in the fire on the altar is included in the prohibition: Do not burn. Rabbi Akiva says: Any item that is called an offering is included in this prohibition.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara now anchors the amoraic discussion in a tannaitic dispute. Rabbi Eliezer takes the narrower position: the prohibition against burning non-designated items on the altar applies only to offerings that have a designated portion for the altar fire. Rabbi Akiva takes the broader position: any item with the legal status of “korban” is included. Rav Ḥisda’s answer to Rami bar Ḥama aligns with Rabbi Akiva’s view. This dispute has far-reaching consequences for defining the boundaries of altar-related prohibitions.
Key Terms:
- רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר (Rabbi Eliezer) = Rabbi Eliezer ben Hyrcanus — a leading Tanna known for his conservative positions
- רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא (Rabbi Akiva) = Rabbi Akiva ben Yosef — a leading Tanna known for his expansive interpretive method
Segment 13
TYPE: גמרא
Rav Ḥisda: The practical difference is the bird sin offering
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: בְּשַׂר חַטַּאת הָעוֹף אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: What is the difference between the opinions of Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Eliezer? Rav Ḥisda said: The difference between them concerns the case discussed earlier, of one who brings some of the meat of a bird sin offering up to the altar. Rabbi Akiva maintains that he is liable, as it is called an offering, whereas Rabbi Eliezer holds that he is exempt, as no portion of it is burned on the altar.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Ḥisda identifies the bird sin offering as the precise nafka mina (practical difference) between the two tannaitic positions. Since the bird sin offering is entirely consumed by the priests with no portion going to the altar fire, it is called a “korban” (satisfying R. Akiva’s criterion) but has no component “mimenu la-ishim” (failing R. Eliezer’s criterion). This neat identification shows how the amoraic dilemma raised by Rami bar Ḥama maps directly onto an existing tannaitic debate.
Key Terms:
- נַפְקָא מִינָּהּ (nafka mina) = Practical difference — the concrete case where two abstract legal positions diverge
Segment 14
TYPE: גמרא
Rav: The practical difference is the leper’s log of oil
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַב אָמַר: לוֹג שֶׁמֶן שֶׁל מְצוֹרָע אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ, דְּתָנֵי לֵוִי: ״כׇּל קׇרְבָּנָם״ – לְרַבּוֹת לוֹג שֶׁמֶן שֶׁל מְצוֹרָע.
English Translation:
Rav said: The difference between them concerns the log of oil that accompanies the guilt offering of a recovered leper, as Levi teaches: Concerning the consecrated items given to priests as gifts, the verse states: “Every offering of theirs…shall be most holy for you and for your sons” (Numbers 18:9). The phrase “every offering” serves to include the log of oil of a leper. This oil is not burned on the altar. Nevertheless, Rabbi Akiva would deem one who brings some of this log up to the altar liable, as it is called an offering, whereas Rabbi Eliezer would deem him exempt, since no part of it is burned in the fire.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav offers an alternative nafka mina: the log of oil used in the purification ritual of a recovered leper (metzora). This oil, which is sprinkled and placed on the leper but never burned on the altar, is nevertheless classified as a “korban” based on a derivation from Numbers 18:9. Like the bird sin offering, it is called an offering but has no portion designated for the altar fire. Rav may prefer this example because the log of oil’s status as a “korban” is explicitly derived by Levi from a verse, making it a stronger illustration of the dispute.
Key Terms:
- לוֹג שֶׁמֶן שֶׁל מְצוֹרָע (log shemen shel metzora) = The log of oil of the leper — a measure of oil used in the purification ceremony of a healed metzora
- מְצוֹרָע (metzora) = One afflicted with tzaraat (a spiritual skin condition) — undergoes a detailed purification process upon healing
Segment 15
TYPE: ברייתא
Baraita: Deriving the prohibition against burning partial leaven and mixed leaven
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״שְׂאֹר … בַּל תַּקְטִירוּ״ – אֵין לִי אֶלָּא כּוּלּוֹ, מִקְצָתוֹ מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״כׇל״. עֵירוּבוֹ מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״כִּי כׇל״.
English Translation:
§ The Gemara returns to the discussion about the prohibition against sacrificing leaven. The Sages taught in a baraita: When the Torah states with regard to leaven: Do not burn it (see Leviticus 2:11), I have derived only that one who burns all of it is liable, as will be explained. From where is it derived that one who burns only part of it is also included in the prohibition? The verse states: “Any [kol] leaven,” which serves to include such a case. The baraita adds: This halakha has been derived only with regard to leaven in a pure state; from where is it derived that the same applies to one who sacrifices it in its mixed state, i.e., mixed with another substance? The verse states the additional expression: “As [ki] any leaven.”
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara shifts to a new sugya analyzing Leviticus 2:11’s wording more carefully. The baraita derives three levels of prohibition: (1) burning an entire quantity of leaven, (2) burning a partial quantity (“miktzato”), derived from “kol” (any), and (3) burning leaven mixed with another substance (“eiruvo”), derived from “ki kol” (as any). This sets up a debate between Abaye and Rava about what “all of it” and “part of it” mean in precise halakhic terms.
Key Terms:
- בַּל תַּקְטִירוּ (bal taktiru) = “Do not burn” — the prohibition against burning leaven or honey on the altar
- עֵירוּבוֹ (eiruvo) = Its mixture — leaven mixed with another substance, still prohibited on the altar
Segment 16
TYPE: גמרא
Abaye: “All” means an olive-bulk; “part” means half an olive-bulk
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַאי קָאָמַר? אָמַר אַבָּיֵי, הָכִי קָאָמַר: ״שְׂאֹר בַּל תַּקְטִירוּ״ – אֵין לִי אֶלָּא כְּזַיִת, חֲצִי זַיִת מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״כׇּל״, עֵירוּבוֹ מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״כִּי כׇל״.
English Translation:
The Gemara analyzes this baraita: What is it saying? What is the meaning of the term: All of it, and the term: Part of it? Abaye said: This is what the baraita is saying: When the verse states about leaven: Do not burn it, I have derived only that this prohibition applies to an olive-bulk of leaven. From where is it derived that this prohibition applies if it is only half an olive-bulk? The verse states: “Any leaven.” Furthermore, from where is it derived that one is liable not only for leaven by itself, but also for leaven in its mixed state? The verse states: “As any leaven.”
קלאוד על הדף:
Abaye interprets the baraita as dealing with minimum quantities. The standard halakhic measure for prohibited actions is a kezayit (olive-bulk), so “all of it” means an olive-bulk — the default minimum. The expansion via “kol” teaches that even half an olive-bulk of leaven triggers the prohibition when burned on the altar. This is significant because it suggests the prohibition against burning leaven is stricter than typical prohibitions, which normally require a full olive-bulk. The further expansion via “ki kol” covers mixtures containing leaven.
Key Terms:
- כְּזַיִת (kezayit) = Olive-bulk — the standard minimum quantity for most halakhic prohibitions and obligations
- חֲצִי זַיִת (ḥatzi zayit) = Half an olive-bulk — below the usual minimum, yet included here due to the expansive “kol”
Segment 17
TYPE: גמרא
Rava: “All” means a full handful; “part” means half a handful
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רָבָא אָמַר: הָכִי קָאָמַר – ״שְׂאֹר בַּל תַּקְטִירוּ״ אֵין לִי אֶלָּא קוֹמֶץ, חֲצִי קוֹמֶץ מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״כׇל״. עֵירוּבוֹ מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״כִּי כׇל״.
English Translation:
Rava said that there is a different interpretation of the baraita: This is what the baraita is saying: When the verse states about leaven: Do not burn it, I have derived only that this prohibition applies to the entire handful that is removed from the meal offering. From where is it derived that this prohibition applies to half of the handful? The verse states: “Any leaven.” Furthermore, from where is it derived that one is liable not only for leaven by itself, but also for its mixed state? The verse states: “As any leaven.”
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava offers a different framework. Rather than dealing with the olive-bulk measure, Rava interprets the baraita as referring to the kometz (handful) — the quantity scooped from a meal offering for burning on the altar. “All” means the entire handful, and “kol” includes half a handful. Since Rava holds that a handful is always at least two olive-bulks, half a handful is at least one olive-bulk — so even Rava’s “partial” amount meets the standard kezayit threshold. The “ki kol” expansion then covers a handful that is a mixture of leaven and non-leaven.
Key Terms:
- קוֹמֶץ (kometz) = Handful — the quantity of flour scooped by the priest from a meal offering, burned on the altar
Segment 18
TYPE: גמרא
Abaye’s underlying principle: A handful can be less than two olive-bulks
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בְּמַאי קָא מִיפַּלְגִי? אַבָּיֵי סָבַר: יֵשׁ קוֹמֶץ פָּחוֹת מִשְּׁנֵי זֵיתִים,
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do Abaye and Rava disagree? The Gemara answers: Abaye holds: There is such an entity as a handful that is less than the volume of two olives.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara now identifies the root of the Abaye-Rava dispute. Abaye holds that a handful (kometz) can be less than two olive-bulks in volume. This seemingly technical point has major implications: if a handful can be smaller than two kezeitim, then there can be a valid priestly scooping (kemitza) that yields less than a kezayit per half-handful. That is why Abaye needs “kol” to extend the prohibition down to half a kezayit. This segment’s thought continues directly into the first segment of amud bet.
Key Terms:
- שְׁנֵי זֵיתִים (shnei zeitim) = Two olive-bulks — the minimum size Rava assigns to a handful
Amud Bet (58b)
Segment 1
TYPE: גמרא
Abaye’s position continued: Burning less than an olive-bulk is halakhically significant
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְיֵשׁ הַקְטָרָה פְּחוּתָה מִכְּזַיִת.
English Translation:
And Abaye consequently maintains that there is such a matter as a halakhically significant burning of a handful even if it is less than the volume of an olive-bulk. It follows that the phrase “any leaven” teaches that if one sacrificed less than an olive-bulk of a handful that was leaven, he is liable.
קלאוד על הדף:
This continues Abaye’s position from the end of amud aleph. Since Abaye holds that a handful can be less than two olive-bulks, it follows that burning a portion of that handful could involve less than a kezayit. Abaye considers such a burning halakhically significant — meaning the prohibition against burning leaven applies even below the standard olive-bulk measure. The phrase “kol se’or” (any leaven) is needed to include this sub-measure scenario.
Key Terms:
- הַקְטָרָה (haktara) = Burning/offering on the altar — the act of placing sacrificial material in the altar fire
Segment 2
TYPE: גמרא
Rava’s position: A handful is always at least two olive-bulks
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְרָבָא אָמַר: אֵין קוֹמֶץ פָּחוֹת מִשְּׁנֵי זֵיתִים, וְאֵין הַקְטָרָה פְּחוּתָה מִכְּזַיִת.
English Translation:
And Rava says: There is no such entity as a handful that is less than the size of two olives, and consequently the mitzva not to burn leaven is referring initially to a full handful of two olive-bulks. And Rava holds that there is no such matter as a halakhically significant burning of a handful if it is less than the volume of an olive-bulk. Therefore, one cannot derive from the phrase “as any leaven” that one can be liable for sacrificing leaven of less than one olive-bulk. Instead, the phrase must be referring to a case where half the handful is leaven.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava’s framework is more conservative. A handful always contains at least two olive-bulks, so halakhically significant burning always involves at least one kezayit. The expansion of “kol” is therefore not about sub-measure quantities but about half a handful — which is still at least one olive-bulk. And the further expansion of “ki kol” (mixtures) refers to a handful that is half leaven and half non-leaven. The fundamental dispute is thus about the physical reality of how much flour a priestly handful contains, with significant implications for the scope of the prohibition.
Key Terms:
- אֵין הַקְטָרָה פְּחוּתָה מִכְּזַיִת (ein haktara peḥuta mi-kezayit) = “There is no halakhically significant burning less than an olive-bulk” — Rava’s principle that the minimum for altar burning is one kezayit
Segment 3
TYPE: מחלוקת
Rava: One who burns leaven-honey mixture receives four sets of lashes
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִיתְּמַר: הַמַּעֲלֶה מִשְּׂאוֹר וּמִדְּבַשׁ עַל גַּבֵּי הַמִּזְבֵּחַ, אָמַר רָבָא: לוֹקֶה מִשּׁוּם שְׂאוֹר, וְלוֹקֶה מִשּׁוּם דְּבַשׁ, לוֹקֶה מִשּׁוּם עֵירוּבֵי שְׂאוֹר, וּמִשּׁוּם עֵירוּבֵי דְּבַשׁ.
English Translation:
§ The Gemara discusses another dispute between Abaye and Rava on this topic: It was stated: With regard to one who offers up a mixture made of leaven and of honey on the altar, Rava says: He is flogged with four sets of lashes for this act, as the verse: “As any leaven and any honey, you shall not burn any of it as an offering made by fire to the Lord” (Leviticus 2:11), includes four separate prohibitions. He is flogged one set due to the prohibition against sacrificing leaven, and he is flogged a second set due to the prohibition against sacrificing honey, and he is flogged a third set due to the prohibition against sacrificing mixtures of leaven, and he is flogged a fourth set due to the prohibition against sacrificing mixtures of honey.
קלאוד על הדף:
A new amoraic dispute emerges regarding the punishment for burning a combined leaven-and-honey mixture on the altar. Rava counts four distinct prohibitions within the single verse: (1) leaven by itself (“se’or”), (2) honey by itself (“devash”), (3) leaven in a mixture (“ki kol se’or”), and (4) honey in a mixture (“kol devash”). Since each is a separate prohibition derived from a distinct term in the verse, Rava holds the offender is flogged four times — once for each violation. This reflects Rava’s general approach of parsing biblical terms for maximum halakhic precision.
Key Terms:
- לוֹקֶה (lokeh) = Receives lashes/flogging — the punishment for violating a biblical prohibition
- עֵירוּבֵי שְׂאוֹר (eiruvei se’or) = Mixtures of leaven — leaven combined with another substance, separately prohibited
Segment 4
TYPE: מחלוקת
Abaye: One is not flogged for a general prohibition (lav she-bikhlalot)
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: אֵין לוֹקִין עַל לָאו שֶׁבִּכְלָלוֹת.
English Translation:
Abaye says: One is not flogged for a general prohibition, i.e., a single mitzva in the Torah that includes many different prohibited acts. Since all these actions are covered by the prohibition: “You shall not burn,” it is considered a general prohibition, for which one is not flogged.
קלאוד על הדף:
Abaye disagrees with Rava’s parsing of the verse into four separate prohibitions. Abaye invokes the principle of “lav she-bikhlalot” — a general prohibition. Since all four actions (burning leaven, honey, mixed leaven, mixed honey) fall under the single prohibitory phrase “lo taktiru” (you shall not burn), they constitute one general prohibition encompassing multiple acts rather than four discrete prohibitions. According to Abaye’s view, a general prohibition does not carry the penalty of lashes in the same way that a specific, focused prohibition does.
Key Terms:
- לָאו שֶׁבִּכְלָלוֹת (lav she-bikhlalot) = A general prohibition — a single Torah prohibition that encompasses multiple prohibited acts
Segment 5
TYPE: גמרא
First version: Abaye concedes two sets of lashes (leaven and honey are distinct)
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: חֲדָא מִיהָא לָקֵי.
English Translation:
The Gemara cites a dispute between the Sages with regard to the opinion of Abaye. There are those who say that Abaye concedes that in any event the offender is flogged with one set of lashes for sacrificing leaven, and he is also flogged a second set of lashes for sacrificing honey, as these are not considered general prohibitions. Since the phrase: “You shall not burn,” is referring to both leaven and honey, it is as though it were written: You shall not burn leaven; you shall not burn honey.
קלאוד על הדף:
The first version of Abaye’s position offers a middle ground. While Abaye rejects four sets of lashes, he may concede two: one for leaven and one for honey. The reasoning is that since the Torah explicitly mentions both substances separately (se’or and devash), the verse effectively creates two distinct prohibitions even under a single “lo taktiru” phrasing. The “generality” is only in the mixtures (eiruvei se’or, eiruvei devash), which are absorbed into the base prohibitions rather than standing as independent violations.
Key Terms:
- חֲדָא מִיהָא (ḥada miha) = “One at least” — the minimum concession that at least some flogging applies
Segment 6
TYPE: גמרא
Second version: Abaye holds no lashes at all, since the prohibition lacks specificity
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, חֲדָא נָמֵי לָא לָקֵי, דְּהָא לָא מְיַחַד לָאוֵיהּ כְּלָאו דַּחֲסִימָה.
English Translation:
And there are those who say that Abaye maintains that the offender is not even flogged with one set of lashes, as the prohibition he transgressed is not specific to one matter, like the prohibition against muzzling. The principle that one is liable to be flogged for violating a prohibition is derived from the juxtaposition of the mitzva: “You shall not muzzle an ox while it treads out the grain” (Deuteronomy 25:4), with the verses that mention lashes. It is inferred from this juxtaposition that one is not liable to be flogged for violating prohibitions whose circumstances are not similar to that of muzzling, e.g., a general prohibition that is not referring to one specific action.
קלאוד על הדף:
The more extreme version of Abaye’s position eliminates lashes entirely. The key principle is that the paradigm for floggable prohibitions is “lo taḥsom” (do not muzzle an ox while threshing) — a prohibition that addresses one specific, well-defined action. By contrast, “lo taktiru” covers multiple substances and scenarios, making it a “general prohibition” that lacks the specificity required for flogging. This is a fundamental principle of criminal Torah law: only prohibitions comparable in structure to the muzzling prohibition carry the penalty of lashes. The daf ends with this unresolved tension between the two versions of Abaye’s view.
Key Terms:
- לָאו דַּחֲסִימָה (lav de-ḥasima) = The prohibition of muzzling — the paradigmatic specific prohibition from which the rules of flogging are derived (Deuteronomy 25:4)
- מְיַחַד לָאוֵיהּ (meyaḥed lavei) = “Its prohibition is specific” — the requirement that a prohibition address a single, defined action to warrant flogging