Menachot Daf 93 (מנחות דף צ״ג)
Daf: 93 | Amudim: 93a – 93b
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (93a)
Segment 1
TYPE: גמרא
Expounding three mentions of “his offering” regarding semikha
Hebrew/Aramaic:
קְרָאֵי לְמָה לִי? ״קׇרְבָּנוֹ״ – וְלֹא קׇרְבַּן חֲבֵירוֹ, ״קׇרְבָּנוֹ״ – וְלֹא קׇרְבַּן גּוֹי, ״קׇרְבָּנוֹ״ – לְרַבּוֹת כׇּל בַּעֲלֵי קׇרְבָּן לִסְמִיכָה.
English Translation:
if the repeated term “his offering” is not needed to counter the a fortiori inferences, why do I need these three verses? The Gemara explains: One instance of “his offering” teaches that one places hands only on one’s own offering, but not on an offering of another person. Another instance of “his offering” teaches that one places hands only on one’s own offering, but not on an offering of a gentile. The third instance of “his offering” serves to include all the owners of a jointly owned offering in the requirement of placing hands, i.e., they are all required to place their hands on the offering.
קלאוד על הדף:
This segment continues the Gemara’s analysis from the previous daf regarding the triple mention of “korbanno” (his offering) in the verses about semikha. Having established that these verses are not needed to counter a fortiori inferences, the Gemara now assigns each mention its own independent teaching: excluding another person’s offering, excluding a gentile’s offering, and including all co-owners of a joint offering in the obligation of semikha. The inclusion of co-owners is particularly significant — it establishes that semikha is a personal obligation that cannot be delegated, requiring each owner to physically lean on the animal.
Key Terms:
- סְמִיכָה (Semikha) = The rite of placing hands on the head of an offering before slaughter
- קׇרְבָּנוֹ (Korbanno) = “His offering” — the possessive form used to derive halakhic exclusions
Segment 2
TYPE: גמרא
Introduction: the heir’s status regarding semikha and substitution
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הַיּוֹרֵשׁ סוֹמֵךְ.
English Translation:
§ The mishna states: If the owner of an offering died, then the heir is regarded as the offering’s owner. Therefore, he places his hands on the offering and brings the accompanying libations, and he can substitute a non-sacred animal for it. Although it is prohibited to perform an act of substitution, if the owner of an offering does this, his attempt is successful to the extent that the non-sacred animal is thereby consecrated, even though the original offering also remains sacred.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara now turns to a new topic from the mishna on the previous daf: the status of an heir with respect to an inherited offering. The mishna’s ruling that an heir can perform semikha, bring libations, and effect substitution raises a fundamental question about the nature of inheritance in the sacrificial system. Does the heir step into the shoes of the deceased owner, or is the inherited offering considered “his” in its own right? This distinction will drive the dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda in the following segments.
Key Terms:
- יוֹרֵשׁ (Yoresh) = Heir — one who inherits an offering after the owner’s death
- תְּמוּרָה (Temura) = Substitution — attempting to exchange a consecrated animal for a non-sacred one, which results in both becoming sacred
Segment 3
TYPE: קושיא
Rav Hananya’s baraita contradicts the mishna on heir’s semikha
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תָּנֵי רַב חֲנַנְיָה קַמֵּיהּ דְּרָבָא: יוֹרֵשׁ אֵינוֹ סוֹמֵךְ, יוֹרֵשׁ אֵינוֹ מֵימֵר. וְהָא אֲנַן תְּנַן: הַיּוֹרֵשׁ סוֹמֵךְ, וּמֵבִיא אֶת נְסָכָיו, וּמֵימֵר.
English Translation:
Rav Ḥananya taught a baraita in the presence of Rava: An heir does not place hands on an offering he inherited, and an heir cannot substitute a non-sacred animal for an offering he inherited. Rava asked: But didn’t we learn in the mishna: The heir places his hands on the offering, and brings the accompanying libations, and he can substitute a non-sacred animal for it and thereby consecrate the non-sacred animal?
קלאוד על הדף:
A direct contradiction emerges between Rav Hananya’s baraita and the mishna. The baraita rules that an heir cannot perform semikha or effect substitution, while the mishna explicitly states the opposite. Rava highlights this tension by citing the mishna against the baraita. This sets up a classic Talmudic resolution: rather than emending the text, Rava will identify the baraita as reflecting a different Tannaitic opinion.
Key Terms:
- מֵימֵר (Meimir) = To effect substitution — the technical term for the act of attempting to exchange a consecrated animal for another
Segment 4
TYPE: תירוץ
Rava resolves: the mishna follows the Rabbis, the baraita follows Rabbi Yehuda
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אֶיפְכַאּי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לָא, מַתְנִיתִין מַנִּי? רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא, דְּתַנְיָא: יוֹרֵשׁ סוֹמֵךְ, יוֹרֵשׁ מֵימֵר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: יוֹרֵשׁ אֵינוֹ סוֹמֵךְ, יוֹרֵשׁ אֵינוֹ מֵימֵר.
English Translation:
Rav Ḥananya said to Rava: Should I reverse the current version of the baraita to have it be in accordance with the mishna? Rava said to him: No, as whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? It is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as it is taught in a baraita: An heir places hands, and an heir can effect substitution. Rabbi Yehuda says: An heir does not place hands, and an heir cannot effect substitution.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rather than emending the baraita (a practice called “eifkhai” — reversing), Rava resolves the contradiction by attributing the two sources to different Tannaitic opinions. The mishna follows the Rabbis (who hold that an heir can perform semikha and substitution), while Rav Hananya’s baraita reflects Rabbi Yehuda’s view. Note the somewhat unusual attribution: typically the anonymous mishna reflects the majority Rabbinic view, and here the text labels it as “Rabbi Yehuda” — meaning the anonymous first opinion in the baraita is actually the Rabbis’ view, and Rabbi Yehuda is the dissenting minority.
Key Terms:
- אֶיפְכַאּי (Eifkhai) = “Should I reverse it?” — a proposal to emend a textual tradition to resolve contradictions
- מַתְנִיתִין מַנִּי (Matnitin manni) = “Whose opinion is the mishna?” — a standard Talmudic formula for attributing an anonymous mishna
Segment 5
TYPE: גמרא
Rabbi Yehuda’s reasoning: “his offering” excludes inherited offerings
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה? ״קׇרְבָּנוֹ״ – וְלֹא קׇרְבַּן אָבִיו, וְיָלֵיף תְּחִלַּת הֶקְדֵּשׁ מִסּוֹף הֶקְדֵּשׁ: מָה סוֹף הֶקְדֵּשׁ – יוֹרֵשׁ אֵינוֹ סוֹמֵךְ, אַף תְּחִילַּת הֶקְדֵּשׁ – יוֹרֵשׁ אֵינוֹ מֵימֵר.
English Translation:
The Gemara clarifies: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda? He expounds the term “his offering” as teaching that one places hands only on one’s own offering, but not on one’s father’s offering that one inherited. And furthermore, Rabbi Yehuda derives the halakha concerning who can substitute a non-sacred animal for an offering, which is the initial stage of consecration, from the halakha concerning who performs the rite of placing hands on the offering, which is the final stage of consecration: Just as with regard to the final stage of consecration, an heir does not place his hands, so too, with regard to the initial stage of consecration, an heir cannot effect substitution.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yehuda’s reasoning operates on two levels. First, he reads “korbanno” — “his offering” — as strictly possessive, excluding an offering inherited from one’s father. Second, he employs a logical derivation from the “end of consecration” (semikha, performed just before slaughter) to the “beginning of consecration” (temura, the act of substitution that creates new sanctity). This conceptual framework treats semikha and temura as two ends of the same spectrum, so that if an heir is excluded from one, he is excluded from the other.
Key Terms:
- תְּחִלַּת הֶקְדֵּשׁ (Tehillat Hekdesh) = Initial stage of consecration — here referring to temura/substitution
- סוֹף הֶקְדֵּשׁ (Sof Hekdesh) = Final stage of consecration — here referring to semikha before slaughter
Segment 6
TYPE: גמרא
The Rabbis’ reasoning: “hamer yamir” includes the heir
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְרַבָּנַן: ״הָמֵר יָמִיר״ – לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַיּוֹרֵשׁ, וְיָלֵיף סוֹף הֶקְדֵּשׁ מִתְּחִילַּת הֶקְדֵּשׁ: מָה תְּחִלַּת הֶקְדֵּשׁ – יוֹרֵשׁ מֵימֵר, אַף סוֹף הֶקְדֵּשׁ – יוֹרֵשׁ סוֹמֵךְ.
English Translation:
And as for the Rabbis, from where do they derive their opinion? The verse states: “If he shall substitute [hamer yamir] animal for animal” (Leviticus 27:10), with the doubled form of hamer yamir serving to include the heir as one capable of effecting substitution. And furthermore, they derive the halakha concerning who performs the rite of placing hands, which is the final stage of consecration, from the halakha concerning who can effect substitution, which is an initial stage of consecration: Just as with regard to the initial stage of consecration, an heir can effect substitution, so too, with regard to the final stage of consecration, an heir places his hands.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Rabbis use the same logical framework as Rabbi Yehuda but arrive at the opposite conclusion. They derive from the doubled verb “hamer yamir” that the Torah includes the heir in the law of substitution. Then they apply the same derivation between initial and final stages of consecration — but in reverse: since the heir CAN effect substitution (initial stage), he CAN also perform semikha (final stage). This elegant symmetry shows how the same interpretive tool yields opposite results depending on the starting premise.
Key Terms:
- הָמֵר יָמִיר (Hamer Yamir) = “If he shall substitute” — the doubled verbal form in Leviticus 27:10, used by the Rabbis as an inclusive derivation
Segment 7
TYPE: גמרא
How the Rabbis expound all three mentions of “his offering”
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְרַבָּנַן, הַאי ״קׇרְבָּנוֹ״ מַאי עָבְדִי לֵיהּ? ״קׇרְבָּנוֹ״ – וְלֹא קׇרְבַּן גּוֹי, ״קׇרְבָּנוֹ״ – וְלֹא קׇרְבַּן חֲבֵירוֹ, ״קׇרְבָּנוֹ״ – לְרַבּוֹת כׇּל בַּעֲלֵי קׇרְבָּן לִסְמִיכָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: And as for the Rabbis, what do they do with this term: “His offering”? The Gemara explains how the Rabbis expound each mention of the term. One instance of “his offering” teaches that one places hands only on one’s own offering, but not on an offering of a gentile. Another instance of “his offering” teaches that one places hands only on one’s own offering, but not on an offering of another person. The third instance of “his offering” serves to include all the owners of a jointly owned offering in the requirement of placing hands, i.e., they are all required to place their hands on the offering.
קלאוד על הדף:
Having presented the Rabbis’ positive derivation from “hamer yamir,” the Gemara now asks: if the Rabbis don’t use “korbanno” to exclude an heir, what do they do with the three mentions? The Rabbis assign each mention to the same three teachings as in Segment 1 — excluding a gentile, excluding another person, and including all co-owners. Since they have no need to exclude an heir (having already included him from “hamer yamir”), all three mentions are fully accounted for without yielding Rabbi Yehuda’s exclusion.
Key Terms:
- בַּעֲלֵי קׇרְבָּן (Ba’alei Korban) = Owners of an offering — here referring to co-owners of a jointly owned sacrifice
Segment 8
TYPE: גמרא
How Rabbi Yehuda has a spare verse to exclude the heir
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, לְרַבּוֹת כׇּל בַּעֲלֵי קׇרְבָּן לִסְמִיכָה – לֵית לֵיהּ, וְאִי נָמֵי אִית לֵיהּ – גּוֹי וַחֲבֵירוֹ מֵחַד קְרָא נָפְקָא. אִיַּיתַּרוּ לֵיהּ תְּרֵי קְרָאֵי: חַד – ״קׇרְבָּנוֹ״ וְלֹא קׇרְבַּן אָבִיו, וְאִידַּךְ – לְרַבּוֹת כׇּל בַּעֲלֵי קׇרְבָּן לִסְמִיכָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara clarifies: And Rabbi Yehuda does not hold that one of the mentions serves to include all the owners of a jointly owned offering in the requirement of placing hands, so he is able to expound it to exclude an heir from the requirement. Alternatively, if he holds that one of the mentions serves to include owners of a jointly owned offering, then he must derive that one does not place hands on the offering of a gentile or of another person from the same one mention in the verse, which leaves him two more mentions in the verses. One he expounds to teach that on “his offering” he places hands, but not on his father’s offering that he inherited, and the other mention remains to include all the owners of a jointly owned offering in the requirement of placing hands.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara explains how Rabbi Yehuda has a “spare” mention of “korbanno” available to exclude an heir. The Gemara offers two possibilities: either Rabbi Yehuda does not derive the co-owner inclusion at all, freeing up a verse for the heir exclusion; or, even if he does hold of the co-owner inclusion, he can derive the gentile and another-person exclusions from a single verse (since they are similar concepts), leaving two verses — one for the heir exclusion and one for the co-owner inclusion. This demonstrates the Gemara’s careful accounting of how each opinion allocates its verses.
Key Terms:
- אִיַּיתַּרוּ (Iyyatru) = They remain extra — a term indicating that certain verses are available for additional derivations
Segment 9
TYPE: גמרא
Rabbi Yehuda uses “hamer yamir” to include women in substitution
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, הַאי ״הָמֵר יָמִיר״ מַאי עָבֵיד לֵיהּ? מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הָאִשָּׁה, דְּתַנְיָא: לְפִי שֶׁכׇּל הָעִנְיָן כּוּלּוֹ אֵינוֹ מְדַבֵּר אֶלָּא בִּלְשׁוֹן זָכָר, מָה סוֹפֵינוּ לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הָאִשָּׁה? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״הָמֵר יָמִיר״.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Yehuda, what does he do with the use of the doubled form in this verse: “If he shall substitute [hamer yamir]”? The Gemara answers: He requires it to include a woman among those who can effect substitution. As it is taught in a baraita: Since the entire matter of substitution is stated in the Torah only in the masculine form, what is the reason that we ultimately come to include a woman? The verse states: “If he shall substitute [hamer yamir],” using a doubled form.
קלאוד על הדף:
Since Rabbi Yehuda does not use the doubled “hamer yamir” to include an heir (as the Rabbis do), the Gemara asks what he does with it. His answer: it includes women in the law of substitution. Since the entire passage of temura is written in masculine language, without the doubled form, women might have been excluded. This reveals a key principle in Talmudic exegesis: when a verse uses a doubled verbal form, each opinion must account for the surplus, even if they differ on what it includes.
Key Terms:
- לְשׁוֹן זָכָר (Leshon Zakhar) = Masculine language — the default grammatical form in which many Torah passages are written
Segment 10
TYPE: גמרא
The Rabbis derive women’s inclusion from “ve-im” instead
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְרַבָּנַן דָּרְשִׁי מִ״וְּאִם״, וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה ״וְאִם״ לָא דָּרֵישׁ.
English Translation:
And as for the Rabbis, they derive that a woman can effect substitution from the term: “And if” (Leviticus 27:10), in the phrase “and if he shall substitute.” And Rabbi Yehuda does not expound the term “and if” at all.
קלאוד על הדף:
This brief but important segment closes the exegetical circle. Both opinions agree that women can effect substitution — they simply differ on the source. The Rabbis derive it from “ve-im” (and if), while Rabbi Yehuda derives it from the doubled “hamer yamir.” The underlying methodological difference is that Rabbi Yehuda does not treat the conjunction “ve-im” as an independent exegetical source, a position that appears elsewhere in the Talmud. This completes the comprehensive analysis of the dispute over the heir’s status.
Key Terms:
- וְאִם (Ve-im) = “And if” — a conjunction that the Rabbis treat as exegetically significant but Rabbi Yehuda does not
Segment 11
TYPE: משנה
Who is excluded from the requirement of placing hands (semikha)
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְנִי׳ הַכֹּל סוֹמְכִין, חוּץ מֵחֵרֵשׁ, שׁוֹטֶה, וְקָטָן, וְסוֹמֵא, וְגוֹי, וְהָעֶבֶד, וְהַשָּׁלִיחַ, וְהָאִשָּׁה.
English Translation:
MISHNA: Everyone who brings an animal offering places hands upon its head, except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, a minor, a blind person, a gentile, a Canaanite slave, the agent of the owner of the offering who brings the offering on the owner’s behalf, and a woman.
קלאוד על הדף:
A new mishna enumerates the eight categories of people excluded from the obligation of semikha. The first three (deaf-mute, imbecile, minor) are the standard trio excluded from mitzvot due to lack of legal competence. The others — blind person, gentile, slave, agent, and woman — each require their own scriptural source, which the Gemara will now proceed to identify. The broad opening statement “everyone places hands” establishes semikha as a universal obligation, making the listed exceptions stand out as requiring specific derivation.
Key Terms:
- חֵרֵשׁ, שׁוֹטֶה, וְקָטָן (Cheresh, Shoteh, v’Katan) = Deaf-mute, imbecile, and minor — the standard trio lacking legal competence for mitzvot
- סוֹמֵא (Summa) = Blind person — excluded from semikha through a verbal analogy
Segment 12
TYPE: משנה
Semikha is a non-essential mitzva (shiyarei mitzva)
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּסְמִיכָה – שְׁיָרֵי מִצְוָה.
English Translation:
And the requirement of placing hands is a non-essential mitzva; therefore, failure to place hands does not prevent the owner from achieving atonement.
קלאוד על הדף:
This brief but significant ruling establishes that semikha, while obligatory, is not indispensable (me’akev) for the validity of the offering. If an owner fails to perform semikha — whether through negligence or inability — the sacrifice still achieves atonement. This classification has practical implications: it means the excluded categories listed in the previous segment (women, agents, etc.) can still bring valid offerings even though they cannot perform semikha. The Gemara below will explore the scriptural basis for this classification.
Key Terms:
- שְׁיָרֵי מִצְוָה (Shiyarei Mitzva) = Non-essential component of a mitzva — an obligation whose omission does not invalidate the act
- מְעַכֵּב (Me’akev) = Indispensable — the opposite status, where omission would invalidate
Segment 13
TYPE: משנה
Details of semikha: on the head, with two hands, immediately before slaughter
Hebrew/Aramaic:
עַל הָרֹאשׁ בִּשְׁתֵּי יָדַיִם, וּבִמְקוֹם שֶׁסּוֹמְכִין שׁוֹחֲטִין, וְתֵכֶף לִסְמִיכָה שְׁחִיטָה.
English Translation:
The rite of placing hands is performed by leaning on the head of the offering with two hands. And in the same location in the Temple that one places hands, one slaughters the animal. And immediately following the rite of placing hands, the slaughter is performed.
קלאוד על הדף:
The mishna specifies three procedural details of semikha: it must be on the head (not another body part), with both hands, and it must immediately precede slaughter in the same location. These three rules create a seamless ritual sequence — the owner leans with full force on the animal’s head, and the slaughter follows without interruption. The requirement of immediacy (tekhef) between semikha and slaughter also explains why they must occur in the same place: there is no time to move the animal between the two acts.
Key Terms:
- תֵּכֶף לִסְמִיכָה שְׁחִיטָה (Tekhef li-Semikha Shekhita) = Immediately following placing hands is the slaughter — a procedural requirement linking the two rites
Segment 14
TYPE: גמרא
Gemara asks: why is a blind person excluded from semikha?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גְּמָ׳ בִּשְׁלָמָא חֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן, דְּלָאו בְּנֵי דֵעָה נִינְהוּ. גּוֹי נָמֵי – ״בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל״ סוֹמְכִין וְאֵין גּוֹיִם סוֹמְכִין. אֶלָּא סוֹמֵא מַאי טַעְמָא לָא?
English Translation:
GEMARA: The Gemara explains why certain types of people do not place hands on an offering: Granted, a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor do not place their hands on the offering, as they are not mentally competent. The exclusion of a gentile is also understandable, as the verses concerning placing hands are introduced with: “Speak to the children of Israel and say to them” (Leviticus 1:2), which indicates that the children of Israel place hands upon their offerings, but gentiles do not place their hands upon their offerings. But with regard to a blind person, what is the reason that he does not place his hands on his offering?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara methodically works through the mishna’s exclusion list. Some exclusions are straightforward: the deaf-mute, imbecile, and minor lack legal competence, and gentiles are excluded by the explicit address “children of Israel.” But a blind person is a fully competent Jewish adult — why should he be excluded from semikha? This question sets up a dispute between Rav Hisda and Rav Yitzhak bar Avdimi about the scriptural source, which will occupy the end of amud aleph and the beginning of amud bet.
Key Terms:
- בְּנֵי דֵעָה (Bnei De’a) = Persons of mental competence — the standard qualification for legal obligations
Segment 15
TYPE: מחלוקת
First opinion: blind person excluded via gezera shava from Elders of the congregation
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַב חִסְדָּא וְרַב יִצְחָק בַּר אַבְדִּימִי, חַד אָמַר: אָתְיָא סְמִיכָה סְמִיכָה מִ״זִּקְנֵי עֵדָה״.
English Translation:
Rav Ḥisda and Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi disagree as to the source of the exclusion of a blind person. One said that it is derived from a verbal analogy between the mention of placing hands in the passage detailing the general requirement to do so, and the mention of placing hands stated with regard to the bull offering brought for a community-wide violation perpetrated due to an erroneous ruling of the Sanhedrin, which is performed by the Elders of the congregation, i.e., the judges of the Sanhedrin: Just as the judges may not be blind (see Sanhedrin 34b), so too the rite of placing hands is not performed by a blind person.
קלאוד על הדף:
One Amora derives the blind person’s exclusion from a gezera shava (verbal analogy) linking the word “semikha” in the general offering context to “semikha” in the context of the bull brought for a communal sin (par he’elem davar). In that case, the Elders of the Sanhedrin perform semikha, and Sanhedrin judges must be able to see. By analogy, all semikha requires sight. This is a powerful derivation because it links the individual’s offering to the communal judicial process.
Key Terms:
- גְּזֵרָה שָׁוָה (Gezera Shava) = Verbal analogy — a hermeneutical rule deriving halakhot from identical words in different contexts
- זִקְנֵי עֵדָה (Ziknei Eda) = Elders of the congregation — the judges of the Sanhedrin who place hands on the communal sin offering
Segment 16
TYPE: מחלוקת
Second opinion: blind person excluded via gezera shava from the burnt offering of appearance
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְחַד אָמַר: אָתְיָא סְמִיכָה סְמִיכָה מֵעוֹלַת רְאִיָּיה.
English Translation:
And the other one said that it is derived from a verbal analogy between the mention of placing hands in the passage detailing the general requirement to do so, and the mention of placing hands stated with regard to the burnt offering of appearance brought by an individual on the pilgrimage Festivals: Just as a blind person is exempt from making the pilgrimage to Jerusalem and bringing the offering (see Ḥagiga 2a), so too he is excluding from the requirement of placing hands.
קלאוד על הדף:
The alternative derivation links semikha to the burnt offering of appearance (olat re’iya) brought on the three pilgrimage Festivals. Since the obligation of re’iya uses the verb “yera’eh” (to be seen/to appear), which implies sight, a blind person is exempt from the pilgrimage and its associated offerings. By verbal analogy with the shared term “semikha,” this exemption extends to all semikha. This approach derives from an individual offering rather than a communal one, a distinction that will prove significant in the Gemara’s analysis on amud bet.
Key Terms:
- עוֹלַת רְאִיָּיה (Olat Re’iya) = Burnt offering of appearance — the obligatory offering brought upon appearing at the Temple on the pilgrimage Festivals
Segment 17
TYPE: קושיא
Why doesn’t the second opinion derive from the Elders of the congregation?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּלְמַאן דְּאָמַר מֵעוֹלַת רְאִיָּיה, מַאי טַעְמָא לָא יָלֵיף מִן זִקְנֵי עֵדָה?
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: And according to the one who said that the exclusion of a blind person is derived from the burnt offering of appearance, what is the reason that he does not derive this from the placing of hands performed by the Elders of the congregation?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara challenges the second opinion: if both derivations reach the same conclusion (excluding a blind person), why prefer the olat re’iya source over the Elders? This question probes the methodology behind choosing one gezera shava over another. The answer, which appears at the top of amud bet, will invoke the principle that one should derive individual laws from individual cases rather than from communal ones — a significant hermeneutical preference.
Key Terms:
- דָּנִין יָחִיד מִיָּחִיד (Danin Yahid mi-Yahid) = One derives the law of an individual from another individual case — a preference for analogies between similar categories
Amud Bet (93b)
Segment 1
TYPE: תירוץ
One derives individual from individual, not individual from communal
Hebrew/Aramaic:
דָּנִין יָחִיד מִיָּחִיד, וְאֵין דָּנִין יָחִיד מִצִּיבּוּר.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: He holds that one derives the halakhot of the offering of an individual from the halakhot of another offering of an individual, such as the burnt offering of appearance, and one does not derive the halakhot of the offering of an individual from the halakhot of a communal offering, e.g., the bull brought for a community-wide violation.
קלאוד על הדף:
This succinct answer articulates a fundamental hermeneutical preference: when choosing between two possible sources for a gezera shava, one should prefer a source from the same category. Since the question concerns semikha by an individual on his personal offering, it is better to derive from another individual offering (olat re’iya) than from a communal offering (par he’elem davar). This principle reflects the Talmudic understanding that analogies are stronger when the compared cases are structurally similar.
Key Terms:
- יָחִיד (Yahid) = Individual — referring to a private offering
- צִיבּוּר (Tzibbur) = Community — referring to a communal offering
Segment 2
TYPE: תירוץ
Counter-argument: one derives from explicit sources, not derived sources
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּלְמַאן דְּיָלֵיף מִזִּקְנֵי עֵדָה, מַאי טַעְמָא לָא יָלֵיף מֵעוֹלַת רְאִיָּיה? דָּנִין מִידֵּי דִּכְתִיב בֵּיהּ סְמִיכָה בְּגוּפֵיהּ, מִמִּידֵּי דִּכְתִיב בֵּיהּ סְמִיכָה בְּגוּפֵיהּ, לְאַפּוֹקֵי עוֹלַת רְאִיָּיה, דְּהִיא גּוּפַהּ מֵעוֹלַת נְדָבָה גָּמְרָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: And according to the one who said that the exclusion of a blind person is derived from the placing of hands performed by the Elders of the congregation, what is the reason that he does not derive this from the burnt offering of appearance? The Gemara answers: He holds that one derives the halakhot of a matter concerning which the requirement of placing hands is explicitly written with regard to that case itself, as is the case in the passage detailing the general requirement of placing hands, from another matter concerning which placing hands is also explicitly written with regard to that case itself, as is the case in the passage describing the bull brought for a community-wide violation of a sin. This serves to exclude the possibility of deriving the halakhot from those of the burnt offering of appearance, as the requirement to place hands upon it is not explicitly written in the Torah with regard to it, but rather it itself is derived from the requirement stated with regard to a voluntary burnt offering.
קלאוד על הדף:
The first opinion counters with a different hermeneutical principle: one should derive from a case where the law is stated explicitly in the Torah, not from a case where the law itself is derived from yet another source. The par he’elem davar has semikha stated explicitly in the Torah, while the olat re’iya’s semikha requirement is itself derived from the voluntary burnt offering. A derivation based on a derivation is considered weaker. This elegant clash of principles — “same category” versus “explicit source” — shows how different hermeneutical priorities lead to different conclusions.
Key Terms:
- סְמִיכָה בְּגוּפֵיהּ (Semikha be-Gufei) = Placing hands explicitly stated regarding that case itself — i.e., not derived from another source
- עוֹלַת נְדָבָה (Olat Nedava) = Voluntary burnt offering — the primary source from which the olat re’iya’s semikha is derived
Segment 3
TYPE: גמרא
Proof: olat re’iya’s semikha is derived from olat nedava via Leviticus 9:16
Hebrew/Aramaic:
דְּתָנֵי תַּנָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב יִצְחָק בַּר אַבָּא: ״וַיַּקְרֵב אֶת הָעֹלָה וַיַּעֲשֶׂהָ כַּמִּשְׁפָּט״ – כְּמִשְׁפַּט עוֹלַת נְדָבָה, לִימֵּד עַל עוֹלַת חוֹבָה שֶׁטְּעוּנָה סְמִיכָה.
English Translation:
This is as a tanna taught in a baraita in the presence of Rav Yitzḥak bar Abba: With regard to the obligatory offering brought by Aaron the High Priest on the eighth day of the inauguration of the Tabernacle, it is written: “And the burnt offering was presented, and he sacrificed in accordance with the ordinance” (Leviticus 9:16). This last phrase means: In accordance with the ordinance of a voluntary burnt offering. Accordingly, this verse teaches about every obligatory burnt offering, including the burnt offering of appearance, that it requires placing hands, just as a voluntary burnt offering does.
קלאוד על הדף:
This baraita provides the proof that the olat re’iya’s requirement of semikha is not stated explicitly but rather derived from Leviticus 9:16, where Aaron’s obligatory burnt offering is described as being performed “in accordance with the ordinance” — understood as the ordinance governing voluntary burnt offerings. Since this derivation establishes that ALL obligatory burnt offerings (including the olat re’iya) require semikha, it confirms that the olat re’iya’s semikha is a “derived” law, which the first opinion considers a weaker basis for a gezera shava.
Key Terms:
- כַּמִּשְׁפָּט (Ka-Mishpat) = “In accordance with the ordinance” — the phrase that links obligatory offerings to the laws of voluntary offerings
- עוֹלַת חוֹבָה (Olat Hova) = Obligatory burnt offering — any burnt offering required by law, as opposed to a voluntary one
Segment 4
TYPE: גמרא
Three mentions of “his hand” exclude slave, agent, and wife from semikha
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהָעֶבֶד וְהַשָּׁלִיחַ וְהָאִשָּׁה. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״יָדוֹ״ – וְלֹא יַד עַבְדּוֹ, ״יָדוֹ״ – וְלֹא יַד שְׁלוּחוֹ, ״יָדוֹ״ – וְלֹא יַד אִשְׁתּוֹ.
English Translation:
§ The mishna states: A Canaanite slave, the agent of the owner of the offering who brings the offering on his behalf, and a woman do not place hands on their offerings. Concerning these halakhot, the Sages taught in a baraita: The term “his hand” is mentioned three times in Leviticus, chapter 3, which details the requirement of placing hands. Each mention is expounded to exclude a different case. “His hand” (Leviticus 3:2), but not the hand of his Canaanite slave; “his hand” (Leviticus 3:8), but not the hand of his agent; “his hand” (Leviticus 3:13), but not the hand of his wife.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara now addresses three more exclusions from the mishna. Following the same pattern seen with “korbanno” (his offering), the three mentions of “yado” (his hand) in Leviticus 3 are each assigned to exclude a different person from performing semikha on the owner’s behalf. The word “his” emphasizes personal performance — it must be his own hand, not that of his slave, agent, or wife. The Gemara will next explain why all three mentions are necessary.
Key Terms:
- יָדוֹ (Yado) = “His hand” — the possessive form used to derive that semikha must be performed personally
- שָׁלִיחַ (Shaliach) = Agent — one appointed to act on another’s behalf
Segment 5
TYPE: גמרא
Why all three exclusions are necessary — the slave vs. agent distinction
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כֹּל הָנֵי לְמָה לִי? צְרִיכָא, אִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא חַד, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא לְמַעוֹטֵי עֶבֶד, דְּלָאו בַּר מִצְוֹת, אֲבָל שָׁלִיחַ דְּבַר מִצְוָה הוּא, וּשְׁלוּחוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם כְּמוֹתוֹ, אֵימָא לִסְמוֹךְ.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: Why do I need all these three exclusions? The Gemara explains that all three mentions are necessary, as had the Merciful One written only one exclusion, I would say that it serves to exclude only a Canaanite slave, as since he is not commanded in mitzvot it is reasonable that he cannot perform the rite of placing hands. But with regard to an agent, since he is commanded in mitzvot, and there is a principle that the halakhic status of a person’s agent is like that of himself, one might say that he could place his hands on the offering of the owner on the owner’s behalf, and thereby fulfill the requirement. Therefore, it is necessary to have an independent source to exclude an agent.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara employs the classic “tzrikha” (necessity) formula to demonstrate that none of the three exclusions is redundant. If the Torah had written only one exclusion, we would apply it to the weakest case — the Canaanite slave, who is not fully obligated in mitzvot. We could not have extended this to an agent, because the powerful principle of “sheluho shel adam kamoto” (a person’s agent is like himself) would suggest that an agent could perform semikha on the owner’s behalf. This reveals that semikha has an inherent personal character that overrides the general principle of agency.
Key Terms:
- שְׁלוּחוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם כְּמוֹתוֹ (Sheluho shel Adam Kamoto) = A person’s agent is like himself — the general principle of halakhic agency
- צְרִיכָא (Tzerikha) = It is necessary — the standard formula explaining why multiple sources are needed
Segment 6
TYPE: גמרא
Why the wife’s exclusion is also necessary — she is “like his own flesh”
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן הָנֵי תַּרְתֵּי, דְּלָאו כְּגוּפֵיהּ דָּמְיָא, אֲבָל אִשְׁתּוֹ דִּכְגוּפֵיהּ דָּמְיָא, אֵימָא תִּיסְמֹךְ – צְרִיכָא.
English Translation:
And had the Merciful One taught us only these two halakhot, one would have excluded only a Canaanite slave and an agent, as they are not considered like his own flesh. But with regard to his wife, who is considered like his own flesh, one might say that she places her hands on her husband’s offering. Therefore, the third mention is necessary to teach that even a wife cannot fulfill the requirement on behalf of her husband.
קלאוד על הדף:
The third step in the necessity argument: even after excluding a slave (not obligated in mitzvot) and an agent (not the owner’s “flesh”), one might have thought a wife could perform semikha since she is considered “like his own body” (ke-gufo). This concept, rooted in the idea of marital unity, is stronger than mere agency. Yet the Torah excludes even her, definitively establishing that semikha is an irreducibly personal act that cannot be performed by any proxy.
Key Terms:
- כְּגוּפֵיהּ דָּמְיָא (Ke-Gufei Damya) = She is considered like his own flesh — the halakhic concept that husband and wife share a single legal identity in certain respects
Segment 7
TYPE: ברייתא
Semikha as non-essential: the verse implies blame but not invalidation
Hebrew/Aramaic:
סְמִיכָה שְׁיָרֵי מִצְוָה. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״וְסָמַךְ״ ״וְנִרְצָה״, וְכִי סְמִיכָה מְכַפֶּרֶת? וַהֲלֹא אֵין כַּפָּרָה אֶלָּא בַּדָּם, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״כִּי הַדָּם הוּא בַּנֶּפֶשׁ יְכַפֵּר״! אֶלָּא לוֹמַר לָךְ, שֶׁאִם עֲשָׂאָהּ לִסְמִיכָה שְׁיָרֵי מִצְוָה, מַעֲלֶה עָלָיו הַכָּתוּב כְּאִילּוּ לֹא כִּיפֵּר, וְכִיפֵּר.
English Translation:
§ The mishna states: The requirement of placing hands is a non-essential mitzva. The Sages taught in a baraita: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the burnt offering, and it shall be accepted for him to effect atonement for him” (Leviticus 1:4). The baraita asks: But does the rite of placing hands effect atonement? Isn’t atonement effected only through the presentation of the blood? As it is stated with regard to blood: “For the soul of the flesh is in the blood, and I have given it to you upon the altar to effect atonement for your souls, for it is the blood of the soul that effects atonement” (Leviticus 17:11). Rather, the verse serves to say to you that if one treated placing hands as though it were a non-essential mitzva and therefore neglected to perform it, then the verse ascribes him blame as though he did not effect atonement; but nevertheless, in actuality, the offering atones for his sin and he does not need to bring another offering.
קלאוד על הדף:
This baraita resolves an apparent contradiction between two verses. Leviticus 1:4 links semikha to atonement (“and it shall be accepted for him to effect atonement”), yet Leviticus 17:11 states definitively that only blood effects atonement. The resolution creates an elegant middle ground: semikha is obligatory, and neglecting it is blameworthy (“as though he did not atone”), but the offering is nonetheless effective. This concept of “shiyarei mitzva” — non-essential components — applies throughout the sacrificial system, distinguishing between what is ideal and what is indispensable.
Key Terms:
- כַּפָּרָה (Kappara) = Atonement — the spiritual effect of the offering
- מַעֲלֶה עָלָיו הַכָּתוּב כְּאִילּוּ לֹא כִּיפֵּר = The verse ascribes him blame as though he did not atone — a formulation indicating moral but not legal consequences
Segment 8
TYPE: ברייתא
Parallel teaching: waving (tenufa) is also a non-essential mitzva
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְתַנְיָא גַּבֵּי תְנוּפָה כִּי הַאי גַוְונָא: ״לִתְנוּפָה לְכַפֵּר״, וְכִי תְּנוּפָה מְכַפֶּרֶת? וַהֲלֹא אֵין כַּפָּרָה אֶלָּא בַּדָּם, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״כִּי הַדָּם הוּא בַּנֶּפֶשׁ יְכַפֵּר״! אֶלָּא לוֹמַר לָךְ, שֶׁאִם עֲשָׂאָהּ לִתְנוּפָה שְׁיָרֵי מִצְוָה, מַעֲלֶה עָלָיו הַכָּתוּב כְּאִילּוּ לֹא כִּיפֵּר, וְכִיפֵּר.
English Translation:
And it is taught in a baraita with regard to waving in this way: “He shall take one male lamb as a guilt offering to be waved to effect atonement for him” (Leviticus 14:21). The baraita asks: Does waving the offering effect atonement? Isn’t atonement effected only through the presentation of the blood? As it is stated: “For it is the blood of the soul that effects atonement” (Leviticus 17:11). Rather, the verse serves to say to you that if one treated waving as though it were a non-essential mitzva and therefore neglected to perform it, then the verse ascribes him blame as though he did not effect atonement; but nevertheless, in actuality, the offering effects atonement for his sin and he does not need to bring another offering.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara brings a parallel baraita showing that the same logic applies to tenufa (waving). Leviticus 14:21 links waving to atonement, yet blood alone effects atonement. The resolution is identical: waving is obligatory but non-essential, and neglecting it brings blame without invalidating the offering. This parallel strengthens the mishna’s classification of semikha by showing it is not an isolated case — the principle of “shiyarei mitzva” applies to multiple ritual components of the sacrificial service. This parallel is particularly relevant because the upcoming mishna will compare semikha and tenufa directly.
Key Terms:
- תְּנוּפָה (Tenufa) = Waving — the ritual of moving offering portions back and forth before God
Segment 9
TYPE: ברייתא
Three mentions of “his hand upon the head” exclude neck, back, and breast
Hebrew/Aramaic:
עַל הָרֹאשׁ, תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״יָדוֹ עַל הָרֹאשׁ״ – וְלֹא יָדוֹ עַל הַצַּוָּאר, ״יָדוֹ עַל הָרֹאשׁ״ – וְלֹא יָדוֹ עַל הַגַּבַּיִים, ״יָדוֹ עַל הָרֹאשׁ״ – וְלֹא יָדוֹ עַל הֶחָזֶה.
English Translation:
§ The mishna further states that that placing hands is performed by leaning on the head of the offering. The Sages taught in a baraita: The phrase “his hand upon the head” is mentioned three times in Leviticus, chapter 3. Each mention is expounded to exclude the possibility of performing the rite on a different part of the animal’s body. Placing hands is performed with “his hand upon the head” (Leviticus 3:2), but not with his hand on the neck of the animal; with “his hand upon the head” (Leviticus 3:8), but not with his hand on the back of the animal; with “his hand upon the head” (Leviticus 3:13), but not with his hand on the breast of the animal.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara turns to another mishna ruling: semikha must be performed on the head. Three mentions of “his hand upon the head” in Leviticus 3 each exclude a different body part — the neck, the back, and the breast. The pattern mirrors the earlier analysis of “korbanno” and “yado”: repetitions in the Torah are never superfluous and must each teach something distinct. The following segments will explain why each exclusion is independently necessary.
Key Terms:
- צַוָּאר (Tzavar) = Neck
- גַּבַּיִים (Gabayim) = Back
- חָזֶה (Hazeh) = Breast
Segment 10
TYPE: גמרא
Why the neck exclusion alone is insufficient — the back is level with the head
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כֹּל הָנֵי לְמָה לִי? צְרִיכִי, דְּאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא חַד לְמַעוֹטֵי צַוָּאר, דְּלָא קָאֵי בַּהֲדֵי רֹאשׁוֹ, אֲבָל גַּבּוֹ דְּקָאֵי לַהֲדֵי רֹאשׁוֹ אֵימָא לָא, צְרִיכָא.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: Why do I need all these three exclusions? The Gemara explains that all three mentions are necessary, as had the Merciful One written only one exclusion, I would say that it serves to exclude only the animal’s neck, as it is not level with the head of the animal. But with regard to its back, which is level with its head, one might say that it is not precluded and that one can fulfill the requirement by placing one’s hands there. Therefore, it is necessary to have an independent source to exclude the animal’s back.
קלאוד על הדף:
The necessity argument here is based on physical proximity. The neck is below and behind the head, so it is the easiest to distinguish from the head. But the back of the animal is level with the head, making it a more plausible alternative location for semikha. Without an independent exclusion, one might have thought that any location at the same height as the head would suffice. The Gemara’s physical reasoning — considering the animal’s anatomy — adds a concrete dimension to the halakhic analysis.
Key Terms:
- קָאֵי בַּהֲדֵי רֹאשׁוֹ (Ka’ei ba-Hadei Rosho) = It stands level with its head — a physical criterion distinguishing which body parts are more similar to the head
Segment 11
TYPE: גמרא
Why the breast exclusion is also necessary — the breast has ritual significance (tenufa)
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן הָנֵי תְּרֵי, מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא אִיתְרַבִּי לִתְנוּפָה, אֲבָל חָזֶה דְּאִיתְרַבִּי לִתְנוּפָה, אֵימָא לָא, צְרִיכָא.
English Translation:
And had the Torah taught us only these two halakhot, one would have excluded only the neck and the back, as those parts are not included in the waving of the offering, i.e., they are not waved. But with regard to the animal’s breast, which is included in the waving of the offering, one might say that it is not precluded and that one can fulfill the requirement by placing one’s hands there. Therefore, the third mention is necessary to teach that placing hands cannot be performed even on the animal’s breast.
קלאוד על הדף:
The final step in this necessity argument introduces a ritual dimension. The breast (hazeh) has a special ritual status because it is part of tenufa (waving) — one might think that a body part with its own sacred ritual function could also serve for semikha. Without the third exclusion, one might reason that the breast’s prominence in the sacrificial service makes it an acceptable alternative location. This completes the demonstration that all three exclusions are independently necessary, using progressively stronger arguments for why each location might have been valid.
Key Terms:
- אִיתְרַבִּי לִתְנוּפָה (Itrabei li-Tenufa) = It is included in waving — the breast has special ritual status as one of the portions waved before God
Segment 12
TYPE: בעיא
Dilemma: does placing hands on the sides of the head count?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: יָדוֹ עַל הַצְּדָדִין, מַהוּ? תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּתַנְיָא: אַבָּא בִּירָאָה בְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב אוֹמֵר: ״יָדוֹ עַל רֹאשׁוֹ״, וְלָא יָדוֹ עַל הַצְּדָדִין.
English Translation:
A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If one placed his hand on the sides of the animal’s head, what is the halakha; does one fulfill the requirement of placing hands by doing so? The Gemara answers: Come and hear, as it is taught in a baraita: Abba Bira’a, son of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, says that the verse: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the burnt offering” (Leviticus 1:4), indicates that it must be done with his hand on the top of its head and not with his hand on the sides of its head.
קלאוד על הדף:
Having established that semikha must be on the head and not on other body parts, a more precise question arises: what about the sides of the head? This is a practical question — when leaning with full force on a large animal, one’s hands might slip to the sides. The baraita resolves this by reading “upon his head” as meaning the top of the head specifically. The precision of this ruling reflects the Talmud’s concern with exact ritual performance.
Key Terms:
- צְּדָדִין (Tzedadin) = Sides — referring to the lateral parts of the animal’s head
Segment 13
TYPE: בעיא
Does a cloth between the hand and the animal constitute an interposition?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בָּעֵי רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: מַטְלֵית מַהוּ שֶׁתָּחוֹץ? תָּא שְׁמַע: וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא דָּבָר חוֹצֵץ בֵּינוֹ לְבֵין הַזֶּבַח.
English Translation:
Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma: If one’s hands were wrapped in a cloth, what is the halakha as to whether the cloth is regarded as an interposition between his hands and the animal such that it invalidates the rite? The Gemara answers: Come and hear a resolution from a baraita, which states: The rite is valid provided that there is no item that interposes between him and the offering.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yirmeya’s question addresses the physical contact requirement of semikha. Since the owner must lean with force on the animal’s head, does a cloth wrapping the hand constitute a disqualifying interposition (hatzitza)? The baraita answers clearly: nothing may interpose between the person and the offering. This requirement of direct contact reinforces the personal, physical nature of semikha — it is a bodily act of identification with the offering, not merely a symbolic gesture that could be performed through a barrier.
Key Terms:
- חוֹצֵץ (Hotzetz) = Interposes — a barrier that separates and potentially invalidates
- מַטְלֵית (Matlit) = Cloth — the specific example raised in the dilemma
Segment 14
TYPE: גמרא
Reish Lakish: “yado” always means two hands, derived from the Yom Kippur goat
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּבִשְׁתֵּי יָדַיִם, מְנָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי? אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, דְּאָמַר קְרָא ״וְסָמַךְ אַהֲרֹן אֶת שְׁתֵּי יָדָו״, כְּתִיב ״יָדוֹ״ וּכְתִיב ״שְׁתֵּי״, זֶה בָּנָה אָב: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״יָדוֹ״ – הֲרֵי כָּאן שְׁתַּיִם, עַד שֶׁיִּפְרֹט לְךָ הַכָּתוּב ״אַחַת״.
English Translation:
§ The mishna adds that the placing of hands is performed with two hands. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Reish Lakish said: As the verse states with regard to the Yom Kippur service: “And Aaron shall place both his hands [yadav] upon the head of the live goat” (Leviticus 16:21). The word yadav, meaning: His hands, is written without a second yod, and so if read without vowels it reads as: His hand. But it is also written “both,” which makes clear that the intention is that he must use both of his hands. This established a paradigm that in any place where it is stated in the Torah: His hand, there are here two hands, unless the verse explicitly specifies that there is only one.
קלאוד על הדף:
Reish Lakish establishes a powerful paradigm (binyan av) from the Yom Kippur scapegoat verse. The word “yadav” is written defectively (without a second yod), so it looks like the singular “yado” (his hand), yet the verse adds “shtei” (both) to clarify it means two. From this textual anomaly, Reish Lakish derives a universal rule: whenever the Torah writes “yado” (his hand), it actually means both hands, unless explicitly stated otherwise. This creative derivation from the written versus vocalized text will spark a dramatic exchange between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Elazar.
Key Terms:
- בָּנָה אָב (Bana Av) = Established a paradigm — a hermeneutical derivation that creates a general rule from one case
- כְּתִיב / קְרִי (Ketiv/Keri) = Written/Read — the distinction between the consonantal text and its traditional vocalization
Segment 15
TYPE: אגדתא
Rabbi Elazar repeats Reish Lakish’s teaching without attribution; Reish Lakish challenges him
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲזַל רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר, אַמְרַהּ לְהָא שְׁמַעְתָּא בְּבֵי מִדְרְשָׁא, וְלָא אַמְרַהּ מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ. שְׁמַע רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ וְאִיקְּפַד, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִי סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ כֹּל הֵיכָא דִּכְתִיב ״יָדוֹ״ תַּרְתֵּי נִינְהוּ, לְמָה לִי לְמִכְתַּב ״יָדָיו״ ״יָדָיו״?
English Translation:
The Gemara relates: Rabbi Elazar went and stated this halakha in the study hall, but he did not say it in the name of Reish Lakish. Reish Lakish heard about this and became angry. He said to Rabbi Elazar: If it enters your mind that wherever it is written: His hand, the meaning is that there are actually two hands, then why do I ever need the Torah to write: His hands, his hands, i.e., yadav in the plural, which it does on numerous occasions?
קלאוד על הדף:
A vivid narrative interlude: Rabbi Elazar repeated Reish Lakish’s teaching in the study hall without proper attribution, angering Reish Lakish. This illustrates the Talmudic ethic that one who repeats a teaching must cite its source. Reish Lakish’s anger, however, leads him to raise a substantive challenge to his own teaching: if “yado” (singular) always means two hands, then why does the Torah ever bother writing “yadav” (plural)? The plural would be entirely redundant. This sets up a refinement of the original principle.
Key Terms:
- בֵּי מִדְרְשָׁא (Bei Midrasha) = The study hall — the public forum where halakhic teachings were transmitted
- אִיקְּפַד (Ikpad) = He became angry — a Talmudic term for indignation
Segment 16
TYPE: קושיא
Reish Lakish cites 24 instances of “yadav” (plural) — Rabbi Elazar is silenced
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אַקְשִׁי לֵיהּ עֶשְׂרִים וְאַרְבַּע ״יָדָיו״, ״יָדָיו תְּבִיאֶינָה״, ״יָדָיו רָב לוֹ״, ״שִׂכֵּל אֶת יָדָיו״ – אִישְׁתִּיק.
English Translation:
Reish Lakish raised objections against him from twenty-four occasions where the Torah writes: His hands, for example: “His own hands [yadav] shall bring the offerings of the Lord” (Leviticus 7:30); “his hands [yadav] shall contend for him, and You shall be a help against his adversaries” (Deuteronomy 33:7); “Guiding his hands [yadav] wittingly, for Manasseh was the firstborn” (Genesis 48:14). Rabbi Elazar was silent, as he had no response.
קלאוד על הדף:
Reish Lakish marshals an impressive array of evidence: twenty-four biblical verses using the explicit plural “yadav.” If the singular “yado” always means two hands, these plurals would be completely superfluous. The breadth of the challenge — spanning Leviticus, Deuteronomy, and Genesis — demonstrates Reish Lakish’s encyclopedic command of the biblical text. Rabbi Elazar is unable to respond, setting up the resolution that will follow once Reish Lakish calms down.
Key Terms:
- אִישְׁתִּיק (Ishtik) = He was silent — indicating inability to respond, not agreement
Segment 17
TYPE: תירוץ
After calming down, Reish Lakish provides the answer: the paradigm applies only to semikha
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לְבָתַר דְּנָח דַּעְתֵּיהּ, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאי טַעְמָא לָא תֵּימָא לִי, ״יָדָיו״ דִּסְמִיכָה קָאָמְרִי?
English Translation:
After Reish Lakish had calmed down, he said to Rabbi Elazar: What is the reason that you did not say to me the following: When I established that paradigm, I was speaking only about the term: His hands [yadav], with regard to placing hands. But with regard to other halakhot, when the Torah says “his hand” the reference is to just one hand, and so when referring to two hands it must say “his hands.”
קלאוד על הדף:
In a touching narrative detail, Reish Lakish himself — after his anger subsides — supplies the answer Rabbi Elazar should have given. The paradigm that “yado” means two hands applies only within the specific context of semikha, not throughout the entire Torah. In other contexts, the singular “yado” means one hand, and the plural “yadav” is genuinely needed to indicate two. This narrowing of the rule resolves the challenge while preserving Reish Lakish’s original derivation. The episode also illustrates the Talmudic ideal that intellectual debate should yield to truth, even when personal feelings are involved.
Key Terms:
- נָח דַּעְתֵּיהּ (Nah Da’atei) = His mind was settled — he calmed down from his anger
Segment 18
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Further refinement: the paradigm applies only to semikha on animals, not Moses’ ordination of Joshua
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בִּסְמִיכָה נָמֵי כְּתִיב: ״וַיִּסְמֹךְ אֶת יָדָיו עָלָיו וַיְצַוֵּהוּ״, סְמִיכָה דִּבְהֵמָה קָאָמְרִי.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: But also with regard to placing hands it is written, concerning Moses’ ordination of Joshua: “And he placed his hands [yadav] upon him and gave him a charge” (Numbers 27:23), using the plural “his hands” [yadav] instead of: His hand [yado]. The Gemara clarifies that Reish Lakish meant that one could say: When I established that paradigm, I was speaking only about the term: His hands [yadav], with regard to placing hands on an animal offering. But in all other cases, if the intention is that there were two hands, the plural must be used.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara presses further: even within the domain of semikha, the Torah uses the plural “yadav” when describing Moses placing his hands on Joshua. This forces yet another refinement: the paradigm applies specifically to semikha on animal offerings, not to any use of semikha. Moses’ laying of hands on Joshua is a different type of semikha (ordination/appointment), where the singular/plural distinction operates normally. This progressive narrowing — from all Torah contexts to semikha contexts to animal-semikha only — demonstrates the Talmud’s precise approach to defining the scope of legal rules.
Key Terms:
- סְמִיכָה דִּבְהֵמָה (Semikha di-Vehema) = Placing hands on an animal — the specific category where “yado” means two hands
Segment 19
TYPE: גמרא
Clarifying the mishna: same location because slaughter immediately follows semikha
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּבִמְקוֹם שֶׁסּוֹמְכִין שׁוֹחֲטִין, תֵּכֶף לִסְמִיכָה שְׁחִיטָה. מַאי קָאָמַר? הָכִי קָאָמַר: בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁסּוֹמְכִין שׁוֹחֲטִין, שֶׁתֵּכֶף לִסְמִיכָה שְׁחִיטָה.
English Translation:
§ The mishna teaches: And in the same location in the Temple that one places hands, one slaughters the animal. And immediately following the rite of placing hands, the slaughter is performed. The Gemara asks: What is the mishna saying? The mishna appears to state two distinct rulings. But if so, the first statement is superfluous, because if the slaughter immediately follows the placing of hands, then it is obvious that the animal is slaughtered without changing its location. The Gemara explains that this is what the mishna is saying: In the same location in the Temple that one places hands one slaughters the animal, because immediately following the rite of placing hands, the slaughter is performed. There are not two distinct rulings; rather, the second statement is the explanation of the first.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara resolves an apparent redundancy in the mishna. What seemed like two independent rules — same location, and immediacy — is actually one rule with its explanation. The requirement that semikha and slaughter occur in the same place is not an independent law but a logical consequence of the immediacy requirement. Since slaughter must follow semikha without interruption, there is no time to relocate the animal. This reading of the mishna as a single unified statement rather than two separate rulings is a characteristic example of Talmudic textual precision.
Key Terms:
- מַאי קָאָמַר (Mai Ka’amar) = What is it saying? — a standard Talmudic formula for analyzing an unclear text
Segment 20
TYPE: משנה
Comparing semikha and tenufa: each has a stringency the other lacks
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְנִי׳ חוֹמֶר בַּסְּמִיכָה מִבַּתְּנוּפָה, וּבַתְּנוּפָה מִבַּסְּמִיכָה – שֶׁאֶחָד מֵנִיף לְכׇל הַחֲבֵרִים, וְאֵין אֶחָד סוֹמֵךְ לְכׇל הַחֲבֵרִים. חוֹמֶר בַּתְּנוּפָה – שֶׁהַתְּנוּפָה נוֹהֶגֶת בְּקׇרְבְּנוֹת הַיָּחִיד וּבְקׇרְבְּנוֹת הַצִּבּוּר,
English Translation:
MISHNA: There is an aspect of greater stringency with regard to placing hands than there is with regard to waving, and there is an aspect of greater stringency with regard to waving than there is with regard to placing hands. The stringency with regard to placing hands is that if several people are partners in bringing an offering, one of them waves the offering on behalf of all the other partners, but one cannot fulfill the requirement of placing hands if he alone places hands on behalf of all the other partners; rather, each member must place hands himself. The stringency with regard to waving is that waving is practiced in the cases of both offerings of an individual, e.g., peace offerings, where the breast and thigh and sacrificial portions are waved, and in the cases of communal offerings, e.g., the two lambs sacrificed on Shavuot, which are waved together with the two loaves;
קלאוד על הדף:
A new mishna compares semikha and tenufa using a classic “homer” (stringency) framework. Semikha is stricter in that it requires each co-owner to personally place hands — it cannot be delegated to one person acting for all. Tenufa is stricter in that it applies to both individual and communal offerings, while semikha applies only to individual ones (communal offerings have semikha performed by the Elders). This comparative analysis reveals the distinct natures of these two ritual acts: semikha is an expression of personal identification with the offering, while tenufa is a procedural component of the sacrificial service.
Key Terms:
- חוֹמֶר (Homer) = Stringency — a comparative framework used throughout Mishnaic literature
- קׇרְבְּנוֹת הַצִּבּוּר (Korbanot ha-Tzibbur) = Communal offerings — sacrifices brought on behalf of the entire community