Menachot Daf 49 (מנחות דף מ״ט)
Daf: 49 | Amudim: 49a – 49b | Date: 29 Shevat 5786
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (49a)
Segment 1
TYPE: גמרא
Resolution: the tanna relies on “Zot Torat HaOlah” to include disqualified items on the altar
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תְּנָא אַ״זֹּאת תּוֹרַת הָעֹלָה״ רִיבָּה סְמִיךְ לֵיהּ.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: The tanna of that baraita relies on the phrase: “This is the law of the burnt offering [ha’ola]: It is that which goes up on its firewood upon the altar all night unto the morning” (Leviticus 6:2), a seemingly superfluous general phrase which is interpreted homiletically to include the halakha that any item that ascends [ola] upon the altar shall not descend from it, even if it was disqualified. The verse is the actual source for the halakha of the baraita, whereas the case of a private altar is cited merely in support of this ruling. Accordingly, the baraita does not contradict the opinion of Rav Shimi bar Ashi.
קלאוד על הדף:
This segment concludes a discussion from the previous daf about disqualified offerings that have already been placed on the altar. The tanna’s actual source is the verse in Leviticus 6:2, which uses the seemingly redundant phrase “ha’ola” (the one that ascends). This is read homiletically: anything that has already “ascended” (ola) onto the altar should not be taken down. The private altar case cited in the baraita is merely an asmakhta (support), not the primary derivation — thereby resolving the contradiction with Rav Shimi bar Ashi.
Key Terms:
- זֹּאת תּוֹרַת הָעֹלָה (Zot Torat HaOlah) = “This is the law of the burnt offering” — a verse used to derive that items placed on the altar should not descend
- סְמִיךְ (samikh) = Relies upon / leans on — the verse serves as the actual source
Segment 2
TYPE: גמרא
New topic: Shavuot sheep slaughtered for the sake of rams — dispute between the baraita and Rav
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תָּנֵי רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חַנָּה קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב: כִּבְשֵׂי עֲצֶרֶת שֶׁשְּׁחָטָן לְשׁוּם אֵילִים – כְּשֵׁרִין, וְלֹא עָלוּ לַבְּעָלִים לְשׁוּם חוֹבָה. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב: עָלוּ וְעָלוּ.
English Translation:
§ The Gemara cites another discussion concerning the sheep of Shavuot. Rabba bar bar Ḥana taught a baraita before Rav: In a case of the two sheep of Shavuot where one slaughtered them for the sake of rams and not for their own sake, they are valid offerings, but they do not satisfy the obligation of the owner, i.e., the community, to sacrifice these offerings. Rav said to Rabba bar bar Ḥana: That is not so; rather, the sheep certainly satisfy the obligation of the community.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara introduces a new sugya about the Shavuot peace offerings. Two lambs (kevasim) are brought as communal shelamim on Shavuot. The baraita rules that if they were slaughtered with the intent that they were rams (eilim) rather than lambs, they are valid but do not fulfill the community’s obligation. Rav disagrees, holding that the community has fulfilled its obligation. This sets up the central dispute of the sugya: does incorrect intent about the identity of the offering effectively change its status?
Key Terms:
- כִּבְשֵׂי עֲצֶרֶת (kivsei Atzeret) = The two lambs of Shavuot — communal peace offerings brought on the festival
- עָלוּ לַבְּעָלִים (alu la-be’alim) = Satisfied the obligation of the owner — the offering counted toward fulfilling the communal duty
Segment 3
TYPE: גמרא
Rav Ḥisda limits Rav’s ruling to a specific scenario
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: מִסְתַּבְּרָא מִילְּתֵיהּ דְּרַב בִּכְסָבוּר אֵילִים, וּשְׁחָטָן לְשׁוּם כְּבָשִׂים, שֶׁהֲרֵי כְּבָשִׂים לְשׁוּם כְּבָשִׂים נִשְׁחֲטוּ.
English Translation:
Rav Ḥisda said: The statement of Rav is reasonable in a case where one thought that they were rams when he slaughtered them, and nevertheless slaughtered them for the sake of lambs. In such a case, it makes sense that they satisfy the community’s obligation since the lambs were slaughtered for the sake of lambs.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Ḥisda narrows the scope of Rav’s lenient ruling. He explains that Rav’s statement — that the offering satisfies the obligation — makes sense only when the slaughterer mistakenly believed the animals were rams but nonetheless declared them to be for the sake of lambs. In this case, despite the error in identification, the actual verbal designation matched the true identity of the animals. The intent and the reality aligned at the level of the sacrificial declaration.
Key Terms:
- כְּסָבוּר (ke-savur) = He thought / mistakenly believed — indicates the priest’s erroneous assumption about the offering’s identity
Segment 4
TYPE: מחלוקת
Dispute: Does erroneous uprooting of an offering’s status constitute valid uprooting?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲבָל כְּסָבוּר אֵילִים, וּשְׁחָטָן לְשׁוּם אֵילִים – לָא. עֲקִירָה בְּטָעוּת הָוְיָא עֲקִירָה; וְרַבָּה אָמַר: עֲקִירָה בְּטָעוּת לָא הָוְיָא עֲקִירָה.
English Translation:
But in a case where he thought that they were rams when he slaughtered them, and therefore slaughtered them for the sake of rams, they do not satisfy the community’s obligation, even though they were actually lambs. This is due to the fact that the erroneous uprooting of the status of an offering constitutes uprooting, despite the fact that it was done in error. But Rabba said: The erroneous uprooting of the status of an offering does not constitute uprooting.
קלאוד על הדף:
This is the central principle of the sugya. According to Rav Ḥisda, if the priest mistakenly thought the lambs were rams and slaughtered them as rams, the offering does not satisfy the obligation — because the erroneous uprooting of its status (akira be-ta’ut) counts as a valid uprooting. In other words, his mistaken intent effectively changed the offering’s sacrificial identity. Rabba disagrees: an uprooting based on an error of fact is not a valid uprooting, so the offering retains its original identity as a lamb offering and satisfies the obligation.
Key Terms:
- עֲקִירָה (akira) = Uprooting — changing an offering’s designated status through intent
- עֲקִירָה בְּטָעוּת (akira be-ta’ut) = Erroneous uprooting — an uprooting based on a mistaken factual assumption
Segment 5
TYPE: קושיא
Rava raises an objection from a mishna about priests who caused piggul
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רָבָא: וּמוֹתְבִינַן אַשְּׁמַעְתִּין, הַכֹּהֲנִים שֶׁפִּיגְּלוּ בַּמִּקְדָּשׁ מְזִידִין – חַיָּיבִין, הָא שׁוֹגְגִין – פְּטוּרִין, וְתָנֵי עֲלַהּ: פִּיגּוּלָן פִּיגּוּל.
English Translation:
Rava said: We raise an objection to our own ruling concerning this halakha from that which was taught in a mishna (Gittin 54a): In a case of priests who disqualified an offering through improper intention in the Temple, by expressing, while sacrificing the offering, the intention to eat it after the appropriate time, if they did so intentionally, they are liable to pay the value of the offering to its owner, who must now bring another offering. It follows, therefore, that if the priests did so unintentionally they are exempt. And it is taught concerning this case in a baraita: Even though they slaughtered it with improper intent unintentionally, their act of improper intention renders the offering piggul, despite the fact that they are exempt from paying damages.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava brings a challenge against his own ruling (which agrees with Rav Ḥisda that erroneous uprooting is valid). The mishna in Gittin states that priests who intentionally caused piggul are liable for damages, implying that if they did so unintentionally, they are exempt from payment. A baraita then adds that even when they acted unintentionally, the offering is still rendered piggul. Rava now asks: what does “unintentionally” mean here? This question sets up the next few segments of analysis.
Key Terms:
- פִּיגּוּל (piggul) = An offering rendered invalid by the intention to eat it after its permitted time
- מְזִידִין (mezidin) = Intentionally — knowingly causing the disqualification
- שׁוֹגְגִין (shogegin) = Unintentionally — acting in error
Segment 6
TYPE: קושיא
Analyzing the case: knowing it was a sin offering — that would be intentional, not unintentional!
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אִילֵּימָא דְּיָדַע דְּחַטָּאת הִיא, וְקָא מְחַשֵּׁב בַּהּ לְשׁוּם שְׁלָמִים – הַאי שׁוֹגְגִין?! מְזִידִין הָווּ!
English Translation:
What are the circumstances in which this is the halakha? If we say that it is referring to a case where the priest knew that the offering was a sin offering, which is eaten for only one day and one night, and nevertheless he intended the offering to be for the sake of a peace offering, which is eaten for two days and one night, and thereby his intention was that it be eaten after its appropriate time, is this considered an unintentional act by the priests? Certainly they were acting intentionally.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara probes the baraita’s case. A sin offering (chatat) may only be eaten for one day and one night, while a peace offering (shelamim) may be eaten for two days and one night. If a priest knew it was a chatat but intended it as a shelamim — thus intending to eat it past the chatat’s time limit — he effectively created piggul. But this would be deliberate, not unintentional. The baraita says the priests were shogegin (unintentional), so this scenario doesn’t fit.
Key Terms:
- חַטָּאת (chatat) = Sin offering — eaten for one day and one night
- שְׁלָמִים (shelamim) = Peace offering — eaten for two days and one night
Segment 7
TYPE: קושיא
Conclusion from the analysis: the case must involve erroneous uprooting — proving it counts
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא לָאו דִּכְסָבוּר שְׁלָמִים הוּא, וְקָא מְחַשֵּׁב בַּהּ לְשׁוּם שְׁלָמִים, וְקָתָנֵי: פִּיגּוּלָן פִּיגּוּל, אַלְמָא עֲקִירָה בְּטָעוּת הָוְיָא עֲקִירָה.
English Translation:
Rather, is it not referring to a case where the offering was a sin offering, which is eaten for only one day and one night, and the priest thought that it was a peace offering and therefore he intended the offering to be for the sake of a peace offering, which is eaten for two days and one night, and thereby his intention was that it be eaten after its appropriate time? And with regard to this case the tanna taught: Their act of improper intention renders the offering piggul. Apparently, this proves that the erroneous uprooting of the status of an offering constitutes uprooting, contrary to the ruling of Rabba.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara concludes that the baraita must be referring to a case where the priest mistakenly thought the chatat was a shelamim, and therefore intended it to be eaten within the shelamim timeframe (two days). Since the chatat only has one day, his intent to eat it on “day two” is actually piggul — and the baraita confirms this intent creates piggul even though the error was unintentional. This directly challenges Rabba’s position that erroneous uprooting does not constitute valid uprooting.
Key Terms:
- אַלְמָא (alma) = Apparently / evidently — introduces the logical conclusion drawn from the analysis
Segment 8
TYPE: תירוץ
Abaye defends Rabba: “unintentional” means the priest didn’t know it was forbidden
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: לְעוֹלָם דְּיָדַע דְּחַטָּאת הִיא, וְקָא מְחַשֵּׁב בַּהּ לְשׁוּם שְׁלָמִים, וּבְאוֹמֵר ״מוּתָּר״.
English Translation:
Abaye said to Rava: There is no objection from this baraita, because actually it is referring to a case where the priest knew that it was a sin offering and nevertheless he intended the offering to be for the sake of a peace offering, and his uprooting was done intentionally. Nevertheless, the baraita refers to the priests as acting unintentionally because it is referring to circumstances where the priest says, i.e., he mistakenly thinks, that it is permitted to sacrifice the offering with this intent.
קלאוד על הדף:
Abaye rescues Rabba’s position with a clever reinterpretation. The priest knew the offering was a chatat and intentionally declared it a shelamim — making the uprooting deliberate, not erroneous. The term “unintentional” in the baraita doesn’t refer to the act of uprooting at all, but rather to the priest’s mistaken belief that such a declaration was halachically permissible. He was a “shogeg” in law (thinking his action was allowed), not a “shogeg” in fact (not knowing what the offering was). This preserves Rabba’s position.
Key Terms:
- אוֹמֵר ״מוּתָּר״ (omer “mutar”) = Says “it is permitted” — mistakenly believes the action is halachically allowed, a type of legal error rather than factual error
Segment 9
TYPE: קושיא
Rabbi Zeira’s objection: R. Shimon’s ruling on meal offerings implies erroneous uprooting counts
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מֵתִיב רַבִּי זֵירָא: רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר, כׇּל מְנָחוֹת שֶׁנִּקְמְצוּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן – כְּשֵׁרוֹת, וְעָלוּ לַבְּעָלִים לְשׁוּם חוֹבָה.
English Translation:
Rabbi Zeira raises an objection to Rabba’s opinion that erroneous uprooting of the status of an offering does not constitute uprooting. A baraita teaches that Rabbi Shimon says: All meal offerings from which the handful was removed not for their sake are entirely valid, and have even satisfied the obligation of the owner, unlike animal offerings slaughtered not for their sake, which do not satisfy the obligation of the owner.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Zeira brings a new challenge to Rabba from a baraita quoting Rabbi Shimon. While animal offerings slaughtered not for their sake do not satisfy the owner’s obligation, Rabbi Shimon rules that meal offerings from which the handful was removed not for their sake are fully valid and even satisfy the owner’s obligation. The next segments will explain why Rabbi Shimon distinguishes between meal offerings and animal offerings, and how this distinction implies a position on erroneous uprooting.
Key Terms:
- נִקְמְצוּ (nikmetzu) = The handful was removed — the act of kemitza (removing a handful) from a meal offering, analogous to slaughter for animal offerings
- שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן (she-lo li-shman) = Not for their sake — performed with intent for a different type of offering
Segment 10
TYPE: גמרא
R. Shimon’s reasoning: meal offerings’ physical form proves their identity
Hebrew/Aramaic:
שֶׁאֵין הַמְּנָחוֹת דּוֹמוֹת לַזְּבָחִים, שֶׁהַקּוֹמֵץ מַחֲבַת לְשׁוּם מַרְחֶשֶׁת – מַעֲשֶׂיהָ מוֹכִיחִין עָלֶיהָ שֶׁהִיא מַחֲבַת, חֲרֵבָה לְשׁוּם בְּלוּלָה – מַעֲשֶׂיהָ מוֹכִיחִין עָלֶיהָ שֶׁהִיא חֲרֵבָה.
English Translation:
This is because meal offerings are not similar to animal offerings. As, in the case of one who removes a handful from a meal offering prepared in a shallow pan for the sake of a meal offering prepared in a deep pan, its mode of preparation proves that it is a shallow-pan meal offering and not a deep-pan meal offering. Since a meal offering prepared in a shallow pan is hard and one prepared in a deep pan is soft, his intention is plainly false. Similarly, if one removes a handful from a dry meal offering, the meal offering of a sinner, which has no oil, for the sake of a meal offering mixed with oil, his intention is plainly false, as its mode of preparation proves that it is a dry meal offering.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Shimon explains why meal offerings are different from animal offerings. Each type of meal offering has a distinctive physical form: a machabat (shallow-pan) offering is hard while a marcheshet (deep-pan) offering is soft; a dry offering (charevah) has no oil while a belulah (mixed) offering does. When a priest tries to designate a machabat as a marcheshet, the physical evidence immediately contradicts his intent. The offering’s appearance “testifies” against his declaration, rendering his intent recognizably false.
Key Terms:
- מַחֲבַת (machabat) = Shallow pan — produces a hard, flat meal offering
- מַרְחֶשֶׁת (marcheshet) = Deep pan — produces a soft, fried meal offering
- מַעֲשֶׂיהָ מוֹכִיחִין (ma’aseha mokhichin) = Its mode of preparation proves — the physical evidence demonstrates the offering’s true identity
Segment 11
TYPE: גמרא
Contrast: animal offerings all look the same during sacrifice, so intent matters more
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲבָל בִּזְבָחִים אֵינוֹ כֵּן, שְׁחִיטָה אַחַת לְכוּלָּן, קַבָּלָה אַחַת לְכוּלָּן, זְרִיקָה אַחַת לְכוּלָּן.
English Translation:
But with regard to animal offerings this is not so. There is one mode of slaughter for all of the offerings, one mode of collection of the blood for all of them, and one mode of sprinkling for all of them. Since the only factor that distinguishes between one type of offering and another is the intention of the individuals involved in its sacrifice, their intention is significant. Consequently, if one of the sacrificial rites is performed for the sake of the wrong type of offering, the offering does not satisfy its owner’s obligation.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Shimon completes his distinction. Unlike meal offerings, all animal offerings undergo the same physical process: identical slaughter, identical blood collection, identical sprinkling. A chatat and a shelamim look the same on the altar. The only thing that distinguishes one from another is the intent of the person performing the service. Therefore, for animal offerings, intent has decisive power — wrong intent can genuinely change the offering’s status.
Key Terms:
- שְׁחִיטָה (shechita) = Slaughter
- קַבָּלָה (kabbalah) = Collection of the blood
- זְרִיקָה (zerikah) = Sprinkling of the blood
Segment 12
TYPE: קושיא
The Gemara challenges: if the priest knew it was a machabat, how does “proof” help?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אִילֵּימָא דְּיָדַע דְּמַחֲבַת הִיא, וְקָא קָמֵיץ לָהּ לְשׁוּם מַרְחֶשֶׁת – כִּי מַעֲשֶׂיהָ מוֹכִיחִין, מַאי הָוֵי? הָא מִיעְקָר קָא עָקַיר לַהּ!
English Translation:
The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances to which Rabbi Shimon is referring? If we say that he is referring to a case where the priest knew that the meal offering was prepared in a shallow pan, and nevertheless he removed a handful from it for the sake of a meal offering prepared in a deep pan, then although its mode of preparation proves that it was prepared in a shallow pan, what of it? In any case he is consciously uprooting its status as a shallow-pan meal offering, changing it to a deep-pan meal offering by means of his intention when he removes the handful.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara questions the logic of Rabbi Shimon’s ruling. If the priest knew the offering was a machabat and deliberately called it a marcheshet, the fact that it looks like a machabat shouldn’t matter — he is deliberately uprooting its status. The physical appearance proves the truth, but the priest made a conscious decision to override that truth with his intent. So why should the offering still satisfy the owner’s obligation?
Key Terms:
- מִיעְקָר קָא עָקַיר (mi’akar ka akar) = He is consciously uprooting it — a deliberate act of changing the offering’s designated status
Segment 13
TYPE: קושיא
The case must involve an error: he thought it was a marcheshet — proving erroneous uprooting counts
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא לָאו דִּכְסָבוּר מַרְחֶשֶׁת הִיא, וְקָא קָמֵיץ לָהּ לְשׁוּם מַרְחֶשֶׁת, וּטְעָה, דְּהָכָא הוּא דְּמַעֲשֶׂיהָ מוֹכִיחִין עָלֶיהָ, הָא בְּעָלְמָא עֲקִירָה בְּטָעוּת הָוְיָא עֲקִירָה.
English Translation:
Rather, is it not referring to a case where the priest thought it was a meal offering prepared in a deep pan and therefore removed a handful for the sake of a meal offering prepared in a deep pan, but he was mistaken, as it was actually a meal offering prepared in a shallow pan? It is specifically here, in this case, that Rabbi Shimon rules that the offering remains valid, since its mode of preparation proves that it is a shallow-pan meal offering, which indicates that in general, erroneous uprooting of the status of an offering constitutes uprooting, contrary the ruling of Rabba.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara reaches the crux of Rabbi Zeira’s challenge. Rabbi Shimon’s ruling must be about a case where the priest mistakenly thought the machabat was a marcheshet. The offering is valid only because its physical appearance overrides the mistaken intent. The implication is that in the general case — where there is no physical proof to contradict the error — erroneous uprooting would indeed constitute valid uprooting. This directly contradicts Rabba’s position.
Key Terms:
- הָא בְּעָלְמָא (ha be-alma) = But in general — introduces the broader implication drawn from the specific ruling
Segment 14
TYPE: תירוץ
Abaye’s defense: actually, R. Shimon refers to a case of deliberate uprooting
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: לְעוֹלָם דְּיָדַע דְּמַחֲבַת הִיא, וְקָא קָמֵיץ לַהּ לְשׁוּם מַרְחֶשֶׁת.
English Translation:
Abaye said to Rabbi Zeira, in response to his objection: This objection to Rabba’s opinion is inconclusive, because one can explain that the baraita is actually referring to a case where the priest knew that the meal offering was prepared in a shallow pan, and nevertheless he removed a handful for the sake of a meal offering prepared in a deep pan.
קלאוד על הדף:
Abaye again comes to Rabba’s defense by reinterpreting the case. He claims Rabbi Shimon is actually discussing a priest who knew the truth — the offering was a machabat — and deliberately designated it as a marcheshet. This was a conscious uprooting, not an erroneous one. The question then becomes: if the priest deliberately uprooted the status, why does the offering remain valid according to Rabbi Shimon?
Key Terms:
- לְעוֹלָם (le-olam) = Actually — a standard Talmudic formula for reinterpreting a premise
Segment 15
TYPE: תירוץ
Rava’s principle: recognizably false intent does not disqualify
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּדְקָא אָמְרַתְּ: כִּי מַעֲשֶׂיהָ מוֹכִיחִין עָלֶיהָ מַאי הָוֵי? רָבָא לְטַעְמֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר רָבָא: מַחְשָׁבָה דְּלָא מִינַּכְרָא – פְּסַל רַחֲמָנָא, מַחְשָׁבָה דְּמִינַּכְרָא – לָא פְּסַל רַחֲמָנָא.
English Translation:
And with regard to that which you said in your question: Although its mode of preparation proves that it is prepared in a shallow pan, what of it, i.e., since he is consciously uprooting its identity, how can it satisfy its owner’s obligation? Abaye answers that Rava conforms to his line of reasoning, as Rava says: The Merciful One disqualifies an offering due to improper intent that is not recognizably false, i.e., when the physical properties of the offering itself do not prove that the intent is mistaken. The Merciful One does not disqualify an offering due to improper intent that is recognizably false. Consequently, if one removes a handful from a shallow-pan meal offering for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering, even if he did so consciously, the offering remains valid and satisfies the owner’s obligation.
קלאוד על הדף:
Abaye completes his defense by invoking Rava’s principle: intent that is “recognizably false” (machshava de-minakra) cannot disqualify an offering. When the physical properties of the offering clearly contradict the priest’s stated intent — as when calling a hard, flat machabat a soft marcheshet — the Torah does not give that intent disqualifying power. Only when the intent is not detectable from the offering’s appearance (machshava de-la minakra) — as with animal offerings, which all look alike — can intent change the offering’s status. This is a fundamental principle about the limits of mental intent in sacrificial law.
Key Terms:
- מַחְשָׁבָה דְּמִינַּכְרָא (machshava de-minakra) = Recognizably false intent — intent that is contradicted by the physical evidence of the offering
- מַחְשָׁבָה דְּלָא מִינַּכְרָא (machshava de-la minakra) = Intent that is not recognizably false — intent that cannot be contradicted by the offering’s appearance
Segment 16
TYPE: משנה
New Mishna: daily and additional offerings do not prevent each other
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְנִי׳ הַתְּמִידִין אֵין מְעַכְּבִין אֶת הַמּוּסָפִין, וְלֹא הַמּוּסָפִין מְעַכְּבִין אֶת הַתְּמִידִין, וְלֹא הַמּוּסָפִין מְעַכְּבִין זֶה אֶת זֶה. לֹא הִקְרִיבוּ כֶּבֶשׂ בַּבּוֹקֶר – יַקְרִיבוּ בֵּין הָעַרְבַּיִם.
English Translation:
MISHNA: Failure to sacrifice the daily offerings does not prevent sacrifice of the additional offerings, and likewise, failure to sacrifice the additional offerings does not prevent sacrifice of the daily offerings. And failure to sacrifice some of the additional offerings on a day when more than one is sacrificed, e.g., if it was both Shabbat and the New Moon, does not prevent sacrifice of the other additional offerings. If the priests did not sacrifice a lamb in the morning as the daily offering, nevertheless, they should sacrifice a lamb in the afternoon as the daily offering, as failure to sacrifice one daily offering does not prevent sacrifice of the other. In all of these cases, if they failed to sacrifice one offering, they should still sacrifice the other.
קלאוד על הדף:
The daf now introduces a new Mishna that establishes a fundamental principle of Temple service: the various daily and additional offerings operate independently of one another. The failure to bring one does not invalidate or prevent the others. This applies between the tamid (daily) and musaf (additional) offerings, among the multiple musaf offerings of a given day, and even between the morning and afternoon daily offerings. The principle ensures maximal fulfillment of sacrificial obligations despite adverse circumstances.
Key Terms:
- תְּמִידִין (temidin) = Daily offerings — the tamid shel shachar (morning) and tamid shel bein ha-arbayim (afternoon)
- מוּסָפִין (musafin) = Additional offerings — special offerings for Shabbat, Rosh Chodesh, and festivals
- מְעַכְּבִין (me’akvin) = Prevent / are indispensable for — one offering does not block another
Segment 17
TYPE: משנה
R. Shimon qualifies: only if the failure was involuntary
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: אֵימָתַי? בִּזְמַן שֶׁהָיוּ אֲנוּסִין אוֹ שׁוֹגְגִין, אֲבָל אִם הָיוּ מְזִידִין וְלֹא הִקְרִיבוּ כֶּבֶשׂ בַּבּוֹקֶר – לֹא יַקְרִיבוּ בֵּין הָעַרְבַּיִם.
English Translation:
Rabbi Shimon said: When does this halakha apply? It applies at a time when the failure to sacrifice the daily morning offering was because they were prevented from sacrificing it due to circumstances beyond their control or they failed to sacrifice it unwittingly. But if the priests acted intentionally and did not sacrifice a lamb in the morning as the daily offering, they should not sacrifice a lamb in the afternoon as the daily offering.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Shimon adds a significant qualification to the Mishna’s general principle. He distinguishes between involuntary failure (ones — beyond one’s control — or shogeg — unintentional) and deliberate omission (mezid). If the priests deliberately skipped the morning tamid, they should not bring the afternoon tamid either. The rationale is that the altar was never properly “inaugurated” for that day’s service — a concept that will be explored further in the next segment.
Key Terms:
- אֲנוּסִין (anusin) = Compelled / forced — circumstances beyond one’s control
- מְזִידִין (mezidin) = Intentionally / deliberately
Segment 18
TYPE: משנה
The incense: if the morning portion was missed, burn the afternoon portion
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לֹא הִקְטִירוּ קְטוֹרֶת בַּבּוֹקֶר – יַקְטִירוּ בֵּין הָעַרְבַּיִם.
English Translation:
Incense was burned twice a day, half a measure in the morning and half a measure in the afternoon. If they did not burn the half-measure of incense in the morning, they should burn the half-measure in the afternoon.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Mishna extends the principle of non-interdependence to the incense (ketoret). The daily measure of incense was divided in half: one portion burned in the morning and one in the afternoon on the golden altar. If the morning portion was missed, the afternoon portion should still be burned. This establishes that each incense offering is independent, similar to the relationship between the morning and afternoon tamid.
Key Terms:
- קְטוֹרֶת (ketoret) = Incense — burned on the golden altar (mizbach ha-zahav) inside the Sanctuary
Segment 19
TYPE: משנה
R. Shimon’s exception for incense: burn the full measure in the afternoon on a new altar
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: וְכוּלָּהּ הָיְתָה קְרֵיבָה בֵּין הָעַרְבַּיִם, שֶׁאֵין מְחַנְּכִין אֶת מִזְבַּח הַזָּהָב אֶלָּא בִּקְטוֹרֶת הַסַּמִּים, וְלֹא מִזְבַּח הָעוֹלָה אֶלָּא בְּתָמִיד שֶׁל שַׁחַר, וְלֹא אֶת הַשּׁוּלְחָן אֶלָּא בְּלֶחֶם הַפָּנִים בְּשַׁבָּת, וְלֹא אֶת הַמְּנוֹרָה אֶלָּא בְּשִׁבְעָה נֵרוֹתֶיהָ בֵּין הָעַרְבַּיִם.
English Translation:
Rabbi Shimon said: And in such a case, the entire measure was sacrificed in the afternoon. The reason for the difference between the daily offerings and the incense is that the daily service on a new golden altar is initiated only with the burning of the incense of the spices in the afternoon, at which time they would burn a full measure. And the daily service on a new altar of the burnt offering, on which the daily offerings were sacrificed, is initiated only with the daily morning offering. And use of a new Table was initiated only with the arrangement of the shewbread on Shabbat, and use of a new Candelabrum was initiated only with the kindling of its seven lamps in the afternoon.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Shimon teaches that when the morning incense was missed on a new golden altar, the entire day’s measure should be burned in the afternoon — because a new altar’s inaugural service was the afternoon incense. He then lists the inaugural service for each Temple vessel: the altar of burnt offering is inaugurated with the morning tamid, the Table with the shewbread on Shabbat, and the Menorah with the kindling of all seven lamps in the afternoon. Each vessel has its own specific inaugural act, after which regular service may proceed.
Key Terms:
- מְחַנְּכִין (mechankin) = Inaugurate / dedicate — the first use of a new Temple vessel
- מִזְבַּח הַזָּהָב (mizbach ha-zahav) = The golden altar — the inner altar used for incense
- לֶחֶם הַפָּנִים (lechem ha-panim) = Shewbread — twelve loaves arranged on the Table every Shabbat
- מְנוֹרָה (menorah) = The Candelabrum — kindled each afternoon in the Sanctuary
Segment 20
TYPE: גמרא
Gemara opens: which takes precedence — daily or additional offerings?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גְּמָ׳ בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אָבִין מֵרַב חִסְדָּא: צִיבּוּר שֶׁאֵין לָהֶן תְּמִידִין וּמוּסָפִין, אֵי זֶה מֵהֶן קוֹדֵם?
English Translation:
GEMARA: The mishna teaches that the daily offerings and the additional offerings each do not prevent fulfillment of the mitzva with the other. Concerning this, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin raised a dilemma before Rav Ḥisda: In the case of a community that did not have the resources to sacrifice both the daily offerings and the additional offerings, which of them takes precedence over the other?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara now explores a practical ramification of the Mishna’s principle. If the community cannot afford both the daily and additional offerings, which should they prioritize? This question arises precisely because the Mishna established that neither offering prevents the other — suggesting they might be of equal importance. The dilemma pits two fundamental halachic principles against each other: frequency (tadir) versus sanctity of the day (mekudash).
Key Terms:
- בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ (ba’a minei) = He raised a dilemma before him — a standard formula for presenting an unresolved question
- קוֹדֵם (kodem) = Takes precedence — has priority in being sacrificed first or exclusively
Segment 21
TYPE: גמרא
Clarification: if both are today’s offerings, the tamid clearly wins — it’s both frequent and sanctified
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא תְּמִידִין דְּיוֹמֵיהּ וּמוּסָפִין דְּיוֹמֵיהּ – פְּשִׁיטָא תְּמִידִין עֲדִיפִי, דְּהָווּ לְהוּ תָּדִיר וּמְקוּדָּשׁ!
English Translation:
The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances to which Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin is referring? If we say that he is referring to a case where the choice is between the daily offerings of that day and the additional offerings of that same day, it is obvious that the daily offerings are given preference, as the sacrifice of the daily offerings is more frequent than the sacrifice of the additional offerings, which are sacrificed only on special occasions, and the daily offerings are also sanctified.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara eliminates the simple case. If the choice is between today’s tamid and today’s musaf, the answer is straightforward: the tamid wins on both counts. It is both tadir (more frequent, brought every day) and mekudash (sanctified). There is a general halachic principle that when one item is both more frequent and more sacred, it takes absolute precedence. The dilemma must therefore involve a more complex scenario.
Key Terms:
- תָּדִיר (tadir) = Frequent / regular — a halachic category referring to obligations that occur more often
- מְקוּדָּשׁ (mekudash) = Sanctified — an offering with a higher level of holiness
Segment 22
TYPE: בעיא
The real dilemma: tomorrow’s tamid vs. today’s musaf — frequency vs. sanctity
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא, תְּמִידִין דְּלִמְחַר וּמוּסָפִין דְּהָאִידָּנָא – תְּמִידִין עֲדִיפִי, שֶׁכֵּן תָּדִיר, אוֹ דִלְמָא מוּסָפִין עֲדִיפִי, דְּהָווּ לְהוּ מְקוּדָּשׁ?
English Translation:
Rather, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin must be referring to a case where they have enough animals for the daily offerings of today and also for either the daily offerings for tomorrow or the additional offerings for today. In such a case, are the daily offerings given preference since their sacrifice is more frequent? Or perhaps the additional offerings are given preference because they are considered more sanctified because they are sacrificed on a holy day.
קלאוד על הדף:
The real dilemma is now articulated. The community has enough for today’s tamid offerings plus either tomorrow’s tamid or today’s musaf — but not both. Tomorrow’s tamid has the advantage of being tadir (regular), while today’s musaf has the advantage of being mekudash (associated with the sanctity of the special day). This is a classic case where the two principles of halachic priority — frequency and sanctity — point in opposite directions. Which one prevails?
Key Terms:
- דְּלִמְחַר (di-le-machar) = Of tomorrow — referring to the next day’s daily offerings
Segment 23
TYPE: תירוץ
Rav Ḥisda attempts to resolve from the Mishna: they don’t prevent each other
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ, תְּנֵיתוּהָ: הַתְּמִידִין אֵין מְעַכְּבִין אֶת הַמּוּסָפִין, וְלֹא הַמּוּסָפִין מְעַכְּבִין אֶת הַתְּמִידִין, וְלֹא הַמּוּסָפִין מְעַכְּבִין זֶה אֶת זֶה.
English Translation:
Rav Ḥisda said to Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin: The resolution to this dilemma can be derived from that which you learned in the mishna: Failure to sacrifice the daily offerings does not prevent sacrifice of the additional offerings, and likewise, failure to sacrifice the additional offerings does not prevent sacrifice of the daily offerings. And failure to sacrifice some of the additional offerings does not prevent sacrifice of the other additional offerings.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Ḥisda suggests that the Mishna itself resolves the dilemma. By stating that neither offering prevents the other, the Mishna implies they are of equal status. The next segment will analyze whether the Mishna can indeed be read this way — examining whether it addresses the case of limited resources or simply the question of sequence.
Key Terms:
- תְּנֵיתוּהָ (tenituha) = You have already learned it — indicates the answer is found in an existing source
Segment 24
TYPE: קושיא
If the Mishna assumes sufficient resources, the order question is already settled by another baraita
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא דְּאִית לֵיהּ, וּלְקַדֵּם, וְהָתַנְיָא: מִנַּיִן שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא דָּבָר קוֹדֵם לְתָמִיד שֶׁל שַׁחַר? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְעָרַךְ עָלֶיהָ הָעֹלָה״.
English Translation:
What are the circumstances to which the mishna is referring? If we say that it is referring to a case where the Temple treasury has all of the animals necessary for both offerings, and the only question is in terms of sacrificing one before the other, isn’t it taught in a baraita: From where is it derived that no sacrifice should precede the sacrifice of the daily offering of morning? The baraita continues: It is derived from that which the verse states: “And the fire upon the altar shall be kept burning thereby, it shall not go out; and the priest shall kindle wood on it every morning; and he shall lay the burnt offering in order on it, and shall cause the fats of the peace offering to go up in smoke upon it” (Leviticus 6:5).
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Ḥisda’s reasoning continues. If the Mishna is discussing a case where they have enough animals for everything and the issue is merely the order of sacrifice, then the Mishna would be unnecessary — a separate baraita already establishes that no sacrifice precedes the morning tamid, derived from Leviticus 6:5. The word “ha-olah” (the burnt offering) with the definite article implies the first, primary burnt offering — the morning tamid.
Key Terms:
- הָעֹלָה (ha-olah) = “The burnt offering” — with the definite article, interpreted as referring specifically to the morning tamid
Segment 25
TYPE: גמרא
Rava’s derivation: “ha-olah” means the first burnt offering of the day
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאָמַר רָבָא: ״הָעֹלָה״ – עוֹלָה רִאשׁוֹנָה!
English Translation:
And Rava says in explanation of this derivation in the baraita that the term “the burnt offering,” with the definite article, is referring to the first burnt offering of the day, which is the daily offering. Consequently, one may not sacrifice the additional offerings before the daily offering.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava explains the homiletical interpretation of “ha-olah”: the definite article (“the”) indicates a specific, known offering — the first offering of the day, which is the morning tamid. This establishes that the tamid must precede all other offerings. Since this order is already established by verse, the Mishna must be teaching something new — namely, the case of limited resources.
Key Terms:
- עוֹלָה רִאשׁוֹנָה (olah rishona) = The first burnt offering — the morning tamid, which must precede all other offerings
Amud Bet (49b)
Segment 1
TYPE: גמרא
Continuing the analysis: if the Mishna is about limited resources on the same day, tamid clearly wins
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא דְּלֵית לֵיהּ! וְאִי דְּיוֹמֵיהּ, אַמַּאי? תָּדִיר וּמְקוּדָּשׁ – תָּדִיר עָדִיף!
English Translation:
Rather, it is obvious that the mishna is referring to a case where he does not have a sufficient number of animals for both offerings. And if it is referring to the offerings of that day, why does the mishna say that failure to sacrifice one does not prevent sacrifice of the other? Since the daily offering is more frequent and it is sanctified, and the additional offerings are sanctified but are less frequent than the daily offering, the frequent offering are given preference. Consequently, failure to sacrifice the daily offering should prevent the sacrifice of the additional offerings.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara now tightens the logical argument. If the Mishna’s scenario involves limited resources for same-day offerings, the tamid would always win — it is both more frequent (tadir) and more sanctified (mekudash) than the musaf. In that case, the Mishna’s ruling that “neither prevents the other” would be meaningless, since the tamid would always take priority. Therefore, the Mishna must be discussing a different scenario.
Key Terms:
- תָּדִיר עָדִיף (tadir adif) = The more frequent one is preferred — a general principle of halachic priority
Segment 2
TYPE: גמרא
The Mishna must be about tomorrow’s tamid vs. today’s musaf — and they are equal
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא לָאו דְּלִמְחַר, וְקָתָנֵי אֵין מְעַכְּבִין זֶה אֶת זֶה, אַלְמָא כִּי הֲדָדֵי נִינְהוּ.
English Translation:
Rather, is it not referring to a case where the Temple treasury does not have enough animals for both the additional offerings of today and the daily offering of tomorrow, and yet the mishna teaches that failure to sacrifice one does not prevent one from sacrificing the other? Evidently, they are equal and he may sacrifice whichever offering he chooses. This would resolve Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin’s dilemma.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Ḥisda reaches his conclusion: the Mishna must be discussing a situation where the choice is between today’s musaf and tomorrow’s tamid. Since the Mishna says “neither prevents the other,” it follows that they are equal in priority — the community may choose either option. This would resolve the dilemma: when tadir and mekudash conflict, the two principles neutralize each other, and the community has discretion.
Key Terms:
- כִּי הֲדָדֵי נִינְהוּ (ki hadadei ninhu) = They are equal to each other — neither takes halachic precedence
Segment 3
TYPE: תירוץ
Abaye rejects Rav Ḥisda’s proof: the Mishna could be about order, not resources
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: לְעוֹלָם דְּאִית לְהוּ, וּלְקַדֵּם. וּדְקָא קַשְׁיָא לָךְ שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא דָּבָר קוֹדֵם – מִצְוָה בְּעָלְמָא הוּא.
English Translation:
Abaye said to Rav Ḥisda: That is not a valid resolution of the dilemma, as one can claim that actually, the mishna is referring to a case where they have enough animals for all the offerings, and the mishna is referring to the issue of sacrificing one before the other. And with regard to that which poses a difficulty for you based upon the baraita that states that no sacrifice should precede the sacrifice of the daily offering of the morning, that baraita is merely stating the mitzva ab initio.
קלאוד על הדף:
Abaye challenges Rav Ḥisda’s resolution by offering an alternative reading of the Mishna. Perhaps the Mishna does address a case where they have enough animals for everything, and the teaching is simply about the order of sacrifice: if one offering was missed, the other can still be brought. As for the baraita requiring the tamid to come first — Abaye downgrades it from an absolute requirement to a mere mitzva le-khatchila (an ideal practice ab initio), not an indispensable rule. This leaves the original dilemma unresolved.
Key Terms:
- מִצְוָה בְּעָלְמָא (mitzva be-alma) = Merely a mitzva — an ideal practice, not an absolute halachic requirement
Segment 4
TYPE: גמרא
A new proof attempt from the six inspected lambs in the Chamber of the Lambs
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תָּא שְׁמַע: אֵין פּוֹחֲתִין מִשִּׁשָּׁה טְלָאִים הַמְבוּקָּרִין בְּלִשְׁכַּת הַטְּלָאִים, כְּדֵי לַשַּׁבָּת וְלִשְׁנֵי יָמִים טוֹבִים שֶׁל רֹאשׁ הַשָּׁנָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution to Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin’s dilemma based upon a mishna (Arakhin 13a): One maintains no fewer than six lambs that have been inspected and found to be unblemished in the Chamber of the Lambs, sufficient for Shabbat and for the two festival days of Rosh HaShana that in some years occur adjacent to it.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara tries a different approach, citing a mishna from Arakhin about maintaining six inspected lambs in the lishkat ha-tela’im (Chamber of the Lambs). These six lambs are kept for the scenario where Shabbat is immediately followed by two days of Rosh HaShana, a three-day stretch when no new lambs can be inspected. The Gemara will now analyze whether this six-lamb minimum implies a preference for tamid over musaf.
Key Terms:
- לִשְׁכַּת הַטְּלָאִים (lishkat ha-tela’im) = The Chamber of the Lambs — a room in the Temple where inspected lambs were kept
- מְבוּקָּרִין (mevukarin) = Inspected — examined for blemishes before being eligible for sacrifice
Segment 5
TYPE: קושיא
If there were enough for everything, six lambs wouldn’t be sufficient — 22 are needed!
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא דְּאִית לֵיהּ תְּמִידִין וּמוּסָפִין – טוּבָא הֲווֹ!
English Translation:
The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances of this case? If we say that it is referring to a case where the Temple treasury has enough animals for all of the offerings that should be brought, six lambs are not enough, as there are many lambs sacrificed for daily offerings and additional offerings on those three days. In total, twenty-two lambs are required: Two each day for the daily offerings, two for the additional offering of Shabbat, seven for the additional offering of Rosh HaShana, and seven for the additional offering of the New Moon.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara questions the six-lamb figure. If the Temple had full resources, six would be far too few for three days of offerings. The calculation: 6 lambs for the three tamid offerings (2 per day), 2 for Shabbat musaf, 7 for Rosh HaShana musaf, and 7 for Rosh Chodesh musaf (since Rosh HaShana falls on the first of Tishrei) — totaling 22 lambs. Clearly, six lambs cannot serve a fully-funded Temple.
Key Terms:
- טוּבָא הֲווֹ (tuva havu) = There would be many — an exclamation that six is far too few
Segment 6
TYPE: קושיא
Conclusion: the Mishna must discuss limited resources, and six lambs = all for temidin
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא לָאו דְּלֵית לֵיהּ, וּשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ תְּמִידִין עֲדִיפִי!
English Translation:
Rather, is it not that the mishna is referring to a case where the Temple treasury does not have enough animals for all of the offerings, and it is teaching that the animals that he does have are utilized for the daily offerings of all three days rather than for the additional offering of Shabbat on the first of the three days? Consequently, one may conclude from it that the daily offerings of tomorrow are given preference over the additional offerings of today.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara draws a strong conclusion: if six lambs is the minimum and the Temple had limited resources, those six lambs would be exactly enough for three days of tamid offerings (2 per day x 3 days = 6). This means the community would allocate all available lambs to the daily offerings rather than using any for the additional offerings. This would prove that the tamid (more frequent) takes precedence over the musaf (more sanctified) — resolving Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin’s dilemma in favor of tadir.
Key Terms:
- תְּמִידִין עֲדִיפִי (temidin adifei) = The daily offerings are preferred — frequency takes precedence over sanctity
Segment 7
TYPE: תירוץ
Rejection: the Mishna has enough resources; six lambs is about the 4-day inspection, per Ben Bag Bag
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לָא, לְעוֹלָם דְּאִית לֵיהּ, וְהָכִי קָא אָמַר: אֵין פּוֹחֲתִין מִשִּׁשָּׁה טְלָאִים הַמְבוּקָּרִין בְּלִשְׁכַּת הַטְּלָאִים אַרְבָּעָה יָמִים קוֹדֶם שְׁחִיטָה, וּמַנִּי? בֶּן בַּג בַּג הִיא.
English Translation:
The Gemara replies: No, this is not a valid proof, as one can claim that actually, the mishna is referring to a case where the Temple treasury has enough animals for all of the offerings of the three days, and this is what the mishna is saying when it mentions six lambs: One maintains for use as daily offerings no fewer than six lambs that have been inspected and found to be unblemished in the Chamber of the Lambs four days prior to their slaughter. Lambs sacrificed as other offerings do not have to be inspected four days prior to being slaughtered. And in accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of ben Bag Bag.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara rejects the proof by reinterpreting the six-lamb mishna entirely. The six lambs are not the only animals available — the Temple has enough for everything. Rather, “six” refers specifically to the lambs that must be pre-inspected four days before slaughter, a special requirement for the tamid offering only. Since musaf animals don’t require this four-day inspection, only the tamid lambs for the three-day period need to be stored in advance. This follows the opinion of Ben Bag Bag, who derives this inspection requirement from a verbal analogy with the Paschal lamb.
Key Terms:
- בֶּן בַּג בַּג (Ben Bag Bag) = A Tanna who derives the four-day inspection requirement for the tamid from the Paschal lamb
- בִּיקּוּר (bikkur) = Inspection — examining the lamb for blemishes four days prior to slaughter
Segment 8
TYPE: ברייתא
Ben Bag Bag’s source: a verbal analogy between the tamid and the Paschal lamb
Hebrew/Aramaic:
דְּתַנְיָא, בֶּן בַּג בַּג אוֹמֵר: מִנַּיִן לְתָמִיד שֶׁטָּעוּן בִּיקּוּר אַרְבָּעָה יָמִים קוֹדֶם שְׁחִיטָה? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״תִּשְׁמְרוּ לְהַקְרִיב לִי בְּמוֹעֲדוֹ״, וּלְהַלָּן הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״וְהָיָה לָכֶם לְמִשְׁמֶרֶת עַד אַרְבָּעָה עָשָׂר יוֹם״.
English Translation:
As it is taught in a baraita that ben Bag Bag says: From where is it derived that the daily offering requires inspection four days prior to its slaughter? The verse states with regard to the daily offering: “You shall observe [tishmeru] to sacrifice to Me in its due season” (Numbers 28:2), and elsewhere, with regard to the Paschal offering, the verse states: “On the tenth day of this month they shall take for them every man a lamb…and you shall keep it [mishmeret] until the fourteenth day of this month” (Exodus 12:3–6).
קלאוד על הדף:
Ben Bag Bag derives the four-day inspection requirement through a gezeira shava (verbal analogy). The word “tishmeru” (you shall observe/guard) appears regarding the tamid in Numbers 28:2, and the related word “mishmeret” (keeping/guarding) appears regarding the Paschal lamb in Exodus 12:6. Just as the Paschal lamb was taken on the tenth of Nisan and kept until the fourteenth — a four-day period of inspection — so too the tamid must be inspected four days before its slaughter.
Key Terms:
- גְּזֵירָה שָׁוָה (gezeira shava) = Verbal analogy — a halachic derivation based on shared terminology between two verses
- תִּשְׁמְרוּ (tishmeru) = You shall observe/guard — the key term linking the tamid to the Paschal lamb
Segment 9
TYPE: גמרא
Completing the verbal analogy: just as the Paschal lamb requires 4-day inspection, so does the tamid
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מָה לְהַלָּן טָעוּן בִּיקּוּר אַרְבָּעָה יָמִים קוֹדֶם שְׁחִיטָה, אַף כָּאן טָעוּן בִּיקּוּר אַרְבָּעָה יָמִים קוֹדֶם שְׁחִיטָה.
English Translation:
Consequently, it is derived by means of a verbal analogy that just as in the verse there, the Paschal offering requires inspection four days prior to its slaughter, from the tenth of the month to the fourteenth, so too here, the daily offering requires inspection four days prior to its slaughter. This is not a requirement that pertains to all offerings; it is stated specifically with regard to the Paschal offering and extended by means of a verbal analogy to the daily offering.
קלאוד על הדף:
The derivation is now complete. The four-day inspection is specific to the Paschal lamb (by explicit verse) and the tamid (by gezeira shava), but does not apply to other offerings. This explains why only tamid lambs needed to be stored in the Chamber of the Lambs — musaf and other offerings could be inspected and slaughtered the same day. This reinterpretation of the six-lamb mishna means it cannot prove that tamid takes precedence over musaf, leaving the original dilemma unresolved.
Key Terms:
- מָה לְהַלָּן… אַף כָּאן (mah le-halan… af kan) = Just as there… so too here — the standard formula for applying a verbal analogy
Segment 10
TYPE: גמרא
Ravina’s challenge: shouldn’t there be seven lambs, not six?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: הָנֵי שִׁשָּׁה? שִׁבְעָה הָווּ, דְּהָא אִיכָּא דְּצַפְרָא דִּתְלָתָא בְּשַׁבְּתָא!
English Translation:
§ The Gemara cites a discussion pertaining to the mishna cited earlier. Ravina said to Rav Ashi: With regard to these six inspected lambs that must always be kept in the Chamber of Lambs, there ought to be seven, as there is a need for another lamb for the daily offering of the morning of the third day of the week, since it cannot be inspected on Shabbat or the subsequent festival days of Rosh HaShana, and therefore should be inspected and kept beforehand.
קלאוד על הדף:
Ravina raises a practical counting question. If Shabbat is followed by two days of Rosh HaShana (Sunday and Monday), then on Tuesday morning the tamid needs to have been inspected four days earlier — which would be Friday. But on Friday there’s also the afternoon tamid, so there should be a seventh lamb already inspected and waiting for Tuesday morning’s tamid. Six lambs only covers three days of morning and afternoon offerings.
Key Terms:
- תְּלָתָא בְּשַׁבְּתָא (telata be-shabbata) = Tuesday (the third day of the week)
- צַפְרָא (tzafra) = Morning
Segment 11
TYPE: תירוץ
Rav Ashi’s retort: by your logic, shouldn’t it be eight?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּלְטַעְמָיךְ, תְּמָנְיָא הָווּ, דְּהָאִיכָּא דְּפַנְיָא דְּמַעֲלֵי שַׁבְּתָא!
English Translation:
Rav Ashi responded to Ravina: According to your reasoning the correct number is not seven, but rather it is eight; as there is also the daily offering of the afternoon of Shabbat eve that should also be counted.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Ashi sharpens Ravina’s own logic. If we are counting forward from Friday, even the Friday afternoon tamid needs to have been inspected four days earlier (on Monday). By that logic the number should be eight, not seven. This counter-challenge forces Ravina to clarify the starting point of the counting.
Key Terms:
- פַנְיָא דְּמַעֲלֵי שַׁבְּתָא (panya de-ma’alei Shabbata) = The afternoon of Shabbat eve (Friday afternoon)
Segment 12
TYPE: תירוץ
Resolution: the six-lamb count starts after the Friday afternoon tamid is sacrificed
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָא לָא קַשְׁיָא, דִּלְבָתַר דְּאַקְרֵיב קָאָמַר.
English Translation:
Ravina replied: That is not difficult, because the mishna is saying that after he sacrificed the daily offering of the afternoon there must be six inspected lambs.
קלאוד על הדף:
Ravina resolves Rav Ashi’s challenge neatly. The mishna’s count of six begins after the Friday afternoon tamid has already been sacrificed. At that point, one needs six pre-inspected lambs for the remaining offerings: Shabbat morning, Shabbat afternoon, Sunday morning, Sunday afternoon, Monday morning, and Monday afternoon — exactly six. The Friday afternoon tamid is not counted because it has already been used. This resolves the counting difficulty while maintaining the six-lamb minimum stated in the mishna.
Key Terms:
- לְבָתַר דְּאַקְרֵיב (le-vatar de-akrev) = After he sacrificed — the counting begins after the Friday afternoon offering