Meilah 1:1-2
משנה מעילה א:א-ב
Seder: Kodashim | Tractate: Meilah | Chapter: 1
📖 Mishna
Mishna 1:1
משנה א:א
Hebrew:
קָדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים שֶׁשְּׁחָטָן בַּדָּרוֹם, מוֹעֲלִים בָּהֶן. שְׁחָטָן בַּדָּרוֹם וְקִבֵּל דָּמָן בַּצָּפוֹן, בַּצָּפוֹן וְקִבֵּל דָּמָן בַּדָּרוֹם, שְׁחָטָן בַּיּוֹם וְזָרַק בַּלַּיְלָה, בַּלַּיְלָה וְזָרַק בַּיּוֹם, אוֹ שֶׁשְּׁחָטָן חוּץ לִזְמַנָּן וְחוּץ לִמְקוֹמָן, מוֹעֲלִין בָּהֶן. כְּלָל אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ, כֹּל שֶׁהָיָה לָהּ שְׁעַת הֶתֵּר לַכֹּהֲנִים, אֵין מוֹעֲלִין בָּהּ. וְשֶׁלֹּא הָיָה לָהּ שְׁעַת הֶתֵּר לַכֹּהֲנִים, מוֹעֲלִין בָּהּ. אֵיזוֹ הִיא שֶׁהָיָה לָהּ שְׁעַת הֶתֵּר לַכֹּהֲנִים. שֶׁלָּנָה, וְשֶׁנִּטְמְאָה, וְשֶׁיָּצְאָה. אֵיזוֹ הִיא שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה לָהּ שְׁעַת הֶתֵּר לַכֹּהֲנִים. שֶׁנִּשְׁחֲטָה חוּץ לִזְמַנָּהּ, חוּץ לִמְקוֹמָהּ, וְשֶׁקִּבְּלוּ פְסוּלִין וְזָרְקוּ אֶת דָּמָהּ:
English:
Offerings of the most sacred order that were disqualified before their blood was sprinkled on the altar, e.g., if one slaughtered them in the south of the Temple courtyard, and not in the north as required, are subject to the following halakha: One is liable for misusing them, i.e., one who derives benefit from them must bring a guilt offering and pay the principal and an additional one-fifth of their value. If he improperly slaughtered them in the south of the courtyard and properly collected their blood in the north, or even if he properly slaughtered them in the north of the courtyard but improperly collected their blood in the south, although the more significant rite was performed improperly, one is liable for misuse if he derives benefit from the animals. The same halakha that applies if the location of the sacrificial rites was altered likewise applies if the time of those rites was altered. Accordingly, if one properly slaughtered them during the day and improperly sprinkled their blood at night, or if he improperly slaughtered them at night and properly sprinkled their blood during the day, one is liable for misuse if he derives benefit from the animals. Or in a case where one slaughtered them with the intent to partake of their meat or sprinkle their blood beyond its designated time, rendering it piggul, or outside its designated area, disqualifying the offering, he is liable for misusing them if he derives benefit from the animals. Rabbi Yehoshua stated a principle with regard to misuse of disqualified sacrificial animals: With regard to any sacrificial animal that had a period of fitness to the priests before it was disqualified, one is not liable for misusing it. Misuse applies specifically to items consecrated to God, which are not permitted for human consumption at all. Once the offering was permitted for consumption by the priests, it is no longer in that category. And with regard to any sacrificial animal that did not have a period of fitness for the priests before it was disqualified, one is liable for misusing it if he derives benefit from it, as it remained consecrated to God throughout. Which is the sacrificial animal that had a period of fitness for the priests? This category includes a sacrificial animal whose meat remained overnight after its blood was presented on the altar and therefore came to have the status of notar and was therefore disqualified, and one that was disqualified when it became ritually impure, and one that left the Temple courtyard and was thereby disqualified. All of these disqualifications transpired after consumption of the sacrificial meat was permitted, and therefore one who derives benefit from these offerings is not liable for misuse. And which is the sacrificial animal that did not have a period of fitness for the priests? It is a sacrificial animal that was slaughtered with the intent to partake of it or sprinkle its blood beyond its designated time, or outside its designated area, or one that those unfit for Temple service collected and sprinkled its blood. All of these disqualifications took effect before consumption of the sacrificial meat was permitted. The offerings therefore remain consecrated to God, and one is liable for misuse if he derives benefit from them.
קלאוד על המשנה:
The opening mishna of Meilah establishes the fundamental framework for the entire tractate. Me’ilah — the unauthorized benefit from consecrated property — applies to items that belong exclusively to God. The mishna begins with a case of disqualified offerings of the most sacred order (kodshei kodashim), teaching that even when an offering is rendered invalid, its sacred status and the laws of me’ilah remain intact.
Rabbi Yehoshua’s principle is the key to understanding the entire chapter: the determining factor is whether the meat ever had a “period of fitness for the priests” (she’at heter lakohanim). If the offering was properly processed to the point where priests could have eaten it, and only then became disqualified (e.g., it became impure, left the courtyard, or remained overnight), me’ilah no longer applies — because the offering had already transitioned from being exclusively God’s to being permitted for human consumption. But if the disqualification occurred before that transition (e.g., improper intent during slaughter), the offering never left God’s domain, and me’ilah still applies.
This principle reflects a profound idea about sanctity: once something is “released” from the heavenly domain to the human domain through the proper ritual process, that transition cannot be fully reversed.
Key Terms:
- קדשי קדשים (Kodshei Kodashim) = Offerings of the most sacred order (e.g., sin offerings, guilt offerings, burnt offerings)
- מעילה (Me’ilah) = Misuse of sacred property; deriving unauthorized benefit from items consecrated to God
- שעת היתר לכהנים (She’at Heter LaKohanim) = A period of fitness for the priests; the point at which the offering becomes permitted for priestly consumption
- פיגול (Piggul) = An offering rendered invalid due to improper intent regarding time
- נותר (Notar) = Sacrificial meat that remained beyond its permitted time for consumption
Mishna 1:2
משנה א:ב
Hebrew:
בְּשַׂר קָדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים שֶׁיָּצָא לִפְנֵי זְרִיקַת דָּמִים, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר, מוֹעֲלִין בּוֹ, וְאֵין חַיָּבִין עָלָיו מִשּׁוּם פִּגּוּל, נוֹתָר וְטָמֵא. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר, אֵין מוֹעֲלִין בּוֹ, אֲבָל חַיָּבִין עָלָיו מִשּׁוּם פִּגּוּל, נוֹתָר וְטָמֵא. אָמַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, וַהֲרֵי הַמַּפְרִישׁ חַטָּאת וְאָבְדָה, וְהִפְרִישׁ אַחֶרֶת תַּחְתֶּיהָ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִמְצֵאת הָרִאשׁוֹנָה וַהֲרֵי שְׁתֵּיהֶן עוֹמְדוֹת, לֹא כְשֵׁם שֶׁדָּמָהּ פּוֹטֵר אֶת בְּשָׂרָהּ, כָּךְ הוּא פוֹטֵר אֶת בְּשַׂר חֲבֶרְתָּהּ. וְאִם פָּטַר דָּמָהּ אֶת בְּשַׂר חֲבֶרְתָּהּ מִן הַמְּעִילָה, דִּין הוּא שֶׁיִּפְטֹר אֶת בְּשָׂרָהּ:
English:
The mishna presents a dispute with regard to the status of offerings of the most sacred order, which normally are not subject to the halakhot of misuse once their blood has been sprinkled and they have been permitted to the priests. The case of the mishna is the meat of offerings of the most sacred order, whose consumption is permitted from the moment their blood was sprinkled, that left the Temple courtyard before the sprinkling of the blood, and then reentered the courtyard. Rabbi Eliezer says: The sprinkling of this blood does not permit its consumption by the priests. Consequently, one is liable for misusing it. And he is not liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibitions of piggul, if he partook of it after it was slaughtered with the intent to partake of it or sprinkle its blood beyond its designated time, or of notar, if he partook of the meat after it remained overnight, or of partaking of the meat while ritually impure. Rabbi Akiva says: The sprinkling is effective despite the fact that the meat left the Temple courtyard and was disqualified, and therefore one is not liable for misusing it. Likewise, other halakhot that apply to offerings whose blood was sprinkled apply to it, and consequently one is liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibitions of partaking of meat that is piggul, or notar, or remained overnight, or of partaking of the meat while ritually impure. Rabbi Akiva said, in support of his opinion: But there is the case of one who designated an animal as his sin offering and it was lost, and he designated another animal in its stead, and thereafter the first sin offering was found and both of them are standing fit for sacrifice. If he slaughtered both animals at the same time and sprinkled the blood of one of them, which means that the second was disqualified as a leftover sin offering, the question arises as to the status of the meat of the second animal with regard to the halakhot of misuse. Is it not the case that just as the blood of the animal whose blood was sprinkled exempts its meat from liability for its misuse, so too it exempts the meat of the other animal? Since he could have chosen to sprinkle the blood of either animal, they are considered as though they were one offering. If so, one may learn from there by an a fortiori inference with regard to the case of sprinkling the blood of meat that left the courtyard and returned: If the sprinkling of its blood exempted the meat of the other animal from the halakhot of misuse, it is only right that it should exempt its own meat that left the courtyard.
קלאוד על המשנה:
This mishna presents a fascinating dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva about the power of blood sprinkling. The case: meat of a most-sacred offering left the Temple courtyard before the blood was sprinkled, then returned. Does the subsequent sprinkling of the blood “work” on this meat that had been temporarily outside?
Rabbi Eliezer says the sprinkling is ineffective for this meat — it remains subject to me’ilah (as if it were still purely God’s). Rabbi Akiva says the sprinkling is effective — the meat transitions to the domain of the priests, removing me’ilah but adding liability for piggul, notar, and impurity. These two positions are actually a package deal: if sprinkling works, you get all the consequences of a properly processed offering (both the benefits and the prohibitions).
Rabbi Akiva’s proof is elegant: he argues from the case of duplicate sin offerings. If one designates a replacement sin offering and then finds the original, sprinkling the blood of one exempts the other from me’ilah — even though that other animal isn’t the one whose blood was sprinkled. If sprinkling can affect a completely different animal, surely it should affect its own meat that merely stepped outside temporarily. This is a kal vachomer (a fortiori argument) at its finest.
Key Terms:
- זריקת דמים (Zerikat Damim) = Sprinkling of blood; the pivotal act that transitions an offering’s status
- רבי אליעזר (Rabbi Eliezer) = Tanna who holds the sprinkling is ineffective for meat that left the courtyard
- רבי עקיבא (Rabbi Akiva) = Tanna who holds the sprinkling is effective despite the meat having left
- קל וחומר (Kal VaChomer) = A fortiori argument; if X applies in a lesser case, surely it applies in a greater case