Chullin Daf 3 (חולין דף ג׳)
Daf: 3 | Amudim: 3a – 3b | Date: Loading...
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (3a)
Segment 1
TYPE: קושיא (Challenge to Rabba bar Ulla)
A loose-end challenge to the resolution given at the end of daf 2.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
חֶרֶב הֲרֵי הוּא כֶּחָלָל, אַב הַטּוּמְאָה הוּא, לְטַמְּיֵיהּ לְסַכִּין, וַאֲזַל סַכִּין וְטַמִּיתֵיהּ לְבָשָׂר!
English Translation:
It is derived from the juxtaposition of “slain” to “sword” that the halakhic status of a sword or any other metal vessel that comes into contact with a corpse is like that of a corpse itself. Similarly, if a metal utensil comes in contact with a person impure with impurity imparted by a corpse, it assumes his status. Therefore, since the impure person is a primary source of ritual impurity, let him render the knife impure, rendering it as well a primary source of impurity, and the knife then goes and renders the flesh impure.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara presses Rabba bar Ulla’s resolution (chullin al taharat ha-kodesh slaughtered by a tamei person): if the slaughterer is impure with corpse-tumah, then the principle of cherev ke-chalal — derived from Numbers 19:16 — elevates the knife into an av ha-tumah on par with a corpse itself. That av ha-tumah knife would then transmit impurity back into the meat, defeating the entire point of the supervised scenario. This is a serious threat to Rabba bar Ulla’s reading and must be resolved.
Key Terms:
- cherev ke-chalal = the halachic principle that a metal object touching corpse-impurity itself becomes av ha-tumah, as if it were the corpse
- av ha-tumah = primary source of ritual impurity, one level above first-degree impurity
Segment 2
TYPE: תירוץ (Two-Part Answer with Supporting Baraita)
Two ways to save Rabba bar Ulla’s resolution — a lighter form of impurity, or an unmetallic knife.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא דְּאִיטַּמִּי בְּשֶׁרֶץ, וְאִי בָּעֵית אֵימָא: לְעוֹלָם דְּאִיטַּמִּי בְּמֵת, וּכְגוֹן שֶׁבָּדַק קְרוּמִית שֶׁל קָנֶה וְשָׁחַט בָּהּ, דְּתַנְיָא: בַּכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִים, בֵּין בְּצוֹר בֵּין בִּזְכוּכִית בֵּין בִּקְרוּמִית שֶׁל קָנֶה.
English Translation:
Rather, it is a case where the person became impure with impurity imparted by a creeping animal; as he assumes first-degree ritual impurity status and does not render vessels impure, the knife remains ritually pure. And if you wish, say instead that actually he became impure with impurity imparted by a corpse, and it is a case where one examined the stalk of a reed, which is a flat wooden vessel that does not become ritually impure, to ensure that it is perfectly smooth with no nicks, and slaughtered with it, as it is taught in a baraita: One may slaughter an animal with any sharp object, whether with a flint, or with glass shards, or with the stalk of a reed.
קלאוד על הדף:
Two alternative readings close the cherev ke-chalal loophole. First: the slaughterer’s impurity was sheretz-based, which is only first-degree impurity and halachically does not transfer to vessels — so the knife stays pure. Second: even if it was full corpse-impurity, the slaughter was performed with a kromit shel kaneh (reed stalk), which as a flat wooden vessel is immune to becoming tamei. A supporting baraita confirms that non-metallic materials like flint, glass, and reed-stalk are valid shechita instruments.
Key Terms:
- sheretz = creeping animal, a source of first-degree (not primary) impurity that does not impart tumah to vessels
- kromit shel kaneh = reed stalk, a flat wooden implement that halachically cannot become ritually impure
Segment 3
TYPE: דעת אביי (Abaye’s Position)
Abaye offers a new reading of the mishna: “everyone” includes a Kuti.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: הָכִי קָתָנֵי – הַכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִין, וַאֲפִילּוּ כּוּתִי. בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? כְּשֶׁיִּשְׂרָאֵל עוֹמֵד עַל גַּבָּיו, אֲבָל יוֹצֵא וְנִכְנָס – לֹא יִשְׁחוֹט.
English Translation:
Abaye said in resolution of the apparent contradiction in the mishna that this is what the mishna is teaching: Everyone slaughters, and even a Samaritan. In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where a Jew is standing over him and ensuring that he slaughters properly; but if the Jew merely exits and enters and does not have a constant presence, the Samaritan may not slaughter the animal.
קלאוד על הדף:
Abaye now opens an entirely new line of resolutions. Instead of reading “everyone” as referring to a tamei person (Rabba bar Ulla’s reading), he reads it as including a Kuti — a Samaritan whose reliability for mitzva-observance is in question. Abaye’s threshold is strict: the Kuti may only slaughter when a Jew is literally standing over him; mere intermittent presence (yotzei ve-nichnas) is insufficient for ab initio permission.
Key Terms:
- Kuti = Samaritan; a non-Jewish group whose observance of certain mitzvot was recognized but whose overall halachic status was contested
- omed al gabav = standing directly over him; continuous in-person supervision
Segment 4
TYPE: דעת אביי (Abaye — Bediavad Test)
The after-the-fact verification procedure for an unsupervised Kuti shechita.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאִם שָׁחַט, חוֹתֵךְ כְּזַיִת בָּשָׂר וְנוֹתֵן לוֹ. אֲכָלוֹ – מוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ, לֹא אֲכָלוֹ – אָסוּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ.
English Translation:
And if the Samaritan slaughtered the animal without supervision, the Jew cuts an olive-bulk of meat from the slaughtered animal and gives it to the Samaritan to eat. If the Samaritan ate it, it is permitted for the Jew to eat meat from what the Samaritan slaughtered. Since Samaritans are meticulous with regard to the meat that they eat and eat meat only from an animal that was slaughtered properly, the Jew may partake of the meat. But if the Samaritan did not eat the meat, there is concern that the animal was not slaughtered properly, and it is prohibited to eat from what the Samaritan slaughtered.
קלאוד על הדף:
Abaye supplies a clever bediavad mechanism that exploits the Kutim’s own scruples. Kutim were known to be strict about not eating non-kosher meat; so if an unsupervised Kuti is offered a k’zayit and readily eats it, we infer he trusts his own shechita and we may trust it too. If he refuses to eat, his own behavior testifies that something was amiss. The test turns the Kuti’s conscience into a self-authenticating kashrut check.
Key Terms:
- k’zayit = olive-bulk, the standard halachic minimum volume of food for consumption-related rulings
Segment 5
TYPE: סוגיית הגמרא (Continuation of Abaye’s Reading)
The mishna’s exclusion clause as it fits Abaye’s structure.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
חוּץ מֵחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן, דַּאֲפִילּוּ דִּיעֲבַד נָמֵי לָא, שֶׁמָּא יִשְׁהוּ, שֶׁמָּא יִדְרְסוּ, וְשֶׁמָּא יַחֲלִידוּ.
English Translation:
And it teaches: This is the halakha with regard to all people except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, who, even if they slaughtered only non-sacred animals, their slaughter is not valid even after the fact. The reason the Sages deemed such slaughter not valid is lest people in these categories interrupt the slaughter, lest they press the knife in the course of slaughter, and lest they conceal the knife beneath the windpipe or the gullet in the course of an inverted slaughter.
קלאוד על הדף:
Continuing the mishna’s structure under Abaye’s reading, the Gemara cites the exclusion of cheresh, shoteh, and katan — for whom even bediavad slaughter is invalid. The three concerns (pausing, pressing, concealing) each correspond to a technical shechita disqualification (shehiya, derasa, hachlada), and these categories cannot be supervised into reliability because their very capacity for careful intent is legally absent.
Segment 6
TYPE: קושיא (Grammatical Challenge on Abaye)
The phrase “ve-kulan she-shachatu” does not fit naturally onto the cheresh-shoteh-katan clause.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְכוּלָּן שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ, אַהֵיָיא? אִילֵּימָא אַחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן – עֲלַהּ קָאֵי, ״וְאִם שָׁחֲטוּ״ מִבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to the clause in the mishna that follows: And any of them who slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid, to which case in the mishna is it referring? If we say that the reference is to the case of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, since that is the halakha to which it stands adjacent, the tanna should have formulated the phrase: And if they slaughtered, instead of: And any of them who slaughtered.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara presses: the mishna’s next line — “ve-kulan she-shachatu va-acherim ro’in otan” (any of them who slaughtered with others watching, their shechita is valid) — to what antecedent does it refer? Grammatically, “kulan” (all of them) implies a plural referent already introduced, not the three just-named exceptions; in that case the tanna would have written “ve-im shachatu” (and if they slaughtered). The grammatical choice of “kulan” is what the Gemara must now account for.
Segment 7
TYPE: קשיא (Unresolved Difficulty on Abaye)
The Kuti option for “ve-kulan” also fails; the question stands as “kashya” against Abaye.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא, אַכּוּתִי – הָא אָמְרַתְּ: כְּשֶׁיִּשְׂרָאֵל עוֹמֵד עַל גַּבָּיו שָׁחֵיט אֲפִילּוּ לְכַתְּחִלָּה! קַשְׁיָא.
English Translation:
Rather, perhaps the reference is to the case of a Samaritan who slaughters. The Gemara rejects that possibility. But didn’t you say in that case: When a Jew is standing over him, a Samaritan may slaughter even ab initio? The Gemara concedes that the formulation of the mishna: And any of them who slaughtered, is difficult according to this explanation of the mishna.
קלאוד על הדף:
The alternative is also rejected: “ve-kulan” cannot refer back to the Kuti either, because for the Kuti under Abaye’s rule, direct supervision already renders the shechita valid lechatchila — so the “acherim ro’in otan” clause would be redundant. The Gemara leaves the grammar as a standing difficulty on Abaye’s reading — kashya, not outright refuted, but unresolved.
Segment 8
TYPE: דעת רבא (Rava’s Objection to Abaye)
Rava challenges Abaye’s claim that yotzei-ve-nichnas fails lechatchila.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רָבָא: וְיוֹצֵא וְנִכְנָס, לְכַתְּחִלָּה לָא? וְהָתְנַן: הַמַּנִּיחַ נָכְרִי בַּחֲנוּתוֹ וְיִשְׂרָאֵל יוֹצֵא וְנִכְנָס – מוּתָּר! הָתָם מִי קָתָנֵי ״מַנִּיחַ״? ״הַמַּנִּיחַ״ קָתָנֵי, דִּיעֲבַד.
English Translation:
Rava said: And in a case where a Jew exits and enters, is it not permitted for the Samaritan to slaughter the animal ab initio? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Avoda Zara 69a): In the case of one who leaves a gentile in his store in which there is wine, and a Jew exits and enters, the wine is permitted? Just as there, the sporadic presence of the Jew is sufficient to ensure that the gentile will refrain from touching the wine, it should be sufficient in the case of a Samaritan who slaughters an animal as well. The Gemara rejects that proof. There, in the case of the store, does the tanna teach: One leaves a gentile ab initio? The tanna teaches: One who leaves, after the fact. Consequently, there is no proof from there that the Jew’s sporadic presence is sufficient to permit slaughter by a Samaritan ab initio.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava challenges Abaye’s strict supervisory threshold with a proof-text from Avoda Zara: a wine-shop with a gentile attendant is permitted when a Jew merely comes and goes. If yotzei ve-nichnas works for wine, why insist on continuous standing over a Kuti slaughterer? The Gemara rebuts its own proof — that mishna uses “ha-maniach” (one who has left), a bediavad formulation, so nothing is proven about lechatchila status from that source alone.
Segment 9
TYPE: תירוץ (Rava’s Actual Proof)
A cleaner proof from Avoda Zara 61a that yotzei-ve-nichnas qualifies lechatchila.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא מֵהָכָא: אֵין הַשּׁוֹמֵר צָרִיךְ לִהְיוֹת יוֹשֵׁב וּמְשַׁמֵּר, אֶלָּא אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁיּוֹצֵא וְנִכְנָס – מוּתָּר.
English Translation:
Rather, proof can be cited from the mishna here (Avoda Zara 61a): In a case where barrels of wine belonging to a Jew are in the possession of a gentile, and a Jew was tasked with supervising those barrels, the supervisor need not be continuously sitting and supervising to ensure that the gentile does not touch the wine; rather, even if the supervisor exits and enters, the wine is permitted. This mishna clearly indicates that exiting and entering is sufficient even ab initio.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava now produces an unambiguous proof from a different mishna in Avoda Zara: a shomer over gentile-handled wine barrels need not sit stationary; intermittent presence suffices, and the wine is permitted — clearly lechatchila. This establishes in principle that yotzei-ve-nichnas is a fully valid supervisory posture, not merely a bediavad concession. Rava will now apply this threshold to Kuti shechita.
Key Terms:
- yotzei ve-nichnas = exiting and entering; intermittent supervisory presence
Segment 10
TYPE: דעת רבא (Rava’s Revised Reading)
Rava restates Abaye’s resolution with the relaxed supervisory threshold.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא, הָכִי קָתָנֵי: הַכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִין, וַאֲפִילּוּ כּוּתִי. בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? כְּשֶׁיִּשְׂרָאֵל יוֹצֵא וְנִכְנָס, אֲבָל בָּא וּמְצָאוֹ שֶׁשָּׁחַט – חוֹתֵךְ כַּזַּיִת בָּשָׂר וְנוֹתֵן לוֹ, אֲכָלוֹ – מוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ, לֹא אֲכָלוֹ – אָסוּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ.
English Translation:
Rather, Rava said in resolution of the apparent contradiction similar to the resolution proposed by Abaye, that this is what the mishna is teaching: Everyone slaughters, and even a Samaritan. In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where a Jew exits and enters; but if the Jew does not exit and enter and instead came and found that the Samaritan slaughtered the animal, the Jew cuts an olive-bulk of meat from the slaughtered animal and gives it to the Samaritan to eat. If the Samaritan ate it, it is permitted for the Jew to eat meat from what the Samaritan slaughtered. But if the Samaritan did not eat the meat, it is prohibited to eat from what the Samaritan slaughtered.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava reformulates Abaye’s reading with his own, gentler benchmark: “everyone” includes a Kuti, permitted lechatchila even under yotzei-ve-nichnas supervision. The bediavad scenario shifts accordingly: only when the Jew arrives after the slaughter (having not been coming and going at all) is the k’zayit test necessary. Rava has thus preserved the substance of Abaye’s Kuti interpretation while liberalizing the supervisory floor.
Segment 11
TYPE: סוגיית הגמרא (Mishna’s Exclusion Clause under Rava)
The “chutz” and “ve-kulan” passages replayed under Rava’s framework.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
חוּץ מֵחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן, דַּאֲפִילּוּ דִּיעֲבַד נָמֵי לָא, שֶׁמָּא יִשְׁהוּ, וְשֶׁמָּא יִדְרְסוּ, וְשֶׁמָּא יַחֲלִידוּ. וְכוּלָּן שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ – אַהֵיָיא? אִילֵּימָא אַחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן – עֲלַהּ קָאֵי, ״וְאִם שָׁחֲטוּ״ מִבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!
English Translation:
And it teaches: This is the halakha with regard to all people except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, whose slaughter is not valid even after the fact. The reason the Sages deemed such slaughter not valid is lest people in these categories interrupt the slaughter, lest they press the knife in the course of slaughter, and lest they conceal the knife beneath the windpipe or the gullet in the course of an inverted slaughter. The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to the clause in the mishna that follows: And any of them who slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid, to which case in the mishna is this referring? If we say that the reference is to the case of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, since that is the halakha to which it stands adjacent, the tanna should have formulated the phrase: And if they slaughtered, instead of: And any of them who slaughtered.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara now re-runs the same grammatical inquiry about “ve-kulan she-shachatu” under Rava’s reading. It first tries to attach the phrase to the cheresh-shoteh-katan exclusion, but the same linguistic objection applies: the plural “kulan” does not naturally point to the three just-excluded categories, since the tanna should have used “ve-im shachatu” in that case.
Segment 12
TYPE: קשיא (Unresolved Difficulty on Rava)
Rava’s reading cannot account for “ve-kulan” either, and the same kashya stands.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא אַכּוּתִי? הָא אָמְרַתְּ: אֲפִילּוּ יוֹצֵא וְנִכְנָס שָׁחֵיט לְכַתְּחִלָּה! קַשְׁיָא.
English Translation:
Rather, perhaps the reference is to the case of a Samaritan who slaughters. The Gemara rejects that possibility. But didn’t you say that if a Jew is present, then even if he exits and enters and does not have a constant presence, a Samaritan may slaughter even ab initio? The Gemara concedes that the formulation of the mishna: And any of them who slaughtered, is difficult according to this explanation of the mishna.
קלאוד על הדף:
Nor can “ve-kulan” be mapped onto the Kuti under Rava’s reading, because even intermittent supervision already suffices for lechatchila slaughter — rendering “acherim ro’in otan” redundant. Rava is left with the identical structural difficulty that plagued Abaye. The Gemara marks this kashya and moves on to test further amoraic resolutions.
Segment 13
TYPE: דעת רב אשי (Rav Ashi’s Position)
A third framework: “everyone” includes a Jewish transgressor, provided he is meshummad le-te’avon.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: הָכִי קָתָנֵי – הַכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִין, וַאֲפִילּוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל מְשׁוּמָּד. מְשׁוּמָּד לְמַאי? לֶאֱכוֹל נְבֵילוֹת לְתֵיאָבוֹן, וְכִדְרָבָא, דְּאָמַר רָבָא: יִשְׂרָאֵל מְשׁוּמָּד אוֹכֵל נְבֵילוֹת לְתֵיאָבוֹן
English Translation:
Rav Ashi said in resolution of the apparent contradiction in the mishna that this is what the mishna is teaching: Everyone slaughters, and even a Jewish transgressor [meshummad]. The Gemara asks: A transgressor of what sort? The Gemara answers: It is one whose transgression is to eat unslaughtered animal carcasses to satisfy his appetite, i.e., for his convenience. And the ruling of the mishna is in accordance with the statement of Rava, as Rava says: In the case of a Jewish transgressor whose transgression is that he eats unslaughtered animal carcasses to satisfy his appetite, if he seeks to slaughter an animal,
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Ashi sidesteps the Kuti question entirely and proposes a third reading: “everyone” includes a Jewish meshummad. The critical specification is meshummad le-te’avon — one who eats neveilot for convenience, not from ideological rebellion — who retains presumed Jewish reliability on matters unconnected to his specific weakness. Rav Ashi grounds this in a halachic ruling of Rava in a different context, which he now imports to explain the mishna.
Key Terms:
- meshummad = Jewish transgressor, an apostate (used in various technical senses in Talmud)
- le-te’avon = for appetite/convenience, as opposed to le-hakh’is (spiteful, ideological) violation
Amud Bet (3b)
Segment 1
TYPE: דעת רב אשי (Rav Ashi — Knife-Examination Rule)
Rava’s halacha on the meshummad continues: pre-examined knife lechatchila, otherwise bediavad knife-examination.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בּוֹדֵק סַכִּין וְנוֹתֵן לוֹ, וּמוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ. אֲבָל לֹא בָּדַק וְנָתַן לוֹ – לֹא יִשְׁחוֹט, וְאִם שָׁחַט – בּוֹדֵק סַכִּינוֹ אַחֲרָיו. נִמְצֵאת סַכִּינוֹ יָפָה – מוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ, וְאִם לָאו – אָסוּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ.
English Translation:
one examines a knife to ensure that it is perfectly smooth with no nicks and gives it to the transgressor, and it is permitted to eat from what he slaughtered. But if one did not examine the knife and give it to the transgressor, the transgressor may not slaughter an animal ab initio. And if the transgressor slaughtered an animal, one examines his knife after his slaughter. If his knife is found to be perfectly smooth, it is permitted to eat meat from what he slaughtered, and if not, it is prohibited to eat from what he slaughtered.
קלאוד על הדף:
The halacha of Rava on the meshummad is now fully laid out. Lechatchila status requires a pre-examined knife handed to the transgressor; absent this, he may not slaughter initially. Bediavad, a post-facto knife inspection resolves the question — a smooth knife renders the shechita kasher, a nicked (pagum) knife invalidates it. The logic: for a meshummad le-te’avon, the kashrut of the instrument itself is the weak link, since the transgressor has no interest in scrupulous technique but will not actively defraud.
Segment 2
TYPE: סוגיית הגמרא (Mishna’s Exclusion Clause under Rav Ashi)
The “chutz” and “ve-kulan” passages replayed a third time, under Rav Ashi’s framework.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
חוּץ מֵחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן, דַּאֲפִילּוּ דִּיעֲבַד נָמֵי לָא, שֶׁמָּא יִשְׁהוּ, שֶׁמָּא יִדְרְסוּ, וְשֶׁמָּא יַחֲלִידוּ. וְכוּלָּן שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ – אַהֵיָיא? אִילֵּימָא אַחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן – עֲלַהּ קָאֵי, ״וְאִם שָׁחֲטוּ״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!
English Translation:
And it teaches: This is the halakha with regard to all people except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, whose slaughter is not valid even after the fact. The reason the Sages deemed such slaughter not valid is lest people in these categories interrupt the slaughter, lest they press the knife in the course of slaughter, and lest they conceal the knife beneath the windpipe or the gullet in the course of an inverted slaughter. The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to the clause in the mishna that follows: And any of them who slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid, to which case in the mishna is this referring? If we say that the reference is to the case of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, since that is the halakha to which it stands adjacent, the tanna should have formulated the phrase: And if they slaughtered, instead of: And any of them who slaughtered.
קלאוד על הדף:
The same grammatical pattern repeats under Rav Ashi: the mishna’s “chutz me-cheresh, shoteh, ve-katan” clause reappears, followed again by the “ve-kulan she-shachatu” inquiry. As before, attempting to hang “kulan” on the cheresh-shoteh-katan trio fails on lexical grounds — the tanna would have used “ve-im shachatu” if that were his target.
Segment 3
TYPE: קשיא (Unresolved Difficulty on Rav Ashi)
The exhaustive “ve-kulan” logical tree for the meshummad, all dead-ends.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא אַיִּשְׂרָאֵל מְשׁוּמָּד? אִי דְּבָדַק סַכִּין וְנוֹתֵן לוֹ, הָא אָמְרַתְּ שׁוֹחֵט לְכַתְּחִלָּה! אֶלָּא דְּלֹא בָּדַק. אִי דְּאִיתֵיהּ לְסַכִּין – לִיבְדְּקֵיהּ הַשְׁתָּא, וְאִי דְּלֵיתֵיהּ לְסַכִּין – כִּי אֲחֵרִים רוֹאִין אוֹתוֹ מַאי הָוֵי? דִּלְמָא בְּסַכִּין פְּגוּמָה שָׁחֵיט! קַשְׁיָא.
English Translation:
Rather, perhaps the reference is to the case of a Jewish transgressor who slaughters. The Gemara asks: In what case? If it is a case where one examined a knife and gave it to the transgressor, didn’t you say in that case that the transgressor may slaughter ab initio? Rather, perhaps the reference is to a case where one did not examine the knife. If it is a case where the knife is available, let him examine the knife now to make sure that there are no nicks. And if it is a case where the knife is not available, then when others see him slaughter, what of it? How can one eat from what he slaughtered? Perhaps he slaughtered the animal with a notched knife. The Gemara concedes that the formulation of the mishna: And any of them who slaughtered, is difficult according to this explanation of the mishna.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara traces every logical branch for hooking “ve-kulan” onto Rav Ashi’s meshummad, and each one collapses. A pre-examined knife already delivers lechatchila status — so supervision adds nothing. Without pre-examination, if the knife exists we can still check it now; if it does not exist, mere observation cannot rule out a pagum knife. Rav Ashi too is left with kashya.
Segment 4
TYPE: דעת רבינא (Ravina’s First Version)
Ravina offers yet another reading: “everyone” means every mumcheh, even one not yet muchzak.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רָבִינָא אָמַר: הָכִי קָתָנֵי – ״הַכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִין״, הַכֹּל מוּמְחִין שׁוֹחֲטִין, מוּמְחִין וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין מוּחְזָקִין.
English Translation:
Ravina said in resolution of the apparent contradiction in the mishna that this is what the mishna is teaching: Everyone slaughters, i.e., everyone who is an expert in the halakhot of ritual slaughter slaughters; all experts are qualified to slaughter, and this is the halakha even if they are not established as accustomed to slaughter with a steady hand and without fainting.
קלאוד על הדף:
Ravina proposes an entirely different interpretive axis. “Ha-kol shochatin” is a reassurance that every mumcheh — anyone knowledgeable in the halachot of shechita — is fit to slaughter, even if he has not yet been observed enough times to be classified as muchzak (a steady and reliable practitioner). The emphasis shifts from identity (Kuti, meshummad) to qualification (halachic expertise).
Key Terms:
- mumcheh = expert, one knowledgeable in the laws of shechita
- muchzak = established, with a track record of reliable performance
Segment 5
TYPE: דעת רבינא (Ravina-v1 — Application)
When is Ravina’s first version in effect: known expertise vs. testable expertise.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? שֶׁיּוֹדְעִין בּוֹ שֶׁיּוֹדֵעַ לוֹמַר הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה, אֲבָל אֵין יוֹדְעִין בּוֹ שֶׁיּוֹדֵעַ לוֹמַר הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה – לֹא יִשְׁחוֹט, וְאִם שָׁחַט – בּוֹדְקִין אוֹתוֹ, אִם יוֹדֵעַ לוֹמַר הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה – מוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ, וְאִם לָאו – אָסוּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ.
English Translation:
In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where people know about him that he knows and is able to recite the halakhot of ritual slaughter. But if people do not know about him that he knows and is able to recite the halakhot of ritual slaughter, he may not slaughter an animal ab initio. And if he slaughtered an animal, one examines him; if he knows and is able to recite the halakhot of ritual slaughter it is permitted to eat meat from what he slaughtered, and if not, it is prohibited to eat from what he slaughtered.
קלאוד על הדף:
Ravina-v1 specifies the operational distinction. Lechatchila: only when the shochet’s halachic competence is publicly known. Absent that public knowledge, he may not slaughter initially; if he did, we test him on the laws of shechita afterward. Passing the exam retroactively validates the slaughter; failing invalidates it. The system is knowledge-based, not behavior-based.
Segment 6
TYPE: סוגיית הגמרא (Mishna’s Exclusion Clause under Ravina-v1)
The same “chutz” and “ve-kulan” inquiry, this time under Ravina-v1.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
חוּץ מֵחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן, דַּאֲפִילּוּ דִּיעֲבַד נָמֵי לָא, שֶׁמָּא יִשְׁהוּ, שֶׁמָּא יִדְרְסוּ, וְשֶׁמָּא יַחֲלִידוּ. וְכוּלָּן שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ – אַהֵיָיא? אִילֵּימָא אַחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן עֲלַהּ קָאֵי, וְאִם שָׁחֲטוּ מִבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!
English Translation:
And it teaches: This is the halakha with regard to all people except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, whose slaughter is not valid even after the fact. The reason the Sages deemed such slaughter not valid is lest people in these categories interrupt the slaughter, lest they press the knife in the course of slaughter, and lest they conceal the knife beneath the windpipe or the gullet in the course of an inverted slaughter. The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to the clause in the mishna that follows: And any of them who slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid, to which case in the mishna is this referring? If we say that the reference is to the case of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, since that is the halakha to which it stands adjacent, the tanna should have formulated the phrase: And if they slaughtered, instead of: And any of them who slaughtered.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara again runs the grammatical inquiry. “Ve-kulan she-shachatu” cannot sit naturally on the cheresh-shoteh-katan exclusion — same linguistic reasoning, same rejection of that reading. The next test will be whether Ravina-v1’s target (the non-publicly-known expert) can host the “kulan” clause.
Segment 7
TYPE: תירוץ (Resolution for Ravina-v1)
Ravina-v1 survives the “ve-kulan” inquiry by locating it in an unusual case.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא, אַשֶּׁאֵין מוּמְחִין, בְּבוֹדְקִין אוֹתוֹ סַגִּי! דְּלֵיתֵיהּ לְקַמַּן דְּלִיבְדְּקֵיהּ.
English Translation:
Rather, perhaps the reference is to a case where they are not experts. The Gemara rejects the possibility that they are not experts, as in that case, if one examines him after the slaughter to determine his expertise in the halakhot of ritual slaughter, it is sufficient. The Gemara answers: Supervision is necessary in the case where the one who slaughtered the animal is not before us so that we can examine him.
קלאוד על הדף:
Uniquely among the four resolutions, Ravina-v1 has an answer. The “ve-kulan” clause applies precisely to a case where the not-yet-publicly-known expert is no longer available for post-facto examination. In that case, the fact that others watched him slaughter substitutes for the missing examination — supervision serves as a proxy for the hilchot-shechita test we would otherwise have run.
Segment 8
TYPE: דעת רבינא (Ravina’s Second Version)
An alternative version inverts the mumcheh/muchzak priority: the focus is on steady-handedness.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאִיכָּא דְאָמְרִי, רָבִינָא אָמַר: הָכִי קָתָנֵי – ״הַכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִין״, הַכֹּל מוּחְזָקִין שׁוֹחֲטִין, מוּחְזָקִין אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין מוּמְחִין. בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ לְפָנֵינוּ שְׁתַּיִם וְשָׁלֹשׁ פְּעָמִים וְלֹא נִתְעַלֵּף, אֲבָל לֹא שָׁחַט לְפָנֵינוּ שְׁתַּיִם וְשָׁלֹשׁ פְּעָמִים – לֹא יִשְׁחוֹט, שֶׁמָּא יִתְעַלֵּף. וְאִם שָׁחַט וְאָמַר: ״בָּרִי לִי שֶׁלֹּא נִתְעַלַּפְתִּי״ – שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה.
English Translation:
And there are those who say that Ravina said that this is what the mishna is teaching: Everyone slaughters, i.e., everyone who is established as accustomed to slaughter with a steady hand and without fainting slaughters; all those established concerning this are qualified to slaughter, even if it is not known if they are experts. In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where they slaughtered before us two or three times and did not faint. But if he did not slaughter before us two or three times he may not slaughter an animal ab initio, lest he faint. And if he slaughtered an animal and said: It is clear to me that I did not faint, his slaughter is valid.
קלאוד על הדף:
The second version inverts the first: “everyone” means every muchzak (even if not proven mumcheh). The concern here is shema yitalef — that he may faint mid-slaughter and thereby ruin it. Two or three observed slaughters without fainting confer muchzak status and lechatchila permission. Post-facto, even without observed track record, the shochet’s own bari-li claim (confident assertion that he did not faint) suffices.
Key Terms:
- bari li = “it is clear/certain to me”; a confident personal assertion that carries halachic weight
Segment 9
TYPE: סוגיית הגמרא (Mishna’s Exclusion Clause under Ravina-v2)
The exclusion and “ve-kulan” machinery one more time, under Ravina-v2.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
חוּץ מֵחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן, דַּאֲפִילּוּ דִּיעֲבַד נָמֵי לָא, שֶׁמָּא יִשְׁהוּ, שֶׁמָּא יִדְרְסוּ, וְשֶׁמָּא יַחֲלִידוּ. וְכוּלָּן שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ – אַהֵיָיא? אִילֵּימָא אַחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן עֲלַהּ קָאֵי, ״וְאִם שָׁחֲטוּ״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!
English Translation:
And it teaches: This is the halakha with regard to all people except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, whose slaughter is not valid even after the fact. The reason the Sages deemed such slaughter not valid is lest people in these categories interrupt the slaughter, lest they press the knife in the course of slaughter, and lest they conceal the knife beneath the windpipe or the gullet in the course of an inverted slaughter. The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to the clause in the mishna that follows: And any of them who slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid, to which case in the mishna is this referring? If we say that the reference is to the case of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, since that is the halakha to which it stands adjacent, the tanna should have formulated the phrase: And if they slaughtered, instead of: And any of them who slaughtered.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara reruns its grammatical inquiry for the final time, under Ravina-v2. The “chutz” exclusion cannot host “ve-kulan” for the same lexical reason given three times earlier; the tanna would have written “ve-im shachatu” if that were his target. The Gemara will now try to hook “kulan” onto Ravina-v2’s non-muchzak case.
Segment 10
TYPE: תירוץ (Resolution for Ravina-v2)
Same structural solution: supervision substitutes when the shochet is unavailable for bari-li questioning.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא, אַשֶּׁאֵין מוּחְזָקִין, וְהָאָמְרַתְּ: בְּ״בָרִי לִי״ סַגִּי! דְּלֵיתֵיהּ קַמַּן דְּלִישַׁיְּילֵיהּ.
English Translation:
Rather, perhaps the reference is to a case where they are not established as accustomed to slaughter with a steady hand and without fainting. The Gemara rejects that possibility, as in that case, didn’t you say that if one said after the slaughter: It is clear to me that I did not faint, it is sufficient? The Gemara answers: Supervision is necessary in the case where the one who slaughtered the animal is not before us so that we can ask him whether he fainted.
קלאוד על הדף:
Ravina-v2 likewise survives, with the parallel answer to v1. The “ve-kulan” clause is aimed at a case where the not-yet-muchzak shochet is not before us to answer whether he fainted. Supervision in that narrow scenario takes the place of the bari-li testimony we would otherwise have extracted — a structural mirror of v1’s fix.
Segment 11
TYPE: סוגיית הגמרא (Meta-Analysis Begins)
The Gemara now systematically explains why each amora rejects the others’ resolutions.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רָבִינָא וְרַבָּה בַּר עוּלָּא, כְּאַבַּיֵּי וְרָבָא וְרַב אָשֵׁי לָא אָמְרִי, מִשּׁוּם דְּקַשְׁיָא לְהוּ ״וְכוּלָּן״.
English Translation:
The Gemara summarizes: Ravina and Rabba bar Ulla did not say a resolution to the apparent contradiction in the mishna like that of Abaye, Rava, and Rav Ashi due to the fact that the phrase in the mishna: And any of them who slaughtered, is difficult for them.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara launches a meta-analysis of why each amora takes the path he does. The first observation: Ravina (in both versions) and Rabba bar Ulla do not adopt Abaye/Rava/Rav Ashi because those three readings cannot absorb the “ve-kulan she-shachatu” clause, while their own readings can. Sensitivity to that one grammatical wrinkle drives the split.
Segment 12
TYPE: סוגיית הגמרא (Why All Reject Rabba bar Ulla — Version A)
Version A: the others hold that Zevachim, not Chullin, is the primary source for the kodashim halacha.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כּוּלְּהוּ כְּרַבָּה בַּר עוּלָּא לָא אָמְרִי, לְהַךְ לִישָּׁנָא דְּאָמְרַתְּ הָכָא עִיקָּר – אַדְּרַבָּה, הָתָם עִיקָּר, דִּבְקָדָשִׁים קָאֵי.
English Translation:
All of the other amora’im did not say a resolution to the apparent contradiction in the mishna like that of Rabba bar Ulla, who interprets the mishna as referring to the case of a ritually impure person; according to that version that you said: The mishna here is the primary source for the halakha of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a sacrificial animal, the other amora’im reject this interpretation because, on the contrary, the mishna there is the primary source, as it is standing in tractate Zevaḥim, which deals with sacrificial animals.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabba bar Ulla had offered two versions explaining the overlap between our mishna and Zevachim 31b. Version A said our mishna is primary and Zevachim is derivative. The other amoraim reject this: on the contrary, Zevachim — an entire tractate dedicated to kodashim — is the natural home for this halacha, and the mishna here must be the derivative/secondary appearance.
Segment 13
TYPE: סוגיית הגמרא (Why All Reject Rabba bar Ulla — Version B)
Version B is rejected because chullin al taharat ha-kodesh is not itself considered kodesh.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לְהַךְ לִישָּׁנָא דְּאָמְרַתְּ: הָתָם עִיקָּר, וְהָכָא אַיְּידֵי דִּתְנָא טָמֵא בְּחוּלִּין תְּנָא נָמֵי טָמֵא בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁין – טָמֵא בְּחוּלִּין גּוּפֵיהּ לָא אִיצְטְרִיכָא לֵיהּ, חוּלִּין שֶׁנַּעֲשׂוּ עַל טׇהֳרַת קֹדֶשׁ לָאו כְּקֹדֶשׁ דָּמוּ.
English Translation:
The amora’im also reject the interpretation according to that other version that you said: The mishna there is the primary source, and here, since the tanna taught the case of a ritually impure person who slaughtered non-sacred animals, he teaches the case of a ritually impure person who slaughtered sacrificial animals as well. The reason is that it was not necessary for the tanna to teach the case itself of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a non-sacred animal, as in the opinion of the other amora’im, the halakhic status of non-sacred foods that were prepared according to the strictures of sacrificial food is not like that of sacrificial food, and it is permitted to render such food impure.
קלאוד על הדף:
Version B of Rabba bar Ulla claimed that Zevachim was primary, and our mishna mentioned the tamei-shochet only incidentally (ag’av) because it was teaching the related chullin case. The other amoraim reject this framing: there is no halacha to teach about a tamei person slaughtering chullin al taharat ha-kodesh in the first place, because such chullin is not legally equivalent to kodesh and rendering it tamei is permitted. With no kernel halacha, there is no ag’av-teaching that would justify the mishna’s inclusion.
Segment 14
TYPE: סוגיית הגמרא (Why All Reject Ravina-v1)
Ravina-v1 is rejected because rov metzuyin etzel shechita mumchin hein.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כּוּלְּהוּ כְּרָבִינָא לָא אָמְרִי, לְהַךְ לִישָּׁנָא דְּאָמַר: מוּמְחִין אִין, שֶׁאֵין מוּמְחִין לָא – רוֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מוּמְחִין הֵן.
English Translation:
All of the other amora’im did not say a resolution to the apparent contradiction in the mishna like that of Ravina; according to that version that he said: Experts, yes, may slaughter ab initio, but those that it is not known that they are experts, no, they may not slaughter ab initio, the other amora’im disagree because they hold that the majority of those associated with slaughter are experts. Therefore, even if it is not known whether they are experts, their slaughter is valid.
קלאוד על הדף:
The other amoraim reject Ravina-v1 on a different ground entirely: rov metzuyin etzel shechita mumchin hein — the vast majority of those who present themselves as slaughterers are in fact expert. Given this statistical presumption, there is no need for prior public confirmation of expertise. The mishna’s “ha-kol shochatin” cannot therefore be restricting the permission to already-known mumchim.
Key Terms:
- rov metzuyin = “the majority of those present/active in [a given practice]”; a halachic principle applied to trade-specific populations
Segment 15
TYPE: סוגיית הגמרא (Why All Reject Ravina-v2)
Ravina-v2 is rejected because le-ilufei la chayshinan.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לְהַךְ לִישָּׁנָא דְּאָמַר: מוּחְזָקִין אִין, שֶׁאֵין מוּחְזָקִין לָא – לְעִלּוֹפֵי לָא חָיְישִׁינַן.
English Translation:
According to that version that Ravina said: People who are established as accustomed to slaughter without fainting, yes, they may slaughter ab initio, but people who are not established as accustomed to slaughter without fainting, no, they may not slaughter ab initio, the other amora’im disagree because they hold that we are not concerned for the possibility of fainting.
קלאוד על הדף:
Ravina-v2’s fainting-based restriction is rejected with a short epistemic claim: le-ilufei la chayshinan — we simply do not worry about the possibility of fainting mid-shechita. The risk is too rare to generate lechatchila restrictions; a shochet may slaughter without prior demonstration of non-fainting capability.
Key Terms:
- le-ilufei la chayshinan = we are not concerned about fainting [as a realistic halachic risk]
Segment 16
TYPE: סוגיית הגמרא (Why Rava and Abaye Disagree)
Each holds to his own analysis of the wine-shop case and its applicability to shechita.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רָבָא לָא אָמַר כְּאַבַּיֵּי, כִּי קוּשְׁיֵיהּ. אַבָּיֵי לָא אָמַר כְּרָבָא, הָתָם לָא נָגַע, הָכָא נָגַע.
English Translation:
Rava did not say a resolution like that of Abaye, that the mishna is referring to a Samaritan, in accordance with the difficulty that he raised from the halakha of wine belonging to a Jew to which a gentile has access. Abaye did not say a resolution like that of Rava, that a Samaritan may slaughter ab initio if a Jew enters and exits, because there, in the case of wine, the gentile does not touch the wine; therefore, it is sufficient if the Jew enters and exits. Here, in the case of slaughter, the Samaritan touches the animal in the course of slaughter, and he can disqualify the slaughter in an instant. Therefore, Abaye holds that it is insufficient for a Jew to enter and exit.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava holds to his stricter-than-Abaye position because of his own objection: yotzei-ve-nichnas works for wine and should work here too. Abaye, in turn, rejects Rava’s leniency by distinguishing the cases structurally — in the wine shop the gentile does not touch the wine (lo naga), whereas in shechita the Kuti actively handles the animal and knife (naga). Active contact requires tighter supervision; mere proximity does not.
Key Terms:
- naga / lo naga = touches / does not touch; the distinction driving Abaye’s rebuttal to Rava
Segment 17
TYPE: סוגיית הגמרא (Why Rav Ashi Rejects Both)
Rav Ashi considers Kutim non-Jews; their shechita cannot be rehabilitated by supervision.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַב אָשֵׁי לָא אָמַר כְּתַרְוַיְיהוּ, קָסָבַר: כּוּתִים גֵּרֵי אֲרָיוֹת הֵן.
English Translation:
Rav Ashi did not say a resolution like that of both of them, Abaye and Rava, because he holds: Samaritans are converts who converted under duress due to the threat posed by lions, and their conversion is void; therefore, their halakhic status is that of a gentile, whose slaughter is not valid.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Ashi takes a more radical position on the Kutim that neutralizes both Abaye’s and Rava’s paths. Invoking the tradition (II Kings 17) that the Kutim were coerced into conversion by fear of lions (gerei arayot), he classifies their status as full gentile — making their shechita categorically invalid, with or without supervision. Since no reading of “ha-kol shochatin” can include a Kuti on this view, he must read “everyone” to mean a meshummad.
Key Terms:
- gerei arayot = converts of lions; pejorative/classificatory term for the Kutim based on II Kings 17:24-28
Segment 18
TYPE: סוגיית הגמרא (Why Abaye Rejects Rav Ashi)
Abaye rejects Rav Ashi because he does not accept the underlying Rava-halacha about meshummad le-te’avon.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אַבָּיֵי לָא אָמַר כְּרַב אָשֵׁי, לָא סְבִירָא לֵיהּ הָא דְּרָבָא. אֶלָּא רָבָא, מַאי טַעְמָא לָא אָמַר כִּשְׁמַעְתֵּיהּ?
English Translation:
Abaye did not say a resolution like that of Rav Ashi, who interprets the mishna as referring to a Jewish transgressor whose transgression is that he eats unslaughtered animal carcasses to satisfy his appetite, because he does not hold that which Rava said, that such a transgressor may slaughter ab initio if his knife is examined beforehand by someone reliable. But as for Rava, what is the reason that he did not say a resolution in accordance with his own statement of halakha with regard to the slaughter of a transgressor and explain the mishna in the manner that Rav Ashi did?
קלאוד על הדף:
Abaye rejects Rav Ashi’s route because he does not accept the halachic premise it rests on — namely, Rava’s ruling that a meshummad le-te’avon may slaughter lechatchila with a pre-examined knife. Without that foundational rule, the Rav Ashi reading has no content. The Gemara now turns a sharper question on Rava himself: since that halacha is his, why didn’t he use it to resolve the mishna?
Segment 19
TYPE: תירוץ (Answer: Rava Spoke le-Divrav de-Abaye)
Rava’s Kuti explanation was offered within Abaye’s framework, not as his own view.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לִדְבָרָיו דְּאַבָּיֵי קָאָמַר, וְלֵיהּ לָא סְבִירָא לֵיהּ.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: When Rava explained that the tanna in the mishna is referring to the slaughter of a Samaritan, he stated his opinion in accordance with the statement of Abaye in order to resolve the difficulty that Abaye raised; but he himself does not hold accordingly.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara offers a subtle resolution: Rava’s Kuti reading was not his own preferred interpretation. He was speaking le-divrav de-Abaye — responding within the framework Abaye had set up, correcting the supervisory threshold while keeping the Kuti identification. Rava’s actual view may well align with Rav Ashi’s meshummad reading, but his engagement with Abaye’s objection produced the statement attributed to him above.
Key Terms:
- le-divrav = “according to his (one’s interlocutor’s) words”; an argumentative mode where one reasons within another’s framework without endorsing it
Segment 20
TYPE: ברייתא (Baraita on Kuti Shechita)
The Sages taught a normative baraita on Kuti shechita, echoing Abaye’s structure.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: שְׁחִיטַת כּוּתִי מוּתֶּרֶת, בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? כְּשֶׁיִּשְׂרָאֵל עוֹמֵד עַל גַּבָּיו, אֲבָל בָּא וּמְצָאוֹ שֶׁשָּׁחַט – חוֹתֵךְ כַּזַּיִת וְנוֹתֵן לוֹ, אֲכָלוֹ – מוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ, וְאִם לָאו – אָסוּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ.
English Translation:
The Sages taught in a baraita: The slaughter performed by a Samaritan is permitted ab initio. In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where there is a Jew standing over him and supervising to ensure that the slaughter was performed properly. But if the Jew came and found that the Samaritan already slaughtered the animal, the Jew cuts an olive-bulk of meat from the slaughtered animal and gives it to the Samaritan to eat. If the Samaritan ate it, it is permitted for the Jew to eat meat from what the Samaritan slaughtered. But if the Samaritan did not eat the meat, it is prohibited to eat from what the Samaritan slaughtered.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara now adduces a baraita that parallels Abaye’s formulation almost word-for-word. It sets out a two-tier regime: lechatchila requires a Jew standing directly over the Kuti (omed al gabav); bediavad, when the Jew arrives to find the animal already slaughtered, the k’zayit test applies. The baraita is a tannaitic anchor for the Kuti-shechita regime the amoraim have been debating.
Segment 21
TYPE: ברייתא (Baraita Continues — Ka-Yotzei Bo)
The baraita launches a parallel case that will continue onto daf 4.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כַּיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ, מָצָא בְּיָדוֹ
English Translation:
Similarly, if the Jew found in the possession of a Samaritan
קלאוד על הדף:
The baraita continues with a “ka-yotzei bo” (similarly) extension: a parallel scenario where a Jew finds something already in the possession of a Kuti. The fragment breaks off mid-thought and carries into daf 4, where the analogous case will be spelled out in full. The bridge into the next daf invites the reader to see how the supervisory principles extend beyond the immediate shechita case.