Chullin Daf 4 (חולין דף ד׳)
Daf: 4 | Amudim: 4a – 4b | Date: Loading...
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (4a)
Segment 1
TYPE: ברייתא
Conclusion of the baraita about testing a Samaritan’s slaughter of birds
Hebrew/Aramaic:
דְּקוּרְיָא שֶׁל צִפֳּרִים, קוֹטֵעַ רֹאשׁוֹ שֶׁל אֶחָד מֵהֶן וְנוֹתֵן לוֹ. אֲכָלוֹ – מוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ, וְאִם לָאו – אָסוּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ.
English Translation:
a string [dekurya] of birds, and the Jew does not know whether they were properly slaughtered, he severs the head of one of them and gives it to the Samaritan to eat. If the Samaritan ate it, it is permitted for the Jew to eat the meat from what the Samaritan slaughtered. But if the Samaritan did not eat the meat, it is prohibited to eat from what the Samaritan slaughtered.
קלאוד על הדף:
The daf opens mid-baraita with a clever practical test for ambiguous cases. When a Jew encounters a Samaritan with a string of slaughtered birds and cannot verify the slaughter, the Jew severs one bird’s head and offers it to the Samaritan. Since Samaritans observe the laws of neveilah just as Jews do, only a properly slaughtered bird would be eaten. The Samaritan’s willingness to eat thus serves as a behavioral verification of kashrut.
Key Terms:
- דְּקוּרְיָא = a string or bundle (of birds tied together)
- כּוּתִי = Samaritan, a member of the population resettled in northern Israel after the Assyrian exile, who adopted parts of Jewish practice
Segment 2
TYPE: גמרא
Abaye’s stringent reading of the baraita’s opening clause
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אַבָּיֵי דָּיֵיק מֵרֵישָׁא, רָבָא דָּיֵיק מִסֵּיפָא. אַבָּיֵי דָּיֵיק מֵרֵישָׁא: טַעְמָא דְּיִשְׂרָאֵל עוֹמֵד עַל גַּבָּיו, אֲבָל יוֹצֵא וְנִכְנָס – לָא.
English Translation:
In arriving at their respective interpretations of the mishna, Abaye inferred from the first clause of the baraita and Rava inferred from the latter clause of the baraita. Abaye inferred from the first clause: The slaughter performed by a Samaritan is permitted in a case where there is a Jew actively supervising to ensure that the slaughter was performed properly, that the reason it is permitted is that the Jew is standing over him. But if the Jew exits and enters, then no, it is prohibited to eat from what the Samaritan slaughtered.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara now returns to a dispute introduced earlier between Abaye and Rava about the level of supervision required for a Samaritan’s slaughter. Abaye reads the baraita’s opening clause—which speaks of a Jew “standing over” the Samaritan—as setting the threshold: only constant, unbroken supervision suffices. The implication is that any departure, even brief, disqualifies the slaughter and requires the bird-test described in segment 1.
Key Terms:
- דָּיֵיק מֵרֵישָׁא = infers from the first clause
- עוֹמֵד עַל גַּבָּיו = standing over him (continuous supervision)
- יוֹצֵא וְנִכְנָס = exits and enters (intermittent supervision)
Segment 3
TYPE: גמרא
Rava’s lenient reading of the baraita’s closing clause
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רָבָא דָּיֵיק מִסֵּיפָא, טַעְמָא דְּבָא וּמְצָאוֹ שֶׁשָּׁחַט, אֲבָל יוֹצֵא וְנִכְנָס – שַׁפִּיר דָּמֵי.
English Translation:
Rava inferred from the latter clause: If the Jew came and found that the Samaritan already slaughtered the animal, the Jew cuts an olive-bulk of meat from the slaughtered animal and gives it to the Samaritan to eat. The reason that it is necessary to administer this test is due only to the fact that the Jew came and found that the Samaritan already slaughtered the animal. But in a case where the Jew exits and enters, it is permitted to eat from what the Samaritan slaughtered ab initio.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava reads the same baraita inversely. Since the closing clause requires the test only when the Jew arrives after the slaughter is complete, the baraita implies that intermittent supervision is sufficient — there is no need for the test in such cases. Rava thus considers a Samaritan reliable so long as the Jew is in the vicinity, even if not constantly watching, reflecting a more trusting baseline assessment of Samaritan halakhic competence.
Key Terms:
- דָּיֵיק מִסֵּיפָא = infers from the latter clause
- בָּא וּמְצָאוֹ = came and found (the slaughter already complete)
- שַׁפִּיר דָּמֵי = it is fine, permitted
Segment 4
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Defending each amora’s reading against the opposing clause
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּלְאַבָּיֵי קַשְׁיָא סֵיפָא, אָמַר לָךְ: יוֹצֵא וְנִכְנָס נָמֵי ״בָּא וּמְצָאוֹ״ קָרֵי לֵיהּ. וּלְרָבָא קַשְׁיָא רֵישָׁא, אָמַר לָךְ: יוֹצֵא וְנִכְנָס נָמֵי כְּעוֹמֵד עַל גַּבָּיו דָּמֵי.
English Translation:
The Gemara raises an objection: And according to Abaye, the latter clause is difficult. The Gemara answers that Abaye could have said to you: The tanna also characterizes the case where a Jew exits and enters as a case of: If the Jew came and found the Samaritan. The Gemara raises an objection: And according to Rava, the first clause is difficult. The Gemara answers that Rava could have said to you: The case where a Jew exits and enters is also considered like a case where the Jew is standing over him, and it is included in that halakha.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara presses each side: each amora’s reading seems contradicted by the clause the other relies upon. The resolution is to broaden the categories. For Abaye, “came and found” includes any case where the Jew was not continuously present, so even the intermittent supervisor falls under the test requirement. For Rava, “standing over him” includes intermittent presence, so brief departures do not push the case into the test category. The dispute thus reduces to which clause governs the ambiguous middle case of intermittent supervision.
Key Terms:
- קַשְׁיָא = a difficulty, an objection
- קָרֵי לֵיהּ = he calls it (i.e., classifies it as)
Segment 5
TYPE: קושיא
Challenging the bird-test: maybe only the tested bird was kosher
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כַּיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ, מָצָא בְּיָדוֹ דְּקוּרְיָא שֶׁל צִפֳּרִין, קוֹטֵעַ רֹאשׁוֹ כּוּ׳. אַמַּאי? לֵיחוּשׁ דִּלְמָא הַאי הוּא דַּהֲוָה שָׁחֵיט שַׁפִּיר!
English Translation:
The baraita continues: Similarly, if the Jew found a string of birds in the possession of a Samaritan, and the Jew does not know whether they were properly slaughtered, he severs the head of one of them and gives it to the Samaritan to eat. If the Samaritan ate it, it is permitted for the Jew to eat from what the Samaritan slaughtered. But if the Samaritan did not eat the meat, it is prohibited to eat from what the Samaritan slaughtered. The Gemara asks: Why is that a reliable indication? Let us be concerned that perhaps it is this bird alone, whose head the Jew severed, that the Samaritan slaughtered properly, and the rest are unslaughtered carcasses.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara raises a sharp objection to the bird-test. The Samaritan can see which bird’s head was severed and offered to him; perhaps that single bird was the one slaughtered properly, while the rest in the bundle are neveilot. His willingness to eat the offered bird therefore proves nothing about the rest. The Gemara now needs a procedural refinement to make the test meaningful.
Key Terms:
- כַּיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ = similarly, in like manner
- לֵיחוּשׁ = let us be concerned, suspect
- דִּלְמָא = perhaps
Segment 6
TYPE: תירוץ
Rav Menashe’s procedural fix: hide the bundle from view
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב מְנַשֶּׁה: (סִימָן: מַכְנִיס, אִיזְמֵל, בִּזְכָרִים) בְּמַכְנִיסָן תַּחַת כְּנָפָיו.
English Translation:
Rav Menashe said an answer to this question. Before presenting his answer, the Gemara cites a mnemonic for the three statements of Rav Menashe cited in this tractate, this one and two others: Inserts, a scalpel (see 31a), into rams (see 51a). Rav Menashe’s answer is as follows: The case in the baraita is one where the Jew inserts the string of birds under the corners of his garment and hands the Samaritan the head of one of the birds. In that way, the Samaritan has no way of knowing from which bird the head was taken. If he ate it, apparently all the birds were slaughtered properly.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Menashe rescues the test by removing the Samaritan’s ability to game it. The Jew tucks the entire bundle under his garment so the Samaritan cannot see which bird the offered head came from. Now the Samaritan must reason that any bird could be the one served, so he will only eat if he knows the entire bundle was properly slaughtered. The Gemara also flags a mnemonic (סימן) for three Rav Menashe statements scattered through the masechet — a study aid Chazal used to retain related teachings.
Key Terms:
- סִימָן = mnemonic, a memory device for grouped teachings
- תַּחַת כְּנָפָיו = under his garment’s corners (i.e., concealed)
Segment 7
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Rav Mesharshiyya: crush the head so it cannot be matched
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְדִלְמָא סִימָנָא הֲוָה יָהֵיב לֵיהּ בְּגַוֵּיהּ? אָמַר רַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא: דִּמְמַסְמֵס לֵיהּ מַסְמוֹסֵי.
English Translation:
The Gemara challenges: And perhaps the Samaritan placed a distinguishing mark in that bird, indicating to him that it is the kosher one. Rav Mesharshiyya said: The case in the baraita is one where the Jew crushed the head that he gave the Samaritan, thereby rendering it indistinguishable from the others.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara raises a further loophole: the Samaritan might have placed a distinguishing mark in the kosher bird so he could recognize its head when offered. Rav Mesharshiyya closes that loophole — the Jew first crushes the severed head into pulp, eliminating any identifying feature. Only when the test is fully blinded on both ends does the Samaritan’s eating prove the entire bundle is kosher.
Key Terms:
- סִימָנָא = a distinguishing mark or sign
- מְמַסְמֵס = crushes, mashes (renders unrecognizable)
Segment 8
TYPE: קושיא
Maybe Samaritans don’t hold bird-shechita is biblical at all
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְדִלְמָא קָסָבְרִי כּוּתִים: אֵין שְׁחִיטָה לָעוֹף מִן הַתּוֹרָה?
English Translation:
The Gemara challenges this answer: And perhaps the Samaritans hold there is no source for the slaughter of a bird in the Torah. Therefore, the fact that the Samaritan ate the bird’s head is no proof that the bird was properly slaughtered.
קלאוד על הדף:
A deeper objection arises: the Torah’s command “as I have commanded you” (Devarim 12:21) refers to slaughter without specifying birds. Some hold the obligation to slaughter birds is rabbinic. If the Samaritans subscribe to that view, they would eat birds even without proper shechita, and their eating would prove nothing. This forces the Gemara to address the broader question: which mitzvot can we presume Samaritans observe?
Key Terms:
- שְׁחִיטָה לָעוֹף = the obligation to slaughter birds (its biblical status was debated)
- מִן הַתּוֹרָה = from the Torah (biblical obligation, as opposed to rabbinic)
Segment 9
TYPE: תירוץ (counter-argument)
The five disqualifications of shechita aren’t written in the Torah either
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּלְטַעְמָיךְ, שְׁהִיָּיה, דְּרָסָה, חֲלָדָה, הַגְרָמָה, וְעִיקּוּר – מִי כְּתִיבָן?
English Translation:
The Gemara rejects that possibility: And according to your reasoning, those actions that disqualify the slaughter of an animal: Interrupting the slaughter, pressing the knife, concealing the knife in the course of an inverted slaughter, diverting [hagrama] the knife from the place of slaughter, and ripping the simanim from their place before cutting them, are they written in the Torah?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara turns the objection on its head. Even the five canonical disqualifications of shechita — שהייה, דרסה, חלדה, הגרמה, עיקור — are halakha l’Moshe miSinai, not explicit in the written Torah. Yet we routinely trust that Samaritans observe them. The same logic must apply to bird-shechita: if the Samaritans embraced the practice, we trust them to perform it as Jews do, regardless of whether it is biblical or rabbinic.
Key Terms:
- שְׁהִיָּיה = pausing during the slaughter
- דְּרָסָה = pressing down on the knife instead of drawing it
- חֲלָדָה = burying the knife in the flesh (inverted cut)
- הַגְרָמָה = diverting the knife outside the proper place
- עִיקּוּר = ripping or dislodging the simanim before cutting
Segment 10
TYPE: כלל
The principle: once Samaritans embraced a mitzva, they perform it like Jews
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא, כֵּיוָן דְּאַחְזִיקוּ בְּהוּ – אַחְזִיקוּ בְּהוּ. הָכָא נָמֵי: כֵּיוָן דְּאַחְזִיקוּ – אַחְזִיקוּ.
English Translation:
Rather, even though the details are not all written in the Torah, once the Samaritans embraced those disqualifications, they embraced them, and a Jew may rely on their slaughter; when they eat from the meat, it is permitted for a Jew to eat the meat as well. Here too, although the requirement of ritual slaughter for a bird is not written in the Torah, once the Samaritans embraced the mitzva of ritual slaughter, they embraced it in the same manner that it is performed by Jews.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara articulates the operative principle: כיון דאחזיקו אחזיקו — “once they embraced it, they embraced it.” When Samaritans take on a practice, they observe it fully according to its halakhic standards, even when the details derive from rabbinic tradition rather than the written Torah. This rule of evidence is what underwrites the entire framework of trusting Samaritan slaughter when verified.
Key Terms:
- אַחְזִיקוּ = they embraced, took hold of (a practice)
Segment 11
TYPE: ברייתא
Tannaitic dispute opens with: Samaritan matza is permitted on Pesach
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאַחְזוּק וְלָא אַחְזוּק בִּדְלָא כְּתִיבָא, תַּנָּאֵי הִיא, דְּתַנְיָא: מַצַּת כּוּתִי מוּתֶּרֶת, וְאָדָם יוֹצֵא בָּהּ יְדֵי חוֹבָתוֹ בַּפֶּסַח.
English Translation:
And with regard to mitzvot that are not written explicitly in the Torah that Samaritans embraced, the question of whether they are presumed to fulfill them in the manner that Jews fulfill them or they are not presumed to do so is a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: It is permitted to eat the matza of a Samaritan on Passover, and a person fulfills his obligation to eat matza on the first night of Passover with it.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara observes that whether Samaritans can be presumed reliable on non-explicit mitzvot is itself a tannaitic dispute, and cites a three-way baraita as evidence. The opening tanna kamma rules permissively: a Samaritan’s matza is fit not only to eat but to fulfill the biblical obligation on the first night of Pesach. This requires presuming that the Samaritan understands the laws of chametz and produced the matza properly.
Key Terms:
- תַּנָּאֵי הִיא = it is a tannaitic dispute
- יוֹצֵא בָּהּ יְדֵי חוֹבָתוֹ = he fulfills his obligation with it
Segment 12
TYPE: דעה
Rabbi Elazar’s strict view: Samaritans don’t know the details
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹסֵר, לְפִי שֶׁאֵין בְּקִיאִין בְּדִקְדּוּקֵי מִצְוֹת כְּיִשְׂרָאֵל.
English Translation:
Rabbi Elazar prohibits the consumption of the matza of a Samaritan on Passover, because the Samaritans are not experts in the details of mitzvot like Jews and do not know the precise nature of leaven prohibited by the Torah.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Elazar represents the strict end of the spectrum. Samaritans, in his view, lack expertise in the fine details of mitzvot — including what counts as chametz, the precise time-windows, and the requirement of שימור (guarding the dough from the moment of harvest with intent for matza). Even matza that looks fine cannot be assumed to meet these specifications, so it is forbidden.
Key Terms:
- דִּקְדּוּקֵי מִצְוֹת = the precise details and nuances of mitzvot
- בְּקִיאִין = expert, knowledgeable
Segment 13
TYPE: דעה
Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel: where Samaritans embraced a mitzva, they are stricter than Jews
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: כׇּל מִצְוָה שֶׁהֶחֱזִיקוּ בָּהּ כּוּתִים, הַרְבֵּה מְדַקְדְּקִין בָּהּ יוֹתֵר מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל.
English Translation:
Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: On the contrary, with regard to any mitzva that the Samaritans embraced and accepted upon themselves, they are more exacting in its observance than are Jews. Therefore, one may assume that they prepared the matza properly.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel takes a notably warm stance: in those mitzvot the Samaritans took on, they are actually more exacting than Jews. This is high praise and reflects a sociological observation — when a community deliberately adopts a practice, they often guard it with extra rigor. The dispute will now be analyzed to find what daylight separates RaShBaG from the tanna kamma.
Key Terms:
- מְדַקְדְּקִין = they are exacting, scrupulous
Segment 14
TYPE: גמרא
Pinpointing the chiddush: the dispute is about the mitzva of שימור
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר מָר: מַצַּת כּוּתִי מוּתֶּרֶת, וְאָדָם יוֹצֵא בָּהּ יְדֵי חוֹבָתוֹ בַּפֶּסַח. פְּשִׁיטָא! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: לָא בְּקִיאִי בְּשִׁימּוּר, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן. רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹסֵר, לְפִי שֶׁאֵין בְּקִיאִין בְּדִקְדּוּקֵי מִצְוֹת. קָסָבַר: לָא בְּקִיאִי בְּשִׁימּוּר.
English Translation:
The Gemara proceeds to analyze that baraita. The Master said: It is permitted to eat the matza of a Samaritan on Passover, and a person fulfills his obligation to eat matza on the first night of Passover with it. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that if the matza is permitted one fulfills his obligation with it on Passover? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that Samaritans are not expert in the mitzva of guarding the matza for the sake of the mitzva, the tanna teaches us that they are expert. Rabbi Elazar deems it prohibited to eat the matza of Samaritans on Passover, due to the fact that the Samaritans are not experts in the details of mitzvot. He holds that Samaritans are not expert in the mitzva of guarding the matza for the sake of the mitzva.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara identifies the precise issue at stake: שימור — guarding the wheat with intent that it become matza, which the Sages derived from the verse “and you shall guard the matzos.” The chiddush of the tanna kamma is not just that the matza is kosher (free of chametz) but that it qualifies for the mitzva itself, presuming Samaritans understand the שימור requirement. Rabbi Elazar disagrees precisely on that point.
Key Terms:
- שִׁימּוּר = guarding the dough/grain from leavening with intent for the mitzva
- פְּשִׁיטָא = isn’t it obvious? (a common Gemara probe asking what new point is being taught)
Segment 15
TYPE: גמרא
First attempt to distinguish RaShBaG from the tanna kamma
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: כׇּל מִצְוָה שֶׁהֶחֱזִיקוּ בָּהּ כּוּתִים, הַרְבֵּה מְדַקְדְּקִין בָּהּ יוֹתֵר מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל. הַיְינוּ תַּנָּא קַמָּא? אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ דִּכְתִיבָא וְלָא אַחְזִיקוּ בַּהּ, תַּנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: כֵּיוָן דִּכְתִיבָא, אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא אַחְזִיקוּ בַּהּ, וְרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל סָבַר: אִי אַחְזוּק – אִין, אִי לָא אַחְזוּק – לָא.
English Translation:
Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: With regard to any mitzva that Samaritans embraced and accepted upon themselves, they are more exacting in its observance than are Jews. The Gemara raises an objection: That is identical to the opinion of the first tanna. The Gemara explains: There is a practical difference between their opinions with regard to a mitzva that is written but with regard to which the Samaritans did not embrace it. The first tanna holds: Once the mitzva is written in the Torah, even if there is no knowledge that they embraced it, Samaritans can be relied upon to perform it properly. And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds: Even with regard to a mitzva written in the Torah, if they embraced its observance, yes, one may rely on the Samaritans, but if they did not embrace its observance, no, one may not rely on them.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara probes: if RaShBaG agrees the matza is permitted, what does he add beyond the tanna kamma? The first answer maps the dispute onto a written-but-unembraced mitzva. The tanna kamma trusts the explicit Torah text alone — if it’s written, Samaritans must observe it. RaShBaG demands evidence of actual embrace; the written law is not enough on its own. This places RaShBaG in the stricter position on this case.
Key Terms:
- הַיְינוּ תַּנָּא קַמָּא = this is the same as the first tanna’s view (a probe for what the second view adds)
- אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ = there is a practical difference between them
Segment 16
TYPE: קושיא
Linguistic objection: RaShBaG’s wording doesn’t fit that reading
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִי הָכִי, ״כׇּל מִצְוָה שֶׁהֶחֱזִיקוּ בָּהּ כּוּתִים״ – ״אִם הֶחְזִיקוּ״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!
English Translation:
The Gemara challenges: If it is so that this is the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, the formulation of his statement is imprecise. He said: With regard to any mitzva that Samaritans embraced and accepted upon themselves, they are more exacting in its observance than are Jews; this indicates that one may rely upon Samaritans to observe those mitzvot even if they are not written in the Torah. Therefore, he should have said: If they embraced, which addresses the statement of the first tanna. Contrary to the first tanna, who said that one may rely upon Samaritans with regard to any mitzva that is written, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that one may rely upon them only if they embraced the mitzva.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara presses on the wording of RaShBaG. He says “every mitzva they embraced” in a positive, descriptive register — praising the Samaritans for their scrupulousness — not in a contrastive sense like “if they embraced.” The phrasing thus does not fit a reading where his point is restrictive (only when embraced). This forces a different reconstruction of what divides the two tannaim.
Key Terms:
- מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ = it should have said (a Gemara critique of imprecise tannaitic wording)
Segment 17
TYPE: תירוץ
Revised reading: dispute is over a non-written mitzva that was embraced
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא, אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ דְּלָא כְּתִיבָא וְאַחְזִיקוּ בַּהּ: תַּנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר, כֵּיוָן דְּלָא כְּתִיבָא, אַף עַל גַּב דְּאַחְזִיקוּ בַּהּ – נָמֵי לָא; רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל סָבַר, כֵּיוָן דְּאַחְזוּק – אַחְזוּק.
English Translation:
Rather, there is a practical difference between their opinions with regard to a mitzva that is not written and with regard to which the Samaritans embraced its observance. The first tanna holds: Since it is not written, even though they embraced its observance one may also not rely upon them. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds: Once it is known that they embraced observance of a mitzva, they embraced the mitzva and one may rely upon them.
קלאוד על הדף:
Reversing the prior alignment: now the tanna kamma is strict and RaShBaG is lenient. For a mitzva not written in the Torah, even if Samaritans embraced it, the tanna kamma withholds trust — they may have absorbed the practice without its halakhic precision. RaShBaG retains his consistent rule: embrace is decisive — once they took it on, they perform it fully. This reading fits his positive phrasing.
Key Terms:
- כֵּיוָן דְּאַחְזוּק – אַחְזוּק = once they have embraced it, they have embraced it (the operative principle)
Segment 18
TYPE: גופא
Returning to Rava: a Jewish transgressor who eats neveilot for appetite
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גּוּפָא אָמַר רָבָא: יִשְׂרָאֵל מְשׁוּמָּד, אוֹכֵל נְבֵילוֹת לְתֵיאָבוֹן – בּוֹדֵק סַכִּין וְנוֹתֵן לוֹ, וּמוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ.
English Translation:
With regard to the statement of Rava cited earlier (3a), the Gemara analyzes the matter itself. Rava says: In the case of a Jewish transgressor whose transgression is that he eats unslaughtered animal carcasses to satisfy his appetite, if he seeks to slaughter an animal, one examines a knife to ensure that it is perfectly smooth with no nicks and gives it to the transgressor, and it is permitted to eat from what he slaughtered.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara now circles back (גופא) to a Rava statement cited earlier on daf 3a, to analyze it on its own terms. Rava distinguishes between two types of transgressor: one who eats neveilot לתיאבון — to satisfy appetite, because kosher meat is unavailable or expensive — versus להכעיס, out of spite. For the appetite-driven transgressor, one may pre-examine the knife and rely on his slaughter, because he prefers permitted food when it’s available.
Key Terms:
- גּוּפָא = literally “the body itself” — return to a previously cited statement to analyze it directly
- מְשׁוּמָּד = an apostate, Jewish transgressor
- לְתֵיאָבוֹן = for appetite (a transgressor who sins out of desire, not defiance)
Segment 19
TYPE: טעם
The behavioral principle: he won’t choose forbidden when permitted is available
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַאי טַעְמָא? כֵּיוָן דְּאִיכָּא הֶתֵּירָא וְאִיסּוּרָא, לָא שָׁבֵיק הֶתֵּירָא וְאָכֵיל אִיסּוּרָא.
English Translation:
The Gemara explains: What is the reason? Since in this case there is the option to slaughter the animal in a permitted manner or to slaughter the animal in a prohibited manner, such a transgressor would not intentionally forsake the permitted manner and eat food slaughtered in a prohibited manner. Since he has a knife that was examined and the majority of those associated with slaughter are experts, the food is presumed to be permitted, and there is no concern that perhaps he intentionally sabotaged the slaughter.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara articulates a fundamental psychological-halakhic principle: לא שביק היתרא ואכיל איסורא — a person does not abandon the permitted and choose the forbidden when both are available at equal cost. The appetite-driven transgressor eats neveilot only when kosher is inconvenient. Given a freshly examined kosher knife and the assumption that most slaughterers know the basics, he will simply slaughter properly. This principle will recur throughout the rest of the daf.
Key Terms:
- לָא שָׁבֵיק הֶתֵּירָא וְאָכֵיל אִיסּוּרָא = he does not forsake the permitted to eat the forbidden (a key heuristic)
Segment 20
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Why pre-examine the knife? He won’t bother fixing one with a nick
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִי הָכִי, כִּי לָא בְּדַק נָמֵי, מִיטְרָח לָא טָרַח.
English Translation:
The Gemara challenges: If so, then even in a case where the Jew did not examine the knife, it should be permitted to eat from the animal slaughtered by the transgressor. The Gemara answers: It is prohibited because if the transgressor discovers that the knife is flawed, he does not exert himself to replace it with a knife with a smooth blade.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara presses Rava’s principle: if the transgressor prefers permitted, why pre-examine the knife at all? The answer carves a nuance: he won’t actively switch to forbidden, but neither will he exert himself to fix a problem. If a knife turns out to be nicked, he won’t bother seeking another. The Jew must therefore hand him a verified knife from the start to ensure the slaughter will be valid.
Key Terms:
- מִיטְרָח לָא טָרַח = he does not exert himself, will not bother
Segment 21
TYPE: סיוע
Sages bring a baraita to support Rava: chametz of transgressors after Pesach
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ רַבָּנַן לְרָבָא: תַּנְיָא דִּמְסַיַּיע לָךְ, חֲמֵצָן שֶׁל עוֹבְרֵי עֲבֵירָה אַחַר הַפֶּסַח
English Translation:
The Sages said to Rava: A baraita is taught that supports your opinion: With regard to the leavened bread of transgressors, who do not eradicate their leavened bread before Passover, after Passover
קלאוד על הדף:
The Rabbis present Rava with what looks like a strong proof from a parallel domain: the chametz of transgressors who didn’t perform biur chametz. The continuation appears at the start of 4b — that this chametz becomes immediately permitted after Pesach. If the principle “he doesn’t forsake the permitted for the forbidden” governs there too, it directly supports Rava’s framework. The full proof and its analysis unfold over the next segments.
Key Terms:
- תַּנְיָא דִּמְסַיַּיע לָךְ = a baraita is taught that supports your view
- עוֹבְרֵי עֲבֵירָה = transgressors
Amud Bet (4b)
Segment 1
TYPE: ברייתא (continuation)
Conclusion: such chametz is permitted immediately because they exchange it
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מוּתָּר מִיָּד, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהֵן מַחְלִיפִין.
English Translation:
it is permitted immediately, due to the fact that they exchange the forbidden leavened bread in their possession with permitted leavened bread belonging to gentiles immediately after Passover.
קלאוד על הדף:
The baraita’s reasoning is striking: even when transgressors had forbidden chametz on Pesach, immediately after Pesach we presume they swapped it with a gentile’s permitted chametz. The conclusion implicit in this presumption is exactly Rava’s principle — given the option to eat permitted instead of forbidden, even transgressors prefer permitted.
Key Terms:
- חֲמֵצָן = their chametz (chametz that was owned by a Jew during Pesach, which becomes biblically forbidden after)
- מַחְלִיפִין = they exchange (swap forbidden chametz with a gentile’s permitted chametz)
Segment 2
TYPE: גמרא
Initial assumption: the baraita is Rabbi Yehuda — biblical post-Pesach chametz
Hebrew/Aramaic:
סַבְרוּהָ, הָא מַנִּי? רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא, דְּאָמַר: חָמֵץ אַחַר הַפֶּסַח דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, וְקָתָנֵי: מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהֵן מַחְלִיפִין, אַלְמָא לָא שָׁבֵיק הֶתֵּירָא וְאָכֵיל אִיסּוּרָא.
English Translation:
The Sages who cited this proof assumed that this baraita is in accordance with whose opinion? They assumed it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: Leavened bread that was not eradicated before Passover is forbidden after Passover by Torah law. The Gemara comments: And nevertheless it is taught that it is permitted due to the fact that the transgressors exchange their leavened bread with that of gentiles. Apparently, even one who performs transgressions does not intentionally forsake the permitted and eat forbidden food, where the permitted food is easily accessible.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Rabbis built their proof on Rabbi Yehuda’s view that chametz she’avar alav haPesach is forbidden מדאורייתא (a biblical penalty for the Jew who kept it through the holiday). If the baraita still permits it after Pesach via the assumption of swapping, then this lenient stance must apply even to a Torah-level prohibition — which is exactly the level Rava addresses (eating neveilot). The proof thus appears to fit perfectly.
Key Terms:
- סַבְרוּהָ = they (the Rabbis) assumed
- חָמֵץ אַחַר הַפֶּסַח = chametz that remained in a Jew’s possession through Pesach
Segment 3
TYPE: קושיא
Maybe the baraita is Rabbi Shimon — only rabbinic, so no proof for Torah law
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מִמַּאי? דִּלְמָא רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא, דְּאָמַר: חָמֵץ אַחַר הַפֶּסַח דְּרַבָּנַן, וְכִי מְקִילִּינַן – בִּדְרַבָּנַן, בִּדְאוֹרָיְיתָא – לָא מְקִילִּינַן!
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: From where in the baraita can this be proven? Perhaps the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says: Leavened bread that was not eradicated before Passover is prohibited after Passover by rabbinic law. And accordingly, when we are lenient it is with regard to prohibitions by rabbinic law, whereas with regard to prohibitions by Torah law, e.g., the prohibition of an unslaughtered carcass, we are not lenient.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara dismantles the proof. The baraita might reflect Rabbi Shimon, who holds chametz after Pesach is only a rabbinic prohibition. Lenient presumptions like “they swap” might be a tool Chazal use only at the rabbinic level — they would not be deployed against Torah-level prohibitions like neveilah. So the baraita doesn’t extend to Rava’s case.
Key Terms:
- דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא = of biblical authority
- דְּרַבָּנַן = of rabbinic authority
Segment 4
TYPE: תירוץ (kal vachomer)
Even on Rabbi Shimon: it’s a certainty, not assumption — and a fortiori for Torah law
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְתִיהְוֵי נָמֵי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, מִי קָתָנֵי ״שֶׁאֲנִי אוֹמֵר הֶחְלִיפוּ״? מִפְּנֵי שֶׁמַּחְלִיפִין קָתָנֵי, דְּוַדַּאי מַחְלִיפִין. וּמָה בִּדְרַבָּנַן לָא שָׁבֵיק הֶתֵּירָא וְאָכֵיל אִיסּוּרָא, בִּדְאוֹרָיְיתָא לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: And let the baraita be even in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. Does the tanna teach: As I say that they exchanged their leavened bread for the leavened bread of a gentile, which would indicate that it is an assumption? He teaches: Due to the fact that they exchange, as a statement of fact, as they certainly exchange. And if in cases involving prohibitions by rabbinic law the transgressor does not intentionally forsake the permitted and eat forbidden food, then in prohibitions by Torah law is it not all the more so reasonable that he would not forsake the permitted in favor of the forbidden?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara recovers the proof with a sharp move. Even granting that the baraita is Rabbi Shimon, the language “מפני שמחליפין” is a factual statement — they certainly do swap — not a leniency-by-presumption. So the baraita reports observed behavior. And then a kal vachomer follows: if even for a rabbinic prohibition transgressors won’t choose forbidden, certainly for a Torah-level one. The proof for Rava stands.
Key Terms:
- קַל וָחוֹמֶר = a fortiori reasoning (implicit here)
- דְּוַדַּאי = certainly, as a matter of fact
Segment 5
TYPE: סיוע ופירוש
Second proof from a baraita: parsing the case of an uncircumcised slaughterer
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לֵימָא מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ, הַכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִין, וַאֲפִילּוּ כּוּתִי, וַאֲפִילּוּ עָרֵל, וַאֲפִילּוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל מְשׁוּמָּד. הַאי עָרֵל הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא מֵתוּ אֶחָיו מֵחֲמַת מִילָּה – הַאי יִשְׂרָאֵל מְעַלְּיָא הוּא! אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא מְשׁוּמָּד לַעֲרֵלוּת, וְקָא סָבַר מְשׁוּמָּד לְדָבָר אֶחָד לָא הָוֵי מְשׁוּמָּד לְכׇל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ.
English Translation:
Let us say that the following baraita supports the opinion of Rava: Everyone slaughters, and even a Samaritan, and even an uncircumcised man, and even a Jewish transgressor. The Gemara asks: This uncircumcised man, what are the circumstances? If we say that he is an uncircumcised man whose brothers died due to circumcision and the concern is that he might suffer a similar fate, clearly he may slaughter, as he is a full-fledged Jew and not a transgressor at all. Rather, it is obvious that he is a transgressor with regard to remaining uncircumcised, as he refuses to be circumcised, and the tanna holds that he may nevertheless slaughter an animal since a transgressor concerning one matter is not a transgressor concerning the entire Torah.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara cites a baraita that lists three categories who may slaughter — Samaritan, uncircumcised man, transgressor — as a potential support. The Gemara isolates the “uncircumcised” case: it cannot mean someone medically exempt (he is fully righteous), so it must mean someone refusing brit milah. The conclusion: a transgressor in one matter is not deemed a transgressor across the entire Torah, and may slaughter.
Key Terms:
- עָרֵל = uncircumcised
- מְעַלְּיָא = upstanding, full-fledged
- מְשׁוּמָּד לְדָבָר אֶחָד = a transgressor regarding one specific matter
Segment 6
TYPE: דקדוק
Pressing the latter clause: the transgressor must be one for “that very matter”
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֵימָא סֵיפָא, וַאֲפִילּוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל מְשׁוּמָּד. הַאי מְשׁוּמָּד הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי מְשׁוּמָּד לְדָבָר אַחֵר – הַיְינוּ מְשׁוּמָּד לַעֲרֵלוּת, אֶלָּא לָאו מְשׁוּמָּד לְאוֹתוֹ דָּבָר, וְכִדְרָבָא.
English Translation:
Say the latter clause of the baraita: And even a Jewish transgressor. This transgressor, what are the circumstances? If he is a transgressor concerning another matter besides eating unslaughtered animal carcasses, that is identical to the case of a transgressor with regard to remaining uncircumcised. Rather, is it not that he is a transgressor concerning the same matter of eating unslaughtered carcasses, and the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rava, who said that one may even rely on the slaughter of a Jewish transgressor whose transgression is that he eats unslaughtered animal carcasses to satisfy his appetite, ab initio?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara works dialectically: if the transgressor in the baraita is a transgressor regarding some unrelated mitzva, that adds nothing beyond the uncircumcised case (already covered by “transgressor in one matter”). The clause must therefore add a transgressor in the very matter of slaughter — meaning one who eats neveilot. That maps directly onto Rava’s teaching, providing apparent support.
Key Terms:
- מְשׁוּמָּד לְאוֹתוֹ דָּבָר = a transgressor regarding the very matter at hand (here, neveilot)
Segment 7
TYPE: דחיה
Rejection: the transgressor is one for idolatry, citing Rav Anan in Shmuel’s name
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לָא, לְעוֹלָם אֵימָא לָךְ: מְשׁוּמָּד לְאוֹתוֹ דָּבָר לָא, מַאי טַעְמָא? כֵּיוָן דְּדָשׁ בֵּיהּ – כְּהֶתֵּירָא דָּמֵי לֵיהּ. אֶלָּא מְשׁוּמָּד לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, וְכִדְרַב עָנָן, דְּאָמַר רַב עָנָן אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: יִשְׂרָאֵל מְשׁוּמָּד לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה מוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ.
English Translation:
The Gemara rejects that proof: No, actually I will say to you: The slaughter of a transgressor concerning the same matter is not valid. What is the reason? It is that since he has become accustomed to performance of that transgression, it is like a permitted act for him, and the concern is that he is not at all careful to slaughter the animal properly. Rather, the transgressor mentioned in the baraita is a transgressor with regard to idol worship, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Anan, as Rav Anan says that Shmuel says: With regard to a Jew who is a transgressor with regard to idol worship, it is permitted to eat from what he slaughters.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara rejects the proof. Perhaps the baraita is not about Rava’s case but introduces a new principle from Rav Anan in Shmuel’s name: a Jewish idolator may still slaughter validly. The reasoning offered against the prior reading is striking: דש ביה — once a person is steeped in a transgression, it feels permitted to him, undercutting the assumption that he prefers permitted. So a neveilah-eater might in fact be unreliable, and the baraita instead addresses idol worship.
Key Terms:
- דָּשׁ בֵּיהּ = he is steeped in it, has trampled the prohibition through repeated violation
- כְּהֶתֵּירָא דָּמֵי לֵיהּ = it appears to him as if it were permitted
Segment 8
TYPE: גופא ואסמכתא
Rav Anan’s source: Yehoshafat partook of Achav’s feast (II Divrei HaYamim 18:2)
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גּוּפָא, אָמַר רַב עָנָן אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: יִשְׂרָאֵל מְשׁוּמָּד לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה מוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ, שֶׁכֵּן מָצִינוּ בִּיהוֹשָׁפָט מֶלֶךְ יְהוּדָה שֶׁנֶּהֱנָה מִסְּעוּדַת אַחְאָב, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וַיִּזְבַּח לוֹ אַחְאָב צֹאן וּבָקָר לָרֹב וְלָעָם אֲשֶׁר עִמּוֹ וַיְסִיתֵהוּ לַעֲלוֹת אֶל רָמַת גִּלְעָד״.
English Translation:
The Gemara analyzes the matter itself: Rav Anan says that Shmuel says: With regard to a Jew who is a transgressor with regard to idol worship, it is permitted to eat from what he slaughters, as we found with regard to Jehoshaphat, king of Judea, who partook of the feast prepared by Ahab, king of Israel, who was a transgressor with regard to idol worship, as it is stated: “And Ahab slaughtered sheep and cattle for him in abundance, and for the people that were with him, and incited him to go up with him to Ramoth Gilead” (II Chronicles 18:2).
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara now turns to analyze Rav Anan’s statement on its own. The proof-text is Yehoshafat — a righteous Judean king — partaking of a feast hosted by Achav, king of the northern kingdom and a notorious idol-worshipper. The verse explicitly mentions slaughter (וַיִּזְבַּח) followed by enticement (וַיְסִיתֵהוּ), suggesting that Yehoshafat ate from what was slaughtered. If so, animals slaughtered by an idolatrous Jew are kosher.
Key Terms:
- יְהוֹשָׁפָט = Yehoshafat, righteous king of Judah
- אַחְאָב = Achav, king of the northern kingdom of Israel and an idol-worshipper
- וַיְסִיתֵהוּ = and he incited him (the verb that triggers the proof)
Segment 9
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Maybe Yehoshafat didn’t eat? “And he incited him” implies food, not just words
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְדִלְמָא מִיזְבָּח זְבַח, מֵיכַל לָא אֲכַל! ״וַיְסִיתֵהוּ״ כְּתִיב, וְדִלְמָא בִּדְבָרִים, אֵין הֲסָתָה בִּדְבָרִים.
English Translation:
The Gemara raises an objection: And perhaps Ahab slaughtered the animals, but Jehoshaphat did not eat the meat of those animals. The Gemara explains: It is written: “And incited him,” indicating that there was an element of persuasion that presumably involved food. The Gemara challenges this explanation: And perhaps Ahab incited him with his words. The Gemara answers: There is no incitement with words.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara begins systematically defending Rav Anan’s reading. The first challenge: maybe Achav slaughtered but Yehoshafat declined to eat. The defense leverages the verb וַיְסִיתֵהוּ — incitement requires substance, not just words. The Gemara claims that genuine הסתה for action involves consumption (food and drink), establishing a literary-halakhic principle that will be tested in the next segment.
Key Terms:
- הֲסָתָה = incitement, persuasion to act
Segment 10
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Testing the rule: cases of incitement-without-food require special treatment
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְלָא? וְהָכְתִיב: ״כִּי יְסִיתְךָ אָחִיךָ״! בַּאֲכִילָה וּבִשְׁתִיָּה, וְהָכְתִיב: ״וַתְּסִיתֵנִי בוֹ לְבַלְּעוֹ חִנָּם״! לְמַעְלָה שָׁאנֵי.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: And is there not incitement with words? But isn’t it written: “If your brother…entices you secretly, saying: Let us go and serve other gods” (Deuteronomy 13:7)? The Gemara answers: There too the incitement is with eating and with drinking. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it written that God said to Satan, who denounced Job: “And you incited Me against him, to destroy him gratuitously” (Job 2:3)? Clearly Satan did not incite God with food and drink. The Gemara answers: Incitement against the One on High is different, as the term is used metaphorically. By contrast, incitement with regard to people involves food and drink.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara stress-tests the claim with two textual challenges. The mesit (one who entices to idolatry) seems to incite with words alone — but the Gemara explains that even there food and drink are involved (parallel sources describe the mesit feasting with the target). Then the verse from Iyov where the Satan “incites” God presents a harder case — clearly no food. The resolution: incitement directed “above” (toward Hashem) is metaphorical and operates on a different register.
Key Terms:
- כִּי יְסִיתְךָ אָחִיךָ = “if your brother entices you” (Devarim 13:7, the law of the mesit)
- לְמַעְלָה שָׁאנֵי = with respect to Heaven, it is different
Segment 11
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Maybe Yehoshafat only drank? The reasoning would extend to eating equally
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְדִלְמָא מִשְׁתָּא אִשְׁתִּי, מֵיכַל לָא אֲכַל? מַאי שְׁנָא שְׁתִיָּה – דְּאָמְרִינַן: מְשׁוּמָּד לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה לָא הָוֵי מְשׁוּמָּד לְכׇל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ, אֲכִילָה נָמֵי – מְשׁוּמָּד לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה לָא הָוֵי מְשׁוּמָּד לְכׇל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ.
English Translation:
The Gemara challenges: And perhaps Jehoshaphat drank at the feast but did not eat. The Gemara responds: What is different about drinking wine with Ahab that it would be permitted? It would be permitted because we say: A transgressor with regard to idol worship is not considered a transgressor with regard to the entire Torah and therefore his wine is not forbidden. With regard to eating a transgressor’s food too, a transgressor with regard to idol worship is not considered a transgressor with regard to the entire Torah. Therefore, the meat of an animal that he slaughters is not forbidden.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara presses further: maybe Yehoshafat drank but didn’t eat. The response: the only basis for permitting drinking would be the principle that a Jewish idol-worshipper is not a transgressor regarding the whole Torah — and that very same principle would permit eating his meat. The two cases stand or fall together, so distinguishing them is unmotivated.
Key Terms:
- לְכׇל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ = with respect to the entire Torah
Segment 12
TYPE: דחיה
Rejoinder: drinking is permitted via a different mechanism — wine wasn’t yet decreed
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא? שְׁתִיָּה – סְתָם יֵינָן הוּא, וַעֲדַיִין לֹא נֶאֱסַר יֵינָן שֶׁל גּוֹיִם, אֲבָל אֲכִילָה – אֵימָא לָךְ: מְשׁוּמָּד לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה הֲוֵי מְשׁוּמָּד לְכׇל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: How can these cases be compared? With regard to drinking, Ahab’s wine is considered ordinary wine of gentiles, and the ordinary wine of gentiles was not yet prohibited, as the Sages issued that decree only several generations later. Therefore, it was permitted for Jehoshaphat to drink Ahab’s wine. But with regard to eating, I will say to you: A transgressor with regard to idol worship is considered a transgressor with regard to the entire Torah. Therefore, it was prohibited for Jehoshaphat to eat the meat from the animals slaughtered by Ahab.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara dismantles the parity argument. Drinking has its own permission: in Yehoshafat’s era the rabbinic decree against סתם יינם of gentiles had not yet been instituted, so even an idolator’s wine was permitted on that ground alone — without invoking the principle about partial transgressors. So one cannot reason from drink to food. The proof from Yehoshafat now requires a stronger anchor.
Key Terms:
- סְתָם יֵינָן = ordinary wine of gentiles (a later rabbinic prohibition)
Segment 13
TYPE: שני תירוצים
Two new defenses: kings don’t drink without eating; the verse links slaughter to enticement
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: לָאו אוֹרְחֵיהּ דְּמַלְכָּא מִשְׁתְּיָא בְּלָא מֵיכְלָא, וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: ״וַיִּזְבַּח … וַיְסִיתֵהוּ״ כְּתִיב, בַּמָּה הֱסִיתוֹ – בִּזְבִיחָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: If you wish, say: It is clear that Jehoshaphat ate at the feast, as it is not typical conduct of a king to drink wine without eating. And if you wish, say instead: “And Ahab slaughtered sheep and cattle for him in abundance, and for the people that were with him, and incited him,” is written, indicating: With what did Ahab incite Jehoshaphat? It was with slaughter of an animal. Apparently, it is permitted to eat from an animal slaughtered by a transgressor with regard to idol worship.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara offers two reinforced answers. First, royal protocol: kings don’t drink at a state banquet without eating, so we may infer Yehoshafat ate. Second, a tighter textual reading: וַיִּזְבַּח is juxtaposed to וַיְסִיתֵהוּ — meaning the act of slaughter itself was the enticement. The narrative thus structurally entangles the slaughter and the consumption, securing the proof.
Key Terms:
- אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא = if you wish, say (introduces an alternative answer)
- אוֹרְחֵיהּ דְּמַלְכָּא = the way of a king, royal custom
Segment 14
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Maybe Ovadia did the slaughter? “In abundance” rules him out — too much for one person
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְדִלְמָא עוֹבַדְיָה זְבַח? ״לָרוֹב״ כְּתִיב, עוֹבַדְיָה לָא הֲוָה סָפֵיק.
English Translation:
The Gemara suggests: And perhaps Obadiah, who was the majordomo of Ahab’s household and a righteous man, slaughtered the animals. The Gemara rejects that suggestion: “In abundance” is written, and Obadiah would not have managed to slaughter all the animals himself.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara now begins systematically eliminating alternative slaughterers. Perhaps Achav had Ovadia, his righteous chief steward (who hid prophets from Izevel — see Melachim Aleph 18), do the slaughtering. The Gemara rejects: the verse says the animals were slaughtered לָרוֹב, in great abundance — far too many for one person to handle, even Ovadia.
Key Terms:
- עוֹבַדְיָה = Ovadia, Achav’s God-fearing house steward
- לָרוֹב = in great quantity, abundantly
- לָא הֲוָה סָפֵיק = he could not have managed (lit. been sufficient for the task)
Segment 15
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Maybe the 7,000 hidden righteous slaughtered? They were in hiding from Izevel
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְדִלְמָא שִׁבְעַת אֲלָפִים זְבוּח, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְהִשְׁאַרְתִּי בְיִשְׂרָאֵל שִׁבְעַת אֲלָפִים כׇּל הַבִּרְכַּיִם אֲשֶׁר לֹא כָרְעוּ לַבַּעַל וְגוֹ׳״, טַמּוֹרֵי הֲווֹ מִיטַּמְּרִי מֵאִיזֶבֶל.
English Translation:
The Gemara suggests: And perhaps the seven thousand righteous people slaughtered the animals, as it is written: “And I will leave seven thousand in Israel, all the knees that have not bowed to Baal, and every mouth that has not kissed it” (I Kings 19:18). The Gemara rejects that suggestion: They were hiding from Jezebel, Ahab’s wife, and would not have gone to the palace to slaughter animals for the feast.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara invokes the famous 7,000 of Israel — those Hashem reserved as having never bowed to Baal, revealed to Eliyahu at Sinai (Melachim Aleph 19:18). Could they have been the slaughterers? No: those righteous Jews were in hiding from Izevel and would not have shown themselves at Achav’s palace to perform a public banquet’s slaughter. The pool of available kosher slaughterers continues to shrink.
Key Terms:
- שִׁבְעַת אֲלָפִים = the seven thousand who never worshipped Baal
- אִיזֶבֶל = Izevel, Achav’s wife who persecuted prophets of Hashem
- טַמּוֹרֵי הֲווֹ מִיטַּמְּרִי = they were hiding
Segment 16
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Maybe Achav’s own men were upstanding? “All his servants are wicked”
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְדִלְמָא גַּבְרֵי דְאַחְאָב הֲווֹ מְעַלּוּ? לָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ, דִּכְתִיב: ״מֹשֵׁל מַקְשִׁיב עַל דְּבַר שָׁקֶר כׇּל מְשָׁרְתָיו רְשָׁעִים״.
English Translation:
The Gemara suggests: And perhaps, although Ahab was an idolater, the men in the employ of Ahab were upstanding people, not idolaters, and they slaughtered the animals. The Gemara rejects that suggestion: That possibility should not enter your mind, as it is written: “If a ruler hearkens to matters of falsehood, all his servants are wicked” (Proverbs 29:12).
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara invokes a verse from Mishlei as a sociological principle: a ruler who attends to falsehood surrounds himself with wicked servants. Achav, who hearkened to false prophets and worshipped Baal, must therefore have had wicked staff. So even his court attendants cannot be the kosher slaughterers — they would slaughter as idolators just like Achav.
Key Terms:
- גַּבְרֵי דְאַחְאָב = the men of Achav (his attendants)
- לָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ = it should not enter your mind
- מֹשֵׁל מַקְשִׁיב עַל דְּבַר שָׁקֶר = “a ruler who hearkens to falsehood” (Mishlei 29:12)
Segment 17
TYPE: קושיא
Maybe Yehoshafat ate only what Ovadia slaughtered, and his men ate the rest
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְדִלְמָא גַּבְרֵי דִּיהוֹשָׁפָט נָמֵי לָא הֲווֹ מְעַלּוּ, זְבוּח גַּבְרֵי דְּאַחְאָב אֲכוּל גַּבְרֵי דִּיהוֹשָׁפָט, זְבוּח עוֹבַדְיָה אֲכַל יְהוֹשָׁפָט.
English Translation:
The Gemara suggests: And perhaps the men in the employ of Jehoshaphat were also not upstanding, and the animals that the men in the employ of Ahab slaughtered, the men in the employ of Jehoshaphat ate, and the animals that Obadiah slaughtered, Jehoshaphat ate.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara now constructs a more elaborate workaround. Suppose Yehoshafat’s men were also not upstanding (so they ate what Achav’s men slaughtered) and Yehoshafat himself ate only the small portion Ovadia personally slaughtered. This neatly preserves Yehoshafat’s piety without permitting an idolator’s slaughter. The challenge demands a counter from Mishlei.
Key Terms:
- גַּבְרֵי דִּיהוֹשָׁפָט = the men of Yehoshafat (his attendants)
Segment 18
TYPE: תירוץ
Inverse inference: a truth-seeking ruler’s servants are righteous
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ, מִדְּ״מוֹשֵׁל מַקְשִׁיב עַל דְּבַר שָׁקֶר כׇּל מְשָׁרְתָיו רְשָׁעִים״, הָא לִדְבַר אֱמֶת – מְשָׁרְתָיו צַדִּיקִים.
English Translation:
The Gemara rejects that suggestion: That possibility should not enter your mind; from the fact that it is written: “If a ruler hearkens to matters of falsehood, all his servants are wicked,” it may be inferred that if a ruler hearkens to matters of truth, all his servants are righteous.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara invokes the inverse of the Mishlei verse: if a wicked ruler attracts wicked servants, then a righteous ruler — Yehoshafat — must have righteous servants. So Yehoshafat’s men were not unreliable, and the suggested workaround collapses. They would not have eaten meat from idolatrous slaughter either, leaving us back at the original question.
Key Terms:
- לִדְבַר אֱמֶת = with respect to truth
- מְשָׁרְתָיו צַדִּיקִים = his servants are righteous
Segment 19
TYPE: קושיא
One last fallback: each king ate only what his own men slaughtered (continues on 5a)
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְדִלְמָא זְבוּח גַּבְרֵי דְּאַחְאָב אֲכַל אַחְאָב וְגַבְרֵיהּ, זְבוּח גַּבְרֵי דִּיהוֹשָׁפָט אֲכַל יְהוֹשָׁפָט וְגַבְרֵיהּ?
English Translation:
The Gemara suggests: And perhaps the animals that the men in the employ of Ahab slaughtered, Ahab and his men ate, and the animals that the men in the employ of Jehoshaphat slaughtered, Jehoshaphat and his men ate.
קלאוד על הדף:
The daf ends mid-question with the most refined version of the workaround: each king ate from his own men’s slaughter, so Yehoshafat never partook of Achav’s idolatrous meat. The Gemara will continue grappling with this on 5a, where it ultimately establishes a stronger anchor for Rav Anan’s principle. The suspended question dramatically illustrates how seriously Chazal took both the demand for textual proof and the demand to preserve Yehoshafat’s piety.
Key Terms:
- גַּבְרֵיהּ = his men, his retinue