Menachot Daf 105 (מנחות דף ק״ה)
Daf: 105 | Amudim: 105a – 105b | Date: Loading...
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (105a)
Segment 1
TYPE: המשך ברייתא
Tail-end of Rabbi Yehuda’s baraita carried over from 104b
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תְּחִלָּה.
English Translation:
first, in the passage discussing burnt offerings (see Leviticus 1:3).
קלאוד על הדף:
This fragment concludes the baraita cited at the bottom of 104b, in which Rabbi Yehuda explains why one who vows “a burnt offering” must bring a bull: because Scripture opens the parasha of olot with a bull (Vayikra 1:3). The word תְּחִלָּה (“first”) establishes Rabbi Yehuda’s exegetical principle — when one vows an undefined category of offering, he fulfills his vow with the species that Torah names first. This sets up the parallel rulings about other undefined vows that follow.
Key Terms:
- תְּחִלָּה (techilla) = first; here, referring to the species with which Scripture opens a parasha, which becomes the default for vague vows
Segment 2
TYPE: ברייתא
Application of Rabbi Yehuda’s “Scripture opens with it” principle to flock burnt offerings
Hebrew/Aramaic:
״מִן הַצֹּאן״ – יָבִיא כֶּבֶשׂ, הוֹאִיל וּפָתַח בּוֹ הַכָּתוּב תְּחִלָּה.
English Translation:
Similarly, one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt offering from the flock, must bring a lamb as his burnt offering, since the verse opens with it first in the passage discussing burnt offerings of the flock, as it is stated: “And if his offering is of the flock, whether of the lambs, or of the goats, for a burnt offering, he shall offer it a male without blemish” (Leviticus 1:10).
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yehuda extends his principle from the broader category of “olah” to the narrower vow of “an olah from the flock.” Since Vayikra 1:10 names כְּבָשִׂים (lambs) before עִזִּים (goats), the default species for an unspecified flock-burnt-offering is a lamb. This reinforces that the rule operates wherever Scripture names a sequence: the first-listed species is what the vower is presumed to have intended.
Key Terms:
- צֹאן (tzon) = flock; in halachic context, includes both sheep and goats
- כֶּבֶשׂ (keves) = a male lamb in its first year, the default flock-olah
Segment 3
TYPE: ברייתא
Final application of the principle to bird burnt offerings
Hebrew/Aramaic:
״מִן הָעוֹף״ – יָבִיא תּוֹרִים, הוֹאִיל וּפָתַח בּוֹ הַכָּתוּב תְּחִלָּה.
English Translation:
Similarly, one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt offering from a type of bird, must bring doves as his burnt offering, since the verse opens with it first in the passage discussing burnt offerings of birds, as it is stated: “And if his offering to the Lord is a burnt offering of birds, then he shall bring his offering of doves or of pigeons” (Leviticus 1:14).
קלאוד על הדף:
A third instance of Rabbi Yehuda’s exegetical rule. Vayikra 1:14 lists תֹּרִים before בְּנֵי יוֹנָה, so one who undertakes “a bird-olah” must bring turtledoves. The cumulative force of these three baraita-clauses is to present a tightly consistent rule: in every undefined-species vow, the verse’s opening word controls. This consistency will become the very basis for the Gemara’s coming difficulty.
Key Terms:
- תּוֹרִים (torim) = turtledoves; one of the two bird species offered in the Mikdash
- בְּנֵי יוֹנָה (benei yonah) = young pigeons; the alternate bird species, named second in Vayikra 1:14
Segment 4
TYPE: קושיא
A devastating internal contradiction within Rabbi Yehuda’s positions
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אַלְּמָה תְּנַן: הֲרֵי עָלַי עוֹלָה – יָבִיא כֶּבֶשׂ. רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן עֲזַרְיָה אוֹמֵר: תּוֹר אוֹ בֶּן יוֹנָה, וְלָא פְּלִיג רַבִּי יְהוּדָה.
English Translation:
If so, why did we learn in a mishna (107a): One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt offering, must bring a lamb, which is the least expensive land animal sacrificed as an offering. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says: He may bring either a dove or pigeon as a bird burnt offering. And Rabbi Yehuda does not disagree.
קלאוד על הדף:
This is a sharp תיובתא: a future mishna (107a) reports that an unspecified “olah” requires a lamb, and Rabbi Yehuda offers no dispute. But the explanation given there — that a lamb is the cheapest land-animal offering — is utterly different from Rabbi Yehuda’s explanation in our baraita (“Scripture opens with it”). If Rabbi Yehuda’s true reasoning is “Scripture opens first,” he should have argued openly with the mishna’s reasoning. The Gemara is forced to abandon its understanding of what made the fine-flour offering “the most notable of the meal offerings” in Rabbi Yehuda’s earlier statement.
Key Terms:
- לָא פְּלִיג (lo palig) = does not disagree; a Talmudic indicator that a tanna assents to a position recorded anonymously
- רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן עֲזַרְיָה (R. Elazar b. Azarya) = a leading tanna of the Yavneh generation, often cited for halachic stringency in vow-fulfillment
Segment 5
TYPE: תירוץ
Reinterpretation of “the most notable of the meal offerings”
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא מַאי מְיוּחֶדֶת שֶׁבַּמְּנָחוֹת? דְּלֵית לֵיהּ שֵׁם לְוַוי.
English Translation:
The Gemara provides a new interpretation: Rather, what does Rabbi Yehuda mean when he says that the fine-flour meal offering is the most notable of the meal offerings? He means that it has no modifier. Only a fine-flour offering is referred to simply as a meal offering, with no other qualification.
קלאוד על הדף:
To rescue Rabbi Yehuda from contradiction, the Gemara reinterprets his criterion. “Notability” was never about the order of Scripture’s text; it was about the linguistic naming pattern. The other four meal offerings — מחבת, מרחשת, מאפה תנור, סולת-of-different-types — all carry a שֵׁם לְוַוי, a qualifier (“baked in a deep pan,” “in a shallow pan,” etc.). Only the simple fine-flour offering is called מִנְחָה without any additional descriptor, and so it alone matches the unmodified vow “Behold a meal offering is upon me.”
Key Terms:
- שֵׁם לְוַוי (shem levai) = an accompanying name; a linguistic modifier that qualifies a noun and distinguishes it from a generic referent
- מְיוּחֶדֶת (meyuchedet) = unique, distinctive — here, distinctive in not requiring any qualifier
Segment 6
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Reconciling the new reading with the baraita’s actual wording
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהָא תָּנָא הוֹאִיל וּפָתַח בּוֹ הַכָּתוּב תְּחִלָּה קָאָמַר? הָכִי קָאָמַר: אֵיזֶהוּ מִנְחָה מְיוּחֶדֶת שֶׁבַּמְּנָחוֹת, דְּלֵית לֵיהּ שֵׁם לְוַוי? זוֹ שֶׁפָּתַח בּוֹ הַכָּתוּב תְּחִלָּה.
English Translation:
The Gemara challenges: But isn’t it taught in the baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says that one must bring a fine-flour meal offering since the verse opens with it first? The Gemara answers: This is what the baraita is saying: Which meal offering is the most notable of the meal offerings, as it has no modifier? It is this, i.e., the fine-flour meal offering, with which the verse opens first. The reason that Rabbi Yehuda holds that one must bring a fine-flour meal offering is not because the verse opens with it, but because it has no modifier.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara confronts the apparent disconnect: Rabbi Yehuda’s baraita explicitly invokes “Scripture opens with it.” How can we now claim his real reason is “lacks a modifier”? The answer reframes the baraita as posing a question and supplying an identifier, not a justification: “Which meal offering lacks a modifier? The one with which Scripture opens first.” The reference to Scripture’s opening is now demoted from being the cause of Rabbi Yehuda’s ruling to merely being the means of identifying which offering he means.
Key Terms:
- הָכִי קָאָמַר (hakhi ka’amar) = this is what he is saying — a Talmudic formula introducing a re-reading of an earlier text
Segment 7
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Why include the “Scripture opens” identifier at all?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
פְּשִׁיטָא, מִנְחַת הַסּוֹלֶת קָאָמַר, סִימָנָא בְּעָלְמָא.
English Translation:
The Gemara challenges: If so, the explanation of the baraita is unnecessary; isn’t it obvious that Rabbi Yehuda is referring to the fine-flour meal offering, as he says so explicitly? The Gemara answers: The baraita explains that the reference to the meal offering with which the passage opens merely serves as a mnemonic, so one should not forget which type of meal offering Rabbi Yehuda is referring to.
קלאוד על הדף:
If the baraita already explicitly says מִנְחַת הַסּוֹלֶת (“the fine-flour meal offering”), what additional information does “the one with which Scripture opens” provide? The Gemara concedes the redundancy and reclassifies the phrase as a סִימָנָא — a mere mnemonic device. Mentioning Scripture’s opening serves not as a halachic source but as a pedagogical aid to fix the identification firmly in the student’s memory. This is a common Talmudic move: rescuing a text by demoting an apparent reason to a study-aid.
Key Terms:
- סִימָנָא בְּעָלְמָא (simana be’alma) = a mere mnemonic — a memory device with no substantive halachic weight
Segment 8
TYPE: בעיא
Rav Pappa’s hybrid-formulation dilemma
Hebrew/Aramaic:
״מִנְחָה״, ״מִין הַמִּנְחָה״ [וְכוּ׳]. בָּעֵי רַב פָּפָּא: ״מִינֵי מִנְחָה״ מַהוּ?
English Translation:
§ The mishna teaches that if one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering, or: It is incumbent upon me to bring a type of meal offering, he must bring one meal offering. This is because he stated his intent in the singular. But if he says in the plural: It is incumbent upon me to bring meal offerings, or: Meal offerings of a certain type, he must bring two meal offerings. Rav Pappa raises a dilemma: If one said: It is incumbent upon me to bring types of a meal offering, using a combination of singular and plural forms, what is the halakha?
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Pappa probes the boundary between the mishna’s two clear cases. The mishna covered fully singular (“מִנְחָה” / “מִין מִנְחָה” → one) and fully plural (“מְנָחוֹת” / “מִין מְנָחוֹת” → two), but said nothing about the hybrid phrase מִינֵי מִנְחָה — plural “types” of singular “meal offering.” Does the plural noun מִינֵי dominate (requiring two), or does the singular מִנְחָה dominate (requiring one)? The dilemma is genuinely ambiguous because each word can be read as the load-bearing noun, and the entire sugya now turns on parsing this question.
Key Terms:
- בָּעֵי (ba’ei) = he raised a dilemma; a Talmudic term introducing an unresolved halachic question
- מִינֵי מִנְחָה (minei minchah) = “types of a meal offering”; the disputed hybrid singular-plural formulation
Segment 9
TYPE: צד אחד של הבעיא
First side of the dilemma — read it as “two”
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כֵּיוָן דְּאָמַר ״מִינֵי״, תַּרְתֵּי קָאָמַר, וּמַאי ״מִנְחָה״? (דְּכוּלַּהּ) מְנָחוֹת נָמֵי ״מִנְחָה״ מִיקַּרְיָין, דִּכְתִיב ״וְזֹאת תּוֹרַת הַמִּנְחָה״.
English Translation:
The Gemara explains the dilemma: Perhaps it should be reasoned that since he said: Types, in the plural, apparently he was saying that he intends to bring two meal offerings. And if so, what is the reason he used the singular word: Meal offering? He used it because the entire category of meal offerings is also referred to as: Meal offering, in the singular, as it is written in the verse: “And this is the law of the meal offering: The sons of Aaron shall offer it before the Lord, in front of the altar” (Leviticus 6:7).
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara articulates the first horn: prioritize מִינֵי. Since the plural carries explicit numerical content (multiple types), interpret the vow as obligating two offerings. The lone singular מִנְחָה is then defended as merely a category-label: Scripture itself uses מִנְחָה (singular) to mean the entire genus, as in וְזֹאת תּוֹרַת הַמִּנְחָה. So the speaker meant “types of [the category called] meal offering,” with no implication that only one is owed.
Key Terms:
- תַּרְתֵּי קָאָמַר (tartei ka’amar) = he is saying “two”; a Talmudic phrase identifying that a phrase implicates a quantity of two
- תּוֹרַת הַמִּנְחָה (Torat haMinchah) = “the law of the meal offering” (Vayikra 6:7); proof that singular מִנְחָה can refer to the entire category
Segment 10
TYPE: צד שני של הבעיא
Second side of the dilemma — read it as “one”
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אוֹ דִלְמָא, כֵּיוָן דְּאָמַר ״מִנְחָה״, חֲדָא מִנְחָה קָאָמַר, וּמַאי ״מִינֵי מִנְחָה״? הָכִי קָאָמַר: ״מִמִּינֵי מִנְחָה חֲדָא מִנְחָה עֲלַי״.
English Translation:
Or perhaps it should be reasoned that since he said: Meal offering, in the singular, apparently he was saying that he intends to bring only one meal offering. And if so, what did he mean by using the plural phrase: Types of a meal offering? This is what he was saying: Of the various types of a meal offering, it is incumbent upon me to bring one.
קלאוד על הדף:
The opposite parsing prioritizes the singular מִנְחָה: since the operative noun is singular, only one offering is owed. The plural מִינֵי is then explained partitively, as if introduced by an implicit מִ — “from [among] the types of meal offering [I undertake] one.” On this reading, the vower has merely indicated the broad category from which his single chosen offering will come. Both sides have grammatical plausibility, leaving the dilemma unresolved purely on linguistic grounds.
Key Terms:
- חֲדָא מִנְחָה קָאָמַר (chada minchah ka’amar) = he is saying “one meal offering” — a parsing in which the singular noun controls
- מִמִּינֵי (mi-minei) = “from among the types” — a partitive reading that lets the plural denote category breadth rather than quantity
Segment 11
TYPE: תא שמע
Attempt to resolve the dilemma from the mishna’s reisha (opening clause)
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תָּא שְׁמַע: ״מִנְחָה״ ״מִין מִנְחָה״ – יָבִיא אַחַת, הָא ״מִינֵי מִנְחָה״ – שְׁתַּיִם.
English Translation:
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof that his intent is to bring two meal offerings, from that which is stated in the mishna: If one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering, or: It is incumbent upon me to bring a type of meal offering, he must bring one. This indicates that if he said: Types of a meal offering, he must bring two.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara presses the mishna’s silence into service. The reisha (first clause) lists exactly two singular formulations that obligate one offering — מִנְחָה and מִין מִנְחָה — and stops. By implication (דיוק), any other formulation, including מִינֵי מִנְחָה, must obligate the higher count of two. This is a classic deductive argument from the mishna’s careful enumeration: had the hybrid phrase also yielded one offering, the mishna should have included it.
Key Terms:
- תָּא שְׁמַע (ta shma) = “come and hear” — a Talmudic formula introducing a textual proof to resolve a dilemma
- הָא (ha) = the implication, the inference; what the absence-from-the-list necessarily yields
Segment 12
TYPE: דחיה
Counter-inference from the mishna’s seifa (closing clause) cancels the first inference
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֵימָא סֵיפָא: ״מְנָחוֹת״, ״מִין מְנָחוֹת״ – יָבִיא שְׁתַּיִם, הָא ״מִינֵי מִנְחָה״ – חֲדָא. אֶלָּא, מֵהָא לֵיכָּא לְמִשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
English Translation:
The Gemara rejects this proof. Say the latter clause: If one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring meal offerings, or: It is incumbent upon me to bring meal offerings of a certain type, he must bring two. This indicates that if he says: Types of a meal offering, he must bring only one. Rather, no inference is to be learned from this mishna, as the potential inferences are contradictory.
קלאוד על הדף:
The same deductive logic, applied to the seifa, yields the opposite result. The seifa enumerates two plural formulations that obligate two offerings; by implication, anything outside that list (including מִינֵי מִנְחָה) obligates only one. Since the same kind of דיוק produces contradictory results from the two halves of the mishna, the technique self-destructs and the mishna proves nothing about Rav Pappa’s case. The Gemara concludes לֵיכָּא לְמִשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ — no proof either way.
Key Terms:
- אֵימָא סֵיפָא (eima seifa) = “say the closing clause”; a Talmudic move that turns the same deductive method against the proof-bringer
- לֵיכָּא לְמִשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ (leika lemishma minah) = “nothing can be inferred from it”; a verdict cancelling the proposed proof
Segment 13
TYPE: תא שמע
A second proof attempt — this time from a baraita
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תָּא שְׁמַע: ״מִין מְנָחוֹת עָלַי״ – יָבִיא שְׁתֵּי מְנָחוֹת מִמִּין אֶחָד, הָא ״מִמִּינֵי מִנְחָה״ – חֲדָא.
English Translation:
The Gemara suggests another resolution to Rav Pappa’s dilemma: Come and hear that which is taught in a baraita: If one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring meal offerings of a certain type, he must bring two meal offerings of one type. This indicates that if one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring of the various types of a meal offering, he is required to bring only one.
קלאוד על הדף:
Having failed with the mishna, the Gemara turns to a baraita. The baraita rules that the formulation מִין מְנָחוֹת (“a type of meal offerings” — singular adjective + plural noun) requires two offerings of one type. By inverse implication, the parallel hybrid מִינֵי מִנְחָה (plural adjective + singular noun) should obligate only one offering — a victory for the second side of Rav Pappa’s dilemma. Note how the proof exploits the structural symmetry between the two hybrid phrases.
Key Terms:
- מִין מְנָחוֹת (min menachot) = “a type of meal offerings”; the inverted hybrid — singular type-word + plural offering-word
Segment 14
TYPE: דחיה
Alternative inference — the baraita’s silence may mean two different types
Hebrew/Aramaic:
דִּלְמָא: הָא ״מִינֵי מִנְחָה״ – מֵבִיא שְׁתֵּי מְנָחוֹת מִשְּׁנֵי מִינִין.
English Translation:
The Gemara rejects this inference: Perhaps the correct inference from the baraita is that this indicates that if one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring types of a meal offering, he must bring two meal offerings, of two different types.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara rejects the inferred ruling. Instead of “bring one,” the silence about מִינֵי מִנְחָה may signal an even higher obligation: two different types of offerings. The baraita explicitly addressed only the easier case of two offerings of one type and left the more demanding case unstated. So the very silence the proof relied on may instead testify to a stricter, not lighter, obligation.
Key Terms:
- שְׁנֵי מִינִין (shenei minin) = two different types — here, two meal offerings drawn from two distinct categories
- דִּלְמָא (dilma) = “perhaps”; introduces a counter-possibility that undermines a proposed proof
Segment 15
TYPE: קושיא
The full baraita already covers two-of-two-types — restoring the original inference
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהָא לָא תָּנֵי הָכִי, ״מִין מְנָחוֹת עָלַי״ – מֵבִיא שְׁתֵּי מְנָחוֹת מִמִּין אֶחָד, ״מִינֵי מְנָחוֹת עָלַי״ – מֵבִיא שְׁתֵּי מְנָחוֹת מִשְּׁנֵי מִינִין, הָא ״מִינֵי מִנְחָה״ – חֲדָא.
English Translation:
The Gemara challenges the rejection. But this is not taught in the baraita, as the full baraita reads as follows: If one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring meal offerings of a certain type, he must bring two meal offerings of one type. If he says: It is incumbent upon me to bring types of meal offerings, he must bring two meal offerings, of two different types. This indicates that if he says: It is incumbent upon me to bring types of a meal offering, he brings only one.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara restores the original inference by quoting the complete text of the baraita. The baraita already explicitly handled the case of “two of two types” by ruling on מִינֵי מְנָחוֹת (fully plural), which obligates two meal offerings of two different types. Since that case is covered, the only remaining unspoken hybrid — מִינֵי מִנְחָה — must indeed obligate just one offering. The dilemma now appears resolved in favor of the second side.
Key Terms:
- לָא תָּנֵי הָכִי (lo tani hakhi) = “it is not taught in this fashion” — a Talmudic refutation by appeal to the baraita’s full textual form
Segment 16
TYPE: דחיה — אוקימתא
The baraita may speak only for R. Shimon — re-interpreting “minei minchah”
Hebrew/Aramaic:
דִּלְמָא הָא מַנִּי, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא, דְּאָמַר: מֶחֱצָה חַלּוֹת וּמֶחֱצָה רְקִיקִין יָבִיא, וּמַאי ״מִינֵי מִנְחָה״? מִנְחָה דְּאִית בַּהּ תְּרֵי מִינֵי.
English Translation:
The Gemara rejects this proof: Perhaps the baraita is not in accordance with all opinions; rather, in accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said with regard to one who vows to bring a meal offering baked in an oven that if he wants to bring half of the meal offering as loaves and half of it as wafers, he may bring it in that manner. And accordingly, what is the meaning of the phrase: Types of a meal offering? It means a meal offering that has two types of baked dough. Therefore, bringing one such meal offering is sufficient.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara restricts the baraita to one tanna’s worldview. Rabbi Shimon, in a separate dispute (97a/63a), permits a single oven-baked meal offering to be split between חַלּוֹת and רְקִיקִין (loaves and wafers). Given that flexibility, מִינֵי מִנְחָה need not mean “multiple meal offerings” at all — it can describe a single offering that internally contains two types of baked dough. So the inference “מִינֵי מִנְחָה obligates one offering” is true here only in the diluted sense of “one offering, containing two sub-types,” not as a universal halacha.
Key Terms:
- חַלּוֹת (challot) = thick loaves of the baked meal offering, mixed with oil
- רְקִיקִין (rekikin) = thin wafers of the baked meal offering, anointed with oil
- אוקימתא (ukimta) = a Talmudic move that restricts a text to a particular tanna’s view to deflect a difficulty
Segment 17
TYPE: השלמת הדחיה
According to the majority Rabbis, the dilemma still stands
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲבָל רַבָּנַן דְּאָמְרִי, מֶחֱצָה חַלּוֹת וּמֶחֱצָה רְקִיקִין – לֹא יָבִיא, מֵבִיא שְׁתֵּי מְנָחוֹת מִשְּׁנֵי מִינִין.
English Translation:
But according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that if one wishes to bring half of the meal offering as loaves and half of it as wafers, he may not bring it in this manner, as they hold that all of the baked items in a meal offering must be of the same type, he consequently must bring two meal offerings of two different types.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara completes the deflection: for the Rabbis, who require homogeneity within a single meal offering, splitting one offering into two internal types is impossible. They must therefore read מִינֵי מִנְחָה as obligating two full offerings of two different types. Since the Rabbis’ view is the dominant one in halacha, Rav Pappa’s dilemma is left unresolved for the mainstream position. The sugya leaves it as a teiku in effect, having only managed to settle the question for Rabbi Shimon.
Key Terms:
- רַבָּנַן (Rabbanan) = the Sages, plural; here, the majority position opposed to Rabbi Shimon’s flexibility
Segment 18
TYPE: ציטוט המשנה ושאלה
Identifying the tanna behind the “I specified but forgot” rule
Hebrew/Aramaic:
״פֵּירַשְׁתִּי וְאֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ מַה פֵּירַשְׁתִּי״ – יָבִיא חֲמִשְׁתָּן. מַאן תַּנָּא?
English Translation:
§ The mishna teaches that if one says: I specified a meal offering but I do not know what meal offering I specified, he must bring all five types of meal offerings. The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who taught this halakha?
קלאוד על הדף:
The sugya now turns to a fresh clause of the mishna: a vower who specified a particular type of meal offering but cannot recall which type discharges his vow by bringing all five types — סולת, מחבת, מרחשת, מאפה תנור, and (depending on the dispute) חלות or רקיקין. The Gemara asks the diagnostic question מַאן תַּנָּא, signaling that this halacha is not universally agreed and inviting attribution. The discussion that follows is essentially: can this rule fit Rabbi Shimon, given his flexibility about מחצה חלות ומחצה רקיקין?
Key Terms:
- פֵּירַשְׁתִּי (peirashti) = “I specified” — the speaker did make a clear vow but has forgotten its content
- חֲמִשְׁתָּן (chamishtan) = “all five of them” — the five categories of meal offering enumerated in the mishna
Segment 19
TYPE: תירוץ ראשון — ר’ ירמיה
The mishna cannot reflect Rabbi Shimon’s position
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, דְּאִי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן – כֵּיוָן דְּאָמַר מֶחֱצָה חַלּוֹת וּמֶחֱצָה רְקִיקִין יָבִיא.
English Translation:
Rabbi Yirmeya said: This halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. As, if it were in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, since he said that if one wants to bring half of his baked meal offering as loaves and half of it as wafers he may bring it in that manner, why does one have to bring only five meal offerings to cover all possible vows that he may have made? He should be required to bring several meal offerings baked in an oven to cover all the possible combinations of loaves and wafers.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yirmeya answers the מַאן תַּנָּא question by elimination. For Rabbi Shimon, who allows internal mixtures of loaves and wafers within a single oven-baked meal offering, far more than five offerings are needed to cover every vow. The vower might have specified ten loaves, ten wafers, nine-and-one, eight-and-two, etc. Since the mishna is content with five, it must reflect a tanna who rejects mixtures within one offering — i.e., the Rabbis, not Rabbi Shimon.
Key Terms:
- רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה (R. Yirmeya) = a fourth-century Eretz-Yisrael amora known for sharp probing questions
- דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן (delo k’R. Shimon) = “not in accordance with Rabbi Shimon” — explicit attribution against him
Segment 20
TYPE: חישוב מתמטי
Even with R. Yehuda’s count, fourteen offerings are needed for R. Shimon
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִי נָמֵי סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, דְּאָמַר כׇּל הַמְּנָחוֹת בָּאוֹת עֶשֶׂר, אִיכָּא לְסַפּוֹקַהּ בְּאַרְבַּע עֶשְׂרֵה מְנָחוֹת.
English Translation:
Therefore, even if the tanna of the mishna holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said that all meal offerings are brought as ten items, as opposed to the opinion of Rabbi Meir that all meal offerings are brought as twelve items, there is cause for uncertainty, which renders fourteen different meal offerings necessary. In addition to the shallow-pan meal offering, the deep-pan meal offering, and the fine-flour meal offering, there are another eleven combinations of baked meal offering that he may have intended. He may have intended to bring ten loaves, or ten wafers, or one loaf and nine wafers, two loaves and eight wafers, three loaves and seven wafers, and so forth.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yirmeya now sharpens the count. Even adopting Rabbi Yehuda’s view that each meal offering is divided into ten loaves/wafers (rather than twelve), the combinatorics under Rabbi Shimon’s permissive ruling generate eleven distinct mixtures (10:0, 9:1, 8:2 … 0:10). Add the three non-baked meal offerings (סולת, מחבת, מרחשת) and the total is fourteen — not five. This arithmetical proof drives home that the mishna’s “bring all five” cannot possibly capture every Shimoni possibility.
Key Terms:
- כָּל הַמְּנָחוֹת בָּאוֹת עֶשֶׂר (kol hamenachot ba’ot eser) = “all meal offerings come as ten” — Rabbi Yehuda’s count of how many loaves/wafers comprise a baked meal offering
- אִיכָּא לְסַפּוֹקַהּ (ika lesapukah) = “there is cause for uncertainty” — the vower’s possible intent must be safelyk covered
Segment 21
TYPE: תירוץ שני — אביי
Abaye rescues R. Shimon via the mayyetei umatnei principle
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, שָׁמְעִינַן לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן דְּאָמַר: מַיְיתֵי וּמַתְנֵי.
English Translation:
Abaye rejected Rabbi Yirmeya’s explanation and said: You may even say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. We have heard that Rabbi Shimon said: One who is uncertain whether he is obligated to bring a certain offering may bring the offering and stipulate that if he is obligated to bring an offering, this is his offering, and if he is not obligated, it is a voluntary offering. Therefore, in the case of the mishna, one can bring the five types of meal offerings, with his baked meal offering including ten loaves and ten wafers, and stipulate that whichever items were included in his vow serve as fulfillment of his obligation, and all the others are voluntary offerings.
קלאוד על הדף:
Abaye reframes the entire problem: the mishna can fit Rabbi Shimon, because Rabbi Shimon also holds the principle of מַיְיתֵי וּמַתְנֵי — “bring it and stipulate.” Under this principle, when uncertainty exists, one may offer a single sacrifice and verbally condition it: “if I’m obligated, this fulfills my obligation; if not, it’s a voluntary offering.” So the vower brings five meal offerings (with the baked one containing both ten loaves and ten wafers) and conditions them. The conditional clause does the combinatorial work; only five physical offerings need be brought.
Key Terms:
- מַיְיתֵי וּמַתְנֵי (mayyetei umatnei) = “he brings and stipulates” — Rabbi Shimon’s principle permitting conditional offerings to resolve halachic doubt
- אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא (afilu teima) = “you may even say” — a Talmudic move that defends a position previously thought to be impossible
Segment 22
TYPE: ראיה מברייתא
Source for Rabbi Shimon’s mayyetei umatnei principle — the doubtful leper
Hebrew/Aramaic:
דְּתַנְיָא: רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר, לַמׇּחֳרָת מֵבִיא אֲשָׁמוֹ וְלוּגּוֹ
English Translation:
As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Nazir 6:1): How should one whose status as a leper is uncertain bring his guilt offering and log of oil on the eighth day of his purification? Rabbi Shimon says: On the following day, after his seven days of purification, he brings his guilt offering and his log of oil
קלאוד על הדף:
Abaye now adduces the source for Rabbi Shimon’s stipulation principle: a baraita treating the doubtful leper (ספק מצורע). After completing his seven-day purification, he is uncertain whether he was truly a leper requiring the eighth-day rites. Rabbi Shimon legislates a conditional sacrifice that simultaneously serves as guilt offering (if leprous) or voluntary peace offering (if not). The text breaks at this point and the conditional formula will follow on amud bet.
Key Terms:
- לַמׇּחֳרָת (lamachorat) = on the morrow — the eighth day, when the post-leprosy guilt offering is brought
- אֲשָׁמוֹ וְלוּגּוֹ (ashamo veLugo) = his guilt offering and his log of oil — the two distinctive korbanot of the metzora’s purification
Amud Bet (105b)
Segment 1
TYPE: המשך הברייתא
The conditional stipulation formula for the doubtful leper
Hebrew/Aramaic:
עִמּוֹ, וְאוֹמֵר: אִם מְצוֹרָע הוּא – זֶהוּ אֲשָׁמוֹ וְזֶה לוּגּוֹ, וְאִם לָאו – אָשָׁם זֶה יְהֵא שַׁלְמֵי נְדָבָה.
English Translation:
with it and says the following stipulation: If this offering is one of a leper, i.e., if I am a leper, this is his guilt offering and that is his log of oil. And if I am not a leper, this animal that I brought for a guilt offering shall be a gift peace offering, because their sacrificial rites are equivalent.
קלאוד על הדף:
Here is the precise stipulation Rabbi Shimon mandates: the same animal serves as either a leper’s guilt offering or a voluntary peace offering, depending on which underlying reality is true. This works because אשם מצורע and שלמי נדבה happen to share substantial procedural overlap (slaughter location, blood placement, libations, waving — see Segment 2). Rabbi Shimon’s willingness to design such a hybrid sacrifice is exactly the principle Abaye is invoking to permit the same approach in our meal-offering case.
Key Terms:
- מְצוֹרָע (metzora) = a person afflicted with biblical “leprosy” requiring extensive purification rites
- שַׁלְמֵי נְדָבָה (shalmei nedavah) = a voluntary peace offering, brought without a prior obligating event
Segment 2
TYPE: פירוט הדינים
The composite halachic regimen of the conditional offering
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאוֹתוֹ אָשָׁם טָעוּן שְׁחִיטָה בַּצָּפוֹן, וּמַתַּן בְּהוֹנוֹת, וּסְמִיכָה, וּנְסָכִים, וּתְנוּפַת חָזֶה וָשׁוֹק, וְנֶאֱכָל לְזִכְרֵי כְהוּנָּה לְיוֹם וָלַיְלָה.
English Translation:
And that uncertain guilt offering requires slaughter in the north of the Temple courtyard, as does a guilt offering; and placement of the blood on the right thumb, and right big toe, and right ear of the leper, as described in Leviticus 14:14; and it requires placing hands on the head of the animal, and the accompanying wine libations, and waving of the breast and thigh, as does a peace offering. And it is eaten by males of the priesthood for one day and the following night like a guilt offering, and not for two days and the intervening night like a peace offering.
קלאוד על הדף:
The conditional offering must satisfy the requirements of both possibilities. From the guilt-offering side: north-side slaughter and the distinctive blood-placement on the leper’s thumb, toe, and ear. From the peace-offering side: סמיכה (laying of hands), נסכים (libations), and tenufah (waving the breast and thigh). The eating window is reduced to the strictest case — one day and one night, like a guilt offering — to avoid violating נותר. This composite regimen is what makes the stipulation viable, and it is also the source of the upcoming difficulty about whether such reduction violates ב”ית הפסול.
Key Terms:
- שְׁחִיטָה בַּצָּפוֹן (shechitah batzafon) = slaughter on the north side of the altar, required for kodshei kodashim
- מַתַּן בְּהוֹנוֹת (matan behonot) = placement of blood on the leper’s right thumb, big toe, and ear
- תְּנוּפַת חָזֶה וָשׁוֹק (tenufat chazeh vashok) = waving of the breast and thigh, the priestly portion of a peace offering
- לְזִכְרֵי כְהוּנָּה (lezikhrei khehunah) = to males of the priesthood — eligible eaters of guilt-offering meat
Segment 3
TYPE: עיון בקושיא ידועה
Acknowledging Zevachim’s resolution and signaling a distinction
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּקָא מְפָרֵיק מָר בִּשְׁחִיטַת קָדָשִׁים.
English Translation:
The Gemara relates to the problem that arises from this stipulation, as treating an offering as two different types of offerings due to a stipulation can cause a situation where an offering is unduly disqualified. In the case of an offering that is sacrificed as both a peace offering and a guilt offering, if its meat is not eaten by dawn of the following day, it is disqualified, even though it might be a peace offering, which can be eaten for another day. The Gemara comments: And even though a Sage resolves this issue in the tractate of: The slaughter of sacrificial animals, i.e., tractate Zevaḥim, in a manner that would not enable a stipulation to be made in this case (see 76b), there is a distinction between the case discussed there and the case discussed here.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara now flags a known difficulty. Treating one animal as both an asham and a shelamim shortens its eating window from two days to one — potentially bringing the meat to בית הפסול (the threshold of disqualification by overnight remainder). In Zevachim 76b, this very objection led the Gemara to prohibit such stipulations ab initio. So why does Rabbi Shimon permit it here? The Gemara is about to draw a careful line between purification needs and other contexts.
Key Terms:
- בית הפסול (beit hapsul) = “the realm of disqualification”; reducing an offering’s permitted eating-time may render its meat נותר
- מְפָרֵיק (mefareik) = he resolves, he distinguishes — refers to Talmudic resolution-techniques applied in a parallel sugya
Segment 4
TYPE: תירוץ זבחים
The standard distinction — purifying a person justifies ab initio stipulation
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֵימַר דְּאָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: מַיְיתֵי וּמַתְנֵי לְכַתְּחִילָּה – לְתַקּוֹנֵי גַּבְרָא, אֲבָל בְּעָלְמָא – דִּיעֲבַד אִין, לְכַתְּחִילָּה לָא.
English Translation:
The resolution given there was: Say that Rabbi Shimon said that in a case of uncertainty one may bring an offering and stipulate with regard to its type ab initio only for the remedy of a man, e.g., in order to purify a person from his uncertain status as a leper, as there is no other way for him to purify himself. But in general, after the fact, after uncertainty arose with regard to the status of a certain offering it is indeed permitted to sacrifice the offering in a manner that may reduce the amount of time allotted for eating it, but one may not consecrate such an offering ab initio.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Zevachim resolution invokes a sharp distinction. Rabbi Shimon’s stipulation principle was permitted לכתחילה only when human personal-status repair (לְתַקּוֹנֵי גַּבְרָא) is at stake, like the metzora who cannot otherwise re-enter the camp. In all other cases, where stipulation merely benefits sacrificial procedure, it is allowed only בדיעבד — after the fact — but not as a planned approach. This distinction would seem to bar Abaye from invoking the same principle for the meal-offering case in our mishna.
Key Terms:
- לְתַקּוֹנֵי גַּבְרָא (letakkonei gavra) = “to repair a man” — to enable a person’s halachic purification when no alternative exists
- לְכַתְּחִילָּה / דִּיעֲבַד (lechatchilla / bediavad) = ab initio (planned) versus after-the-fact — a fundamental halachic dichotomy
Segment 5
TYPE: חילוק עיקרי
Distinguishing meal offerings — no eating-time reduction means no בית הפסול
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָנֵי מִילֵּי גַּבֵּי שְׁלָמִים, דְּקָא מְמַעֵט בַּאֲכִילָתָן, דְּהָווּ לְהוּ קָדָשִׁים לְבֵית הַפְּסוּל, אֲבָל מְנָחוֹת – אֲפִילּוּ לְכַתְּחִילָּה.
English Translation:
The Gemara explains why here it would nevertheless be permitted to make the stipulation ab initio: Nevertheless, this statement that one may stipulate with regard to an offering only after the fact applies only to a peace offering, as sacrificing it as a guilt offering reduces its allotted time for eating, which may bring sacrificial meat to the status of disqualification. But stipulation with regard to meal offerings when one does not remember which type he vowed to bring is permitted even ab initio, as this does not reduce its allotted time for eating. Therefore, the mishna could be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara now defends Abaye’s reading of the mishna by limiting the Zevachim restriction. The “only-bediavad” rule applies only when stipulation actively shortens an offering’s eating window (e.g., transforming a two-day shelamim into a one-day asham). All meal offerings, however, are eaten exclusively for one day and one night — the same window applies whether the meal-offering is מנחת חוטא, נדבה, מאפה, etc. So conditional stipulation among them carries no eating-time reduction and no בית הפסול risk, and it is therefore permitted לכתחילה. The mishna’s “bring all five and stipulate” can indeed be Rabbi Shimon’s.
Key Terms:
- הָנֵי מִילֵּי (hanei millei) = “these words apply [only to]” — a Talmudic limiting clause
- מְמַעֵט בַּאֲכִילָתָן (memaeit ba’achilatan) = reducing their eating-time — the trigger that creates the בית הפסול concern
Segment 6
TYPE: קושיית רב פפא
Two-vessels objection: ten loaves + ten wafers exceeds one isaron
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא לְאַבָּיֵי: רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן דְּאָמַר מֶחֱצָה חַלּוֹת וּמֶחֱצָה רְקִיקִין יָבִיא, הָא קָא מַיְיתֵי עִשָּׂרוֹן אֶחָד מִשְּׁנֵי עִשָּׂרוֹן, וְלוֹג אֶחָד מִשְּׁנֵי לוּגִּין!
English Translation:
Rav Pappa said to Abaye: How can you explain that the mishna could be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said that if one wants to bring half of his baked meal offering as loaves and half of it as wafers he may bring it in that manner, as one can bring a meal offering of ten loaves and ten wafers and stipulate that some of them are brought in order to fulfill his obligation and the rest are a voluntary offering? This cannot be, as the twenty loaves and wafers constitute a total of two-tenths of an ephah in volume, and must therefore be sanctified in two separate service vessels. This causes a situation where one brings one-tenth of an ephah, which constitutes one meal offering as fulfillment of the individual’s obligation, from two separate tenths of an ephah. And similarly, the two meal offerings require two log of oil, each of which is sanctified in a separate vessel, and it turns out that each meal offering includes one log of oil from two separate log.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Pappa launches a sharp practical objection. A standard meal offering is one isaron with one log of oil, sanctified in one כלי שרת. But Abaye’s plan to bring ten loaves and ten wafers in one offering doubles the volume to two isaron and requires two log of oil — necessitating two separate service vessels. The vower’s actual obligation, however, was a single isaron and one log. So Abaye’s solution forces the vower to bring “one isaron from two isaron” and “one log from two log” — fragmenting the unitary requirement of a single meal offering across two vessels.
Key Terms:
- עִשָּׂרוֹן (isaron) = one-tenth of an ephah; the standard volume of fine flour for a single meal offering
- לוֹג (log) = a liquid measure; the standard volume of oil for a single meal offering
- כלי שרת (kli sharet) = a sanctified service vessel; sanctifies its contents and is limited in capacity
Segment 7
TYPE: תירוץ אביי
Rabbi Shimon explicitly validates fulfilling one isaron from two
Hebrew/Aramaic:
שָׁמְעִינַן לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, דְּאָמַר: אִם הֵבִיא עִשָּׂרוֹן אֶחָד מִשְּׁנֵי עֶשְׂרוֹנוֹת, וְלוֹג אֶחָד מִשְּׁנֵי לוּגִּין – יָצָא.
English Translation:
Abaye answered: This is not difficult, as we have heard that Rabbi Shimon said that if one brought one-tenth of an ephah as a meal offering from two separate tenths, and similarly, if one brought one log of oil from two separate log, he has fulfilled his obligation.
קלאוד על הדף:
Abaye disposes of the difficulty with a known Shimoni position. Rabbi Shimon already holds that bringing one isaron drawn from two separate sanctified isaron, and one log drawn from two separate sanctified log, constitutes valid fulfillment. So the multi-vessel structure that Rav Pappa flagged is not a deal-breaker — it is exactly the kind of fragmented sanctification that Rabbi Shimon permits. The conditional offering can proceed using two vessels with the appropriate stipulation.
Key Terms:
- שָׁמְעִינַן לֵיהּ (sham’inan leih) = “we have heard him say” — referring to a known position elsewhere in Rabbi Shimon’s halachic corpus
- יָצָא (yatza) = he has fulfilled his obligation — a verdict of post-facto validity
Segment 8
TYPE: שאלה ופיתרון
The kemitzah problem and its conditional solution
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּמִיקְמָץ הֵיכִי קָמַץ? דְּמַתְנֵי וְאָמַר: אִי חַלּוֹת לְחוֹדַיְיהוּ, וּרְקִיקִין לְחוֹדַיְיהוּ אֲמַרִי – דְּקָא קָמֵיצְנָא מֵחַלּוֹת לֶיהֱוֵי אַחַלּוֹת, דְּקָא קָמֵיצְנָא מֵרְקִיקִין לֶיהֱוֵי אַרְקִיקִין. אִי מֶחֱצָה רְקִיקִין וּמֶחֱצָה חַלּוֹת אֲמַרִי – דְּקָא קָמֵיצְנָא מֵחַלּוֹת לֶיהֱוֵי אַמֶּחֱצָה חַלּוֹת וּמֶחֱצָה רְקִיקִין, וּדְקָא קָמֵיצְנָא מֵרְקִיקִין לִיהְווֹ אַמֶּחֱצָה רְקִיקִין וּמֶחֱצָה חַלּוֹת.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: But how does one remove a handful from this meal offering, which consists of both loaves and wafers? The Gemara answers that he stipulates and says: If I specified in my vow that I would bring loaves only, or similarly if I said that I would bring wafers only, let the handful that I remove from the loaves be for the loaves, and let the handful that I remove from the wafers be for the wafers. If I said in my vow that I would bring a meal offering that is half wafers and half loaves, let the handful that I remove from the loaves be for half the loaves and half the wafers, and let the handful that I remove from the wafers be for half the wafers and half the loaves.
קלאוד על הדף:
Even granting the multi-vessel sanctification, kemitzah (the mandatory removal of a handful that is burned on the altar) presents a fresh complication: how does the priest remove a handful that legally represents whichever vow the speaker actually made? The answer is layered conditional intent. The kohen articulates: “If I vowed only loaves, this kometz from the loaves serves the loaves; if only wafers, this kometz from the wafers serves the wafers; if half-and-half, each kometz partly represents loaves-portion and partly wafers-portion.” This nested stipulation lets one set of physical actions discharge any of the possible vows.
Key Terms:
- קמיצה (kemitzah) = removing a fistful of fine flour from a meal offering — the avodah analogous to slaughter
- קוֹמֶץ (kometz) = the handful itself, burned on the altar; without valid kemitzah, the meal offering is invalid
Segment 9
TYPE: קושיא — מתחילה
Beginning of the next challenge: half-and-half requires only one kometz
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהָא בָּעֵי מִיקְמָץ חַד קוֹמֶץ מֵחַלּוֹת
English Translation:
The Gemara challenges this suggestion: But if the vow was to bring a meal offering that is half loaves and half wafers, it requires removing one handful from the loaves
קלאוד על הדף:
The daf cuts off mid-sentence — the challenge will be completed at the start of 106a. The setup is clear: if the vow was for a half-loaves/half-wafers offering, only one kometz should be taken (since it’s a single offering). But Abaye’s plan removed two kometzim (one from loaves and one from wafers), which is invalid for the half-half scenario. The continuation on 106a will work through how Abaye’s nested stipulation can or cannot solve this final wrinkle.
Key Terms:
- חַד קוֹמֶץ (chad kometz) = a single fistful — the requirement for a single integrated meal offering, even one containing two textures