Chullin Daf 2 (חולין דף ב׳)
Daf: 2 | Amudim: 2a – 2b | Date: Loading...
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (2a)
Segment 1
TYPE: משנה (Mishna)
The opening mishna of the masekhet — the constitutional rule of who is qualified to perform shechita.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְנִי׳ הַכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִין וּשְׁחִיטָתָן כְּשֵׁרָה, חוּץ מֵחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן, שֶׁמָּא יְקַלְקְלוּ אֶת שְׁחִיטָתָן. וְכוּלָּן שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ וַאֲחֵרִים רוֹאִין אוֹתָן – שְׁחִיטָתָן כְּשֵׁרָה.
English Translation:
MISHNA: Everyone slaughters an animal, i.e., can perform halakhically valid slaughter, and their slaughter is valid, except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, lest they ruin their slaughter because they lack competence. And for all of them, when they slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid.
קלאוד על הדף:
The masekhet opens with its foundational rule: shechita is not reserved for priests or a specialized caste — any Jew of sound mind may perform it. The three excluded categories (cheresh, shoteh, katan) are not disqualified because they are impure or unworthy, but because they lack the competence (da’at) to perform the act correctly, and are likely to “ruin” (yekalkelu) the shechita. The final clause introduces a remedy: supervision (acherim ro’in otan) can substitute for personal competence bediavad. This tripartite structure — general rule, exception, and override — will drive the entire sugya that follows.
Key Terms:
- חֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן (cheresh, shoteh, katan) = deaf-mute, imbecile, and minor — the classic halakhic trio lacking legal da’at
- שֶׁמָּא יְקַלְקְלוּ (shema yekalkelu) = lest they ruin it — the concern driving their disqualification
Segment 2
TYPE: סוגיית הגמרא (Gemara’s Opening Challenge)
The internal contradiction that drives the entire daf.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גְּמָ׳ ״הַכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִין״ – לְכַתְּחִלָּה, ״וּשְׁחִיטָתָן כְּשֵׁרָה״ – דִּיעֲבַד!
English Translation:
GEMARA: There is an apparent contradiction between the first two phrases of the mishna. The tanna begins: Everyone slaughters an animal, indicating that their performing slaughter is permitted ab initio, and then teaches: And their slaughter is valid, indicating that their slaughter is valid only after the fact.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara opens the masekhet with a precision challenge on the mishna’s very first line. “Ha-kol shochatin” (everyone slaughters) implies lechatchila — permission from the outset — while “shechitatan kesheira” (their slaughter is valid) is classic bediavad language, validating only after the fact. If everyone is permitted to slaughter ab initio, the result would obviously be valid, making the second phrase redundant. This apparent internal contradiction (setira) becomes the engine that drives the entire daf’s analysis of when “ha-kol” means lechatchila and when it does not.
Key Terms:
- לְכַתְּחִלָּה (lechatchila) = ab initio — permitted from the outset
- דִּיעֲבַד (bediavad) = after the fact — valid once done, but not permitted to begin with
Segment 3
TYPE: קושיא (Challenge — Rav Acha bar Rava)
Rav Acha counters: “ha-kol” does not always mean lechatchila.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: וְכֹל ״הַכֹּל״ לְכַתְּחִלָּה הוּא? אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה: הַכֹּל מְמִירִין, אֶחָד הָאֲנָשִׁים וְאֶחָד הַנָּשִׁים – הָכִי נָמֵי דִּלְכַתְּחִלָּה הוּא? וְהָא כְּתִיב: ״לֹא יַחֲלִיפֶנּוּ וְלֹא יָמִיר אֹתוֹ טוֹב בְּרָע אוֹ רַע בְּטוֹב״!
English Translation:
Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: And does every use of the term: Everyone, indicate that the action in question is permitted ab initio? If that is so, in the mishna (Temura 2a), where it says: Everyone substitutes a non-sacred animal for a sacrificial animal, both men and women, is that also an expression indicating that it is permitted ab initio? But isn’t it written: “He shall neither exchange it, nor substitute it, good for bad, or bad for good” (Leviticus 27:10)?
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Acha challenges the Gemara’s implicit premise that “ha-kol” necessarily connotes lechatchila. He produces a clear counterexample from Temura: that mishna also opens with “ha-kol memirin” (everyone substitutes), yet temura — substituting a non-sacred animal for a sacrificial one — is explicitly forbidden by the Torah (Lev 27:10), punishable by lashes. Clearly “ha-kol” there cannot mean lechatchila. If the Temura mishna can use “ha-kol” in a bediavad sense, perhaps our mishna’s “ha-kol shochatin” does too, dissolving the contradiction.
Key Terms:
- תְּמוּרָה (temura) = substitution of a non-sacred animal for a consecrated one — a Torah prohibition, though the substitution itself takes effect
Segment 4
TYPE: תירוץ (Answer — Rav Ashi)
Rav Ashi distinguishes: Temura’s mishna self-clarifies; ours does not.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָתָם, כִּדְקָתָנֵי טַעְמָא: לֹא שֶׁהָאָדָם רַשַּׁאי לְהָמִיר, אֶלָּא שֶׁאִם הֵמִיר – מוּמָר, וְסוֹפֵג אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים.
English Translation:
Rav Ashi answers: There, the reason the mishna uses the word everyone is that it immediately teaches: That is not to say that it is permitted for a person to substitute; rather, it means that if one did substitute a non-sacred animal for a sacrificial animal, substitution takes effect, and the one who substituted the non-sacred animal incurs [vesofeg] the forty lashes that are the punishment for violating the prohibition “Nor substitute it.” But here, since the mishna does not similarly qualify its statement, it indicates that everyone may perform the slaughter ab initio.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Ashi blocks the counterexample on textual grounds. The Temura mishna itself explicitly clarifies that “ha-kol” there does not mean permission — it teaches that if one violates the prohibition, the substitution takes halakhic effect and lashes are incurred. The mishna there knew it needed to qualify its “ha-kol.” Our mishna offers no such qualifier, so the default reading of “ha-kol shochatin” stands as lechatchila, and the original contradiction returns in full force.
Segment 5
TYPE: קושיא (Challenge — Rav Acha presses from Arakhin)
A second counterexample: Arakhin’s “ha-kol” also cannot mean lechatchila.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא הַכֹּל מַעֲרִיכִין וְנֶעֱרָכִין, נוֹדְרִין וְנִידָּרִין, הָכִי נָמֵי דִּלְכַתְּחִלָּה? וְהָא כְּתִיב: ״וְכִי תֶחְדַּל לִנְדֹּר לֹא יִהְיֶה בְךָ חֵטְא״!
English Translation:
Rav Aḥa challenges: But a mishna teaches (Arakhin 2a): Everyone takes vows of valuation and is thereby obligated to donate to the Temple treasury the value fixed by the Torah based on the age and gender of the person valuated; and everyone is valuated, and therefore one who vowed to donate his fixed value is obligated to pay; everyone vows to donate the market value of a person as a slave to the Temple treasury and is thereby obligated to pay; and everyone is the object of a vow if others vowed to donate his market value. Is that also an expression indicating that it is permitted ab initio? But it is written: “And if you shall cease to vow, there shall be no sin in you” (Deuteronomy 23:23), indicating that it is preferable not to vow.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Acha redeploys his strategy with a fresh counterexample — the opening mishna of Arakhin, which uses “ha-kol ma’arichin ve-ne’erachin, nodrin ve-nidarin” for vows of valuation and market-value vows to the Temple. Yet Torah itself discourages vowing (Deut 23:23), so “ha-kol” there cannot carry a lechatchila sense. Unlike Temura, the Arakhin mishna contains no explicit qualifier, so Rav Ashi’s earlier distinction cannot save him here. The challenge is sharper the second time.
Key Terms:
- עֶרְכִּין (erkhin) = vows of valuation — donating to the Temple the Torah’s fixed “valuation” of a person by age and gender (Lev 27)
- נְדָרִים (nedarim) = vows — including pledges of market value (demei) to the Temple
Segment 6
TYPE: מחלוקת תנאים (Tannaitic Dispute — Kohelet’s warning against vows)
Rabbi Meir vs. Rabbi Yehuda on whether vowing is ever ideal.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּכְתִיב: ״טוֹב אֲשֶׁר לֹא תִדֹּר מִשֶּׁתִּדּוֹר וְלֹא תְשַׁלֵּם״, וְתַנְיָא: טוֹב מִזֶּה וּמִזֶּה שֶׁאֵינוֹ נוֹדֵר כׇּל עִיקָּר, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: טוֹב מִזֶּה וּמִזֶּה נוֹדֵר וּמְשַׁלֵּם. וַאֲפִילּוּ רַבִּי יְהוּדָה לָא קָאָמַר אֶלָּא בְּאוֹמֵר ״הֲרֵי זוֹ״,
English Translation:
And it is written: “It is better that you should not vow, than that you should vow and not pay” (Ecclesiastes 5:4); and it is taught in a baraita with regard to that verse: Better than both this one, who vows and does not pay, and that one, who vows and pays, is one who does not take a vow at all; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: Better than both this one, who vows and does not pay, and that one, who does not vow at all, is one who vows and pays in fulfillment of that vow. Rav Aḥa comments: And even Rabbi Yehuda states his opinion only in a case where one vows and says: This animal is designated for sacrifice, as in that case there is no concern that he will fail to fulfill his commitment, since even if the animal is stolen or lost, he is not required to bring another in its place.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Acha reinforces his point with Kohelet 5:4 and the tannaitic dispute it spawned. Rabbi Meir reads the verse as a blanket warning: best not to vow at all. Rabbi Yehuda softens it: it is better to vow and pay. But Rav Acha notes that even Rabbi Yehuda only endorses “harei zo” — designation of a specific animal, where there is no ongoing personal obligation if the animal is lost — not an open-ended personal pledge. The argument sets up the punchline on 2b: if even Rabbi Yehuda does not approve of “harei alai,” then “ha-kol nodrin” certainly is not lechatchila.
Key Terms:
- הֲרֵי זוֹ (harei zo) = “this one is [consecrated]” — designating a specific animal, a one-shot pledge
- הֲרֵי עָלַי (harei alai) = “it is incumbent upon me” — a personal obligation that remains binding even if the designated animal is lost
Amud Bet (2b)
Segment 1
TYPE: המשך הקושיא (Continuation of Rav Acha’s Challenge)
The punchline: even Rabbi Yehuda concedes “harei alai” is to be avoided.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲבָל אָמַר ״הֲרֵי עָלַי״ – לֹא.
English Translation:
But in the case of one who vows and says: It is incumbent upon me to bring an offering, even Rabbi Yehuda concedes that no, it is best not to vow at all. Likewise, it is preferable not to vow to donate a certain monetary value to the Temple treasury. Apparently, then, the statements in that mishna: Everyone takes vows of valuation, and: Everyone vows to donate the assessment of a person to the Temple treasury, do not indicate that it is permitted to do so ab initio.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Acha lands his blow: when the vow is “harei alai” — an unshakable personal obligation — even Rabbi Yehuda concedes that not vowing is better. Since erkhin and nedarim of demei are by their nature personal obligations, the Arakhin mishna’s “ha-kol” cannot mean lechatchila. Therefore “ha-kol” does not universally imply lechatchila, and Rav Ashi’s reading of our mishna must find support elsewhere.
Segment 2
TYPE: קושיא נגדית (Rav Ashi’s Counter-Challenge)
Does “ha-kol” always mean NOT lechatchila? Hardly — look at sukka and tzitzit.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְכֹל ״הַכֹּל״ לָאו לְכַתְּחִלָּה הוּא? אֶלָּא ״הַכֹּל חַיָּיבִים בְּסוּכָּה״, ״הַכֹּל חַיָּיבִין בְּצִיצִית״, הָכִי נָמֵי דְּלָאו לְכַתְּחִלָּה?
English Translation:
Rav Ashi responded: And is that to say that every use of the term: Everyone, is an indication that the action in question is not permitted ab initio? Rather, is the term: Everyone, in the baraita that states: Everyone is obligated in the mitzva of sukka, and in the baraita that states: Everyone is obligated in the mitzva of ritual fringes, also an indication that they are not permitted ab initio?
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Ashi turns Rav Acha’s move against him: if “ha-kol” has no fixed lechatchila meaning, does that mean it never means lechatchila? He cites “ha-kol chayyavin be-sukka” and “ha-kol chayyavin be-tzitzit” — obligations that are obviously performed ab initio with full rabbinic encouragement. The tactic is dialectical symmetry: Rav Acha’s rule that “ha-kol” does not imply lechatchila must also be too strong.
Segment 3
TYPE: תירוץ וקושיא (Clarification and Fresh Challenge)
Rav Acha: obligations are a different case. Rav Ashi: then what about semichah?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
חַיָּיבִין – לָא קָאָמֵינָא. אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, ״הַכֹּל סוֹמְכִין, אֶחָד הָאֲנָשִׁים וְאֶחָד הַנָּשִׁים״ – הָכִי נָמֵי דְּלָאו לְכַתְּחִלָּה? וְהָא כְּתִיב: ״וְסָמַךְ יָדוֹ … וְנִרְצָה״!
English Translation:
Rav Aḥa answered: I am not speaking about cases where it is stated: Everyone is obligated, as it goes without saying that fulfilling any obligation is permitted ab initio. Rav Ashi asked: If that is so, that which was stated: Everyone who brings an offering places hands on the animal, both men and women (see Menaḥot 93a), is that also an expression indicating that it is not permitted ab initio? But isn’t it written: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the burnt offering, and it shall be accepted for him to effect atonement for him” (Leviticus 1:4)?
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Acha concedes a carve-out: “chayyavin” mishnayot (obligations) trivially carry lechatchila force, because fulfilling an obligation is by definition desirable. Rav Ashi immediately finds a harder case: “ha-kol somchin” — the Menachot mishna on semichah, laying hands on a korban. The verse “ve-samach yado… ve-nirtza” ties acceptance of the offering to semichah, clearly indicating an ab initio performance. Yet the mishna uses “ha-kol” without the word “chayyavin,” so Rav Acha’s carve-out does not save him.
Key Terms:
- סְמִיכָה (semichah) = laying hands on a korban’s head — part of the sacrificial procedure tied to the offering’s acceptance
Segment 4
TYPE: הודאה (Rav Acha’s Concession and Return to the Mishna)
Yes, “ha-kol” is context-dependent — so maybe our mishna’s is bediavad after all.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִין, אִיכָּא ״הַכֹּל״ לְכַתְּחִלָּה, וְאִיכָּא ״הַכֹּל״ דִּיעֲבַד. אֶלָּא ״הַכֹּל״ דְּהָכָא, מִמַּאי דִּלְכַתְּחִלָּה הוּא דְּתִקְשֵׁי לָךְ? דִּלְמָא דִּיעֲבַד הוּא, וְלָא תִּקְשֵׁי לָךְ.
English Translation:
Rav Aḥa answered: Indeed, there are instances where the word: Everyone, indicates ab initio, and there are instances where the word: Everyone, indicates after the fact. Rather, concerning the term: Everyone, that appears here in the mishna, from where can it be determined that it is an expression indicating that it is permitted ab initio, creating an apparent contradiction in the mishna that will be difficult for you? Perhaps it is an expression indicating that everyone’s slaughter is valid after the fact, and there will not be a contradiction in the mishna that will be difficult for you.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Acha accepts the symmetry: “ha-kol” can mean either lechatchila or bediavad depending on context. He then turns to the specific case at hand — what forces the Gemara to read our mishna’s “ha-kol shochatin” as lechatchila rather than bediavad? If one reads both clauses as bediavad, the apparent contradiction (setira) dissolves. This is Rav Acha’s attempted resolution of the opening challenge.
Segment 5
TYPE: תגובה חזקה (Rav Ashi’s Definitive Objection)
The redundancy argument — two bediavad clauses make no sense.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֲנָא ״שְׁחִיטָתָן כְּשֵׁרָה״ קַשְׁיָא לִי, מִדְּקָתָנֵי שְׁחִיטָתָן כְּשֵׁרָה דִּיעֲבַד, מִכְּלָל דְּ״הַכֹּל״ לְכַתְּחִלָּה הוּא, דְּאִי דִּיעֲבַד – תַּרְתֵּי דִּיעֲבַד לְמָה לִי?
English Translation:
Rav Ashi said to Rav Aḥa: I find the phrase: And their slaughter is valid, to be difficult for me. From the fact that the tanna teaches: And their slaughter is valid, which is an expression indicating that it is valid after the fact, conclude by inference that the initial phrase in the mishna: Everyone slaughters, is an expression indicating that it is permitted ab initio. As, if it indicated that it is valid after the fact, why do I need two phrases teaching that it is valid after the fact?
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Ashi identifies the precise textual pressure: “shechitatan kesheira” is unambiguously bediavad language (validity after the fact). If “ha-kol shochatin” also merely taught bediavad, the mishna would have two redundant clauses (“tartei diavad lamah li”). The mishna’s drafter never wastes words, so the two clauses must carry different force — the first lechatchila, the second bediavad. The contradiction is real and demands a substantive resolution.
Segment 6
TYPE: תירוץ מכריע (Rabba bar Ulla’s Resolution)
The mishna teaches two distinct cases — this dissolves the contradiction.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר עוּלָּא: הָכִי קָתָנֵי – הַכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִין, וַאֲפִילּוּ טָמֵא בְּחוּלִּין. טָמֵא בְּחוּלִּין מַאי לְמֵימְרָא? בְּחוּלִּין שֶׁנַּעֲשׂוּ עַל טׇהֳרַת הַקֹּדֶשׁ, וְקָסָבַר: חוּלִּין שֶׁנַּעֲשׂוּ עַל טׇהֳרַת הַקֹּדֶשׁ כְּקֹדֶשׁ דָּמוּ.
English Translation:
Rabba bar Ulla said, in resolution of the conflict in the mishna, that this is what the mishna is teaching: Everyone slaughters, and even a ritually impure person may slaughter a non-sacred animal ab initio. The Gemara interjects: What is the purpose of stating that a ritually impure person may slaughter a non-sacred animal ab initio? There is no prohibition against rendering non-sacred meat impure. The Gemara answers that the reference is to non-sacred animals that were being prepared according to the strictures of sacrificial food, and the tanna holds that the halakhic status of non-sacred foods that were prepared according to the strictures of sacrificial food is like that of sacrificial food insofar as it is prohibited to render such food impure.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabba bar Ulla resolves the contradiction by mapping each clause of the mishna onto a different scenario. “Ha-kol shochatin” (lechatchila) addresses a tamei person slaughtering chullin — specifically chullin she-na’asu al taharat ha-kodesh, non-sacred food treated with the stringencies of kodesh. The chiddush is real: one might have thought that since this food is treated like kodesh, a tamei person must not slaughter it, but the mishna rules that he may do so lechatchila (with precautions). The second clause (“shechitatan kesheira”) will address a different case that is only valid bediavad.
Key Terms:
- חוּלִּין שֶׁנַּעֲשׂוּ עַל טׇהֳרַת הַקֹּדֶשׁ (chullin al taharat ha-kodesh) = non-sacred food prepared under the purity standards of sacrificial food — treated like kodesh for contamination purposes
- טָמֵא (tamei) = a ritually impure person
Segment 7
TYPE: פירוט מעשי (Practical Technique)
How to perform the shechita safely — the long-knife device.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כֵּיצַד הוּא עוֹשֶׂה? מֵבִיא סַכִּין אֲרוּכָּה וְשׁוֹחֵט בָּהּ, כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יִגַּע בַּבָּשָׂר.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: How does an impure person act in order to ensure that he will not render the flesh of the slaughtered animal impure? The Gemara answers: He brings a long knife and slaughters the animal with it, so that he will not come into contact with the flesh of the slaughtered animal.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara fills in the practical mechanism behind Rabba bar Ulla’s reading. The tamei person slaughters with a sakin arucha — a long-handled knife — so that although he performs the cut, his body never contacts the flesh. This preserves the taharah of the chullin al taharat ha-kodesh while still permitting him to slaughter lechatchila. The halakhic insight: when a practical workaround guarantees no violation will occur, the act itself is permitted from the outset.
Key Terms:
- סַכִּין אֲרוּכָּה (sakin arucha) = a long knife — a mechanical device to distance the tamei person from the flesh
Segment 8
TYPE: הבחנה (The Bediavad Case — Kodashim)
The mishna’s second clause: tamei + kodashim is valid only bediavad.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּבְמוּקְדָּשִׁים לֹא יִשְׁחוֹט, שֶׁמָּא יִגַּע בַּבָּשָׂר, וְאִם שָׁחַט וְאוֹמֵר ״בָּרִי לִי שֶׁלֹּא נָגַעְתִּי״ – שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה.
English Translation:
Rabba bar Ulla continues his interpretation of the mishna: And the reason the mishna also indicates that he may not slaughter ab initio is that with regard to sacrificial animals, he may not slaughter them ab initio even with a long knife, lest he come into contact with the flesh. But if he slaughtered the sacrificial animal and says: It is clear to me that I did not come into contact with the flesh, his slaughter is valid after the fact.
קלאוד על הדף:
This is the “shechitatan kesheira” (bediavad) half of Rabba bar Ulla’s reading. With actual kodashim, the long-knife workaround is insufficient — the stakes are too high to permit lechatchila, so the tamei person may not begin. But if he did slaughter and testifies “bari li she-lo nagati” (I am certain I did not touch), his shechita is valid after the fact. Thus the two clauses of the mishna are no longer redundant: the first teaches lechatchila for chullin al taharat ha-kodesh, the second teaches bediavad for kodashim proper.
Key Terms:
- בָּרִי לִי (bari li) = “I am certain” — a personal testimony of certainty used in halakha to validate a bediavad act
- מוּקְדָּשִׁים (mukdashim) = sacrificial animals (kodashim)
Segment 9
TYPE: הסבר המשנה (Explaining the Exclusion of Cheresh/Shoteh/Katan)
Why the three are disqualified even from plain chullin, even bediavad.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
חוּץ מֵחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן, דַּאֲפִילּוּ בְּחוּלִּין גְּרֵידֵי, דִּיעֲבַד נָמֵי לָא, שֶׁמָּא יִשְׁהוּ, שֶׁמָּא יִדְרְסוּ, וְשֶׁמָּא יַחֲלִידוּ.
English Translation:
And it teaches: This is the halakha with regard to all people except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, who, even if they slaughtered only non-sacred animals, their slaughter is not valid even after the fact. The reason the Sages deemed such slaughter not valid is lest people in these categories interrupt the slaughter, lest they press the knife in the course of slaughter, and lest they conceal the knife beneath the windpipe or the gullet in the course of an inverted slaughter.
קלאוד על הדף:
The mishna excludes cheresh, shoteh, and katan even from ordinary chullin and even bediavad — a harsher standard than applied to tamei. The reason is their incompetence with the five shechita-disqualifying errors: shehiya (pause), derasa (pressing instead of drawing), chaladah (concealing the knife), and the other two (hagrama, ikur) would have the same concern. Because these errors cannot be verified after the fact and the persons involved cannot give reliable testimony that they avoided them, the Sages invalidated the shechita categorically.
Key Terms:
- שְׁהִיָּה (shehiya) = pausing mid-shechita
- דְּרָסָה (derasa) = pressing the knife down instead of drawing it across
- חֲלָדָה (chaladah) = concealing the knife beneath the simanim during the cut
Segment 10
TYPE: בעיא (Inquiry into the Supervision Clause)
To which case does “ve-kulan she-shachatu” refer? Two options eliminated.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְכוּלָּן שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ, אַהֵיָיא? אִילֵּימָא אַחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן – עֲלַהּ קָאֵי, ״וְאִם שָׁחֲטוּ״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ! אֶלָּא אַטָּמֵא בְּחוּלִּין – הָא אָמְרַתְּ: לְכַתְּחִלָּה נָמֵי שָׁחֵיט!
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to the clause that follows in the mishna: And any of them who slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid, to which case in the mishna is it referring? If we say that the reference is to the case of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, why was it formulated: And any of them who slaughtered? Since it stands adjacent to that halakha, the tanna should have formulated the phrase: And if they slaughtered. Rather, perhaps the reference is to the case of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a non-sacred animal. The Gemara rejects that possibility as well. But didn’t you say in that case: He slaughters the animal even ab initio?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara eliminates candidates for the “ve-kulan she-shachatu” supervision clause. It cannot refer to cheresh/shoteh/katan because the grammar is wrong — the mishna would have said “ve-im shachatu” (if they slaughtered) to connect to the preceding clause, not the freestanding “ve-kulan.” It also cannot refer to tamei + chullin, since that case is already permitted lechatchila (with a long knife) and needs no supervision to rescue it.
Segment 11
TYPE: תירוץ (Resolution: Supervision Substitutes for “Bari Li”)
The remaining case: tamei + kodashim where he is not before us to be asked.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאֶלָּא, אַטָּמֵא בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁים – בְּ״בָרִי לִי״ סַגִּי! דְּלֵיתֵיהּ קַמַּן דִּנְשַׁיְּילֵיהּ.
English Translation:
And rather, perhaps the reference is to the case of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a sacrificial animal. The Gemara rejects that possibility, as in that case, if the ritually impure person says: It is clear to me that I did not come into contact with the flesh, it is sufficient, and there is no need for supervision. The Gemara answers: Supervision is necessary in the case of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a sacrificial animal, to account for a case where the ritually impure person is not before us so that we can ask him whether he came into contact with the flesh.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara briefly hesitates: isn’t “bari li” testimony from the tamei person himself sufficient, so why introduce supervision? The answer: precisely because there are cases where the slaughterer is no longer available to testify (“leiteh kaman di-nshayleih”). In those cases, supervision during the shechita substitutes for the later self-testimony and renders the shechita kasher. The mishna’s “acherim ro’in otan” thus has a specific, narrow target — tamei + kodashim absent the slaughterer.
Segment 12
TYPE: שקלא וטריא (Methodological Question — Primary Source)
Is the halakha primarily derived from here or from Zevachim?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הַאי טָמֵא בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁים, מֵהָכָא נָפְקָא? מֵהָתָם נָפְקָא: כׇּל הַפְּסוּלִין שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ – שְׁחִיטָתָן כְּשֵׁרָה, שֶׁהַשְּׁחִיטָה כְּשֵׁרָה בְּזָרִים, בְּנָשִׁים, וּבַעֲבָדִים, וּבִטְמֵאִים, וַאֲפִילּוּ בְּקׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים, וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יִהְיוּ טְמֵאִין נוֹגְעִין בַּבָּשָׂר.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: Is this halakha of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a sacrificial animal learned from an analysis of the mishna here? It is learned explicitly from the mishna there (Zevaḥim 31b): With regard to all those who are unfit for Temple service who slaughtered an offering, their slaughter is valid, as the slaughter of an offering is valid ab initio when performed even by non-priests, by women, by Canaanite slaves, and by ritually impure individuals. And this is the halakha even with regard to offerings of the most sacred order, provided that the ritually impure will not touch the flesh of the slaughtered animal, thereby rendering it impure.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara raises a methodological concern. The rule that tamei may slaughter kodashim (provided he does not contact the flesh) is explicitly taught in Zevachim 31b — “kol ha-pesulin she-shachatu, shechitatan kesheira” — alongside other disqualified Temple personnel. If the halakha already appears there in explicit form, why does our mishna need to state it again, and which location is the primary source (ikar)?
Segment 13
TYPE: תרי תירוצי (Two Alternative Answers)
Either locus can be primary — the other is “ag’av” (tacked on).
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָכָא עִיקָּר. הָתָם, אַיְּידֵי דִּתְנָא שְׁאָר פְּסוּלִין – תְּנָא נָמֵי טָמֵא בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁים. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: הָתָם עִיקָּר, דִּבְקָדָשִׁים קָאֵי. הָכָא, אַיְּידֵי דִּתְנָא טָמֵא בְּחוּלִּין – תָּנֵי נָמֵי טָמֵא בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁים.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: The mishna here is the primary source. There, since the tanna taught the rest of those disqualified for Temple service, he taught the case of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a sacrificial animal as well. And if you wish, say instead that the mishna there is the primary source, as it is standing in tractate Zevaḥim, which deals with sacrificial animals. Here, since the tanna taught the case of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a non-sacred animal, he also teaches the case of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a sacrificial animal.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara offers two equally defensible answers, illustrating the principle that the same halakha can have multiple “homes” in the Mishnah. (1) Chullin is primary; Zevachim merely adds it “ag’av” (alongside) the other disqualified personnel listed there. (2) Alternatively, Zevachim is primary because its subject matter is kodashim; our mishna borrows the case “ag’av” the parallel ruling about tamei + chullin. The dispute is left unresolved — a characteristic Talmudic “teiku” of methodology rather than substance.
Key Terms:
- אַיְּידֵי (ag’av / ayidei) = “by the way” — tacked on alongside related material
Segment 14
TYPE: פתיחת סוגיא חדשה (Opening of Next Sugya)
What type of tumah is at issue? The “cherev ke-chalal” problem.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הַאי טָמֵא, דְּאִיטַּמָּא בְּמַאי? אִילֵּימָא דְּאִיטַּמִּי בְּמֵת, ״בַּחֲלַל חֶרֶב״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא,
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: This ritually impure person mentioned in the mishna is one who became impure with what form of impurity? If we say that he became impure with impurity imparted by a corpse, this is difficult, as the Merciful One states: “And whosoever in the open field touches one slain with a sword” (Numbers 19:16).
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara now opens a new line of inquiry that continues onto 3a: what form of tumah is the mishna discussing? It begins with tumat met (corpse impurity) — but the verse “ba-chalal cherev” (Num 19:16) teaches the principle “cherev ke-chalal”: a sword that has touched a corpse itself transmits corpse-impurity with the same severity as the corpse. If so, the knife used by the tamei person would itself become av ha-tumah and render the slaughtered flesh impure, defeating the mishna’s ruling. The sugya will resolve this on the next daf.
Key Terms:
- בַּחֲלַל חֶרֶב (ba-chalal cherev) = “one slain by a sword” (Num 19:16) — the source for “cherev ke-chalal,” that a sword touching a corpse takes on the corpse’s tumah status
Next: Daf 3 →