Chullin Daf 74 (חולין דף ע״ד)
Daf: 74 | Amudim: 74a – 74b | Date: Loading...
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (74a)
Segment 1
TYPE: מסקנא
Conclusion of the previous sugya: hanging limbs are only rabbinically prohibited
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֵין בָּהֶן אֶלָּא מִצְוַת פְּרוֹשׁ בִּלְבָד.
English Translation:
In fact, such limbs and flesh are not prohibited by Torah law, as the slaughter does not render them as though they had already fallen off prior to the slaughter, and the verse cited in the baraita is not a true derivation but a mere support. Accordingly, with regard to them, there is nothing other than a rabbinic mitzva to separate oneself from consuming them.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara closes the discussion carried over from daf 73 about a limb or flesh that was dangling from an animal that was then slaughtered. By Torah law these are not prohibited, because slaughter does not retroactively treat them as having fallen off while the animal was alive; the verse cited earlier in the baraita is a mere asmachta (scriptural support), not a true derivation. All that remains is a rabbinic directive to refrain from eating them. This conclusion frames the daf’s governing principle, which the coming lines will name explicitly.
Key Terms:
- מִצְוַת פְּרוֹשׁ = a rabbinic duty to separate oneself from something — here, from eating the hanging limb
- אַסְמַכְתָּא = a verse cited as support for a rabbinic law rather than as its actual source
Segment 2
TYPE: מימרא
Two contradictory reports of Rav’s ruling on one who ate the hanging limb
Hebrew/Aramaic:
יָתֵיב רַב יוֹסֵף קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב הוּנָא, וְיָתֵיב וְקָאָמַר: אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: אֲכָלוֹ לָזֶה – לוֹקֶה. אֲמַר לֵיהּ הָהוּא מֵרַבָּנַן: לָא תְּצִיתוּ לֵיהּ, הָכִי אָמַר רַב יִצְחָק בַּר שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר מָרְתָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְרַב: אֲכָלוֹ לָזֶה – אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה.
English Translation:
§ Rav Yosef sat before Rav Huna, and he sat and said: Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: If one ate this hanging limb he is flogged for violating the prohibition against eating a limb from a living animal. One of the Sages said to him: Do not listen to his statement in the name of Rav, as this is what Rav Yitzḥak bar Shmuel bar Marta says in the name of Rav: If one ate this hanging limb he is not flogged.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Yosef, sitting before Rav Huna, transmits Rav’s ruling through Rav Yehuda: one who ate the hanging limb receives lashes, presumably for eating ever min ha-chai. An anonymous sage protests — do not listen to him — citing an opposite tradition in Rav’s name through Rav Yitzchak bar Shmuel bar Marta: he is not flogged. Two students of Rav thus hold irreconcilable versions of the master’s ruling, and the halachic stakes are lashes for a Torah prohibition.
Key Terms:
- לוֹקֶה = receives thirty-nine lashes for violating a Torah prohibition
- אֵבֶר מִן הַחַי = a limb severed from a living animal, prohibited to eat
Segment 3
TYPE: תירוץ
Rav Yosef resolves the contradiction: death severs the limb, slaughter does not
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב הוּנָא: אֲנַן אַמַּאן נִסְמוֹךְ? אַהְדְּרִינְהוּ רַב יוֹסֵף לְאַפֵּיהּ, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאי קוּשְׁיָא? כִּי אֲמַרִי אֲנָא – בְּמִיתָה, דְּעוֹשָׂה נִיפּוּל; כִּי אֲמַר אִיהוּ – בִּשְׁחִיטָה, דְּאֵינָהּ עוֹשָׂה נִיפּוּל.
English Translation:
Rav Huna said to Rav Yosef: Upon whose version of Rav’s ruling shall we rely? Rav Yosef turned his face away in anger and said to him: What is the difficulty? When I said in Rav’s name that one is flogged for eating a limb that had been hanging from an animal when it died, I was referring to a case of death by means other than slaughter, which renders the limb as though it had already fallen off prior to the animal’s death. When Rav Yitzḥak bar Shmuel bar Marta said in the name of Rav that one is not flogged, he was referring to the case of a slaughter, which does not render the limb as though it had already fallen off prior to the slaughter and therefore serves to render the limb permitted for consumption.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Huna asks the practical question — on which version of Rav do we rely? Rav Yosef, offended that the contradiction was even raised, turns his face away and answers that both reports are true and address different cases. When the animal died without slaughter, the limb is treated as having fallen off during its lifetime — it is ever min ha-chai and one is flogged for it. When the animal was slaughtered, the slaughter does not sever the limb; it is covered by the shechitah and carries no lashes. This is the principle the daf now sets out to source: mitah osah nippul, shechitah einah osah nippul.
Key Terms:
- מִיתָה עוֹשָׂה נִיפּוּל = death (without slaughter) renders a hanging limb as though it fell off while the animal was alive
- שְׁחִיטָה אֵינָהּ עוֹשָׂה נִיפּוּל = slaughter does not render the hanging limb as though it had fallen off
Segment 4
TYPE: דרשה
Rava derives the principle from the extra phrase ‘when they are dead’
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רָבָא: מְנָא הָא מִלְּתָא דַאֲמוּר רַבָּנַן: מִיתָה עוֹשָׂה נִיפּוּל, שְׁחִיטָה אֵינָהּ עוֹשָׂה נִיפּוּל, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְכֹל אֲשֶׁר יִפֹּל עָלָיו מֵהֶם בְּמֹתָם יִטְמָא״, לְמַעוֹטֵי מַאי? אִילֵּימָא לְמַעוֹטֵי בְּחַיֵּיהֶם – מִ״נִּבְלָתָם״ נָפְקָא, אֶלָּא שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: מִיתָה עוֹשָׂה נִיפּוּל, וְאֵין שְׁחִיטָה עוֹשָׂה נִיפּוּל.
English Translation:
§ Rava said: From where is this matter that the Sages stated derived: The death of an animal by means other than slaughter renders a hanging limb as though it had already fallen off prior to the slaughter, whereas the slaughter of the animal does not render a limb as though it had already fallen off? As it is written with regard to the eight species of impure creeping animals: “And anything that these fall upon, when they are dead, it shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:32). What does the term “when they are dead” serve to exclude? If we say it serves to exclude the time when they are alive, that principle is derived from: “And everything upon which any part of their carcass falls shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:35), which explicitly states that only their carcasses impart impurity. Rather, learn from the verse that death renders a hanging limb as though it had already fallen off, and slaughter does not render a hanging limb as though it had already fallen off.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava asks for the scriptural source of the Sages’ rule and finds it in the law of the eight sheratzim: ‘And anything that these fall upon, when they are dead, it shall be impure’ (Vayikra 11:32). The phrase ‘when they are dead’ (b’motam) must exclude something. It cannot come to exclude their lifetime, since that is already known from the word ‘their carcass’ (nivlatam) in verse 35. It must therefore teach that only death makes a hanging limb ‘fall’ — slaughter does not.
Key Terms:
- בְּמֹתָם = ‘when they are dead’ — the seemingly superfluous phrase from which Rava darshens
- לְמַעוֹטֵי = ‘to exclude what?’ — the standard question posed to an apparently redundant term
Segment 5
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Rav Adda bar Ahava: the verse is about creeping animals! Rava: reassign it to beheimah
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה לְרָבָא: וְהָא קְרָא בִּשְׁרָצִים כְּתִיב! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לִשְׁרָצִים, דְּלָאו בְּנֵי שְׁחִיטָה נִינְהוּ – תְּנֵהוּ עִנְיָן לִבְהֵמָה.
English Translation:
Rav Adda bar Ahava said to Rava: But this verse is written with regard to creeping animals, which do not require slaughter. How then can a halakha with regard to slaughter be derived from here? Rava said to him: If, because it is superfluous, this verse is not referring to the matter of creeping animals, which are not subject to the requirement of slaughter, apply it to the matter of an animal, which is subject to slaughter.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Adda bar Ahava objects that the verse Rava expounded is written about sheratzim, creatures to which slaughter does not apply at all — how can it teach a law about slaughter? Rava answers with the classic hermeneutic move: im eino inyan — since the teaching is superfluous in its own context (sheratzim have no shechitah), transfer it to the context where it is meaningful, the domesticated animal, which is subject to slaughter.
Key Terms:
- אִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לְ… תְּנֵהוּ עִנְיָן לְ… = ‘if it is not needed for this matter, apply it to that matter’ — reassigning a superfluous teaching to another context
- שְׁרָצִים = the eight species of creeping animals whose carcasses impart ritual impurity (Vayikra 11:29-30)
Segment 6
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
But the phrase is needed for moist-versus-dry! Answer: it is written twice
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאַכַּתִּי מִבְּעֵי לֵיהּ, כְּעֵין מִיתָה: לַחִין – מְטַמְּאִים, יְבֵשִׁים – אֵין מְטַמְּאִים! תְּרֵי ״בְּמֹתָם״ כְּתִיבִי.
English Translation:
The Gemara objects: But the phrase “when they are dead, it shall be impure” is still necessary to teach a different halakha, i.e., that they impart impurity only when they are still in a state similar to their state at the time of their death, i.e., if they are moist they impart impurity, whereas if they are dry they do not impart impurity. The Gemara explains that “when they are dead” is written twice, once in the verse cited, and once in the previous verse, which states: “Whoever touches them when they are dead shall be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 11:31).
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara objects that ‘when they are dead’ carries a different, established teaching: sheratzim impart impurity only when in a state resembling their death — moist they defile, dried out they do not. If so, the phrase is not free for Rava’s derivation. The answer: b’motam is written twice — in verse 31 and again in verse 32 — one occurrence for the moist/dry rule, the other free to teach that death, and not slaughter, severs the hanging limb.
Key Terms:
- כְּעֵין מִיתָה = in a state resembling their death — the requirement that a sheretz be moist to impart impurity
- לַחִין מְטַמְּאִים יְבֵשִׁים אֵין מְטַמְּאִים = moist carcasses defile, dry ones do not
Segment 7
TYPE: מחלוקת אמוראים
Rav Chisda and Rabbah dispute the scope of the mishna’s machloket
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: מַחְלוֹקֶת בְּאֵבֶר דְּעוּבָּר חַי, אֲבָל בְּאֵבֶר דְּעוּבָּר מֵת – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל שְׁחִיטָה עוֹשָׂה נִיפּוּל. וְרַבָּה אָמַר: כְּמַחְלוֹקֶת בָּזֶה כָּךְ מַחְלוֹקֶת בָּזֶה.
English Translation:
§ The Gemara returns to the dispute in the mishna (72a) with regard to a fetus that extended its foreleg and then its mother was slaughtered. Rabbi Meir holds that the foreleg is regarded as a carcass with the associated impurity, while the Rabbis hold that although it is not permitted for consumption, the slaughter prevents it from having the impurity of a carcass. With regard to this dispute, Rav Ḥisda said: The dispute concerns only the limb of a fetus that was alive when the mother was slaughtered; but concerning the case of the limb of a fetus that was dead when the mother was slaughtered, everyone agrees that slaughter renders the fetus’s limb as though it had already fallen off prior to the slaughter, and it imparts impurity as a limb from a living animal. But Rabba said: Just as there is a dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis concerning this case, where the fetus was alive, so too, there is a dispute between them concerning that case, where the fetus had died.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara returns to the mishna (72a) about a fetus that stuck out its foreleg before its mother was slaughtered, where Rabbi Meir treats the protruding limb as a carcass and the Rabbis do not. Rav Chisda limits the dispute to the limb of a fetus that was alive at the mother’s slaughter; if the fetus had died in the womb, all agree that slaughter ‘makes the limb fall,’ and it defiles as a limb from a living animal. Rabbah disagrees: the machloket applies equally whether the fetus was alive or dead.
Key Terms:
- אֵבֶר דְּעוּבָּר = the limb of a fetus that protruded from the womb before slaughter
- כְּמַחְלוֹקֶת בָּזֶה כָּךְ מַחְלוֹקֶת בָּזֶה = just as they dispute this case, so they dispute that case
Segment 8
TYPE: קושיא מברייתא
A baraita cites the eight-month fetus against the mishna’s stated rationale
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בֶּן שְׁמֹנֶה חַי. וְהָתַנְיָא: בֶּן שְׁמֹנֶה חַי יוֹכִיחַ, שֶׁאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁיֵּשׁ בְּמִינוֹ שְׁחִיטָה – אֵין שְׁחִיטָתוֹ מְטַהַרְתּוֹ.
English Translation:
§ The mishna states that an eight-month-old fetus that was born alive is not rendered ritually pure by slaughtering it. The reason given is that the concept of permitting an animal through slaughter is never stated with regard to that kind of animal. The Gemara challenges: But isn’t it taught in a baraita in a discussion about whether slaughter renders a tereifa pure from the impurity of a carcass: An eight-month-old fetus that was born alive will prove the point, as even though there are other animals of that kind that are permitted through slaughter, its slaughter does not render it pure from having the impurity of a carcass. This refutes the claim that the issue of slaughter rendering an animal pure from having the impurity of a carcass is a function of whether or not the concept of slaughter applies to that kind of animal.
קלאוד על הדף:
The mishna had ruled that a live eight-month fetus is not purified by its own slaughter because ‘its kind has no slaughter.’ The Gemara now quotes a baraita that deploys the very same case in the opposite direction: the live eight-month fetus ‘will prove’ that purity through slaughter is not a function of the species — for its kind does have slaughter, and yet its own slaughter does not purify it. The baraita and the mishna thus appear to contradict each other over whether an eight-month fetus counts as a species subject to slaughter.
Key Terms:
- בֶּן שְׁמֹנֶה = an eight-month fetus — premature and considered nonviable in the Gemara’s framework
- יוֹכִיחַ = ‘will prove’ — a counterexample used to break a proposed logical link
Segment 9
TYPE: תירוץ
Rav Kahana: the tannaim differ over whether slaughter ‘via its mother’ counts
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא: יֵשׁ בְּמִינוֹ שְׁחִיטָה אַגַּב אִמּוֹ, וְתַנָּא דִּידַן מִינָא דְּאִמֵּיהּ לָא פָּרֵיךְ.
English Translation:
Rav Kahana said: The tanna of the baraita holds that even with regard to an eight-month-old fetus it can be said that there are animals of that kind that are permitted through slaughter, i.e., when they are still inside the womb and the mother is slaughtered; such an animal is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of its mother. Therefore, he cites the case of an eight-month-old fetus as a refutation. But the tanna of our mishna holds that the fact that this kind of animal is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of its mother does not define it as a kind of animal concerning which there is a concept of slaughter, and therefore he holds that this case cannot be used as a refutation.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Kahana dissolves the contradiction: the baraita’s tanna reckons the eight-month fetus a species subject to slaughter because such a fetus can be permitted through the slaughter of its mother while in the womb — yesh b’mino shechitah agav imo. Our mishna’s tanna, however, does not consider the mother’s slaughter to define the fetus’s own kind, and therefore denies that the case can serve as a refutation. The dispute is thus about the very definition of ‘a kind subject to slaughter.’
Key Terms:
- אַגַּב אִמּוֹ = ‘by virtue of its mother’ — permitted through the mother’s slaughter
- מִינָא דְּאִמֵּיהּ לָא פָּרֵיךְ = the tanna does not refute from the mother’s kind
Segment 10
TYPE: דרשה
The source that slaughtering a tereifa blocks carcass impurity: ‘some of the animal’
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּלְהַאי תַּנָּא דְּפָרֵיךְ, טְרֵפָה דִּשְׁחִיטָתָהּ מְטַהַרְתָּהּ מְנָא לֵיהּ? נָפְקָא לֵיהּ מִדְּרַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב, דְּאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ בְּמַתְנִיתָא תָּנָא: אָמַר קְרָא ״וְכִי יָמוּת מִן הַבְּהֵמָה״, מִקְצָת בְּהֵמָה מְטַמְּאָה וּמִקְצָת בְּהֵמָה אֵינָהּ מְטַמְּאָה, וְאֵיזוֹ זוֹ? זוֹ טְרֵפָה שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: And according to that tanna of the baraita, who does use it as a refutation, from where does he derive that the slaughter of a tereifa renders it pure from having the impurity of a carcass? The Gemara answers that he derives it from that which Rav Yehuda says that Rav says, as Rav Yehuda says that Rav says, and some say it was taught in a baraita: The verse states: “And if some domesticated animal, of which you may eat, dies, one who touches its carcass shall be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 11:39). The word “some” teaches that only some dead animals impart impurity as a carcass, but some dead animals do not impart impurity as a carcass. And what is it that does not impart impurity? That is a tereifa that one slaughtered.
קלאוד על הדף:
If the baraita’s tanna uses the eight-month fetus as a refutation, he cannot derive the purity of a slaughtered tereifa from species-logic — so what is his source? The Gemara answers with Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav (some cite it as a baraita): the verse ‘And if some of the animal dies’ (Vayikra 11:39) implies that only part of the category of dead animals imparts carcass impurity — some do and some do not. Which dead animal does not defile? A tereifa that was properly slaughtered: the shechitah, though it cannot permit the meat, suffices to block the impurity of a carcass.
Key Terms:
- מִקְצָת בְּהֵמָה = ‘some of the animal’ — the partitive reading of min ha-beheimah
- טְרֵפָה שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ = a mortally defective animal that was slaughtered — forbidden to eat but free of carcass impurity
Segment 11
TYPE: בעיא
Rav Hoshaya’s dilemma: slaughtering a live nine-month fetus inside the womb
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בָּעֵי רַב הוֹשַׁעְיָא: הוֹשִׁיט אֶת יָדוֹ לִמְעֵי בְּהֵמָה, וְשָׁחַט בֶּן תִּשְׁעָה חַי, מַהוּ? תִּבְּעֵי לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר, וְתִבְּעֵי לְרַבָּנַן.
English Translation:
§ Rav Hoshaya raises a dilemma: If one inserted his hand inside the womb of an animal and slaughtered a nine-month-old fetus that was alive, what is the halakha? Does the slaughter performed inside the mother render the fetus permitted? The Gemara notes: This dilemma may be raised according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and it may be raised according to the opinion of the Rabbis.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Hoshaya poses a startling question: if one inserted his hand into the womb of a living animal and slaughtered the live, full-term fetus inside — does that slaughter permit it? The Gemara notes that the dilemma has purchase according to both sides of the mishna’s machloket: it can be raised according to Rabbi Meir and according to the Rabbis, as the next two segments spell out.
Key Terms:
- בָּעֵי = raises a dilemma — poses an unresolved halachic question
- בֶּן תִּשְׁעָה חַי = a live nine-month (full-term) fetus
Segment 12
TYPE: צדדי הבעיא
The dilemma per Rabbi Meir: perhaps slaughter works only outside the womb
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תִּבְּעֵי לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר: עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר בֶּן פְּקוּעָה טָעוּן שְׁחִיטָה – הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּיָצָא לַאֲוִיר הָעוֹלָם, אֲבָל בִּמְעֵי אִמּוֹ – לָא שָׁרְיָא לֵיהּ שְׁחִיטָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara elaborates: It may be raised according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir. It is possible that Rabbi Meir states in the mishna below that a nine-month-old ben pekua requires slaughter, and slaughter renders the animal permitted only in that case, because that statement may apply only in a case where the animal emerged into the airspace of the world, i.e., once it was born alive. But if it is still inside its mother, its slaughter does not render it permitted.
קלאוד על הדף:
According to Rabbi Meir, who holds that a nine-month ben pekua requires its own slaughter, one might think in-utero slaughter certainly works. But perhaps not: Rabbi Meir may require and validate slaughter only once the animal has emerged into the airspace of the world; while still inside its mother, its own slaughter may accomplish nothing at all.
Key Terms:
- בֶּן פְּקוּעָה = a fetus found alive inside its slaughtered mother — permitted, per the Rabbis, by her slaughter
- אֲוִיר הָעוֹלָם = the airspace of the world — halachic birth, emergence from the womb
Segment 13
TYPE: צדדי הבעיא
Or per the Rabbis: perhaps the Torah validated all four simanim
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אוֹ דִילְמָא, אֲפִילּוּ לְרַבָּנַן, אַרְבָּעָה סִימָנִין אַכְשַׁר בֵּיהּ רַחֲמָנָא.
English Translation:
Or perhaps even the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Meir and maintain that a nine-month-old ben pekua is permitted by virtue of its mother’s slaughter, would concede that the slaughter of the fetus itself also permits it. Perhaps with regard to such an animal the Merciful One considers four simanim, i.e., the windpipe and the gullet of the mother and the windpipe and the gullet of the fetus, to be fit for slaughter, and the fetus is permitted by the cutting of either pair.
קלאוד על הדף:
From the other direction: even the Rabbis, who hold the mother’s slaughter permits the fetus, might concede that the fetus’s own slaughter in the womb also works. Perhaps the Torah rendered four simanim fit for this animal — the mother’s windpipe and gullet and the fetus’s own — so that cutting either pair permits the fetus. The dilemma is thus live on both views.
Key Terms:
- סִימָנִים = the windpipe (kaneh) and gullet (veshet), the organs cut in shechitah
- אַרְבָּעָה סִימָנִין אַכְשַׁר בֵּיהּ רַחֲמָנָא = ‘the Merciful One validated four simanim for it’ — either the mother’s or the fetus’s pair suffices
Segment 14
TYPE: פשיטות
Rav Chananya attempts a proof from the animal ‘born a tereifa from the womb’
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב חֲנַנְיָא, תָּא שְׁמַע: הֲרֵי שֶׁנּוֹלְדָה טְרֵפָה מִן הַבֶּטֶן, וְאִי אִיתָא, מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ דְּהָיְתָה לָהּ שְׁעַת הַכּוֹשֶׁר, דְּאִי בָּעֵי עַיֵּיל יְדֵיהּ וְשַׁחֲטַהּ!
English Translation:
Rav Ḥananya said: Come and hear a resolution of this dilemma from the mishna (72b), as it considers an animal that was born as a tereifa from the womb as one that never had a period of potential fitness. But if it is so, that one can slaughter a fetus in its mother’s womb, you find that actually it did have a period of potential fitness, as if one wants to, he can insert his hand into the womb and slaughter it before it develops into a tereifa.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Chananya offers a resolution from the earlier mishna, which treats an animal born a tereifa from the womb as one that never had a moment of fitness. If in-utero slaughter were effective, such an animal did have a period of potential fitness — one could have reached in and slaughtered it before it developed its defect. The mishna’s assumption that no such moment existed suggests that slaughtering a fetus inside the womb accomplishes nothing.
Key Terms:
- תָּא שְׁמַע = ‘come and hear’ — introducing a proposed proof from a tannaitic source
- שְׁעַת הַכּוֹשֶׁר = a period of potential fitness — a moment when the animal could have been permitted
Segment 15
TYPE: דחייה
Rava deflects: read ‘formed as a tereifa’ — a five-legged fetus
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: תָּנֵי שֶׁנּוֹצְרָה טְרֵפָה מִן הַבֶּטֶן, וּמַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ בְּבַעֲלַת חָמֵשׁ רַגְלַיִם.
English Translation:
Rava said to Rav Ḥananya: Teach that mishna as referring to a case where the fetus was formed as a tereifa from its outset while inside the womb, and you find such a case where a fetus has five legs, which certainly developed from the outset. Consequently, there was never a possibility of slaughtering it.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava rejects the proof by emending the reading: teach not ‘born a tereifa from the womb’ but ‘formed a tereifa from the womb’ — an animal whose defect was part of its formation from the outset, such as a fetus with five legs. For such an animal no moment of fitness ever existed, even granting that in-utero slaughter works. The proof collapses, and Rav Hoshaya’s dilemma remains unresolved.
Key Terms:
- שֶׁנּוֹצְרָה טְרֵפָה = formed as a tereifa — defective from its very formation
- בַּעֲלַת חָמֵשׁ רַגְלַיִם = a five-legged animal — a congenital defect that renders it a tereifa from formation
Segment 16
TYPE: משנה
The mishna: a fetus found in a slaughtered animal is permitted by her slaughter
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְנִי׳ הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַבְּהֵמָה, וּמָצָא בָּהּ בֶּן שְׁמֹנֶה חַי אוֹ מֵת, אוֹ בֶּן תִּשְׁעָה מֵת – קוֹרְעוֹ וּמוֹצִיא אֶת דָּמוֹ.
English Translation:
MISHNA: In the case of one who slaughtered an animal and found within it an eight-month-old fetus, i.e., one that was not full term, whether it was alive or dead, or a nine-month-old fetus, i.e., one that was full term, that was dead, that fetus is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of its mother, as it is considered part of its mother. Therefore, its blood is considered part of its mother’s blood and is prohibited, so one must tear the fetus and remove its blood before it may be consumed.
קלאוד על הדף:
A new mishna states the foundational rule of ben pekua: one who slaughters an animal and finds inside it an eight-month fetus — alive or dead — or a dead nine-month fetus, the fetus is permitted by the mother’s slaughter, for it is considered part of her body. Its blood, however, is treated like the mother’s blood and remains forbidden; therefore one tears the fetus open and removes its blood before eating it.
Key Terms:
- קוֹרְעוֹ וּמוֹצִיא אֶת דָּמוֹ = one tears it open and removes its blood — the fetus is permitted but its blood is not
- עוּבָּר יֶרֶךְ אִמּוֹ = the underlying concept that a fetus is considered a limb of its mother
Segment 17
TYPE: משנה
The machloket: a live nine-month fetus — independent animal or part of the mother?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מָצָא בֶּן תִּשְׁעָה חַי – טָעוּן שְׁחִיטָה, וְחַיָּיב בְּ״אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ״, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: שְׁחִיטַת אִמּוֹ מְטַהַרְתּוֹ.
English Translation:
If he found within it a live nine-month-old fetus, it requires its own slaughter, as it is considered an independent full-fledged animal, and if one slaughters both the mother and fetus on the same day, one is liable for violating the prohibition against slaughtering an animal itself and its offspring on the same day; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Even when the fetus is nine months old, it is still considered part of its mother, and the slaughter of its mother renders it permitted for consumption.
קלאוד על הדף:
The mishna continues with the case that drives the rest of the daf: if he found a live nine-month fetus inside, Rabbi Meir says it requires its own slaughter, for it is a full-fledged independent animal — and consequently one who slaughters mother and fetus on the same day violates oto v’et beno. The Rabbis say the mother’s slaughter renders even a full-term live fetus permitted: it remains part of her body until born. The entire second half of the daf explores the boundaries of this dispute.
Key Terms:
- אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ = the prohibition against slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day (Vayikra 22:28)
- שְׁחִיטַת אִמּוֹ מְטַהַרְתּוֹ = its mother’s slaughter renders it permitted
Amud Bet (74b)
Segment 1
TYPE: משנה (המשך)
Rabbi Shimon Shezuri: even five years old and plowing; and the agreed case of a torn mother
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן שֵׁזוּרִי אוֹמֵר: אֲפִילּוּ בֶּן חָמֵשׁ שָׁנִים וְחוֹרֵשׁ בַּשָּׂדֶה – שְׁחִיטַת אִמּוֹ מְטַהַרְתּוֹ. קְרָעָהּ וּמָצָא בָּהּ בֶּן תִּשְׁעָה חַי – טָעוּן שְׁחִיטָה, לְפִי שֶׁלֹּא נִשְׁחֲטָה אִמּוֹ.
English Translation:
Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: Even if the fetus emerged alive and is now five years old and plowing in the field, the earlier slaughter of its mother rendered it permitted and it does not require slaughter before it is eaten. But if one tore an animal, i.e., he killed it without slaughtering it, and inside he found a live nine-month-old fetus, everyone agrees that the fetus requires its own slaughter because its mother was not slaughtered.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Shimon Shezuri extends the Rabbis’ principle to its logical extreme: once the mother was slaughtered with the fetus inside, the fetus never requires slaughter — even if it emerged, grew up, and is now five years old and plowing the field, the slaughter performed years ago on its mother covers it. The mishna closes with a case all agree on: if the mother was torn — killed without valid slaughter — a live nine-month fetus found inside requires its own slaughter, since no shechitah was ever performed on its mother.
Key Terms:
- בֶּן חָמֵשׁ שָׁנִים וְחוֹרֵשׁ בַּשָּׂדֶה = five years old and plowing the field — a fully grown, working ben pekua
- קְרָעָהּ = he tore it — killed the mother without valid slaughter
Segment 2
TYPE: מימרא
Rabbi Oshaya limits the machloket to slaughter; the Gemara probes what that excludes
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אָמַר רַבִּי אוֹשַׁעְיָא: לֹא הִילְּכוּ בּוֹ אֶלָּא עַל עִסְקֵי שְׁחִיטָה בִּלְבַד. לְמַעוֹטֵי מַאי? לְמַעוֹטֵי חֶלְבּוֹ וְגִידוֹ.
English Translation:
GEMARA: Rabbi Elazar says that Rabbi Oshaya says: The Sages discussed the permissibility of a live nine-month-old fetus found inside a slaughtered animal only with regard to the matter of whether it requires its own slaughter. The Gemara asks: What does Rav Oshaya’s statement serve to exclude? Rav Oshaya’s statement indicates that with regard to other matters all agree that it is considered an independent animal, with the associated prohibitions. The Gemara suggests: It serves to exclude its fat, i.e., the fats that are prohibited in a regular animal, such as the fat of the kidneys and innards, and its sciatic nerve.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Elazar reports in the name of Rabbi Oshaya that the tannaim of the mishna disputed the live nine-month fetus ‘only with regard to matters of slaughter.’ The Gemara immediately asks what this formulation excludes — on what point do Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis agree that the fetus is an independent animal? Its first suggestion: the forbidden fat (chelev) and the sciatic nerve — that in these all agree the ben pekua is treated like any ordinary animal.
Key Terms:
- לֹא הִילְּכוּ בּוֹ אֶלָּא = ‘they debated it only with regard to’ — a limiting formulation
- חֶלְבּוֹ וְגִידוֹ = its forbidden fat and its sciatic nerve
Segment 3
TYPE: קושיא
The fat of the fetus cannot be the agreed point — it is itself disputed
Hebrew/Aramaic:
חֶלְבּוֹ דְּמַאי? אִילֵּימָא: חֶלְבּוֹ דִּשְׁלִיל, מִפְלָג פְּלִיגִי! דְּתַנְיָא: גִּיד הַנָּשֶׁה נוֹהֵג בַּשְּׁלִיל וְחֶלְבּוֹ אָסוּר, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אֵינוֹ נוֹהֵג בַּשְּׁלִיל וְחֶלְבּוֹ מוּתָּר. וְאָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אָמַר רַבִּי אוֹשַׁעְיָא: מַחְלוֹקֶת בְּבֶן תִּשְׁעָה חַי, וְהָלַךְ רַבִּי מֵאִיר לְשִׁיטָתוֹ, וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה לְשִׁיטָתוֹ.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: The fat of which part? If we say that this is referring to the fat of the fetus, that is difficult because the Sages disagree as to whether or not it is permitted, as it is taught in a baraita: The prohibition of the sciatic nerve applies to a fetus and its fat is prohibited; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: The prohibition of the sciatic nerve does not apply to a fetus, and its fat is permitted. And Rabbi Elazar says that Rabbi Oshaya says: This dispute concerns a live nine-month-old fetus, and Rabbi Meir follows his standard line of reasoning, which he expressed in the mishna, that such a fetus is considered an independent full-fledged animal; and Rabbi Yehuda follows his standard line of reasoning, as expressed by the Rabbis in the mishna, that such a fetus is considered a part of the mother.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara tests the suggestion: the fat of which part? If the fetus’s own forbidden fat, that is explicitly disputed in a baraita: Rabbi Meir holds the gid ha-nasheh prohibition applies to a fetus and its chelev is forbidden; Rabbi Yehuda holds the gid does not apply to a fetus and its chelev is permitted. And Rabbi Elazar in the name of Rabbi Oshaya himself aligned that baraita with our mishna — Rabbi Meir following his view that the fetus is an independent animal, Rabbi Yehuda following the Rabbis’ view that it is part of its mother. So the fat cannot be a point of agreement.
Key Terms:
- שְׁלִיל = a fetus in the womb
- הָלַךְ לְשִׁיטָתוֹ = follows his own established line of reasoning
Segment 4
TYPE: דחייה
Nor can it be the fat of the sciatic nerve — that too is disputed
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא, חֶלְבּוֹ דְּגִיד מִפְלָג פְּלִיגִי, דְּתַנְיָא: גִּיד הַנָּשֶׁה – מְחַטֵּט אַחֲרָיו בְּכׇל מָקוֹם שֶׁהוּא, וְחוֹתֵךְ שַׁמְנוֹ מֵעִיקָּרוֹ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: גּוֹמְמוֹ עִם הַשּׁוֹפִי.
English Translation:
Rather, say that Rabbi Elazar is referring to the fat of the sciatic nerve of the fetus, which all agree is permitted. The Gemara rejects this as well: But the Sages also disagree with regard to that, as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to the sciatic nerve, one scrapes around it to remove it entirely in any place that it is found in the thigh, and one cuts out its fat completely, even those fats that are sunk into the flesh; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: One cuts out the nerve and the fat that is level with the flesh of the thigh, but there is no obligation to remove all traces of the fat.
קלאוד על הדף:
Perhaps, then, the agreed point is the fat of the gid ha-nasheh itself, which is ordinarily permitted by Torah law? The Gemara rejects this as well: that fat is also subject to a tannaitic dispute. Rabbi Meir requires one to dig after the sciatic nerve wherever it runs and to cut out its fat down to the root; Rabbi Yehuda requires only trimming it level with the surface of the flesh. Since both candidate ‘agreements’ are in fact disputes, Rabbi Oshaya’s statement must be reformulated.
Key Terms:
- מְחַטֵּט אַחֲרָיו = scrapes and digs after it — removing every trace of the nerve
- גּוֹמְמוֹ עִם הַשּׁוֹפִי = cuts it level with the surface of the flesh, without excavating
Segment 5
TYPE: מסקנא
The corrected version: the dispute concerns eating; all agree on rove’a and choresh
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא אִי אִתְּמַר – הָכִי אִתְּמַר, אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אָמַר רַבִּי אוֹשַׁעְיָא: לֹא הִילְּכוּ בּוֹ אֶלָּא עַל עִסְקֵי אֲכִילָה בִּלְבַד, לְמַעוֹטֵי רוֹבְעוֹ, וְחוֹרֵשׁ בּוֹ.
English Translation:
Rather, if Rabbi Oshaya’s statement was stated, it was stated like this: Rabbi Elazar says that Rabbi Oshaya says: The Sages discussed the permissibility of the fetus only with regard to matters of consumption, i.e., whether or not it must be slaughtered in order to permit its flesh and whether or not the fat and the sciatic nerve are permitted. This statement serves to exclude only one who copulates with the animal, or one who plows with it together with an animal of a different species, as everyone agrees that these prohibitions apply to such a fetus just as they do to any other animal.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara restates the tradition: Rabbi Elazar said in the name of Rabbi Oshaya that the tannaim debated the ben pekua only with regard to matters of consumption — whether slaughter is needed and whether the fat and gid are forbidden. What stands outside the dispute are the non-dietary prohibitions: one who copulates with the animal and one who plows with it together with another species violate those prohibitions according to all opinions, for in every respect other than eating the ben pekua is an ordinary living animal.
Key Terms:
- עִסְקֵי אֲכִילָה = matters of consumption
- רוֹבְעוֹ וְחוֹרֵשׁ בּוֹ = bestiality with it, and plowing with it in a forbidden mixture (kilayim) — prohibitions that apply to it per all opinions
Segment 6
TYPE: מחלוקת אמוראים
Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan dispute whether the blood follows the fat
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ: לְדִבְרֵי הַמַּתִּיר בְּחֶלְבּוֹ – מַתִּיר בְּדָמוֹ, לְדִבְרֵי הָאוֹסֵר בְּחֶלְבּוֹ – אוֹסֵר בְּדָמוֹ. וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אַף לְדִבְרֵי הַמַּתִּיר בְּחֶלְבּוֹ – אוֹסֵר בְּדָמוֹ.
English Translation:
§ A related amoraic dispute is cited concerning a live nine-month-old fetus found inside a slaughtered animal: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: According to the statement of Rabbi Yehuda, who permits the fat, he also permits its blood; according to the statement of Rabbi Meir, who prohibits its fat, he also prohibits its blood. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even according to Rabbi Yehuda, who permits its fat, he prohibits its blood.
קלאוד על הדף:
Reish Lakish links the fetus’s blood to its fat: Rabbi Yehuda, who permits the ben pekua’s chelev, permits its blood as well; Rabbi Meir, who forbids the chelev, forbids the blood. Rabbi Yochanan severs the link: even Rabbi Yehuda, who permits the fat, concedes that the blood is forbidden. Blood, on this view, is anomalous — the mother’s slaughter cannot permit it even if the fetus is ‘part of its mother.’
Key Terms:
- לְדִבְרֵי הַמַּתִּיר = according to the opinion of the one who permits
- דָּמוֹ = its blood — the fluid the mishna already required removing
Segment 7
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Rabbi Yochanan objects from the mishna; Rabbi Zeira reduces the dispute to karet
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ: קוֹרְעוֹ וּמוֹצִיא אֶת דָּמוֹ. אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: לוֹמַר שֶׁאֵין עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת.
English Translation:
Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish from the mishna, which states with regard to an eight-month-old fetus, whether alive or dead, or a dead nine-month-old fetus, found inside a slaughtered animal, that since it is considered part of the mother its blood is prohibited. Therefore, one must tear the fetus and remove its blood before it may be consumed. The mishna prohibits the blood but apparently permits the rest of the fetus, including its fat, which contradicts the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish. In resolution of this difficulty, Rabbi Zeira said: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish meant to say only that the consumption of blood lost as the fetus died is not punishable by excision from the World-to-Come [karet], whereas Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that it is.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yochanan turns the mishna against Reish Lakish: ‘he tears it open and removes its blood’ — the mishna forbids the fetus’s blood while permitting the rest, including, apparently, its fat, which contradicts the symmetry Reish Lakish proposed. Rabbi Zeira rescues the position by narrowing it: Reish Lakish never claimed the blood is wholly permitted, only that eating it does not carry karet, whereas Rabbi Yochanan holds it does. The dispute is over the severity, not the existence, of the prohibition.
Key Terms:
- כָּרֵת = excision — the severe divine punishment attached to eating blood
- אֵין עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת = not punishable by karet — forbidden, but at a lower level of severity
Segment 8
TYPE: קושיא
But per Rabbi Yehuda, even blood of exudate carries karet!
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לְמַאן קָאָמְרִי? לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, לֹא יְהֵא אֶלָּא דַּם הַתַּמְצִית, דְּתַנְיָא: דַּם הַתַּמְצִית בְּאַזְהָרָה, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בְּהִכָּרֵת.
English Translation:
The Gemara clarifies: According to whom did Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish state that one who permits the fat of the fetus also holds that the consumption of its blood is not punishable by karet? Ostensibly, it is according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who permits its fat. But that is difficult, because this blood should be regarded only as blood of exudate, i.e., blood that exudes from the neck of the animal after the initial spurt of its slaughter concludes. This blood did not spurt out during the slaughter of the mother. Rabbi Yehuda holds that consumption of even this blood is punishable by karet, as it is taught in a baraita: The consumption of blood of exudate is prohibited by a regular prohibition and is punishable with lashes, unlike the initial spurt of blood, known as blood of the soul, whose consumption is punishable by karet. Rabbi Yehuda says: Blood of exudate is also punishable by karet.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara probes Rabbi Zeira’s reformulation: according to whom does Reish Lakish deny karet? Presumably according to Rabbi Yehuda, who permits the fat. But that is difficult: the fetus’s blood, which never spurted at slaughter, should be no worse than dam ha-tamtzit — the blood that oozes after the initial spurt — and a baraita teaches that while the first tanna holds dam ha-tamtzit is a plain prohibition, Rabbi Yehuda holds it carries karet. How, then, can Reish Lakish say that per Rabbi Yehuda the fetus’s blood escapes karet?
Key Terms:
- דַּם הַתַּמְצִית = blood of exudate — blood that drains after the initial spurt of slaughter
- דַּם הַנֶּפֶשׁ = the lifeblood — the spurting blood with which the soul departs, whose consumption carries karet
Segment 9
TYPE: תירוץ
Rav Yosef son of Rav Salla: karet for exudate exists only where there is karet for lifeblood
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תַּרְגְּמָא רַב יוֹסֵף בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב סַלָּא חֲסִידָא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב פָּפָּא: אִית לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה ״דָּם״ וְ״כׇל דָּם״, כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּמִיחַיַּיב אַדַּם הַנֶּפֶשׁ – מִיחַיַּיב אַדַּם הַתַּמְצִית, וְכֹל הֵיכָא דְּלָא מִחַיַּיב אַדַּם הַנֶּפֶשׁ – לָא מִחַיַּיב אַדַּם הַתַּמְצִית.
English Translation:
Rav Yosef, son of Rav Salla the Pious, interpreted this matter before Rav Pappa: One of the verses prohibiting the consumption of blood states: “And whoever…eats any blood, and I will set My face against that soul that eats the blood, and will cut him off from among his people” (Leviticus 17:10). Rabbi Yehuda holds that since it would have been sufficient for the verse to state: Blood, but instead it states: “Any blood,” it is interpreted as teaching that wherever one is liable for karet for the consumption of blood of the soul, i.e., the initial spurt from the slaughter, as is the halakha with regard to a regular animal, one is also liable for karet for the consumption of blood of exudate, i.e., the rest of the blood. But wherever one is not liable for karet for the consumption of blood of the soul, as is the halakha with regard to the blood of a fetus according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that the fetus is not considered an independent life, one is also not liable for karet for the consumption of blood of exudate; rather, its blood is subject to a regular prohibition.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Yosef son of Rav Salla the Pious, before Rav Pappa, explains Rabbi Yehuda’s own hermeneutic: the Torah could have written ‘blood’ but wrote ‘any blood’ (Vayikra 17:10). Rabbi Yehuda derives from this that karet for blood of exudate tracks karet for lifeblood: wherever eating the dam ha-nefesh carries karet — as in an ordinary animal — the exudate carries karet too; but where the lifeblood itself carries no karet — as with the fetus, which per Rabbi Yehuda is not an independent life — the exudate carries none either, and the fetus’s blood remains a plain prohibition. Reish Lakish’s position per Rabbi Yehuda is thus internally coherent.
Key Terms:
- דָּם וְכׇל דָּם = ‘blood’ versus ‘any blood’ — the textual amplification Rabbi Yehuda expounds
- אַזְהָרָה = a plain negative prohibition, punishable by lashes rather than karet
Segment 10
TYPE: בעיא
May one redeem a firstborn donkey with a ben pekua? Per Rabbi Meir it is obvious
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: מַהוּ לִפְדּוֹת בְּבֶן פְּקוּעָה? אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר לָא תִּיבְּעֵי לָךְ, דְּכֵיוָן דְּאָמַר טָעוּן שְׁחִיטָה – שֶׂה מְעַלְּיָא הוּא.
English Translation:
§ A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the halakha with regard to redeeming a firstborn donkey with a ben pekua? Can one perform the mitzva, as stated in the Torah: “And every firstborn of a donkey you shall redeem with a lamb” (Exodus 13:13), with this animal? The Gemara elaborates: According to the opinion of Rabbi Meir do not raise the dilemma, as, since he says a ben pekua requires slaughter, evidently it is a full-fledged lamb, and therefore it can certainly be used to redeem a donkey.
קלאוד על הדף:
A new dilemma: the Torah commands ‘and every firstborn of a donkey you shall redeem with a lamb’ (Shemot 13:13) — may one use a ben pekua as that lamb? According to Rabbi Meir the question does not arise: since he holds a ben pekua requires its own slaughter, it is a full-fledged lamb (seh me’alya) and certainly valid for the redemption.
Key Terms:
- פֶּטֶר חֲמוֹר = a firstborn donkey, which must be redeemed with a lamb or have its neck broken
- שֶׂה מְעַלְּיָא = a proper, full-fledged lamb
Segment 11
TYPE: צדדי הבעיא
Per the Rabbis: is it ‘meat in a basket,’ or does a running animal count as a lamb?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כִּי תִּיבְּעֵי לָךְ אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבָּנַן, דְּאָמְרִי: שְׁחִיטַת אִמּוֹ מְטַהַרְתּוֹ, מַאי? כֵּיוָן דְּאָמְרִי שְׁחִיטַת אִמּוֹ מְטַהַרְתּוֹ – כְּבִשְׂרָא בְּדִיקּוּלָא הוּא, אוֹ דִילְמָא, כֵּיוָן דְּרָהֵיט וְאָזֵיל וְרָהֵיט וְאָתֵי – ״שֶׂה״ קָרֵינָא בֵּיהּ?
English Translation:
When should you raise the dilemma? Raise it according to the opinion of the Rabbis, as they say that the slaughter of its mother renders it permitted. What is the halakha in this case? Does one say that since the Rabbis say that the slaughter of its mother renders it permitted, it is apparent that despite being physically alive, a ben pekua is halakhically regarded like meat placed in a pot, which cannot be used to redeem a donkey (see Bekhorot 12a)? Or perhaps, since the animal is running back and forth, i.e., it is alive, we call it a lamb and it can be used?
קלאוד על הדף:
The dilemma is live according to the Rabbis, who hold the mother’s slaughter already permitted the ben pekua. On one hand, halachically the animal may be regarded as already slaughtered — ‘like meat sitting in a basket’ — and a basket of meat cannot redeem a donkey. On the other hand, the creature runs back and forth: it is visibly, physically alive, and perhaps whatever runs is called a ‘seh.’ The question is whether halachic status or physical reality fixes the animal’s name.
Key Terms:
- כְּבִשְׂרָא בְּדִיקּוּלָא = ‘like meat in a basket’ — halachically already slaughtered meat despite being alive
- רָהֵיט וְאָזֵיל וְרָהֵיט וְאָתֵי = it runs back and forth — visibly alive
Segment 12
TYPE: מחלוקת אמוראים
Mar Zutra: one cannot redeem with it; Rav Ashi: one can
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מָר זוּטְרָא אָמַר: אֵין פּוֹדִין, וְרַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: פּוֹדִין.
English Translation:
Mar Zutra said: One cannot redeem a donkey with this lamb, and Rav Ashi said: One can redeem it.
קלאוד על הדף:
The dilemma resolves into an amoraic dispute: Mar Zutra rules that a ben pekua cannot serve to redeem a firstborn donkey — the halachic ‘meat in a basket’ characterization prevails. Rav Ashi rules that it can — the living, running animal is a lamb in every colloquial and scriptural sense. The next segments record their debate over sources.
Key Terms:
- אֵין פּוֹדִין = one may not redeem with it
- פּוֹדִין = one may redeem with it
Segment 13
TYPE: קושיא
Rav Ashi probes Mar Zutra’s source: the gezerah shavah ‘seh’-‘seh’ from the Pesach offering
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אָשֵׁי לְמָר זוּטְרָא: מַאי דַּעְתָּךְ? דְּגָמְרַתְּ ״שֶׂה״ ״שֶׂה״ מִפְּסָחִים?
English Translation:
Rav Ashi said to Mar Zutra: What is the reason for your opinion? Is it because you derive the halakhot of redeeming a firstborn donkey from Paschal offerings by means of a verbal analogy between the term “lamb” (Exodus 13:13) written concerning a firstborn donkey and “lamb” (Exodus 12:5) written concerning a Paschal offering, and a ben pekua is unfit for sacrifice as a Paschal offering?
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Ashi challenges Mar Zutra to justify his stringency: is your reasoning a verbal analogy between ‘lamb’ written at the redemption of the firstborn donkey (Shemot 13:13) and ‘lamb’ written at the Paschal offering (Shemot 12:5)? A ben pekua is unfit for the Pesach — an animal already ‘slaughtered’ cannot be sacrificed — and by the gezerah shavah it would be unfit for the redemption as well. Rav Ashi grants the mechanics in order to attack them in the next segment.
Key Terms:
- גְּזֵרָה שָׁוָה = a verbal analogy — identical terms in two passages import laws from one to the other
- שֶׂה = ‘lamb’ — the shared term linking the firstborn-donkey redemption to the Paschal offering
Segment 14
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
If the analogy is total, the lamb must be male, unblemished, and a yearling!
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִי מָה לְהַלָּן – זָכָר, תָּמִים, וּבֶן שָׁנָה, אַף כָּאן – זָכָר, תָּמִים, וּבֶן שָׁנָה! ״תִּפְדֶּה״ ״תִּפְדֶּה״ רִיבָּה.
English Translation:
If so, just as there, with regard to the Paschal offering, it must be male, unblemished, and in its first year, so too here, the lamb must be male, unblemished, and in its first year. Yet the mishna in Bekhorot (9a) states explicitly that one may redeem with a female lamb, and even if it is blemished, and also with one that is past its first year. Mar Zutra responded: The repetition of the words “You shall redeem,” “You shall not redeem” written in the verse: “And every firstborn of a donkey you shall redeem with a lamb, and if you shall not redeem it then you shall break its neck” (Exodus 13:13), included a lamb that does not fulfill these criteria.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Ashi presses: if the gezerah shavah imports the Pesach’s definition of ‘lamb,’ it should import all of it — male, unblemished, within its first year. Yet the mishna in Bekhorot explicitly validates redeeming with a female, a blemished animal, or an older one. Mar Zutra answers: the doubled expression ‘you shall redeem… you shall not redeem’ (tifdeh tifdeh) in the verse amplifies, including lambs that lack those criteria.
Key Terms:
- זָכָר תָּמִים וּבֶן שָׁנָה = male, unblemished, and in its first year — the Paschal lamb’s requirements
- תִּפְדֶּה תִּפְדֶּה רִיבָּה = the repeated ‘you shall redeem’ comes to amplify and include
Segment 15
TYPE: משא ומתן
Then what is the analogy for? To exclude the ben pekua itself
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִי ״תִּפְדֶּה״ ״תִּפְדֶּה״ רִיבָּה, אֲפִילּוּ כֹּל מִילֵּי נָמֵי, אִם כֵּן ״שֶׂה״ ״שֶׂה״ מַאי אַהֲנִי לָךְ?
English Translation:
Rav Ashi responds: If the repetition of “You shall redeem,” “You shall not redeem” serves to amplify, then it should even amplify all other types of lambs, including a ben pekua, i.e., they should also be included in the category of those that are fit for redemption. Mar Zutra answers: If that was so, what purpose would the verbal analogy of “lamb,” “lamb” serve? Rather, the repetition of “You shall redeem” serves to include all types of lambs, but the verbal analogy still serves to exclude a ben pekua.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Ashi turns the amplification against Mar Zutra: if tifdeh-tifdeh amplifies, let it amplify everything, ben pekua included — and the stringency dissolves. Mar Zutra answers with the final calibration: if the amplification swallowed everything, the gezerah shavah of seh-seh would serve no purpose at all. Rather, the repetition includes lambs that lack the Pesach criteria, while the verbal analogy retains exactly one exclusion — the ben pekua. The exchange ends with each ruling anchored in a coherent reading.
Key Terms:
- אִם כֵּן… מַאי אַהֲנִי לָךְ = ‘if so, what purpose does it serve for you?’ — every hermeneutic tool must retain some function
- רִיבָּה וּמִיעֵט = the interplay of amplifying and limiting expositions
Segment 16
TYPE: בעיא
A new dilemma: does a ben pekua count as second-degree impurity after its mother?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: מַהוּ לִמְנוֹת בּוֹ רִאשׁוֹן וְשֵׁנִי?
English Translation:
§ A dilemma was raised before the Sages: According to the Rabbis, a ben pekua is permitted for consumption and is therefore susceptible to ritual impurity. If the ben pekua was still inside the slaughtered mother and the body of the mother came in contact with a primary source of ritual impurity, what is the halakha with regard to counting the mother as having first-degree ritual impurity and the ben pekua as having second-degree ritual impurity? If the fetus is considered independent of the mother, it is rendered impure only through its contact with the mother and so would have second-degree impurity. But if it is considered part of the mother it would have the same first-degree impurity as the mother.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Sages raise a dilemma in the laws of tum’ah: per the Rabbis a ben pekua is food, hence susceptible to impurity. If the fetus is still inside the slaughtered mother and the mother’s body touches a primary source of impurity, do we count degrees — the mother first-degree, the fetus second-degree — as with two separate items? Or is the fetus simply part of the mother, contracting her own first-degree impurity directly? The question is the tum’ah-mirror of the daf’s master issue: one body or two.
Key Terms:
- רִאשׁוֹן וְשֵׁנִי לְטוּמְאָה = first- and second-degree ritual impurity — the descending chain of transmitted impurity
- אַב הַטּוּמְאָה = a primary source of impurity
Segment 17
TYPE: מחלוקת אמוראים
Rabbi Yochanan counts degrees; Reish Lakish: a nut rattling in its shell
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: מוֹנִין בּוֹ רִאשׁוֹן וְשֵׁנִי. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ אוֹמֵר: אֵין מוֹנִין בּוֹ רִאשׁוֹן וְשֵׁנִי, נַעֲשָׂה כֶּאֱגוֹז הַמִּתְקַשְׁקֵשׁ בִּקְלִיפָּתוֹ.
English Translation:
Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One counts the mother as having first-degree impurity and the ben pekua as having second-degree impurity. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: One does not count the mother as having first-degree impurity and the ben pekua as having second-degree impurity. Rather, the fetus has first-degree impurity like its mother, as it is considered like a nut rattling in its shell; this is considered a single entity such that if impurity touches the shell, both the nut and the shell are rendered impure with the same degree of impurity.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yochanan says one counts first and second degrees — mother and fetus are two entities, and the fetus is rendered impure only through contact with her. Reish Lakish says one does not count degrees: the fetus is like a nut rattling in its shell — shell and kernel are a single entity, and when impurity touches the shell, both bear the same degree. Each amora here holds the position consistent with his earlier view about the fetus’s blood: Rabbi Yochanan treats the fetus as independent, Reish Lakish as part of the mother.
Key Terms:
- נַעֲשָׂה כֶּאֱגוֹז הַמִּתְקַשְׁקֵשׁ בִּקְלִיפָּתוֹ = ‘it becomes like a nut rattling in its shell’ — loose inside, yet a single entity with its container
- מוֹנִין בּוֹ = one counts degrees of impurity in it
Segment 18
TYPE: קושיא ממשנה
Reish Lakish objects from the protruding-foreleg mishna: ‘contact with a carcass’
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַבָּשָׂר מַגַּע נְבֵלָה – דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.
English Translation:
Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish raised an objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan from the mishna (72a): If a fetus extended its foreleg outside its mother’s womb and then the mother was slaughtered, and afterward the foreleg was severed, the flesh of both the mother and the fetus are ritually impure due to having been in contact with a carcass. Since the foreleg was not permitted through an act of slaughter it is regarded as a carcass with the associated ritual impurity. The rest of the flesh, which was permitted, was in contact with it and was thereby rendered ritually impure; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
קלאוד על הדף:
Reish Lakish attacks Rabbi Yochanan from the mishna (72a): where a fetus extended its foreleg before the mother’s slaughter and the limb was afterward severed, Rabbi Meir rules the flesh — of mother and fetus — is impure as having touched a carcass, since the unslaughtered limb is a neveilah and the permitted flesh contacted it. The objection will emerge from the mechanics of how that flesh became susceptible to impurity at all.
Key Terms:
- מַגַּע נְבֵלָה = impurity through contact with a carcass
- הַבָּשָׂר = the flesh — of the mother and the fetus, which touched the severed limb
Segment 19
TYPE: המשך המשנה
And the Rabbis: contact with a slaughtered tereifa — a rabbinic disqualification
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: מַגַּע טְרֵפָה שְׁחוּטָה.
English Translation:
And the Rabbis say: The flesh has the ritual impurity of having been in contact with a tereifa that was slaughtered. The limb is regarded as a tereifa that was slaughtered, which by Torah law is prohibited for consumption but does not carry ritual impurity. Nevertheless, the Sages decreed that if a tereifa was slaughtered and then came in contact with another item, the other item should be regarded as ritually impure to the extent that it will disqualify sacrificial foods that come in contact with it.
קלאוד על הדף:
The mishna’s other side: the Rabbis rule the flesh bears the status of contact with a slaughtered tereifa. By Torah law a slaughtered tereifa is forbidden to eat but carries no impurity; the Sages nevertheless decreed that what touches it is treated as impure to the extent of disqualifying sacrificial food. The limb, permitted from neveilah-impurity by the slaughter yet forbidden as if a tereifa, transmits only this rabbinic-level taint.
Key Terms:
- מַגַּע טְרֵפָה שְׁחוּטָה = contact with a slaughtered tereifa — a rabbinic impurity that disqualifies kodashim
- פּוֹסֵל אֶת הַקֳּדָשִׁים = disqualifies sacrificial foods without imparting further impurity
Segment 20
TYPE: קושיא
Reish Lakish springs the trap: per you, how was the fetus rendered susceptible?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בִּשְׁלָמָא לְדִידִי, דְּאָמֵינָא חַד גּוּפָא הוּא – הַיְינוּ דְּאִיתַּכְשַׁר בִּדְמָא דְּאִמֵּיהּ, אֶלָּא לְדִידָךְ, בְּמַאי אִיתַּכְשַׁר?
English Translation:
Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish explains his objection: Granted, according to my opinion, as I say that the mother and fetus together are one entity; that is why the flesh of the fetus is rendered susceptible to ritual impurity through the blood of its mother that spilled onto the body of the mother. When the blood from the mother’s slaughter renders the mother susceptible to impurity, the fetus is also rendered susceptible to impurity, as it is considered part of the mother. But according to your opinion, that the fetus is an independent entity, through what means is it rendered susceptible to contracting impurity from its foreleg?
קלאוד על הדף:
Reish Lakish now states his objection: food contracts impurity only after being rendered susceptible (huchshar) by contact with one of seven liquids. Granted on my view — mother and fetus are one body — the blood of the mother’s slaughter that wet her body rendered the fetus susceptible together with her. But on your view, that they are two entities, the mother’s blood cannot serve the fetus: through what was the fetus ever rendered susceptible, such that the mishna declares its flesh impure from contact with the limb?
Key Terms:
- הֶכְשֵׁר = rendering food susceptible to impurity through contact with one of seven liquids
- אִיתַּכְשַׁר בִּדְמָא דְּאִמֵּיהּ = it was rendered susceptible through its mother’s blood
Segment 21
TYPE: תירוץ
Rabbi Yochanan: slaughter itself renders susceptible, per Rabbi Shimon
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: בִּשְׁחִיטָה, וּכְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן.
English Translation:
Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish: It is rendered susceptible through the slaughter of its mother, which also permits the consumption of the fetus, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who maintains that the flesh of a slaughtered animal is rendered susceptible to ritual impurity by virtue of the fact that it is permitted for consumption, even if it did not come in contact with blood or one of the other six liquids. Accordingly, the fetus will be susceptible to impurity even if it is not considered part of its mother.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yochanan answers that the fetus was rendered susceptible by the slaughter itself, in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, who holds that the act of slaughter — by permitting the flesh for consumption — renders it susceptible to impurity even without any contact with blood or another liquid. Since the mother’s shechitah is what permits the ben pekua, that same shechitah suffices to make its flesh susceptible, with no need to treat the two as one body.
Key Terms:
- שְׁחִיטָה מַכְשֶׁרֶת = slaughter itself renders the flesh susceptible to impurity (the view of Rabbi Shimon)
- שִׁבְעָה מַשְׁקִין = the seven liquids (water, dew, oil, wine, milk, blood, honey) that ordinarily create susceptibility
Segment 22
TYPE: קושיא מברייתא
Rabbi Yochanan counters from a baraita: the river and the cemetery
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ: עָבַר בְּנָהָר – הוּכְשַׁר, הָלַךְ לְבֵית הַקְּבָרוֹת – נִטְמָא.
English Translation:
Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish from a baraita: If a ben pekua grew up and passed through a river, it was thereby rendered susceptible to impurity. Therefore, if it went from there to a cemetery, it is rendered impure.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yochanan fires back with a baraita: a ben pekua that grew up and passed through a river was thereby rendered susceptible to impurity, and if it then walked into a cemetery it became impure. The baraita makes the animal’s susceptibility hinge on its wetting in the river — a datum that will now be turned against Reish Lakish’s one-body theory.
Key Terms:
- עָבַר בְּנָהָר – הוּכְשַׁר = it passed through a river — it was rendered susceptible by the water
- הָלַךְ לְבֵית הַקְּבָרוֹת – נִטְמָא = it went to a cemetery — it contracted corpse impurity
Segment 23
TYPE: קושיא
Per Reish Lakish, why did it need the river? The daf ends with the challenge pending
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בִּשְׁלָמָא לְדִידִי דְּאָמֵינָא תְּרֵי גּוּפֵי נִינְהוּ, מִשּׁוּם הָכִי: הוּכְשַׁר – אִין, לֹא הוּכְשַׁר – לָא, אֶלָּא לְדִידָךְ דְּאָמְרַתְּ חַד גּוּפָא הוּא, הָא אִיתַּכְשַׁר בִּדְמָא דְּאִמֵּיהּ!
English Translation:
Rabbi Yoḥanan explains his objection: Granted, according to my opinion, as I say that the mother and fetus are two entities; it is due to that reason that only if the ben pekua itself has been rendered susceptible to impurity by coming in contact with the water of the river, yes, it can be rendered impure upon entering a cemetery, whereas if it has not been rendered susceptible to impurity through these waters, no, it does not become impure when it enters a cemetery. But according to your opinion, in which you said that the mother and fetus together are one entity, why is it necessary for it to have passed through a river? It was already rendered susceptible to impurity through the blood of its mother that spilled onto the mother’s body when it was slaughtered.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yochanan presses the symmetry in reverse: granted on my view — two entities — the ben pekua needs its own hechsher, so only after wetting in the river can the cemetery defile it. But on your view that mother and fetus are one body, the animal was already rendered susceptible long ago by its mother’s blood at the slaughter — the river should be superfluous! The amud ends with Reish Lakish under challenge; the Gemara’s resolution unfolds at the start of daf 75.
Key Terms:
- תְּרֵי גּוּפֵי נִינְהוּ = they are two bodies — mother and fetus as separate entities
- חַד גּוּפָא הוּא = it is one body — the fetus as part of its mother