Chullin Daf 75 (חולין דף ע״ה)
Daf: 75 | Amudim: 75a – 75b | Date: Loading...
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (75a)
Segment 1
TYPE: תירוץ
Reish Lakish deflects the river baraita: a dry slaughter, and not like Rabbi Shimon
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בִּשְׁחִיטָה יַבִּישְׁתָּא, וּדְלָא כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן.
English Translation:
Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish answers: The baraita is referring to a case where the slaughter of the mother was dry, i.e., where no blood was emitted, and therefore, even the mother was not rendered susceptible to ritual impurity. And the baraita is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who maintains that the flesh of a slaughtered animal is rendered susceptible to ritual impurity by virtue of the fact that it is permitted for consumption, regardless of whether or not it came into contact with blood or other liquids.
קלאוד על הדף:
The daf opens with Reish Lakish’s answer to the challenge that closed daf 74: if mother and fetus are one body, why did the grown ben pekua need the river to become susceptible to impurity — it was already wetted by its mother’s blood at slaughter! Reish Lakish answers that the baraita speaks of a dry slaughter (shechitah yabishta), one that emitted no blood, so even the mother herself was never rendered susceptible. He adds that the baraita then cannot follow Rabbi Shimon, for whom slaughter itself creates susceptibility without any liquid. The answer saves his one-body theory at the cost of narrowing the baraita to a specific case and excluding a tannaitic view.
Key Terms:
- שְׁחִיטָה יַבִּישְׁתָּא = a dry slaughter — one in which no blood was emitted
- וּדְלָא כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן = and not in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, who holds slaughter itself renders flesh susceptible
Segment 2
TYPE: מימרא
Who is the tanna of the river baraita? Rabbi Yosei HaGelili — against the Rabbis
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַאן תַּנָּא עָבַר בְּנָהָר הוּכְשַׁר, הָלַךְ לְבֵית הַקְּבָרוֹת נִטְמָא? אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי הִיא, דְּתַנְיָא: רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי: מְטַמֵּא טוּמְאַת אֳכָלִים, וְצָרִיךְ הֶכְשֵׁר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵינוֹ מְטַמֵּא טוּמְאַת אֳכָלִין, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא חַי, וְכׇל שֶׁהוּא חַי אֵינוֹ מְטַמֵּא טוּמְאַת אֳכָלִין.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who taught this baraita: If a ben pekua grew up and passed through a river, it was thereby rendered susceptible to impurity, and therefore if it went from there to a cemetery, it is rendered impure? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: The flesh of a ben pekua can become impure with the ritual impurity of food, but it first needs to be rendered susceptible to ritual impurity by coming in contact with liquid. But the Rabbis say: It cannot become impure with the ritual impurity of food because it is alive, and any live animal cannot become impure with the ritual impurity of food, even if it is permitted for consumption.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara asks who taught the baraita that a live, grown ben pekua can be rendered susceptible in a river and made impure in a cemetery — for it presumes a living creature can contract food impurity at all. Rabbi Yochanan identifies the tanna as Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, cited by Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar: the ben pekua’s flesh contracts food impurity and requires hechsher. The Rabbis disagree on principle: whatever is alive cannot contract the impurity of food, even if — like a ben pekua — it is technically permitted for consumption while alive.
Key Terms:
- טוּמְאַת אֳכָלִים = the ritual impurity of food
- כׇּל שֶׁהוּא חַי אֵינוֹ מְטַמֵּא טוּמְאַת אֳכָלִין = whatever is alive cannot contract food impurity
Segment 3
TYPE: אזדא לטעמיה
Rabbi Yochanan is consistent: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and Beit Shammai said one thing
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאַזְדָּא רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לְטַעְמֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי וּבֵית שַׁמַּאי אָמְרוּ דָּבָר אֶחָד.
English Translation:
The Gemara notes: And Rabbi Yoḥanan follows his standard line of reasoning, as Rabbi Yoḥanan says that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and Beit Shammai said the same thing, i.e., they both hold that even a live animal can become impure with the ritual impurity of food.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara notes that Rabbi Yochanan’s attribution follows his own established teaching elsewhere: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and Beit Shammai ‘said the same thing’ — both hold that a living creature can be treated as food for the laws of impurity. The next segment supplies the Beit Shammai source.
Key Terms:
- וְאַזְדָּא לְטַעְמֵיהּ = and he follows his own line of reasoning — a consistency note
- אָמְרוּ דָּבָר אֶחָד = they said one and the same thing — two authorities sharing a principle
Segment 4
TYPE: ראיה ממשנה
The Beit Shammai source: from when are fish susceptible to impurity?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי – הָא דַּאֲמַרַן. בֵּית שַׁמַּאי, דִּתְנַן: דָּגִים, מֵאֵימָתַי מְקַבְּלִין טוּמְאָה? בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: מִשֶּׁיִּצּוֹדוּ, וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: מִשֶּׁיָּמוּתוּ. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: מִשָּׁעָה שֶׁאֵין יְכוֹלִין לִחְיוֹת.
English Translation:
The opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili is that which we stated in the baraita. The opinion of Beit Shammai is as we learned in a mishna (Okatzin 3:8): With regard to fish, from when are they susceptible to impurity as food? Beit Shammai say: From when they are caught in a trap, as at this point they are considered food, since they do not require slaughter. And Beit Hillel say: From when they die. Rabbi Akiva says: From when they are no longer able to live.
קלאוד על הדף:
The proof that Beit Shammai treat a living creature as food comes from the mishna in Okatzin: from when are fish — which require no slaughter — susceptible to food impurity? Beit Shammai say from the moment they are trapped, while still alive; Beit Hillel say only from death; and Rabbi Akiva takes a middle position — from the moment they can no longer live. Beit Shammai thus parallel Rabbi Yosei HaGelili’s ben pekua: a live creature that needs no shechitah already counts as food.
Key Terms:
- מִשֶּׁיִּצּוֹדוּ = from when they are caught — Beit Shammai’s threshold
- מִשֶּׁיָּמוּתוּ = from when they die — Beit Hillel’s threshold
Segment 5
TYPE: ביאור
The gap between Rabbi Akiva and Beit Hillel: the convulsing fish
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: דָּג מְקַרְטֵעַ אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ.
English Translation:
The Gemara analyzes that mishna: What is the difference between the opinions of Rabbi Akiva and Beit Hillel? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The difference between them is the case of a convulsing fish. Rabbi Akiva holds that such a fish can already become ritually impure, while Beit Hillel require it to have actually died.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara asks what practical case separates Rabbi Akiva’s ‘from when they can no longer live’ from Beit Hillel’s ‘from when they die.’ Rabbi Yochanan answers: the convulsing fish — a fish out of water in its final spasms. For Rabbi Akiva it is already ‘unable to live’ and counts as food for impurity; for Beit Hillel, until it actually dies it is a living creature and immune.
Key Terms:
- דָּג מְקַרְטֵעַ = a convulsing fish — flopping in its death throes
- מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ = what is the practical difference between them?
Segment 6
TYPE: בעיא
Rav Chisda: does a tereifa-defect in a fish count as ‘unable to live’?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בָּעֵי רַב חִסְדָּא: נוֹלְדוּ בְּדָגִים סִימָנֵי טְרֵפָה, מַהוּ? תִּיבְּעֵי לְמַאן דְּאָמַר טְרֵפָה חַיָּה, וְתִיבְּעֵי לְמַאן דְּאָמַר טְרֵפָה אֵינָהּ חַיָּה.
English Translation:
Rav Ḥisda raises a dilemma: According to Rabbi Akiva, if symptoms of a tereifa developed in a fish, e.g., a perforation in the intestines, which will certainly result in the animal’s death (see 42a), what is the halakha? Can it already be rendered ritually impure as if it were now dead? The Gemara clarifies: One can raise this dilemma according to the one who says that an animal that is a tereifa can live, i.e., it will not necessarily die within a year, and one can raise this dilemma according to the one who says that a tereifa cannot live, but will die within a year.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Chisda extends Rabbi Akiva’s category with a dilemma: if a fish developed the physical defects that render an animal a tereifa — say, a perforated intestine — is it already ‘unable to live’ and thus impurity-susceptible as food? The Gemara maps the question onto the classic dispute whether a tereifa can survive: the dilemma stands according to both positions, as the next segment unfolds.
Key Terms:
- סִימָנֵי טְרֵפָה = the physical signs of a tereifa — mortal defects
- טְרֵפָה חַיָּה / אֵינָהּ חַיָּה = the dispute whether a tereifa can survive beyond twelve months
Segment 7
TYPE: צדדי הבעיא ותיקו
Both sides of the dilemma — and it stands unresolved: teiku
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תִּיבְּעֵי לְמַאן דְּאָמַר טְרֵפָה חַיָּה, בְּהֵמָה הוּא דִּנְפִישָׁא חַיּוּתַהּ, אֲבָל דָּגִים דְּלָא נְפִישָׁא חַיּוּתַיְיהוּ – לָא, אוֹ דִילְמָא אֲפִילּוּ לְמַאן דְּאָמַר טְרֵפָה אֵינָהּ חַיָּה, הָנֵי מִילֵּי בְּהֵמָה דְּיֵשׁ בְּמִינָהּ שְׁחִיטָה, אֲבָל דָּגִים דְּאֵין בְּמִינָן שְׁחִיטָה – אֵימָא לָא. תֵּיקוּ.
English Translation:
The Gemara elaborates: One can raise this dilemma according to the one who says that a tereifa can live, as perhaps that opinion is limited to an animal, as an animal has a strong life force, and it could live despite such symptoms. But with regard to a fish, whose life force is not strong, all would agree that it will not survive. Or perhaps, even according to the one who says that a tereifa cannot live, it is possible that this matter, that a tereifa is regarded as dead, applies only to an animal, as the requirement to slaughter it in order to permit it for consumption applies to this type of creature, i.e., to animals, and so to invalidate its slaughter, the Torah classifies an animal that is a tereifa as though it is dead. But with regard to fish, where the requirement to slaughter it in order to permit it does not apply to this type of creature, I would say that a fish with symptoms of a tereifa is not considered as though it were dead. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
קלאוד על הדף:
The dilemma cuts both ways. Even the one who says a tereifa can live might concede that only a beheimah, with its robust vitality, survives such defects — a fish, whose life force is slight, surely cannot, and it should count as dead. Or conversely: even the one who says a tereifa cannot live may treat it as dead only in animals, where the Torah’s category of slaughter operates and a tereifa’s slaughter is invalidated; fish, which need no shechitah at all, may never enter that framework. The Gemara closes with teiku — the question stands.
Key Terms:
- נְפִישָׁא חַיּוּתַהּ = its life force is abundant — an animal’s robust vitality
- תֵּיקוּ = the dilemma stands unresolved
Segment 8
TYPE: מחלוקת אמוראים
The stillborn’s fat: Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish dispute its status
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הֵטִילָה נֵפֶל, רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: חֶלְבּוֹ כְּחֵלֶב בְּהֵמָה, וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ אָמַר: חֶלְבּוֹ כְּחֵלֶב חַיָּה.
English Translation:
§ The Rabbis state in the mishna that a nine-month-old fetus is considered to be part of its mother. Therefore, when the mother is slaughtered, the entire fetus is permitted, including all its fats. The Gemara asks: If an animal expelled a non-viable newborn, what is the status of the fetus’s fat? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Its fat is like the fat of any other domesticated animal, and one is liable to receive karet if he eats it. And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Its fat is like the fat of an undomesticated animal, which is not prohibited.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara turns to the fat (chelev) of a fetus. If an animal expelled a nonviable stillborn, Rabbi Yochanan rules its fat is like the fat of a beheimah — the forbidden chelev, carrying karet; Reish Lakish rules it is like the fat of a chayah, an undomesticated animal, whose corresponding fat is permitted. At stake is when a fetus becomes an ‘animal’ whose fat the Torah forbade.
Key Terms:
- נֵפֶל = a nonviable stillborn
- חֵלֶב בְּהֵמָה / חֵלֶב חַיָּה = the forbidden fat of a domesticated animal versus the permitted fat of an undomesticated one
Segment 9
TYPE: ביאור המחלוקת
First version: air makes the animal, or months make the animal
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: חֶלְבּוֹ כְּחֵלֶב בְּהֵמָה – אַוֵּירָא גָּרֵים. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ אָמַר: חֶלְבּוֹ כְּחֵלֶב חַיָּה – חֳדָשִׁים גָּרְמִי.
English Translation:
The Gemara elaborates: Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Its fat is like the fat of any other domesticated animal, as he maintains that the exit of a fetus through the airspace of the opening of the womb causes it to be regarded as an independent animal. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Its fat is like the fat of an undomesticated animal, as he maintains that the completion of the months of gestation causes a fetus to be regarded as an independent animal, and this stillborn did not reach this stage.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara articulates the underlying principle of each view. Rabbi Yochanan holds avira garim — emergence into the air of the world is what creates independent animal status, so even a premature stillborn, once expelled, bears forbidden chelev. Reish Lakish holds chodashim garmi — completing the months of gestation creates the status, and this stillborn, which never finished its months, is no animal and its fat is not chelev.
Key Terms:
- אַוֵּירָא גָּרֵים = the air causes it — birth into the world’s airspace confers animal status
- חֳדָשִׁים גָּרְמִי = the months cause it — completed gestation confers animal status
Segment 10
TYPE: איכא דאמרי
Second version: the dispute is the in-utero fat of a full-term fetus
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִיכָּא דְאָמְרִי: כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּלֹא כָּלוּ לוֹ חֳדָשָׁיו – לָא כְּלוּם הוּא. כִּי פְּלִיגִי – הֵיכָא דְּהוֹשִׁיט יָדוֹ לִמְעֵי בְּהֵמָה, וְתָלַשׁ חֵלֶב שֶׁל בֶּן תִּשְׁעָה חַי וְאָכַל. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: חֶלְבּוֹ כְּחֵלֶב בְּהֵמָה, חֳדָשִׁים גָּרְמִי. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ אָמַר: חֶלְבּוֹ כְּחֵלֶב חַיָּה, חֳדָשִׁים וְאַוֵּירָא גָּרְמִי.
English Translation:
Some say that there is another explanation of this dispute: In any case where its months of gestation were not completed, everyone agrees that it is nothing, i.e., it is not an independent animal and its fat is not included in the prohibition of forbidden fats. When they disagree it is with regard to a case where one inserted his hand into the womb of an animal and removed the fat of a live nine-month-old fetus and ate it. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Its fat is like the fat of any other domesticated animal, as the months of gestation alone cause it to be regarded as an independent animal. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Its fat is like the fat of an undomesticated animal, as it is the months of gestation and its exit through the airspace of the opening of the womb that together cause it to be regarded as an independent animal. Since this fetus was not yet born, it is not subject to the prohibition of forbidden fats.
קלאוד על הדף:
An alternative tradition reframes the machloket. All agree that a fetus whose months were not completed is ‘nothing’ — its fat is not forbidden chelev. They disagree where one reached into the womb, tore out the fat of a live full-term (nine-month) fetus, and ate it. Rabbi Yochanan: months alone confer animal status, so this fat is forbidden chelev. Reish Lakish: months and emergence together are required; the unborn fetus, whole months notwithstanding, is not yet an animal and its fat is not chelev.
Key Terms:
- אִיכָּא דְאָמְרִי = some say — an alternative version of the tradition
- תָּלַשׁ חֵלֶב שֶׁל בֶּן תִּשְׁעָה חַי = tore out the fat of a live nine-month fetus in the womb
Segment 11
TYPE: קושיא מברייתא
Rabbi Yochanan objects from the sacrificial baraita on the fetus’s fat
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ: מָה חֵלֶב וּשְׁתֵּי כְלָיוֹת הָאֲמוּרוֹת בְּאָשָׁם – מוּצָא מִכְּלַל שְׁלִיל, אַף כֹּל – מוּצָא מִכְּלַל שְׁלִיל.
English Translation:
Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish from a baraita that discusses the sacrifice of the fat surrounding a fetus inside a pregnant animal: Just as with regard to the requirement to sacrifice the fat and two kidneys (see Leviticus 7:3-4), which is stated with regard to a guilt offering, the fat of a fetus is excluded from the category of fats that one is required to sacrifice because a guilt offering is always a male, so too, with regard to every offering, even in the case of a female offering, the fat of a fetus is excluded from the category of fats that one is required to sacrifice.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yochanan attacks Reish Lakish from a baraita on the sacrificial parts: just as ‘the fat and the two kidneys’ stated in the guilt offering exclude the fat of a fetus — an asham is always male and carries no fetus — so in every offering the fetus’s fat is excluded from the parts burned on the altar. The Torah, that is, needed a paradigm to exclude fetal fat from sacrifice.
Key Terms:
- חֵלֶב וּשְׁתֵּי כְלָיוֹת = the fat and the two kidneys — the sacrificial portions (Vayikra 7:3-4)
- אָשָׁם = a guilt offering — always a male animal
- מוּצָא מִכְּלַל שְׁלִיל = excluded from applying to a fetus
Segment 12
TYPE: הסבר הקושיא ותשובה
If the fat is permitted, why exclude it? Reish Lakish: that verse is my source
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בִּשְׁלָמָא לְדִידִי, הַיְינוּ דְּאִיצְטְרִיךְ קְרָא לְמַעוֹטֵי, אֶלָּא לְדִידָךְ, אַמַּאי אִיצְטְרִיךְ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: טַעְמָא דִּידִי נָמֵי מֵהָכָא.
English Translation:
Rabbi Yoḥanan explains his objection: Granted, according to my opinion that the fat of a fetus is forbidden for consumption, this is why a verse was necessary to exclude it from being sacrificed on the altar. But according to your opinion that it is not forbidden, why is a verse necessary to exclude it? Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said to him: My explanation is also derived from the verse here, which serves as the source for the fact that the fat of a fetus is not forbidden.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yochanan presses the point: on my view, that fetal fat is forbidden chelev, the exclusion is intelligible — one might have thought that what is forbidden to eat must be offered on the altar, so a verse excludes it. But on your view that fetal fat is not chelev at all, why would a verse be needed to exclude it from sacrifice? Reish Lakish turns the weapon around: that very verse is my source — the Torah’s exclusion of fetal fat from the altar reveals that it is not in the category of chelev.
Key Terms:
- בִּשְׁלָמָא לְדִידִי = it is understandable according to me — the opening of a two-sided challenge
- טַעְמָא דִּידִי נָמֵי מֵהָכָא = my reasoning too is from here — the objector’s proof-text is claimed as one’s own source
Segment 13
TYPE: איכא דאמרי (קושיא הפוכה)
The reversed version: Reish Lakish objects to Rabbi Yochanan
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מָה חֵלֶב וּשְׁתֵּי כְלָיוֹת הָאֲמוּרוֹת בְּאָשָׁם מוּצָא מִכְּלַל שְׁלִיל, אַף כֹּל – מוּצָא מִכְּלַל שְׁלִיל.
English Translation:
And some say that there is another version of this objection in which Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish raised an objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan from that baraita: Just as with regard to the requirement to sacrifice “the fat and two kidneys” that is stated with regard to a guilt offering, the fat of a fetus is excluded from the category of fats that one is required to sacrifice, so too, with regard to every offering, the fat of a fetus is excluded from the category of fats that one is required to sacrifice.
קלאוד על הדף:
Another tradition reverses the exchange: Reish Lakish raises the same baraita against Rabbi Yochanan. Granted on my view — fetal fat is not chelev — the Merciful One reasonably excluded it from the altar. But on your view that it is full chelev, it should be sacrificed like all forbidden fats of an offering: why does the Torah exclude it?
Key Terms:
- אֵיתִיבֵיהּ = he raised an objection against him
- לִיקְרַב = let it be sacrificed — why should it not go up on the altar?
Segment 14
TYPE: תירוץ
Rabbi Yochanan: it is like an offering whose time has not yet come
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בִּשְׁלָמָא לְדִידִי, מִשּׁוּם הָכִי מַיעֲטֵיהּ רַחֲמָנָא, אֶלָּא לְדִידָךְ – לִיקְרַב? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִידֵּי דְּהָוֵה אַמְּחוּסַּר זְמַן.
English Translation:
Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish explains the objection: Granted, according to my opinion that the fat of the fetus is not prohibited like the other fats, it is due to that reason that the Merciful One excludes it from the requirement of being sacrificed. But according to your opinion, that the fat of the fetus is considered one of the forbidden fats, let it also be sacrificed. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: The reason that this fat is not sacrificed is just as it is with regard to an offering whose time has not yet arrived, i.e., it is not yet seven days old, which may not be sacrificed (see Leviticus 22:27) despite being of a species of animal that may be sacrificed. Similarly, with regard to the fat of the fetus, despite being included among those fats that are prohibited, it may not be sacrificed.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yochanan answers that exclusion from the altar does not prove permission to eat: the fetus’s fat is comparable to mechusar zman, an animal within its first seven days, which belongs to a sacrificial species yet may not be offered until its time arrives. So too fetal fat can be true forbidden chelev while nonetheless barred from the altar. The objection dissolves without deciding the dispute.
Key Terms:
- מְחוּסַּר זְמַן = an offering whose time has not yet arrived — an animal younger than eight days (Vayikra 22:27)
- מִידֵּי דְּהָוֵה אַ־ = it is analogous to — a halachic comparison
Segment 15
TYPE: מימרא
Rabbi Ami: inside a tereifa the positions invert — the prohibitor permits, the permitter prohibits
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַבִּי אַמֵּי: הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַטְּרֵפָה וּמָצָא בָּהּ בֶּן תִּשְׁעָה חַי, לְדִבְרֵי הָאוֹסֵר – מַתִּיר, לְדִבְרֵי הַמַּתִּיר – אוֹסֵר.
English Translation:
§ The Gemara returns to the dispute in the mishna with regard to a nine-month-old fetus found alive inside its slaughtered mother. Rabbi Meir holds that the fetus itself must be slaughtered in order to permit it, whereas the Rabbis hold that it is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of its mother. Rabbi Ami said: With regard to one who slaughtered a tereifa and found inside it a live nine-month-old fetus: According to the statement of Rabbi Meir, who prohibits a nine-month-old fetus found inside a kosher animal until it is slaughtered itself, if it is found inside a tereifa he permits the fetus once it is slaughtered itself. But according to the statement of Rabbi Yehuda, referred to as the Rabbis in the mishna, who permits a nine-month-old fetus found inside a kosher animal by virtue of the slaughter of its mother, if it is found inside a tereifa he prohibits it, even if it is slaughtered itself.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Ami states a striking inversion for a live nine-month fetus found inside a slaughtered tereifa. Rabbi Meir, ‘the one who prohibits’ the fetus in a kosher mother until it is slaughtered itself, permits it here — the fetus is an independent animal, unharmed by its mother’s defect, and its own shechitah permits it. But Rabbi Yehuda (the Rabbis), ‘the one who permits’ via the mother’s slaughter, prohibits it here: the fetus is part of its mother, the mother is a tereifa, and a tereifa’s part can never be permitted — even the fetus’s own slaughter cannot help, for it is merely ‘part’ of a forbidden animal.
Key Terms:
- הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַטְּרֵפָה = one who slaughters a tereifa — the slaughter is valid to avert carcass status but cannot permit eating
- לְדִבְרֵי הָאוֹסֵר מַתִּיר = according to the one who prohibits, he permits — Rabbi Ami’s inversion
Segment 16
TYPE: מימרא חולקת
Rava: even the permitter permits — four simanim were validated
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רָבָא אָמַר: לְדִבְרֵי הַמַּתִּיר נָמֵי מוּתָּר, אַרְבָּעָה סִימָנִין אַכְשַׁר בֵּיהּ רַחֲמָנָא.
English Translation:
Rava said: According to the statement of Rabbi Yehuda, who permits a nine-month-old fetus found inside a kosher animal by virtue of the slaughter of its mother, he also permits it if it is found inside a tereifa, once the fetus itself is slaughtered. The reason is that the Merciful One considers four simanim to be fit for slaughter, i.e., the windpipe and gullet of the mother and those of the fetus, with the fetus being permitted by the cutting of either pair.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava disagrees with the second half of Rabbi Ami’s inversion: even Rabbi Yehuda, who permits the fetus through the mother’s slaughter, agrees that a fetus found in a tereifa is permitted once slaughtered itself. His reason is the principle from daf 74: the Merciful One validated four simanim for this animal — the mother’s pair and the fetus’s own pair. When the mother’s simanim fail because she is a tereifa, the fetus’s own windpipe and gullet remain available, and its own shechitah permits it.
Key Terms:
- אַרְבָּעָה סִימָנִין אַכְשַׁר בֵּיהּ רַחֲמָנָא = the Merciful One validated four simanim in it — either the mother’s or the fetus’s pair suffices
- לְדִבְרֵי הַמַּתִּיר נָמֵי מוּתָּר = even according to the one who permits, it is permitted
Segment 17
TYPE: מימרא
Rav Chisda begins his three-part ruling on the fetus inside a tereifa
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַטְּרֵפָה, וּמָצָא בָּהּ בֶּן תִּשְׁעָה חַי –
English Translation:
Rav Ḥisda said: With regard to one who slaughtered a tereifa and found inside it a live nine-month-old fetus,
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Chisda now states his own ruling for one who slaughtered a tereifa and found inside it a live nine-month fetus. The amud breaks off mid-sentence; his three-part ruling — slaughter, priestly gifts, and purity — is completed at the top of 75b, where Rava will immediately probe its apparent inconsistency.
Key Terms:
- בֶּן תִּשְׁעָה חַי = a live nine-month (full-term) fetus
- הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַטְּרֵפָה = one who slaughters an animal that is a tereifa
Amud Bet (75b)
Segment 1
TYPE: המשך המימרא
The ruling completed: requires slaughter, owes the gifts, yet pure if it dies
Hebrew/Aramaic:
טָעוּן שְׁחִיטָה, וְחַיָּיב בִּזְרוֹעַ וְהַלְּחָיַיִם וְהַקֵּבָה, וְאִם מֵת – טָהוֹר מִלְּטַמֵּא בְּמַשָּׂא.
English Translation:
the fetus requires its own slaughter to permit its consumption, and it is subject to the obligation to give the foreleg and the jaw and the maw to a priest, as is required for a non-sacred animal that is slaughtered. But nevertheless, if it dies, the fact that its mother was slaughtered serves to render it pure with regard to imparting impurity to people through their carrying of it, as it does not impart the impurity of a carcass.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Chisda’s ruling: the fetus requires its own slaughter to be eaten; when slaughtered it is obligated in the priestly gifts — the foreleg, the jaw, and the maw — like any ordinary non-sacred animal; and yet, if it dies unslaughtered, its mother’s slaughter protects it from imparting the carcass impurity of carrying. The ruling straddles both tannaitic positions, and Rava pounces next.
Key Terms:
- זְרוֹעַ לְחָיַיִם וְקֵבָה = the foreleg, the jaw, and the maw — gifts to the kohen from every slaughtered non-sacred animal (Devarim 18:3)
- טָהוֹר מִלְּטַמֵּא בְּמַשָּׂא = pure from imparting impurity through carrying — free of carcass status
Segment 2
TYPE: קושיא
Rava: your ruling rides two opinions at once
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: טָעוּן שְׁחִיטָה – כְּמַאן? כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר, וְאִם מֵת טָהוֹר מִלְּטַמֵּא בְּמַשָּׂא – כְּמַאן? כְּרַבָּנַן.
English Translation:
Rava said to Rav Ḥisda: Your ruling is inconsistent. When you say it requires slaughter, in accordance with whose opinion is that? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, that a live nine-month-old fetus is not permitted by virtue of its mother’s slaughter. But when you say that if it dies, it is pure with regard to imparting impurity through carrying, in accordance with whose opinion is that? It is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava exposes the seam: ‘requires slaughter’ — according to whom? Rabbi Meir, who denies that the mother’s slaughter permits a live nine-month fetus. ‘If it dies it is pure from imparting impurity through carrying’ — according to whom? The Rabbis, who hold the mother’s slaughter takes effect on it. A single ruling cannot straddle both sides of the machloket.
Key Terms:
- כְּמַאן = according to whom? — the demand that a ruling align with a single tannaitic view
- תַּרְתֵּי דְסָתְרֵי = two elements that contradict each other (the thrust of Rava’s challenge)
Segment 3
TYPE: תשובת רב חסדא
Rav Chisda counters: Rabbi Chiyya’s baraita has the same structure
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְלִיטַעְמָיךְ, הָא דְתָנֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא: הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַטְּרֵפָה וּמָצָא בָּהּ בֶּן תִּשְׁעָה חַי – טָעוּן שְׁחִיטָה, וְחַיָּיב בִּזְרוֹעַ וְהַלְּחָיַיִם וְהַקֵּבָה, וְאִם מֵת – טָהוֹר מִלְּטַמֵּא בְּמַשָּׂא. טָעוּן שְׁחִיטָה כְּמַאן? כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר, וְאִם מֵת – טָהוֹר מִלְּטַמֵּא בְּמַשָּׂא, כְּרַבָּנַן.
English Translation:
Rav Ḥisda replied: And according to your reasoning, the same difficulty arises with that which Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches in a baraita: With regard to one who slaughtered an animal that is a tereifa and found inside it a live nine-month-old fetus, it requires its own slaughter, and it is subject to the obligation to give the foreleg and the jaw and the maw to a priest. But nevertheless, if it dies, it is pure with regard to imparting impurity through carrying. When he says that it requires slaughter, in accordance with whose opinion is that? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. But when he says that if it dies, it is pure with regard to imparting impurity through carrying, it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Chisda answers with a tu quoque: by your reasoning, the baraita taught by Rabbi Chiyya is equally impossible, for it states precisely the same three rulings — the fetus found alive in a slaughtered tereifa requires slaughter, is obligated in the gifts, and if it dies is pure from imparting impurity through carrying. There too, ‘requires slaughter’ sounds like Rabbi Meir while the purity clause sounds like the Rabbis. The baraita’s existence shows the combination must be explicable.
Key Terms:
- וְלִיטַעְמָיךְ = and according to your own reasoning — turning the difficulty back on the questioner
- תָּנֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא = Rabbi Chiyya taught a baraita
Segment 4
TYPE: דחייה
Rava: the baraita can be all Rabbi Meir — but your ruling cannot
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָא לָא קַשְׁיָא, רַבִּי חִיָּיא אִם כְּבָר מְצָאוֹ מֵת קָאָמַר, אֶלָּא לְדִידָךְ קַשְׁיָא!
English Translation:
Rava responded: That is not difficult, as it is possible that Rabbi Ḥiyya was speaking about if one found that the fetus had already died inside the mother. In such a case, Rabbi Meir concedes that its mother’s slaughter renders it pure, as stated in the mishna. Accordingly, the baraita is entirely in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. But according to your opinion, that even if it was found alive and died later it is pure from the impurity of a carcass, it is difficult.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava deflects the counter: Rabbi Chiyya’s baraita is not difficult, for it can be read as speaking of a fetus already found dead in the womb — and in that case even Rabbi Meir concedes, as our mishna states, that the mother’s slaughter averts carcass impurity. The whole baraita then follows Rabbi Meir alone. But your ruling, which spoke of a fetus found alive that later died, remains internally split.
Key Terms:
- אִם כְּבָר מְצָאוֹ מֵת = if he found it already dead — the reading that saves the baraita for Rabbi Meir
- אֶלָּא לְדִידָךְ קַשְׁיָא = but according to you it remains difficult
Segment 5
TYPE: תירוץ
Rav Chisda: it is all the Rabbis — four simanim were validated
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לְדִידִי נָמֵי לָא קַשְׁיָא, אַרְבָּעָה סִימָנִים אַכְשַׁר בֵּיהּ רַחֲמָנָא.
English Translation:
Rav Ḥisda said to Rava: According to my opinion also it is not difficult, as I claim that the entire baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and although the slaughter of its mother permits the fetus, its own slaughter can also permit it, as the Merciful One considers four simanim to be fit for slaughter, two of the mother and two of the fetus, the fetus being permitted through the cutting of either pair.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Chisda resolves his own ruling: the entire position follows the Rabbis. The mother’s slaughter indeed permits the fetus — which is why, if it dies, it is pure from carcass impurity — and nevertheless its own slaughter is also effective, for the Merciful One validated four simanim in it: the mother’s pair and its own. Inside a tereifa, where the mother’s simanim cannot permit anything, the fetus’s own pair carries the load; hence ‘requires slaughter’ is not Rabbi Meir’s voice but the Rabbis’ own second channel.
Key Terms:
- לְדִידִי נָמֵי לָא קַשְׁיָא = according to my view too it is not difficult
- אַרְבָּעָה סִימָנִים = four simanim — the two channels through which a ben pekua may be permitted
Segment 6
TYPE: עובדא
Rabbi Zeira ascends and hears that Rabbi Yochanan said the same
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כִּי סָלֵיק רַבִּי זֵירָא, אַשְׁכְּחֵיהּ לְרַב אַסִּי דְּיָתֵיב וְקָאָמַר לֵיהּ לְהָא שְׁמַעְתָּא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: יִישַׁר, וְכֵן אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן. מִכְּלָל דִּפְלִיג עֲלֵיהּ רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ?
English Translation:
The Gemara relates: When Rabbi Zeira ascended to Eretz Yisrael, Rav Asi found him sitting and saying this halakha of Rav Ḥisda, i.e., that the Merciful One considers four simanim to be fit for slaughter. Rav Asi said to him: That is correct, and so says Rabbi Yoḥanan. Rabbi Zeira asked him: Can I conclude by inference from your statement that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s colleague, disagrees with him?
קלאוד על הדף:
When Rabbi Zeira went up to Eretz Yisrael, Rav Asi found him reciting this teaching of Rav Chisda — the four simanim. Rav Asi confirmed it: ‘Well said, and so said Rabbi Yochanan.’ Rabbi Zeira probed the confirmation: may I infer that Reish Lakish, Rabbi Yochanan’s constant disputant, disagrees with him on this?
Key Terms:
- כִּי סָלֵיק = when he ascended — immigration from Bavel to Eretz Yisrael
- יִישַׁר = well said — a word of approbation
- מִכְּלָל דִּפְלִיג = does it follow by inference that he disagrees?
Segment 7
TYPE: תשובה מסופקת
Rav Asi cannot say: Reish Lakish paused — or was drinking — and stayed silent
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מִשְׁהָא הֲוָה שָׁהֵי לֵיהּ וְשָׁתֵיק לֵיהּ, וְאִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: מִשְׁתָּא הֲוָה שָׁתֵי וְשָׁתֵיק לֵיהּ.
English Translation:
Rav Asi answered: I do not know, as after Rabbi Yoḥanan made his statement, Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish was waiting for him to see if he would retract, and he therefore remained silent about whether or not he disagreed. But it is possible that after I left, he disagreed. And some say that Rav Asi said: At that time, Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish was drinking, and that is why he remained silent. Therefore, I do not know whether or not he disagreed.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Asi’s answer is a small masterpiece of scholarly honesty: he does not know whether Reish Lakish disputed the ruling. One version: Reish Lakish was waiting to see whether Rabbi Yochanan would retract, and so remained silent. Another version: he was drinking at that moment and stayed silent. Either way, silence is not consent — the question of his position remains open.
Key Terms:
- מִשְׁהָא הֲוָה שָׁהֵי לֵיהּ = he was pausing and waiting for him — silence pending possible retraction
- מִשְׁתָּא הֲוָה שָׁתֵי = he was drinking — the alternative explanation of the silence
Segment 8
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Rabbi Shimon Shezuri versus the first tanna: the animal that stood on the ground
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן שֵׁזוּרִי אוֹמֵר: אֲפִילּוּ וְכוּ׳. הַיְינוּ תַּנָּא קַמָּא! אָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא: הִפְרִיס עַל גַּבֵּי קַרְקַע אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ.
English Translation:
§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: Even if a nine-month-old fetus emerged alive and is now five years old and plowing in the field it does not require slaughter. The Gemara asks: This opinion of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri is identical to that of the first tanna, i.e., the Rabbis. What difference is there between them? Rav Kahana said: The difference between them is a case where the fetus stood upon the ground. According to the opinion of the first tanna, once the fetus walks on the ground there is a rabbinic decree requiring that it be slaughtered before it is consumed, lest people mistakenly permit other animals without slaughter. Rabbi Shimon Shezuri disagrees and holds that it does not require slaughter.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara turns to the mishna: Rabbi Shimon Shezuri’s ‘even five years old and plowing’ seems identical to the Rabbis’ own position — what divides them? Rav Kahana answers: a ben pekua that stood upon the ground. The first tanna holds a rabbinic decree requires its slaughter — onlookers who see it eaten unslaughtered may come to permit ordinary animals; Rabbi Shimon Shezuri requires nothing, the Torah permission standing as is.
Key Terms:
- הַיְינוּ תַּנָּא קַמָּא = this is identical to the first tanna! — the demand for a distinguishing case
- הִפְרִיס עַל גַּבֵּי קַרְקַע = it stood (set its hooves) upon the ground
Segment 9
TYPE: מימרא
Rav Mesharshiyya: the offspring of a ben pekua and an ordinary mother has no remedy
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא: לְדִבְרֵי הָאוֹמֵר חוֹשְׁשִׁין לְזֶרַע הָאָב, בֶּן פְּקוּעָה הַבָּא עַל בְּהֵמָה מְעַלַּיְיתָא – הַוָּלָד אֵין לוֹ תַּקָּנָה.
English Translation:
Rav Mesharshiyya said: According to the statement of the one who says that when defining the status of an animal one needs to be concerned with its paternity, if a ben pekua copulated with a full-fledged animal, the offspring has no rectification. Although when the mother and father are each a ben pekua the offspring is permitted without ritual slaughter, if the father is a ben pekua but the mother is not, the offspring is simultaneously defined as requiring slaughter, based on the mother, and being excluded from the requirement for slaughter, based on the father. Therefore, no act of slaughter can permit it.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Mesharshiyya draws a startling consequence for the view that paternity matters (chosheshin l’zera ha-av): if a male ben pekua mated with an ordinary kosher animal, the offspring ‘has no rectification.’ From its mother’s side it requires shechitah; from its father’s side its own simanim are as if already cut — the father’s channel of slaughter is spent. It simultaneously needs slaughter and cannot be permitted by slaughter, so no act can ever permit it.
Key Terms:
- חוֹשְׁשִׁין לְזֶרַע הָאָב = we are concerned for the father’s seed — paternity shapes the offspring’s status
- אֵין לוֹ תַּקָּנָה = it has no remedy — no procedure can permit it for consumption
Segment 10
TYPE: מימרא
Abaye: everyone concedes in the bizarre cases — people remember a wonder
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּקָלוּט בֶּן פְּקוּעָה שֶׁמּוּתָּר, מַאי טַעְמָא? כֹּל מִלְּתָא דִּתְמִיהָא מִידְכָּר דְּכִירִי לַהּ אִינָשֵׁי. אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּקָלוּט בֶּן קְלוּטָה בֶּן פְּקוּעָה שֶׁמּוּתָּר, מַאי טַעְמָא? תְּרֵי תְּמִיהֵי מִידְכָּר דְּכִירִי אִינָשֵׁי.
English Translation:
Abaye says: Everyone, i.e., even the first tanna, who requires the slaughter of a ben pekua that stood upon the ground, agrees with regard to a ben pekua with non-cloven hooves that was found inside a kosher animal, that it is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of its mother. What is the reason for this? It is that people remember any bizarre matter, and there is no concern that if it is permitted without slaughter, people will mistakenly permit regular animals without slaughter. Some say that Abaye said: Everyone agrees with regard to a ben pekua with non-cloven hooves found inside an animal with non-cloven hooves that was itself born to a kosher animal, that the fetus is permitted without slaughter even if it stood on the ground. What is the reason? It is that people remember two bizarre matters.
קלאוד על הדף:
Abaye carves an exception to the first tanna’s decree: all concede that a kalut ben pekua — one with uncloven, solid hooves, found inside a kosher cloven-hoofed mother — is permitted without slaughter even after standing on the ground. The decree exists to prevent onlookers from generalizing; but people remember anything bizarre, and no one will infer from a solid-hoofed ox that ordinary animals need no shechitah. A second version requires two wonders — a kalut born of a kalutah that was herself a ben pekua — before the concession applies.
Key Terms:
- קָלוּט = an animal with uncloven, solid hooves — an anomaly in a kosher species
- כֹּל מִלְּתָא דִּתְמִיהָא מִידְכָּר דְּכִירִי לַהּ אִינָשֵׁי = people remember anything astonishing — a marvel will not mislead onlookers
Segment 11
TYPE: פסק
Ze’eiri in Rabbi Chanina’s name: the halacha follows Rabbi Shimon Shezuri
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר זְעֵירִי אָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן שֵׁזוּרִי, וְכֵן הָיָה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן שֵׁזוּרִי מַתִּיר בִּבְנוֹ וּבֶן בְּנוֹ עַד סוֹף כׇּל הַדּוֹרוֹת. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: הוּא מוּתָּר, וּבְנוֹ אָסוּר.
English Translation:
Ze’eiri says that Rabbi Ḥanina says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Shezuri that a ben pekua is permitted without slaughter even if it stood upon the ground. And similarly, Rabbi Shimon Shezuri would permit without slaughter the offspring of a ben pekua and the offspring of its offspring, and so on to the end of all future generations. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It, the ben pekua itself, is permitted, but its offspring is prohibited unless it is slaughtered.
קלאוד על הדף:
Ze’eiri reports in the name of Rabbi Chanina that the halacha follows Rabbi Shimon Shezuri — a ben pekua that stood on the ground needs no slaughter — and that Rabbi Shimon Shezuri would permit likewise its son and its son’s son to the end of all generations. Rabbi Yochanan narrows the ruling: the ben pekua itself is permitted, but its offspring is forbidden without slaughter.
Key Terms:
- הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן שֵׁזוּרִי = the halacha follows Rabbi Shimon Shezuri
- עַד סוֹף כׇּל הַדּוֹרוֹת = to the end of all the generations — the permission descends through the line
Segment 12
TYPE: עובדא
Adda bar Chavu’s bear-mauled ben pekua: Rav Ashi orders it slaughtered
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אַדָּא בַּר חָבוּ הֲוָה לֵיהּ בֶּן פְּקוּעָה דִּנְפַל דֵּיבָא עֲלֵיהּ, אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב אָשֵׁי. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: זִיל שַׁחְטֵיהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָאָמַר זְעֵירִי אָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן שֵׁזוּרִי, וְכֵן הָיָה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן שֵׁזוּרִי מַתִּיר בִּבְנוֹ וּבֶן בְּנוֹ עַד סוֹף כׇּל הַדּוֹרוֹת, וַאֲפִילּוּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לָא קָאָמַר אֶלָּא בְּנוֹ, אֲבָל אִיהוּ לָא!
English Translation:
The Gemara relates: Adda bar Ḥavu had a ben pekua that was attacked by a bear and was about to die. He came before Rav Ashi to inquire what to do. Rav Ashi said to him: Go and slaughter it before it dies so that you can eat it, in accordance with the opinion of the first tanna that if a ben pekua stood upon the ground it requires slaughter. Adda bar Ḥavu said to Rav Ashi: But doesn’t Ze’eiri say that Rabbi Ḥanina says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri that a ben pekua is permitted without slaughter even if it stood upon the ground, and similarly, Rabbi Shimon Shezuri would permit without slaughter the offspring of a ben pekua and the offspring of its offspring, and so on to the end of all future generations? And even Rabbi Yoḥanan, who disagreed, said his dissenting opinion only with regard to its offspring, but with regard to a ben pekua itself, he did not disagree that it is permitted.
קלאוד על הדף:
A living test case: Adda bar Chavu owned a ben pekua that a bear attacked, and it was dying. Rav Ashi told him: go slaughter it — implying that a grounded ben pekua requires shechitah, like the first tanna. Adda bar Chavu objected from Ze’eiri’s ruling: the halacha follows Rabbi Shimon Shezuri, who permits the ben pekua and its descendants forever — and even Rabbi Yochanan disagreed only about the offspring, conceding that the ben pekua itself is permitted!
Key Terms:
- דִּנְפַל דֵּיבָא עֲלֵיהּ = a bear (deiva) fell upon it — the animal was mortally mauled
- זִיל שַׁחְטֵיהּ = go, slaughter it — Rav Ashi’s practical instruction
Segment 13
TYPE: תירוץ
Rav Ashi reinterprets Rabbi Yochanan: he spoke within Rabbi Shimon Shezuri’s view
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן שֵׁזוּרִי קָאָמַר.
English Translation:
Rav Ashi said to Adda bar Ḥavu: Rabbi Yoḥanan was speaking according to the statement of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri, i.e., he said that even Rabbi Shimon Shezuri permits only a ben pekua itself, but not its offspring. But Rabbi Yoḥanan himself agrees with the first tanna that a ben pekua that stood upon the ground is prohibited without slaughter.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Ashi parries the first objection by rereading Rabbi Yochanan: when he said ‘it is permitted but its son is forbidden,’ he was not ruling — he was glossing Rabbi Shimon Shezuri, limiting even that tanna’s permission to the ben pekua itself and not its offspring. Rabbi Yochanan’s own position, however, follows the first tanna: a ben pekua that stood on the ground requires slaughter.
Key Terms:
- לְדִבְרֵי… קָאָמַר = he spoke within the other’s opinion — explicating a view without endorsing it
- אִיהוּ = it itself — the ben pekua as opposed to its offspring
Segment 14
TYPE: קושיא
But Rabbi Chanina’s rule is global: wherever Shezuri taught, the halacha follows him!
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהָאָמַר רָבִין בַּר חֲנִינָא אָמַר עוּלָּא אָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן שֵׁזוּרִי, וְלֹא עוֹד, אֶלָּא כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁשָּׁנָה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן שֵׁזוּרִי בְּמִשְׁנָתֵנוּ – הֲלָכָה כְּמוֹתוֹ!
English Translation:
Adda bar Ḥavu persisted: But didn’t Ravin bar Ḥanina say that Ulla says that Rabbi Ḥanina says with regard to a different issue: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri; and moreover, not only is the halakha in accordance with his opinion with regard to this matter, but in any place where Rabbi Shimon Shezuri taught a halakha in our Mishna, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion?
קלאוד על הדף:
Adda bar Chavu persists with a stronger source: Ravin bar Chanina in the name of Ulla in the name of Rabbi Chanina — the halacha follows Rabbi Shimon Shezuri, and moreover, wherever Rabbi Shimon Shezuri taught in our Mishna, the halacha follows him. A global rule of psak should certainly cover the ben pekua.
Key Terms:
- וְלֹא עוֹד אֶלָּא = and moreover — escalating the force of the source
- כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁשָּׁנָה… הֲלָכָה כְּמוֹתוֹ = wherever he taught in our Mishna, the halacha follows him
Segment 15
TYPE: תירוץ ופסק
Rav Ashi: I hold like Rabbi Yonatan — Shezuri prevails only in two cases
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֲנָא כִּי הָא סְבִירָא לִי, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן שֵׁזוּרִי בִּמְסוּכָּן, וּבִתְרוּמַת מַעֲשֵׂר שֶׁל דְּמַאי.
English Translation:
Rav Ashi said to Adda bar Ḥavu: I hold in accordance with this statement of Rabbi Yonatan, as Rabbi Yonatan says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri in the case of one who is dangerously ill, and in the case of teruma of the tithe of doubtfully tithed produce [demai], but not in other cases, e.g., in the case of his disagreement with the first tanna concerning a ben pekua.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Ashi stands his ground by choosing a competing rule of psak: Rabbi Yonatan’s, that the halacha follows Rabbi Shimon Shezuri in exactly two places — the dangerously ill man (mesukan) and terumat ma’aser of demai — and nowhere else. The ben pekua is not among them, so the grounded ben pekua requires slaughter, as he instructed. The Gemara now cites the two mishnayot.
Key Terms:
- אֲנָא כִּי הָא סְבִירָא לִי = I hold in accordance with this — selecting between competing rules of decision
- מְסוּכָּן = one who is dangerously ill
Segment 16
TYPE: ראיה ממשנה
The mesukan case: writing a get on an implied instruction
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מְסוּכָּן, דִּתְנַן: בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה הָיוּ אוֹמְרִים, הַיּוֹצֵא בְּקוֹלָר וְאָמַר: ״כִּתְבוּ גֵּט לְאִשְׁתִּי״, הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ יִכְתְּבוּ וְיִתְּנוּ. חָזְרוּ לוֹמַר: אַף הַמְפָרֵשׁ וְהַיּוֹצֵא בִּשְׁיָירָא. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן שֵׁזוּרִי אוֹמֵר: אַף הַמְסוּכָּן.
English Translation:
The Gemara now elaborates on these two cases. The case of one who is dangerously ill is as we learned in a mishna (Gittin 65b): Initially, the Sages would say that in the case of one who is taken out in a neck chain [bekolar] to be executed and who said: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, these people who hear should write the document and give it to her. Although there was no explicit instruction to give it to her, this is understood to have been his intention, in order to release her from the obligation to perform levirate marriage or the ritual through which she becomes free of her levirate bonds [ḥalitza]. They then said that this halakha applies even to one who sets sail and one who departs in a caravan to a distant place. A bill of divorce is given to his wife under these circumstances even if her husband said only: Write a bill of divorce for my wife. Rabbi Shimon ben Shezuri says: Even in the case of one who is dangerously ill who gives that instruction, they write the bill of divorce and give it to his wife.
קלאוד על הדף:
The first of Shezuri’s two prevailing rulings, from Gittin: originally the Sages said that a man led out in the execution collar who says ‘write a get for my wife’ — they write and give it, his intention to deliver being obvious. They extended this to one setting sail or leaving with a caravan. Rabbi Shimon Shezuri extended it further: even a dangerously ill man’s bare instruction to ‘write’ implies ‘and give,’ sparing his wife the levirate bond.
Key Terms:
- הַיּוֹצֵא בְּקוֹלָר = one led out in a neck-chain to execution
- כִּתְבוּ גֵּט לְאִשְׁתִּי = ‘write a get for my wife’ — the bare instruction understood to include delivery
Segment 17
TYPE: ראיה ממשנה
The demai case: relying on the am ha’aretz’s word
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תְּרוּמַת מַעֲשֵׂר שֶׁל דְּמַאי, דִּתְנַן: תְּרוּמַת מַעֲשֵׂר שֶׁל דְּמַאי שֶׁחָזְרָה לִמְקוֹמָהּ, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן שֵׁזוּרִי אוֹמֵר: אַף בַּחוֹל שׁוֹאֲלוֹ וְאוֹכְלוֹ עַל פִּיו.
English Translation:
The case of teruma of the tithe of demai is as we learned in a mishna (Demai 4:1): With regard to teruma of the tithe of demai, i.e., teruma of the tithe that was separated from the produce of an am ha’aretz, who is suspected of not separating tithes properly, that fell and returned to its original place, becoming mingled with the rest of produce from which it had been separated, Rabbi Shimon ben Shezuri says: Even on a weekday one may ask the am ha’aretz whether or not he separated the necessary tithes and then eat based on his statement.
קלאוד על הדף:
The second prevailing ruling, from Demai: terumat ma’aser separated from doubtfully tithed produce that fell back into the pile it came from. Rabbi Shimon Shezuri permits asking the am ha’aretz — even on a weekday, when no Shabbat-honor leniency operates — whether he had in fact tithed, and eating on the strength of his answer. In these two mishnayot alone, per Rabbi Yonatan, does the halacha follow Rabbi Shimon Shezuri; the daf thus ends by settling the practical law of the grounded ben pekua in favor of requiring slaughter.
Key Terms:
- דְּמַאי = doubtfully tithed produce bought from an am ha’aretz
- שׁוֹאֲלוֹ וְאוֹכְלוֹ עַל פִּיו = one may ask him and eat on his word