Chullin Daf 39 (חולין דף ל״ט)
Daf: 39 | Amudim: 39a – 39b | Date: Loading...
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (39a)
Segment 1
TYPE: גמרא
Conclusion of the previous sugya: framing the three-way dispute about whose intent matters
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לָא יָלְפִינַן. וַאֲתָא רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר לְמֵימַר: יָלְפִינַן חוּץ מִפְּנִים, וַאֲתָא רַבִּי יוֹסֵי לְמֵימַר: אֲפִילּוּ בִּפְנִים נָמֵי ״זֶה מְחַשֵּׁב וְזֶה עוֹבֵד״ לָא אָמְרִינַן.
English Translation:
we do not derive in this manner. And Rabbi Eliezer comes to say that we derive the halakhot of non-sacred slaughter outside the Temple from the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple, and therefore the intent of the gentile invalidates non-sacred slaughter. And Rabbi Yosei comes to say that even inside the Temple, in a case where this owner has improper intent and that other person is performing the slaughter, we do not say that the intent of the owner invalidates the slaughter.
קלאוד על הדף:
This segment closes the previous discussion by mapping out the three positions in the mishna on whose intent disqualifies a slaughter. The anonymous first opinion holds we do not derive non-sacred slaughter (חוץ) from Temple slaughter (פנים), so a gentile’s idolatrous intent is irrelevant. Rabbi Eliezer derives חוץ from פנים, so the gentile’s intent does invalidate. Rabbi Yosei makes the boldest claim: even inside the Temple, when “this one intends and that one performs the service” (זה מחשב וזה עובד), the non-performer’s intent never disqualifies — only the actual servicer’s mind matters.
Key Terms:
- חוץ מפנים = deriving the laws of non-sacred slaughter “outside” the Temple from the laws of sacrificial slaughter “inside” the Temple
- זה מחשב וזה עובד = “this one has the intent and that one performs the service” — a case where the owner’s improper thought is separate from the person actually doing the rite
Segment 2
TYPE: גמרא
An Amoraic dispute: slaughtering with intent to perform a later rite for idol worship
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִתְּמַר: הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַבְּהֵמָה לִזְרוֹק דָּמָהּ לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, וּלְהַקְטִיר חֶלְבָּהּ לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה – רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: פְּסוּלָה, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ אָמַר: מוּתֶּרֶת.
English Translation:
§ It was stated that there is an amoraic dispute with regard to one who slaughtered an animal in order to sprinkle its blood for idol worship, or to burn its fat for idol worship. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The slaughter is not valid, and benefit from the animal is forbidden. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: The slaughter is valid and deriving benefit from the animal is permitted.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara now opens the central machloket of the daf. A Jew slaughters a non-sacred animal properly, but at the moment of slaughter intends to later sprinkle its blood or burn its fat for idol worship. The improper intent attaches to a future rite (sprinkling/burning), not to the act of slaughter itself. Rabbi Yoḥanan rules the slaughter invalid and the animal forbidden; Reish Lakish rules it valid and permitted. The question turns on two principles that the next segments unpack.
Key Terms:
- לזרוק דמה = to sprinkle/throw its blood (a sacrificial rite, here directed toward idolatry)
- להקטיר חלבה = to burn its fat (another sacrificial rite)
- פסולה / מותרת = invalid (and forbidden) / permitted
Segment 3
TYPE: גמרא
Rabbi Yoḥanan’s reasoning: transfer of intent across rites, and deriving חוץ from פנים
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר פְּסוּלָה: מְחַשְּׁבִין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה, וְיָלְפִינַן חוּץ מִפְּנִים.
English Translation:
The Gemara elaborates. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The slaughter is not valid and benefit from the animal is forbidden. He holds that one transfers intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite. If, while slaughtering a sacrificial animal, one intends to perform one of the other sacrificial rites in an improper manner the offering is invalidated. And Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that we derive the halakhot of non-sacred slaughter outside the Temple from the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple. Since that intent invalidates the slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple, it invalidates the slaughter of non-sacred animals outside the Temple as well.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling rests on two distinct principles that must both be true. First, מחשבין מעבודה לעבודה — improper intent regarding one rite (here, the future sprinkling) attaches to and disqualifies the rite one is currently performing (the slaughter). Second, ילפינן חוץ מפנים — this disqualifying mechanism, which is native to Temple offerings, is exported to govern non-sacred slaughter outside as well. Only with both links does the chain run from “idolatrous intent about sprinkling” all the way to “this non-sacred slaughter is forbidden.”
Key Terms:
- מחשבין מעבודה לעבודה = intent regarding one sacrificial rite is “transferred” to disqualify the rite currently being performed
- עבודה = a sacrificial rite (slaughter, receiving the blood, conveying it, sprinkling it)
Segment 4
TYPE: גמרא
Reish Lakish’s reasoning: no transfer of intent, and no derivation of חוץ from פנים
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר מוּתֶּרֶת: אֵין מְחַשְּׁבִין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה, וְלָא גָּמְרִינַן חוּץ מִפְּנִים.
English Translation:
Reish Lakish says: The slaughter is valid, and deriving benefit from the animal is permitted. He holds that one does not transfer intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite. Therefore, while slaughtering the animal, only intent to perform the slaughter improperly invalidates the offering, but intent to perform another sacrificial rite improperly does not invalidate the offering. And Reish Lakish holds that we do not derive the halakhot of non-sacred slaughter outside the Temple from the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple.
קלאוד על הדף:
Reish Lakish denies both of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s premises. He holds אין מחשבין מעבודה לעבודה — intent about a future rite cannot reach back to taint the present one, so only idolatrous intent during the slaughter act itself could matter. And even granting some disqualifying mechanism inside the Temple, לא גמרינן חוץ מפנים — non-sacred slaughter is simply not learned from sacrificial law. With both links severed, the animal is permitted.
Key Terms:
- אין מחשבין מעבודה לעבודה = intent regarding one rite does not transfer to disqualify the rite being performed
- לא גמרינן = we do not derive (one body of law from another)
Segment 5
TYPE: גמרא
The two follow their consistent line of reasoning, shown in a parallel dispute about shelo lishmah
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאָזְדוּ לְטַעְמַיְיהוּ, דְּאִתְּמַר: שְׁחָטָהּ לִשְׁמָהּ לִזְרוֹק דָּמָהּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ – רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: פְּסוּלָה, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ אָמַר: כְּשֵׁרָה.
English Translation:
And Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish follow their standard line of reasoning, as it was stated: If one slaughtered a sin offering for its own sake, but with intent to sprinkle its blood not for its own sake but for the sake of another type of offering, Rabbi Yoḥanan says that the offering is unfit, and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says that the offering is fit.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara shows the dispute is principled, not local: the same two Amoraim argue identically in a purely-Temple case. Here a sin offering is slaughtered lishmah (for its own sake) but with intent to sprinkle its blood shelo lishmah (for the sake of a different offering). The improper intent again sits on a future rite. Rabbi Yoḥanan disqualifies (intent transfers); Reish Lakish validates (it does not). Their consistency (אזדו לטעמייהו) confirms the real fault line is מחשבין מעבודה לעבודה.
Key Terms:
- אזדו לטעמייהו = “they follow their (own) reasoning” — each Amora rules consistently across related cases
- לשמה / שלא לשמה = for its own (designated) sake / not for its own sake (for a different offering)
Segment 6
TYPE: גמרא
The source of the dispute in the Temple case: whether to learn from the law of piggul
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר פְּסוּלָה: מְחַשְּׁבִין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה, וְגָמְרִינַן מִמַּחְשֶׁבֶת פִּיגּוּל. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ אָמַר כְּשֵׁרָה: אֵין מְחַשְּׁבִין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה, וְלָא גָּמְרִינַן מִמַּחְשֶׁבֶת פִּיגּוּל.
English Translation:
The Gemara elaborates: Rabbi Yoḥanan says that the offering is unfit. He holds that one transfers intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite, and the reason is that we derive the halakha of slaughter of a sin offering not for its sake from the halakha of intent for piggul, i.e., performance of one of the sacrificial rites with the intent to sprinkle the blood of the offering beyond its appointed time. And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says that the offering is fit because he holds that one does not transfer intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite, and the reason is that we do not derive the halakha of any other improper intent from the halakha of intent for piggul.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara identifies the textual root of the Temple-case dispute: piggul. In the laws of piggul, intent during one rite (e.g., slaughter) to consume the offering beyond its appointed time disqualifies — so piggul is itself a clear instance of transferred intent. Rabbi Yoḥanan generalizes from piggul that intent transfers across rites for any disqualifying thought; Reish Lakish treats piggul as a unique law that cannot be the source for other categories of improper intent.
Key Terms:
- מחשבת פיגול = the disqualifying intent of piggul — intending, during a rite, to eat or offer the sacrifice beyond its permitted time
- גמרינן ממחשבת פיגול = deriving the broader rule of transferred intent from the specific law of piggul
Segment 7
TYPE: גמרא
Why both disputes are necessary (צריכא): the first half — defending Reish Lakish in the idolatry case
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּצְרִיכָא, דְּאִי אִיתְּמַר בְּהָא, בְּהָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ, מִשּׁוּם דְּחוּץ מִפְּנִים לָא יָלְפִינַן, אֲבָל פְּנִים מִפְּנִים – אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן.
English Translation:
The Gemara notes: And it is necessary to state the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish in both cases. As, if it were stated only with regard to that case of one who slaughters an animal in order to sprinkle its blood for idol worship, perhaps one would conclude that it is specifically in that case that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish states his opinion that the slaughter is valid, due to the fact that we do not derive the halakhot of non-sacred slaughter outside the Temple from the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple. But in the case of one who slaughters an offering for the sake of another offering, where we would be deriving the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple from the halakhot of another case of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple, say that Reish Lakish concedes to Rabbi Yoḥanan that the offering is unfit.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara explains why we needed both statements of the dispute (the classic צריכא move). Had we heard only the idolatry case, we might have thought Reish Lakish validates merely because of the weak link — that non-sacred law (חוץ) is not derived from Temple law (פנים). In the all-Temple case of shelo lishmah, though, where the derivation is פנים from פנים, Reish Lakish might have conceded to Rabbi Yoḥanan that it is disqualified.
Key Terms:
- צריכא = “it is necessary” — both versions of a dispute are required because each teaches something the other would not
- פנים מפנים = deriving one Temple-slaughter law from another Temple-slaughter law (a stronger, internal derivation)
Segment 8
TYPE: גמרא
The second half of צריכא: defending Rabbi Yoḥanan in the Temple case
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאִי אִתְּמַר בְּהָךְ, בְּהַהִיא קָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, אֲבָל בְּהָא – אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ, צְרִיכָא.
English Translation:
And if their dispute was stated with regard to this case of one who slaughters an offering for the sake of another offering, perhaps one would conclude that it is specifically in this case that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that the offering is unfit, because he holds that one derives the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple from the halakhot of another case of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple. But in that case of one who slaughters an animal in order to sprinkle its blood for idol worship, say that Rabbi Yoḥanan concedes to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish that the offering is fit due to the fact that the halakhot of non-sacred slaughter outside the Temple are not derived from the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple. Therefore, it is necessary to state the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish in both cases.
קלאוד על הדף:
The mirror image: had we heard only the Temple shelo lishmah dispute, we might have thought Rabbi Yoḥanan disqualifies only because the derivation there is the robust פנים from פנים. In the idolatry case, which requires the weaker חוץ from פנים, we might have expected Rabbi Yoḥanan to concede to Reish Lakish that the animal is permitted. Since each scenario could have been read narrowly, both statements are genuinely necessary — צריכא.
Key Terms:
- מודי ליה = “he concedes to him” — the hypothetical that one Amora would agree with the other in a given case
- בהך / בהא = “in that (case)” / “in this (case)” — pointing to the two scenarios being compared
Segment 9
TYPE: קושיא
Rav Sheshet objects from Rabbi Yosei’s kal vaḥomer in the mishna
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מֵתִיב רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: קַל וָחוֹמֶר הַדְּבָרִים, וּמָה בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁמַּחְשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁין – אֵין הַכֹּל הוֹלֵךְ אֶלָּא אַחַר הָעוֹבֵד, מְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין מַחְשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת בְּחוּלִּין – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא הַכֹּל הוֹלֵךְ אֶלָּא אַחַר הַשּׁוֹחֵט?
English Translation:
Rav Sheshet raises an objection to both Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish from the statement in the mishna with regard to one who slaughters for a gentile when the intent of the gentile is for idol worship. Rabbi Yosei says: The matter of the intent of the gentile is irrelevant in this case as can be derived by means of an a fortiori inference. If in a place where intent while slaughtering the animal invalidates the slaughter, i.e., in sacrificial animals, such as when slaughtering an offering with the intent to sacrifice it beyond its designated time, everything follows only the intent of the priest performing the service and not the intent of the owner, then in a place where intent does not invalidate the slaughter, i.e., in non-sacred animals, is it not right that everything should follow only the intent of the one who slaughters the animal?
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Sheshet challenges both Amoraim from Rabbi Yosei’s kal vaḥomer in the mishna. Rabbi Yosei argued: in the Temple, “where intent disqualifies,” only the performer’s mind counts, not the owner’s; all the more so for non-sacred animals, “where intent does not disqualify,” only the slaughterer’s mind should count. The phrases “where intent disqualifies” (Temple) and “where intent does not disqualify” (chullin) are ambiguous, and the next segments probe exactly what Rabbi Yosei meant — which will determine whether his statement clashes with Rabbi Yoḥanan, with Reish Lakish, or with neither.
Key Terms:
- קל וחומר = an a fortiori inference, from a lenient case to a stringent one (or vice versa)
- אין הכל הולך אלא אחר העובד = “everything follows only the one performing the service” — only the actual servicer’s intent matters
- מוקדשין / חולין = consecrated (sacrificial) animals / non-sacred animals
Segment 10
TYPE: גמרא
Clarifying the phrase “intent does not disqualify in chullin” — rejecting the literal reading
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַאי ״אֵין מַחְשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת בְּחוּלִּין״? אִילֵּימָא דְּלָא פָּסְלָה כְּלָל, אֶלָּא זְבִיחָה דַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה דְּמִיתַּסְרָא, הֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ?
English Translation:
Rav Sheshet elaborates: What is the meaning of: Intent does not invalidate the slaughter in non-sacred animals? If we say that it means that intent does not invalidate the slaughter of non-sacred animals at all, but then how can you find a case of slaughter with intent for idol worship where the animal is forbidden?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara dismisses the most literal reading of Rabbi Yosei. If “intent never disqualifies non-sacred animals” meant intent is wholly inoperative in chullin, the mishna’s own ruling — that slaughter with idolatrous intent (זביחה דעבודה זרה) is forbidden — would be impossible to explain. So Rabbi Yosei cannot mean that intent has no power at all in non-sacred slaughter; he must mean something narrower.
Key Terms:
- אילימא = “if you were to say” — introducing a reading the Gemara will reject
- זביחה דעבודה זרה = slaughter performed with intent for idol worship
- היכי משכחת לה = “how can you find it?” — i.e., the proposed reading produces an impossible result
Segment 11
TYPE: תירוץ
Reinterpreting Rabbi Yosei: “intent does not disqualify” means it does not transfer between rites
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה, וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: וּמָה בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁמַּחְשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה – אֵין הַכֹּל הוֹלֵךְ אֶלָּא אַחַר הָעוֹבֵד, מְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין מַחְשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת בְּחוּלִּין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה, אֶלָּא בְּאוֹתָהּ עֲבוֹדָה – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא הַכֹּל הוֹלֵךְ אֶלָּא אַחַר הַשּׁוֹחֵט?
English Translation:
Rather, it is obvious that the meaning of that phrase in the statement of Rabbi Yosei is that one does not transfer intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite, and this is what Rabbi Yosei is saying: If in a place where intent invalidates, i.e., in sacrificial animals, from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite, everything follows only the intent of the one performing the slaughter, and the intent of the owners is irrelevant, in a place where intent does not invalidate, i.e., in non-sacred animals, from one rite to another rite but it does so only within the same rite, is it not right that everything should follow only the intent of the one who slaughters the animal?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara settles on a reading: the contrast is about whether intent transfers between rites. In the Temple, intent disqualifies even מעבודה לעבודה (from one rite to another); in chullin, intent disqualifies only באותה עבודה (within the same rite being performed), not across rites. On this reading Rabbi Yosei affirms transferred intent inside the Temple but denies it for non-sacred slaughter — which is exactly what generates the problem the next segment spells out.
Key Terms:
- פשיטא = “it is obvious” — the Gemara’s confident adoption of the remaining interpretation
- באותה עבודה = “within that same rite” — disqualifying intent confined to the very rite being performed, not spilling over to another
Segment 12
TYPE: קושיא
The reinterpretation creates a difficulty for BOTH Amoraim
Hebrew/Aramaic:
פְּנִים קַשְׁיָא לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ, חוּץ קַשְׁיָא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן!
English Translation:
According to this understanding of the contention of Rabbi Yosei in the mishna, the case of the slaughter of a sacrificial animal inside the Temple is difficult for Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, as contrary to his opinion, Rabbi Yosei says that in that case one transfers intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite. The case of slaughter of a non-sacred animal outside the Temple is difficult for Rabbi Yoḥanan, as contrary to his opinion, Rabbi Yosei says that in that case one does not transfer intent from one rite to another rite.
קלאוד על הדף:
The reinterpretation cuts both ways and wounds each Amora on a different flank. On the Temple side (פנים), Rabbi Yosei now affirms transferred intent — contradicting Reish Lakish, who denies it. On the non-sacred side (חוץ), Rabbi Yosei denies transferred intent — contradicting Rabbi Yoḥanan, who applies it to chullin. The mishna thus appears to refute each of them in turn.
Key Terms:
- קשיא = “it is difficult” — a standing objection that has not yet been resolved
- פנים / חוץ = the inside-the-Temple case / the outside-the-Temple (non-sacred) case
Segment 13
TYPE: תירוץ
Resolving the difficulty for Reish Lakish (he retracted); the difficulty for Rabbi Yoḥanan remains
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בִּשְׁלָמָא פְּנִים, לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא מִקַּמֵּי דְּשַׁמְעַהּ מֵרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, הָא לְבָתַר דְּשַׁמְעַהּ מֵרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן. אֶלָּא חוּץ, קַשְׁיָא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן!
English Translation:
Rav Sheshet continues: Granted, the case of inside the Temple is not difficult for Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, because one can explain that he stated this statement that one does not transfer intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite before he heard the mishna from Rabbi Yoḥanan, his teacher, and he stated that one transfers intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite after he heard the mishna from Rabbi Yoḥanan. His dispute with Rabbi Yoḥanan is limited to transfer of intent for idol worship from rite to rite. But the case of slaughter of a non-sacred animal outside the Temple is difficult for Rabbi Yoḥanan.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Temple-side problem against Reish Lakish dissolves easily: since Rabbi Yoḥanan was his teacher, we can say Reish Lakish denied transferred intent only before he learned this mishna from Rabbi Yoḥanan, and accepted it afterward (his recorded dispute being limited to the idolatry case). But the חוץ problem against Rabbi Yoḥanan cannot be dispatched so easily, because Rabbi Yosei’s mishna squarely denies transferred intent in chullin — exactly where Rabbi Yoḥanan affirms it. This sets up Rav Sheshet’s own resolution in the next segment.
Key Terms:
- בשלמא = “granted” — conceding that one half of a difficulty can be answered, while pressing the other half
- מקמי דשמעה / לבתר דשמעה = “before he heard it / after he heard it” — distinguishing an Amora’s earlier and later positions
Segment 14
TYPE: תירוץ
Rav Sheshet’s own resolution: Rabbi Yosei contrasts four rites (Temple) with two rites (chullin)
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הוּא מוֹתֵיב לַהּ וְהוּא מְפָרֵק לַהּ, בְּאַרְבַּע עֲבוֹדוֹת, וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: וּמָה בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁמַּחְשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁין בְּאַרְבַּע עֲבוֹדוֹת – אֵין הַכֹּל הוֹלֵךְ אֶלָּא אַחַר הָעוֹבֵד,
English Translation:
Rav Sheshet raises the objection, and he resolves it. That which Rabbi Yosei said, that intent inside the Temple disqualifies the slaughter of a sacrificial animal but intent outside the Temple does not disqualify the slaughter of a non-sacred animal, is unrelated to transfer of intent from one rite to another. Rather, Rabbi Yosei is referring to a case where one performed any of the four sacrificial rites with improper intent, e.g., to eat the offering beyond its appointed time. And this is what Rabbi Yosei is saying: If in a place where intent while slaughtering the animal invalidates the slaughter in sacrificial animals, if that intent was during performance of any of the four sacrificial rites, i.e., slaughter, receiving the blood, conveying the blood to the altar, and sprinkling the blood on the altar, everything follows only the intent of the priest performing the service and not the intent of the owner,
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Sheshet now retracts the rite-transfer reading entirely (הוא מותיב לה והוא מפרק לה — “he raised it and he resolves it”). Rabbi Yosei’s contrast is not about whether intent transfers, but about how many rites are vulnerable to disqualifying intent. In the Temple, intent can disqualify during all four sacrificial rites — slaughter, kabbalah (receiving the blood), holakhah (conveying it), and zerikah (sprinkling). Because intent has such broad reach there yet still only the performer’s mind counts, the kal vaḥomer can run to chullin (concluded in 39b segment 1). On this reading Rabbi Yosei says nothing about transferred intent, so neither Amora is contradicted.
Key Terms:
- הוא מותיב לה והוא מפרק לה = “he raises the objection and he resolves it” — the same sage poses and answers the difficulty
- ארבע עבודות = the four sacrificial rites: שחיטה (slaughter), קבלה (receiving the blood), הולכה (conveying), זריקה (sprinkling)
Amud Bet (39b)
Segment 1
TYPE: תירוץ
Conclusion of Rav Sheshet’s resolution: in chullin only two rites are vulnerable
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין מַחְשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת בְּחוּלִּין אֶלָּא בִּשְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא הַכֹּל הוֹלֵךְ אֶלָּא אַחַר הַשּׁוֹחֵט.
English Translation:
then in a place where intent invalidates the slaughter in non-sacred animals slaughtered with intent for idol worship during performance of only two sacrificial rites, slaughter and sprinkling the blood, is it not right that everything should follow only the intent of the one who slaughters the animal?
קלאוד על הדף:
This completes Rav Sheshet’s reread of Rabbi Yosei’s kal vaḥomer. In non-sacred slaughter directed toward idolatry, only two acts can carry disqualifying intent — slaughter and sprinkling — a far narrower exposure than the Temple’s four rites. The inference then runs: if even where intent has wide reach (Temple, four rites) only the performer’s mind matters, then where intent has narrow reach (chullin, two rites) certainly only the slaughterer’s mind matters and the owner’s idolatrous intent is irrelevant. Read this way, Rabbi Yosei makes no claim about transferred intent, so the objection against Rabbi Yoḥanan falls away.
Key Terms:
- שתי עבודות = the two rites relevant to idolatrous non-sacred slaughter: slaughter (שחיטה) and sprinkling the blood (זריקה)
- אינו דין = “is it not logical?” — the rhetorical conclusion of a kal vaḥomer
Segment 2
TYPE: ברייתא
A baraita supports Rabbi Yoḥanan — and introduces the incident in Caesarea
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תַּנְיָא כְּוָותֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַבְּהֵמָה לִזְרוֹק דָּמָהּ לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה וּלְהַקְטִיר חֶלְבָּהּ לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ זִבְחֵי מֵתִים. שְׁחָטָהּ וְאַחַר כָּךְ חִישֵּׁב עָלֶיהָ – זֶה הָיָה מַעֲשֶׂה בְּקֵיסָרִי, וְלֹא אָמְרוּ בָּהּ לֹא אִיסּוּר וְלֹא הֶיתֵּר.
English Translation:
It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: With regard to one who slaughters an animal in order to sprinkle its blood for idol worship or to burn its fat for idol worship, the status of these animals is that of offerings to the dead, i.e., to idols, and the slaughter is not valid. If one slaughtered the animal and thereafter intended in its regard to sprinkle its blood or burn its fats for idol worship, that was the incident in Caesarea, and the Sages did not say anything with regard to the animal, neither prohibition nor permission.
קלאוד על הדף:
A baraita is cited as direct support (תניא כוותיה) for Rabbi Yoḥanan: slaughtering with intent to later sprinkle or burn for idolatry renders the animal “offerings to the dead” (זבחי מתים), i.e. forbidden. The baraita then adds a striking second clause: where the slaughter was proper and the idolatrous intent arose only afterward (שחטה ואחר כך חישב), that was the famous incident in Caesarea, and the Sages issued no ruling at all — neither forbidding nor permitting. The rest of the amud is a sustained attempt to explain that silence.
Key Terms:
- תניא כוותיה = “a baraita is taught in accordance with him” — Tannaitic support for an Amora’s position
- זבחי מתים = “sacrifices to the dead,” a Biblical term (Psalms 106:28) for idolatrous offerings, hence forbidden
- מעשה בקיסרי = the incident in Caesarea — the case of after-the-fact idolatrous intent
Segment 3
TYPE: גמרא
Rav Ḥisda’s explanation of the Sages’ silence: respect for both opposing views
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: לֹא אָמְרוּ בָּהּ אִיסּוּר – מִשּׁוּם כְּבוֹדָן דְּרַבָּנַן. לֹא הֶיתֵּר – מִשּׁוּם כְּבוֹדוֹ דְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר.
English Translation:
Rav Ḥisda says in explanation of the conduct of the Sages that they did not say prohibition, due to the honor of the Rabbis in the mishna, who hold that the unspecified intent of a gentile, and presumably likewise of a Jew who worships idols, is not presumed to be directed to idol worship, and therefore his slaughter is valid. Nor did the Sages say permission, due to the honor of Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that the unspecified intent of a gentile, and presumably likewise of a Jew who worships idols, is presumed to be directed to idol worship.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Ḥisda reads the Caesarea silence as deliberate deference to the unresolved machloket of the mishna. They withheld a prohibition out of respect for the Rabbanan, who do not presume idolatrous intent and would validate the slaughter; and they withheld a permission out of respect for Rabbi Eliezer, who does presume idolatrous intent and would forbid it. Refusing to rule was itself a way of honoring both schools where the law had not been decided.
Key Terms:
- כבודן דרבנן = “the honor of the Rabbis” — deference to the majority view in the mishna
- כבודו דרבי אליעזר = “the honor of Rabbi Eliezer” — deference to his dissenting stringent view
Segment 4
TYPE: קושיא
Challenging Rav Ḥisda: the Rabbanan might actually permit, and Rabbi Eliezer might not forbid
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מִמַּאי? דִּלְמָא עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמְרִי רַבָּנַן הָתָם, אֶלָּא דְּלָא שְׁמַעְנֵאּ דְּחַשֵּׁיב, אֲבָל הָכָא דִּשְׁמַעְנֵאּ דְּחַשֵּׁיב – הוֹכִיחַ סוֹפוֹ עַל תְּחִלָּתוֹ!
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: From where is that conclusion drawn? Perhaps the Rabbis say that the slaughter is permitted only there in the mishna, because we did not hear explicitly that the gentile intends the slaughter for idol worship. But here in the case in the baraita, where we hear thereafter that he intends to sprinkle the blood or burn the fats for idol worship, perhaps his ultimate statement proves the nature of his original intent while performing the slaughter.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara questions Rav Ḥisda’s whole framing by introducing a new principle: הוכיח סופו על תחילתו — “his end proves his beginning.” Perhaps the Rabbanan permit in the mishna only because nothing revealed idolatrous intent; but in Caesarea, where the man openly voiced idolatrous intent right after slaughtering, even the Rabbanan might infer that the same intent was present during the slaughter, and so forbid. If so, the silence is not explained by “respecting the Rabbanan’s leniency” at all.
Key Terms:
- ממאי = “from where (do you know this)?” — challenging an asserted premise
- הוכיח סופו על תחילתו = “his end proves his beginning” — later conduct/statements reveal the actor’s original intent
Segment 5
TYPE: קושיא
The second prong of the challenge: Rabbi Eliezer’s stringency may be limited to a gentile
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִי נָמֵי, עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הָתָם אֶלָּא גַּבֵּי נׇכְרִי, דִּסְתָם מַחְשֶׁבֶת נׇכְרִי לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, אֲבָל יִשְׂרָאֵל – הוֹכִיחַ סוֹפוֹ עַל תְּחִלָּתוֹ לָא אָמְרִינַן.
English Translation:
Alternatively, perhaps when Rabbi Eliezer states there in the mishna that slaughter performed on behalf of a gentile is not valid, this applies only with regard to an animal that is owned by a gentile, as the unspecified intent of a gentile is directed to idol worship. But in the case in the baraita where the animal belongs to a Jew, we do not say that his ultimate statement proves the nature of his original intent.
קלאוד על הדף:
The flip side of the challenge: maybe Rabbi Eliezer forbids only because a gentile’s unspecified intent is presumed idolatrous (סתם מחשבת נכרי לעבודה זרה). The Caesarea case, however, involved a Jew, and for a Jew we may not invoke “his end proves his beginning.” If so, Rabbi Eliezer too might permit here — and again the Sages’ silence would not be due to “respecting Rabbi Eliezer’s stringency.” Both halves of Rav Ḥisda’s explanation are thus shaken, prompting the search for a better account.
Key Terms:
- אי נמי = “alternatively” — offering a second, independent line of objection
- סתם מחשבת נכרי לעבודה זרה = the unspecified intent of a gentile is presumed to be for idolatry
- גבי נכרי / ישראל = with respect to a gentile / a Jew — the distinction limiting Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling
Segment 6
TYPE: גמרא
Rav Sheizevi’s alternative: the silence honors Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב שֵׁיזְבִי: לֹא אָמְרוּ בָּהּ הֶיתֵּר מִשּׁוּם כְּבוֹדוֹ דְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, הֵי רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל?
English Translation:
Rather, Rav Sheizevi said that the Sages did not state permission with regard to the animal in the baraita due to the honor of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who holds that one’s ultimate actions prove the nature of his original intent. The Gemara asks: Which statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel indicates that this is his opinion?
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Sheizevi reframes the silence around the principle of הוכיח סופו על תחילתו itself. The Sages withheld a permission so as not to override Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who holds that a person’s later conduct reveals his original intent — and would therefore forbid the Caesarea animal, reading the after-the-fact idolatrous intent back into the slaughter. The Gemara immediately demands to know which of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s recorded rulings establishes that he embraces this principle, launching a search through two candidate sources.
Key Terms:
- רב שיזבי = a Babylonian Amora offering the replacement explanation
- הי = “which?” — asking which specific statement of RSb”G is meant
Segment 7
TYPE: גמרא
First candidate source: RSb”G’s ruling on bills of divorce (Gittin)
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִילֵּימָא רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל דְּגִיטִּין, דִּתְנַן: הַבָּרִיא שֶׁאָמַר ״כִּתְבוּ גֵּט לְאִשְׁתִּי״ – רָצָה לְשַׂחֵק בָּהּ.
English Translation:
If we say that the reference is to the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel with regard to bills of divorce, this is difficult. As we learned in a mishna (Gittin 66a) that if a dying man said to the people present: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, those people should write and deliver the bill of divorce to his wife. Although the delivery was not included in his command, that is clearly his intent. But a healthy man who says: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, but did not say: Deliver it to her, presumably sought to mock her and not to designate his listeners as agents of delivery.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara floats its first candidate: a mishna in Gittin. A dying man who says merely “write a get for my wife” is presumed to intend the full giving; a healthy man who says the same, without “and give it,” is presumed only to be joking (רצה לשחק בה), since a healthy man has no reason to send a get. This baseline distinction sets up the incident, cited next, in which a healthy man’s later actions seem to override the joking presumption.
Key Terms:
- בריא = a healthy person (as opposed to a שכיב מרע, one on his deathbed)
- כתבו גט לאשתי = “write a bill of divorce for my wife”
- רצה לשחק בה = “he sought to mock/jest with her” — the default reading of a healthy man’s bare instruction
Segment 8
TYPE: גמרא
The Gittin incident: RSb”G rules based on whether the man jumped or was blown off the roof
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּמַעֲשֶׂה בְּבָרִיא שֶׁאָמַר ״כִּתְבוּ גֵּט לְאִשְׁתִּי״, וְעָלָה לַגָּג וְנָפַל וָמֵת. אָמַר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: אִם מֵעַצְמוֹ נָפַל, הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט, וְאִם הָרוּחַ דָּחַתּוּ, אֵינוֹ גֵּט.
English Translation:
The mishna continues: And there was an incident involving a healthy man who said: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, and then ascended to the roof and fell, and died. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If he fell at his own initiative, taking his own life, it is a valid bill of divorce, as it is clear that he anticipated his death, thereby rendering his halakhic status like that of a dying man. But if the wind forced him to fall and he died, it is not a valid bill of divorce, as there was no clear intent to give her the bill of divorce.
קלאוד על הדף:
The incident: a healthy man ordered a get written, climbed to a roof, fell, and died. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel rules by how he fell — if he jumped of his own will (מעצמו נפל), the get is valid, because his suicide reveals he knew he was dying and his earlier instruction was serious; if the wind blew him off (הרוח דחתו), it is invalid, since nothing connects his death to his words. At first glance this looks like exactly the הוכיח סופו על תחילתו principle Rav Sheizevi needs.
Key Terms:
- מעצמו נפל = he fell of his own initiative (jumped) — revealing prior intent
- הרוח דחתו = the wind pushed him — an accidental death that reveals nothing about intent
- הרי זה גט / אינו גט = it is a valid bill of divorce / it is not a valid bill of divorce
Segment 9
TYPE: קושיא
A prior difficulty on the Gittin mishna: does the incident contradict the ruling?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהָוֵינַן בַּהּ: מַעֲשֶׂה לִסְתּוֹר?
English Translation:
And we discussed the mishna: Did the tanna cite an incident to contradict that which was stated previously in the mishna? The tanna states unequivocally that when a healthy man says: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, the bill of divorce is not valid. The tanna then cites an incident indicating that under certain circumstances, when a healthy man says: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, the bill of divorce is valid.
קלאוד על הדף:
Before this mishna can serve as Rav Sheizevi’s proof, the Gemara recalls a problem already raised about it: a citation that contradicts its own rule (מעשה לסתור). The mishna first says a healthy man’s bare instruction is a joke and yields no valid get — yet the cited incident shows a healthy man’s get can be valid. The internal tension must be resolved before we know what the mishna actually holds.
Key Terms:
- הוינן בה = “we discussed it” — recalling an earlier Talmudic analysis of this source
- מעשה לסתור? = “an incident to contradict?!” — objection that a cited case undermines the stated ruling
Segment 10
TYPE: תירוץ
Resolution: the mishna is incomplete — the principle of הוכיח סופו is built in
Hebrew/Aramaic:
חַסּוֹרֵי מִיחַסְּרָא וְהָכִי קָתָנֵי: אִם הוֹכִיחַ סוֹפוֹ עַל תְּחִלָּתוֹ – הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט, וּמַעֲשֶׂה נָמֵי בְּבָרִיא שֶׁאָמַר ״כִּתְבוּ גֵּט לְאִשְׁתִּי״, וְעָלָה לַגָּג וְנָפַל וָמֵת. אָמַר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: אִם מֵעַצְמוֹ נָפַל – הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט, וְאִם הָרוּחַ דָּחַתּוּ – אֵינוֹ גֵּט.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: The mishna is incomplete and this is what it is teaching: The healthy man who says: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, but did not say: Deliver it to her, presumably sought to mock her. But if his ultimate actions prove the nature of his initial intent, that he seeks to give the bill of divorce because he is about to die, it is a valid bill of divorce. And there was an incident involving a healthy man who said: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, and then ascended to the roof and fell, and died. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: If he fell at his own initiative, it is a valid bill of divorce, but if the wind forced him to fall, it is not a valid bill of divorce.
קלאוד על הדף:
The standard Talmudic repair: חסורי מיחסרא — the mishna is missing a clause, and should read that a healthy man’s bare get is normally a joke, but if his end proves his beginning it is valid. The cited incident then illustrates this added clause rather than contradicting the rule. Crucially, this resolution explicitly anchors Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s roof ruling in the principle of הוכיח סופו על תחילתו — seemingly the proof Rav Sheizevi wanted.
Key Terms:
- חסורי מיחסרא = “it is deficient and incomplete” — emending a terse mishna by supplying its missing premise
- והכי קתני = “and this is what it teaches” — the corrected, fuller reading
Segment 11
TYPE: דחיה
Rejecting the Gittin proof: that case has an explicit prior statement, unlike slaughter
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְדִלְמָא שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּקָאָמַר ״כִּתְבוּ״.
English Translation:
The Gemara explains why this is not a proof: But perhaps the case cited there is different, as the husband initially says: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, indicating that he originally intended to fall from the roof. By contrast, in the case of slaughter, there is no indication of his original intent.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara rejects the Gittin source as a true parallel. There, the man had already made an explicit prior statement (“write a get for my wife”); his later suicide merely confirms and clarifies a stated intent. The slaughter case is different — the slaughterer said nothing at the time, so the after-the-fact idolatrous intent has no prior declaration to clarify. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s get ruling therefore cannot be the source for applying הוכיח סופו to Caesarea, and the Gemara must find a different statement of his.
Key Terms:
- ודלמא שאני התם = “but perhaps it is different there” — distinguishing the proof-case from the case at hand
- דקאמר כתבו = “because he (already) said ‘write’” — the explicit prior statement that the slaughter case lacks
Segment 12
TYPE: גמרא
Ravina’s source: RSb”G on a recipient who refuses inherited slaves (teruma)
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבִינָא: מִשּׁוּם כְּבוֹדוֹ דְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל דְּהָכָא, דְּתַנְיָא: הַכּוֹתֵב נְכָסָיו לַאֲחֵרִים, וְהָיוּ בָּהֶן עֲבָדִים, וְאָמַר הַלָּה ״אִי אֶפְשִׁי בָּהֶן״, אִם הָיָה רַבּוֹ שֵׁנִי כֹּהֵן – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ אוֹכְלִין בִּתְרוּמָה. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: כֵּיוָן שֶׁאָמַר הַלָּה ״אִי אֶפְשִׁי בָּהֶן״ – כְּבָר זָכוּ בָּהֶן יוֹרְשִׁין.
English Translation:
Rather, Ravina said that the Sages did not state permission in the incident in Caesarea with regard to the animal due to the honor of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, to avoid contradicting the opinion that is cited here, as it is taught in a baraita: In a case of a person on his deathbed who wrote a document transferring his property to others, and there were slaves among his property, and that intended recipient says: I do not want to assume ownership of the slaves, if their second master, the intended recipient, was a priest, these slaves may partake of teruma, and his protest is ignored. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Once that intended recipient says: I do not want to assume ownership of the slaves, heirs of the original owner already acquired them.
קלאוד על הדף:
Ravina supplies a better source. A dying man bequeaths property including slaves to a recipient who later protests “I do not want them” (אי אפשי בהן). The first tanna holds the priest-recipient may still feed the slaves teruma — his protest is ignored, so he owns them. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagrees: the protest shows he never wanted them, so the original heirs acquired them instead. Critically, here there is no prior statement by the recipient — exactly like the silent slaughterer — so RSb”G’s position truly rests on הוכיח סופו, making it the right parallel.
Key Terms:
- הכותב נכסיו לאחרים = one who deeds his property to others (typically a שכיב מרע, on his deathbed)
- אי אפשי בהן = “I have no desire for them” — the recipient’s refusal of the slaves
- אוכלין בתרומה = the slaves may eat teruma (because owned by a priest, on the first tanna’s view)
Segment 13
TYPE: קושיא
A prior difficulty on this baraita: does the first tanna really ignore even loud protest?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהָוֵינַן בַּהּ: לְתַנָּא קַמָּא, אֲפִילּוּ עוֹמֵד וְצוֹוֵחַ?
English Translation:
And we discussed the baraita: And according to the first tanna, does the intended recipient acquire the slaves even if he stands and shouts in protest that he does not want to assume ownership of the slaves? That is not reasonable.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara recalls an earlier analysis of this baraita to clarify exactly where RSb”G and the first tanna part ways. Surely the first tanna does not force ownership on a recipient who stands and shouts his refusal (עומד וצווח)? Such open protest should block the acquisition for everyone. The next segment maps out which scenarios are agreed and which are truly disputed.
Key Terms:
- עומד וצווח = “stands and shouts” — vigorously protesting in real time
- לתנא קמא = “according to the first tanna” — testing the unnamed first opinion’s reach
Segment 14
TYPE: תירוץ
Rabba defines the agreed extremes: shout-from-the-start vs. silent-then-shout
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר רַבָּה, וְאִיתֵּימָא רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: בְּצוֹוֵחַ מֵעִיקָּרָא – דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּלָא קָנָה, בְּשׁוֹתֵק וּבַסּוֹף צוֹוֵחַ – דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דִּקְנָה.
English Translation:
Rabba said, and some say it was Rabbi Yoḥanan who said: In a case where he shouts in protest at the outset, while the owner is giving him the gift, everyone agrees that he did not acquire the slaves. In a case where he was silent at that moment and ultimately shouted his protest at a later opportunity, everyone agrees that he acquired the slaves.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabba (or Rabbi Yoḥanan) brackets the two undisputed extremes. If the recipient shouts his refusal from the very start (צווח מעיקרא), all agree he never acquired the slaves. If he was silent when the gift was given and only later shouted (שותק ובסוף צווח), all agree he did acquire them — his belated protest is too late to undo a completed acquisition. The genuine machloket lies in a third, intermediate case, spelled out next.
Key Terms:
- צווח מעיקרא = shouting (protesting) from the outset
- שותק ובסוף צווח = silent at first and shouting only at the end
- כולי עלמא לא פליגי = “all agree” — there is no dispute in these cases
Segment 15
TYPE: גמרא
The disputed middle case: silent at a third-party transfer, then shouting; the first tanna’s view
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כִּי פְּלִיגִי – שֶׁזִּיכָּה לוֹ עַל יְדֵי אַחֵר, וְשָׁתַק וּלְבַסּוֹף צָוַוח; תַּנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: מִדִּשְׁתֵיק – קְנָנְהוּ, וְהַאי דְּקָא צָוַוח – מִיהְדָּר קָא הָדַר בֵּיהּ.
English Translation:
When they disagree it is in a case where the owner transferred ownership of the slaves to him through another person, and at that point the recipient was silent, and ultimately, when he actually received the slaves, he shouted in protest. The first tanna holds: Since he was initially silent, he acquired the slaves, and the fact that he is ultimately shouting indicates that he is retracting his initial acceptance of the gift. That retraction is ineffective, as acquisitions cannot be nullified in that manner.
קלאוד על הדף:
The dispute lives in the middle case: the gift was effected through a third party (זיכה לו על ידי אחר) — a mode that takes effect automatically, even without the recipient’s awareness — and the recipient was silent then but shouted afterward. The first tanna reads the silence as acceptance: he acquired the slaves, and his later shout is a mere retraction (חזרה), which cannot undo a finished acquisition. RSb”G will read the same facts oppositely.
Key Terms:
- זיכה לו על ידי אחר = transferred ownership to him via a third party — effective even without his active consent
- מיהדר קא הדר ביה = “he is (merely) retracting” — an after-the-fact change of mind, legally ineffective once acquisition is complete
Segment 16
TYPE: גמרא
RSb”G’s view: the later protest proves he never accepted — the proof Ravina needed
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל סָבַר: הוֹכִיחַ סוֹפוֹ עַל תְּחִילָּתוֹ, וְהָא דְּלָא צְוַוח מֵעִיקָּרָא, סָבַר: כִּי לָא אָתֵי לִידִי אַמַּאי אֶצְוַוח.
English Translation:
And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds: His ultimate actions prove the nature of his original intent. He never wanted the slaves and always intended to avoid assuming ownership of them. And the fact that he did not shout initially is because he thought: As the situation is that they did not yet enter my possession, why would I shout?
קלאוד על הדף:
This is the linchpin of Ravina’s proof. RSb”G applies הוכיח סופו על תחילתו: the later shout reveals that the recipient never wanted the slaves from the start, so the heirs acquired them. His silence at the third-party transfer is no concession — “as long as they had not yet come into my hands, why should I bother to shout?” Because this ruling depends on reading later conduct back into the silent beginning, with no prior statement involved, it is the genuine analogue to the silent Caesarea slaughterer — and so the Sages withheld a permission out of deference to it.
Key Terms:
- הוכיח סופו על תחילתו = “his end proved his beginning” — RSb”G’s governing principle, now firmly sourced
- כי לא אתי לידי אמאי אצווח = “while they haven’t reached my possession, why should I shout?” — explaining the recipient’s initial silence
Segment 17
TYPE: גמרא
Halachic ruling: the law follows Rabbi Yosei — only the slaughterer’s intent matters
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי.
English Translation:
§ The Gemara resumes discussion of the dispute in the mishna where Rabbi Yosei says that when a Jew slaughters an animal on behalf of a gentile, even if it is known that the intent of the gentile is for idol worship, the slaughter is valid, as it is only the intent of the slaughterer that is relevant. Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei.
קלאוד על הדף:
Returning to the mishna’s three-way dispute, the Gemara fixes the practical halakha: Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel rules like Rabbi Yosei. In practice, then, only the slaughterer’s intent counts; the owner’s idolatrous intent — even when known — does not invalidate a properly performed Jewish slaughter. This ruling governs the two real-world cases that follow.
Key Terms:
- הלכה כרבי יוסי = “the law is like Rabbi Yosei” — a formal halachic ruling
- רב יהודה אמר שמואל = Rav Yehuda transmitting in the name of his teacher Shmuel
Segment 18
TYPE: מעשה
A practical case in Tzikuneya: idolaters keep the blood and fat, the Jews keep meat and hide
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָנְהוּ טַיָּיעֵי דַּאֲתוֹ לְצִיקוֹנְיָא, יְהוּב דִּיכְרֵי לְטַבָּחֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל, אֲמַרוּ לְהוּ: דְּמָא וְתַרְבָּא לְדִידַן, מַשְׁכָּא וּבִישְׂרָא לְדִידְכוּ. שַׁלְחַהּ רַב טוֹבִי בַּר רַב מַתְנָה לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב יוֹסֵף: כִּי הַאי גַּוְונָא מַאי? שְׁלַח לֵיהּ: הָכִי אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי.
English Translation:
The Gemara relates: There were these Arabs who came to Tzikuneya, and they gave rams to Jewish slaughterers. The Arabs said to them: The blood and the fat are for us, for use in our idol worship, and the hide and the flesh are for you. Rav Tuvi bar Rav Mattana sent a question to be asked before Rav Yosef: In a case like this, what is the halakha? Rav Yosef sent to him: This is what Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, and it is the intent of the slaughterer and not the intent of the owner that determines the validity of the slaughter.
קלאוד על הדף:
A live test of the ruling: traveling idolaters in Tzikuneya hand rams to Jewish butchers, openly declaring that the blood and fat (for idol worship) are theirs while the meat and hide go to the Jews. The owners’ intent is explicitly idolatrous, yet Rav Yosef applies Shmuel’s ruling — הלכה כרבי יוסי — so the slaughter is valid and the meat permitted, since only the Jewish slaughterer’s intent matters. The abstract halakha is thus put directly to work.
Key Terms:
- טייעי = traveling Arab merchants (the gentile animal-owners here)
- דמא ותרבא לדידן = “the blood and the fat are for us” — the portions the idolaters wanted for worship
- כי האי גוונא מאי = “in a case like this, what (is the law)?” — the practical query sent to Rav Yosef
Segment 19
TYPE: גמרא
According to Rabbi Eliezer: does a gentile’s payment to a Jewish butcher forbid the meat?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אַוְיָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: לְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, יְהֵיב לֵיהּ זוּזָא לְטַבָּח יִשְׂרָאֵל, מַאי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: חָזֵינַן, אִי אִינִישׁ אַלָּמָא הוּא דְּלָא מָצֵי מְדַחֵי לֵיהּ – אָסוּר, וְאִי לָא – אָמַר לֵיהּ: ״רֵישָׁיךָ וְהַר״.
English Translation:
Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Avya, said to Rav Ashi: According to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in the mishna, that if a Jew slaughters an animal on behalf of a gentile the slaughter is not valid, if the gentile gave a dinar to a Jewish slaughterer in order to purchase a small amount of the meat, what is the halakha? Does that small amount invalidate the entire slaughter? Rav Ashi said to him: We examine the situation. If this gentile is a violent man, and the Jew is unable to repudiate his offer and tell him to take his money, the entire animal is forbidden, because the slaughter was partially on behalf of the gentile. And if the gentile is not violent, the Jew can say to him: Go and arrange a collision between your head and a mountain, as I will not slaughter an animal on your behalf.
קלאוד על הדף:
A theoretical probe into Rabbi Eliezer’s (rejected) view: if an idolater pays a dinar for a share of the meat, does that minority stake taint the whole slaughter? Rav Ashi distinguishes by coercion. If the gentile is a thug whom the Jew cannot rebuff (אלמא), the Jew is effectively slaughtering partly on the gentile’s behalf, and on Rabbi Eliezer’s view the whole animal would be forbidden. If the gentile is not violent, the Jew can simply refuse — “go bang your head against a mountain” (רישיך והר) — and no idolatrous stake attaches at all. The pungent idiom underscores that the Jew bears no compulsion in the ordinary case.
Key Terms:
- זוזא = a zuz/dinar — the coin the gentile pays for a portion of the meat
- איניש אלמא = a violent/powerful person whom one cannot refuse
- רישיך והר = “your head and a mountain” — a dismissive idiom telling the gentile to get lost
Segment 20
TYPE: משנה
A new mishna: slaughtering in worship of natural forces — mountains, seas, rivers, etc.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הַשּׁוֹחֵט לְשֵׁם הָרִים, לְשֵׁם גְּבָעוֹת, לְשֵׁם יַמִּים, לְשֵׁם נְהָרוֹת, לְשֵׁם מִדְבָּרוֹת – שְׁחִיטָתוֹ פְּסוּלָה.
English Translation:
MISHNA: In the case of one who slaughters an animal for the sake of, i.e., to worship, mountains, for the sake of hills, for the sake of seas, for the sake of rivers, or for the sake of wildernesses, his slaughter is not valid.
קלאוד על הדף:
The daf closes with the opening line of a new mishna, shifting from slaughter on behalf of a gentile to slaughter dedicated to created natural forces — mountains, hills, seas, rivers, wildernesses. One who slaughters לשם (for the sake of, i.e., in worship of) any of these has performed an invalid slaughter, since the act is directed toward an object of idolatrous veneration. The following daf will analyze precisely why such slaughter is disqualified and whether the resulting animal is merely unfit or also forbidden in benefit.
Key Terms:
- לשם הרים = “for the sake of (i.e., to worship) mountains” — and likewise hills, seas, rivers, deserts
- שחיטתו פסולה = his slaughter is invalid (the resulting animal may not be eaten as properly slaughtered meat)