Chullin Daf 31 (חולין דף ל״א)
Daf: 31 | Amudim: 31a – 31b | Date: Loading...
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (31a)
Segment 1
TYPE: גמרא
Conclusion of the previous discussion on slaughtering a flying bird with an arrow.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גִּידְפֵי דְּמִיפַּרְמִי.
English Translation:
that the feathers at the front of the neck were unraveled by the arrow, a clear indication that slaughter was performed from the front of the neck.
קלאוד על הדף:
This fragment completes a discussion carried over from daf 30b concerning Rabbi Yona bar Taḥlifa, who slaughtered flying birds by shooting an arrow at the front of the neck. The proof that the slaughter was valid — that the arrow cut the simanim from the front rather than ripping the neck open — is that the feathers at the throat were unraveled (מיפרמי), showing the arrow passed cleanly through the proper place. The Gemara uses this physical evidence to confirm that even an unconventional method of slaughter can be valid if the cut lands correctly.
Key Terms:
- גִּידְפֵי (gidfei) = feathers
- מִיפַּרְמִי (mifparmi) = unraveled, split apart
Segment 2
TYPE: קושיא
A difficulty raised against the arrow-slaughter method: the mitzva of covering the blood.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהָא בָּעֵי כִּסּוּי, וְכִי תֵּימָא דִּמְכַסּוּ לֵיהּ, וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא אָמַר רַב: הַשּׁוֹחֵט צָרִיךְ שֶׁיִּתֵּן עָפָר לְמַטָּה וְעָפָר לְמַעְלָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְכִסָּהוּ בֶּעָפָר״, ״עָפָר״ לֹא נֶאֱמַר אֶלָּא ״בֶּעָפָר״, מְלַמֵּד שֶׁהַשּׁוֹחֵט צָרִיךְ שֶׁיִּתֵּן עָפָר לְמַטָּה וְעָפָר לְמַעְלָה!
English Translation:
The Gemara notes another difficulty encountered in the slaughter of a flying bird with an arrow. But doesn’t the bird’s blood require covering with earth? And if you would say that Rabbi Yona bar Taḥlifa covers the blood, but doesn’t Rabbi Zeira say that Rav says: In fulfilling the mitzva of covering the blood, one who slaughters an undomesticated animal or bird must place earth beneath the blood and earth above it, as it is stated: “He shall spill its blood, and cover it in earth” (Leviticus 17:13). It is not stated: Cover it with earth, but rather “in earth.” This teaches that one who slaughters must place earth beneath the blood and earth above the blood, so that the blood will be within the earth.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara presses a practical objection against the arrow-slaughter method: a bird’s blood must be covered (kisui hadam). Worse, Rabbi Zeira in the name of Rav teaches a stringent requirement — earth must be placed both beneath the blood and above it, so that the blood is genuinely “in the earth” (be’afar) and not merely sprinkled with earth on top. Since the bird is shot in mid-flight, it would seem impossible to have prepared earth underneath where the blood will fall. This sets up the difficulty resolved in the next segment.
Key Terms:
- כִּסּוּי הַדָּם (kisui hadam) = the mitzva of covering the blood of a slaughtered undomesticated animal or bird with earth
- בֶּעָפָר (be’afar) = “in the earth” — the verse’s precise wording, teaching that blood must be sandwiched between two layers of earth
Segment 3
TYPE: תירוץ
Resolution of the kisui hadam difficulty.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
דְּמַזְמֵין לֵיהּ לְעָפָר דְּכוּלַּהּ פִּתְקָא.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yona bar Taḥlifa would designate for himself the earth of the entire valley [patka] before shooting the arrow. That earth would serve as the layer of earth beneath the blood and he would proceed to cover the blood with another layer of earth.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara resolves the problem with a clever device: before shooting, Rabbi Yona bar Taḥlifa would mentally designate the soil of the entire valley as the lower layer of earth for covering the blood. Wherever the bird’s blood would land, it would already be resting on “designated” earth, satisfying the requirement of earth beneath. He would then cover it with a second layer afterward. This teaches that the “earth below” need not be physically heaped in advance — verbal designation of available ground suffices.
Key Terms:
- מַזְמֵין (mazmin) = designates, sets aside (mentally) for a mitzva
- פִּתְקָא (patka) = a valley or open field
Segment 4
TYPE: גמרא
Amoraic gloss on the mishna’s rule about decapitation in one stroke.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָיָה שׁוֹחֵט וְהִתִּיז, אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: מְלֹא צַוָּאר וְחוּץ לַצַּוָּאר.
English Translation:
§ The mishna teaches: In a case where one was in the process of slaughtering the animal in the standard manner and he decapitated the animal in one motion, if the length of the knife is equivalent to the breadth of the animal’s entire neck, the slaughter is valid. Rabbi Zeira says: The knife must be equivalent to the breadth of the animal’s entire neck and extend beyond the neck.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara now turns to a clause of the mishna (from daf 30b) about a slaughterer who decapitates the animal in a single forward stroke. The mishna validated this if the knife is “as long as the full neck.” Rabbi Zeira qualifies the mishna: the knife must be long enough to span the entire neck and still extend beyond it. The reasoning is that a knife exactly the breadth of the neck would have to cut while its tip is already digging into the back of the neck, risking that the slaughter is done by pressing (derisa) rather than by a clean drawing motion.
Key Terms:
- הִתִּיז (hitiz) = decapitated, severed the head in one stroke
- מְלֹא צַוָּאר (melo tzavar) = the full breadth of the neck
- חוּץ לַצַּוָּאר (chutz latzavar) = beyond the neck — extra knife length past the neck’s width
Segment 5
TYPE: בעיא
A dilemma about the precise meaning of Rabbi Zeira’s qualification.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: מְלֹא צַוָּאר וְחוּץ לַצַּוָּאר כִּמְלֹא צַוָּאר, דַּהֲווֹ לַהּ תְּרֵי צַוָּארֵי, אוֹ דִלְמָא מָלֵא צַוָּאר וְחוּץ לַצַּוָּאר מַשֶּׁהוּ?
English Translation:
A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Did Rabbi Zeira mean: Equivalent to the breadth of the animal’s entire neck and extend beyond the neck by an amount equivalent to the breadth of the entire neck, in which case the length of the knife would equal the breadth of two necks? Or perhaps he meant: Equivalent to the breadth of the entire neck and beyond the neck by any amount?
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Zeira’s words “beyond the neck” are ambiguous, and the Sages raise a formal dilemma (ibaya). Did he mean the knife must extend beyond the neck by a full additional neck’s breadth — making it two necks long — or did he mean it need only extend by any small amount (mashehu)? The practical question is exactly how long a knife one needs to validly decapitate in a single stroke. The next segment seeks a resolution from the mishna itself.
Key Terms:
- אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ (ibaya lehu) = a dilemma was raised — a formal unresolved question
- מַשֶּׁהוּ (mashehu) = any minimal amount
Segment 6
TYPE: ראיה
A proof brought from the mishna’s two-animal case to resolve the dilemma.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תָּא שְׁמַע: הָיָה שׁוֹחֵט וְהִתִּיז שְׁנֵי רָאשִׁין בְּבַת אַחַת, אִם יֵשׁ לַסַּכִּין מְלֹא צַוָּאר אֶחָד – כָּשֵׁר. מַאי מְלֹא צַוָּאר אֶחָד? אִילֵּימָא מְלֹא צַוָּאר אֶחָד וְתוּ לָא, הַשְׁתָּא בִּבְהֵמָה אַחַת בָּעֵינַן מְלֹא צַוָּאר וְחוּץ לַצַּוָּאר, בִּשְׁתֵּי בְּהֵמוֹת סַגִּי לְהוּ כִּמְלֹא צַוָּאר אֶחָד? אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא מְלֹא צַוָּאר חוּץ לִשְׁנֵי צַוָּארִין.
English Translation:
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof to resolve the dilemma from the continuation of the mishna: If one was in the process of slaughtering two animals simultaneously, and he decapitated two heads in one motion, if the length of the knife is equivalent to the breadth of an entire neck of one of the animals the slaughter is valid. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase: The breadth of an entire neck of one of the animals? If we say that it means the breadth of one entire neck and nothing more, that is difficult. Now, for the slaughter of one animal, we require that the knife be equivalent to the breadth of the animal’s entire neck and extend beyond the neck; for the slaughter of two animals, is it possible that a knife whose length is equivalent to the breadth of one animal’s entire neck would be sufficient? Rather, it is obvious that it means that the length of the knife must be equivalent to the breadth of one entire neck beyond the breadth of two necks.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara seeks to resolve the dilemma from the mishna’s parallel clause about decapitating two animals at once, which requires a knife “the full breadth of one neck.” That phrase cannot mean literally one neck and no more — it would be absurd that two animals require a shorter knife (relative to the total neck-span) than one. So the mishna’s phrase must mean: one full neck-breadth beyond the two necks being cut. By analogy, when slaughtering one animal, “beyond the neck” likewise means a full additional neck — resolving the dilemma toward the first option.
Key Terms:
- תָּא שְׁמַע (ta shema) = “come and hear” — a phrase introducing a proof
- בְּבַת אַחַת (bevat achat) = simultaneously, in a single motion
- פְּשִׁיטָא (peshita) = it is obvious
Segment 7
TYPE: מסקנא
Conclusion: the dilemma is resolved.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ, מְלֹא צַוָּאר חוּץ לַצַּוָּאר, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
English Translation:
The Gemara suggests: Learn from the mishna that Rabbi Zeira means that the length of the knife must be equivalent to the breadth of the animal’s entire neck and extend beyond the neck by the breadth of the entire neck. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from it that this was Rabbi Zeira’s intent.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara accepts the proof and closes the dilemma definitively: Rabbi Zeira meant that the knife must equal a full neck-breadth plus an additional full neck-breadth — effectively two necks long. The doubled phrase “shema minah… shema minah” (“learn from it… learn from it”) is the Talmud’s standard formula for a conclusively resolved question. The practical halakha for single-stroke decapitation is thus settled.
Key Terms:
- שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ (shema minah) = “learn from it” — a conclusive resolution of a dilemma
Segment 8
TYPE: גמרא
Rav Menashe qualifies the mishna’s allowance of slaughter with a scalpel.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים – בִּזְמַן שֶׁהוֹלִיךְ וְלֹא הֵבִיא וְכוּ׳. אָמַר רַב מְנַשֶּׁה: בְּאִיזְמֵל שֶׁאֵין לוֹ קַרְנַיִם.
English Translation:
§ The mishna continues: In what case is this statement said? It is when one drew the knife back and did not draw it forth, or drew it forth and did not draw it back. But if he drew it back and forth, even if the knife was of any length, even if he slaughtered with a scalpel, the slaughter is valid. Rav Menashe said: This is the halakha in the case of a scalpel that does not have protrusions from the sides. If there are protrusions, since the scalpel is short, there is concern that the corners may perforate the simanim or enter between the simanim and invalidate the slaughter.
קלאוד על הדף:
The mishna’s requirement of a long knife applies only to a one-directional stroke (only forward or only back); a back-and-forth sawing motion validates slaughter with any blade, even a tiny scalpel. Rav Menashe restricts this leniency: it holds only for a smooth scalpel with no protruding corners (karnayim). A short scalpel with side-protrusions is dangerous, because as it saws back and forth its corners can puncture the simanim or slip between them — an invalidating defect (ikkur or derisa) rather than a clean cut.
Key Terms:
- אִיזְמֵל (izmel) = a scalpel — a small, sharp blade
- קַרְנַיִם (karnayim) = corners or protrusions on the side of a blade
- סִימָנִים (simanim) = the windpipe (kaneh) and gullet (veshet), the organs that must be cut in shechita
Segment 9
TYPE: שאלה ותשובה
Rav Aḥa asks about slaughtering with a needle.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אַוְיָא לְרַב מְנַשֶּׁה: מַחְטָא מַאי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַחְטָא מִבְזָע בָּזַע.
English Translation:
Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Avya, said to Rav Menashe: What is the halakha with regard to slaughter with a needle? Rav Menashe said to him: A needle pierces the simanim, as it perforates the neck instead of cutting it.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Aḥa probes the limits of Rav Menashe’s principle by asking about an ordinary round needle. Rav Menashe rules it invalid: a needle does not cut, it perforates. Valid shechita requires a slicing action that severs the simanim; a needle merely tears a hole through them, which is not “slaughter” at all. This establishes that the instrument’s shape matters — it must be capable of cutting, not just piercing.
Key Terms:
- מַחְטָא (machta) = a needle
- מִבְזָע בָּזַע (mivza baza) = it perforates/punctures — tears a hole rather than slicing
Segment 10
TYPE: גמרא
The halakha of a cobbler’s needle, and a clarification of the mishna’s wording.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַחְטָא דְּאוּשְׁכָּפֵי, מַאי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: תְּנֵינָא ״אֲפִילּוּ כׇּל שֶׁהוּא״. מַאי לָאו מַחְטָא דְּאוּשְׁכָּפֵי? לָא, אִיזְמֵל. אִיזְמֵל בְּהֶדְיָא קָתָנֵי לַהּ! פָּרוֹשֵׁי קָא מְפָרֵשׁ: מַאי ״כׇּל שֶׁהוּ״ – אִיזְמֵל.
English Translation:
Rav Aḥa then asked Rav Menashe: What is the halakha with regard to slaughtering with a cobbler’s needle, which is flat and has sharp sides? Rav Menashe said to him: We already learn in the mishna: Even if the knife was of any length, the slaughter is valid. What, is it not referring to slaughter with a cobbler’s needle? The Gemara responds: No. The reference is to slaughtering with a scalpel, which is larger than a cobbler’s needle. The Gemara objects: The tanna teaches the case of a scalpel explicitly in the mishna. Therefore, the phrase in the mishna: A knife of any length, must be referring to an item smaller than a scalpel. The Gemara explains: The subsequent mention of the scalpel is explaining the phrase: Even if the knife was of any length. What is the knife of any length with which slaughter is valid? It is a scalpel.
קלאוד על הדף:
A cobbler’s needle differs from an ordinary needle: it is flat with sharp edges, so it can cut, not merely pierce. Rav Menashe answers from the mishna’s phrase “even a knife of any length [kol shehu].” The Gemara debates whether “kol shehu” denotes the cobbler’s needle (a smaller item, distinct from the explicitly-mentioned scalpel) or whether the scalpel itself is what “kol shehu” defines. It concludes that the mishna’s mention of the scalpel is simply explaining what “kol shehu” means — leaving the cobbler’s needle still in question, to be resolved next.
Key Terms:
- מַחְטָא דְּאוּשְׁכָּפֵי (machta de’ushkafei) = a cobbler’s needle — flat with sharp sides, capable of cutting
- כׇּל שֶׁהוּא (kol shehu) = “any amount” — the mishna’s phrase for a very small blade
- פָּרוֹשֵׁי קָא מְפָרֵשׁ (paroshei ka mefaresh) = the tanna is explaining/clarifying his own earlier words
Segment 11
TYPE: גמרא
A supporting argument and its rebuttal regarding the mishna’s two cases.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָכִי נָמֵי מִסְתַּבְּרָא, דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ מַחְטָא דְּאוּשְׁכָּפֵי, הַשְׁתָּא מַחְטָא דְּאוּשְׁכָּפֵי שַׁרְיָא, אִיזְמֵל מִיבַּעְיָא? אִיזְמֵל אִצְטְרִיכָא לֵיהּ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: לִיגְזַר אִיזְמֵל שֶׁאֵין לוֹ קַרְנַיִם אַטּוּ אִיזְמֵל שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ קַרְנַיִם, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
English Translation:
This too stands to reason, as, if it enters your mind that the phrase: A knife of any length, is referring to a cobbler’s needle, now that it is permitted to slaughter with a cobbler’s needle, is it necessary for the tanna to teach that it is permitted to slaughter with a scalpel, which is larger than a cobbler’s needle? The Gemara rejects that reasoning: It is necessary for the mishna to teach both the case of a cobbler’s needle and the case of a scalpel, as it could enter your mind to say that it is prohibited to slaughter with a scalpel even though it is permitted to slaughter with a cobbler’s needle. The reasoning for this distinction would be: Let the Sages issue a decree prohibiting the use of a scalpel with no protrusions due to the prohibition against using a scalpel with protrusions. Therefore, the tanna teaches us that there is no decree and it is permitted to slaughter with a scalpel that has no protrusions.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara offers a supporting logical argument (hachi nami mistabra): if “kol shehu” meant a cobbler’s needle, then mentioning the scalpel would be redundant, since a scalpel is larger and obviously fine. But the Gemara rejects this — both cases are necessary. One might have thought the Sages would decree against a smooth scalpel as a precaution (gezeira) lest people slaughter with a corner-bearing scalpel, which is dangerous. The mishna teaches that no such decree exists. This illustrates the recurring talmudic concern that the Sages sometimes extend a prohibition to a permitted case to prevent confusion with a forbidden one.
Key Terms:
- הָכִי נָמֵי מִסְתַּבְּרָא (hachi nami mistabra) = “this too stands to reason” — a supporting argument
- גְּזֵרָה (gezeira) = a rabbinic decree extending a prohibition as a protective fence
- קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן (ka mashma lan) = “it teaches us” — the novel point of the ruling
Segment 12
TYPE: משנה
A new mishna: a knife that falls and slaughters on its own.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְנִי׳ נָפְלָה סַכִּין וְשָׁחֲטָה, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁשָּׁחֲטָה כְּדַרְכָּהּ – פְּסוּלָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְזָבַחְתָּ … וְאָכַלְתָּ״, מַה שֶּׁאַתָּה זוֹבֵחַ אַתָּה אוֹכֵל.
English Translation:
MISHNA: If a knife fell and slaughtered an animal, although the knife slaughtered the animal in the standard manner, the slaughter is not valid, as it is stated: “And you shall slaughter…and you shall eat” (Deuteronomy 27:7), from which it is derived: That which you slaughter you may eat, and that which was slaughtered on its own, you may not eat.
קלאוד על הדף:
A new mishna introduces a foundational rule: if a knife falls of its own accord and happens to slaughter an animal perfectly, the slaughter is invalid. The verse “you shall slaughter… and you shall eat” is read as a limiting derivation — only what you slaughter may be eaten, not what was slaughtered without any human agency. This mishna becomes the springboard for the rest of the daf’s central debate: how much human involvement and intent is required for valid shechita.
Key Terms:
- נָפְלָה סַכִּין (nafla sakin) = a knife fell — slaughter occurring with no human action at all
- כְּדַרְכָּהּ (kedarkah) = in the standard manner — a technically perfect cut
- ״וְזָבַחְתָּ … וְאָכַלְתָּ״ = “and you shall slaughter… and you shall eat” (Deuteronomy 27:7) — the source verse
Segment 13
TYPE: גמרא
The Gemara infers the mishna’s converse: a dropped knife validates.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גְּמָ׳ טַעְמָא דְּנָפְלָה, הָא הִפִּילָהּ הוּא – כְּשֵׁרָה, וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא מִיכַּוֵּין.
English Translation:
GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if a knife fell and slaughtered an animal the slaughter is not valid. The Gemara notes: The reason the slaughter is not valid is that the knife fell. But by inference, if one dropped the knife the slaughter is valid, and that is the halakha even though when dropping the knife he did not intend to slaughter the animal.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara reads the mishna by precise inference (diyuk): it disqualifies only a knife that fell by itself. The implication (ha) is that if a person actively dropped the knife — even with no intent to slaughter — the slaughter is valid. The decisive factor is human agency, not intent. This inference frames the daf’s core question: which tanna holds that shechita does not require kavana (intent)?
Key Terms:
- טַעְמָא דְּ… הָא (taama de… ha) = “the reason is… [therefore] this implies” — an inferential reading
- הִפִּילָהּ (hipilah) = he dropped it — a human action, distinct from a knife falling on its own
- כַּוָּונָה (kavana) = intent; here, conscious intent to slaughter
Segment 14
TYPE: גמרא
Rava identifies the tanna of the mishna as Rabbi Natan, citing a baraita.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַאן תַּנָּא דְּלָא בָּעֵינַן כַּוָּונָה לִשְׁחִיטָה? אָמַר רָבָא: רַבִּי נָתָן הִיא, דְּתָנֵי אוֹשַׁעְיָא זְעֵירָא דְּמִן חַבְרַיָּא: זָרַק סַכִּין לְנוֹעֳצָהּ בַּכּוֹתֶל, וְהָלְכָה וְשָׁחֲטָה כְּדַרְכָּהּ – רַבִּי נָתָן מַכְשִׁיר, וַחֲכָמִים פּוֹסְלִים. הוּא תָּנֵי לַהּ, וְהוּא אָמַר לַהּ: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי נָתָן.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who holds that we do not require intent for slaughter? Rava said: It is Rabbi Natan, as Oshaya, the youngest of the company of Sages, taught a baraita: If one threw a knife to embed it in the wall and in the course of its flight the knife went and slaughtered an animal in its proper manner, Rabbi Natan deems the slaughter valid and the Rabbis deem the slaughter not valid. Oshaya teaches the baraita and he says about it: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan that there is no need for intent to perform a valid act of slaughter.
קלאוד על הדף:
Since the mishna implies that a dropped knife validates slaughter even without intent, Rava asks which tanna holds this view. He identifies Rabbi Natan, citing a baraita taught by Oshaya: if a person threw a knife to lodge it in a wall and it slaughtered an animal en route, Rabbi Natan validates the slaughter while the Rabbis disqualify it. Notably, Oshaya both transmits the baraita and rules the halakha follows Rabbi Natan — establishing that intent is not required for shechita.
Key Terms:
- מַאן תַּנָּא (man tanna) = “who is the tanna” — identifying the authority behind an anonymous mishna
- רַבִּי נָתָן (Rabbi Natan) = a tanna who holds that slaughter requires no intent
- בָּרַיְיתָא (baraita) = a tannaitic teaching not included in the Mishna
- מַכְשִׁיר / פּוֹסֵל (machshir / posel) = deems valid / deems invalid
Segment 15
TYPE: קושיא
A challenge: Rava already made this identification once before.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהָא אַמְרַהּ רָבָא חֲדָא זִימְנָא, דִּתְנַן: וְכוּלָּן שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ וַאֲחֵרִים רוֹאִין אוֹתָן – שְׁחִיטָתָן כְּשֵׁרָה. וְאָמְרִינַן: מַאן תַּנָּא דְּלָא בָּעֵי כַּוָּונָה לִשְׁחִיטָה? וְאָמַר רָבָא: רַבִּי נָתָן הִיא.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: But didn’t Rava already say it one time that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan? As we learned in a mishna (2a): And with regard to any of them, a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, who slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid even though they are incapable of intent. And we said: Who is the tanna who holds that we do not require intent for slaughter? And Rava said: It is Rabbi Natan.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara objects that Rava’s identification seems redundant: he already said the same thing about the mishna on daf 2a, which validates the slaughter of a deaf-mute, imbecile, or minor when supervised — clearly a case where intent is absent. Why would Rava need to repeat that Rabbi Natan is the tanna of the no-intent view? This sets up the Gemara’s standard tzricha analysis: showing why both statements are necessary.
Key Terms:
- חֲדָא זִימְנָא (chada zimna) = “one time” — i.e., already stated once
- חֵרֵשׁ, שׁוֹטֶה, וְקָטָן = a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor — those legally incapable of intent
Segment 16
TYPE: תירוץ
First half of the tzricha: the two cases differ in one direction.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
צְרִיכָא, דְּאִי אַשְׁמְועִינַן הָתָם – מִשּׁוּם דְּקָא מִיכַּוֵּין לְשׁוּם חֲתִיכָה בְּעוֹלָם, אֲבָל הָכָא, דְּלָא קָא מִיכַּוֵּין – אֵימָא לָא.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: Both statements are necessary. As had Rava taught us his statement there with regard to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, one would have thought that the slaughter is valid due to the fact that although the individual lacks intent to slaughter the animal, he intends his action for the sake of cutting in general. But here, with regard to throwing a knife at the wall, where he does not intend to cut at all, say no, the slaughter is not valid.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara answers that both statements of Rava are necessary (tzricha). The deaf-mute case alone would not teach the knife-throwing case: there, the slaughterer at least intends a cutting motion in a general sense, even if not specifically to slaughter. One might therefore assume that a person throwing a knife at a wall — who intends no cut whatsoever — produces an invalid slaughter. Hence the second case must be stated explicitly.
Key Terms:
- צְרִיכָא (tzricha) = “it is necessary” — the formula showing two seemingly redundant statements each teach something
- חֲתִיכָה בְּעוֹלָם (chaticha be’olam) = a cutting action in a general sense, even without intent to slaughter
Segment 17
TYPE: תירוץ
Second half of the tzricha: the two cases differ in the other direction.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן הָכָא, מִשּׁוּם דְּקָאָתֵי מִכֹּחַ בֶּן דַּעַת, אֲבָל הָתָם דְּלָא קָאָתֵי מִכֹּחַ בֶּן דַּעַת – אֵימָא לָא, צְרִיכָא.
English Translation:
And had Rava taught us his statement here with regard to throwing the knife, one would have thought that the slaughter is valid is due to the fact that it comes due to the action of a mentally competent person. But there, with regard to slaughter by a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, where the slaughter does not come due to the action of a mentally competent person, say that the slaughter is not valid. Therefore, it is necessary for Rava to teach both cases.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara completes the tzricha from the opposite direction. Had Rava taught only the knife-throwing case, one might assume it is valid because the act comes from the force of a mentally competent person (ben da’at), even if he lacked slaughter-intent. The deaf-mute case, where the slaughterer is not a ben da’at at all, would then seem invalid. Since each case could not be derived from the other, both are necessary — a textbook two-directional tzricha.
Key Terms:
- בֶּן דַּעַת (ben da’at) = a mentally competent adult, legally capable of intent
- כֹּחַ (koach) = force or agency — here, the force generated by a competent person’s action
Segment 18
TYPE: מחלוקת אמוראים
An amoraic dispute: immersion of a niddah without intent.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִתְּמַר: נִדָּה שֶׁנֶּאֶנְסָה וְטָבְלָה, אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: טְהוֹרָה לְבֵיתָהּ, וַאֲסוּרָה לֶאֱכוֹל בִּתְרוּמָה. וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אַף לְבֵיתָהּ לֹא טָהֲרָה.
English Translation:
§ The mishna is now cited as proof in an amoraic dispute. It was stated: With regard to a menstruating woman who, after the menstrual flow ended, was compelled against her will and immersed in a ritual bath, Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: She is ritually pure vis-à-vis her house, i.e., it is permitted for her to engage in intercourse with her husband, but it is prohibited for her to partake of teruma because the immersion is not considered valid for that purpose. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: She was not purified even vis-à-vis her house.
קלאוד על הדף:
The discussion of intent now broadens from slaughter to ritual immersion (tevila). The case: a woman who finished her menstrual period was forced to immerse against her will, with no intent to purify herself. Rav (via Rav Yehuda) rules she is pure enough to resume marital relations (her “house”) — non-sacred matters need no intent — but not pure enough to eat teruma. Rabbi Yoḥanan disagrees: without intent the immersion accomplishes nothing, not even for her husband. This three-way framework (no intent valid for nothing / valid for non-sacred only / valid for everything) drives the rest of the daf.
Key Terms:
- נִדָּה (niddah) = a menstruating woman, ritually impure until she immerses
- שֶׁנֶּאֶנְסָה (shene’ensa) = who was compelled, forced — i.e., immersed without her own intent
- טְהוֹרָה לְבֵיתָהּ (tehora leveitah) = pure “for her house” — permitted to resume relations with her husband
- תְּרוּמָה (teruma) = the priestly portion of produce, which may be eaten only in a state of ritual purity
Segment 19
TYPE: קושיא
Rava challenges Rav’s position as internally inconsistent.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא לְרַב נַחְמָן, לְרַב דְּאָמַר: טְהוֹרָה לְבֵיתָהּ וַאֲסוּרָה לֶאֱכוֹל בִּתְרוּמָה – עֲוֹן כָּרֵת (הוּתְּרָה) [הִתַּרְתָּ], אִיסּוּר מִיתָה מִיבַּעְיָא?
English Translation:
Rava said to Rav Naḥman: According to the opinion of Rav, who says that she is ritually pure vis-à-vis her house but it is prohibited for her to partake of teruma, it is difficult. With regard to a transgression punishable by karet, i.e., intercourse with a menstruating woman, she was rendered permitted by immersion against her will; with regard to partaking of teruma, a prohibition punishable by death at the hand of Heaven, which is a lesser punishment, is it necessary to say that it is permitted for her through immersion against her will? Why then does Rav deem it prohibited for her to partake of teruma?
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava presses Rav’s ruling with a kal vachomer-style objection. Intercourse with a niddah carries karet, the gravest punishment; eating teruma in impurity carries death at the hand of Heaven, a lesser penalty. If a forced immersion is potent enough to lift the severe karet prohibition, how can it fail to lift the lighter teruma prohibition? Rav’s split ruling seems backwards. The resolution in the next segment hinges on a different distinction — sacred versus non-sacred — rather than the severity of the punishment.
Key Terms:
- כָּרֵת (karet) = excision — the severe punishment for intercourse with a niddah
- אִיסּוּר מִיתָה (issur mita) = a prohibition punishable by death at the hand of Heaven — here, eating teruma in impurity
- מִיבַּעְיָא (mivaya) = “is it necessary to say?” — a rhetorical a fortiori objection
Segment 20
TYPE: תירוץ
Rav Naḥman resolves the difficulty: the issue is sacred vs. non-sacred.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: בַּעְלָהּ חוּלִּין הוּא, וְחוּלִּין לָא בָּעֵי כַּוָּונָה. וּמְנָא תֵּימְרָא? דִּתְנַן: גַּל שֶׁנִּתְלַשׁ וּבוֹ אַרְבָּעִים סְאָה וְנָפַל עַל הָאָדָם וְעַל הַכֵּלִים – טְהוֹרִין. מַאי לָאו אָדָם דּוּמְיָא דְּכֵלִים? מָה כֵּלִים דְּלָא מִיכַּוְּונִי, אַף אָדָם נָמֵי לָא בָּעֵי כַּוָּונָה.
English Translation:
Rav Naḥman said to him: The halakhic status of her husband is non-sacred, and non-sacred items do not require intent for purification. And from where do you say so? It is as we learned in a mishna (Mikvaot 5:6): In the case of a wave that was detached from the sea, and in it were forty se’a of water, and that wave fell on an impure person or on impure vessels, they are ritually pure. What, is it not that a person is similar to vessels? Just as vessels do not intend to be purified and they are purified by the wave, so too, a person does not require intent in order to be purified.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Naḥman explains that Rav’s distinction is not about severity of punishment but about sacred versus non-sacred. Relations with one’s husband fall under the category of chullin (non-sacred), which requires no intent for purification; teruma is sacred and does require intent. He proves that non-sacred purification needs no intent from a mishna in Mikvaot: a detached wave of forty se’a that falls on impure people or vessels purifies them. The pairing of “person” with “vessels” — which obviously have no intent — implies a person too is purified without intent.
Key Terms:
- חוּלִּין (chullin) = non-sacred items or status
- גַּל שֶׁנִּתְלַשׁ (gal shenitlash) = a wave detached from the sea
- אַרְבָּעִים סְאָה (arba’im se’a) = forty se’a — the minimum volume of water for a valid mikveh
- דּוּמְיָא (dumya) = “similar to” — a hermeneutic linking two items in a clause
Segment 21
TYPE: דחייה
The Gemara rejects Rav Naḥman’s proof from the wave.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מִמַּאי? דִּלְמָא בְּיוֹשֵׁב וּמְצַפֶּה עָסְקִינַן, אֵימָתַי יִתָּלֵשׁ הַגַּל,
English Translation:
The Gemara rejects that proof: From where is there proof that this is the meaning of the mishna? Perhaps we are dealing with the case of one who sits near the water and waits to determine when the wave will be detached, which is tantamount to having intent to immerse,
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara challenges Rav Naḥman’s proof. The Mikvaot mishna need not mean the person was purified without intent — perhaps it speaks of someone sitting by the shore deliberately watching and waiting for the wave to break over him. That anticipation counts as intent to immerse. If so, the mishna proves nothing about purification without intent. The argument continues onto amud bet.
Key Terms:
- מִמַּאי (mimai) = “from where?” — a challenge demanding proof for an interpretation
- יוֹשֵׁב וּמְצַפֶּה (yoshev umetzapeh) = sitting and anticipating — a posture that constitutes intent
Amud Bet (31b)
Segment 1
TYPE: דחייה
The rejection continues: the analogy can be read the opposite way.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְכֵלִים דּוּמְיָא דְּאָדָם, מָה אָדָם דְּבָעֵינַן כַּוָּונָה, אַף כֵּלִים נָמֵי דְּקָא מְכַוֵּין לְהוּ אָדָם!
English Translation:
and vessels are similar to a person: Just as for a person, we require his intent for purification, so too for vessels, they are purified only in a case where a person intends for them to be purified.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara turns Rav Naḥman’s analogy on its head. He read “person like vessels” — vessels need no intent, so neither does a person. But the comparison can equally run the other way: “vessels like a person” — just as a person requires intent, vessels too are purified only when a person intends it for them. The dumya hermeneutic is symmetrical, so it proves nothing on its own. Rav Naḥman’s proof from Mikvaot collapses.
Key Terms:
- דּוּמְיָא (dumya) = “similar to” — a symmetrical comparison that can be read in either direction
Segment 2
TYPE: קושיא
A counter-challenge: if intent is present, the mishna teaches nothing new.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְכִי תֵּימָא, בְּיוֹשֵׁב וּמְצַפֶּה, מַאי לְמֵימְרָא?
English Translation:
And if you would say: If the mishna is referring to the case of one who sits and waits to determine when the wave will be detached, what is the purpose of stating this halakha? It is obvious and introduces no novel element.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara presses back on its own rejection. If the Mikvaot mishna really speaks of a person sitting and anticipating the wave — i.e., with full intent — then what is the mishna teaching? An intentional immersion in forty se’a is plainly valid; the case would be self-evident and pointless to state. This pressure forces the Gemara to find a genuine novelty in the mishna even on the “with intent” reading, which it supplies next.
Key Terms:
- מַאי לְמֵימְרָא (mai lemeimra) = “what is there to say?” — an objection that a teaching states the obvious
Segment 3
TYPE: תירוץ
The mishna’s novelty even with intent: no protective decrees apply.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: לִיגְזַר מִשּׁוּם חַרְדָּלִית שֶׁל גְּשָׁמִים, אִי נָמֵי לִיגְזַר רָאשִׁין אַטּוּ כִּיפִּין, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּלָא גָּזְרִינַן!
English Translation:
The Gemara responds that there is a novel element in this halakha. Lest you say: Let us issue a decree that a detached wave does not effect purification due to the concern that otherwise, one would receive the mistaken impression that one is purified in a cascade [ḥardalit] of rainwater containing forty se’a. The halakha is that rainwater purifies only when pooled in one place. Alternatively, let us issue a decree that the edges of the waves, which are in contact with the ground, are ineffective in purifying people and vessels standing on the ground due to the concern that otherwise one would receive the mistaken impression that vessels are purified even if one pushes them upward into the arc of the waves while the water remains airborne. Therefore, the tanna teaches us that we do not issue either of those decrees.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara supplies the mishna’s novelty. Even with intent, one might have expected the Sages to disqualify a detached wave for two reasons: a precautionary decree lest people equate it with a moving cascade of rainwater (ḥardalit), which does not purify; or a decree against the wave’s edges lest people purify in its airborne arc. The mishna’s novelty is precisely that no such decrees were enacted — a detached wave purifies. The proof for Rav Naḥman’s no-intent thesis is thus inconclusive, since the mishna can be fully explained on the “with intent” reading.
Key Terms:
- מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא (mahu detema) = “lest you say” — introduces an expected but rejected assumption
- חַרְדָּלִית (ḥardalit) = a cascade or fast-flowing stream of rainwater, which does not purify
- רָאשִׁין / כִּיפִּין (rashin / kippin) = the edges of waves / the arcs of waves
Segment 4
TYPE: גמרא
A supporting source for the rule against immersing in the airborne arc.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּמְנָא תֵּימְרָא דְּלָא מַטְבְּלִינַן בְּכִיפִּין? דִּתְנַן: מַטְבִּילִין בְּרָאשִׁין, וְאֵין מַטְבִּילִין בְּכִיפִּין, שֶׁאֵין מַטְבִּילִין בָּאֲוִיר.
English Translation:
And from where do you say that we do not immerse in the arcs of waves? As we learned in a baraita: One may immerse in the edges of waves, but one may not immerse in their arcs, as one may not immerse in air. Immersion may be performed only on the ground.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara substantiates the prior segment’s premise — that immersion in a wave’s arc is invalid — with a baraita: one may immerse in the edges of waves (where the water meets the ground) but not in their airborne arcs, because immersion in mid-air is not immersion. This brief aside confirms the rule that a valid mikveh requires water resting on or against the ground, not water suspended in the air.
Key Terms:
- מַטְבִּילִין (matbilin) = one may immerse
- בָּאֲוִיר (ba’avir) = in the air — immersion suspended in air is invalid
Segment 5
TYPE: גמרא
A fresh proof that non-sacred purification needs no intent — from Makhshirin.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא חוּלִּין דְּלָא בָּעֵי כַּוָּונָה מִיהָא מְנָלַן? דִּתְנַן: פֵּירוֹת שֶׁנָּפְלוּ לְתוֹךְ אַמַּת הַמַּיִם, וּפָשַׁט מִי שֶׁיָּדָיו טְמֵאוֹת וּנְטָלָן – יָדָיו טְהוֹרוֹת, וּפֵירוֹת אֵינָן בְּ״כִי יוּתַּן״.
English Translation:
The Gemara again asks: But in any event, from where do we derive that non-sacred items do not require intent? The Gemara answers: It is as we learned in a mishna (Makhshirin 4:7): Produce becomes susceptible to ritual impurity only if it is dampened by one of seven liquids and its owner was amenable to its dampening. This is derived from the verse: “But when water is placed on the seed, and some of their carcass shall fall on it, it is impure to you” (Leviticus 11:38). If produce fell into a stream, and one whose hands were ritually impure extended his hands and took the produce from the water channel, his hands are ritually pure through immersion in the stream, and this produce is not in the category of: “But when water is placed.” The produce is not susceptible to ritual impurity because the owner did not intend that his hands become wet.
קלאוד על הדף:
Since the Mikvaot proof failed, the Gemara seeks another source that non-sacred purification needs no intent, and finds one in Makhshirin. There, a person with impure hands reaches into a stream to retrieve fallen produce; his hands emerge purified even though he intended only to grab the fruit, not to immerse. The mishna’s very point is twofold: his hands are purified (no intent needed), yet the produce is not rendered susceptible to impurity, because for “ki yutan” — wetting that makes produce receptive to tum’a — the owner’s intent is required, and here he did not want his hands wet.
Key Terms:
- אַמַּת הַמַּיִם (amat hamayim) = a water channel or stream
- כִּי יוּתַּן (ki yutan) = “when [water] is placed” (Leviticus 11:38) — produce becomes susceptible to impurity only when intentionally wetted
- שִׁבְעָה מַשְׁקִין (shiva mashkin) = the seven liquids that render produce susceptible to ritual impurity
Segment 6
TYPE: גמרא
The contrasting clause of the Makhshirin mishna.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאִם בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁיּוּדְחוּ יָדָיו – טְהוֹרוֹת, וּפֵירוֹת בְּ״כִי יוּתַּן״.
English Translation:
But if he placed his hands into the stream so that his hands would be rinsed and purified, his hands are ritually pure, and the produce is in the category of: “But when water is placed.” Since he was amenable to the dampening of his hands, the water on his hands renders the produce susceptible to ritual impurity. From the first case in the mishna it is clear that his hands are purified even though his intent was not to immerse them in the water.
קלאוד על הדף:
The mishna’s second clause sharpens the proof by contrast. If the person specifically intended his hands to be rinsed, then not only are his hands pure but the produce now is susceptible to impurity, since he was amenable to the wetting. The key inference for our sugya comes from comparing the two clauses: in the first clause his hands were purified even with no intent to immerse them — proving definitively that non-sacred purification (here, hand-purity) requires no intent. Rav Naḥman’s thesis now has solid support.
Key Terms:
- בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁיּוּדְחוּ (bishvil sheyudchu) = “so that they would be rinsed” — performed with deliberate intent
- טָהֳרַת יָדַיִם (taharat yadayim) = purity of the hands — a non-sacred-level purity
Segment 7
TYPE: קושיא
Rava objects to Rav Naḥman from a mishna in Ḥagiga.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רָבָא לְרַב נַחְמָן: טָבַל לְחוּלִּין וְהוּחְזַק לְחוּלִּין – אָסוּר לְמַעֲשֵׂר. הוּחְזַק – אִין, לֹא הוּחְזַק – לָא.
English Translation:
Rava raised an objection to Rav Naḥman from a mishna (Ḥagiga 18b): If one immersed for the purpose of eating non-sacred food and assumed the presumptive status of ritual purity for non-sacred food, it is prohibited for him to partake of second-tithe produce. The Gemara infers: If one assumed the presumptive status of ritual purity with regard to non-sacred food, yes, it is permitted for him to eat non-sacred food; if he did not assume the presumptive status, he may not eat non-sacred food. This indicates that even when immersing in order to partake of non-sacred food, one must intend to assume the presumptive status of ritual purity.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava now attacks Rav Naḥman’s position with a mishna from Ḥagiga. That mishna states that one who immersed for non-sacred food and “established a presumptive status” (huchzak) for it is still barred from second-tithe (maaser). Rava reads it by inference: the mishna mentions huchzak as a condition — implying that without establishing the presumptive status, one is not even permitted non-sacred food. This would mean non-sacred purification does require intent, contradicting Rav Naḥman.
Key Terms:
- אֵיתִיבֵיהּ (eitiveih) = “he raised an objection against him”
- הוּחְזַק (huchzak) = established a presumptive status of purity, by conscious assumption
- מַעֲשֵׂר (maaser) = second-tithe produce, which requires a higher level of purity-intent than chullin
Segment 8
TYPE: תירוץ
Rav Naḥman re-reads the Ḥagiga mishna to neutralize the objection.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָכִי קָאָמַר: אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהוּחְזַק לְחוּלִּין – אָסוּר לְמַעֲשֵׂר.
English Translation:
Rav Naḥman rejects the proof from the mishna and says that no intent is required to assume the presumptive status of ritual purity in order to eat non-sacred food. Rather, this is what the mishna is saying: Although he assumes the presumptive status of ritual purity for non-sacred food, it is prohibited for him to partake of second-tithe produce.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Naḥman parries by re-reading the Ḥagiga mishna. Rava read “huchzak” as a necessary condition (only if he established the status is non-sacred food permitted). Rav Naḥman reads it concessively: “even though [af al pi] he established the presumptive status for non-sacred food, he is still barred from second-tithe.” On this reading the mishna says nothing about what happens without huchzak, and so poses no objection to his view that non-sacred purification needs no intent.
Key Terms:
- הָכִי קָאָמַר (hachi ka’amar) = “this is what it is saying” — a re-interpretation of a text’s intent
- אַף עַל פִּי (af al pi) = “even though” — a concessive reading rather than a conditional one
Segment 9
TYPE: קושיא
Rava presses again from a further clause of the same mishna.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: טָבַל וְלֹא הוּחְזַק – כְּאִילּוּ לֹא טָבַל. מַאי לָאו: כְּאִילּוּ לֹא טָבַל כְּלָל?
English Translation:
Rava raised an objection to Rav Naḥman from that same mishna: If one immersed without intent to assume the presumptive status of ritual purity, it is as though he did not immerse. What, is the meaning of the mishna not that it is as though he did not immerse at all?
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava sharpens his attack with the mishna’s next line: one who immersed but did not establish the presumptive status is “as though he had not immersed.” Rava argues this must mean as though he did not immerse at all — so even for non-sacred food he gains nothing without intent. If correct, this directly refutes Rav Naḥman.
Key Terms:
- כְּאִילּוּ לֹא טָבַל (ke’ilu lo taval) = “as if he had not immersed” — the immersion is entirely ineffective
Segment 10
TYPE: תירוץ
Rav Naḥman deflects, and a baraita is found that vindicates him.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לָא, כְּאִילּוּ לֹא טָבַל לְמַעֲשֵׂר, אֲבָל טָבַל לְחוּלִּין. הוּא סָבַר: דַּיחוֹיֵי קָא מְדַחֵי לֵיהּ. נְפַק דָּק וְאַשְׁכַּח, דְּתַנְיָא: טָבַל וְלֹא הוּחְזַק – מוּתָּר לַחוּלִּין וְאָסוּר לַמַּעֲשֵׂר.
English Translation:
Rav Naḥman rejects that proof as well. No, it means that if he immersed without intent it is as though he did not immerse to partake of second-tithe produce, but in that case, he immersed for non-sacred food, for which no intent is necessary. The Gemara comments: Rava believed that Rav Naḥman was merely putting him off with his claim that the formulation of the mishna does not conclusively support his objection; he believed that Rav Naḥman was not stating the real meaning of the mishna. Rava then went out, examined the sources, and discovered that it is taught in a baraita explicitly in accordance with the opinion of Rav Naḥman: If one immersed and had no intent to assume the presumptive status of ritual purity, it is permitted for him to eat non-sacred food, but it is prohibited for him to partake of second-tithe produce.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Naḥman deflects again: “as though he had not immersed” means only with respect to second-tithe, not non-sacred food. Rava initially suspected Rav Naḥman was merely fending off the objection (dichuya) without stating the mishna’s true sense. But upon investigating, Rava found a baraita that states Rav Naḥman’s reading explicitly: one who immersed without intent is permitted non-sacred food but barred from second-tithe. The baraita decisively confirms Rav Naḥman — non-sacred purification needs no intent.
Key Terms:
- דַּיחוֹיֵי קָא מְדַחֵי (dichuyei ka medachei) = “he is merely deflecting” — a non-definitive answer given only to push off an objection
- נְפַק דָּק וְאַשְׁכַּח (nefak dak ve’ashkach) = “he went out, examined, and found” — discovering a decisive source
Segment 11
TYPE: קושיא
Abaye notes the baraita seems to refute Rabbi Yoḥanan.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי לְרַב יוֹסֵף: לֵימָא תֶּיהְוֵי תְּיוּבְתָּא דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן מֵהָא?
English Translation:
Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Let us say that there will be a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan from this baraita. This baraita states that immersion without intent is effective for non-sacred items, while Rabbi Yoḥanan said (31a) that if a woman who is impure due to menstruation immerses without intent she is forbidden to her husband, who is non-sacred.
קלאוד על הדף:
Abaye observes that the baraita just found does more than confirm Rav Naḥman — it appears to demolish Rabbi Yoḥanan. The baraita establishes that immersion without intent works for non-sacred matters; but Rabbi Yoḥanan (segment 18 of 31a) held that a forced niddah is not even pure for her husband — a non-sacred matter. Abaye asks whether the baraita is a tiyuvta, a conclusive refutation, of Rabbi Yoḥanan.
Key Terms:
- תְּיוּבְתָּא (tiyuvta) = a conclusive refutation of an amoraic opinion from a tannaitic source
Segment 12
TYPE: תירוץ
Rav Yosef defends Rabbi Yoḥanan: he follows a different tanna.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן הוּא דְּאָמַר כְּרַבִּי יוֹנָתָן בֶּן יוֹסֵף.
English Translation:
Rav Yosef said to him: Indeed, the baraita is contrary to his opinion, but Rabbi Yoḥanan is saying his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosef.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Yosef shields Rabbi Yoḥanan from refutation. An amora’s opinion is not “refuted” by a baraita if it simply follows a different tannaitic view. Rabbi Yoḥanan, says Rav Yosef, bases himself on Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosef, a tanna who holds that even non-sacred purification requires intent. The baraita Abaye cited reflects the opposing tannaitic view; it is a machloket among tannaim, and Rabbi Yoḥanan is entitled to side with one of them.
Key Terms:
- רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן בֶּן יוֹסֵף (Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosef) = a tanna who holds that even non-sacred immersion requires intent
- דְּאָמַר כְּ… (de’amar ke…) = “he rules in accordance with” — an amora aligning with a particular tanna
Segment 13
TYPE: ברייתא
The baraita of Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosef on the leprous garment.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
דְּתַנְיָא: רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן בֶּן יוֹסֵף אוֹמֵר: ״וְכוּבַּס״, מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״שֵׁנִית״? מַקִּישׁ תִּכְבּוֹסֶת שְׁנִיָּה לְתִכְבּוֹסֶת רִאשׁוֹנָה: מָה תִּכְבּוֹסֶת רִאשׁוֹנָה לְדַעַת, אַף תִּכְבּוֹסֶת שְׁנִיָּה לְדַעַת.
English Translation:
As it is taught in a baraita with regard to the verse dealing with the purification of a leprous garment, which must be laundered, quarantined for a week, and then immersed in a ritual bath: “And the garment…that you shall wash and the leprosy departed from them, and it shall be washed a second time and shall be pure” (Leviticus 13:58). Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosef says: It would have been sufficient for the verse to simply state: And it shall be washed and shall be pure. For what purpose does the verse state: “A second time”? The Torah juxtaposes the second washing, the immersion, with the first washing, the laundering. Just as the first washing is performed with intent, as it is written: “And the priest shall command that they wash the garment that has the leprous mark, and he shall quarantine it seven days more” (Leviticus 13:54), so too, the second washing, the immersion in a ritual bath, must be performed with intent.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Yosef now cites the baraita that grounds Rabbi Yoḥanan’s view. Concerning a leprous garment that is washed, quarantined, then immersed, the verse says it “shall be washed a second time.” Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosef asks why “a second time” is needed and answers with a hekesh: it juxtaposes the second washing (the immersion) with the first (the laundering performed at the priest’s command). Just as the first washing is done with intent, so must the immersion be — establishing that even immersing a non-sacred garment requires intent.
Key Terms:
- מַקִּישׁ / הֶיקֵּשׁ (makkish / hekesh) = a juxtaposition of two laws in a verse, deriving a feature of one from the other
- תִּכְבּוֹסֶת (tichbosset) = a washing; here, the laundering and the subsequent immersion of a leprous garment
- לְדַעַת (leda’at) = with knowledge/intent
Segment 14
TYPE: ברייתא
The baraita limits the hekesh: intent yes, priestly command no.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִי מָה לְהַלָּן בָּעֵינַן דַּעַת כֹּהֵן, אַף כָּאן בָּעֵינַן דַּעַת כֹּהֵן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְטָהֵר״, מִכׇּל מָקוֹם.
English Translation:
If so, based on the same juxtaposition, perhaps derive: Just as there, with regard to the first washing, we require the intent of a priest, who commands to wash the garment, so too here, with regard to the second washing, we require the intent of a priest. Therefore, the verse states: “And shall be pure” (Leviticus 13:58), indicating that there is purity in any case where there is intent, even without a command from a priest. In the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosef, even the immersion of the non-sacred garment must be performed with intent. Rav Yosef states that Rabbi Yoḥanan bases his statement on Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosef’s opinion.
קלאוד על הדף:
The baraita continues by limiting how far the hekesh reaches. If the second washing equals the first in every respect, perhaps it requires not just intent but specifically a priest’s intent — since the first washing is done at the priest’s command. The verse “and it shall be pure” (vetaher) closes this off: purity is achieved “in any case” of proper intent, even without a priestly command. The net result, on which Rabbi Yoḥanan relies: even a non-sacred garment’s immersion requires intent — but the intent of any person suffices.
Key Terms:
- דַּעַת כֹּהֵן (da’at kohen) = the intent/awareness of a priest specifically
- ״וְטָהֵר״ (vetaher) = “and it shall be pure” (Leviticus 13:58) — the verse limiting the hekesh
- מִכׇּל מָקוֹם (mikol makom) = “in any case” — purity results regardless of who provides the intent
Segment 15
TYPE: קושיא
Rav Shimi bar Ashi challenges Rav Yosef’s defense.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב שִׁימִי בַּר אָשֵׁי: וּמִי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן הָכִי? וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הֲלָכָה כִּסְתַם מִשְׁנָה.
English Translation:
Rav Shimi bar Ashi objects to the association of the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan with the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosef: Did Rabbi Yoḥanan say that immersion of a non-sacred garment requires intent? But doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say that the halakha is in accordance with an unattributed mishna?
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Shimi bar Ashi objects to Rav Yosef’s defense. Rabbi Yoḥanan is famous for the methodological principle that the halakha follows an unattributed mishna (stam mishna). Our daf’s own mishna — “if a knife fell” — is unattributed and, as established earlier, reflects Rabbi Natan’s no-intent view. So Rabbi Yoḥanan should rule like Rabbi Natan (no intent), not like Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosef (intent required). Rav Yosef’s harmonization seems to violate Rabbi Yoḥanan’s own principle.
Key Terms:
- מַתְקֵיף (matkif) = raises a strong objection
- הֲלָכָה כִּסְתַם מִשְׁנָה (halakha kistam mishna) = the halakha follows an unattributed mishna — a hallmark principle of Rabbi Yoḥanan
Segment 16
TYPE: גמרא
The challenge is spelled out via our mishna.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּתְנַן: נָפְלָה סַכִּין וְשָׁחֲטָה, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁשָּׁחֲטָה כְּדַרְכָּהּ – פְּסוּלָה. וְהָוֵינַן בָּהּ: טַעְמָא דְּנָפְלָה, הָא הִפִּילָהּ הוּא – כְּשֵׁרָה, וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא מִיכַּוֵּין. וְאָמְרִינַן: מַאן תַּנָּא דְּלָא בָּעֵי כַּוָּונָה לִשְׁחִיטָה? אָמַר רָבָא: רַבִּי נָתָן הִיא.
English Translation:
And we learned in the mishna: If a knife fell and slaughtered an animal, although the knife slaughtered the animal in the standard manner, the slaughter is not valid. And we discussed it: The reason the slaughter is not valid is that the knife fell. But by inference, if one dropped the knife the slaughter is valid, and that is the ruling even though when dropping the knife he did not intend to slaughter the animal. And we say: Who is the tanna who holds that we do not require intent for slaughter? Rava said: It is Rabbi Natan. Based on his principle that the halakha is in accordance with an unattributed mishna, Rabbi Yoḥanan should rule in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan cited in the unattributed mishna, and not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosef.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Shimi spells out his objection. Our mishna (“if a knife fell”) is unattributed, and Rava already established (31a, segment 14) that its no-intent inference reflects Rabbi Natan. By Rabbi Yoḥanan’s own principle that the halakha follows a stam mishna, he should hold like Rabbi Natan — that slaughter, and by extension immersion, needs no intent. This makes Rav Yosef’s claim, that Rabbi Yoḥanan follows the intent-requiring Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosef, internally inconsistent.
Key Terms:
- הָוֵינַן בָּהּ (haveinan bah) = “we discussed it” — referring back to an earlier sugya’s analysis
- סְתַם מִשְׁנָה (stam mishna) = an unattributed mishna, presumed to carry authoritative weight
Segment 17
TYPE: תירוץ
Resolution: slaughter and immersion are distinct cases.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בִּשְׁחִיטָה, אֲפִילּוּ רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן בֶּן יוֹסֵף [מוֹדֵי], מִדְּגַלִּי רַחֲמָנָא מִתְעַסֵּק בְּקָדָשִׁים פָּסוּל – מִכְּלָל דְּחוּלִּין לָא בָּעֵינַן כַּוָּונָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: With regard to slaughter, even Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosef concedes that intent is not necessary. He learns this from the fact that the Merciful One revealed that if one acts unawares in performing the slaughter of sacrificial animals, with no intent to slaughter, the offering is disqualified. This is derived (13a) from the verse: “You shall slaughter it to your will” (Leviticus 19:5). By inference, conclude that with regard to the slaughter of non-sacred animals we do not require intent.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara resolves Rav Shimi’s objection by distinguishing slaughter from immersion. With regard to slaughter, even Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosef agrees no intent is needed — because the Torah explicitly disqualifies a sacrificial offering slaughtered by mitasek (acting unawares), derived from “you shall slaughter it lirtzonchem.” That special verse, needed only for sacred animals, implies that non-sacred slaughter needs no intent. So the stam mishna about a knife — which concerns slaughter — does not commit Rabbi Yoḥanan on immersion; on immersion he can still follow Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosef. No contradiction remains.
Key Terms:
- מִתְעַסֵּק (mitasek) = one who acts unawares, without directed intent
- קָדָשִׁים (kodashim) = sacrificial/consecrated animals
- ״לִרְצֹנְכֶם״ (lirtzonchem) = “to your will” (Leviticus 19:5) — the verse requiring intent for slaughter of offerings
Segment 18
TYPE: גמרא
Clarifying the Rabbis’ position against Rabbi Natan.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְרַבָּנַן, נְהִי דְּלָא בָּעֵינַן כַּוָּונָה לִזְבִיחָה, לַחֲתִיכָה בָּעֵינַן.
English Translation:
While on this subject the Gemara clarifies: And the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Natan and hold that slaughter of non-sacred animals requires intent would say: Although we do not require intent to slaughter non-sacred animals, we require intent to cut the neck of the animal. Throwing the knife down is not sufficient.
קלאוד על הדף:
Having shown that even Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosef concedes no intent is needed for slaughter, the Gemara must now explain how the Rabbis (who disqualified the wall-thrown knife in segment 14 of 31a) understand the matter. Their position: they concede no intent is required for the act of “slaughter” (zevicha) as such, but they do require intent for “cutting” (chaticha) — a basic minimal intent to perform a cutting action. Merely flinging a knife with no intent to cut anything fails even that minimal threshold.
Key Terms:
- רַבָּנַן (Rabbanan) = the Rabbis — here, those who dispute Rabbi Natan
- זְבִיחָה (zevicha) = the act of slaughter
- חֲתִיכָה (chaticha) = cutting — the Rabbis require intent at least to perform a cut
Segment 19
TYPE: גמרא
Rava explains how Rabbi Natan prevails over the Rabbis.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רָבָא: בְּהָא זְכָנְהוּ רַבִּי נָתָן לְרַבָּנַן, מִי כְּתִיב ״וְחָתַכְתָּ״? ״וְזָבַחְתָּ״ כְּתִיב, אִי בָּעֵינַן כַּוָּונָה לַחֲתִיכָה – אֲפִילּוּ לִזְבִיחָה נָמֵי לִיבְעֵי, אִי לָא בָּעֵינַן כַּוָּונָה לִזְבִיחָה – לַחֲתִיכָה נָמֵי לָא לִיבְעֵי.
English Translation:
Rava said that it was with this contention that Rabbi Natan overcame the Rabbis: He said: Is it written with regard to the slaughter of non-sacred animals: And you shall cut? It is written: “And you shall slaughter” (Deuteronomy 12:21). The Torah does not distinguish between cutting and slaughtering; if we require intent for cutting, we should require intent even for slaughtering. Conversely, if we do not require intent for slaughtering, we should also not require intent for cutting.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava praises the logical force of Rabbi Natan’s argument that defeats the Rabbis’ two-tier position. The Rabbis distinguished “slaughter” (no intent) from “cutting” (intent required). But Rava notes the Torah never wrote “and you shall cut” — it wrote “and you shall slaughter.” There is only one act named in the verse. So intent is either required for the whole act or for none of it; the Rabbis’ split between zevicha and chaticha has no scriptural footing. Hence Rabbi Natan’s clean position — no intent at all — prevails.
Key Terms:
- זְכָנְהוּ (zechanhu) = “he won against them” / overcame them in argument
- ״וְזָבַחְתָּ״ (vezavachta) = “and you shall slaughter” (Deuteronomy 12:21) — the one verb the Torah uses
Segment 20
TYPE: בעיא
The Gemara clarifies the exact case of the forced immersion.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הֵיכִי דָּמֵי נִדָּה שֶׁנֶּאֶנְסָה וְטָבְלָה? אִילֵימָא דְּאַנְסַהּ חֲבִירְתַּהּ וְאַטְבְּלַהּ, כַּוָּונָה דַּחֲבִרְתַּהּ כַּוָּונָה מְעַלַּיְיתָא הִיא.
English Translation:
The Gemara revisits the matter of immersion without intent. What are the circumstances of a menstruating woman who, after the menstrual flow ended, was compelled against her will and immersed in a ritual bath? If we say that another woman compelled her and immersed her in a ritual bath, the immersion should be valid even according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, as the intent of another woman is full-fledged intent.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara returns to define the original case precisely. What exactly is “a niddah who was compelled and immersed”? It cannot mean that another woman forced and immersed her — because the friend’s intent counts as full intent, so even Rabbi Yoḥanan would deem her pure. The case must therefore involve a total absence of any directing intent, which the Gemara will pin down via Rav Pappa in segment 22.
Key Terms:
- הֵיכִי דָּמֵי (heichi dami) = “what is the case?” — a request to specify circumstances
- כַּוָּונָה מְעַלַּיְיתָא (kavana me’alayta) = full-fledged, valid intent
Segment 21
TYPE: גמרא
A further reason the “friend immersed her” reading must be rejected.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְעוֹד, בִּתְרוּמָה נָמֵי אָכְלָה, דִּתְנַן: הַחֵרֶשֶׁת, וְהַשּׁוֹטָה, וְהַסּוֹמָא, וְשֶׁנִּטְרְפָה דַּעְתָּהּ, אִם יֵשׁ לָהֶן פִּקְּחוֹת מְתַקְּנוֹת אוֹתָן – אוֹכְלוֹת בִּתְרוּמָה.
English Translation:
And furthermore, in that case the immersion enables her to partake of teruma as well, as we learned in a mishna (Nidda 13b): In the case of a woman who is a deaf-mute, or an imbecile, or blind, or who went insane, and is therefore unable to examine herself reliably, if one of these women has a competent friend, that friend prepares her by examining her and immersing them in a ritual bath. And on that basis the incompetent woman may partake of teruma.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara adds a second reason against the “another woman immersed her” reading. If a competent friend provides the intent, the immersion works even for teruma — as the mishna in Nidda teaches: a deaf-mute, imbecile, blind, or insane woman whose competent friends prepare and immerse her may eat teruma. So if our case were a friend-assisted immersion, even Rav would permit teruma, contradicting his ruling that she is barred from it. The original case must therefore be one with no intent whatsoever — confirming that the dispute is precisely about intent-free immersion.
Key Terms:
- פִּקְּחוֹת (pikchot) = competent women — able to provide valid intent
- מְתַקְּנוֹת (metaknot) = prepare/ready them — examine and immerse the incapable women
Segment 22
TYPE: גמרא
Rav Pappa defines the case according to each opinion.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: לְרַבִּי נָתָן, שֶׁנָּפְלָה מִן הַגֶּשֶׁר, וּלְרַבָּנַן, שֶׁיָּרְדָה לְהָקֵר.
English Translation:
Rav Pappa said: According to Rabbi Natan, who does not require intent for the slaughter of non-sacred animals, immersion against her will that renders it permitted for a woman to engage in intercourse with her husband is in a case where she fell from a bridge into a river, with no intent at all. According to the Rabbis, who require intent to cut for slaughter to be valid and intent to enter the water for immersion to be valid, it is referring to a case where she descended into the water to cool herself, with no thought of purification.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Pappa specifies the case differently for each tanna. For Rabbi Natan, who requires no intent at all, the “forced immersion” can be the extreme case of a woman who fell off a bridge into a river — pure accident, zero intent — and she is still valid for her husband. For the Rabbis, who require at least a minimal intent to enter the water, the case is a woman who deliberately went down to cool off: she intended to enter the water (satisfying the minimal “cutting”-level intent), though not to purify herself. This parallels precisely the slaughter dispute — Rabbi Natan needs nothing, the Rabbis need minimal intent.
Key Terms:
- שֶׁנָּפְלָה מִן הַגֶּשֶׁר (shenafla min hagesher) = who fell from a bridge — total absence of intent
- שֶׁיָּרְדָה לְהָקֵר (sheyarda lehaker) = who descended to cool off — intent to enter the water, but not to purify
Segment 23
TYPE: גמרא
Rava’s ruling on slaughtering a red heifer alongside another animal.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רָבָא: שָׁחַט פָּרָה וְשָׁחַט בְּהֵמָה אַחֶרֶת עִמָּהּ, לְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל פְּסוּלָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara continues its discussion of the dispute between Rabbi Natan and the Rabbis. Rava said: If one slaughtered a red heifer and in the same action slaughtered another animal together with it, everyone agrees that the red heifer is disqualified.
קלאוד על הדף:
The daf closes by extending the intent debate to the red heifer (para aduma), whose preparation uniquely requires focused intent. Rava rules that if one slaughters the red heifer while simultaneously slaughtering an ordinary animal alongside it, everyone — both Rabbi Natan and the Rabbis — agrees the heifer is disqualified. The red heifer demands undivided intent directed solely to it; splitting one’s attention across two animals undermines that requirement, even for those who hold ordinary slaughter needs no intent. The discussion of this principle continues onto daf 32.
Key Terms:
- פָּרָה (para) = the red heifer (para aduma), whose ashes purify from corpse-impurity
- לְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל (ledivrei hakol) = “according to all opinions” — a point on which the disputants agree