Chullin Daf 70 (חולין דף ע׳)
Daf: 70 | Amudim: 70a – 70b | Date: Loading...
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (70a)
Segment 1
TYPE: גמרא
The second leg of the tzerikha begun on 69b: why both Rav Huna–Rabba cases were needed.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאִי אִתְּמַר בְּהָא: בְּהָא קָאָמַר רַבָּה, אֲבָל בְּהָא – אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ לְרַב הוּנָא, צְרִיכָא.
English Translation:
And if their dispute was stated only with regard to that case, when one-third emerged through the wall of the womb, one might have thought it is only in that case that Rabba says the animal is consecrated from that point forward, as that results in a stringency, i.e., the fetus is subject to firstborn status. But in this case, when after one-third emerged it was sold to a gentile, and where ruling that the animal is consecrated from that point forward results in a leniency, one might say that Rabba concedes to Rav Huna. Therefore, it was necessary for the dispute to be stated in both cases.
קלאוד על הדף:
This completes the tzerikha from the end of 69b, now run in Rabba’s direction. Had only the wall-birth case been taught, one might think Rabba insists on prospective consecration only there, where it yields the stringent result (the firstborn is subject to sanctity); but in the sale case, where prospective consecration is lenient (the firstborn is exempt), one might think Rabba would concede to Rav Huna. Teaching both cases establishes that each Amora holds his timing principle consistently, indifferent to whether it produces leniency or stringency.
Key Terms:
- צְרִיכָא = “it is necessary” — the device showing both cases of a dispute had to be taught
- מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ = “he concedes to him” — the rejected supposition that Rabba would yield to Rav Huna
Segment 2
TYPE: קושיא
A challenge to Rav Huna from the mishna’s “cast to the dogs.”
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תְּנַן: הַמְבַכֶּרֶת הַמְקַשָּׁה לֵילֵד – מְחַתֵּךְ אֵבֶר אֵבֶר וּמַשְׁלִיךְ לִכְלָבִים. מַאי לָאו, מְחַתֵּךְ וּמַנִּיחַ? וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ לְמַפְרֵעַ הוּא קָדוֹשׁ – יִקָּבֵר מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!
English Translation:
The Gemara raises a difficulty with the opinion of Rav Huna. We learned in the mishna: If an animal that was giving birth to a firstborn male was encountering difficulty giving birth, and in order to alleviate the difficulty one wishes to terminate the birth, he may cut up the fetus limb by limb and cast it to the dogs. What, is it not teaching that one cuts each limb and leaves it outside the body, casting the limbs to the dogs only after he has already extracted a majority of its body? And if you say a firstborn is consecrated retroactively, then once the majority of the fetus emerges from the womb all of the limbs would be consecrated retroactively according to Rav Huna. Accordingly, the mishna should have said the limbs must be buried.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara presses Rav Huna’s retroactive-consecration view against the mishna. If a majority of the fetus has emerged piecemeal, Rav Huna’s principle should make sanctity reach back over all the extracted limbs — yet the mishna lets one toss them to the dogs rather than requiring burial. The tension is sharp: retroactive holiness would forbid casting consecrated limbs to dogs and demand they be buried.
Key Terms:
- מְחַתֵּךְ וּמַנִּיחַ = “cuts and leaves” — extracting and setting aside the limbs (so a majority accumulates outside)
- מַשְׁלִיךְ לִכְלָבִים = “casts to the dogs” — the disposal the mishna permits, implying no sanctity attached
Segment 3
TYPE: תירוץ
The Gemara defends Rav Huna by restricting the mishna’s case.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לָא, הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? בִּמְחַתֵּךְ וּמַשְׁלִיךְ.
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: No, here we are dealing with one who cuts each limb and immediately casts it to the dogs, before any consecration takes effect.
קלאוד על הדף:
The defense narrows the mishna’s scenario: it speaks of one who cuts and immediately discards each limb to the dogs, so that no majority ever accumulates outside the womb at once. Since the majority threshold is never crossed, sanctity never attaches even on Rav Huna’s view, and there is nothing to bury. The mishna is thus describing piecemeal removal, not a case where a majority is extracted and held.
Key Terms:
- מְחַתֵּךְ וּמַשְׁלִיךְ = “cuts and casts away” — disposing of each limb at once so no majority is ever present together
Segment 4
TYPE: קושיא
The Gemara objects that the mishna’s structure should have been different.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲבָל מְחַתֵּךְ וּמַנִּיחַ, מַאי יִקָּבֵר? אַדִּתְנָא סֵיפָא: ״יָצָא רוּבּוֹ יִקָּבֵר וְנִפְטְרָה מִן הַבְּכוֹרָה״, לִיפְלוֹג וְלִיתְנֵי בְּדִידֵיהּ: בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים – בִּמְחַתֵּךְ וּמַשְׁלִיךְ אֵבֶר אֵבֶר, אֲבָל מְחַתֵּךְ וּמַנִּיחַ – יִקָּבֵר.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: But according to this, if one cuts the limbs and leaves them, what is the halakha? Each one must be buried. If that is so, rather than teaching in the latter clause of the mishna: If a majority of the fetus had already emerged it is considered to have been born and duly consecrated, and so if one cut it up it must be buried, and any future offspring from that animal is exempted from firstborn status; let the tanna instead distinguish and teach a case in which the limbs are consecrated within the context of the first case itself, in the following manner: In what case is this statement, that the limbs may be cast to the dogs, said? It is with regard to one who cuts pieces of the fetus and immediately casts them to the dogs limb by limb, before a majority has emerged. But if one cuts and leaves the limbs until a majority has emerged, each one of them must be buried.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara presses the implication of the answer: if “cuts and leaves” would require burial, the mishna should have made that distinction internally — drawing the line within the difficult-birth clause itself (discard if removed piecemeal, bury if a majority accumulates) rather than jumping to a separate “majority emerged” clause about a whole fetus. The objection is one of redactional economy: the tanna chose a clumsy structure if the real fault line is discard-versus-leave.
Key Terms:
- בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים = “in what case was this said” — the formula for a tanna qualifying his own ruling
- לִיפְלוֹג וְלִיתְנֵי בְּדִידֵיהּ = “let him distinguish and teach within it” — the demand that the mishna split the case internally
Segment 5
TYPE: תירוץ
The Gemara rereads the mishna’s second clause as exactly that distinction.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָכִי נָמֵי קָאָמַר: בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? בִּמְחַתֵּךְ וּמַשְׁלִיךְ, אֲבָל מְחַתֵּךְ וּמַנִּיחַ – נַעֲשָׂה כְּמִי שֶׁיָּצָא רוּבּוֹ, וְיִקָּבֵר.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: That is indeed what the latter clause of the mishna is saying: In what case is this statement said? It is with regard to one who cuts and casts the limbs to the dogs before a majority emerges. But if one cuts and leaves the limbs until a majority emerges it is regarded as though a majority of it emerged at one time, and so it must be buried.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara resolves the redactional objection by reading the mishna’s “majority emerged” clause as precisely the internal qualification demanded. The latter clause effectively says: the discard-to-dogs license applies only to piecemeal removal; but if one cuts and accumulates a majority, it is treated as if the whole majority emerged together — and so it must be buried. The two clauses are therefore the very distinction the objection sought, just phrased as a separate sentence.
Key Terms:
- נַעֲשָׂה כְּמִי שֶׁיָּצָא רוּבּוֹ = “it becomes as one whose majority emerged” — accumulated limbs count as a majority emerging at once
- הָכִי נָמֵי קָאָמַר = “that is indeed what it says” — the mishna already encodes the needed distinction
Segment 6
TYPE: בעיא
Rava asks whether the majority-rule applies to a single limb.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בָּעֵי רָבָא: הָלְכוּ בְּאֵיבָרִין אַחַר הָרוֹב, אוֹ לֹא הָלְכוּ בְּאֵיבָרִין אַחַר הָרוֹב?
English Translation:
§ Rava raises a dilemma: Does one follow the majority with regard to limbs or does one not follow the majority with regard to limbs?
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava opens a new layer of the majority threshold. We already count “most of the fetus” as born; Rava asks whether the majority rule also operates within a single limb — i.e., whether the emergence of most of one limb pulls the rest of that limb along with it. The terse question will be sharpened over the next segments into a precise borderline case.
Key Terms:
- הָלְכוּ אַחַר הָרוֹב = “do we follow the majority” — the principle that the greater part determines the status of the whole
- אֵיבָרִין = limbs — the unit Rava asks whether the majority rule applies to internally
Segment 7
TYPE: גמרא
The Gemara probes the first possible reading of Rava’s case.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הֵיכִי דָּמֵי: אִילֵּימָא, כְּגוֹן שֶׁיָּצָא רוֹב בְּמִיעוּט אֵבֶר, וְקָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ: הַאי מִיעוּט דְּבָרַאי, בָּתַר רוֹב דְּאֵבֶר שָׁדֵינַן לֵיהּ, אוֹ בָּתַר רוּבָּא דְּעוּבָּר שָׁדֵינַן לֵיהּ?
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this dilemma; what exactly is Rava’s question? If we say it is referring to a case where the majority of the fetus emerged, but that majority includes the emergence of the minority part of one of its limbs, then Rava is raising the following dilemma: With regard to this minority part of a limb that is outside the womb, do we cast it, i.e., count it, together with the majority of that limb, which is still inside the womb, as if the entire limb was still inside the womb? If so, it would be regarded as though a majority of the fetus has not yet emerged. Or perhaps we cast it and count it together with the majority of the fetus that has already emerged, and so it is regarded as though a majority of the fetus has emerged and it is duly consecrated.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara tests one way to construe Rava: the fetal majority is already out, but it includes only the minority of some limb (most of that limb still inside). Would we “pull” the protruding minority back to its inside majority — undoing the fetal majority — or count it with the emerged fetal majority? This framing makes the limb’s own majority potentially override the fetal majority, which the next segment rejects as implausible.
Key Terms:
- רוֹב בְּמִיעוּט אֵבֶר = “the [fetal] majority [out] with [only] a minority of a limb” — the first candidate scenario
- שָׁדֵינַן לֵיהּ = “we cast/attach it” — i.e., to which side we count the borderline part
Segment 8
TYPE: גמרא
The Gemara dismisses that reading as self-evident.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
פְּשִׁיטָא דְּלָא שָׁבְקִינַן רוּבָּא דְּעוּבָּר, וְאָזְלִינַן בָּתַר רוֹב אֵבֶר!
English Translation:
The Gemara rejects this possibility: In that case it is obvious that we do not disregard the majority of the fetus and go after the majority of the limb. Consequently, Rava would not have raised a dilemma about this.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara dismisses that construction: it is self-evidently wrong to abandon a completed fetal majority in favor of a single limb’s majority. The whole-fetus majority is the operative threshold, and a lone limb cannot reverse it. Since the answer is obvious, Rava — who poses genuine dilemmas — could not have meant this scenario.
Key Terms:
- פְּשִׁיטָא = “it is obvious” — a marker that this reading is too clear to be Rava’s real question
- לָא שָׁבְקִינַן רוּבָּא דְּעוּבָּר = “we do not abandon the fetal majority” — the fetal majority outranks a single limb’s majority
Segment 9
TYPE: גמרא
The Gemara reframes Rava’s case as exactly half-emerged with a limb’s majority out.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא, כְּגוֹן שֶׁיָּצָא חֶצְיוֹ בְּרוֹב אֵבֶר, וְקָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ: הָהוּא מִיעוּט דִּבְגַוַּאי, מַהוּ לְמִישְׁדְּיֵיהּ בָּתַר רוֹב אֵבֶר?
English Translation:
Rather, the dilemma is referring to a case where half of the fetus emerged, but that half includes the majority of a certain limb, and Rava raises the following dilemma: With regard to this minority part of a limb that is inside the womb, what is the halakha as to whether one casts it and counts it together with the majority of that limb and considers it as if that entire limb has emerged? If it is counted, it would be regarded as though a majority of the fetus has emerged, and it is duly consecrated.
קלאוד על הדף:
The true case is a knife’s-edge: exactly half the fetus is out, and within that half lies the majority of one limb whose minority still remains inside. Rava asks whether the limb’s inside-minority is “pulled out” to join its own emerged majority — which would tip the fetus from half to a majority and consecrate it. Here the limb-level majority rule is decisive precisely because the fetus is poised exactly at half.
Key Terms:
- חֶצְיוֹ בְּרוֹב אֵבֶר = “half [out], with the majority of a limb” — the borderline case that makes Rava’s question live
- מִיעוּט דִּבְגַוַּאי = “the minority [of the limb] inside” — the remaining sliver whose status decides consecration
Segment 10
TYPE: גמרא
The Gemara tries to resolve Rava’s dilemma from the mishna.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תָּא שָׁמַע: יָצָא רוּבּוֹ – הֲרֵי זֶה יִקָּבֵר. מַאי רוּבּוֹ? אִילֵּימָא רוּבּוֹ מַמָּשׁ, עַד הַשְׁתָּא לָא אַשְׁמְעִינַן דְּרוּבּוֹ כְּכוּלּוֹ?
English Translation:
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution from a statement of the mishna: If a majority of the fetus had already emerged, it is considered to have been born and duly consecrated, and so if one cut it up it must be buried. The Gemara clarifies: What is meant by a majority of the fetus? If we say it means literally the majority of the fetus, then the following difficulty arises: Until now had we not learned the principle that the majority of an item is considered like all of it? This is a well-established principle and it is not necessary to teach it again in this context.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara attempts a proof from the mishna’s “most of it emerged.” It presses on what “most” adds: if it means a literal, straightforward majority, the clause is redundant, since “the majority is like the whole” (rubo ke-khulo) is already a familiar principle needing no restatement here. The redundancy invites a richer reading — that the mishna is teaching a non-obvious case, possibly the very limb-majority scenario Rava raised.
Key Terms:
- תָּא שָׁמַע = “come and hear” — the formula introducing an attempted proof from a tannaitic source
- רוּבּוֹ כְּכוּלּוֹ = “its majority is like all of it” — the established principle that makes a plain reading redundant
Segment 11
TYPE: גמרא
The proposed proof: the mishna must mean the half-with-limb-majority case.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא לָאו, כְּגוֹן שֶׁיָּצָא חֶצְיוֹ בְּרוֹב אֵבֶר!
English Translation:
Rather, is the mishna not referring to a case where half of the fetus emerged, but that half includes the majority of a limb? If so, the mishna directly resolves Rava’s dilemma and teaches that the minority part of the limb inside the womb is regarded as though it had emerged.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara proposes that the non-redundant reading of “most of it” is precisely Rava’s case: half the fetus out, including the majority of a limb. On this reading the mishna already rules that the limb’s inside-minority is pulled out with its own majority, tipping the fetus past half and consecrating it — resolving Rava’s dilemma affirmatively. If accepted, the limb-level majority rule would be established from the mishna itself.
Key Terms:
- אֶלָּא לָאו = “rather, is it not” — the rhetorical move asserting the only sensible (non-redundant) reading
Segment 12
TYPE: גמרא
The Gemara deflects the proof, leaving Rava’s dilemma open.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לָא, כְּגוֹן שֶׁיָּצָא רוּבּוֹ בְּמִיעוּט אֵבֶר, וְקָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּלָא שָׁבְקִינַן רוּבּוֹ דְּעוּבָּר דִּבְהֵמָה וְאָזְלִינַן בָּתַר אֵבֶר.
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: No, the mishna could be referring to a case where the majority of the fetus emerged, but that majority includes the emergence of the minority of a limb, and it teaches us that we do not disregard the majority of the fetus and go after the majority of the limb.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara blocks the proof by supplying an alternative non-redundant reading: the mishna teaches the opposite borderline — most of the fetus is out but a limb’s minority is among what emerged (its majority still inside), and the novelty is that we do not drag the emerged part back to the limb’s inside-majority to undo the fetal majority. On this reading the mishna addresses limb-majority going the other direction, so it does not resolve Rava’s specific question. Rava’s dilemma therefore remains unanswered on the page.
Key Terms:
- רוּבּוֹ בְּמִיעוּט אֵבֶר = “[fetal] majority out with a minority of a limb” — the alternative reading that leaves Rava’s case undecided
- לָא שָׁבְקִינַן … בָּתַר אֵבֶר = “we do not abandon [the fetal majority] to follow the limb” — the mishna’s actual chiddush on this reading
Segment 13
TYPE: בעיא
Rava asks whether an interposition at birth blocks consecration.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בָּעֵי רָבָא: כְּרָכוֹ בְּסִיב, מַהוּ? בְּטַלִּיתוֹ, מַהוּ?
English Translation:
§ A firstborn animal is consecrated by virtue of the fact that its birth is the first in which the womb of the mother opens, as indicated by the verse: “Consecrate to Me every firstborn, that which opens the womb” (Exodus 13:2). Concerning this condition, Rava raises a dilemma: If one wrapped the fetus in the bast of a palm tree while it was still in the womb, and it therefore did not come in contact with the opening of the womb directly when it emerged, what is the halakha with regard to whether it is consecrated? Likewise, if one wrapped it in his robe when it emerged, what is the halakha?
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava pivots from “how much emerged” to “how it emerged,” exploring the verse’s requirement of peter rechem — the firstborn must open the womb. He asks whether an interposition between fetus and womb defeats consecration: wrapped in palm-fiber or in a garment, the fetus never directly touches the opening. The dilemma probes whether consecration requires literal contact with the womb’s walls or merely passage through the opening.
Key Terms:
- פֶּטֶר רֶחֶם = “that which opens the womb” — the scriptural basis (Exodus 13:2) for firstborn sanctity
- סִיב = the bast/fiber of a palm tree — a wrapping that interposes between fetus and womb
- חֲצִיצָה = (implied) interposition — the conceptual issue of a barrier blocking contact
Segment 14
TYPE: בעיא
Rava refines: wrapped in another animal’s afterbirth.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בְּשִׁלְיָתוֹ, מַהוּ? בְּשִׁלְיָתוֹ? אוֹרְחֵיהּ הוּא! אֶלָּא בְּשִׁלְיָא אַחֶרֶת, מַהוּ?
English Translation:
Rava adds: If it emerged wrapped in its afterbirth, what is the halakha? The Gemara interjects: How could one suggest that being wrapped in its afterbirth would pose a problem? That is its natural manner of birth, and the afterbirth is consequently not considered an interposition. Accordingly, it is considered as though it was in direct contact with the opening of the womb. Rather, Rava’s dilemma must be as follows: If it emerged wrapped in the afterbirth of a different animal, what is the halakha?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara refines the interposition series. A fetus’s own afterbirth cannot be a problem — it is the natural manner of birth and so is not deemed a barrier at all. The dilemma must therefore concern a foreign afterbirth, from a different animal: is that an interposition that blocks consecration, or, being still afterbirth-tissue, does it count like the fetus’s own and permit the womb to be “opened”?
Key Terms:
- שִׁלְיָא = the afterbirth/placenta — natural birth-tissue, not an interposition when it is the fetus’s own
- אוֹרְחֵיהּ הוּא = “that is its [natural] way” — why a fetus’s own afterbirth poses no question
- שִׁלְיָא אַחֶרֶת = “a different afterbirth” — the genuine dilemma: foreign birth-tissue as a barrier
Segment 15
TYPE: בעיא
Rava asks about a fetus brought out by hand, hind-legs first.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כְּרָכַתּוּ וַאֲחָזַתּוּ וְהוֹצִיאַתּוּ, מַהוּ? הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דִּנְפַק דֶּרֶךְ רֵישֵׁיהּ – פְּטַרְתֵּיהּ! אֶלָּא דִּנְפַק דֶּרֶךְ מַרְגְּלוֹתָיו.
English Translation:
Another dilemma: If one wrapped it in one’s hands and held it and brought it out in that fashion, such that the fetus did not come in direct contact with the opening of the womb, what is the halakha? With regard to all these dilemmas the Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If the fetus had already partially emerged headfirst and then one wrapped up the body, which was still inside the womb, the halakha in such a case is clear: Since its head emerged, it is already considered to have been born and to have opened up the womb, and it is duly consecrated. Rather, the dilemma is in a case where it partially emerged hind legs first, and the majority of the body, which was still in the womb, was wrapped before it emerged.
קלאוד על הדף:
Now the interposition is a human hand: someone grasps the fetus and draws it out so it never touches the womb directly. The Gemara narrows the live case — if the head had already emerged, consecration is settled, since the head’s emergence already opened the womb. The dilemma is only where it came feet-first and the bulk of the body was wrapped and extracted by hand before contacting the opening.
Key Terms:
- דֶּרֶךְ רֵישֵׁיהּ = “headfirst” — if the head emerged, the womb is already opened and the question is moot
- דֶּרֶךְ מַרְגְּלוֹתָיו = “feet-first” — the breech case where the hand-interposition question is genuine
Segment 16
TYPE: בעיא
Rava asks about a weasel that swallowed and re-deposited the fetus.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בְּלָעַתְהוּ חוּלְדָּה וְהוֹצִיאַתּוּ, מַהוּ? הוֹצִיאַתּוּ? הָא אַפֵּיקְתֵּיהּ! אֶלָּא, בְּלָעַתּוּ וְהוֹצִיאַתּוּ, וְהִכְנִיסַתּוּ וֶהֱקִיאַתּוּ, וְיָצָא מֵאֵלָיו, מַהוּ?
English Translation:
Rava raises additional dilemmas: If a weasel entered the womb and swallowed the fetus there, and then exited the womb, bringing the fetus out in its stomach, what is the halakha? The Gemara interjects: Is there any doubt about a case where the weasel brought the fetus out in its stomach? In such a case it is the weasel that brought it out, and it is certainly not regarded as though the fetus opened the womb. Rather, the dilemma concerns a case where the weasel swallowed the fetus and brought it out, and then brought it back into the womb and vomited it out while inside the womb, and the fetus subsequently emerged of its own accord. What is the halakha in this case?
קלאוד על הדף:
The most baroque interposition: a weasel swallows the fetus inside the womb. If it simply carried the fetus out in its belly, the weasel — not the fetus — opened the womb, so consecration plainly fails. The dilemma is the intricate variant where the weasel swallowed it, exited, re-entered, vomited it back inside, and the fetus then emerged on its own — testing whether the prior swallowing has spoiled the eventual self-emergence as a true “opening of the womb.”
Key Terms:
- חוּלְדָּה = a weasel — the agent whose intervention raises the opening-of-the-womb question
- הָא אַפֵּיקְתֵּיהּ = “but it [the weasel] took it out” — why the simple case is no dilemma
- יָצָא מֵאֵלָיו = “it emerged of its own accord” — the final self-emergence whose validity is in question
Segment 17
TYPE: תיקו
The final interposition dilemma — a fetus crossing into a second womb — is left unresolved.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הִדְבִּיק שְׁנֵי רְחָמִים, וְיָצָא מִזֶּה וְנִכְנַס לָזֶה, מַהוּ? דִּידֵיהּ פָּטַר, דְּלָאו דִּידֵיהּ לָא פָּטַר, אוֹ דִלְמָא דְּלָאו דִּידֵיהּ נָמֵי פָּטַר? תֵּיקוּ.
English Translation:
Another dilemma: If one pressed together the openings of two wombs of two animals giving birth to firstborns, and a fetus exited from the womb of this animal and entered the womb of that animal, and then emerged from the womb of the second animal, after which the second animal gave birth to its fetus, what is the halakha with regard to whether the fetus of the second animal is consecrated as a firstborn? Is the womb considered to have opened only when its own fetus emerges from inside, but a fetus that is not its own is not halakhically considered to have opened the womb? Or perhaps even a fetus that is not its own is also considered to have opened the womb? The Gemara does not provide a resolution for these dilemmas and concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
קלאוד על הדף:
The series climaxes in a bizarre case: the openings of two birthing wombs are pressed together, a fetus passes out of the first and through the second, opening the second womb before that animal’s own fetus emerges. The question is whether a foreign fetus can perform the peter rechem for the second mother, exempting her own offspring — i.e., does “opening the womb” require one’s own offspring, or does any passage through suffice? The Gemara leaves this entire run of dilemmas as teiku, unresolved.
Key Terms:
- הִדְבִּיק שְׁנֵי רְחָמִים = “joined two wombs” — the contrived setup of two adjacent openings
- דִּידֵיהּ / דְּלָאו דִּידֵיהּ = “its own / not its own” — whether only a mother’s own fetus can open her womb
- תֵּיקוּ = the dilemmas stand unresolved
Segment 18
TYPE: בעיא
Rav Aḥa: does airspace or contact of the womb consecrate?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בָּעֵי רַב אַחָא: נִפְתְּחוּ כּוֹתְלֵי בֵּית הָרֶחֶם, מַהוּ? אֲוִיר רֶחֶם מַקְדִּישׁ, וְהָאִיכָּא, אוֹ דִלְמָא נְגִיעַת רֶחֶם מְקַדְּשָׁה, וְהָא לֵיכָּא?
English Translation:
Rav Aḥa raises a dilemma: If the walls of the opening of the womb opened and widened to such an extent that when the fetus emerged it did not touch them, what is the halakha? Does the airspace of the opening of the womb consecrate the fetus as it is born, and this situation exists here in this case; or perhaps it is the contact with the opening of the womb that consecrates it, and this situation does not exist here in this case?
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Aḥa isolates the conceptual core of peter rechem: is consecration triggered by the fetus passing through the airspace of the womb’s opening, or specifically by physical contact with its walls? In his case the opening has widened so much that the fetus exits without touching the walls at all. Airspace is present (so it consecrates on the first view), but contact is absent (so it does not on the second) — a clean test of which factor the verse demands.
Key Terms:
- כּוֹתְלֵי בֵּית הָרֶחֶם = the walls of the womb’s opening — the surface whose role is in question
- אֲוִיר רֶחֶם מַקְדִּישׁ = “the airspace of the womb consecrates” — the first proposed mechanism
- נְגִיעַת רֶחֶם מְקַדְּשָׁה = “contact with the womb consecrates” — the rival mechanism
Segment 19
TYPE: בעיא
Mar bar Rav Ashi: do dislodged womb-walls still consecrate?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בָּעֵי מָר בַּר רַב אָשֵׁי: נֶעְקְרוּ כּוֹתְלֵי בֵּית הָרֶחֶם, מַהוּ? נֶעְקְרוּ – לֵיתַנְהוּ! אֶלָּא נֶעְקְרוּ וְתָלוּ לֵיהּ בְּצַוְּארֵיהּ, מַאי? בִּמְקוֹמָן מְקַדְּשִׁי, שֶׁלֹּא בִּמְקוֹמָן לֹא מְקַדְּשִׁי, אוֹ דִלְמָא שֶׁלֹּא בִּמְקוֹמָן נָמֵי מְקַדְּשִׁי?
English Translation:
Mar bar Rav Ashi raises a dilemma: If the walls of the opening of the womb were removed, what is the halakha? The Gemara interjects: The halakha in this case is clear, since if they were removed they are not there to consecrate the fetus. Rather, the dilemma is in a case where they were removed from their original place, recessed inside the womb, and as the fetus emerged, the walls lay on its neck. In such a case, what is the halakha? Do the walls of the opening of the womb consecrate a fetus only when they are in their natural place, but when they are not in their natural place they cannot consecrate a fetus? Or perhaps when they are not in their natural place they also consecrate the fetus.
קלאוד על הדף:
Mar bar Rav Ashi presses a related variable: not whether the walls touch, but whether they must be in their natural location. Walls entirely gone obviously cannot consecrate; the real case is walls that detached and slid inward, draping on the fetus’s neck as it emerged. There is contact with the walls, but in the wrong position — so the dilemma is whether consecration depends on the walls being in their proper place or merely on contact wherever they are.
Key Terms:
- נֶעְקְרוּ = “were uprooted/dislodged” — the walls detached from their natural position
- בִּמְקוֹמָן / שֶׁלֹּא בִּמְקוֹמָן = “in their place / out of their place” — whether location is essential to consecration
Segment 20
TYPE: בעיא
Rabbi Yirmeya asks Rabbi Zeira about thinned womb-walls.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בָּעֵי מִינֵּיהּ רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה מֵרַבִּי זֵירָא: נִגְמְמוּ כּוֹתְלֵי בֵּית הָרֶחֶם, מַהוּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: קָא נָגְעַתְּ בְּבַעְיָא דְּאִיבַּעְיָא לַן, דְּבָעֵי רַבִּי זֵירָא, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַבִּי זֵירָא מֵרַבִּי אַסִּי: עוֹמֵד מְרוּבֶּה עַל הַפָּרוּץ וְיָצָא דֶּרֶךְ פָּרוּץ, פָּרוּץ מְרוּבֶּה עַל הָעוֹמֵד וְיָצָא דֶּרֶךְ עוֹמֵד, מַאי?
English Translation:
Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma before Rabbi Zeira: If the walls of the opening of the womb were thinned [nigmemu] by removing the inner layer, what is the halakha? If the fetus then emerges through them is it consecrated? Rabbi Zeira said to him: You have touched upon a dilemma that was already raised before us, and that discussion provides the answer to your dilemma. As Rabbi Zeira raised a dilemma, and some say Rabbi Zeira raised that dilemma before Rabbi Asi: If a section of the opening of the womb was cut away, but the standing section, i.e., the part remaining, is greater in size than the breached, removed, section, and the offspring emerged through the breached section; or if the breached section is greater in size than the standing section and the offspring emerged through the standing section, what is the halakha?
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yirmeya asks about walls that were shaved thin (nigmemu). Rabbi Zeira replies that this connects to an earlier dilemma of his (or one he posed to Rabbi Asi) framed in the standing-versus-breached terminology familiar from the laws of partitions: when part of the opening is intact (omed) and part is breached (parutz), and the fetus exits through one or the other, does consecration follow? Importing that framework will let Rabbi Zeira answer Rabbi Yirmeya by analogy.
Key Terms:
- נִגְמְמוּ = “were thinned/shaved” — the inner layer of the walls scraped away
- עוֹמֵד / פָּרוּץ = “standing / breached” — the intact versus gapped portions, a partition-law framework applied here
Segment 21
TYPE: תירוץ
Rabbi Zeira resolves the thinned-walls case by inference.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
עַד כָּאן לָא אִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ אֶלָּא פָּרוּץ מְרוּבֶּה עַל הָעוֹמֵד, דְּאִיכָּא עוֹמֵד בְּעוֹלָם, אֲבָל נִגְמְמוּ – לָא קָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ.
English Translation:
Rabbi Zeira explains how this dilemma can resolve Rabbi Yirmeya’s dilemma: That dilemma was raised only with regard to a case where the breached section is greater than the standing section, as there is at least some part of the womb still standing and therefore one can consider the possibility that it could consecrate the fetus. But a dilemma was not raised with regard to case where the walls were thinned, because in that case it is obvious that the fetus is not consecrated, as there is nothing left to consecrate it.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Zeira extracts the answer by a fortiori from his own framing. Even his earlier dilemma was only entertained because some intact wall (omed) still existed to potentially consecrate; doubt was reasonable only when there was a standing remnant. In the thinned-walls case, by contrast, the consecrating surface has effectively been scraped out of existence — so it is obvious the fetus is not consecrated, and Rabbi Yirmeya’s question is answered in the negative. The daf thus closes the firstborn material by settling the thinned-walls case while leaving the standing-versus-breached dilemma itself open.
Key Terms:
- עַד כָּאן לָא אִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ אֶלָּא = “the dilemma was raised only where…” — the limiting move that isolates the decisive factor
- אִיכָּא עוֹמֵד בְּעוֹלָם = “there is a standing [wall] in existence” — the precondition for any doubt, absent when the walls are thinned away
Amud Bet (70b)
Segment 1
TYPE: משנה
A new mishna on touching a dead fetus inside its mother’s womb.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְנִי׳ בְּהֵמָה שֶׁמֵּת עוּבָּרָהּ בְּתוֹךְ מֵעֶיהָ וְהוֹשִׁיט הָרוֹעֶה אֶת יָדוֹ וְנָגַע בּוֹ, בֵּין בִּבְהֵמָה טְמֵאָה בֵּין בִּבְהֵמָה טְהוֹרָה – טָהוֹר. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי אוֹמֵר: בִּטְמֵאָה – טָמֵא, וּבִטְהוֹרָה – טָהוֹר.
English Translation:
MISHNA: With regard to an animal whose fetus died in its womb and the shepherd reached his hand into the womb and touched the fetus, both in the case of a non-kosher animal and in the case of a kosher animal the fetus does not have the status of an animal carcass that imparts ritual impurity, and the shepherd remains ritually pure. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: In the case of a non-kosher animal it is impure, and in the case of a kosher animal it is pure.
קלאוד על הדף:
This mishna shifts from consecration to ritual purity: a fetus dies inside the womb and a shepherd reaches in and touches it. The anonymous first tanna rules him pure across the board — a dead fetus enclosed in its mother is not yet a carcass (neveila), whether the mother is kosher or not. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili dissents only regarding a non-kosher mother, where he holds the dead fetus does convey impurity. The dispute sets up the Gemara’s search for each opinion’s scriptural source.
Key Terms:
- רוֹעֶה = the shepherd who reaches into the womb and touches the dead fetus
- נְבֵלָה = a carcass conveying ritual impurity by contact
- רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי = the dissenter who deems the fetus impure inside a non-kosher mother
Segment 2
TYPE: גמרא
Rav Ḥisda grounds the first tanna in an a fortiori inference.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גְּמָ׳ מַאי טַעְמָא דְּתַנָּא קַמָּא? אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: קַל וָחוֹמֶר, אִם הוֹעִילָה אִמּוֹ לְהַתִּירוֹ בַּאֲכִילָה, לֹא תּוֹעִיל לוֹ לְטַהוֹרֵיהּ מִידֵי נְבֵלָה?
English Translation:
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the ruling of the first tanna? Rav Ḥisda said: It is apparent through an a fortiori inference: If being inside its mother is effective to permit it for consumption through the slaughter of its mother even if the fetus was found dead inside the womb, then should being inside its mother not also be effective to render it pure from the impurity of an animal carcass?
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Ḥisda supplies the first tanna’s logic with a kal va-chomer paralleling Rava’s inference on 69a. Being enclosed in the mother is potent enough to achieve the greater result — permitting the fetus for consumption via her slaughter, even when found dead inside. If enclosure can do that, it can surely accomplish the lesser result of keeping the dead fetus from conveying carcass impurity. Purity is the easier threshold than edibility.
Key Terms:
- תַּנָּא קַמָּא = the anonymous first tanna, who rules pure in all cases
- קַל וָחוֹמֶר = the a fortiori inference: if enclosure permits eating, it surely prevents carcass impurity
Segment 3
TYPE: גמרא
A hekkesh extends the first tanna’s ruling to a non-kosher mother.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אַשְׁכְּחַן בְּהֵמָה טְהוֹרָה, בְּהֵמָה טְמֵאָה מְנָלַן? אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְכִי יָמוּת מִן הַבְּהֵמָה״ – זוֹ בְּהֵמָה טְמֵאָה, ״אֲשֶׁר הִיא לָכֶם לְאׇכְלָה״ – זוֹ בְּהֵמָה טְהוֹרָה, אִיתַּקַּשׁ בְּהֵמָה טְמֵאָה לִבְהֵמָה טְהוֹרָה: מָה בְּהֵמָה טְהוֹרָה – עוּבָּרָהּ טָהוֹר, אַף בְּהֵמָה טְמֵאָה – עוּבָּרָהּ טָהוֹר.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: We found a rationale for this halakha with regard to a kosher animal; from where do we derive that the same applies to a non-kosher animal? The Gemara answers that the verse states: “And when a domesticated animal dies, of those that you eat, one who touches its carcass shall be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 11:39). The Gemara interprets the verse as follows: “And when a domesticated animal dies,” this is referring to a non-kosher animal; “of those that you eat,” this is referring to a kosher animal. The verse thereby juxtaposes a non-kosher animal to a kosher animal with regard to imparting impurity of a carcass, and teaches that just as with regard to a kosher animal, its fetus that died in its womb is pure, as derived above through an a fortiori inference, so too, with regard to a non-kosher animal, its dead fetus is pure.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Ḥisda’s kal va-chomer only covers a kosher mother, whose slaughter permits the fetus; a non-kosher mother’s slaughter permits nothing, so the inference does not reach her. The Gemara bridges the gap with a hekkesh: Leviticus 11:39 is parsed so “when a behema dies” denotes a non-kosher animal and “of those you eat” denotes a kosher one, juxtaposing the two for carcass-impurity. The juxtaposition transfers the kosher result to the non-kosher case — her dead fetus is likewise pure.
Key Terms:
- אִיתַּקַּשׁ = “they are juxtaposed/equated” — a hekkesh linking two cases so a law transfers between them
- בְּהֵמָה טְמֵאָה / טְהוֹרָה = a non-kosher / kosher animal, the two halves of the verse
- וְכִי יָמוּת מִן הַבְּהֵמָה = “and when an animal dies” (Leviticus 11:39) — the verse supplying the juxtaposition
Segment 4
TYPE: גמרא
Rabbi Yitzḥak supplies Rabbi Yosei HaGelili’s scriptural source.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי, מַאי טַעְמָא? אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: דְּאָמַר קְרָא ״וְכׇל הוֹלֵךְ עַל כַּפָּיו בְּכׇל הַחַיָּה הַהֹלֶכֶת וְגוֹ׳״ – מְהַלְּכֵי כַּפַּיִם בְּחַיָּה טִמֵּאתִי לָךְ.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, what is the reason for his ruling? Rabbi Yitzḥak said that the verse states with regard to non-kosher animals that do not have cloven hooves: “And whatever walks on its paws, among any [bekhol] undomesticated animal [ḥayya] that walks on all fours, they are impure for you; whoever touches their carcass shall be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 11:27). Rabbi Yosei HaGelili expounds this verse as follows: Those animals that walk on their paws, i.e., that do not have cloven hooves, which are inside the body of an animal, I rendered impure for you. Rabbi Yitzḥak interprets the term bekhol as meaning: Inside the body of, and the word ḥayya as meaning: A live animal. Accordingly, he understands the verse to be referring to a dead fetus found inside a living animal.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yitzḥak reconstructs Rabbi Yosei HaGelili’s source through a bold rereading of Leviticus 11:27. He takes bekhol (“among any”) to mean “inside the body of,” and chayya not as “undomesticated animal” but as “a live animal.” So the verse about paw-walking (non-cloven-hoof) creatures speaks of a dead, paw-type fetus found inside a living mother — declaring it impure. This grounds Rabbi Yosei HaGelili’s view that such a fetus does convey impurity, at least in a non-kosher mother.
Key Terms:
- מְהַלְּכֵי כַּפַּיִם = paw-walkers — non-kosher creatures lacking cloven hooves
- בְּכׇל = “among any,” reread as “inside the body of” — the hook for “a fetus within”
- חַיָּה = normally “undomesticated animal,” reread here as “a live animal” (the mother)
Segment 5
TYPE: קושיא
An objection: a kalut fetus in a cow should then be impure.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, קָלוּט בִּמְעֵי פָרָה לִיטַמֵּא, דִּמְהַלְּכֵי כַפַּיִם בְּחַיָּה הוּא? מְהַלְּכֵי כַפַּיִם בִּמְהַלְּכֵי אַרְבַּע, וְהַאי מְהַלְּכֵי אַרְבַּע בִּמְהַלְּכֵי שְׁמֹנֶה הוּא.
English Translation:
The Gemara objects: If that is so, then a dead fetus with non-cloven hooves found inside a cow should be impure, despite the fact that it is from a kosher species, as it is an animal that walks on its paws that is inside the body of a kosher animal. The Gemara explains: The verse renders impure an animal that walks upon its four paws that is inside an animal that walks on four paws. But this is a case of an animal that walks on four inside an animal that walks on eight. Since the mother cow’s hooves are entirely split into two parts, it actually walks on eight parts and is not the animal referred to by the verse.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara tests Rabbi Yitzḥak’s reading with a series of “leg-counting” cases. A kalut (closed-hoof) fetus inside a cow seems to fit “paw-walker inside a live animal” and should be impure — yet it is not. The resolution introduces a hidden parameter: the verse means a four-part walker inside a four-part walker, whereas a cow, with each hoof fully split, counts as walking on eight. The mismatch (four inside eight) places this case outside the verse, so the kalut fetus stays pure.
Key Terms:
- מְהַלְּכֵי אַרְבַּע / שְׁמֹנֶה = “walking on four / eight” — closed hooves count as four, fully split hooves as eight
- קָלוּט = a fetus with closed (uncloven) hooves, the four-part walker in this analysis
Segment 6
TYPE: קושיא
A cow fetus in a camel: resolved by the extra word “and whatever.”
Hebrew/Aramaic:
פָּרָה בִּמְעֵי גָמָל לֹא תְּטַמֵּא, דִּמְהַלְּכֵי שְׁמֹנֶה בִּמְהַלְּכֵי אַרְבַּע הוּא, ״הוֹלֵךְ״, ״וְכׇל הוֹלֵךְ״ – לְרַבּוֹת פָּרָה בִּמְעֵי גָמָל.
English Translation:
The Gemara raises another objection: If that is so, then a dead fetus in the form of a cow, which has eight parts to its legs, inside the womb of a camel, a non-kosher animal with non-cloven hooves, should not be impure, as it is an animal that walks on eight inside an animal that walks on four, and the verse is not referring to it. The Gemara responds that the verse could have stated: Walks upon, but instead states: “And whatever walks upon,” i.e., the addition of the word “whatever” serves to include a dead cow fetus in the womb of a camel, teaching that it is impure.
קלאוד על הדף:
The inverse case now arises: a cow fetus (eight) inside a camel (four) would fall outside the “four-in-four” formula and seem pure, yet it should be impure. The Gemara closes the gap with the extra word: the verse says ve-khol holekh (“and whatever walks”), not merely holekh, and the inclusive ve-khol stretches the law to cover the eight-in-four combination. The amplification keeps a dead cow fetus inside a camel within the impurity rule.
Key Terms:
- גָּמָל = a camel — a non-kosher four-part walker, the mother in this objection
- וְכׇל הוֹלֵךְ = “and whatever walks” — the inclusive phrase extending impurity to the eight-in-four case
Segment 7
TYPE: קושיא
A kalut in a kalut cow: kept pure by Rav Ḥisda’s inference.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
קָלוּט בִּמְעֵי קְלוּטָה לִיטַמֵּא, דִּמְהַלְּכֵי אַרְבַּע בִּמְהַלְּכֵי אַרְבַּע הוּא! לְהָכִי אַהֲנִי קַל וָחוֹמֶר דְּרַב חִסְדָּא.
English Translation:
The Gemara objects: If that is so, then a dead fetus with non-cloven hooves inside the womb of a cow with non-cloven hooves should be impure, as it is an animal that walks on four inside an animal that walks on four, but the halakha is that since the mother is a kosher species, it is pure. The Gemara explains: It is to that end that the a fortiori inference of Rav Ḥisda is effective, as it renders pure the fetuses of all kosher animals, even if their hooves are not fully cloven.
קלאוד על הדף:
A genuine “four-in-four” now appears: a kalut fetus inside a kalut (closed-hoof) cow, which fits Rabbi Yitzḥak’s verse precisely and should be impure. Yet the halakha keeps it pure — because the mother is still a kosher species. This is exactly where Rav Ḥisda’s earlier kal va-chomer does its work: enclosure in any kosher mother purifies her fetus, overriding the leg-count rule for kosher animals regardless of hoof shape.
Key Terms:
- קְלוּטָה = a closed-hoof (kalut) cow — a four-part walker that is nonetheless a kosher species
- לְהָכִי אַהֲנִי קַל וָחוֹמֶר דְּרַב חִסְדָּא = “this is what Rav Ḥisda’s inference accomplishes” — purifying all kosher-mother fetuses
Segment 8
TYPE: קושיא
Rav Aḥadvoi bar Ami demolishes the leg-count reading: a pig in a pig.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב אַחָדְבוּי בַּר אַמֵּי: חֲזִיר בִּמְעֵי חֲזִירְתָּא לָא לִיטַמֵּא, דִּמְהַלְּכֵי שְׁמֹנֶה בִּמְהַלְּכֵי שְׁמֹנֶה הוּא!
English Translation:
Rav Aḥadvoi bar Ami objects to this explanation that the verse renders impure only animals that walk on four inside animals that walk on four: If that is so, a dead pig fetus inside the womb of a female pig should not be impure, as a pig has cloven hooves, and so it is an animal that walks on eight inside an animal that walks on eight, and so the verse is not referring to it.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Aḥadvoi bar Ami exposes a fatal flaw in the whole leg-counting scheme. A pig has fully cloven hooves, so a pig fetus inside a sow is “eight inside eight” — which the verse, on this reading, would exclude, making it pure. But a pig is non-kosher, and its dead fetus must surely be impure, so the leg-count framework yields an absurd result. This objection forces the Gemara to abandon Rabbi Yitzḥak’s verse as Rabbi Yosei HaGelili’s source and seek a better one.
Key Terms:
- מַתְקֵיף לַהּ = “objects to it” — a forceful challenge that undermines the prior approach
- חֲזִיר בִּמְעֵי חֲזִירְתָּא = “a pig in a sow” — eight-in-eight, the case that breaks the leg-count rule
Segment 9
TYPE: גמרא
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak relocates the source to Leviticus 5:2.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק, מֵהָכָא: ״נֶפֶשׁ כִּי תִגַּע בְּכׇל טָמֵא אוֹ בְנִבְלַת חַיָּה טְמֵאָה אוֹ בְּנִבְלַת בְּהֵמָה טְמֵאָה אוֹ בְּנִבְלַת שֶׁרֶץ טָמֵא״.
English Translation:
Rather, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili’s opinion is derived from here: The verse states with regard to the sliding-scale offering brought by one who was unaware that he was impure when he ate consecrated food or entered the Temple: “A person who touched anything impure, or the carcass of a non-kosher undomesticated animal, or the carcass of a non-kosher domesticated animal, or the carcass of an impure creeping animal, and is guilty, it having being hidden from him that he is impure” (Leviticus 5:2).
קלאוד על הדף:
Abandoning the leg-count derashah, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak roots Rabbi Yosei HaGelili’s view in Leviticus 5:2, the verse listing sources of impurity for the sliding-scale offering. The verse specifies “the carcass of a non-kosher domesticated animal” — language that will prove redundant on its plain meaning and thus available for a new exposition. The next segment extracts the fetus-in-a-non-kosher-mother teaching from that redundancy.
Key Terms:
- נֶפֶשׁ כִּי תִגַּע = “a person who touches” (Leviticus 5:2) — the verse Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak expounds
- נִבְלַת בְּהֵמָה טְמֵאָה = “the carcass of a non-kosher animal” — the phrase reread to teach the fetus case
Segment 10
TYPE: גמרא
The redundancy yields the fetus rule: impure in a non-kosher mother.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְכִי נִבְלַת בְּהֵמָה טְמֵאָה מְטַמְּאָה, וּבִטְהוֹרָה לֹא מְטַמְּאָה? אֶלָּא אֵיזֶה זֶה? זֶה עוּבָּר, שֶׁבִּטְמֵאָה טָמֵא, וּבִטְהוֹרָה טָהוֹר.
English Translation:
The verse presents a difficulty: Does only a carcass of a non-kosher animal impart impurity, and that of a kosher animal not impart impurity? The halakha is that both do. Rather, what is this animal to which the verse is referring? This is a fetus, which if inside a non-kosher animal is impure, and if inside a kosher animal is pure.
קלאוד על הדף:
The exposition exploits the apparent redundancy. Singling out “a non-kosher animal” implies a kosher one would not impart impurity — but both ordinary carcasses plainly do, so the plain reading cannot be intended. The verse must therefore speak of a special borderline entity: a dead fetus, which imparts impurity when inside a non-kosher mother but not inside a kosher mother — precisely Rabbi Yosei HaGelili’s ruling.
Key Terms:
- אֵיזֶה זֶה? זֶה עוּבָּר = “what is this? this is a fetus” — the resolution that the verse must mean a fetus
- שֶׁבִּטְמֵאָה טָמֵא, וּבִטְהוֹרָה טָהוֹר = “impure in a non-kosher, pure in a kosher [mother]” — Rabbi Yosei HaGelili’s distinction
Segment 11
TYPE: גמרא
Why both Rabbi Yitzḥak’s and Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak’s derivations are needed.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּמֵאַחַר דְּנָפְקָא לֵיהּ מִדְּרַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק, דְּרַבִּי יִצְחָק לְמָה לִי? אִי לָאו דְּרַבִּי יִצְחָק, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: כּוּלֵּיהּ לְכִדְרַבִּי הוּא דַּאֲתָא, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: And since this halakha is derived from the statement of Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak, why do I need the proof of Rabbi Yitzḥak from the verse: “And whatever walks on its paws, among any undomesticated animal that walks on all fours” (Leviticus 11:27)? The Gemara explains: Were it not for the derivation of Rabbi Yitzḥak, I would say that the entire verse expounded by Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak comes to teach only that which Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi derived from it, as cited by the Gemara later on. Rabbi Yitzḥak’s statement teaches us that the verse is also to be expounded as Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak explained.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara reconciles the two derivations rather than discarding Rabbi Yitzḥak’s. Without his exposition, one might assume Leviticus 5:2 (Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak’s verse) is fully consumed by a different teaching of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi cited later, leaving no room to read the fetus-rule into it. Rabbi Yitzḥak’s parallel derashah signals that the verse is indeed available for the fetus exposition too — so both contributions stand.
Key Terms:
- לְכִדְרַבִּי = “for what Rabbi [Yehuda HaNasi] derived” — the alternative use of the verse that Rabbi Yitzḥak’s derashah forecloses
- קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן = “it teaches us” — the point of retaining Rabbi Yitzḥak’s seemingly superfluous derivation
Segment 12
TYPE: ברייתא
A baraita: Rabbi Yonatan reviews the sources for carcass impurity with ben Azzai.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תַּנְיָא, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן: נַמְתִּי לוֹ לְבֶן עַזַּאי, לָמַדְנוּ נִבְלַת בְּהֵמָה טְהוֹרָה שֶׁמְּטַמְּאָה, וְנִבְלַת בְּהֵמָה טְמֵאָה שֶׁמְּטַמְּאָה, נִבְלַת חַיָּה טְמֵאָה שֶׁמְּטַמְּאָה.
English Translation:
§ It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yonatan, a student of Rabbi Yishmael, says: I said [namti] to ben Azzai: We learned that a carcass of a kosher domesticated animal imparts impurity from the verse: “And when a domesticated animal dies, of those that you eat, one who touches its carcass shall be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 11:39). And we learned that a carcass of a non-kosher domesticated animal imparts impurity, and that a carcass of a non-kosher undomesticated animal imparts impurity, from the verse: “A person who touched anything impure, or the carcass of a non-kosher undomesticated animal, or the carcass of a non-kosher domesticated animal” (Leviticus 5:2).
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara cites a baraita preserving an exchange between Rabbi Yonatan (a student of Rabbi Yishmael) and ben Azzai, mapping the scriptural sources for carcass impurity by category. From Leviticus 11:39 they derive that a kosher domesticated animal’s carcass conveys impurity; from Leviticus 5:2 they derive the same for a non-kosher domesticated animal and a non-kosher undomesticated animal (chayya). The systematic survey sets up the open question of the next segment — the kosher chayya.
Key Terms:
- נַמְתִּי לוֹ = “I said to him” — the baraita’s archaic verb framing the scholarly dialogue
- בֶּן עַזַּאי = ben Azzai, the interlocutor in this Tannaitic exchange
- בְּהֵמָה / חַיָּה = domesticated animal / undomesticated animal — the categories being sourced
Segment 13
TYPE: ברייתא
Ben Azzai sources the kosher chayya carcass from “among any.”
Hebrew/Aramaic:
נִבְלַת חַיָּה טְהוֹרָה לֹא לָמַדְנוּ מִנַּיִן? נָם לִי: ״כָּל הוֹלֵךְ עַל כַּפָּיו בְּכׇל הַחַיָּה הַהֹלֶכֶת״.
English Translation:
But we did not yet learn about a carcass of a kosher undomesticated animal. From where is it derived that it imparts impurity? Ben Azzai said to me that this is derived from the verse: “And whatever walks on its paws, among any undomesticated animal that walks on all fours” (Leviticus 11:27). The inclusive term “among any” serves to include even a carcass of a kosher undomesticated animal among those that impart impurity.
קלאוד על הדף:
The survey reaches its one gap: the carcass of a kosher undomesticated animal (chayya tehora), not yet sourced. Ben Azzai fills it from Leviticus 11:27, taking the inclusive bekhol (“among any”) to sweep in even a kosher chayya among the carcasses that impart impurity. Notably, ben Azzai reads the same verse that Rabbi Yitzḥak used for the fetus-rule, but to a different end — illustrating how one verse can support multiple derashot.
Key Terms:
- חַיָּה טְהוֹרָה = a kosher undomesticated animal — the missing category in the survey
- בְּכׇל הַחַיָּה = “among any undomesticated animal” — read inclusively to add the kosher chayya carcass
Segment 14
TYPE: ברייתא
Rabbi Yonatan disputes ben Azzai’s reading and invokes Rabbi Yishmael.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
נַמְתִּי לוֹ: וְכִי נֶאֱמַר ״וְכׇל חַיָּה״? וַהֲלֹא לֹא נֶאֱמַר אֶלָּא ״בְּכׇל הַחַיָּה״, לִמְהַלְּכֵי כַּפַּיִם בְּחַיָּה הוּא דַּאֲתָא. נָם לִי: וּמָה יִשְׁמָעֵאל אוֹמֵר בְּדָבָר הַזֶּה?
English Translation:
Rabbi Yonatan continues. I said to ben Azzai: But does it state: And any undomesticated animal? Isn’t it stated only: “Among any undomesticated animal”? And as explained earlier, this comes to teach that a dead fetus in the form of any of the animals that walk on their paws inside an undomesticated animal imparts impurity. He said to me: And what does Rabbi Yishmael, your teacher, say about this matter?
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yonatan rejects ben Azzai’s grammar: the verse says bekhol ha-chayya (“among any”), not ve-khol chayya (“and any”), so it cannot simply be adding the kosher chayya carcass; the bet points instead to the paw-walker-within-a-chayya (fetus) reading. Stymied on the kosher-chayya source, ben Azzai turns the question back: how does Rabbi Yishmael, Rabbi Yonatan’s own teacher, derive it? This hands the floor to the Rabbi Yishmael tradition in the next segments.
Key Terms:
- וְכׇל חַיָּה / בְּכׇל הַחַיָּה = “and any animal” vs. “among any animal” — the grammatical hinge of Rabbi Yonatan’s objection
- יִשְׁמָעֵאל = Rabbi Yishmael, Rabbi Yonatan’s teacher, whose derivation ben Azzai now requests
Segment 15
TYPE: ברייתא
Rabbi Yishmael derives all categories by interlocking behema and chayya.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
נַמְתִּי לוֹ: ״וְכִי יָמוּת מִן הַבְּהֵמָה״ – זוֹ בְּהֵמָה טְמֵאָה, ״אֲשֶׁר הִיא לָכֶם לְאׇכְלָה״ – זוֹ בְּהֵמָה טְהוֹרָה, לָמַדְנוּ חַיָּה בִּכְלַל בְּהֵמָה, וּבְהֵמָה בִּכְלַל חַיָּה.
English Translation:
I said to him that Rabbi Yishmael derives all these halakhot from the verse: “And when a domesticated animal dies, of those that you eat, one who touches its carcass shall be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 11:39), as follows: “And when a domesticated animal [habehema] dies,” this is referring to a non-kosher animal; “of those that you eat,” this is referring to a kosher animal. And we learned that a ḥayya is included in the category of a behema, i.e., the term behema can also refer collectively to both domesticated and undomesticated animals. And likewise, a behema is included in the category of a ḥayya.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yishmael’s method is more economical: he derives all the categories from the single verse Leviticus 11:39 by reading behema expansively. Parsing “when a behema dies” as the non-kosher case and “of those you eat” as the kosher case, he then leverages the principle that behema and chayya are mutually inclusive categories — each term can stand for the other. This lexical interlock lets one verse generate the impurity rule for both domesticated and undomesticated animals at once.
Key Terms:
- חַיָּה בִּכְלַל בְּהֵמָה = “chayya is included in behema” — the terms overlap so a law on one covers the other
- בְּהֵמָה בִּכְלַל חַיָּה = “behema is included in chayya” — the reciprocal inclusion completing the interlock
Segment 16
TYPE: ברייתא
The interlock is applied by purity-status, completing the derivation.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
חַיָּה טְהוֹרָה בִּכְלַל בְּהֵמָה טְהוֹרָה, חַיָּה טְמֵאָה בִּכְלַל בְּהֵמָה טְמֵאָה,
English Translation:
Furthermore, a kosher ḥayya is included when the Torah makes reference to a kosher behema, and a non-kosher ḥayya is included when the Torah makes reference to a non-kosher behema.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yishmael now applies the interlock by purity-status, matching like with like: a kosher chayya rides along with the verse’s kosher behema, and a non-kosher chayya with its non-kosher behema. This precisely fills the gap ben Azzai struggled with — the kosher chayya carcass — without recourse to the contested bekhol reading. The daf breaks off here, mid-derashah, with the category-mapping of carcass impurity continuing onto the next page.
Key Terms:
- חַיָּה טְהוֹרָה בִּכְלַל בְּהֵמָה טְהוֹרָה = “a kosher chayya within a kosher behema” — matching the inclusion by purity status
- חַיָּה טְמֵאָה בִּכְלַל בְּהֵמָה טְמֵאָה = “a non-kosher chayya within a non-kosher behema” — the parallel for the impure side