Chullin Daf 12 (חולין דף י״ב)
Daf: 12 | Amudim: 12a – 12b | Date: Loading...
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (12a)
Segment 1
TYPE: סיום הקושיא
Closing the cliffhanger from 11b — even R. Meir must concede that rov operates where inspection is impossible
Hebrew/Aramaic:
פֶּסַח וְקָדָשִׁים מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? אֶלָּא הֵיכָא דְּאֶפְשָׁר – אֶפְשָׁר, הֵיכָא דְּלָא אֶפְשָׁר – לָא אֶפְשָׁר. הָכָא נָמֵי, הֵיכָא דְּאֶפְשָׁר – אֶפְשָׁר, הֵיכָא דְּלָא אֶפְשָׁר – לָא אֶפְשָׁר.
English Translation:
then with regard to the Paschal offering and sacrificial meat that one is obligated to eat, what is there to say? Rather, according to Rabbi Meir, there is no alternative to saying: Where it is possible to examine the situation it is possible, and the majority is not followed; where it is not possible to examine the situation it is not possible, and the majority is followed. If so, here too, according to the Rabbis, it cannot be proven from the above sources that one follows a non-quantifiable majority ab initio, as perhaps where it is possible to examine the situation it is possible, and where it is not possible to examine the situation it is not possible, and the majority is followed.
קלאוד על הדף:
The reductio from 11b lands. Even R. Meir, who normally chashesh le-mi’uta, must concede that rov is operative for the Paschal offering and other kodashim — otherwise, no one could ever fulfill the mitzvah of eating them, since pre-eating inspection of the brain membrane and other internal organs is impossible. So R. Meir’s stringency must itself work on the principle אֶפְשָׁר/לָא אֶפְשָׁר: when inspection is possible, inspect; when impossible, rely on rov. By extension, the same logical move applies to the Sages — the senior’s killer objection from 11b stands: none of the ten proposed derivations actually proves rov for the case where inspection IS possible. The 10-Sage tournament collapses inconclusively, and the Gemara now turns to other applications of rov in shechita.
Key Terms:
- פֶּסַח וְקָדָשִׁים = the Paschal lamb and sacrificial offerings — eaten under positive mitzvah obligations
- הֵיכָא דְּאֶפְשָׁר / לָא אֶפְשָׁר = “where possible / not possible” — the universal qualifying principle
Segment 2
TYPE: מימרא
Pivot to a new sugya — Rav Nachman in the name of Rav: continuous observation is required
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַב: רָאָה אֶחָד שֶׁשָּׁחַט, אִם רָאָהוּ מִתְּחִלָּה וְעַד סוֹף – מוּתָּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ, וְאִם לָאו – אָסוּר לֶאֱכוֹל מִשְּׁחִיטָתוֹ.
English Translation:
§ Rav Naḥman says that Rav says: In the case of a person who saw one who slaughtered an animal, if the person saw him slaughtering continuously from beginning to end of the act, he is permitted to eat from his slaughter, and if not, he is prohibited from eating from his slaughter.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara turns to another application of rov in shechita. Rav Nachman in the name of Rav: if you see someone perform shechita, you may eat from it ONLY if you watched מִתְּחִלָּה וְעַד סוֹף — start to finish. Partial observation is not enough. The next several segments will probe this rule’s logic: when does it bite, why isn’t the rov of competent slaughterers enough by itself, and how does it interact with the principle “רוֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מוּמְחִין הֵן.”
Key Terms:
- מִתְּחִלָּה וְעַד סוֹף = “from beginning to end” — uninterrupted observation
- רָאָה אֶחָד שֶׁשָּׁחַט = “saw someone slaughter” — the case under analysis
Segment 3
TYPE: היכי דמי
Probing the cases — knowledgeable, ignorant, or unknown?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דְּיָדַע דִּגְמִיר, לְמָה לִי רָאָה? וְאִי דְּיָדַע דְּלָא גְּמִיר, פְּשִׁיטָא!
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If it is a case where the onlooker knows that he is knowledgeable in the halakhot of slaughter, why do I require that the onlooker saw the slaughter? Even if he did not see him slaughter, the onlooker may rely on his slaughter. And if the onlooker knows that he is not knowledgeable in the halakhot of slaughter, it is obvious that only if the person saw him slaughtering from beginning to end he is permitted to eat from his slaughter.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara fences off the obvious cases. (1) If you know the slaughterer is גְמִיר (learned in the halachot of shechita), the meat is permitted regardless of whether you watched — Rav’s rule adds nothing. (2) If you know he is לָא גְּמִיר (not learned), it’s obvious that you must watch start-to-finish to prevent error. So Rav’s chiddush must apply to a third, more interesting case: where you don’t know either way.
Key Terms:
- גְּמִיר = he has learned (the halachot of shechita) — implies competence
- לָא גְּמִיר = he has not learned — implies risk of error
Segment 4
TYPE: שאלה
If the case is the unknown competence one, why not just rely on rov?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאֶלָּא, דְּלָא יְדַע אִי גְּמִיר אִי לָא גְּמִיר, לֵימָא: רוֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מוּמְחִין הֵן.
English Translation:
Rather, perhaps it is a case where the onlooker does not know whether he is knowledgeable or whether he is not knowledgeable. But if that is the case, let us say: The majority of those associated with slaughter are experts in the halakhot of slaughter, and one may rely on his slaughter.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara presses: if the case is the unknown-competence one, why not invoke the famous rov — רוֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מוּמְחִין הֵן (most who deal with slaughter are experts)? This statistical rov should suffice without requiring continuous observation. So Rav’s mitt’chila ve-ad sof requirement seems redundant.
Key Terms:
- רוֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מוּמְחִין הֵן = “the majority of those engaged in slaughter are experts” — the operative statistical rov for shechita
Segment 5
TYPE: ראיה מברייתא
A baraita confirms the rov — found chicken or agent’s slaughter is presumed valid
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מִי לָא תַּנְיָא: הֲרֵי שֶׁמָּצָא תַּרְנְגוֹלֶת שְׁחוּטָה בַּשּׁוּק, אוֹ שֶׁאָמַר לִשְׁלוּחוֹ ״צֵא שְׁחוֹט״, וְהָלַךְ וּמָצָא שָׁחוּט – חֶזְקָתוֹ שָׁחוּט.
English Translation:
Isn’t it taught in a baraita: In a case where one found a slaughtered chicken in the marketplace, or where one said to his agent: Go out and slaughter a chicken, and he went and found the chicken slaughtered and he does not know who slaughtered it, its presumptive status is that it was slaughtered properly.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara strengthens its challenge with a baraita: a chicken found slaughtered in the marketplace, OR a chicken found slaughtered after being sent to an unknown agent, has the chazaka of being properly slaughtered. This is a paradigm case of relying on rov mumchin even with zero observation. So why does Rav demand watching from start to finish?
Key Terms:
- תַּרְנְגוֹלֶת שְׁחוּטָה בַּשּׁוּק = a slaughtered chicken found in the market
- חֶזְקָתוֹ שָׁחוּט = “its chazaka is that it was slaughtered” — i.e., kosherly
Segment 6
TYPE: דיוק
The principle is established — so why doesn’t it apply here?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אַלְמָא אָמְרִינַן: רוֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מוּמְחִין הֵן. הָכָא נָמֵי לֵימָא: רוֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מוּמְחִין הֵן!
English Translation:
Apparently, we say: The majority of those associated with slaughter are experts. Here too, in a case where it is unknown whether he is knowledgeable, let us say: The majority of those associated with slaughter are experts.
קלאוד על הדף:
Drawing the dilemma sharper: the baraita has firmly established the rule רוב מומחין הן. So in our case (unknown competence) we should rely on it as well, and Rav’s “watch start-to-finish” demand should be unnecessary. The next segment supplies the resolution.
Key Terms:
- אַלְמָא = “apparently” / “evidently” — drawing an inference
- לֵימָא = “let us say” — proposing the parallel application
Segment 7
TYPE: תירוץ
The real case — the slaughterer is known incompetent, and only one siman was witnessed
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לְעוֹלָם דְּיָדַע דְּלָא גְּמִיר, וּכְגוֹן דִּשְׁחַט קַמַּן חַד סִימָן שַׁפִּיר. מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: מִדְּהַאי שַׁפִּיר הָךְ נָמֵי שַׁפִּיר, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: הַאי אִתְרְמוֹיֵי אִיתְרְמִי לֵיהּ, אִידַּךְ – שֶׁמָּא שָׁהָה שֶׁמָּא דָּרַס.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: Actually, the reference is to a case where the onlooker knows that the one slaughtering is not knowledgeable in the halakhot of slaughter, and where he slaughtered one siman before us properly. Lest you say: From the fact that this siman was slaughtered properly, that siman was also slaughtered properly; therefore, Rav teaches us that this is not so. As, perhaps this siman happened to be slaughtered properly for him, but with regard to the other siman, perhaps he interrupted the slaughter or perhaps he pressed the knife, invalidating the slaughter.
קלאוד על הדף:
The resolution: Rav’s chiddush operates in a refined sub-case of the “known incompetent” scenario. The slaughterer is known to be לָא גְמִיר (not learned), but the observer happened to see ONE siman cut properly. One might think: if this siman was good, the other one — out of view — must have been good too (especially given a partial observation). Rav rules: no, this very partial observation is treacherous. The witnessed cut may have been mere luck (אִתְרְמוֹיֵי אִיתְרְמִי לֵיהּ — “it just happened to come out right for him”), and the unwitnessed siman might suffer from שהיה or דרסה. Continuous observation is essential here.
Key Terms:
- דִּשְׁחַט קַמַּן חַד סִימָן שַׁפִּיר = “he slaughtered one siman properly before us”
- אִתְרְמוֹיֵי אִיתְרְמִי לֵיהּ = “it just happened to turn out for him” — luck, not skill
Segment 8
TYPE: בעיא
Rav Dimi bar Yosef tests Rav Nachman with a paired pair of cases
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַב דִּימִי בַּר יוֹסֵף מֵרַב נַחְמָן: הָאוֹמֵר לִשְׁלוּחוֹ ״צֵא וּשְׁחוֹט״, וְהָלַךְ וּמָצָא שָׁחוּט, מַהוּ? אָמַר לוֹ: חֶזְקָתוֹ שָׁחוּט. הָאוֹמֵר לִשְׁלוּחוֹ ״צֵא וּתְרוֹם״, וְהָלַךְ וּמָצָא תָּרוּם, מַאי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֵין חֶזְקָתוֹ תָּרוּם.
English Translation:
Rav Dimi bar Yosef raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman: With regard to one who says to his agent: Go out and slaughter a chicken, and he went and found the chicken slaughtered, what is the halakha? Rav Naḥman said to him: Its presumptive status is that it was slaughtered properly. And he raised another dilemma: With regard to one who says to his agent: Go out and separate teruma for me, and he went and found that teruma was separated from his produce, what is the halakha? Rav Naḥman said to him: Its presumptive status is not that teruma was separated.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Dimi bar Yosef poses two parallel cases. (1) “Go and slaughter the chicken” — the principal returns to find it slaughtered. Rav Nachman: kosher, the agent did it. (2) “Go and separate teruma from my produce” — returns to find teruma separated. Rav Nachman: NOT considered properly separated. The rulings are asymmetric. The next segment presses on the asymmetry.
Key Terms:
- שָׁלִיחַ = an agent
- תְּרוּמָה = the priestly portion; only the produce-owner (or his authorized agent) can validly designate it
Segment 9
TYPE: מה נפשך
The dilemma — either שליח עושה שליחותו is a chazaka, or it isn’t
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מָה נַפְשָׁךְ, אִי חֲזָקָה שָׁלִיחַ עוֹשֶׂה שְׁלִיחוּתוֹ – אֲפִילּוּ תְּרוּמָה נָמֵי, וְאִי אֵין חֲזָקָה שָׁלִיחַ עוֹשֶׂה שְׁלִיחוּתוֹ – אֲפִילּוּ שְׁחִיטָה נָמֵי לָא.
English Translation:
Rav Dimi bar Yosef challenged: Whichever way you look at it, your ruling is problematic. If there is a presumption that an agent performs his assigned agency, that should be the case even with regard to teruma; and if there is no presumption that an agent performs his assigned agency, there should be no such presumption even with regard to slaughter.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Dimi presses with a classic מָה נַפְשָׁךְ. The chazaka שליח עושה שליחותו (an agent fulfills his agency) is either valid or not. If valid, both shechita and teruma should benefit from it. If invalid, neither should. Rav Nachman’s split ruling looks logically incoherent.
Key Terms:
- מָה נַפְשָׁךְ = “whichever way” — a logical wedge demanding consistency
- חֲזָקָה שָׁלִיחַ עוֹשֶׂה שְׁלִיחוּתוֹ = “the chazaka that an agent performs his agency” — a major principle in halacha
Segment 10
TYPE: תירוץ של רב נחמן
Rav Nachman’s elegant resolution — the rulings rest on different rovs, not on the agent-chazaka
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לְכִי תֵּיכוּל עֲלַהּ כּוֹרָא דְמִלְחָא, לְעוֹלָם אֵין חֲזָקָה שָׁלִיחַ עוֹשֶׂה שְׁלִיחוּתוֹ, וּשְׁחִיטָה – אִי נָמֵי דִּילְמָא אִינָשׁ אַחֲרִינָא שְׁמַע וַאֲזַל שְׁחַט – רוֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מוּמְחִין הֵן. תְּרוּמָה – דִּילְמָא אִינָשׁ אַחֲרִינָא שְׁמַע וַאֲזַל תְּרַם, הָוֵה לֵיהּ תּוֹרֵם שֶׁלֹּא מִדַּעַת, וְהַתּוֹרֵם שֶׁלֹּא מִדַּעַת – אֵין תְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה.
English Translation:
Rav Naḥman said to Rav Dimi in jest: After you eat a kor of salt over it, and analyze the matter at length, you will be able to understand the difference. Actually, there is no presumption that an agent performs his assigned agency, and in the case of slaughter, even if perhaps another person heard him instruct the agent and that person went and slaughtered the chicken, the slaughter would be valid, because the majority of those associated with slaughter are experts. By contrast, in the case of teruma, if perhaps another person heard him instruct the agent and then went and separated his teruma, he becomes one who designates teruma without the knowledge of the owner of the produce; and with regard to one who designates teruma without the knowledge of the owner of the produce, his teruma is not teruma.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Nachman’s witty answer (with the famous “go eat a kor of salt” — a Talmudic idiom for “think hard about it”): the agent-chazaka is in fact NOT operative; both cases really are uncertain about who acted. But shechita and teruma differ in the consequences of “someone else who overheard.” For shechita: it doesn’t matter, because rov mumchin guarantees that whoever did it likely did it well — the meat is kosher. For teruma: an unauthorized person who separates teruma without the owner’s permission produces NO halachically valid teruma at all (תורם שלא מדעת אין תרומתו תרומה). So even though both cases share the same evidentiary safek, the halachic consequences diverge entirely. The asymmetry is principled, not arbitrary.
Key Terms:
- כּוֹרָא דְמִלְחָא = a kor of salt — a Talmudic idiom for prolonged study and reflection
- תּוֹרֵם שֶׁלֹּא מִדַּעַת = “one who separates teruma without [the owner’s] consent” — invalid as teruma
Segment 11
TYPE: לימא תנאי היא
Is the rov-mumchin principle itself a tannaitic dispute? — The lost-goats-and-roosters baraita
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לֵימָא: רוֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מוּמְחִין הֵן תַּנָּאֵי הִיא? דְּתַנְיָא: הֲרֵי שֶׁאָבְדוּ לוֹ גְּדָיָיו וְתַרְנְגוֹלָיו וְהָלַךְ וּמְצָאָן שְׁחוּטִים – רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹסֵר, רַבִּי חֲנִינָא בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי מַתִּיר. אָמַר רַבִּי: נִרְאִין דְּבָרִים שֶׁל רַבִּי יְהוּדָה שֶׁמְּצָאָן בְּאַשְׁפָּה, וְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי חֲנִינָא בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי שֶׁמְּצָאָן בְּבַיִת.
English Translation:
The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the statement: The majority of those associated with slaughter are experts, is a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: In a case where one’s young goats and roosters were lost, and the owner went and found them slaughtered, Rabbi Yehuda deems the meat forbidden, and Rabbi Ḥanina, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, deems it permitted. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: The statement of Rabbi Yehuda appears correct in a case where the owner found the slaughtered animals in a scrap heap, as the concern is that they were thrown away because the slaughter was not valid. And the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, appears correct in a case where he found them in the house.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara wonders whether the rov-mumchin rule itself is contested at the tannaitic level. A baraita: someone’s goats and chickens went missing; he later finds them slaughtered. R. Yehuda forbids; R. Chanina son of R. Yosei HaGelili permits. Rebbi (R. Yehuda HaNasi) tries to harmonize: R. Yehuda’s view fits a case where they were found in an אשפה (scrap heap); R. Chanina’s fits a case where they were found in a בית (house). The next two segments will probe whether this preserves the rov-mumchin universally or carves out a tannaitic dispute about it.
Key Terms:
- לֵימָא תַּנָּאֵי הִיא = “shall we say it is a dispute among tanna’im?” — the formula for proposing tannaitic disagreement
- גְּדָיָיו וְתַרְנְגוֹלָיו = his young goats and roosters
- אַשְׁפָּה / בַּיִת = scrap heap / house — the locations distinguishing the views
Segment 12
TYPE: הצעה
Proposing the dispute as about the rov-mumchin principle itself
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַאי לָאו בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי, דְּמָר סָבַר: אָמְרִינַן רוֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מוּמְחִין הֵן, וּמָר סָבַר: לָא אָמְרִינַן רוֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מוּמְחִין הֵן?
English Translation:
What, is it not with regard to this matter that they disagree, that one Sage, Rabbi Ḥanina, holds: We say that the majority of those associated with slaughter are experts, and one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds: We do not say that the majority of those associated with slaughter are experts?
קלאוד על הדף:
The simplest reading of the dispute: R. Chanina endorses רוב מומחין (so a slaughtered chicken found anywhere is presumed kosher); R. Yehuda rejects it (and so we forbid). If this is right, then the very principle Rav Nachman has been treating as foundational is in fact subject to a major tannaitic disagreement. Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak will reject this reading in the next segment.
Key Terms:
- בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי = “in this matter they disagree” — formula proposing a dispute analysis
Segment 13
TYPE: דחיית ההצעה
Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak rescues the rov — both Tannaim accept it; their dispute is empirical
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא רוֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מוּמְחִין הֵן, וּבְבַיִת – דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דִּשְׁרֵי, בְּאַשְׁפָּה שֶׁבַּשּׁוּק – דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּאָסוּר, כִּי פְּלִיגִי בְּאַשְׁפָּה שֶׁבַּבַּיִת: מָר סָבַר אָדָם עָשׂוּי לְהַטִּיל נִבְלָתוֹ בְּאַשְׁפָּה שֶׁבַּבַּיִת, וּמַר סָבַר אֵין אָדָם עָשׂוּי לְהַטִּיל נִבְלָתוֹ בְּאַשְׁפָּה שֶׁבַּבַּיִת.
English Translation:
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: No, the fact is that everyone agrees that the majority of those associated with slaughter are experts, and if he found the slaughtered goats or roosters in the house, everyone agrees that it is permitted to eat the meat. If he found them in a scrap heap that is in the marketplace, everyone agrees that it is prohibited to eat the meat. When they disagree is in a case where he found them in a scrap heap that is in the house. One Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds: A person is prone to cast his unslaughtered animal carcass onto a scrap heap that is in the house. And one Sage, Rabbi Ḥanina, holds: A person is not prone to cast his unslaughtered animal carcass onto a scrap heap that is in the house.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak rescues the rov-mumchin principle by carving up the cases more finely. Both Tannaim accept rov mumchin universally. They agree on (a) found in a normal house: kosher (kept means eaten); (b) found in a marketplace scrap heap: forbidden (discarded means treif and tossed). Their actual disagreement concerns ONLY a scrap heap WITHIN the house. R. Yehuda: people DO sometimes throw treif carcasses there (so we worry); R. Chanina: people don’t, they take them outside (so we permit). The dispute is not about the principle of rov mumchin but about a behavioral question — whether the in-house scrap heap is the kind of place a person discards an unslaughtered carcass.
Key Terms:
- אַשְׁפָּה שֶׁבַּבַּיִת = a scrap heap inside the house — the disputed locus
- אָדָם עָשׂוּי לְהַטִּיל נִבְלָתוֹ = “a person is wont to discard his neveila [there]” — the empirical claim at issue
Segment 14
TYPE: ניתוח דברי רבי
Probing Rebbi’s harmonization — which “ashpah” did he mean?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר מָר, אָמַר רַבִּי: נִרְאִין דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה שֶׁמְּצָאָן בְּאַשְׁפָּה. מַאי אַשְׁפָּה? אִילֵּימָא אַשְׁפָּה שֶׁבְּשׁוּק – הָא אָמְרַתְּ דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּאָסוּר! אֶלָּא לָאו פְּשִׁיטָא בְּאַשְׁפָּה שֶׁבַּבַּיִת.
English Translation:
The Master said in the baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: The statement of Rabbi Yehuda appears correct in a case where he found them in the scrap heap. The Gemara asks: What is the term scrap heap referring to in this context? If we say the reference is to a scrap heap in the marketplace, didn’t you say that everyone agrees that it is prohibited, and it is not merely the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? Rather, it is obvious that he found it on a scrap heap that is in the house, and it is in that case that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.
קלאוד על הדף:
Now the Gemara dissects Rebbi’s own statement using Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak’s framework. Rebbi said R. Yehuda’s view fits the “אשפה” case. Which scrap heap? Not the marketplace one (everyone agrees that’s forbidden — Rebbi’s “fits R. Yehuda” wouldn’t be saying anything). It must be אשפה שבבית — the in-house scrap heap. So Rebbi is identifying the disputed case and choosing R. Yehuda’s view there.
Key Terms:
- אָמַר מָר = “the Master said” — referring back to a quoted statement
Segment 15
TYPE: קושיא — סתירה ברבי
A contradiction in Rebbi’s own statement — closing the amud
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֵימָא סֵיפָא, וְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי חֲנִינָא בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי שֶׁמְּצָאָן בְּבַיִת. מַאי בַּיִת? אִילֵּימָא בַּיִת מַמָּשׁ – הָאָמְרַתְּ דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דִּשְׁרֵי! אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא בְּאַשְׁפָּה שֶׁבַּבַּיִת. קַשְׁיָא דְּרַבִּי אַדְּרַבִּי!
English Translation:
Say the latter clause of the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: And the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, appears correct in a case where he found them in the house. What is the word house referring to in this context? If we say the reference is to an actual house, didn’t you say that everyone agrees that it is permitted? Rather, it is obvious that he found it on a scrap heap that is in the house. If so, it is difficult, as there is a contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, where he rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda to prohibit the meat in a case where it is found in a scrap heap in the house, and another statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, where he rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, to permit the meat in that case.
קלאוד על הדף:
Now examine Rebbi’s other clause: he ALSO said R. Chanina’s view fits the “בית” case. Which “house”? Not a literal house (everyone agrees that’s permitted — nothing for Rebbi to “fit” R. Chanina to). So it must also be אשפה שבבית. But that creates a contradiction in Rebbi: same case, two opposite rulings. The amud ends with קַשְׁיָא דְּרַבִּי אַדְּרַבִּי — “Rebbi contradicts Rebbi!” — the resolution waits on amud bet.
Key Terms:
- קַשְׁיָא דְּרַבִּי אַדְּרַבִּי = “a difficulty: Rebbi against Rebbi” — the two clauses conflict
Amud Bet (12b)
Segment 1
TYPE: תירוץ
Resolving the contradiction — Rebbi was identifying where each Tanna concedes to the other
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָכִי קָאָמַר: נִרְאִין דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה לְרַבִּי חֲנִינָא בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי בְּאַשְׁפָּה שֶׁבַּשּׁוּק, שֶׁאַף רַבִּי חֲנִינָא בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי לֹא נֶחְלַק עָלָיו אֶלָּא בְּאַשְׁפָּה שֶׁבַּבַּיִת, אֲבָל בְּאַשְׁפָּה שֶׁבַּשּׁוּק מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ, וְנִרְאִין כּוּ׳.
English Translation:
The Gemara explains: This is what Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is saying: The statement of Rabbi Yehuda appears correct to Rabbi Ḥanina, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, in a case where one found them in a scrap heap that is in a marketplace, as Rabbi Ḥanina, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda only in a case where one found them in a scrap heap that is in the house. But in a case where he found them in a scrap heap that is in a marketplace he concedes to Rabbi Yehuda. And the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, appears correct to Rabbi Yehuda in a case where he found them in the house, as he concedes to Rabbi Ḥanina in that case.
קלאוד על הדף:
Resolution: Rebbi was not contradicting himself — he was mapping out the “concession zones” of each Tanna. R. Yehuda’s view “appears correct” TO R. CHANINA in the marketplace-scrap-heap case (where even R. Chanina concedes — they only really disagree about the in-house heap). And R. Chanina’s view “appears correct” TO R. YEHUDA in the actual house case (where even R. Yehuda concedes). Rebbi is being a fine commentator, not a confused one.
Key Terms:
- מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ = “concedes to him” — accepting the other’s view in that specific case
Segment 2
TYPE: דיוק במשנה
Returning to the Mishna of Hakol Shochatin — Rava’s diyuk on the future tense
Hebrew/Aramaic:
חוּץ מֵחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן, שֶׁמָּא יְקַלְקְלוּ אֶת שְׁחִיטָתָן. ״שֶׁמָּא קִלְקְלוּ״ לָא קָתָנֵי, אֶלָּא ״שֶׁמָּא יְקַלְקְלוּ״. אָמַר רָבָא: זֹאת אוֹמֶרֶת אֵין מוֹסְרִין לָהֶן חוּלִּין לְכַתְּחִלָּה.
English Translation:
§ The mishna stated: Everyone slaughters an animal, i.e., can perform halakhically valid slaughter, and their slaughter is valid, except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, lest they ruin their slaughter. The Gemara infers: The tanna does not teach: Due to the concern that they ruined their slaughter, in the past tense; rather, he teaches: Lest they ruin their slaughter, in the future. Rava says: That is to say that one does not give them non-sacred animals for slaughter ab initio, even with the supervision of others.
קלאוד על הדף:
Returning to the opening Mishna of “הכל שוחטין” — “all may slaughter EXCEPT cheresh, shoteh, and katan, lest they ruin their slaughter.” Rava notices the future tense: “שֶׁמָּא יְקַלְקְלוּ” (lest they ruin) rather than “שֶׁמָּא קִלְקְלוּ” (perhaps they ruined). This points forward, not backward. So the rule is preventive: even with supervision, we don’t initiate (לכתחלה) handing over a knife to these three categories. Rava’s chiddush distinguishes a category-of-action prohibition from a post-hoc disqualification.
Key Terms:
- חֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן = a deaf-mute, an imbecile, a minor — the three classical halachic incompetents
- לְכַתְּחִלָּה = “from the outset” — i.e., we should not even begin
- חוּלִּין = non-sacred (everyday) meat
Segment 3
TYPE: שאלה
The next clause — bedi’avad these three are kosher; whose tanna’s view is this?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְכוּלָּן שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ וַאֲחֵרִים רוֹאִים אוֹתָם, שְׁחִיטָתָן כְּשֵׁרָה. מַאן תְּנָא דְּלָא בָּעֵינַן כַּוָּונָה לִשְׁחִיטָה?
English Translation:
The mishna continues: And for all of them, when they slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid, including even a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, who lack competence and whose intent is not halakhically effective. The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who taught that we do not require intent for slaughter?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Mishna’s continuation: even cheresh/shoteh/katan, when supervised, produce valid slaughter (שחיטתן כשרה). But these three categories are halachically considered to LACK כַּוָּונָה (intent). So the Mishna implicitly teaches that shechita does not require intent. Whose Tanna? The Gemara asks: which authority holds that shechita does not need כוונה?
Key Terms:
- כַּוָּונָה = (halachic) intent / focused awareness
- דְּלָא בָּעֵינַן כַּוָּונָה = “we do not require intent”
Segment 4
TYPE: תירוץ
Rava — it’s R. Natan, who validates a thrown-knife slaughter
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רָבָא: רַבִּי נָתָן הִיא, דְּתָנֵי אוֹשַׁעְיָא זְעֵירָא דְּמִן חַבְרַיָּא: זָרַק סַכִּין לְנוֹעֳצָהּ בַּכּוֹתֶל, וְהָלְכָה וְשָׁחֲטָה כְּדַרְכָּהּ – רַבִּי נָתָן מַכְשִׁיר, וַחֲכָמִים פּוֹסְלִין. הוּא תָּנֵי לַהּ, וְהוּא אָמַר לַהּ: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי נָתָן.
English Translation:
Rava said: It is Rabbi Natan, as Oshaya, the youngest of the company of Sages, taught a baraita, stating: If one threw a knife to embed it in the wall, and in the course of its flight the knife went and slaughtered an animal in its proper manner, Rabbi Natan deems the slaughter valid, and the Rabbis deem the slaughter not valid. Oshaya teaches the baraita and he states about it: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan that there is no need for intent to perform a valid act of slaughter.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava identifies the Mishna’s authority as R. Natan, citing a baraita taught by Oshaya the Younger of the chevraya: someone throws a knife at a wall, and in mid-flight it accidentally slaughters an animal. R. Natan rules the shechita kosher; the Sages rule it invalid. The dispute is precisely over whether shechita requires כוונה. Oshaya (who taught the baraita) also paskens: הלכה כרבי נתן — no kavanah needed. This perfectly explains the Mishna’s leniency for cheresh/shoteh/katan when supervised.
Key Terms:
- רַבִּי נָתָן = R. Natan, the Tanna who held shechita does not require kavanah
- אוֹשַׁעְיָא זְעֵירָא דְּמִן חַבְרַיָּא = “Oshaya the Younger of the Chevraya” — a transmitter of baraitot
- מַכְשִׁיר / פּוֹסְלִין = validates / invalidates
Segment 5
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
The thrown knife travels in one direction — but shechita needs back-and-forth motion!
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהָא בָּעֵינַן מוֹלִיךְ וּמֵבִיא? שֶׁהָלְכָה וּבָאָה כְּדַרְכָּהּ.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: How could the slaughter in the baraita be valid? But don’t we require that the slaughterer move the knife back and forth on the throat of the animal? When one throws a knife, it goes in one direction and does not return. The Gemara answers: The case in the baraita is one where the knife went and cut the animal’s throat, caromed off the wall and came back to cut the throat again in its proper manner.
קלאוד על הדף:
A practical worry: shechita requires מוליך ומביא — drawing the blade back and forth across the throat. A thrown knife only goes forward. The Gemara’s clever fix: the case is a knife that hit the wall, ricocheted back, and on the return trip cut through again. So the back-and-forth requirement is met physically, even though no human hand controlled the motion. This dramatizes how thoroughly R. Natan removes kavanah from the equation — a chance ricochet is enough.
Key Terms:
- מוֹלִיךְ וּמֵבִיא = “draws and brings back” — the requirement of back-and-forth blade motion
- שֶׁהָלְכָה וּבָאָה = “that it went and came back” — describing the ricochet
Segment 6
TYPE: בעיא — ר׳ יוחנן
A new bei’a — does a katan have halachically operative מחשבה?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא, בָּעֵי רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: קָטָן יֵשׁ לוֹ מַחְשָׁבָה, אוֹ אֵין לוֹ מַחְשָׁבָה?
English Translation:
§ Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan raises a dilemma: In matters that require thought and intent, does a minor have halakhically effective thought, or does he not have halakhically effective thought?
קלאוד על הדף:
R. Yochanan opens a related question — about מחשבה rather than maaseh. In contexts where halacha gives weight to a person’s thought (e.g., designating an item for a particular use), does a minor’s mental state count? This bei’a will run through several Mishnayot in tractate Kelim regarding נטמא vessels.
Key Terms:
- מַחְשָׁבָה = halachic “thought” or designation — the mental act that gives an object its halachic identity
- קָטָן = minor — under bar mitzvah age
Segment 7
TYPE: קושיית ר׳ אמי
R. Ami questions why R. Yochanan even asks — the Mishna in Kelim already settles it!
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי אַמֵּי: וְתִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ מַעֲשֶׂה? מַאי שְׁנָא מַעֲשֶׂה דְּלָא קָא מִבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ – דִּתְנַן: ״יֵשׁ לָהֶן מַעֲשֶׂה״? מַחְשָׁבָה נָמֵי לָא תִּיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ, דִּתְנַן: ״אֵין לָהֶן מַחְשָׁבָה״!
English Translation:
Rabbi Ami said to Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: And let Rabbi Yoḥanan raise this dilemma with regard to the action of a minor, whether the action of a minor that indicates intent is effective. What is different about the action of a minor that Rabbi Yoḥanan does not raise a dilemma? Is it due to the fact that we learned in a mishna (Kelim 17:15): A deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor have the capacity to perform an action that is halakhically effective? With regard to thought as well let him not raise this dilemma, as we learned in the same mishna: They do not have the capacity for halakhically effective thought.
קלאוד על הדף:
R. Ami presses: why did R. Yochanan even ask the question? The same Mishna (Kelim 17:15) that says cheresh/shoteh/katan DO have halachic מעשה also explicitly says they do NOT have halachic מחשבה. So why is R. Yochanan asking about minors at all? The Mishna seems to settle both directions clearly. The next segment (last on the daf) sketches the Mishna in detail to set up the resolution.
Key Terms:
- יֵשׁ לָהֶן מַעֲשֶׂה / אֵין לָהֶן מַחְשָׁבָה = “they have actions / they do not have thought” — the Mishna’s parallel rulings
- תִּיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ = “let him ask” — i.e., why is he raising it as a question?
Segment 8
TYPE: ציטוט המשנה
The Mishna’s exact wording — acorn/pomegranate/walnut shells; cliffhanger to Daf 13
Hebrew/Aramaic:
דִּתְנַן: הָאַלּוֹן, וְהָרִמּוֹן, וְהָאֱגוֹז שֶׁחֲקָקוּם תִּינוֹקוֹת לָמוֹד בָּהֶן עָפָר, אוֹ שֶׁהִתְקִינוּם לְכַף מֹאזְנַיִם – טְמֵאִין, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהֶן מַעֲשֶׂה,
English Translation:
As we learned in that mishna: With regard to an acorn, a pomegranate, or a nut, which minors hollowed in order to measure dirt with them or that they affixed to a scale, the halakhic status of those shells is that of vessels, and they are susceptible to ritual impurity. By contrast, if the minors merely thought to use the shells for measuring or weighing, unlike adults, they do not thereby render those shells into vessels. The reason for this distinction is due to the fact that they have the capacity to perform an action,
קלאוד על הדף:
The amud closes with the source-Mishna being quoted: an acorn, pomegranate, or nutshell that children HOLLOWED OUT (a physical maaseh) to use as measuring cups or scale pans become halachic kelim, susceptible to tumah. The implication (concluded after the daf break) is that mere thought to so designate them does NOT make them kelim — only the physical act does. This Mishna seems to flatly settle R. Yochanan’s question: minors have מעשה but not מחשבה. The resolution of why R. Yochanan still asks waits on Daf 13.
Key Terms:
- אַלּוֹן / רִמּוֹן / אֱגוֹז = acorn / pomegranate / nut — examples of natural items convertible into vessels
- תִּינוֹקוֹת = young children — the agents in question
- לָמוֹד בָּהֶן עָפָר = “to measure dirt with them” — a children’s game that creates a real instrument