Chullin Daf 15 (חולין דף ט״ו)
Daf: 15 | Amudim: 15a – 15b | Date: Loading...
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (15a)
Segment 1
TYPE: ברייתא
Continuation of Rav Sheshet’s lamp-based proof: metal lamps and the dachi b’yadayim principle
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כׇּל נֵרוֹת שֶׁל מַתֶּכֶת מִטַּלְטְלִין, חוּץ מִן הַנֵּר שֶׁהִדְלִיקוּ בּוֹ בְּאוֹתָהּ שַׁבָּת.
English Translation:
One may move all metal lamps on Shabbat, even old ones, because they do not become repugnant like earthenware lamps, except for a metal lamp that one kindled on that same Shabbat and that was burning when Shabbat began, which it is prohibited to move for the entire Shabbat due to the prohibition against extinguishing.
קלאוד על הדף:
The baraita continues the lamp discussion from the bottom of 14b: metal lamps may be moved (they do not become repugnant), except a metal lamp kindled and burning at sunset, which is muktzeh for the duration of Shabbat. Rabbi Yehuda’s principle migo d’itkatzai l’bein hashmashot itkatzai l’kuli yoma is shown to apply to muktzeh due to issur (the active prohibition against extinguishing), not only muktzeh due to mius. The animal slaughtered on Shabbat is parallel: forbidden as ever min hachai at sunset, the prohibition extends to the entire day even after the slaughter formally removes the issur.
Key Terms:
- נר של מתכת = Metal lamp — does not become repugnant, the standard mius is absent
- מוקצה מחמת איסור = Muktzeh due to active prohibition — the burning-lamp / live-animal category
Segment 2
TYPE: דחייה
But the lamp case may be different: it was set aside by direct human action
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְדִלְמָא שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּהוּא דָּחֵי לֵיהּ בְּיָדַיִם!
English Translation:
The Gemara rejects that analogy. And perhaps it is different there, in the case of the burning lamp, as he set it aside by direct action when he kindled the lamp. By contrast, in the case of an animal, he did not set it aside, and therefore, perhaps once it is slaughtered it is permitted.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara raises an objection that fatally weakens Rav Sheshet’s analogy. With the burning lamp, the user himself actively set it aside by kindling it — this is דחי ליה בידים, a self-imposed muktzeh through deliberate use. With the live animal, no such direct setting-aside has occurred: the owner did nothing on Shabbat itself to render the animal off-limits, the prohibition simply attached to it. So the lamp’s all-day stringency may not transfer to the slaughtered animal. Rav Sheshet’s proposal collapses.
Key Terms:
- דחי ליה בידים = He set it aside with his own hands — self-imposed muktzeh through active use
Segment 3
TYPE: הצעה חדשה
Rav Ashi: the source is Rabbi Yehuda’s ruling on one who cooks on Shabbat
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: רַבִּי יְהוּדָה דִּמְבַשֵּׁל הִיא, דִּתְנַן: הַמְבַשֵּׁל בְּשַׁבָּת, בְּשׁוֹגֵג – יֵאָכֵל, בְּמֵזִיד – לֹא יֵאָכֵל, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.
English Translation:
Rather, Rav Ashi said: When Rav said that the halakha that consumption of the animal is prohibited for that day is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, the reference is to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to one who cooks, as we learned in a baraita: With regard to one who cooks on Shabbat, if he did so unwittingly, he may eat what he cooked. If he acted intentionally, he may not eat what he cooked. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Ashi pivots to a fourth attribution. The baraita on cooking-on-Shabbat: Rabbi Meir permits the cooked food b’shogeg, forbids b’meizid; Rabbi Yehuda forbids both — b’shogeg the food may be eaten only after Shabbat, b’meizid never. The Mishna’s case of slaughter-on-Shabbat fits Rabbi Yehuda’s ruling perfectly: even b’shogeg, the slaughtered animal is forbidden for the day. This becomes the maskana (concluding attribution).
Key Terms:
- המבשל בשבת = One who cooks on Shabbat — the parallel chillul Shabbat case
- בשוגג / במזיד = Unwittingly / intentionally — the legal categories of Shabbat violation
Segment 4
TYPE: ברייתא
Rabbi Yehuda’s penalty: even unwitting violation is forbidden until motzaei Shabbat
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בְּשׁוֹגֵג – יֵאָכֵל בְּמוֹצָאֵי שַׁבָּת, בְּמֵזִיד – לֹא יֵאָכֵל עוֹלָמִית.
English Translation:
Rabbi Yehuda says: If he cooked the food unwittingly, he may eat it at the conclusion of Shabbat, as the Sages penalized even one who sinned unwittingly by prohibiting him from deriving immediate benefit from the dish that he cooked. If he cooked it intentionally, he may never eat from it.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yehuda imposes a penalty (קנס) even on the inadvertent violator: the food may not be eaten until after Shabbat, ensuring the offender derives no immediate benefit from his transgression. The intentional violator is forbidden forever from his own cooking. The principle is to disincentivize Shabbat melachot by removing the practical reward.
Key Terms:
- קנס = Rabbinic penalty
- יאכל במוצאי שבת = May be eaten at the conclusion of Shabbat — the time-deferred permission
Segment 5
TYPE: דעה שלישית
Rabbi Yochanan HaSandlar: even harsher — forbidden to the perpetrator forever even b’shogeg
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן הַסַּנְדְּלָר אוֹמֵר: בְּשׁוֹגֵג – יֵאָכֵל לְמוֹצָאֵי שַׁבָּת לַאֲחֵרִים וְלֹא לוֹ, בְּמֵזִיד – לֹא יֵאָכֵל עוֹלָמִית, לֹא לוֹ וְלֹא לַאֲחֵרִים.
English Translation:
Rabbi Yoḥanan HaSandlar says: If he acted unwittingly, the food may be eaten at the conclusion of Shabbat by others, but not by him. If he cooked the food intentionally, it may never be eaten, neither by him nor by others. According to Rav, the mishna is referring to a case where one slaughtered the animal unwittingly. According to Rabbi Yehuda, the slaughter is valid but it is prohibited to eat the animal on Shabbat.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yochanan HaSandlar takes the most stringent line. B’shogeg: after Shabbat the food is permitted only to others, never to the cooker himself. B’meizid: forbidden forever to everyone. This three-way machloket becomes the framework for asking which view fits the Mishna’s ruling that ‘his slaughter is valid.’
Key Terms:
- ר’ יוחנן הסנדלר = Tanna — the third opinion in the bishul-on-Shabbat baraita
Segment 6
TYPE: קושיא
Why not interpret the Mishna as Rabbi Meir b’meizid?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְנוֹקְמַהּ בְּמֵזִיד, וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר!
English Translation:
The Gemara challenges this: And let us interpret the mishna as referring to a case where he slaughtered the animal intentionally, and explain that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who rules that eating the animal in such a case is permitted only after the conclusion of Shabbat.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara presses: why must we attribute the day-prohibition specifically to Rabbi Yehuda? Rabbi Meir himself forbids consumption b’meizid. Perhaps the Mishna addresses an intentional violator and follows Rabbi Meir, in which case the prohibition is also on Shabbat itself.
Key Terms:
- (No new technical terms in this segment)
Segment 7
TYPE: דחייה
Rejected: the Yom Kippur juxtaposition forces equivalence between shogeg and meizid
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ, דְּקָתָנֵי דֻּמְיָא דְּיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים – מָה יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים לָא שְׁנָא בְּשׁוֹגֵג וְלָא שְׁנָא בְּמֵזִיד – לָא אָכֵיל, אַף הָכָא נָמֵי לָא שְׁנָא בְּשׁוֹגֵג וְלָא שְׁנָא בְּמֵזִיד – לָא אָכֵיל.
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: That possibility should not enter your mind, as the case of slaughter on Shabbat is juxtaposed to and taught in a manner similar to the case of slaughter on Yom Kippur. Just as with regard to slaughter on Yom Kippur, it is no different whether one slaughtered it unwittingly and it is no different whether he slaughtered it intentionally, he may not eat it that day due to the fast, so too here, with regard to slaughter on Shabbat, it is no different whether he slaughtered it unwittingly and it is no different whether he slaughtered it intentionally, he may not eat it that day. Rabbi Meir, though, deems it permitted for one who cooked unwittingly to eat the cooked food on Shabbat.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara rejects the Rabbi-Meir-meizid reading by attending to the Mishna’s structure: שוחט בשבת is taught alongside שוחט ביום הכפורים, and on Yom Kippur the prohibition against eating applies regardless of intent (the issue is the fast itself, not the chillul). The parallelism dictates that shogeg and meizid produce the same result for the Mishna’s day-prohibition. Only Rabbi Yehuda offers this uniformity.
Key Terms:
- דמיא דיום הכפורים = Similar to Yom Kippur — the structural parallelism
- לא שנא בשוגג ולא שנא במזיד = No difference between unwitting and intentional
Segment 8
TYPE: קושיא
But ‘liable to the death penalty’ implies meizid only — how can Rabbi Yehuda fit?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּמִי מָצֵית מוֹקְמַתְּ לַהּ בְּשׁוֹגֵג וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה? וְהָא ״אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁמִּתְחַיֵּיב בְּנַפְשׁוֹ״ קָתָנֵי! הָכִי קָאָמַר: אַף עַל פִּי דִּבְמֵזִיד מִתְחַיֵּיב בְּנַפְשׁוֹ הוּא, הָכָא דִּבְשׁוֹגֵג – שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: And can you interpret the mishna as referring to a case of unwitting slaughter and in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? But isn’t it taught in the mishna: Although he is liable to receive the death penalty? One is liable to be executed only if he intentionally performs labor on Shabbat. The Gemara answers that this is what the mishna is saying: Although if he slaughtered it intentionally he is liable to receive the death penalty, here, in a case where he slaughtered the animal unwittingly, his slaughter is valid.
קלאוד על הדף:
If the Mishna fits Rabbi Yehuda for the b’shogeg case (since shogeg + Yom-Kippur parallelism uniformly forbids), how does the Mishna’s phrase ‘liable to the death penalty’ fit? Capital liability requires intent. The Gemara reframes the Mishna’s syntax: although a meizid offender would be liable to death, this Mishna is teaching that even in the shogeg case the slaughter is technically valid. The death-penalty phrase is incidental to defining the category of violation, not a description of the actual case.
Key Terms:
- מתחייב בנפשו = Liable to capital punishment — requires intent (meizid)
Segment 9
TYPE: קושיא
Why not interpret the Mishna as Rabbi Yochanan HaSandlar?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְנוֹקְמַהּ כְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן הַסַּנְדְּלָר, דְּאָמַר: לָא שְׁנָא בְּשׁוֹגֵג וְלָא שְׁנָא בְּמֵזִיד – לָא אָכֵיל! רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן הַסַּנְדְּלָר קָמְפַלֵּיג בְּמוֹצָאֵי שַׁבָּת, לַאֲחֵרִים וְלֹא לוֹ, תַּנָּא דִּידַן ״שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה״ קָתָנֵי, לָא שְׁנָא לוֹ וְלָא שְׁנָא לַאֲחֵרִים.
English Translation:
The Gemara challenges: And let us interpret the mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan HaSandlar, who says: It is no different whether he cooked unwittingly and it is no different whether he cooked intentionally; he may not eat it on Shabbat. The Gemara explains: Rabbi Yoḥanan HaSandlar draws a distinction with regard to the conclusion of Shabbat, in that he permits eating food cooked on Shabbat for others and not for him, while the tanna of our mishna teaches: His slaughter is valid, without qualification, indicating that with regard to his ruling it is no different for him and it is no different for others.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara then asks: Rabbi Yochanan HaSandlar also forbids both shogeg and meizid on Shabbat itself, satisfying the Yom-Kippur parallel. Why specifically Rabbi Yehuda? The answer: Rabbi Yochanan HaSandlar distinguishes between the cook himself and others on motzaei Shabbat (forbidden to him alone), but the Mishna says simply ‘his slaughter is valid’ without qualification, indicating the meat is permitted to everyone alike after Shabbat. Rabbi Yochanan HaSandlar’s distinction would have required qualification. Therefore Rabbi Yehuda is the cleanest fit.
Key Terms:
- (No new technical terms in this segment)
Segment 10
TYPE: מעשה
The tanna recites the bishul baraita before Rav, who silences him
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תָּנֵי תַּנָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב: הַמְבַשֵּׁל בְּשַׁבָּת, בְּשׁוֹגֵג – יֵאָכֵל, בְּמֵזִיד – לֹא יֵאָכֵל, וּמְשַׁתֵּיק לֵיהּ רַב.
English Translation:
§ The tanna taught a baraita before Rav: One who cooks on Shabbat unwittingly may eat the food that he cooked; if he did so intentionally, he may not eat the food that he cooked, and Rav silenced him.
קלאוד על הדף:
The sugya now turns to a famous incident. A reciter (תנא) repeated the bishul baraita — ‘b’shogeg ye’achel, b’meizid lo ye’achel’ (Rabbi Meir’s view) — before Rav, and Rav silenced him. Why? The Gemara explores the layers of interpretation: did Rav reject Rabbi Meir’s view? Did he prefer Rabbi Yehuda? Or was something more subtle at stake?
Key Terms:
- משתיק ליה רב = Rav silenced him — the unusual rabbinic intervention
- תנא = Tanna — a reciter of baraitot, distinct from the Tannaim of the Mishna
Segment 11
TYPE: הצעה
Was Rav silencing because he holds like Rabbi Yehuda?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַאי טַעְמָא מְשַׁתֵּיק לֵיהּ? אִילֵּימָא מִשּׁוּם דִּסְבִירָא לֵיהּ כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, וְתַנָּא תָּנֵי כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר, מִשּׁוּם דִּסְבִירָא לֵיהּ כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, מַאן דְּתָנֵי כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר מְשַׁתֵּיק לֵיהּ?!
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: What is the reason that Rav silenced him? If we say it is because Rav holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda and the tanna taught the baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, can it be that merely because he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda he silences one who teaches a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir?
קלאוד על הדף:
The first attempt: Rav silenced the tanna because Rav personally rules like Rabbi Yehuda (forbidden until motzaei Shabbat) and disagrees with Rabbi Meir. The Gemara objects: a teacher does not silence a tanna merely for citing an opposing tannaitic view — both views are legitimate parts of the tradition, and one cites the baraita as one received it.
Key Terms:
- (No new technical terms in this segment)
Segment 12
TYPE: מקור
Rav Chanan bar Ami: Rav rules privately like Meir but publicly like Yehuda for amei ha’aretz
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְעוֹד, מִי סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה? וְהָאָמַר רַב חָנָן בַּר אַמֵּי: כִּי מוֹרִי לְהוּ רַב לְתַלְמִידֵיהּ – מוֹרֵי לְהוּ כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר, וְכִי דָּרֵישׁ בְּפִירְקָא – דָּרֵישׁ כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, מִשּׁוּם עַמֵּי הָאָרֶץ!
English Translation:
And furthermore, does Rav hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? But doesn’t Rav Ḥanan bar Ami say: When Rav issues a ruling to his students, he issues a ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and when he teaches in his public lecture delivered on the Festival, he teaches in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, due to his concern that the ignoramuses would treat the prohibition of labor on Shabbat with disdain?
קלאוד על הדף:
A foundational principle of pesak emerges: Rav Chanan bar Ami transmits that Rav privately ruled for his disciples like Rabbi Meir but in his public lectures (פרקא) taught like Rabbi Yehuda. Why? Because the public audience included amei ha’aretz who might mishandle the lenient Rabbi-Meir position, treating chillul Shabbat lightly. Hierarchical pesak: leniency for the trained, stringency for the masses.
Key Terms:
- מורי להו לתלמידיה = He rules for his disciples
- דריש בפירקא = He expounds in the public lecture
- עמי הארץ = The unlearned masses — the audience requiring greater stringency
Segment 13
TYPE: הצעה ודחייה
Maybe Rav silenced the tanna during the public lecture? Rejected: the people listen to the amora, not the tanna
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְכִי תֵּימָא: תַּנָּא בְּפִירְקֵיהּ תְּנָא קַמֵּיהּ, אַטּוּ כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לְתַנָּא צָיְיתִי? לְאָמוֹרָא צָיְיתִי!
English Translation:
And if you would say that the tanna taught the baraita before Rav during the public lecture and Rav silenced him so that the ignoramuses would not learn from him, is that to say that everyone attending the public lecture listens to the tanna who is citing the baraita? There is no need to silence the tanna, because they listen to the disseminator [amora], the Sage who repeats what he hears from Rav loudly for the benefit of those attending the lecture, and the amora quoted Rav’s ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.
קלאוד על הדף:
Perhaps Rav silenced the tanna because the tanna was reciting Rabbi Meir’s leniency in public where amei ha’aretz might pick it up. The Gemara rejects this: in the public lecture format, the audience listens to the אמורא (interpreter who repeats Rav’s words loudly to the crowd), not directly to the tanna. The tanna’s recitation is for Rav’s benefit; silencing him would not serve the protective function. Some other reason must explain the silencing.
Key Terms:
- אמורא = Disseminator — the interpreter who relays the lecturer’s words to the crowd
- פירקא = The public Festival lecture
Segment 14
TYPE: פתרון
Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak: the tanna recited shochet (not mevashel), and Rav corrected him
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: תַּנָּא שׁוֹחֵט תְּנָא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב: הַשּׁוֹחֵט בְּשַׁבָּת, בְּשׁוֹגֵג – יֵאָכֵל, בְּמֵזִיד – לֹא יֵאָכֵל. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאי דַּעְתָּיךְ כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר? עַד כָּאן לָא קָשָׁרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר אֶלָּא בִּמְבַשֵּׁל, דְּרָאוּי לָכוֹס, אֲבָל שׁוֹחֵט דְּאֵין רָאוּי לָכוֹס – לָא!
English Translation:
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: The tanna taught the halakha of one who slaughters before Rav: One who slaughters an animal on Shabbat unwittingly may eat from the slaughtered animal; if he slaughtered it intentionally, he may not eat from the slaughtered animal. Rav said to the tanna: What do you think, that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir? Rabbi Meir deems eating permitted only in the case of one who cooks unwittingly on Shabbat, as even before he cooks the food it is fit to be chewed [lakhos], i.e., to be eaten uncooked, in a permitted manner, and therefore it was not set aside from use when Shabbat began. But in the case of one who slaughters an animal, where the meat was not fit to chew, Rabbi Meir does not permit eating it on Shabbat, because it was set aside from use on Shabbat.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak resolves the puzzle. The tanna was actually reciting the baraita with שוחט (slaughter), not מבשל (cooking). His version: ‘one who slaughters on Shabbat b’shogeg may eat, b’meizid may not.’ Rav silenced him because Rabbi Meir’s leniency does not extend to slaughter. Rabbi Meir permits cooking-shogeg only because the food was ‘fit to chew’ (ראוי לכוס) raw — it was never muktzeh at sunset. Meat from a live animal, by contrast, is not fit to chew before slaughter, so the meat was muktzeh at sunset. Therefore even Rabbi Meir would forbid the Shabbat-slaughtered animal that day.
Key Terms:
- ראוי לכוס = Fit to chew (raw) — the test for whether the item was muktzeh before melacha was performed
- שוחט vs מבשל = Slaughter vs cooking — different muktzeh starting points
Segment 15
TYPE: קושיא
But Rav himself said the Mishna’s day-prohibition is Rabbi Yehuda — implying Rabbi Meir would permit
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהָא מַתְנִיתִין דְּשׁוֹחֵט הוּא, וְאָמַר רַב הוּנָא: דָּרֵשׁ חִיָּיא בַּר רַב מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב: אֲסוּרָה בַּאֲכִילָה לְיוֹמָא, וְנָסְבִין חַבְרַיָּא לְמֵימֵר: רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא, הָא רַבִּי מֵאִיר שָׁרֵי!
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: But isn’t the mishna addressing the case of one who slaughters an animal, and Rav Huna says that Ḥiyya bar Rav taught in the name of Rav: Consumption of the animal is prohibited for that day, and the members of the company of Sages, i.e., those in the academy, tended to say that this halakha is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, from which it may be inferred: But Rabbi Meir permits consumption of the slaughtered animal even on Shabbat, and he is not concerned that the animal was set aside from use when Shabbat began?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara raises a sharp internal contradiction. If Rabbi Meir himself agrees that Shabbat-slaughtered meat is forbidden (no ראוי-לכוס defense applies to slaughter), then Rav’s earlier statement attributing the day-prohibition to Rabbi Yehuda would be misleading — the prohibition is universal, not the unique view of Rabbi Yehuda. By inferring ‘Rabbi Yehuda is the source,’ the listener would assume Rabbi Meir disagrees and permits the meat. The two transmissions clash.
Key Terms:
- (No new technical terms in this segment)
Segment 16
TYPE: תירוץ
Resolution begins: Rabbi Meir would permit — but only in a special case
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כִּי שָׁרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר,
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: When Rabbi Meir permits consumption of the slaughtered animal even on Shabbat,
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara begins to resolve: Rabbi Meir permits the Shabbat-slaughtered animal only in a specific case where the standard muktzeh barrier does not apply. The Gemara will spell out the case at the start of 15b — a household with a critically ill person before Shabbat, in which case the animal was not muktzeh at sunset because slaughter was already permitted-in-advance for the choleh.
Key Terms:
- (No new technical terms in this segment)
Amud Bet (15b)
Segment 1
TYPE: המשך
The completion: a critically ill person was in the household before Shabbat
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כְּגוֹן שֶׁהָיָה לוֹ חוֹלֶה מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם.
English Translation:
it is in a case where one had a critically ill person in his household while it was still day, before Shabbat, as it is permitted to slaughter the animal for such a person even on Shabbat. Therefore, the unslaughtered animal was not set aside from use.
קלאוד על הדף:
The 15a discussion completes here: Rabbi Meir permits the meat where the household had a חולה before Shabbat, allowing slaughter for that person on Shabbat itself. Since the slaughter was potentially permitted from the outset, the live animal was not muktzeh at sunset. After the slaughter — even if performed for someone other than the ill person — the meat is permitted. The choleh’s presence dissolves the muktzeh barrier.
Key Terms:
- חולה = Critically ill person — whose pikuach nefesh permits melacha
- מבעוד יום = Before Shabbat began (literally ‘while it was still day’)
Segment 2
TYPE: פירוש לרבי יהודה
Rabbi Yehuda’s prohibition fits the case where the choleh recovered before Shabbat
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִי הָכִי, מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה דְּאָסַר? כְּגוֹן שֶׁהָיָה לוֹ חוֹלֶה וְהִבְרִיא.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: If so, what is the reason that Rabbi Yehuda prohibited consumption of the meat on Shabbat? The Gemara answers: He issued this ruling in a case where one had a critically ill person in his household before Shabbat and that person recovered. In that case, although the unslaughtered animal was not set aside from use when Shabbat began, it is prohibited to slaughter it on Shabbat. According to Rabbi Yehuda, if he slaughtered it unwittingly, its consumption is prohibited on Shabbat.
קלאוד על הדף:
If Rabbi Meir permits in the choleh case, what is Rabbi Yehuda’s case? The Gemara: where the household had a choleh before Shabbat but he recovered (הבריא) before sunset. The animal was ‘designated for slaughter’ before Shabbat (and therefore not muktzeh at sunset under one analysis), but by Shabbat morning the heter to slaughter had vanished. Rabbi Yehuda nonetheless penalizes the b’shogeg slaughterer.
Key Terms:
- הבריא = He recovered — the choleh’s restoration removing the heter to slaughter
Segment 3
TYPE: מימרא
Rav Acha bar Ada in Rav’s name: slaughter for a choleh is forbidden to the healthy; cooking is permitted
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְכִי הָא דְּאָמַר רַב אַחָא בַּר אַדָּא אָמַר רַב, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק בַּר אַדָּא אָמַר רַב: הַשּׁוֹחֵט לַחוֹלֶה בְּשַׁבָּת – אָסוּר לַבָּרִיא, הַמְבַשֵּׁל לַחוֹלֶה בְּשַׁבָּת – מוּתָּר לַבָּרִיא.
English Translation:
And that which Rav silenced the tanna for not stating that an unslaughtered animal is set aside from use, even when the prohibited labor of slaughter was performed unwittingly, is in accordance with that which Rav Aḥa bar Adda says that Rav says, and some say it is that which Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Adda says that Rav says: In the case of one who slaughters an animal to feed an ill person on Shabbat, it is prohibited for a healthy person to partake of the slaughtered animal on Shabbat. In a case of one who cooks food to feed an ill person on Shabbat, it is permitted for a healthy person to partake of that food.
קלאוד על הדף:
A foundational ruling: when one slaughters for a choleh on Shabbat, the meat is forbidden to a healthy person on Shabbat. When one cooks for a choleh on Shabbat, the cooked food is permitted to a healthy person. Why the asymmetry? The next segment explains.
Key Terms:
- שוחט לחולה / מבשל לחולה = Slaughtering for the ill / cooking for the ill — the asymmetric pair
Segment 4
TYPE: טעם
The reason: cooking acts on already-permitted food; slaughter acts on previously-forbidden meat
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַאי טַעְמָא? הַאי רָאוּי לָכוֹס, וְהַאי אֵינוֹ רָאוּי לָכוֹס.
English Translation:
What is the reason for this distinction? This food was fit to be chewed before it was cooked, and therefore it was not set aside from use when Shabbat began, and the meat of that animal was not fit to be chewed before the animal was slaughtered, and therefore it was set aside from use when Shabbat began.
קלאוד על הדף:
The asymmetry hinges on ראוי לכוס. Pre-cooking, the food was already raw-edible: not muktzeh at sunset. Cooking is just an enhancement. The healthy person can rely on the heter that already attached to the food at sunset. Pre-slaughter meat is not raw-edible: the live animal at sunset was forbidden as ever min hachai. Only the choleh’s pikuach-nefesh need pierces that prohibition; the healthy person has no such heter, so the meat remains muktzeh for him.
Key Terms:
- (No new technical terms in this segment)
Segment 5
TYPE: הוספה
Rav Pappa: the principle is not absolute — there are exceptions in each direction
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: פְּעָמִים שֶׁהַשּׁוֹחֵט מוּתָּר, כְּגוֹן שֶׁהָיָה לוֹ חוֹלֶה מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם; מְבַשֵּׁל אָסוּר, כְּגוֹן שֶׁקָּצַץ לוֹ דַּלַּעַת.
English Translation:
Rav Pappa says: There are times when one slaughters for an ill person on Shabbat and it is permitted for a healthy person to eat the meat on Shabbat, such as where he had a critically ill person in his household before Shabbat and the animal was designated for slaughter while it was still day, before Shabbat; in that case, it was not set aside from use. And there are times when one cooks on Shabbat for an ill person and it is prohibited for a healthy person to eat the food on Shabbat, such as where one cut a gourd that was attached to the ground for the ill person on Shabbat. Because it is prohibited to detach the gourd on Shabbat, it is set aside from use and forbidden.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Pappa adds nuance. Sometimes shochet-for-choleh is permitted to a healthy person — where the choleh existed already before Shabbat (the standard early-designation case). And sometimes cooking is forbidden — as when the cook detached a gourd from the ground for the ill person on Shabbat. The detachment itself was an act of melacha and the gourd was muktzeh; that pre-existing prohibition is not erased by the choleh’s heter. Each case must be analyzed on its own.
Key Terms:
- שקצץ לו דלעת = He cut a gourd for him — detaching a gourd from the ground, the prohibited melacha
Segment 6
TYPE: הלכה
Rav Dimi of Nehardea’s halachic ruling: shochet-for-choleh permits raw meat to the healthy
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב דִּימִי מִנְּהַרְדְּעָא, הִלְכְתָא: הַשּׁוֹחֵט לַחוֹלֶה בְּשַׁבָּת – מוּתָּר לַבָּרִיא בְּאוּמְצָא, מַאי טַעְמָא? כֵּיוָן דְּאִי אֶפְשָׁר לִכְזַיִת בָּשָׂר בְּלֹא שְׁחִיטָה, כִּי קָא שָׁחֵיט – אַדַּעְתָּא דְּחוֹלֶה קָא שָׁחֵיט. הַמְבַשֵּׁל לַחוֹלֶה בְּשַׁבָּת – אָסוּר לַבָּרִיא, גְּזֵירָה שֶׁמָּא יַרְבֶּה בִּשְׁבִילוֹ.
English Translation:
Rav Dimi of Neharde’a says that the halakha is: In the case of one who slaughters for an ill person on Shabbat, it is permitted for a healthy person to eat the raw meat [be’umtza]. What is the reason that it is permitted? Since it is impossible for an olive-bulk of meat to be permitted without slaughter of the entire animal, when he slaughters the animal, he slaughters it with the ill person in mind. Since slaughter of the animal was permitted, all its meat is permitted even for a healthy person. In the case of one who cooks for an ill person on Shabbat, it is prohibited for a healthy person to eat the food on Shabbat. What is the reason that it is prohibited? It is due to a rabbinic decree lest he increase the amount of food that he is cooking on behalf of the healthy person.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Dimi formalizes the halacha. שוחט לחולה — the meat is permitted to a healthy person, but only as raw meat (אומצא), not cooked further on Shabbat. Why? Because slaughter cannot produce less than a kezayit; the entire animal becomes permitted by the single act done for the choleh. By contrast, cooking is divisible — one could cook just enough for the choleh — so the rabbis decreed that cooked food is forbidden to the healthy lest the cook be tempted to enlarge the portion (גזירה שמא ירבה בשבילו).
Key Terms:
- אומצא = Raw meat (Aramaic)
- גזירה שמא ירבה בשבילו = Decree lest he add for the healthy person — the cooking-specific safeguard
Segment 7
TYPE: משנה
New mishna: valid slaughtering instruments — hand sickle (smooth side), flint, sharpened reed
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְנִי׳ הַשּׁוֹחֵט בְּמַגַּל יָד, בְּצוֹר, וּבְקָנֶה – שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה.
English Translation:
MISHNA: In the case of one who slaughters an animal with the smooth side of a hand sickle, which has both a smooth and a serrated side, or with a sharpened flint, or with a reed that was cut lengthwise and sharpened, his slaughter is valid.
קלאוד על הדף:
The next mishna shifts to the laws of the slaughtering instrument itself. The smooth side of a hand sickle (which has both a smooth and serrated edge), a sharpened flint, and a sharpened reed all yield valid shechita. The principle: the cutting edge must be smooth (חלק) and not serrated (פגום). The mishna’s choice of language — שוחט (one who slaughters) rather than שוחטין (one may slaughter) — will become the basis for the Gemara’s inference about ab initio versus after-the-fact.
Key Terms:
- מגל יד = Hand sickle — a tool with both smooth and serrated edges
- צור = Flint — a sharp stone
- קנה = Reed — a sharpened plant stalk
Segment 8
TYPE: המשך המשנה
The mishna continues: anyone may always slaughter with anything that cuts — with key exceptions
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הַכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִין, וּלְעוֹלָם שׁוֹחֲטִין, וּבַכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִין, חוּץ מִמַּגַּל קָצִיר, וְהַמְּגֵירָה, וְהַשִּׁינַּיִם, וְהַצִּיפּוֹרֶן, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהֵם חוֹנְקִין.
English Translation:
All slaughter [hakkol shoḥatin], and one may always slaughter, and one may slaughter with any item that cuts, except for the serrated side of the harvest sickle, a saw, the teeth of an animal when attached to its jawbone, and a fingernail, because they are serrated and they consequently strangle the animal and do not cut its windpipe and gullet as required.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Mishna gives the celebrated triadic phrasing: הכל שוחטין (anyone slaughters), ולעולם שוחטין (always one may slaughter), ובכל שוחטין (one may slaughter with anything) — excepting only items that strangle: the serrated side of the harvest sickle, a saw, animal teeth still attached to the jaw, and a fingernail. The principle: serrated edges do not cut cleanly but tear and pinch, violating the requirement that shechita sever simanim through smooth motion.
Key Terms:
- הכל שוחטין = All may slaughter — the broad permission of who may shecht
- חונקין = They strangle — the disqualification for serrated tools
Segment 9
TYPE: דיוק לשון
The Gemara’s first inference: the Mishna’s wording ‘one who slaughters’ implies after-the-fact only
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גְּמָ׳ הַשּׁוֹחֵט – דִּיעֲבַד אִין, לְכַתְּחִלָּה לָא. בִּשְׁלָמָא בְּמַגַּל יָד – דִּלְמָא אָתֵי לְמֶעְבַּד בְּאִידַּךְ גִּיסָא, אֶלָּא צוֹר וְקָנֶה לְכִתְחִלָּה לָא? וּרְמִינְהִי: בַּכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִין, בֵּין בְּצוֹר, בֵּין בִּזְכוּכִית, בֵּין בִּקְרוּמִית שֶׁל קָנֶה!
English Translation:
GEMARA: The Gemara notes that the language of the mishna, which states: One who slaughters an animal with a hand sickle, with a flint, or with a reed, rather than: One may slaughter, indicates that after the fact, yes, the slaughter is valid, but one may not slaughter with those blades ab initio. The Gemara asks: Granted, one may not slaughter it with a hand sickle, lest he come to perform the slaughter with the other, serrated, side; but as a flint and a reed have no serrated side, is it so that one may not slaughter with those ab initio? And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a baraita: One may slaughter with any item that cuts, whether with a flint, or with glass shards, or with the stalk of a reed.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara extracts a distinction from the mishnaic phrasing. השוחט (descriptive participle, ‘one who slaughters’) indicates after-the-fact validity. If the mishna meant ‘one may slaughter’ ab initio, it would have used the imperative shochatin. So with the smooth side of the hand sickle, the flint, and the reed, the slaughter is valid b’di’avad but not permitted l’chatchila.
Key Terms:
- בדיעבד = After-the-fact
- לכתחילה = From the outset / ab initio
Segment 10
TYPE: קושיא
Why l’chatchila restriction for flint and reed — they have no serrated side?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לָא קַשְׁיָא: כָּאן בְּתָלוּשׁ, כָּאן בִּמְחוּבָּר. דְּאָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא: הַשּׁוֹחֵט בִּמְחוּבָּר לַקַּרְקַע – רַבִּי פּוֹסֵל וְרַבִּי חִיָּיא מַכְשִׁיר; עַד כָּאן לָא קָא מַכְשִׁיר רַבִּי חִיָּיא אֶלָּא בְּדִיעֲבַד, אֲבָל לְכַתְּחִלָּה לָא.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. There, where the baraita permits slaughter ab initio, it is referring to slaughter with a flint and a reed when they are detached. Here, where the mishna says that the slaughter is valid only after the fact, it is referring to slaughter with a flint and a reed when they are attached to the ground, as Rav Kahana says: In the case of one who slaughters with a blade that is attached to the ground, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems the slaughter not valid and Rabbi Ḥiyya deems it valid. The Gemara infers: Even Rabbi Ḥiyya deems the slaughter valid only after the fact; but one may not do so ab initio.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara accepts the hand-sickle restriction as obvious: the user might mistakenly slaughter with the serrated side. But why ban l’chatchila a flint or reed, which have no serrated side? A baraita is then quoted contradicting the mishna: ‘one may slaughter with any cutting item, including a flint, a glass shard, or a reed-stalk’ — this is unrestricted, l’chatchila.
Key Terms:
- רמינהי = The Gemara’s standard formula for raising a contradiction between sources
Segment 11
TYPE: תירוץ
Resolution: the Mishna addresses attached blades; the baraita addresses detached
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בְּמַאי אוֹקֵימְתַּהּ כְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא וְדִיעֲבַד? אֶלָּא הָא דְּתַנְיָא: בַּכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִין, בֵּין בְּתָלוּשׁ בֵּין בִּמְחוּבָּר, בֵּין שֶׁהַסַּכִּין לְמַעְלָה וְצַוַּאר בְּהֵמָה לְמַטָּה, בֵּין שֶׁהַסַּכִּין לְמַטָּה וְצַוַּאר בְּהֵמָה לְמַעְלָה – מַנִּי? לָא רַבִּי וְלָא רַבִּי חִיָּיא! אִי רַבִּי חִיָּיא – דִּיעֲבַד אִין, לְכִתְחִלָּה לָא; אִי רַבִּי – דִּיעֲבַד נָמֵי לָא.
English Translation:
In accordance with which opinion did you interpret the mishna? Is it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya, and the slaughter is valid after the fact? But if so, with regard to that which is taught in a baraita: One may slaughter with any item that cuts, whether with a blade that is detached from the ground or with a blade that is attached to the ground, whether the knife is above and the neck of the animal is below or the knife is below and the neck of the animal is above; in accordance with whose opinion is it? It is in accordance neither with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi nor with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya. If one would claim that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya, he says: After the fact, yes, the slaughter is valid, but it is not permitted to slaughter in this manner ab initio. If one would claim that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, he says: Even after the fact, the slaughter is not valid.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Kahana resolves by introducing the attached/detached distinction. תלוש (detached) blades — permitted l’chatchila. מחובר (attached to the ground) blades — valid only b’di’avad according to Rabbi Chiyya, while Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi (Rebbi) invalidates them entirely. Even Rabbi Chiyya, who validates the attached-blade slaughter, only does so b’di’avad. The mishna’s restriction therefore applies to the attached case.
Key Terms:
- תלוש = Detached — the standard permitted state
- מחובר לקרקע = Attached to the ground — the disputed restricted case
- רבי וריב”ח = Rebbi (Yehuda HaNasi) and Rabbi Chiyya — the disputants
Segment 12
TYPE: קושיא
Counter-baraita: a different source allows attached blades l’chatchila — whose view?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לְעוֹלָם רַבִּי חִיָּיא, וַאֲפִילּוּ לְכַתְּחִלָּה, וְהַאי דְּקָמִיפַּלְגִי בְּדִיעֲבַד – לְהוֹדִיעֲךָ כֹּחוֹ דְּרַבִּי.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: Actually, the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya, and he permits slaughter with these blades even ab initio. And the fact that the opinions of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Ḥiyya were formulated such that they disagree concerning the halakha after the fact is to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi that the slaughter is not valid even after the fact.
קלאוד על הדף:
Another baraita: ‘one may slaughter with anything cutting, whether detached or attached, whether knife above or neck above.’ This is unrestricted. Whose view does it represent? Not Rebbi (who invalidates attached-blade slaughter even b’di’avad) and not Rabbi Chiyya (who only validates b’di’avad). The Gemara seems to have a third position to account for.
Key Terms:
- (No new technical terms in this segment)
Segment 13
TYPE: תירוץ
Resolution: the baraita is Rabbi Chiyya, who actually permits even l’chatchila
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאֶלָּא, מַתְנִיתִין דְּקָתָנֵי ״הַשּׁוֹחֵט״, דִּיעֲבַד – אִין, לְכַתְּחִלָּה – לָא, מַנִּי? לָא רַבִּי וְלָא רַבִּי חִיָּיא, אִי רַבִּי חִיָּיא – אֲפִילּוּ לְכַתְּחִלָּה, אִי רַבִּי – דִּיעֲבַד נָמֵי לָא.
English Translation:
But rather, the mishna here, which teaches: With regard to one who slaughters, after the fact, yes, it is valid, but it is not ab initio, in accordance with whose opinion is it? It is in accordance neither with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi nor with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya. If one would claim that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya, he says: The slaughter is permitted even ab initio. If one would claim that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, he says: Even after the fact, the slaughter is not valid.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara revises: Rabbi Chiyya permits attached-blade slaughter even l’chatchila. The dispute with Rebbi was framed in b’di’avad terms only להודיעך כחו דרבי — to convey the strength of Rebbi’s stringency (he invalidates even after the fact, not merely ab initio). This is a classic Gemara trope: a dispute is presented in extreme form to highlight one side’s far-reaching position.
Key Terms:
- להודיעך כחו דרבי = To inform you of the power (i.e., strict reach) of Rebbi’s position
Segment 14
TYPE: חידוש קושיא
If Rabbi Chiyya permits attached blades l’chatchila, whose view is the Mishna’s restriction?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לְעוֹלָם רַבִּי חִיָּיא, וַאֲפִילּוּ לְכַתְּחִלָּה, וּמַתְנִיתִין דְּקָתָנֵי ״הַשּׁוֹחֵט״ – רַבִּי הִיא.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: Actually, Rabbi Ḥiyya holds that it is permitted to slaughter with these blades, and even ab initio; and the mishna here, which teaches: One who slaughters, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.
קלאוד על הדף:
But this revision creates a new problem. If Rabbi Chiyya permits even l’chatchila, then the Mishna’s restriction (di’avad-only) cannot be Rabbi Chiyya. And it cannot be Rebbi, who invalidates entirely. The Mishna’s halfway position fits neither.
Key Terms:
- (No new technical terms in this segment)
Segment 15
TYPE: תירוץ
Resolution: the Mishna is Rebbi — but in a different sub-case
Hebrew/Aramaic:
קַשְׁיָא דְּרַבִּי אַדְּרַבִּי? לָא קַשְׁיָא: כָּאן בִּמְחוּבָּר מֵעִיקָּרוֹ, כָּאן בְּתָלוּשׁ וּלְבַסּוֹף חִיבְּרוֹ.
English Translation:
The Gemara objects: This is difficult, as there is a contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and another statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as in his dispute with Rabbi Ḥiyya he holds that the slaughter is not valid. The Gemara answers: This contradiction is not difficult. There, in his dispute with Rabbi Ḥiyya, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that slaughter is not valid in a case where the blade was attached from the outset; here, in the mishna, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems the slaughter valid after the fact in a case where the blade was detached and ultimately he reattached it.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Mishna is Rebbi after all — but addressing a sub-case where the blade was originally detached and only later reattached (תלוש ולבסוף חיברו). In Rebbi’s dispute with Rabbi Chiyya, the case was מחובר מעיקרו (attached from the outset). The two stages — always-attached vs. detached-then-reattached — yield different rulings. Rebbi invalidates the always-attached blade entirely, but for the reattached blade he validates b’di’avad.
Key Terms:
- מחובר מעיקרו = Attached from the outset — always part of the ground
- תלוש ולבסוף חיברו = Detached and ultimately he reattached — a hybrid status
Segment 16
TYPE: ראיה
Proof: a baraita distinguishing the same categories — wheel-mounted, embedded knife, vs. natural protrusion
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּמְנָא תֵּימְרָא דְּשָׁנֵי לַן בֵּין מְחוּבָּר מֵעִיקָּרוֹ לְתָלוּשׁ וּלְבַסּוֹף חִיבְּרוֹ? דְּתַנְיָא: הַשּׁוֹחֵט בְּמוּכְנִי – שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה, בִּמְחוּבָּר לַקַּרְקַע – שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה, נָעַץ סַכִּין בַּכּוֹתֶל וְשָׁחַט בָּהּ – שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה, הָיָה צוֹר יוֹצֵא מִן הַכּוֹתֶל אוֹ קָנֶה עוֹלֶה מֵאֵלָיו וְשָׁחַט בּוֹ – שְׁחִיטָתוֹ פְּסוּלָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: And from where do you say that there is a difference for us between a blade that was attached from the outset and a blade that was detached and ultimately he reattached it? As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who slaughters with a mechanism [bemukhni] of a wheel with a knife attached to it, his slaughter is valid; with an item that is attached to the ground, his slaughter is valid; if one embedded a knife in a wall and slaughtered with it, his slaughter is valid. If there was a flint emerging from a wall or a reed arising from the ground on its own and he slaughtered with it, his slaughter is not valid.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara adduces a baraita that explicitly tracks the always-attached vs. reattached distinction. Valid: slaughter with a wheel-mounted blade (מוכני, attached but recently fixed), with anything attached to the ground that was fixed there, or with a knife embedded in a wall by the user. Invalid: slaughter with a flint protruding naturally from a wall or a reed growing wild from the ground. The user’s act of fixing/embedding (his own ידיים action) elevates the attached blade; pure natural attachment without human installation invalidates.
Key Terms:
- מוכני = Wheel-mounted mechanism — a fixed but human-installed blade
- נעץ סכין בכותל = He embedded a knife in the wall — human reattachment
- צור יוצא מן הכותל = A flint protruding from a wall (naturally) — the invalid case