Chullin Daf 44 (חולין דף מ״ד)
Daf: 44 | Amudim: 44a – 44b | Date: Loading...
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (44a)
Segment 1
TYPE: ברייתא
Continuation from Daf 43: combining the stringencies of both schools is folly; follow one school consistently
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מֵחוּמְרֵי בֵּית שַׁמַּאי וּמֵחוּמְרֵי בֵּית הִלֵּל – עָלָיו הַכָּתוּב אוֹמֵר: ״הַכְּסִיל בַּחוֹשֶׁךְ הוֹלֵךְ״. אֶלָּא אִי כְּבֵית שַׁמַּאי – כְּקוּלֵּיהֶן וּכְחוּמְרֵיהֶן, אִי כְּבֵית הִלֵּל – כְּקוּלֵּיהֶן וּכְחוּמְרֵיהֶן.
English Translation:
And one who wishes to adopt both the stringencies of Beit Shammai and the stringencies of Beit Hillel, with regard to him the verse states: “The fool walks in darkness” (Ecclesiastes 2:14). Rather, one should act either in accordance with Beit Shammai, following both their leniencies and their stringencies, or in accordance with Beit Hillel, following both their leniencies and their stringencies.
קלאוד על הדף:
This continues the baraita that closed Daf 43, deployed by Mar son of Ravina to critique Rava’s ruling on the bull. Just as one who takes both schools’ leniencies is “wicked,” one who takes both their stringencies is a “fool walking in darkness” — methodological incoherence cuts both ways. The principle: a person must commit to one school as a complete package (קוּלֵּיהֶן וּכְחוּמְרֵיהֶן — its leniencies and its stringencies together), never cherry-picking. This frames the daf’s defense of Rava that follows.
Key Terms:
- חוּמְרָא / קוּלָּא (chumra / kula) = a stringency / a leniency
- הַכְּסִיל בַּחוֹשֶׁךְ הוֹלֵךְ (hakesil bachoshech holech) = “the fool walks in darkness” (Kohelet 2:14) — the verse condemning one who adopts both schools’ stringencies
- כְּקוּלֵּיהֶן וּכְחוּמְרֵיהֶן (kekuleihen ukechumreihen) = “according to their leniencies and their stringencies” — following one school as an integrated whole
Segment 2
TYPE: קושיא
An internal contradiction in the baraita: halakha is always like Beit Hillel, yet one may follow Beit Shammai?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָא גּוּפַאּ קַשְׁיָא, אָמְרַתְּ: לְעוֹלָם הֲלָכָה כְּדִבְרֵי בֵּית הִלֵּל, וַהֲדַר תָּנֵי: וְהָרוֹצֶה לַעֲשׂוֹת כְּדִבְרֵי בֵּית שַׁמַּאי יַעֲשֶׂה!
English Translation:
The Gemara objects to the wording of the baraita: This baraita itself is difficult. First you say that the halakha is always in accordance with the statement of Beit Hillel, and then you teach that one who wishes to act in accordance with the statement of Beit Shammai may do so.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara pauses to resolve an internal tension in the baraita itself (הָא גּוּפַאּ קַשְׁיָא). It opens by declaring the halakha is always like Beit Hillel — yet it then permits one to act like Beit Shammai if he wishes. These two clauses appear to contradict: if Beit Hillel is binding, how can Beit Shammai remain a live option? The next two segments offer two resolutions, both turning on the famous Heavenly Voice (בַּת קוֹל) that decided the dispute.
Key Terms:
- הָא גּוּפַאּ קַשְׁיָא (ha gufa kashya) = “this itself is difficult” — a formula flagging an internal contradiction within a single source
- לְעוֹלָם הֲלָכָה כְּ… (le’olam halakha ke…) = “the halakha is always like…” — a binding, settled ruling
Segment 3
TYPE: תירוץ
First resolution: one clause is before the Heavenly Voice, the other after it
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לָא קַשְׁיָא, כָּאן – קוֹדֶם בַּת קוֹל, כָּאן – לְאַחַר בַּת קוֹל.
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: This is not difficult. Here, the statement that a person may act as he wishes was made before the Divine Voice emerged and announced that the halakha is always in accordance with Beit Hillel. There, the statement that the halakha is always in accordance with Beit Hillel was made after the Divine Voice issued this ruling.
קלאוד על הדף:
The first resolution is chronological. The permission to follow either school reflects the era before the Heavenly Voice (בַּת קוֹל) declared the halakha to be like Beit Hillel — when the dispute was genuinely open. The binding “always like Beit Hillel” reflects the era after the Voice settled the matter. The famous bat kol (cited in the Talmud, e.g. Eruvin 13b) is treated here as the decisive turning point that ended the freedom to choose Beit Shammai.
Key Terms:
- בַּת קוֹל (bat kol) = a Heavenly Voice; here, the one that proclaimed “the halakha is like Beit Hillel,” ending the dispute
- קוֹדֶם / לְאַחַר (kodem / le’achar) = “before / after” — distinguishing two time periods to resolve the contradiction
Segment 4
TYPE: תירוץ
Second resolution: both are after the Voice, following R’ Yehoshua that one disregards a Heavenly Voice
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאִי בָּעֵית אֵימָא, אַף לְאַחַר בַּת קוֹל, וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ הִיא, דְּאָמַר: אֵין מַשְׁגִּיחִין בְּבַת קוֹל.
English Translation:
And if you wish, say instead that even the statement that a person may act as he wishes was made after the Divine Voice announced that the halakha is in accordance with Beit Hillel, and this statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who says: One disregards a Divine Voice that attempts to intervene in matters of halakha. According to him, the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel has not yet been decided.
קלאוד על הדף:
The alternative resolution invokes one of the most profound principles in the Talmud: לֹא בַּשָּׁמַיִם הִיא — the Torah is not in Heaven. Rabbi Yehoshua famously held that “we do not heed a Heavenly Voice” in deciding halakha, since the Torah was already given at Sinai for human courts to interpret by majority rule. On this view both baraita-clauses postdate the Voice, but the choice to follow either school remains open because the bat kol carries no halakhic authority. The dispute is thus left undecided by Heaven, a striking assertion of rabbinic interpretive autonomy.
Key Terms:
- אֵין מַשְׁגִּיחִין בְּבַת קוֹל (ein mashgichin bevat kol) = “we do not heed a Heavenly Voice” — Rabbi Yehoshua’s principle that halakha is decided by human reasoning and majority, not divine intervention
- רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ (Rabbi Yehoshua) = the tanna associated with this principle (cf. the “oven of Akhnai,” Bava Metzia 59b)
Segment 5
TYPE: קושיא
Returning to the main problem: Rava’s ruling still seems indefensible
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מִכׇּל מָקוֹם, קַשְׁיָא.
English Translation:
The Gemara notes: In any case, Rava’s ruling is difficult. How could he rule in accordance with two contradictory stringencies in order to deem the animal a tereifa?
קלאוד על הדף:
Having resolved the baraita’s internal contradiction, the Gemara returns to its original target: Rava’s ruling on the bull (from Daf 43) still stands accused. Whichever way one reads the Beit Shammai/Beit Hillel principle, it condemns combining incompatible positions — and Rava had deemed the bull a tereifa by fusing Rav’s stringency with Shmuel’s. The objection persists (מִכׇּל מָקוֹם קַשְׁיָא), setting up Rav Tavut’s defense in the next segment, which will show Rava actually followed a single coherent view.
Key Terms:
- מִכׇּל מָקוֹם (mikol makom) = “in any case” — signaling a return to an unresolved difficulty after a digression
Segment 6
TYPE: תירוץ
Rav Tavut defends Rava: he ruled entirely like Rav, who already holds the turbatz is not a slaughter-site yet disqualifies with any amount
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב טָבוּת: כּוּלַּהּ כְּרַב עַבְדַהּ, דְּכִי אֲתָא רָמֵי בַּר יְחֶזְקֵאל אָמַר: לָא תְּצִיתוּ לְהוּ לְהָנֵי כְּלָלֵי דְּכָיֵיל יְהוּדָה אֲחִי מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב! הָכִי אָמַר רַב: וֶושֶׁט נָתְנוּ [בּוֹ] חֲכָמִים שִׁיעוּר, מִכְּלָל דְּתוּרְבַּץ הַוֶּושֶׁט לָאו מְקוֹם שְׁחִיטָה הוּא, וְקָאָמַר בְּמַשֶּׁהוּ.
English Translation:
Rav Tavut said: Rava acted entirely in accordance with the opinion of Rav. As when Rami bar Yeḥezkel came, he said: Do not listen to those principles that Rav Yehuda, my brother, formulated in the name of Rav. Although Rav holds that a perforation of any part of the entrance of the gullet renders an animal a tereifa, this is not because it is a location fit for slaughter. Rather, this is what Rav said: The Sages gave a measure defining the portion of the gullet that is valid for slaughter. By inference, one learns that the entrance of the gullet is not a location fit for slaughter. And nevertheless, he says that a perforation in any amount renders the animal a tereifa.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Tavut rescues Rava by correcting the record about Rav’s view. Rami bar Yechezkel transmits that Rav Yehuda’s formulation (which paired Rav’s “any amount” with “the turbatz is a slaughter-site”) was inaccurate. In truth Rav held both that the turbatz is not a valid slaughter-site and that any perforation there disqualifies. If so, Rava was not fusing Rav and Shmuel at all — he was following Rav’s single, internally consistent position. The charge of illegitimate cherry-picking collapses.
Key Terms:
- כּוּלַּהּ כְּרַב עַבְדַהּ (kulah keRav avdah) = “he did it entirely according to Rav” — Rava followed one coherent authority, not a hybrid
- רָמֵי בַּר יְחֶזְקֵאל (Rami bar Yechezkel) = the Sage who corrected Rav Yehuda’s transmission of Rav’s view
- נָתְנוּ בּוֹ חֲכָמִים שִׁיעוּר (natnu bo chakhamim shiur) = “the Sages gave it [the gullet] a measure” — defining the valid-for-slaughter portion, implying the turbatz lies outside it
Segment 7
TYPE: גמרא
Defining the valid-for-slaughter portion of the gullet: upper and lower boundaries
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לְמַעְלָה עַד כַּמָּה? אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: עַד כְּדֵי תְּפִיסַת יָד. לְמַטָּה עַד כַּמָּה? אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ: עַד כְּדֵי שֶׁיַּשְׂעִיר.
English Translation:
Since it was mentioned that the Sages gave a measure defining the portion of the gullet that is valid for slaughter, the Gemara asks: How far up the gullet is the upper boundary for valid slaughter? Rav Naḥman said: It is until the point that there remains only sufficient space for a hand to grip the gullet. The Gemara asks: How far down is the lower boundary? Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: Until the gullet becomes hairy, i.e., until the opening of the rumen, whose lining is hairy.
קלאוד על הדף:
Prompted by Rav’s “the Sages gave a measure,” the Gemara maps the precise valid-for-slaughter zone of the gullet. The upper limit (excluding the turbatz) is the point that still leaves enough room for a hand’s grip (תְּפִיסַת יָד). The lower limit is where the gullet’s lining turns hairy (שֶׁיַּשְׂעִיר) — the transition into the rumen, whose interior is villous. Slaughter outside this band, in the turbatz above or the rumen below, is invalid.
Key Terms:
- תְּפִיסַת יָד (tefisat yad) = “a hand’s grip” — the upper boundary measure of valid slaughter
- עַד כְּדֵי שֶׁיַּשְׂעִיר (ad kedei sheyas’ir) = “until it becomes hairy” — the lower boundary, where the gullet meets the villous lining of the rumen
Segment 8
TYPE: קושיא
A contradiction: Rav (via Geneiva) calls the lowest handbreadth of the gullet the “inner rumen”
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִינִי? וְהָאָמַר רָבִינָא אָמַר גְּנִיבָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב: טֶפַח בַּוֶּושֶׁט סָמוּךְ לַכָּרֵס – זֶהוּ כָּרֵס הַפְּנִימִי. אַמַּאי? כִּי קָא שָׁחֵט בְּכָרֵס קָא שָׁחֵיט!
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: Is that so? But doesn’t Ravina say that Geneiva says in the name of Rav: The lowermost handbreadth in the gullet, adjacent to the rumen, this is the inner rumen? If so, why does Rav Naḥman permit slaughter until the opening of the rumen? When one slaughters within the bottom handbreadth, he is slaughtering in the rumen, and his slaughter should be invalid.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara challenges Rav Nachman’s lower boundary. Ravina, citing Geneiva in Rav’s name, taught that the bottommost handbreadth of the gullet itself, adjacent to the rumen, is already classified as “inner rumen” (כָּרֵס הַפְּנִימִי) — and the inner rumen is not a valid slaughter-site. If so, Rav Nachman’s permission to slaughter right down to where the gullet turns hairy would actually allow slaughter in the rumen, which should be invalid. The two statements appear to clash about where the gullet ends.
Key Terms:
- טֶפַח (tefach) = a handbreadth, the disputed lowermost segment
- כָּרֵס הַפְּנִימִי (kares hapnimi) = the inner rumen — not a valid location for slaughter
- גְּנִיבָא (Geneiva) = the Sage whose tradition in Rav’s name generates the difficulty
Segment 9
TYPE: תירוץ
Two answers: re-read Rav as the top of the rumen, or restrict his case to an extra-hairy bull
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֵימָא: טֶפַח בְּכָרֵס סָמוּךְ לַוֶּושֶׁט – זֶהוּ כָּרֵס הַפְּנִימִי. אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: כִּי קָאָמַר רַב – בְּתוֹרָא, דְּמַשְׂעַר טְפֵי.
English Translation:
Rather, say that Rav’s statement should be amended, as follows: The uppermost handbreadth in the rumen, adjacent to the gullet, this is the inner rumen, which is not a valid location for slaughter. By contrast, the lowermost handbreadth of the gullet is a valid location for slaughter. And if you wish, say instead that when Rav says that the lowermost handbreadth of the gullet is considered the rumen, he is referring specifically to a bull, which is especially hairy, and hairs appear even within the lowermost handbreadth of the gullet itself. By contrast, in other animals, the entire lower gullet is a valid location for slaughter.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara offers two ways to dissolve the contradiction. First, emend Geneiva’s report: it should read “the top handbreadth of the rumen, adjacent to the gullet, is the inner rumen” — so the bottom of the gullet itself remains valid for slaughter. Alternatively, restrict Rav’s statement to a בּוֹר (bull), which is exceptionally hairy, so that hair-lining (and thus rumen-status) extends even into the gullet’s lowest handbreadth; in ordinary animals the entire lower gullet stays valid. Either way, Rav Nachman’s boundary is preserved.
Key Terms:
- בְּתוֹרָא דְּמַשְׂעַר טְפֵי (betora demas’ar tefei) = “in a bull, which is hairier” — restricting Rav’s stringency to an unusually villous animal
- אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא (iba’eit eima) = “if you wish, say” — introducing an alternative resolution
Segment 10
TYPE: שיטת אמורא
Shmuel: a turbatz detached from the jaw is kosher, supported by the mishna’s “detached lower jaw”
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: תּוּרְבַּץ הַוֶּושֶׁט שֶׁנִּיטַּל כּוּלּוֹ מִלֶּחִי – כָּשֵׁר, וּתְנָא תּוּנָא: נִיטַּל לֶחִי הַתַּחְתּוֹן – כָּשֵׁר.
English Translation:
§ Rav Naḥman says that Shmuel says: If the entrance of the gullet was completely detached from the jaw, the animal is kosher. And the tanna of the mishna also taught this later (54a): If the lower jaw was detached entirely, it is kosher.
קלאוד על הדף:
A new statement from Shmuel (via Rav Nachman): if the turbatz becomes detached from the jaw, the animal is still kosher — the turbatz is dispensable. Shmuel adduces support from a later mishna (54a) that an animal whose lower jaw was removed is kosher. The next several segments will subject this ruling to a serious challenge from the principle that ripping the simanim (the windpipe and gullet) from their attachment is a tereifa.
Key Terms:
- תּוּרְבַּץ הַוֶּושֶׁט שֶׁנִּיטַּל (turbatz havesht shenital) = “the entrance of the gullet that was detached” from the jaw
- תְּנָא תּוּנָא (tena tuna) = “the tanna [also] taught” — citing a mishna in support
- לֶחִי הַתַּחְתּוֹן (lechi hatachton) = the lower jaw
Segment 11
TYPE: קושיא
Rav Pappa objects: a detached turbatz means ripped simanim, which should be a tereifa
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב פָּפָּא: וְהָאִיכָּא עִיקּוּר סִימָנִים?
English Translation:
Rav Pappa objects to this: How can Shmuel say that if the entrance of the gullet is detached the animal is kosher? But isn’t there ripping of the simanim, the gullet and the windpipe, from their place? This should render the animal a tereifa.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Pappa raises the central difficulty: detaching the turbatz from the jaw necessarily uproots the simanim — the windpipe and gullet — from their anchoring, and uprooted simanim (עִיקּוּר סִימָנִים) are a recognized tereifa. So how can Shmuel deem such an animal kosher? This objection drives the next four segments, which carefully distinguish different modes of detachment to reconcile Shmuel with the simanim rule.
Key Terms:
- עִיקּוּר סִימָנִים (ikkur simanim) = the ripping/uprooting of the windpipe and gullet from their attachment, a disqualifying defect
- סִימָנִים (simanim) = “the signs” — the windpipe (קנה) and gullet (ושט), the organs severed in valid slaughter
Segment 12
TYPE: קושיא
The objection rebounds: the mishna itself (“detached lower jaw is kosher”) is hard for Rav Pappa too
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּלְרַב פָּפָּא קַשְׁיָא מַתְנִיתִין: נִיטַּל לֶחִי הַתַּחְתּוֹן – כָּשֵׁר.
English Translation:
The Gemara interjects: But according to Rav Pappa, the mishna is difficult as well, since it states: If the lower jaw was detached, it is kosher. If the lower jaw is detached, the windpipe and gullet will necessarily be detached as well, since they are attached to it.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara turns Rav Pappa’s objection back on him. The very mishna Shmuel cited — “a detached lower jaw is kosher” — poses the same problem for Rav Pappa: surely detaching the jaw rips the attached simanim too, so by his logic the mishna should rule the animal a tereifa. Since Rav Pappa must somehow reconcile the mishna with the simanim rule, his answer for the mishna may also rescue Shmuel — which is exactly what the next segment tests.
Key Terms:
- קַשְׁיָא מַתְנִיתִין (kashya matnitin) = “the mishna is difficult” — the cited mishna creates the same problem for the objector
- מַתְקֵיף לַהּ (matkeif lah) = “objects to it” — raising a strong challenge
Segment 13
TYPE: גמרא
Distinguishing uprooting from above-the-simanim severing rescues the mishna but not yet Shmuel
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בִּשְׁלָמָא מַתְנִיתִין לְרַב פָּפָּא לָא קַשְׁיָא, הָא דְּאִיעֲקוּר אִיעֲקוֹרֵי, הָא דְּאִיגּוּם אִיגּוֹמֵי מֵעִילָּוֵי סִימָנִים, אֶלָּא לִשְׁמוּאֵל קַשְׁיָא!
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: Granted, the mishna is not difficult for Rav Pappa. This halakha, that the ripping of the simanim renders the animal a tereifa, applies only when the simanim are completely ripped from the jaw. That statement of the mishna, that an animal whose jaw is detached is kosher, is referring to a case where the lower jaw is severed above its connection to the simanim, which themselves remain connected to the remaining flesh of the jaw. But the halakha that the ripping of the simanim renders the animal a tereifa is difficult for Shmuel. How can an animal remain kosher when the entrance of its gullet is removed, if this entails the ripping of the simanim?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara distinguishes two scenarios. The simanim-tereifa applies when they are genuinely uprooted (אִיעֲקוֹרֵי) from their base. The mishna’s “detached jaw,” by contrast, means the jaw was severed above (אִיגּוֹמֵי מֵעִילָּוֵי) the point where the simanim attach, leaving the simanim themselves still connected to residual flesh — hence kosher. This neatly saves the mishna for Rav Pappa. But Shmuel spoke of the turbatz itself being removed, which does seem to entail uprooted simanim — so his ruling remains difficult, prompting the refinement in the next segment.
Key Terms:
- אִיעֲקוֹרֵי (i’akorei) = “uprooted” — the simanim torn from their base (a tereifa)
- אִיגּוּם / אִיגּוֹמֵי מֵעִילָּוֵי סִימָנִים (iggum me’ilavei simanim) = “severed above the simanim” — cutting the jaw higher up while the simanim stay attached (kosher)
Segment 14
TYPE: תירוץ
Emending Shmuel: he permits a MOSTLY-detached turbatz, not a fully detached one
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לָא תֵּימָא כּוּלּוֹ, אֶלָּא אֵימָא רוּבּוֹ.
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: Do not say that Shmuel deems the animal kosher if the entrance of the gullet was completely detached. Rather, say that he deems it kosher only if it was mostly detached.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara rescues Shmuel by re-reading his word “completely” (כּוּלּוֹ) as “mostly” (רוּבּוֹ). Shmuel did not permit a fully detached turbatz — which would indeed be uprooted simanim — but only a majority-detached one, where a minority connection survives and the animal can heal. This precise calibration aligns Shmuel with the simanim rule. But it immediately invites a counter-challenge from another Shmuel teaching, addressed in the final segment of the amud.
Key Terms:
- כּוּלּוֹ / רוּבּוֹ (kulo / rubo) = “all of it” vs. “most of it” — the emendation softening Shmuel’s ruling to a majority detachment
Segment 15
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
A counter-Shmuel (majority-loosened simanim are tereifa); resolved by peeling vs. forcible tearing
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהָאָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: סִימָנִים שֶׁנִּדַּלְדְּלוּ בְּרוּבָּן – טְרֵפָה? אָמַר רַב שִׁישָׁא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִידִי: הָא דְּאִקְּפַל אִיקְּפוֹלֵי, הָתָם דְּאִפְּרוּק אִפְּרוֹקֵי.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: But doesn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say that Shmuel says: Simanim that were detached in their majority render the animal a tereifa? Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, said: This statement of Shmuel, that the animal is kosher even if the simanim are mostly detached, applies only to a case in which the entrance of the gullet was peeled off from the flesh of the jaw, such that the connected tissue is concentrated in one area. In such a case, the animal might recover. There, where Shmuel deems the animal a tereifa, he is referring to a case in which the simanim were forcibly separated [de’ippruk ipprukei] from the jaw and are connected only by a few discontinuous pieces of flesh. In such a case the animal cannot recover.
קלאוד על הדף:
A direct contradiction surfaces: Rabba bar bar Chana cites Shmuel that simanim “loosened in their majority” are a tereifa — clashing with the just-emended ruling that a majority-detached turbatz is kosher. Rav Sheisha resolves it by the manner of detachment. If the turbatz was cleanly peeled (אִיקְּפוֹלֵי) so the remaining connection is intact and concentrated, the animal can heal and is kosher. But if the simanim were violently torn loose (אִפְּרוֹקֵי), clinging only by scattered shreds, they cannot reunite and the animal is a tereifa. The deciding factor is healability, not the bare fraction detached.
Key Terms:
- נִדַּלְדְּלוּ (nidaldelu) = “became loosened/dangling” — the simanim partly torn from their base
- אִקְּפַל אִיקְּפוֹלֵי (ikpal ikpolei) = “peeled off” cleanly, with the remaining attachment intact (kosher, can heal)
- אִפְּרוּק אִפְּרוֹקֵי (ipruk iprokei) = “forcibly torn loose,” connected only by scattered shreds (tereifa, cannot heal)
Segment 16
TYPE: משנה וברייתא
Returning to the mishna’s “cut windpipe”: how much is “its majority”?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּפְסוּקַת הַגַּרְגֶּרֶת. תָּנָא: כַּמָּה פְּסוּקַת הַגַּרְגֶּרֶת? בְּרוּבָּהּ. וְכַמָּה רוּבָּה? רַב אָמַר:
English Translation:
§ The mishna states: Or an animal with a cut windpipe, cut across its width, is a tereifa. With regard to this the Sages taught: How much must the windpipe be cut to render the animal a tereifa? In its majority. And how much is its majority? Rav says:
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara now turns to the mishna’s tereifa of a cut windpipe (פְּסוּקַת הַגַּרְגֶּרֶת). A baraita establishes that the windpipe must be severed across its majority (בְּרוּבָּהּ) to render the animal a tereifa — a partial cut is not enough. This prompts the precise question that opens amud bet: does “majority” mean the majority of the windpipe’s full thickness, or only of its hollow inner space? Rav’s answer (split into two versions) follows on 44b.
Key Terms:
- פְּסוּקַת הַגַּרְגֶּרֶת (pesukat hagargeret) = a windpipe cut/severed across its width, a tereifa
- בְּרוּבָּהּ (berubah) = “in its majority” — the threshold of disqualifying severance
Amud Bet (44b)
Segment 1
TYPE: גמרא
Two versions of Rav: majority of the windpipe’s full thickness, or majority of its hollow space
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רוֹב עוֹבְיָהּ, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ: רוֹב חֲלָלָה.
English Translation:
The majority of its width, counting the width of the wall of the windpipe itself, the thickness of which is uneven. And some say that Rav says: The majority of its space, the inner area of the cross section of the windpipe, not counting the width of the windpipe wall.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav’s measure of “majority” comes down in two versions. One reads him as requiring the majority of the windpipe’s full thickness (רוֹב עוֹבְיָהּ) — wall included — a more stringent standard. The other reads him as requiring only the majority of its hollow space (רוֹב חֲלָלָהּ) — the inner air-channel — a more lenient standard, since the cartilage wall is excluded from the count. The next segment dramatizes which version Rav truly held, through a real case before him.
Key Terms:
- רוֹב עוֹבְיָהּ (rov ovyah) = “the majority of its thickness” — including the windpipe’s wall (stringent)
- רוֹב חֲלָלָהּ (rov chalalah) = “the majority of its hollow” — only the inner air-space (lenient)
Segment 2
TYPE: מעשה
A case before Rav: his students correct him, and Rabba bar bar Chana permits and buys the meat
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָהִיא פְּסוּקַת הַגַּרְגֶּרֶת דַּאֲתַאי לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב, יָתֵיב וְקָא בָּדֵיק לַהּ בְּרוֹב עוֹבְיָהּ. אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ רַב כָּהֲנָא וְרַב אַסִּי לְרַב: לִימַּדְתָּנוּ רַבֵּינוּ בְּרוֹב חֲלָלָהּ! שַׁדְּרֵיהּ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה, בַּדְקַהּ בְּרוֹב חֲלָלָהּ וְאַכְשְׁרַהּ, וּזְבַן מִינַּהּ בִּתְלֵיסַר אִיסְתֵּירֵי פְּשִׁיטֵי בִּישְׂרָא.
English Translation:
The Gemara recounts: There was a certain animal with a cut windpipe that came before Rav, i.e., it was brought for inspection to decide whether it was kosher. Rav was sitting and checking it to see if the windpipe had been cut in the majority of its width. Rav Kahana and Rav Asi said to Rav: Didn’t you teach us, our teacher, that a cut windpipe is measured by the majority of its space? Rav sent the animal before Rabba bar bar Ḥana, who checked it in the majority of its space and deemed it kosher, and purchased meat from it at the price of thirteen plain istera coins.
קלאוד על הדף:
This case settles which version of Rav is authentic. Rav began inspecting by the stricter “majority of thickness,” but his students Rav Kahana and Rav Asi reminded him: “You taught us — majority of the space!” Deferring to his own earlier teaching, Rav sent the animal to Rabba bar bar Chana, who measured by the hollow space, deemed it kosher, and even bought thirteen istera-coins’ worth of its meat. The episode both fixes the halakha as “majority of the hollow space” and showcases the integrity of a master who accepts correction from his disciples. The purchase, however, raises further questions explored throughout the rest of the amud.
Key Terms:
- לִימַּדְתָּנוּ רַבֵּינוּ (limadtanu rabbeinu) = “you taught us, our teacher” — students respectfully reminding Rav of his own ruling
- שַׁדְּרֵיהּ (shadreih) = “he sent it” — Rav referred the case to another authority rather than ruling against his own teaching
- תְּלֵיסַר אִיסְתֵּירֵי פְּשִׁיטֵי (teleisar isterei peshitei) = “thirteen plain istera coins” — the standard price Rabba bar bar Chana paid for the meat
Segment 3
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
May a second sage permit what the first leaned to forbid? Here Rav never formally prohibited it
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהֵיכִי עָבֵיד הָכִי? וְהָתַנְיָא: חָכָם שֶׁטִּימֵּא – אֵין חֲבֵירוֹ רַשַּׁאי לְטַהֵר, אָסַר – אֵין חֲבֵירוֹ רַשַּׁאי לְהַתִּיר! שָׁאנֵי הָכָא, דְּרַב לָא אֲסַר מֵיסָר.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: And how could Rabba bar bar Ḥana do this, i.e., deem permitted an animal that Rav was going to deem prohibited? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: If a halakhic authority deemed an item impure, another halakhic authority is not allowed to deem it pure; likewise, if he prohibited it, another authority is not allowed to permit it? The Gemara responds: It is different here, since Rav did not actually prohibit the animal. He merely considered doing so, but he sent it to Rabba bar bar Ḥana before issuing a formal ruling.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara raises a procedural problem rooted in rabbinic etiquette: a baraita forbids one sage from permitting what a colleague has already prohibited (חָכָם שֶׁאָסַר אֵין חֲבֵירוֹ רַשַּׁאי לְהַתִּיר). How, then, could Rabba bar bar Chana permit an animal Rav was leaning to forbid? The answer hinges on a key distinction: Rav never issued a binding prohibition — he only began inspecting and then referred the case. Since no formal ruling was made, Rabba bar bar Chana was free to decide it. This protects both the dignity of the first authority and the integrity of unresolved cases.
Key Terms:
- חָכָם שֶׁאָסַר אֵין חֲבֵירוֹ רַשַּׁאי לְהַתִּיר (chacham she’asar…) = “a sage who prohibited [something] — his colleague may not permit it” — a rule of judicial deference
- לָא אֲסַר מֵיסָר (lo asar meisar) = “he did not actually prohibit” — Rav only considered it, never issued a binding ruling
Segment 4
TYPE: קושיא
How could he eat from a sage-ruled animal? A challenge from Yechezkel’s declaration of piety
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְכֵיוָן דְּאוֹרִי בַּהּ חָכָם, הֵיכִי אֲכַל מִינַּהּ? וְהָא כְּתִיב: ״וָאֹמַר אֲהָהּ ה׳ אֱלֹהִים הִנֵּה נַפְשִׁי לֹא מְטֻמָּאָה וּנְבֵלָה וּטְרֵפָה לֹא אָכַלְתִּי מִנְּעוּרַי וְעַד עַתָּה וְלֹא בָא בְּפִי בְּשַׂר פִּגּוּל״.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: And once a halakhic authority has ruled with regard to the animal, even to permit it, how could Rabba bar bar Ḥana eat from it? But isn’t it written: “Then I said: Alas, Lord God, my soul has not become impure; and from my youth until now I have not eaten an unslaughtered carcass, or a tereifa; and no piggul flesh came into my mouth” (Ezekiel 4:14).
קלאוד על הדף:
A new and subtler objection: even if Rabba bar bar Chana could permit the animal, how could he then eat from it himself? The Gemara invokes Yechezkel’s striking profession of piety (Ezekiel 4:14), where the prophet lists foods he scrupulously avoided. The Sages read each phrase of that verse as a self-imposed standard of refinement beyond the letter of the law — and one of those standards (explained next) is precisely not eating from an animal that a sage had to rule on. The verse becomes the springboard for a meditation on supererogatory piety.
Key Terms:
- דְּאוֹרִי בַּהּ חָכָם (de’ori bah chacham) = “[an animal] regarding which a sage issued a ruling” — even a permissive ruling implies prior doubt
- בְּשַׂר פִּגּוּל (besar pigul) = lit. “piggul flesh”; here homiletically reinterpreted as meat a sage had to permit
- יְחֶזְקֵאל ד׳:י״ד (Yechezkel 4:14) = the prophet’s declaration of dietary scrupulousness, the basis of the discussion
Segment 5
TYPE: מדרש / דרשה
The Sages expound each phrase of Yechezkel’s verse as a measure of refined piety
Hebrew/Aramaic:
״הִנֵּה נַפְשִׁי לֹא מְטֻמָּאָה״ – שֶׁלֹּא הִרְהַרְתִּי בַּיּוֹם לָבֹא לִידֵי טוּמְאָה בַּלַּיְלָה, ״וּנְבֵלָה וּטְרֵפָה לֹא אָכַלְתִּי״ – שֶׁלֹּא אָכַלְתִּי בְּשַׂר ״כּוֹס כּוֹס״ מֵעוֹלָם, ״וְלֹא בָא בְּפִי בְּשַׂר פִּגּוּל״ – שֶׁלֹּא אָכַלְתִּי מִבְּהֵמָה שֶׁהוֹרָה בָּהּ חָכָם. מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי נָתָן אָמְרוּ: שֶׁלֹּא אָכַלְתִּי מִבְּהֵמָה שֶׁלֹּא הוּרְמוּ מַתְּנוֹתֶיהָ.
English Translation:
The Sages interpreted the verse as follows: “My soul has not been become impure” means that I did not think of sexual thoughts during the day so as to come to the impurity of a seminal emission at night. “I have not eaten an unslaughtered carcass, or a tereifa” means that I never ate the flesh of an animal that was in danger of imminent death, leading one to say: Slaughter it, slaughter it quickly, before it dies. “And no piggul flesh came into my mouth,” means that I never ate from an animal with regard to which there was uncertainty whether it is prohibited and a Sage issued a ruling to permit it. The Sages said in the name of Rabbi Natan: The phrase means that I never ate from an animal from which the gifts of the priesthood, the foreleg, jaw, and abomasum, were not separated. The above acts are technically permitted but unseemly. How, then, could Rabba bar bar Ḥana consume the meat of this animal?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Sages expound Yechezkel’s verse as a ladder of voluntary refinements, each going beyond strict law. “My soul was not defiled” — he never entertained day-thoughts that might cause nocturnal impurity. “I ate no nevelah or tereifa” — he never ate the meat of an animal slaughtered in panic (“kos kos!” — quick, before it dies), which is technically valid but unseemly. “No piggul came into my mouth” — he never ate from an animal a sage had to permit, since the very need for a ruling marks borderline doubt. Rabbi Natan adds: he never ate from an animal whose priestly gifts (foreleg, jaw, maw) were not yet separated. Each act is permitted yet falls short of the pious ideal — sharpening the question of how Rabba bar bar Chana ate the meat he himself permitted.
Key Terms:
- בְּשַׂר “כּוֹס כּוֹס” (besar “kos kos”) = meat of an animal rushed to slaughter as it nears death (“hurry, hurry!”) — valid but unseemly
- שֶׁהוֹרָה בָּהּ חָכָם (shehora bah chacham) = “regarding which a sage ruled” — the very need for a ruling signals doubt one might piously avoid
- מַתְּנוֹת כְּהוּנָּה (matnot kehuna) = the priestly gifts (foreleg, jaw, and maw) that should be separated before eating
Segment 6
TYPE: תירוץ
Resolution: the piety applies only to reasoning-based rulings; here he relied on received tradition
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָנֵי מִילֵּי – מִילְּתָא דְתַלְיָא בִּסְבָרָא, רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אַגְּמָרֵיהּ סְמַךְ.
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: This statement, that it is unseemly for a halakhic authority to rely on his own ruling to permit the meat, applies only to a matter that depends on reasoning. Rabba bar bar Ḥana relied on his learning, i.e., a received tradition. There is nothing unseemly about relying upon a received tradition.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara resolves the difficulty by distinguishing two types of ruling. Yechezkel’s standard — avoiding meat a sage had to permit — applies to a ruling reached through independent reasoning (סְבָרָא), where the sage’s own judgment is fallible and self-interest could subtly intrude. But Rabba bar bar Chana’s permission rested on received tradition (גְּמָרָא) — Rav’s own established teaching that majority-of-the-hollow is the measure. There is nothing unseemly in eating from an animal permitted by firm transmitted law, so he could partake without compromising piety.
Key Terms:
- מִילְּתָא דְּתַלְיָא בִּסְבָרָא (milta detalya bisvara) = “a matter dependent on reasoning” — where independent judgment, and possible bias, are involved
- אַגְּמָרֵיהּ סְמַךְ (agemareih samach) = “he relied on his received tradition” — settled, transmitted law rather than personal reasoning
Segment 7
TYPE: קושיא
A second concern: suspicion (chashada) — a judge should distance himself from even the appearance of impropriety
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְתִיפּוֹק לֵיהּ מִשּׁוּם חֲשָׁדָא, דְּתַנְיָא: דָּן אֶת הַדִּין, זִיכָּה וְחַיָּיב, טִימֵּא וְטִיהֵר, אָסַר וְהִתִּיר, וְכֵן הָעֵדִים שֶׁהֵעִידוּ – כּוּלָּן רַשָּׁאִין לִיקַּח, אֲבָל אָמְרוּ חֲכָמִים: הַרְחֵק מִן הַכִּיעוּר וּמִן הַדּוֹמֶה לוֹ.
English Translation:
The Gemara objects: But let one derive that Rabba bar bar Ḥana should not have purchased the meat due to suspicion, as it is taught in a baraita: If one issued a judgment, acquitted or convicted, deemed impure or pure, prohibited or permitted; or if witnesses testified with regard to a case, in all of these instances the judges or witnesses are allowed to purchase the item that they deemed permitted. But the Sages said: Distance yourself from unseemliness and from things similar to it. If so, Rabba bar bar Ḥana should not have purchased the meat that he himself permitted.
קלאוד על הדף:
Even granting the previous resolution, a separate problem of appearances arises (חֲשָׁדָא). A baraita affirms that a judge who permitted an item is technically allowed to buy it — yet the Sages added the ethical charge: “Distance yourself from the unseemly and from whatever resembles it” (הַרְחֵק מִן הַכִּיעוּר). Buying the very meat one just permitted could make onlookers suspect a quid pro quo. So how could Rabba bar bar Chana purchase it? The next segment answers via a memorable exchange between Rabba and his wife.
Key Terms:
- חֲשָׁדָא (chashada) = suspicion; the concern that an action looks improper even if it is permitted
- הַרְחֵק מִן הַכִּיעוּר וּמִן הַדּוֹמֶה לוֹ (harchek min hakiur umin hadomeh lo) = “distance yourself from the unseemly and from what resembles it” — avoiding even the appearance of wrongdoing
Segment 8
TYPE: תירוץ ומעשה
The answer: weighed meat dispels suspicion; Rabba and his wife (Rav Chisda’s daughter) on the firstborn
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָנֵי מִילֵּי מִידֵּי דִּמְזַבֵּין מִשּׁוּמָא, הָכָא מַתְקְלָא מוֹכַח, כִּי הָא דְּרַבָּה שְׁרָא טְרֵפְתָּא וּזְבַן מִינַּהּ בִּישְׂרָא, אֲמַרָה לֵיהּ בַּת רַב חִסְדָּא: אַבָּא שָׁרֵי בּוּכְרָא וְלָא זָבֵן מִינֵּיהּ בִּישְׂרָא.
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: This statement applies only to an item that is sold based on an appraisal of its value and not by standard measure. In such cases onlookers might suspect that the judge is receiving a favorable price in return for his judgment. But here, the weight of the meat proves that the judge is not receiving a discount, but is paying the standard price. This is like that incident where Rabba permitted a possible tereifa for consumption and bought meat from it. His wife, the daughter of Rav Ḥisda, said to him: Father permitted a firstborn animal, declaring that it possessed a blemish that renders it permitted for consumption, but did not buy meat from it. Why are you acting differently?
קלאוד על הדף:
The suspicion concern applies only where an item is sold by appraisal (שׁוּמָא) — a negotiable price that could conceal a bribe-like discount. But meat sold by weight (מַתְקְלָא מוֹכַח, “the scale proves it”) leaves no room for suspicion, since the price is fixed and public. The Gemara illustrates with a domestic exchange: Rabba permitted a doubtful tereifa and then bought its meat, and his wife — the daughter of Rav Chisda — challenged him: her father permitted a firstborn (declaring its blemish) yet refused to buy its meat. Why does Rabba act otherwise?
Key Terms:
- מַתְקְלָא מוֹכַח (matkela mokhach) = “the scale proves it” — meat sold by weight at a fixed price, dispelling suspicion
- דְּאַשּׁוּמָא מִזְדְּבַן (de’ashuma mizdeban) = “sold by appraisal” — a negotiable valuation that could hide favoritism
- בּוּכְרָא (bukhra) = a firstborn animal, permitted for consumption only once a sage rules its blemish permanent
Segment 9
TYPE: מעשה
Rabba’s reply: a firstborn is sold by appraisal, but his weighed meat raises no suspicion
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לַהּ: הָנֵי מִילֵּי בּוּכְרָא דְּאַשּׁוּמָא מִזְדְּבַן, הָכָא מַתְקְלָא מוֹכַח, מַאי אִיכָּא – מִשּׁוּם אוּמְצָא מְעַלַּיְיתָא? כֹּל יוֹמָא אוּמְצָא מְעַלַּיְיתָא זַבִּנוּ לִי.
English Translation:
Rabba said to her: That matter applies to a firstborn, which is sold based on appraisal of its value. Here, the weight of the meat proves that I am paying the standard price and not unfairly deriving benefit from my judgment. What suspicion is there in this case? Will people suspect me because I received a superior piece of meat? Every day they sell me a superior piece of meat.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabba answers his wife by drawing the very distinction the Gemara just made. Her father avoided buying the firstborn because firstborn meat is sold by appraisal, where a discount could be suspected. Rabba’s tereifa-meat, by contrast, was sold by weight, so the scale itself proves he paid full price. He adds, almost wryly, that no one would suspect him merely for getting a choice cut — “every day they sell me a fine piece of meat” anyway, since he is a respected figure. The distinction between appraisal-sale and weight-sale becomes the operative halakha.
Key Terms:
- אוּמְצָא מְעַלַּיְיתָא (umtza me’alyaita) = “a superior/choice piece of meat” — which Rabba routinely receives, so it arouses no suspicion
- בַּת רַב חִסְדָּא (bat Rav Chisda) = the daughter of Rav Chisda, Rabba’s wife, who raised the challenge
Segment 10
TYPE: אגדה
Rav Chisda’s aphorisms: the true scholar “sees his own tereifa” and so “hates gifts”
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: אֵיזֶהוּ תַּלְמִיד חָכָם? זֶה הָרוֹאֶה טְרֵפָה לְעַצְמוֹ. וְאָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: אֵיזֶהוּ ״שׂוֹנֵא מַתָּנֹת יִחְיֶה״? זֶה הָרוֹאֶה טְרֵפָה לְעַצְמוֹ.
English Translation:
The Gemara cites an aphorism: Rav Ḥisda says: Who is a Torah scholar? This is one who sees his own tereifa. In other words, when the status of his own animal is uncertain, he deems it prohibited without concern for his own monetary loss. And Rav Ḥisda says: Who is referred to by the verse: “He that hates gifts shall live” (Proverbs 15:27)? This is one who sees his own tereifa. He is careful to avoid deriving benefit from that which is not his own, and even from items that are his concerning which it is questionable whether or not they are permitted.
קלאוד על הדף:
The discussion of judicial integrity blossoms into aggadic praise. Rav Chisda defines the true תַּלְמִיד חָכָם as one who “sees his own tereifa” — who, faced with doubt about his own animal, rules strictly against his own financial interest rather than rationalizing a leniency. Such a person also embodies “he who hates gifts shall live” (Mishlei 15:27): by refusing benefit from what is not cleanly his, he merits long life. The phrase “sees his own tereifa” becomes a byword for the self-discipline of ruling against oneself.
Key Terms:
- הָרוֹאֶה טְרֵפָה לְעַצְמוֹ (haro’eh tereifa le’atzmo) = “one who sees his own [animal as] a tereifa” — who rules strictly against his own interest in cases of doubt
- שׂוֹנֵא מַתָּנֹת יִחְיֶה (sonei matanot yichyeh) = “he who hates gifts shall live” (Mishlei 15:27) — avoiding unearned benefit brings long life
Segment 11
TYPE: אגדה
Such a scholar merits both worlds; Mar Zutra and Rav Zevid expound the reward
Hebrew/Aramaic:
דָּרֵשׁ מָר זוּטְרָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב חִסְדָּא: כׇּל מִי שֶׁקּוֹרֵא וְשׁוֹנֶה, וְרוֹאֶה טְרֵפָה לְעַצְמוֹ, וְשִׁימֵּשׁ תַּלְמִידֵי חֲכָמִים – עָלָיו הַכָּתוּב אוֹמֵר: ״יְגִיעַ כַּפֶּיךָ כִּי תֹאכֵל אַשְׁרֶיךָ וְטוֹב לָךְ״. רַב זְבִיד אָמַר: זוֹכֶה וְנוֹחֵל שְׁנֵי עוֹלָמוֹת, הָעוֹלָם הַזֶּה וְהָעוֹלָם הַבָּא, ״אַשְׁרֶיךָ״ – בְּעוֹלָם הַזֶּה, ״וְטוֹב לָךְ״ – לָעוֹלָם הַבָּא.
English Translation:
Mar Zutra taught in the name of Rav Ḥisda: Anyone who reads the Torah and studies the Mishna, and sees his own tereifa, and has served Torah scholars to learn the ways of halakhic judgment, about him the verse states: “When you eat the labor of your hands, happy shall you be, and it shall be well with you” (Psalms 128:2). Rav Zevid says: Such a person merits inheriting two worlds, this world and the World-to-Come. When the verse states: “Happy shall you be,” it means in this world, and when it states: “And it shall be well with you,” it is referring to the World-to-Come.
קלאוד על הדף:
Mar Zutra builds on Rav Chisda: the complete scholar combines three things — Scripture and Mishna learning (קוֹרֵא וְשׁוֹנֶה), the integrity to “see his own tereifa,” and apprenticeship under masters (שִׁימֵּשׁ תַּלְמִידֵי חֲכָמִים). Of him the verse says “you shall eat the labor of your hands; happy are you, and it shall be well with you” (Tehillim 128:2). Rav Zevid parses the doubled blessing: “happy are you” in this world, “it shall be well with you” in the World-to-Come — the self-disciplined scholar is rewarded in both. The financial restraint of ruling against oneself yields spiritual abundance.
Key Terms:
- שִׁימֵּשׁ תַּלְמִידֵי חֲכָמִים (shimesh talmidei chakhamim) = “served Torah scholars” — apprenticeship under masters to learn practical judgment, not merely book-knowledge
- שְׁנֵי עוֹלָמוֹת (shnei olamot) = “two worlds” — reward in both this world and the World-to-Come, read into the doubled phrase of Tehillim 128:2
Segment 12
TYPE: אגדה
Two models of refusing gifts: Rabbi Elazar declines all; Rabbi Zeira declines gifts but accepts invitations (continued on Daf 45)
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר, כִּי הֲווֹ מְשַׁדְּרִי לֵיהּ מִבֵּי נְשִׂיאָה מִידֵּי, לָא שָׁקֵיל, וְכִי הֲווֹ מְזַמְּנִי לֵיהּ, לָא אָזֵיל. אָמַר: לָא קָא בָּעֵי מָר דְּאֵיחֵי? דִּכְתִיב: ״וְשׂוֹנֵא מַתָּנוֹת יִחְיֶה״. רַבִּי זֵירָא, כִּי מְשַׁדְּרִי לֵיהּ, לָא שָׁקֵיל, כִּי הֲווֹ מַזְמְנִין לֵיהּ, אָזֵיל. אֲמַר:
English Translation:
With regard to the verse: “He that hates gifts shall live,” the Gemara relates that when they would send Rabbi Elazar some gift from the house of the Nasi, he would not take it. And when they would invite him, he would not go there. When declining these offers, he said to them: Does Master not desire that I live? As it is written: “He that hates gifts shall live.” By contrast, when they would send a gift to Rabbi Zeira, he would not take it, but when they would invite him he would go. He said in explanation:
קלאוד על הדף:
The daf closes with two contrasting embodiments of “he who hates gifts shall live.” Rabbi Elazar took the verse to its fullest: he refused both material gifts from the Nasi’s house and even invitations to dine, reasoning that any benefit compromises the ideal — “does the Master not want me to live?” Rabbi Zeira drew a finer line: he declined outright gifts but accepted invitations. His reasoning, which begins here, continues on Daf 45 — that being a guest actually honors the host, so it is not the kind of “gift” the verse warns against. The two models frame an enduring debate about accepting benefit from others.
Key Terms:
- בֵּי נְשִׂיאָה (bei nesi’a) = “the house of the Nasi” — the patriarch’s household, source of the offered gifts and invitations
- מְשַׁדְּרִי / מְזַמְּנִי (meshadrei / mezamnei) = “they send [a gift]” vs. “they invite [him]” — the two forms of benefit treated differently by Rabbi Zeira