Chullin Daf 78 (חולין דף ע״ח)

📖 Breakdown

Amud Aleph (78a)

Segment 1

TYPE: גמרא

Conclusion of the discussion of darkei ha-Emori: why painting a tree with red paint is permitted

Hebrew/Aramaic:

דְּנִיכְחוֹשׁ חֵילֵיהּ, אֶלָּא סוֹקְרוֹ בְּסִיקְרָא אַמַּאי? כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלִיחְזְיוּהּ אִינָשֵׁי וְלִיבְעֻי רַחֲמֵי עִילָּוֵיהּ.

English Translation:

that the tree’s strength will lessen. It is possible that the tree shed its fruits prematurely due to excessive blossoming. It taxes the tree to sustain these blossoms, and this may render the tree incapable of sustaining the fruits that subsequently grow from the blossoms. Stones were used to weaken the tree during blossoming, thereby reducing the number of blossoms that it needed to nourish. But with regard to painting it with red paint, for what benefit is it performed that makes it permitted despite the fact that this was the practice of the Amorites? The Gemara explains: One does so in order that people will see the tree and pray for it.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara concludes the fourth perek with a discussion of practices that resemble the superstitious ‘ways of the Amorites’ (darkei ha-Emori). Loading stones on a fruit tree that sheds its fruit is permitted because it has a real botanical benefit — it weakens the tree and thins its excessive blossoms, so the tree can sustain the fruit it produces. Painting the tree with red paint has no such physical effect, so the Gemara must find another justification: the paint is a public signal, so that passersby will see the afflicted tree and pray for mercy on its behalf.

Key Terms:

• סִיקְרָא = Red paint or ochre used to mark the afflicted tree
• דַּרְכֵי הָאֱמוֹרִי = The ‘ways of the Amorites’ — superstitious gentile practices forbidden as irrational customs; a practice with demonstrable benefit is exempt

Segment 2

TYPE: ברייתא

The source for publicizing misfortune: the metzora cries ‘Impure, impure’ so the public will pray for him

Hebrew/Aramaic:

כִּדְתַנְיָא: ״וְטָמֵא טָמֵא יִקְרָא״ – צָרִיךְ לְהוֹדִיעַ לָרַבִּים, וְרַבִּים מְבַקְּשִׁים עָלָיו רַחֲמִים. וְכֵן מִי שֶׁאֵירַע בּוֹ דָּבָר – צָרִיךְ לְהוֹדִיעַ לָרַבִּים, וְרַבִּים מְבַקְּשִׁים עָלָיו רַחֲמִים.

English Translation:

As it is taught in a baraita: It is derived from the verse: “And he will cry: Impure, impure” (Leviticus 13:45), that a leper must publicize the fact that he is ritually impure. He must announce his pain to the masses, and the masses will pray for mercy on his behalf. And likewise, one to whom any unfortunate matter happens must announce it to the masses, and then the masses will pray for mercy on his behalf.

קלאוד על הדף:

The justification for the red paint comes from a baraita on the metzora. The Torah requires the leper to call out ‘Impure, impure’ (Vayikra 13:45) — not only to warn people away from contracting impurity, but so that his pain becomes known to the masses and they pray for mercy on his behalf. The baraita generalizes the principle: anyone to whom a painful matter happens should make it known to the public, and the public will beseech mercy for him. Suffering is not meant to be borne alone; publicizing it recruits the community’s prayer.

Key Terms:

• וְטָמֵא טָמֵא יִקְרָא = ‘And he will cry: Impure, impure’ (Vayikra 13:45) — the metzora’s required announcement
• מְבַקְּשִׁים עָלָיו רַחֲמִים = ‘They pray for mercy on his behalf’ — the purpose of publicizing misfortune

Segment 3

TYPE: גמרא

Ravina identifies the tanna behind the custom of hanging date clusters on a shedding palm

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אָמַר רָבִינָא: כְּמַאן תָּלֵינַן כּוּבְסָא בְּדִיקְלָא, כְּמַאן? כִּי הַאי תַּנָּא.

English Translation:

Ravina said: In accordance with whose opinion do we hang bunches of unripe dates on a palm tree that casts off its dates, despite the fact that this is the practice of the Amorites? It is in accordance with the opinion of this tanna of the baraita just cited, who states that one must announce such occurrences to the masses so that they will pray for mercy.

קלאוד על הדף:

Ravina asks: in accordance with whom do we hang bunches of unripe dates on a palm tree that casts off its fruit — a practice that outwardly resembles darkei ha-Emori? He answers: in accordance with the tanna of the baraita just cited. The hanging clusters, like the red paint, are a public advertisement of the tree’s affliction, inviting those who see it to pray for it. A custom that looks superstitious is legitimated when its mechanism is prayer rather than magic.

Key Terms:

• כּוּבְסָא = A cluster of unripe dates
• דִּיקְלָא = A palm tree

Segment 4

TYPE: הדרן

Closing formula for the fourth perek, Beheimah HaMakshah

Hebrew/Aramaic:

הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ בְּהֵמָה הַמְקַשָּׁה.

English Translation:

We will return to you, Beheimah HaMakshah!

קלאוד על הדף:

With this the fourth perek — Beheimah HaMakshah, which dealt with the animal in difficult labor, the status of the fetus, and related matters — comes to a close. The traditional hadran formula expresses the learner’s bond with the completed chapter: ‘We will return to you.’ The fifth perek, Oto V’et Beno, begins immediately, taking up the prohibition of slaughtering a mother animal and her offspring on the same day (Vayikra 22:28).

Key Terms:

• הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ = ‘We will return to you’ — the traditional formula recited upon completing a perek

Segment 5

TYPE: משנה

The scope of oto v’et beno: everywhere, in every era, for chullin and for kodashim

Hebrew/Aramaic:

מַתְנִי׳ אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ נוֹהֵג בֵּין בָּאָרֶץ בֵּין בְּחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ, בִּפְנֵי הַבַּיִת וְשֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי הַבַּיִת, בְּחוּלִּין וּבְמוּקְדָּשִׁין.

English Translation:

MISHNA: The prohibition against slaughtering an animal itself and its offspring applies both in Eretz Yisrael and outside of Eretz Yisrael, both in the presence, i.e., the time, of the Temple and not in the presence of the Temple, and it applies with regard to non-sacred animals and with regard to sacrificial animals.

קלאוד על הדף:

The opening mishna of the new perek establishes the universal scope of the prohibition: it applies in Eretz Yisrael and outside it, while the Temple stands and after its destruction, and to both non-sacred (chullin) and sacrificial (mukdashin) animals. This is the mishna’s standard formula for a mitzvah that is chovat haguf — an obligation on the person rather than on the land — and it sets up the twelve-case analysis that follows, in which the variables of chullin/kodashim and inside/outside the Temple courtyard are systematically permuted.

Key Terms:

• אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ = ‘It and its offspring’ — the prohibition of slaughtering an animal and its offspring on one day (Vayikra 22:28)
• בִּפְנֵי הַבַּיִת = ‘In the presence of the Temple’ — while the Beit HaMikdash stands
• מוּקְדָּשִׁין = Consecrated animals designated as offerings

Segment 6

TYPE: משנה

Case 1 — both chullin, slaughtered outside: both kosher; the second slaughterer is lashed

Hebrew/Aramaic:

כֵּיצַד? הַשּׁוֹחֵט אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ, חוּלִּין בַּחוּץ – שְׁנֵיהֶם כְּשֵׁרִים, וְהַשֵּׁנִי סוֹפֵג אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים.

English Translation:

How so? In the case of one who slaughters an animal itself and its offspring, both of which are non-sacred, and slaughters them outside the Temple courtyard, both of the animals are fit for consumption, but for slaughtering the second animal, one incurs [sofeg] the forty lashes for violating the prohibition: “You shall not slaughter it and its offspring both in one day” (Leviticus 22:28).

קלאוד על הדף:

The first and simplest case: both animals are non-sacred and slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, the normal setting for chullin. The slaughter itself is valid, so both animals are fit to eat. But the person who slaughtered the second animal has violated the negative commandment of oto v’et beno and incurs the forty lashes (malkot). The mishna thus establishes the baseline: the prohibition affects the slaughterer, not the validity of the shechitah.

Key Terms:

• סוֹפֵג אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים = ‘Absorbs the forty’ — receives the thirty-nine lashes (malkot) prescribed for violating a negative commandment
• כְּשֵׁרִים = Fit — the animals are valid for consumption

Segment 7

TYPE: משנה

Case 2 — both kodashim, slaughtered outside: karet for the first, both pasul, both lashed

Hebrew/Aramaic:

קָדָשִׁים בַּחוּץ – הָרִאשׁוֹן חַיָּיב כָּרֵת, וּשְׁנֵיהֶם פְּסוּלִים, וּשְׁנֵיהֶם סוֹפְגִים אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים.

English Translation:

If both animals were sacrificial animals slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, then for slaughtering the first animal, one is liable to receive excision from the World-to-Come [karet]. For slaughtering the second animal one is not liable to receive karet. The second animal was not fit for sacrifice, since one may not slaughter an animal and its offspring on the same day. And both animals are disqualified for use as offerings, and for the slaughter of both of them, one incurs forty lashes apiece: The first being a sacrificial animal slaughtered outside the courtyard and the second being the offspring of an animal slaughtered that day.

קלאוד על הדף:

Now both animals are consecrated offerings slaughtered outside the courtyard. The first slaughterer commits shechutei chutz — slaughtering a sacrificial animal outside the Temple — and is liable to karet. The second slaughterer is not liable to karet: since the animal could not validly be offered that day (its mother having been slaughtered), it is mechusar zman, and the karet of shechutei chutz does not attach to an animal unfit for the altar. Both animals are disqualified, and each slaughterer incurs lashes — the first for shechutei chutz, the second for oto v’et beno.

Key Terms:

• כָּרֵת = Excision — being ‘cut off,’ the severe divinely-imposed penalty for slaughtering kodashim outside the Temple
• שְׁחוּטֵי חוּץ = Sacrificial animals slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard
• מְחוּסַּר זְמַן = ‘Lacking time’ — an animal whose permitted time for sacrifice has not yet arrived

Segment 8

TYPE: משנה

Cases 3-4 — both inside: chullin invalid in the courtyard; kodashim — first fit, second lashed and unfit

Hebrew/Aramaic:

חוּלִּין בִּפְנִים – שְׁנֵיהֶם פְּסוּלִין, וְהַשֵּׁנִי סוֹפֵג אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים; קָדָשִׁים בִּפְנִים – הָרִאשׁוֹן כָּשֵׁר וּפָטוּר, וְהַשֵּׁנִי סוֹפֵג אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים וּפָסוּל.

English Translation:

If both animals were non-sacred and slaughtered inside the Temple courtyard, both of them are unfit to be sacrificed, being non-sacred animals slaughtered in the courtyard. And for slaughter of the second animal, one incurs the forty lashes for slaughtering an animal and its offspring on a single day. If both animals were sacrificial animals slaughtered inside the Temple courtyard, the first is fit for sacrifice, and one who slaughters it is exempt from any punishment. But for slaughter of the second animal, one incurs the forty lashes for slaughtering an animal and its offspring on a single day, and it is unfit for sacrifice, because one was not allowed to slaughter it on that day.

קלאוד על הדף:

The mishna reverses the location. Chullin slaughtered inside the courtyard are both disqualified — non-sacred slaughter in the azarah is itself prohibited (chullin ba’azarah), and such meat may not be eaten — while the second slaughterer additionally incurs lashes for oto v’et beno. With kodashim inside, everything is where it belongs: the first slaughter is fully valid and the slaughterer exempt; the second animal, however, is mechusar zman — barred from the altar until the next day — so its slaughterer is lashed and the animal is unfit for sacrifice.

Key Terms:

• חוּלִּין בַּעֲזָרָה = Non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard — prohibited, and the meat is forbidden
• פָּטוּר = Exempt from punishment

Segment 9

TYPE: משנה

Case 5 — chullin then kodashim, outside: first fit and exempt; second lashed and pasul

Hebrew/Aramaic:

חוּלִּין וְקָדָשִׁים בַּחוּץ – הָרִאשׁוֹן כָּשֵׁר, וּפָטוּר, וְהַשֵּׁנִי סוֹפֵג אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים, וּפָסוּל.

English Translation:

If the first animal was non-sacred and the second a sacrificial animal, and both were slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, the first is fit for consumption and one who slaughters it is exempt from any punishment. But for slaughtering the second animal, one incurs the forty lashes for slaughtering an animal and its offspring on a single day, and the animal is unfit for sacrifice.

קלאוד על הדף:

A mixed pair outside the courtyard, mother first. The non-sacred mother is slaughtered normally outside: fit to eat, no liability. The consecrated offspring slaughtered second violates oto v’et beno — its slaughterer is lashed — and the animal is disqualified from the altar. Note that the second slaughterer is not liable to karet for shechutei chutz, because the animal was already barred from sacrifice that day as the offspring of the animal slaughtered first.

Key Terms:

• פָּסוּל = Disqualified — unfit for sacrifice (or, for chullin in the courtyard, forbidden for consumption)

Segment 10

TYPE: משנה

Case 6 — kodashim then chullin, outside: first karet and pasul; second kosher; both lashed

Hebrew/Aramaic:

קָדָשִׁים וְחוּלִּין בַּחוּץ – הָרִאשׁוֹן חַיָּיב כָּרֵת וּפָסוּל, וְהַשֵּׁנִי כָּשֵׁר, וּשְׁנֵיהֶם סוֹפְגִים אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים.

English Translation:

If the first animal was a sacrificial animal and the second was non-sacred and both were slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, for the first animal, one is liable to receive karet for slaughtering a sacrificial animal outside the courtyard, and the animal is unfit for sacrifice. And the second is fit for consumption; and for the slaughter of both of them one incurs forty lashes apiece: The first being a sacrificial animal slaughtered outside the courtyard and the second being the offspring of an animal slaughtered that day.

קלאוד על הדף:

The reverse order: the consecrated mother is slaughtered outside first — full shechutei chutz, karet, and disqualification. The non-sacred offspring slaughtered second is perfectly kosher meat, since chullin belong outside; but its slaughterer violated oto v’et beno. Thus both slaughterers are lashed, each for a different prohibition: the first for slaughtering kodashim outside, the second for the mother-and-offspring prohibition — a neat illustration of how the mishna tracks each liability to its own source.

Key Terms:

• חַיָּיב כָּרֵת = Liable to excision
• שְׁנֵיהֶם סוֹפְגִים = Both incur lashes — each for a distinct prohibition

Segment 11

TYPE: משנה

Cases 7-8 — mixed pairs inside: the mismatched animal is disqualified; the second slaughterer lashed

Hebrew/Aramaic:

חוּלִּין וְקָדָשִׁים בִּפְנִים – שְׁנֵיהֶם פְּסוּלִין, וְהַשֵּׁנִי סוֹפֵג אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים. קָדָשִׁים וְחוּלִּין בִּפְנִים – הָרִאשׁוֹן כָּשֵׁר וּפָטוּר, וְהַשֵּׁנִי סוֹפֵג אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים וּפָסוּל.

English Translation:

If the first animal was non-sacred and the second was a sacrificial animal and both were slaughtered inside the Temple courtyard, both of them are unfit for sacrifice. And for slaughtering the second animal, one incurs the forty lashes. If the first animal was a sacrificial animal and the second was non-sacred and both were slaughtered inside the Temple courtyard, the first is fit for sacrifice and one who slaughters it is exempt from any punishment. And for slaughtering the second animal, one incurs the forty lashes, and the animal is unfit for sacrifice, as it is non-sacred.

קלאוד על הדף:

Inside the courtyard the polarity flips: kodashim are in their place and chullin are out of place. Chullin then kodashim inside — both are disqualified: the first as chullin ba’azarah, the second (though a sacrificial animal in the right location) because it is mechusar zman; the second slaughterer is lashed. Kodashim then chullin inside — the first is entirely valid and its slaughterer exempt; the second is lashed for oto v’et beno and the animal is pasul as non-sacred meat slaughtered in the courtyard.

Key Terms:

• מְחוּסַּר זְמַן = ‘Lacking time’ — the offspring may not be offered on the day its mother was slaughtered (Vayikra 22:27-28)

Segment 12

TYPE: משנה

Case 9 — both chullin, first outside then inside: first fit; second lashed and pasul

Hebrew/Aramaic:

חוּלִּין בַּחוּץ וּבִפְנִים – הָרִאשׁוֹן כָּשֵׁר, וּפָטוּר, וְהַשֵּׁנִי סוֹפֵג אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים, וּפָסוּל.

English Translation:

If both animals were non-sacred, and one slaughters them, the first outside the Temple courtyard and the second inside the Temple courtyard, the first is fit for consumption and one who slaughters it is exempt from any punishment. And for slaughtering the second animal, one incurs the forty lashes for slaughtering an animal and its offspring on a single day, and the animal is unfit for sacrifice as it is non-sacred.

קלאוד על הדף:

Both animals are non-sacred, but the locations differ: the mother outside (normal — fit and exempt), the offspring inside the courtyard. The second slaughterer is lashed for oto v’et beno, and the animal is disqualified — not because of the mother-offspring prohibition, but because it is chullin slaughtered in the azarah. The mishna is careful to assign each disqualification to its true cause.

Key Terms:

• בַּחוּץ וּבִפְנִים = Outside and then inside — the mishna permutes the locations of the two slaughters

Segment 13

TYPE: משנה

Case 10 — both kodashim, first outside then inside: karet for the first; both lashed; both pasul

Hebrew/Aramaic:

קָדָשִׁים בַּחוּץ וּבִפְנִים – הָרִאשׁוֹן חַיָּיב כָּרֵת, וּשְׁנֵיהֶם סוֹפְגִים אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים, וּשְׁנֵיהֶם פְּסוּלִים.

English Translation:

If both animals were sacrificial animals, and one slaughters them, the first outside the Temple courtyard and the second inside the Temple courtyard, for slaughtering the first animal one is liable to receive karet, and for slaughtering both of them one incurs forty lashes apiece. One set of lashes is given because the first was a sacrificial animal slaughtered outside the courtyard, and the second set of lashes is given because the second animal is the offspring of an animal slaughtered that day. And both of them are unfit for sacrifice.

קלאוד על הדף:

Both animals are consecrated: the mother is slaughtered outside — shechutei chutz, karet, lashes, disqualification. The offspring is then slaughtered inside, in the proper place, but it is the offspring of an animal slaughtered that day: its slaughterer is lashed for oto v’et beno and the animal is unfit as mechusar zman. So the first slaughterer bears karet and lashes for the location, and the second bears lashes for the day — both animals lost to the altar.

Key Terms:

• וּשְׁנֵיהֶם פְּסוּלִים = And both are disqualified — the first by shechutei chutz, the second by mechusar zman

Segment 14

TYPE: משנה

Cases 11-12 — first inside then outside: the second chullin animal is kosher; the second sacrificial animal is pasul

Hebrew/Aramaic:

חוּלִּין בִּפְנִים וּבַחוּץ – הָרִאשׁוֹן פָּסוּל, וּפָטוּר, וְהַשֵּׁנִי סוֹפֵג אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים, וְכָשֵׁר. קָדָשִׁים בִּפְנִים וּבַחוּץ – הָרִאשׁוֹן כָּשֵׁר, וּפָטוּר, וְהַשֵּׁנִי סוֹפֵג אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים, וּפָסוּל.

English Translation:

If both animals were non-sacred, and one slaughters them, the first inside the Temple courtyard and the second outside the Temple courtyard, the first is unfit for sacrifice, as it is non-sacred, and the one who slaughters it is exempt. And for the second, one incurs the forty lashes and the animal is fit for consumption. If both animals were sacrificial animals, and one slaughters them, the first inside the Temple courtyard and the second outside the Temple courtyard, the first is fit for sacrifice and one who slaughters it is exempt. And for the second animal, one incurs the forty lashes, and the animal is unfit for sacrifice because its requisite time has not yet arrived.

קלאוד על הדף:

The final permutations. Chullin inside then outside: the first is disqualified (chullin ba’azarah) though its slaughterer is exempt; the second, slaughtered outside where chullin belong, is kosher meat — but its slaughterer is still lashed for oto v’et beno. Kodashim inside then outside: the first is fully valid; the second slaughterer is lashed and the animal is pasul. The mishna notes the reason: ‘its requisite time has not yet arrived’ — as mechusar zman it is not fit for the altar, and therefore its slaughter outside does not even generate karet.

Key Terms:

• לֹא הִגִּיעַ זְמַנּוֹ = ‘Its time has not arrived’ — mechusar zman; an offering may not be brought on the day its mother was slaughtered

Segment 15

TYPE: גמרא

The source that oto v’et beno applies to mukdashin: the juxtaposition of Vayikra 22:27 and 22:28

Hebrew/Aramaic:

גְּמָ׳ תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: מִנַּיִן לְאוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ שֶׁנּוֹהֵג בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁין? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״שׁוֹר אוֹ כֶשֶׂב אוֹ עֵז כִּי יִוָּלֵד״, וּכְתִיב בָּתְרֵיהּ: ״וְשׁוֹר אוֹ שֶׂה אֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ לֹא תִשְׁחֲטוּ בְּיוֹם אֶחָד״ – לִימֵּד עַל אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ שֶׁנּוֹהֵג בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁין.

English Translation:

GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: From where is it derived that the prohibition against slaughtering an animal itself and its offspring in a single day applies to sacrificial animals? It is derived from a verse, as the verse states: “When a bull, or a sheep, or a goat, is born…but from the eighth day and forward it may be accepted for an offering…to the Lord” (Leviticus 22:27), and it is written in the following verse: “And whether it be a bull or a sheep, you shall not slaughter it and its offspring both in one day.” The juxtaposition of the verses teaches with regard to the prohibition against slaughtering an animal itself and its offspring that it applies to sacrificial animals as well.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara opens by grounding the mishna’s first ruling — that the prohibition applies to sacrificial animals. A baraita derives it from context: the verse ‘When a bull or a sheep or a goat is born… it may be accepted for an offering’ (Vayikra 22:27) deals with kodashim, and immediately afterward comes ‘And whether it be a bull or a sheep, you shall not slaughter it and its offspring in one day’ (22:28). The juxtaposition (semichut) teaches that the mother-and-offspring prohibition governs consecrated animals as well.

Key Terms:

• תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר = ‘The verse states’ — the formula introducing a scriptural derivation
• סְמִיכוּת הַפָּרָשִׁיּוֹת = Juxtaposition of passages — deriving law from the adjacency of verses

Segment 16

TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ

Perhaps the prohibition applies only to kodashim? Answer: the repeated ‘bull’ breaks the context

Hebrew/Aramaic:

וְאֵימָא: בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁין – אִין, בְּחוּלִּין – לָא! ״שׁוֹר״ הִפְסִיק הָעִנְיָן.

English Translation:

The Gemara challenges: But since this prohibition is taught in the context of other halakhot of consecrated animals, perhaps I will say: Yes, it applies to sacrificial animals, but it does not apply to non-sacred animals. The Gemara explains: The repetitive phrase “and whether it be a bull or a sheep” in the second verse, when those types of animals, i.e., bulls and sheep, were already mentioned in the first verse, interrupted the topic, clarifying that the second verse is not referring to sacrificial animals.

קלאוד על הדף:

If the prohibition sits inside a passage about offerings, perhaps it applies only to mukdashin and not to ordinary chullin at all. The Gemara deflects: the second verse needlessly repeats ‘a bull or a sheep’ when those very animals were just named in verse 27. That repetition ‘interrupts the topic’ (hifsik ha’inyan) — it signals that verse 28 opens a new, independent prohibition not confined to the sacrificial context.

Key Terms:

• הִפְסִיק הָעִנְיָן = ‘It interrupted the topic’ — a textual break indicating the verse is not limited to the preceding context

Segment 17

TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ

Then perhaps only chullin and not kodashim? Answer: the vav connects back to the first matter

Hebrew/Aramaic:

וְאֵימָא: בְּחוּלִּין – אִין, בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁין – לָא! כְּתִיב: ״וְשׁוֹר״ – וָי״ו מוֹסִיף עַל עִנְיָן רִאשׁוֹן.

English Translation:

The Gemara challenges: But if so, I will say: Yes, the prohibition applies to non-sacred animals, but it does not apply to sacrificial animals. The Gemara explains: Since in that verse it is written: “And whether it be a bull…you shall not slaughter it and its offspring,” the conjunction “and” adds the prohibition stated in the second verse to the first matter, including sacrificial animals as well.

קלאוד על הדף:

The pendulum swings back: if verse 28 stands independent of the offerings context, perhaps it covers only chullin and excludes kodashim. The Gemara answers from the single letter vav: the verse says ‘And whether it be a bull’ (ve-shor) — and the conjunctive vav ‘adds to the first matter,’ stitching verse 28 back to the sacrificial context of verse 27. The result of the two moves together: the repetition detaches the prohibition from an exclusively sacrificial reading, while the vav retains kodashim within it — so it applies to both.

Key Terms:

• וָי״ו מוֹסִיף עַל עִנְיָן רִאשׁוֹן = ‘The vav adds to the first matter’ — the conjunction links a verse to the preceding passage

Segment 18

TYPE: קושיא

If linked to kodashim, kilayim should be excluded — yet the baraita includes kilayim and koy

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אִי מָה קָדָשִׁים כִּלְאַיִם לָא, אַף אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ כִּלְאַיִם לָא? אַלְּמָה תַּנְיָא: אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ נוֹהֵג בְּכִלְאַיִם וּבְכוֹי?

English Translation:

The Gemara challenges: If this prohibition also applies to sacrificial animals, perhaps just as with regard to sacrificial animals, the offspring of diverse kinds is not included, e.g., the offspring of a ewe and a goat is unfit to be an offering, so too with regard to the prohibition of: A mother and its offspring, the offspring of diverse kinds should not be included, so that in the case of the offspring of a ewe and a goat, it would be permitted to slaughter the mother and offspring on the same day. Why, then, is it taught in a baraita (see Tosefta 5:1): The prohibition of: A mother and its offspring, applies to the offspring of diverse kinds and to a koy, a kosher animal with characteristics of both domesticated and undomesticated animals?

קלאוד על הדף:

The linkage to kodashim now threatens to prove too much: a hybrid of ewe and goat (kilayim) is unfit as an offering, so if oto v’et beno is read through the lens of kodashim, hybrids should be excluded from the prohibition. But a baraita explicitly teaches that oto v’et beno applies to kilayim and to a koy — the enigmatic animal with characteristics of both domesticated and wild species. The inclusion of the hybrid must therefore have its own source, which the Gemara will now seek.

Key Terms:

• כִּלְאַיִם = The offspring of diverse kinds — here, a hybrid of ewe and goat, unfit as an offering
• כּוֹי = A kosher animal of ambiguous status, with characteristics of both domesticated (beheimah) and undomesticated (chayah) animals

Segment 19

TYPE: גמרא

A second difficulty: ‘seh’ is written — and Rava taught a rule about that word

Hebrew/Aramaic:

וְעוֹד, ״שֶׂה״ כְּתִיב, וְאָמַר רָבָא:

English Translation:

And additionally, why should the prohibition of: A mother and its offspring, apply to the offspring of diverse kinds? “A sheep,” is written in the verse with regard to that prohibition, and Rava said

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara adds a second, sharper difficulty before resolving anything: the prohibition’s verse uses the word ‘seh’ — and Rava established a general rule about that word, to be stated at the top of the next amud. The citation of Rava’s rule is the cliffhanger on which the amud ends: if ‘seh’ everywhere excludes hybrids, the baraita’s inclusion of kilayim in oto v’et beno demands a specific textual justification.

Key Terms:

• שֶׂה = A young sheep or goat — the term whose precise definition Rava’s rule addresses

Amud Bet (78b)

Segment 1

TYPE: גמרא

Rava’s rule: wherever ‘seh’ is stated it excludes kilayim; the word ‘or’ includes the hybrid here

Hebrew/Aramaic:

זֶה בָּנָה אָב – כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״שֶׂה״ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא לְהוֹצִיא אֶת הַכִּלְאַיִם. אָמַר קְרָא ״אוֹ״ לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַכִּלְאַיִם.

English Translation:

concerning the verse: “These are the animals that you may eat: An ox, a seh of sheep, and a seh of goats” (Deuteronomy 14:4), that this verse establishes a paradigm for other cases: Wherever the word seh is stated in the Torah, it serves only to exclude an animal of diverse kinds. The Hebrew word seh denotes either a sheep or a goat. The offspring of diverse kinds, which is neither a sheep nor a goat, does not qualify as a seh. The Gemara answers that with regard to a mother and its offspring, the verse states: “Whether it be a bull or a sheep” (Leviticus 22:28), and the “or” is superfluous there and serves to include the offspring of diverse kinds.

קלאוד על הדף:

Rava’s rule, completing the citation begun on the previous amud: the verse ‘an ox, a seh of sheep, and a seh of goats’ (Devarim 14:4) establishes a binyan av — a paradigm — that wherever the Torah says ‘seh’ it means a true sheep or goat, excluding a hybrid, which is neither. If so, how does oto v’et beno cover kilayim? The Gemara answers: the seemingly superfluous word ‘or’ in ‘a bull or a sheep’ (Vayikra 22:28) comes to include the offspring of diverse kinds.

Key Terms:

• בָּנָה אָב = ‘Established a paradigm’ (binyan av) — a model case from which a general rule is derived for the entire Torah
• אוֹ = ‘Or’ — the disjunctive particle, expounded here as an inclusion (ribui)

Segment 2

TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ

But ‘or’ is needed to separate the prohibitions! Answer: separation is derived from ‘its offspring’

Hebrew/Aramaic:

הַאי ״אוֹ״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְחַלֵּק, דְּסָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: עַד דְּשָׁחֵיט שׁוֹר וּבְנוֹ שֶׂה וּבְנוֹ לָא מִיחַיַּיב, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן. לְחַלֵּק – מִ״בְּנוֹ״ נָפְקָא.

English Translation:

The Gemara challenges: This word “or” is necessary to separate the prohibitions, as it might enter your mind to say: One is not liable unless he slaughters both a bull and its offspring and a sheep and its offspring in a single day. Therefore, the word “or” teaches us that one is liable for slaughtering either type of animal with its offspring. The Gemara responds: Separating the prohibitions is derived from the use of the words “its offspring” instead of their offspring.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara challenges the use of ‘or’ for kilayim: the word is needed lechalek — to separate the two species into independent prohibitions. Without it one might think there is no liability until one slaughters both a bull with its offspring and a sheep with its offspring on the same day. The answer: separation is already available from the singular ‘its offspring’ (beno) — the verse speaks of one animal and its own offspring, not of a combined set — freeing ‘or’ for the inclusion of hybrids.

Key Terms:

• לְחַלֵּק = ‘To separate’ — to establish that each case generates independent liability
• בְּנוֹ = ‘Its offspring’ — the singular possessive, from which the separation of liabilities is derived

Segment 3

TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ

The baraita seems to derive separation from ‘or’ — the Gemara re-reads it as deriving from ‘it’

Hebrew/Aramaic:

וְאַכַּתִּי מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא: אִילּוּ נֶאֱמַר ״שׁוֹר וָשֶׂה וּבְנוֹ״, הָיִיתִי אוֹמֵר: עַד שֶׁיִּשְׁחוֹט שׁוֹר וָשֶׂה וּבְנוֹ, תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״שׁוֹר אוֹ שֶׂה אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ״. מַאי לָאו מֵ״אוֹ״ נָפְקָא לֵיהּ? לָא, מֵ״אוֹתוֹ״.

English Translation:

The Gemara challenges: But the word “or” is still necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: If it were stated: A bull, and a sheep, and its offspring you shall not slaughter in one day, I would say: One is not liable unless he slaughters a bull, and a sheep, and the offspring of one of them in a single day. Therefore, the verse states: “A bull or a sheep…it and its offspring” (Leviticus 22:28), to teach that one is liable even for slaughtering either of them and its offspring. What, is it not from the word “or” that the baraita derives this halakha? The Gemara responds: No, it is derived from the word “it,” and the offspring of diverse kinds are included in the prohibition due to the word “or.”

קלאוד על הדף:

A baraita appears to contradict that answer: ‘If it were stated: a bull and a sheep and its offspring, I would say one is liable only for slaughtering a bull, and a sheep, and the offspring of one of them; therefore the verse states: a bull OR a sheep — it and its offspring.’ Does the baraita not derive the separation from ‘or’? The Gemara re-reads: no — the operative word in the baraita’s citation is ‘it’ (oto), the singular pronoun, which isolates each animal with its own offspring. ‘Or’ remains free to include kilayim.

Key Terms:

• אוֹתוֹ = ‘It’ — the singular pronoun, re-read as the true source of the separation

Segment 4

TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ

This works for the Rabanan but not for Chananyah — who answers: no verse is needed, he follows R’ Yonatan

Hebrew/Aramaic:

הָנִיחָא לְרַבָּנַן, דִּמְיַיתַּר לְהוּ ״אוֹתוֹ״, אֶלָּא לַחֲנַנְיָה, דְּלָא מְיַיתַּר לֵיהּ ״אוֹתוֹ״, לְחַלֵּק מְנָא לֵיהּ? לְחַלֵּק לָא צְרִיךְ קְרָא, דְּסָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יוֹנָתָן.

English Translation:

The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the opinion of the Rabbis, cited further in the discussion, for whom the word “it” is superfluous and can be used for this derivation, leaving the word “or” available to include the offspring of diverse kinds; but according to the opinion of Ḥananya, for whom the word “it” is not superfluous, from where does he derive that one is to separate into two prohibitions slaughtering either a bull with its offspring or a sheep with its offspring? The Gemara answers that there is no need for a verse to separate them into two prohibitions, as Ḥananya holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan.

קלאוד על הדף:

The re-reading depends on ‘oto’ being superfluous — true for the Rabanan, who will use it to exclude males from the prohibition, leaving ‘or’ free. But Chananyah (who applies the prohibition to males and females alike) needs ‘oto’ for his own purposes; from where does he derive the separation? The answer: Chananyah requires no verse at all, because he holds like Rabbi Yonatan, for whom a conjunctive phrase naturally means ‘either together or each separately’ unless Scripture says otherwise.

Key Terms:

• הָנִיחָא = ‘This works well for…’ — the formula testing whether an answer holds for every opinion
• מְיַיתַּר = Superfluous — a word unneeded for its plain sense and therefore available for derivation

Segment 5

TYPE: ברייתא

Rabbi Yoshiyah: ‘his father and his mother’ requires a second verse to teach liability for each alone

Hebrew/Aramaic:

דְּתַנְיָא: ״אִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יְקַלֵּל אֶת אָבִיו וְאֶת אִמּוֹ״, אֵין לִי אֶלָּא אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ, אָבִיו שֶׁלֹּא אִמּוֹ וְאִמּוֹ שֶׁלֹּא אָבִיו מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ קִלֵּל״ – אָבִיו קִלֵּל, אִמּוֹ קִלֵּל, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה.

English Translation:

As it is taught in a baraita: From the verse: “A man who curses his father and his mother shall die” (Leviticus 20:9), I have derived only that one is liable if he curses both his father and his mother. From where do I derive that if one curses his father but not his mother, or his mother but not his father, he is liable? The continuation of the verse states: “His father and his mother he has cursed, his blood is upon him.” In the first part of the verse, the word “curses” is in proximity to “his father,” and in the last part of the verse, “cursed” is in proximity to “his mother.” This teaches that the verse is referring to both a case where he cursed only his father and a case where he cursed only his mother; this is the statement of Rabbi Yoshiya. Rabbi Yoshiya maintains that conjunctions are interpreted strictly unless the verse indicates otherwise.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara cites the classic dispute. Regarding ‘a man who curses his father and his mother’ (Vayikra 20:9), Rabbi Yoshiyah reads the conjunction strictly: the plain verse teaches liability only for cursing both. Liability for cursing the father alone or the mother alone must be derived from the verse’s ending — ‘his father and his mother he has cursed’ — where the word ‘cursed’ stands next to ‘his mother,’ and at the opening ‘curses’ stands next to ‘his father,’ splitting the verse into two independent cases.

Key Terms:

• רַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה = Tanna who reads conjunctive vav strictly — ‘X and Y’ means both together unless the verse itself indicates otherwise
• אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ קִלֵּל = ‘His father and his mother he has cursed’ (Vayikra 20:9) — the re-ordered ending expounded to cover each parent separately

Segment 6

TYPE: ברייתא

Rabbi Yonatan: a conjunction means each alone unless the Torah writes ‘together’ (yachdav)

Hebrew/Aramaic:

רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן אוֹמֵר: מַשְׁמָע שְׁנֵיהֶם כְּאֶחָד, וּמַשְׁמָע אֶחָד בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ, עַד שֶׁיִּפְרוֹט לְךָ הַכָּתוּב ״יַחְדָּו״.

English Translation:

Rabbi Yonatan says: There is no need for this derivation, because the phrase “his father and his mother” indicates that one is liable if he curses both of them together, and it also indicates that he is liable if he curses either one of them on their own, unless the verse specifies that one is liable only if he curses both together. An example of a verse where the Torah specifies that the halakha applies only to the two elements in conjunction is: “You shall not plow with an ox and a donkey together” (Deuteronomy 22:10). According to Rabbi Yonatan, had the verse stated with regard to a mother and its offspring: A bull and a sheep, and not: A bull or a sheep, one would still be liable for slaughtering each with its own offspring independently. Therefore, the word “or” is superfluous, and is utilized by Ḥananya, who agrees with the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan, to include the offspring of diverse kinds in this prohibition.

קלאוד על הדף:

Rabbi Yonatan disagrees: ‘his father and his mother’ inherently means both together or either one alone; no extra derivation is needed. Only where Scripture explicitly writes ‘together’ (yachdav) — as in ‘you shall not plow with an ox and a donkey together’ (Devarim 22:10) — is the law restricted to the combination. On this view, ‘a bull and a sheep’ would already generate liability for each species with its own offspring, so the word ‘or’ is genuinely superfluous — and Chananyah, following Rabbi Yonatan, uses it to include kilayim.

Key Terms:

• רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן = Tanna who reads ‘X and Y’ as ‘X or Y’ by default — combination is required only where the Torah writes yachdav
• יַחְדָּו = ‘Together’ — the Torah’s explicit marker that a law applies only to the combination

Segment 7

TYPE: גמרא

The underlying dispute: Rabanan — the prohibition applies to mothers only; Chananyah — to fathers too

Hebrew/Aramaic:

מַאי חֲנַנְיָה, וּמַאי רַבָּנַן? דְּתַנְיָא: אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ נוֹהֵג בִּנְקֵבוֹת, וְאֵינוֹ נוֹהֵג בִּזְכָרִים. חֲנַנְיָה אוֹמֵר: נוֹהֵג בֵּין בִּזְכָרִים וּבֵין בִּנְקֵבוֹת.

English Translation:

The Gemara asks: What is the opinion of Ḥananya, and what is the opinion of the Rabbis that were mentioned earlier? Their opinions are elucidated as it is taught in a baraita: Despite the fact that the verse is written in the masculine form, the prohibition against slaughtering itself and its offspring in a single day applies to females, i.e., to a mother and its offspring, but it does not apply to males, i.e., a male animal and its offspring. Ḥananya says: It applies both to males and to females.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara now identifies the dispute it has been referencing. A baraita teaches: oto v’et beno applies to females — a mother and her offspring — and not to males; Chananyah says it applies to both males and females. Though the verse is grammatically masculine (‘oto… beno’), the Rabanan restrict the prohibition to the mother, whose relationship to the offspring is certain; Chananyah extends it to a known father. The remainder of the amud unpacks the Rabanan’s derivation.

Key Terms:

• חֲנַנְיָה = Tanna who applies oto v’et beno to both the sire and the dam
• נְקֵבוֹת = Females — per the Rabanan, only the mother and her offspring are covered

Segment 8

TYPE: ברייתא

The Rabanan’s reasoning: an analogy to the mother bird — females and not males

Hebrew/Aramaic:

מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבָּנַן? דְּתַנְיָא: יָכוֹל יְהֵא אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ נוֹהֵג בֵּין בִּזְכָרִים וּבֵין בִּנְקֵבוֹת? וְדִין הוּא: חִיֵּיב כָּאן, וְחַיָּיב בְּאֵם עַל הַבָּנִים; מָה כְּשֶׁחִיֵּיב בְּאֵם עַל הַבָּנִים – בִּנְקֵבוֹת וְלֹא בִּזְכָרִים, אַף כְּשֶׁחִיֵּיב כָּאן – בִּנְקֵבוֹת וְלֹא בִּזְכָרִים.

English Translation:

The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of the Rabbis, i.e., the first tanna? Their reasoning is as it is taught in a baraita: One might have thought that the prohibition against slaughtering a mother and its offspring would apply both to males and to females. But could one not derive this by logical inference, reaching the opposite conclusion: The Torah rendered one obligated here not to slaughter an animal and its offspring in a single day, and the Torah rendered one obligated with regard to a mother bird with its chicks not to seize them together, but to dispatch the mother. Just as when it rendered one obligated with regard to a mother bird with its chicks, the obligation applies to female birds but not to males, as the verse states: “And the mother sitting on the chicks” (Deuteronomy 22:6), so too, when it rendered one obligated here, with regard to an animal and its offspring, the obligation should apply to female animals, but not to males.

קלאוד על הדף:

The baraita builds the Rabanan’s case as a logical inference. One might have thought the prohibition covers males and females alike; but compare the parallel mitzvah of the mother bird (shiluach haken): the Torah obligates one there only regarding the mother — ‘and the mother sitting on the chicks’ (Devarim 22:6) — and not the father. Just as that obligation attaches to females and not males, so here: oto v’et beno should attach to the mother and not the sire.

Key Terms:

• אֵם עַל הַבָּנִים = ‘The mother upon the young’ — the mitzvah of shiluach haken, dispatching the mother bird (Devarim 22:6-7)

Segment 9

TYPE: פירכא

The refutation: the mother bird is exempt when ‘prepared’ — oto v’et beno is not

Hebrew/Aramaic:

לֹא, אִם אָמַרְתָּ בְּאֵם עַל הַבָּנִים, שֶׁכֵּן לֹא עָשָׂה בָּהּ מְזוּמָּן כְּשֶׁאֵינוֹ מְזוּמָּן, תֹּאמַר בְּאוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ, שֶׁעָשָׂה בּוֹ מְזוּמָּן כְּשֶׁאֵינוֹ מְזוּמָּן?

English Translation:

One may respond: No, if you say that this is so with regard to a mother bird with its chicks, for which the Torah did not render prepared ones equivalent to unprepared ones, as the obligation to dispatch the mother bird applies only where one happens to encounter a mother bird with its chicks spontaneously, but not to ones that he keeps in his property, shall you also say that this is so with regard to the prohibition of an animal itself and its offspring, for which the Torah rendered prepared ones equivalent to unprepared ones, prohibiting an animal and its offspring even if they are prepared? If so, the prohibition against slaughtering an animal and its offspring should apply to both males and females.

קלאוד על הדף:

The analogy is attacked at its weak point: the mother-bird obligation applies only to a chance encounter — a nest that is not mezuman, not readily available in one’s own domain — while oto v’et beno applies even to animals fully prepared in one’s barn. Since the Torah treated the prepared like the unprepared here, this prohibition is broader than shiluach haken, and perhaps it is broad in the other dimension too — applying to males as well as females. The logical inference alone cannot settle the question.

Key Terms:

• מְזוּמָּן = ‘Prepared’ — readily available in one’s domain; shiluach haken applies only to the unprepared (a chance encounter), while oto v’et beno applies to both

Segment 10

TYPE: תלמוד לומר

The verse resolves it: ‘oto’ — one and not two; then the analogy to the mother bird returns

Hebrew/Aramaic:

תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אוֹתוֹ״ – אֶחָד וְלֹא שְׁנַיִם. אַחַר שֶׁחִלֵּק הַכָּתוּב, זָכִיתִי לְדִין: חִיֵּיב כָּאן וְחִיֵּיב בְּאֵם עַל הַבָּנִים – מָה כְּשֶׁחִיֵּיב בְּאֵם עַל הַבָּנִים – בִּנְקֵבוֹת וְלֹא בִּזְכָרִים, אַף כְּשֶׁחִיֵּיב כָּאן – בִּנְקֵבוֹת וְלֹא בִּזְכָרִים.

English Translation:

Therefore, the verse states: “A bull or a sheep, it and its offspring” (Leviticus 22:28). The superfluous word “it” indicates that this applies to only one parent, but not to two. The baraita continues: After the verse separated the parents, rendering the prohibition applicable to only one of them, I merited returning to the logical inference mentioned earlier: The Torah rendered one obligated here not to slaughter an animal and its offspring in a single day, and the Torah rendered one obligated to dispatch the mother with regard to a mother bird with its chicks. Just as when it rendered one obligated with regard to a mother bird with its chicks, the obligation applies to females but not to males, so too, when it rendered one obligated here, the obligation applies to females but not to males.

קלאוד על הדף:

Scripture itself decides: the superfluous ‘it’ (oto) teaches ‘one and not two’ — the prohibition attaches to one parent only, not to both. Once the verse has separated the parents, the earlier analogy is reinstated to determine which parent: just as the mother-bird obligation attaches to females and not males, so oto v’et beno attaches to the mother and not the sire. The verse limits the number; the analogy selects the female.

Key Terms:

• אֶחָד וְלֹא שְׁנַיִם = ‘One and not two’ — the prohibition covers a single parent, not both
• זָכִיתִי לְדִין = ‘I have merited the inference’ — with the verse’s help, the logical analogy can now be applied

Segment 11

TYPE: גמרא

A supporting derivation: ‘its offspring’ — the parent to whom the offspring clings, excluding the male

Hebrew/Aramaic:

וְאִם נַפְשְׁךָ לוֹמַר, ״בְּנוֹ״ – מִי שֶׁבְּנוֹ כָּרוּךְ אַחֲרָיו, יָצָא זָכָר שֶׁאֵין בְּנוֹ כָּרוּךְ אַחֲרָיו.

English Translation:

And if it is your wish to say that one can refute this, that refutation can be countered by the following derivation: The verse states: “It and its offspring” (Leviticus 22:28), indicating that this applies to that parent whose offspring clings to it. This serves to exclude the male parent, whose offspring does not cling to it.

קלאוד על הדף:

The baraita appends a reinforcing derivation introduced by ‘if it is your wish to say’ (ve-im nafshecha lomar): the word ‘its offspring’ (beno) indicates the parent to whom the offspring clings and follows — the mother. A male’s offspring does not cling to him, so the sire is excluded. This gives the Rabanan a direct textual anchor for selecting the mother, independent of the analogy to the mother bird.

Key Terms:

• וְאִם נַפְשְׁךָ לוֹמַר = ‘And if it is your wish to say’ — a formula introducing a backup derivation against a potential refutation
• כָּרוּךְ אַחֲרָיו = ‘Clings to it’ — the offspring follows the mother, not the sire

Segment 12

TYPE: שקלא וטריא

What refutation did the backup answer? That ‘oto’ is masculine — countered again by ‘its offspring’

Hebrew/Aramaic:

מָה אִם נַפְשְׁךָ לוֹמַר? וְכִי תֵּימָא ״אוֹתוֹ״ זָכָר מַשְׁמַע, הֲרֵי הוּא אוֹמֵר ״בְּנוֹ״ – מִי שֶׁבְּנוֹ כָּרוּךְ אַחֲרָיו, יָצָא זָכָר שֶׁאֵין בְּנוֹ כָּרוּךְ אַחֲרָיו.

English Translation:

The Gemara asks: To what possible refutation is the expression: If it is your wish to say, referring? The Gemara explains that the possible refutation is: And if you would say that the word “it,” in the verse denotes a male, as it is expressed in the masculine gender in the Hebrew, the response is that the verse also states “its offspring” in that verse, indicating that this applies to that parent whose offspring clings to it. This serves to exclude the male parent, whose offspring does not cling to it.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara asks what objection the backup derivation was answering. The implicit challenge: the word ‘oto’ is grammatically masculine — perhaps it designates the male parent specifically! The response: the same verse says ‘its offspring,’ the one whose offspring clings to it — and an offspring clings to its mother, not its father. The feminine reality of the mother-offspring bond overrides the masculine grammar of the pronoun, and the Rabanan’s reading stands: the prohibition applies to the mother.

Key Terms:

• זָכָר מַשְׁמַע = ‘It implies a male’ — the grammatical objection from the masculine pronoun oto
• יָצָא זָכָר = ‘The male is excluded’ — the sire, to whom the offspring does not cling, is outside the prohibition

📝 Summary

Overview

Chullin 78 is a daf of transition. It closes the fourth perek, Beheimah HaMakshah, with a brief but touching coda on darkei ha-Emori — explaining why painting an ailing tree with red paint is permitted despite resembling Amorite superstition: it publicizes the tree’s plight so that passersby will pray for it, a principle the baraita derives from the metzora’s cry of “Impure, impure” (Vayikra 13:45). With the hadran, the fifth perek, Oto V’et Beno, opens: the prohibition of slaughtering a mother animal and her offspring on the same day (Vayikra 22:28). The mishna maps twelve permutations of chullin and kodashim slaughtered inside or outside the Temple courtyard, and the Gemara then derives the prohibition’s scope — that it covers mukdashin, that it includes hybrids (kilayim), and that per the Rabanan it applies to mothers only.

Amud Aleph Highlights

• Red paint on a shedding tree is permitted because it invites public prayer, not because of any magical effect; loading stones is permitted because it genuinely weakens the tree’s excessive blossoming.
• A baraita generalizes from “and he will cry: Impure, impure”: anyone struck by misfortune should publicize it so the masses pray for mercy on his behalf. Ravina identifies this tanna as the basis for hanging date clusters on an afflicted palm.
• Hadran: perek 4 (Beheimah HaMakshah) concludes; perek 5 (Oto V’et Beno) begins.
• The mishna: oto v’et beno applies everywhere, in every era, to chullin and mukdashin — then systematically works through twelve cases, tracking for each animal whether it is fit, and for each slaughterer whether he incurs lashes or karet (e.g., kodashim outside brings karet for the first slaughter, while the second animal is mechusar zman).
• The Gemara derives that the prohibition applies to mukdashin from the juxtaposition of Vayikra 22:27 (offerings) and 22:28; the repeated “bull” detaches the verse from an exclusively sacrificial reading, while the conjunctive vav retains kodashim — so both are covered.
• A difficulty: if linked to kodashim, hybrids should be excluded — yet a baraita includes kilayim and the koy. The amud ends citing Rava’s rule about “seh”.

Amud Bet Highlights

• Rava’s rule: wherever the Torah says “seh” it excludes kilayim; here the superfluous “or” (“a bull or a sheep”) includes the hybrid.
• “Or” is not needed to separate the species into independent prohibitions — separation comes from “beno” (per the answer) or from “oto” (per the re-read baraita), leaving “or” free for kilayim.
• This works for the Rabanan, for whom “oto” is superfluous; Chananyah needs no verse for separation because he follows Rabbi Yonatan’s rule on conjunctions.
• The Rabbi Yoshiyah / Rabbi Yonatan dispute on “his father and his mother” (Vayikra 20:9): does “X and Y” mean both together unless the verse splits them, or either one alone unless the Torah writes “yachdav”?
• The Rabanan vs Chananyah dispute: does oto v’et beno apply only to females (mothers) or also to males? The Rabanan analogize to shiluach haken (females only); the mezuman distinction refutes the analogy; “oto” then teaches “one and not two,” reinstating the analogy; and “beno” — the parent to whom the offspring clings — independently excludes the sire.

Key Disputes

Conclusions

The darkei ha-Emori question is fully resolved: practices with real benefit, or whose mechanism is public prayer, are permitted. The Gemara establishes that oto v’et beno applies to mukdashin (juxtaposition of Vayikra 22:27-28), to chullin (the repeated “bull” interrupts the context), and to kilayim (the inclusive “or,” despite Rava’s rule that “seh” excludes hybrids). The Rabanan-Chananyah dispute itself is not decided on this daf, but each side’s derivation is fully worked out: the Rabanan use “oto” (“one and not two”) plus the shiluach haken analogy and “beno” (the parent to whom the offspring clings) to limit the prohibition to mothers; Chananyah, following Rabbi Yonatan, keeps “oto” for himself and needs no verse to separate the species.

Key Figures

Tannaim: Rabbi Yoshiyah, Rabbi Yonatan, Chananyah, the Rabanan of the baraita Amoraim: Ravina, Rava

One-Line Takeaway

As perek five opens, the Torah’s single verse “you shall not slaughter it and its offspring in one day” is unpacked word by word — “or” includes hybrids, “oto” limits the prohibition to one parent, and “beno” points to the mother, to whom the offspring clings.

🎯 ELI5 (Explain Like I’m 5)

The Big Picture 🖼️

Today’s daf finishes one chapter and starts a brand new one! First, we learn why painting a sick tree red isn’t silly superstition — it’s actually a way to ask for prayers. Then we open a whole new topic: the Torah’s rule that you can’t slaughter a mother animal and her baby on the same day.

The Red Tree and Telling People Your Troubles 🌳

Imagine your neighbor’s fruit tree is sick — it keeps dropping its fruit before it’s ripe. In ancient times, people would paint the tree with bright red paint. Wait a minute… isn’t that superstition? The rabbis were very careful about copying strange magical customs (called darkei ha’Emori — the ‘ways of the Amorites,’ irrational practices Jews shouldn’t copy).

But the Gemara says the red paint is totally fine — because it’s not magic at all! The bright red color makes everyone walking by say, ‘Whoa, that tree is sick!’ And then they pray for it to get better.

Where do we learn this idea? From the metzora — a person with a special skin condition described in the Torah. The Torah says he must call out ‘Impure, impure!’ wherever he goes. Why announce your problems? So everyone who hears will pray for him to get better!

Ravina adds: that’s also why people hang clusters of unripe dates on a struggling palm tree. It’s like putting up a big sign that says ‘This tree needs your prayers!’

Think of it like… wearing a cast on your broken arm. Everyone who sees it asks, ‘Oh no, what happened? Feel better soon!’ The cast doesn’t just protect your arm — it tells the whole world you could use some kind wishes.

The Simple Idea 💡: When something sad happens, don’t hide it — share it, so lots of people can pray for you.

The Mother and Baby Rule 🐄🐮

Now we start a new chapter called Oto V’et Beno — ‘it and its child.’ The Torah says: ‘You shall not slaughter it and its offspring in one day’ (Vayikra 22:28). Simple version: you can’t slaughter a mama animal and her baby on the same day.

The mishna teaches that this rule applies EVERYWHERE and ALWAYS — in Israel and outside Israel, when the Temple stands and when it doesn’t, and to ordinary animals and to animals set aside as Temple offerings (called kodashim — ‘holy’ animals promised as sacrifices).

Then the mishna does something the Talmud loves: it builds a giant grid of cases! What if both animals are ordinary? What if both are offerings? What if they’re slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, or inside it? Each combination gets its own answer. Here are a few samples:

Notice the pattern: the mother-and-baby rule punishes the PERSON (with lashes) but doesn’t usually ruin the MEAT. An ordinary animal slaughtered properly is still kosher to eat — the slaughterer just broke a rule doing it.

Think of it like… driving through a red light on your way to school. You still ARRIVE at school — the trip ‘worked’ — but you still get a ticket for how you got there.

The Simple Idea 💡: Slaughtering mother and baby on one day is forbidden, but the punishment lands on the person, and each problem (wrong place, wrong day) gets tracked separately.

How the Rabbis Read Every Single Word 🔍

Here’s where it gets really cool. The Torah’s verse says: ‘a bull OR a sheep — IT and its offspring.’ The rabbis treat every little word like a clue in a treasure hunt. Nothing is wasted!

First puzzle: this verse sits right next to a verse about Temple offerings. So maybe the rule ONLY applies to offerings? No — the verse repeats ‘bull’ and ‘sheep’ when it didn’t need to, and that repetition is like hitting the ‘new topic’ button. But then a tiny letter vav (the Hebrew word for ‘and’) connects it back to the offerings verse — so the rule covers BOTH ordinary animals AND offerings.

Second puzzle: what about mixed-breed animals? A sheep-goat mix (called kilayim — ‘mixed kinds’) can’t be a Temple offering. And there’s a mysterious creature called the koy — an animal the rabbis couldn’t decide was a farm animal or a wild animal! Are these included in our rule? Yes — the little word ‘or’ in ‘a bull or a sheep’ is extra, and extra words always come to ADD something. Here, ‘or’ adds the hybrids.

Third puzzle: when the Torah says ‘X and Y,’ does it mean both together, or each one alone? Rabbi Yoshiyah and Rabbi Yonatan famously argue about this. Take the verse ‘one who curses his father and his mother.’ Rabbi Yoshiyah says ‘and’ means BOTH — you’d need another hint in the verse to punish someone who cursed just one parent. Rabbi Yonatan says ‘and’ naturally means either together OR separately — unless the Torah adds the word yachdav (‘together’), like ‘don’t plow with an ox and a donkey together.’

Think of it like… reading a party invitation that says ‘bring chips and soda.’ Does that mean you must bring both? Or is either one fine? Rabbi Yoshiyah says both; Rabbi Yonatan says either — unless the invitation says ‘both together, please!’

The Simple Idea 💡: The rabbis squeeze meaning out of every word — even ‘or,’ ‘and,’ and ‘it’ — because the Torah never wastes a single letter.

Mother Only, or Father Too? 🐔👨‍👩‍👧

Now the big debate of the daf! The Rabanan (the majority of rabbis) say the rule covers only the MOTHER and her baby. Chananyah says it covers the FATHER and his baby too. Who’s right, and how does each side prove it?

The Rabanan bring a comparison to another mitzvah: shiluach haken, the mother bird rule. The Torah says if you find a bird’s nest, you must send away the mother before taking the eggs — and that rule only applies to the mama bird, never the papa bird. So maybe our rule is also moms-only?

But wait — the comparison has a hole! The bird rule only applies to a WILD nest you stumble upon, not birds in your own coop. Our rule applies even to animals in your own barn. So maybe our rule is bigger and broader in every way — including dads?

The verse settles it. The word ‘oto’ (‘it’) means ONE parent, not two. Okay, one parent — but which one? Back comes the bird comparison: just like the bird rule picks the mother, our rule picks the mother.

And there’s one more beautiful clue. The verse says ‘beno’ — ‘its offspring.’ Whose offspring is it, really? The parent the baby follows around! A calf trots after its mama everywhere; it doesn’t follow the father at all. So ‘its offspring’ points straight at the mother.

Think of it like… ducklings at the pond. Have you ever seen baby ducks waddling in a line? Who are they following? Always the mama duck! The Torah says the rule belongs to the parent the baby actually clings to.

The Simple Idea 💡: The Rabanan say the rule protects the mother-baby pair — because ‘it’ means one parent, and the baby who ‘clings’ tells us that parent is the mom.

The Super Simple Summary 🎯

• Painting a sick tree red (or hanging date clusters on it) isn’t superstition — it’s a signal so people will notice and pray, just like the metzora announces ‘Impure, impure!’ so everyone prays for him.
• New chapter! The Torah forbids slaughtering a mother animal and her baby on the same day (Vayikra 22:28) — everywhere, in every era, for ordinary animals and Temple offerings alike.
• The mishna runs through 12 combinations (ordinary vs offering, inside vs outside the Temple) — usually the meat stays fine but the second slaughterer gets lashes, and each punishment is tracked to its own reason.
• Tiny words do big jobs: ‘or’ includes hybrid animals like the sheep-goat mix and the mysterious koy, and ‘it’ (oto) teaches the rule covers one parent, not two.
• Rabbi Yoshiyah and Rabbi Yonatan argue whether ‘X and Y’ in the Torah means both together or each one alone — Rabbi Yonatan says each alone, unless the Torah writes ‘together.’
• The Rabanan say the rule is mothers-only (like the mother bird mitzvah, and because the baby ‘clings’ to its mom); Chananyah says fathers count too.

⚖️ Halacha

A Note on This Daf

Most of Kodashim deals with Temple law that awaits the rebuilding of the Beit HaMikdash. This daf is different: the prohibition of oto v’et beno (Vayikra 22:28) is fully practical halacha today, observed in every kosher slaughterhouse. It is codified at length in Rambam, Hilchot Shechitah chapter 12, and in Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah, Siman 16 — and nearly every ruling there traces directly to the mishna and Gemara on our daf.

Topic 1: The Basic Prohibition — Lashes for the Second Slaughter, but the Meat Is Kosher

Source in Daf: 78a, Segments 5-6 (the mishna: “both are fit for consumption, but for slaughtering the second animal one incurs the forty lashes”)

Rambam — Hilkhot Shechitah 12:1

Hebrew:

הַשׁוֹחֵט אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ בְּיוֹם אֶחָד הַבָּשָׂר מֻתָּר בַּאֲכִילָה וְהַשּׁוֹחֵט לוֹקֶה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר “אֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ לֹא תִשְׁחֲטוּ בְּיוֹם אֶחָד”. וְאֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה אֶלָּא עַל שְׁחִיטַת הָאַחֲרוֹן. לְפִיכָךְ אִם שָׁחַט אֶחָד מִשְּׁנֵיהֶן וּבָא חֲבֵרוֹ וְשָׁחַט אֶת הַשֵּׁנִי, חֲבֵרוֹ לוֹקֶה.

English:

When a person slaughters an animal and its offspring on the same day, the meat is permitted to be eaten. The slaughterer, however, is punished by lashes, as it is stated: “It and its offspring you shall not slaughter in one day” (Vayikra 22:28). He receives lashes only for slaughtering the second animal. Accordingly, if one person slaughtered one of such a pair and another person slaughtered the second, the one who slaughtered the second alone receives lashes.

Connection: This is the mishna’s opening case verbatim (78a, Segment 6): “chullin outside — both are kosher, and the second one incurs the forty lashes” (הַשֵּׁנִי סוֹפֵג אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים). The Rambam draws out the mishna’s two foundational principles: the prohibition attaches to the act of the second slaughter, not to the meat — so both animals remain fully kosher — and liability follows whoever performs that second slaughter, even a different person.

Shulchan Aruch — Yoreh De’ah 16:1

Hebrew:

אָסוּר לִשְׁחוֹט אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ בְּיוֹם אֶחָד, לֹא שְׁנָא הָאֵם וְאַחַר כָּךְ הַבֵּן אוֹ הַבַּת, לֹא שְׁנָא הַבֵּן אוֹ הַבַּת וְאַחַר כָּךְ הָאֵם.

English (adapted):

It is forbidden to slaughter an animal and its offspring on one day — it makes no difference whether one slaughters the mother first and afterward the son or daughter, or the son or daughter first and afterward the mother.

Connection: The mishna’s twelve cases (78a, Segments 6-14) systematically permute the order — mother first, offspring first — and in every permutation the second slaughterer is liable. The Shulchan Aruch distills this into the rule that order is irrelevant: the transgression is completed by whichever slaughter comes second on that day.

Shulchan Aruch — Yoreh De’ah 16:3

Hebrew:

עָבַר וְשָׁחַט אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ בְּיוֹם אֶחָד, מֻתָּר לְאָכְלָם. וְיֵשׁ מִי שֶׁאוֹסֵר (בּוֹ בַּיּוֹם לֶאֱכֹל הָאַחֲרוֹן).

English (adapted):

If one transgressed and slaughtered an animal and its offspring on one day, it is permitted to eat them. And there is an authority who forbids (eating the latter one on that same day).

Connection: The base ruling follows our mishna directly — “both are kosher” (שְׁנֵיהֶם כְּשֵׁרִים). The dissenting view cited (and glossed by the Rema as applying only to the second animal, on that day) is a rabbinic penalty on the transgressor; even that view concedes the mishna’s Torah-level principle that the shechitah itself is valid.

Topic 2: Universal Scope — Every Era, Every Place, Chullin and Mukdashin

Source in Daf: 78a, Segment 5 (the mishna: “applies in Eretz Yisrael and outside it, in the presence of the Temple and not in its presence, to chullin and to mukdashin”) and Segments 15-17 (the Gemara’s derivation from the juxtaposition of Vayikra 22:27-28)

Rambam — Hilkhot Shechitah 12:2

Hebrew:

אִסּוּר אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ נוֹהֵג בְּכָל זְמַן וּבְכָל מָקוֹם, בְּחֻלִּין וּבְמֻקְדָּשִׁין, בֵּין קָדָשִׁים הַנֶּאֱכָלִין בֵּין קָדָשִׁים שֶׁאֵינָן נֶאֱכָלִין. לְפִיכָךְ הָרִאשׁוֹן שֶׁשָּׁחַט בַּעֲזָרָה וְהַשֵּׁנִי בַּחוּץ, אוֹ הָרִאשׁוֹן בַּחוּץ וְהַשֵּׁנִי בַּעֲזָרָה, בֵּין שֶׁהָיוּ שְׁנֵיהֶן חֻלִּין אוֹ שְׁנֵיהֶן קָדָשִׁים, בֵּין שֶׁהָיָה אֶחָד מֵהֶן חֻלִּין וְאֶחָד קָדָשִׁים — זֶה שֶׁשָּׁחַט אַחֲרוֹן לוֹקֶה מִשּׁוּם אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ.

English:

The prohibition against slaughtering an animal and its offspring applies in all times and in all places, with regard to ordinary animals and sacrificial animals — with regard to sacrifices of which we partake and with regard to sacrifices of which we do not partake. Therefore, if one slaughtered the first animal in the Temple courtyard and the second outside of it, or the first outside the Temple courtyard and the second inside, whether they were both ordinary animals, or both sacrificial animals, or one was an ordinary animal and one a sacrificial one — the one who slaughtered the second animal receives lashes for violating the prohibition of an animal and its offspring.

Connection: This halacha is a direct condensation of the entire mishna of 78a. Its opening clause codifies Segment 5 — the prohibition is a chovat haguf, binding everywhere and in every era, for chullin and mukdashin alike. Its second half sweeps up the mishna’s twelve permutations (Segments 6-14): whatever combination of inside/outside and chullin/kodashim, the constant across all twelve cases is that the second slaughterer is lashed for oto v’et beno. The other liabilities the mishna tracks (karet for shechutei chutz, disqualification for chullin ba’azarah or mechusar zman) are codified in their own places in Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot and Hilchot Shechitah; here the Rambam isolates the oto v’et beno strand. The application to mukdashin itself rests on the Gemara’s derivation (Segments 15-17): the juxtaposition of “when a bull or a sheep or a goat is born” (Vayikra 22:27, dealing with offerings) to “it and its offspring you shall not slaughter in one day” (22:28), with the repeated “bull” detaching the verse from an exclusively sacrificial reading and the conjunctive vav retaining kodashim within it.

Topic 3: Only Slaughter — and Only a Kosher Beheimah, Including Kilayim

Source in Daf: 78a, Segments 18-19 and 78b, Segment 1 (the baraita including kilayim and koy; Rava’s rule that “seh” excludes hybrids; the word “or” written to include them)

Rambam — Hilkhot Shechitah 12:3

Hebrew:

אֵין אִסּוּר אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ נוֹהֵג אֶלָּא בִּשְׁחִיטָה בִּלְבַד, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר “לֹא תִשְׁחֲטוּ” — בִּשְׁחִיטַת שְׁנֵיהֶן הוּא הָאִסּוּר. אֲבָל אִם נָחַר הָרִאשׁוֹן אוֹ נִתְנַבֵּל בְּיָדוֹ, מֻתָּר לִשְׁחֹט. וְכֵן אִם שָׁחַט הָרִאשׁוֹן וְנִחָר הַשֵּׁנִי אוֹ נִתְנַבֵּל בְּיָדוֹ, פָּטוּר.

English:

The prohibition against slaughtering an animal and its offspring applies only with regard to ritual slaughter, as the verse states: “You shall not slaughter” — the prohibition involves the slaughter of both animals. If, however, one pierced the neck of the first or it became a nevelah in his hand, it is permitted to slaughter the second. Similarly, if he slaughtered the first and pierced the neck of the second or it became a nevelah in his hand, he is not liable.

Connection: The Torah’s chosen verb — לֹא תִשְׁחֲטוּ, “you shall not slaughter” — which the Gemara on our daf parses word by word (Segments 15-17 and onward) to define the prohibition’s scope, also defines its limit: only two valid acts of shechitah combine to create liability. This ruling is codified in Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 16:9 in nearly identical language.

Rambam — Hilkhot Shechitah 12:8

Hebrew:

אֵין אִסּוּר אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ נוֹהֵג אֶלָּא בִּבְהֵמָה טְהוֹרָה בִּלְבַד, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר “וְשׁוֹר אוֹ שֶׂה אֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ לֹא תִשְׁחֲטוּ בְּיוֹם אֶחָד”. וְנוֹהֵג בְּכִלְאַיִם. כֵּיצַד? צְבִי שֶׁבָּא עַל הָעֵז וְשָׁחַט הָעֵז וְאֶת בְּנָהּ — לוֹקֶה. אֲבָל הָעֵז שֶׁבָּא עַל הַצִּבְיָה — אָסוּר לִשְׁחֹט אוֹתָהּ וְאֶת בְּנָהּ, וְאִם שָׁחַט אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה: פָּרָה וּבְנָהּ אָסְרָה תּוֹרָה, לֹא צִבְיָה וּבְנָהּ.

English:

The prohibition against slaughtering an animal and its offspring applies only with regard to a kosher domesticated animal, as it is stated: “A bull or a sheep — it and its offspring you shall not slaughter in one day.” It does apply with regard to hybrid species. What is implied? When a male deer mates with a female goat and one slaughters the goat and its offspring, one is liable. When, however, a male goat mates with a female deer, it is forbidden to slaughter the deer and its offspring; if one slaughtered them, however, one is not liable for lashes — the Torah forbade a cow and its offspring, not a deer and its offspring.

Connection: This codifies the sugya spanning 78a Segments 18-19 into 78b Segment 1. The baraita taught that oto v’et beno “applies to kilayim and to a koy” — and the Gemara asked how, given Rava’s paradigm (binyan av) that wherever the Torah says “seh” it excludes hybrids. The answer: the seemingly superfluous “or” in “a bull or a sheep” (Vayikra 22:28) comes to include the offspring of diverse kinds. The Rambam’s careful gradations — full lashes where the mother is a true goat, a prohibition without lashes where the mother is a deer — reflect the boundary of that inclusion: the verse includes a hybrid offspring, but the mother herself must be of the species the Torah named. The parallel Shulchan Aruch rulings are Yoreh De’ah 16:7 (“It applies to kilayim that come from the species of sheep and the species of goat”) and 16:8, which reproduces the Rambam’s deer-goat cases almost word for word.

Topic 4: The Mother Certainly — the Father as a Safek

Source in Daf: 78b, Segments 4-12 (the Rabanan/Chananyah dispute: “it applies to females and not to males; Chananyah says, to both males and females,” with the derivations from “oto,” from the mother bird, and from “beno — the one whose offspring clings to it”)

Rambam — Hilkhot Shechitah 12:11

Hebrew:

אִסּוּר אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ נוֹהֵג בִּנְקֵבוֹת, שֶׁזֶּה בְּנָהּ וַדַּאי. וְאִם נוֹדַע וַדַּאי שֶׁזֶּה הוּא אָבִיו — אֵין שׁוֹחֲטִין שְׁנֵיהֶן בְּיוֹם אֶחָד, וְאִם שָׁחַט אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה, שֶׁהַדָּבָר סָפֵק אִם נוֹהֵג בִּזְכָרִים אוֹ אֵינוֹ נוֹהֵג.

English:

The prohibition against slaughtering an animal and its offspring applies with regard to females, for the offspring is certainly its own. If one knows with certainty that a male fathered offspring, the two should not be slaughtered on the same day; if one slaughtered them, however, he is not liable for lashes, for the matter is a doubt — whether the prohibition applies with regard to males or does not apply.

Connection: This is the Rambam’s resolution of the daf’s central dispute (78b, Segment 7): the Rabanan hold oto v’et beno applies to females only — derived from the analogy to the mother bird (Segment 8), from “oto — one and not two” (Segment 10), and from “beno — the one whose offspring clings to it, excluding the male, whose offspring does not cling to it” (Segments 11-12) — while Chananyah applies it to males and females alike. Because the dispute is not conclusively decided, the Rambam rules with a doubled edge: for the mother, whose relationship is biologically certain (בְּנָהּ וַדַּאי), the prohibition applies in full with lashes; for a known father, we are stringent in practice (one may not slaughter them on one day, in deference to Chananyah), but lenient as to punishment — no lashes, since one is not flogged on a safek.

Shulchan Aruch — Yoreh De’ah 16:2

Hebrew:

אִסּוּר אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ נוֹהֵג בִּנְקֵבוֹת, שֶׁזֶּה בְּנָהּ וַדַּאי. וְאִם נוֹדַע וַדַּאי שֶׁזֶּה הוּא אָבִיו — אֵין שׁוֹחֲטִין שְׁנֵיהֶם בְּיוֹם אֶחָד, וְאִם שָׁחַט אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה, שֶׁהַדָּבָר סָפֵק אִם נוֹהֵג בִּזְכָרִים אוֹ אֵינוֹ נוֹהֵג.

English (adapted):

The prohibition of “it and its offspring” applies to females, for the offspring is certainly hers. And if it is known with certainty that a given male is the father, one does not slaughter the two of them on one day; but if one did slaughter, he is not lashed, for the matter is a doubt — whether the prohibition applies to males or does not apply.

Connection: The Shulchan Aruch adopts the Rambam’s formulation verbatim, and both trace to our amud. Note how the psak preserves the anatomy of the sugya itself: the Rabanan’s certainty about the mother becomes definite Torah law with lashes, while Chananyah’s view about the father survives as a le’chatchilah stringency — a safek de’oraita treated stringently in conduct, leniently in penalty.

A Closing Note: Publicizing Misfortune

The daf opens (78a, Segments 1-3) by permitting the practice of painting an afflicted tree with red paint — not for any physical benefit, but “so that people will see it and pray for mercy on its behalf,” derived from the metzora’s cry of “Impure, impure” (Vayikra 13:45): “one to whom any unfortunate matter happens must announce it to the masses, and the masses will pray for mercy on his behalf.” While the tree-painting itself is not codified as a halacha, the underlying principle — that suffering should be shared with the community so that the many can beseech mercy — echoes through the halachic tradition of communal prayer for the sick (such as reciting a mi sheberach publicly and the practice of visiting the sick in order to pray for them). The sugya’s test for darkei ha-Emori is itself of enduring halachic significance: a practice with a demonstrable benefit, or whose mechanism is prayer rather than superstition, falls outside the prohibition.

Summary of Rulings