Chullin Daf 86 (חולין דף פ״ו)
Daf: 86 | Amudim: 86a – 86b | Date: Loading...
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (86a)
Segment 1
TYPE: תירוץ
Rav Dimi’s version explained in ‘it is not necessary’ style: tze terof teaches that Rebbi follows Rabbi Shimon on covering
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לָא מִיבַּעְיָא קָאָמַר: לָא מִיבַּעְיָא ״צֵא נְחוֹר״ דְּלָאו שְׁחִיטָה הִיא כְּלָל, אֲבָל ״צֵא טְרוֹף״ אֵימָא שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה שְׁמָהּ שְׁחִיטָה וְלִיבְעֵי כִּסּוּי, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן כִּדְרַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא.
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: Rav Dimi is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary. That is, it is not necessary to teach: Go out and tear loose, since it is obvious that this is not considered slaughter at all and one is not required to cover the blood. But with regard to the instruction: Go out and render the bird a tereifa, I would say that an act of slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted is nevertheless considered an act of slaughter, and the blood of this bird should require covering. Therefore, Rav Dimi teaches us in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba (85a), that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds with regard to the mitzva of covering the blood that an act of slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted is not considered an act of slaughter, and one is therefore not required to cover the blood of this bird.
קלאוד על הדף:
The daf opens by resolving 85b’s closing question — why did the tze terof (render it a tereifa) tradition not prescribe the simpler tearing loose? The answer: Rav Dimi’s report is framed as lo mibaya, ‘it is not necessary to say.’ Tearing loose obviously involves no slaughter and no covering; the news is in tze terof itself — one might have thought an unfit slaughter still counts as slaughter and requires covering, so Rebbi’s advice teaches, in line with Rabbi Chiyya bar Abba’s report (85a), that for kisui hadam Rebbi holds unfit slaughter is not slaughter.
Key Terms:
- לָא מִיבַּעְיָא קָאָמַר = ‘he speaks in the style of: it is not necessary’ — the cited case is the novel one; the omitted case is obvious
Segment 2
TYPE: קושיא
And for Ravin’s version — why not say tze terof? Surely not because Rebbi holds unfit slaughter is slaughter
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּלְמַאן דְּאָמַר ״צֵא נְחוֹר״, מַאי טַעְמָא לָא אָמַר ״צֵא טְרוֹף״? וְכִי תֵּימָא קָסָבַר שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה שְׁמָהּ שְׁחִיטָה, וְהָא אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: רָאָה רַבִּי דְּבָרָיו שֶׁל רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בְּכִסּוּי הַדָּם, וּשְׁנָאוֹ בִּלְשׁוֹן חֲכָמִים!
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: And according to the one who says that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to Rabbi Ḥiyya: Go out and tear loose the windpipe and gullet, what is the reason Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi did not say: Go out and render the bird a tereifa? And if you would say the reason is because Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that an act of slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted is considered an act of slaughter, and one would be required to cover the blood, this is untenable. As doesn’t Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi saw as correct the statement of Rabbi Shimon, that an ineffective slaughter is not considered an act of slaughter with regard to the mitzva of covering the blood, and taught it in the mishna here using the term: The Rabbis?
קלאוד על הדף:
The symmetric question is posed to Ravin’s tradition (tze nechor — tear it loose): why did Rebbi not offer the tereifa route? One cannot answer that Rebbi holds an unfit slaughter is slaughter and would require covering for a slaughtered tereifa — for Rabbi Chiyya bar Abba testified that Rebbi endorsed Rabbi Shimon’s view for kisui hadam and canonized it as ‘the Rabbis’ in our mishna.
Key Terms:
- צֵא נְחוֹר = ‘go tear it loose’ — Ravin’s version of Rebbi’s advice for obtaining usable blood
Segment 3
TYPE: תירוץ
Ravin’s version too is ‘not necessary’ style: tze nechor teaches that bird slaughter is Torah law
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לָא מִיבַּעְיָא קָאָמַר: לָא מִיבַּעְיָא ״צֵא טְרוֹף״, דִּשְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה לֹא שְׁמָהּ שְׁחִיטָה, אֲבָל ״צֵא נְחוֹר״ – אֵימָא: אֵין שְׁחִיטָה לָעוֹף מִן הַתּוֹרָה, וּנְחִירָתוֹ זוֹ הִיא שְׁחִיטָתוֹ, וְלִיבְעֵי כִּסּוּי, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן ״כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוִּיתִיךְ״.
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: Ravin is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary. That is, it is not necessary to teach: Go out and render the bird a tereifa, since an act of slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted is not considered slaughter and one would not be required to cover the blood of the bird. But with regard to the instruction: Go out and tear loose the windpipe and gullet, I would say that the slaughter of a bird is not obligatory by Torah law to render it permitted for consumption, and consequently, the tearing loose of its windpipe and gullet is considered its slaughter and the blood of this bird should require covering. Therefore, Ravin teaches us that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that the slaughter of a bird is obligatory by Torah law, as he himself derives from the verse: “As I have commanded you” (Deuteronomy 12:21).
קלאוד על הדף:
Ravin’s report is also lo mibaya: the tereifa route is obvious — unfit slaughter is not slaughter and needs no covering. The news is in tze nechor: one might have thought there is no Torah-law shechita for birds, in which case tearing loose would itself constitute the bird’s ‘slaughter’ and require covering. Rebbi’s advice teaches otherwise — as he himself derives from ‘as I have commanded you’ (Devarim 12:21), bird slaughter is Torah law, so nechira is not slaughter and its blood needs no covering. Both traditions emerge as deliberate teachings, each fixing a different principle.
Key Terms:
- אֵין שְׁחִיטָה לָעוֹף מִן הַתּוֹרָה = ‘there is no Torah-law slaughter for birds’ — the rejected premise that would have made nechira into slaughter
- כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוִּיתִיךְ = ‘as I have commanded you’ (Devarim 12:21) — Rebbi’s source that shechita’s laws, including for birds, were commanded orally
Segment 4
TYPE: קושיא (אגדה)
Could moths really have struck Rabbi Chiyya’s flax? His merit protected the generation’s flax!
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּמִי נְפַל לֵיהּ יָאנִיבָא בְּכִיתָּנֵיהּ? וְהָאָמַר רָבִין בַּר אַבָּא, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ אָמַר רַבִּי אָבִין בַּר שְׁבָא: מִשֶּׁעָלוּ בְּנֵי הַגּוֹלָה פָּסְקוּ הַזִּיקִין וְהַזְּוָעוֹת וְהָרוּחוֹת וְהָרְעָמִים, וְלֹא הֶחְמִיץ יֵינָם, וְלֹא לָקָה פִּשְׁתָּנָם, וְנָתְנוּ חֲכָמִים עֵינֵיהֶם בְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא וּבָנָיו.
English Translation:
§ The Gemara questions the very occurrence of the incident involving Rabbi Ḥiyya: And could moths have infested his flax? But doesn’t Ravin bar Abba say, and some say Rabbi Avin bar Sheva says: From when the people of the Exile ascended from Babylonia to Eretz Yisrael there ceased to be meteors, earthquakes, storm winds, and thunder; and their wine did not sour, and their flax was not stricken with an infestation of moths; and the Sages placed their eyes, i.e., attributed these phenomena, to the merit of Rabbi Ḥiyya and his sons, who ascended from Babylonia? If so, how was Rabbi Ḥiyya’s flax affected?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara now questions the story’s very premise. Ravin bar Abba (or Rabbi Avin bar Sheva) taught: from when the exiles ascended from Babylonia, meteors, earthquakes, storms, and thunder ceased, wine did not sour, and flax was not stricken — and the Sages attributed all this to the merit of Rabbi Chiyya and his sons. How then was the flax of Rabbi Chiyya himself — the very source of the protection — infested with moths?
Key Terms:
- פָּסְקוּ הַזִּיקִין וְהַזְּוָעוֹת = meteors and earthquakes ceased — the natural calamities stilled in the merit of the immigrants
- נָתְנוּ חֲכָמִים עֵינֵיהֶם = ‘the Sages placed their eyes’ — attributed the blessing to a specific person’s merit
Segment 5
TYPE: תירוץ (אגדה)
A tzaddik’s merit avails the world, not himself — like Chanina ben Dosa and his kav of carobs
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כִּי מַהְנְיָא זְכוּתַיְיהוּ – אַעָלְמָא, אַדִּידְהוּ – לָא, כִּדְרַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב, דְּאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: בְּכׇל יוֹם וָיוֹם בַּת קוֹל יוֹצֵאת וְאוֹמֶרֶת: כָּל הָעוֹלָם כּוּלּוֹ נִיזּוֹן בִּשְׁבִיל חֲנִינָא בְּנִי, וַחֲנִינָא בְּנִי דַּי לוֹ בְּקַב חָרוּבִין מֵעֶרֶב שַׁבָּת לְעֶרֶב שַׁבָּת.
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: When their merit is effective, it is effective for the rest of the world but not for themselves. And this is in accordance with the statement that Rav Yehuda says in the name of Rav, as Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Each and every day a Divine Voice emerges and says: The entire world is sustained in the merit of Ḥanina ben Dosa, My son, and yet for Ḥanina, My son, a kav of carobs, i.e., a very small amount of inferior food, is sufficient to sustain him from one Shabbat eve to the next Shabbat eve. Similarly, the merit of Rabbi Ḥiyya and his sons was effective for others but not for themselves.
קלאוד על הדף:
The resolution is a principle of righteous merit: when their merit is effective, it is effective for the world — but not for themselves. The proof is Rav’s famous teaching: every day a Divine Voice proclaims, ‘the whole world is sustained for the sake of Chanina My son, and Chanina My son suffices with a kav of carobs from Shabbat eve to Shabbat eve.’ The one who feeds the world subsists on carobs; the one whose merit shields the world’s flax loses his own to the moths.
Key Terms:
- בַּת קוֹל = a Divine Voice — a heavenly echo announcing what is decreed above
- קַב חָרוּבִין = a kav of carobs — the meager weekly ration of Chanina ben Dosa, emblem of the tzaddik’s own austerity
Segment 6
TYPE: משנה
A deaf-mute, imbecile, or minor who slaughtered: supervised — cover the blood; unsupervised — exempt
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְנִי׳ חֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ, וַאֲחֵרִים רוֹאִין אוֹתָם – חַיָּיב לְכַסּוֹת. בֵּינָן לְבֵין עַצְמָן – פָּטוּר מִלְּכַסּוֹת.
English Translation:
MISHNA: In the case of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor who slaughtered an undomesticated animal or a bird, and others saw them and ensured that the slaughter was properly performed, in which case the slaughter is valid (see 2a), one who oversaw the slaughter is obligated to cover the blood. If they slaughtered the animals among themselves without supervision, one is exempt from the obligation to cover the blood.
קלאוד על הדף:
The new mishna applies the perek’s principles to disqualified slaughterers. A cheresh (deaf-mute), shoteh (imbecile), and katan (minor) lack the competence for reliable shechita; but if others watched them slaughter and confirmed it was done properly, the slaughter is valid and the blood must be covered. If they slaughtered among themselves, unsupervised, one is exempt from covering — the slaughter’s validity cannot be established.
Key Terms:
- חֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן = a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor — the classic triad of those presumed incompetent in halachic acts
- אֲחֵרִים רוֹאִין אוֹתָם = others observe them — supervision that validates their slaughter
Segment 7
TYPE: משנה (המשך)
The same for oto v’et bno: supervised — the offspring is forbidden that day; unsupervised — Rabbi Meir permits, the Rabbis forbid
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְכֵן לְעִנְיַן אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ, שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ וַאֲחֵרִים רוֹאִין אוֹתָן – אָסוּר לִשְׁחוֹט אַחֲרֵיהֶם, בֵּינָן לְבֵין עַצְמָן – רַבִּי מֵאִיר מַתִּיר לִשְׁחוֹט אַחֲרֵיהֶן, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹסְרִים, וּמוֹדִים שֶׁאִם שָׁחַט – שֶׁאֵינוֹ סוֹפֵג אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים.
English Translation:
And likewise with regard to the matter of slaughtering a mother and its offspring on the same day, if a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor slaughtered an undomesticated mother animal and others saw them, it is prohibited to slaughter its offspring after them. If they slaughtered the mother animal among themselves, Rabbi Meir deems it permitted to slaughter its offspring after them and the Rabbis deem it prohibited. And the Rabbis concede that if one slaughtered the offspring thereafter that he does not incur the forty lashes, as it is possible the mother was not properly slaughtered.
קלאוד על הדף:
The mishna extends the case to oto v’et bno. If the disqualified trio slaughtered a mother under observation, one may not slaughter her offspring that day. If unsupervised, Rabbi Meir permits slaughtering the offspring after them — their act is presumed no slaughter — and the Rabbis forbid, treating the act as possibly valid. And the Rabbis concede that one who did slaughter the offspring receives no lashes: the mother’s slaughter is at most a doubt, and lashes are not administered on a doubt.
Key Terms:
- רַבִּי מֵאִיר מַתִּיר… וַחֲכָמִים אוֹסְרִים = Rabbi Meir permits and the Rabbis forbid — the positions here run opposite to their stances in the covering mishna
- אֵינוֹ סוֹפֵג אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים = he does not incur the forty lashes — no malkot for a doubtful violation
Segment 8
TYPE: קושיא
The Rabbis seem inconsistent: silent in the first clause, disputing in the second
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גְּמָ׳ וְרַבָּנַן, מַאי שְׁנָא רֵישָׁא דְּלָא פְּלִיגִי, וּמַאי שְׁנָא סֵיפָא דִּפְלִיגִי?
English Translation:
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: And as for the Rabbis, what is different about the first clause of the mishna that discusses the covering of the blood, where they do not disagree with the statement that if a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor slaughtered an animal without supervision one is exempt from the obligation to cover the blood, which indicates the Rabbis hold that such an act of slaughter is not considered an act of slaughter; and what is different about the latter clause of the mishna that discusses the prohibition against slaughtering a mother and its offspring on the same day, where they disagree with Rabbi Meir and hold that if a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor slaughtered a mother animal without supervision one is prohibited to subsequently slaughter its offspring, indicating they hold that such an act of slaughter is in fact considered an act of slaughter?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara probes the Rabbis’ position across the mishna’s two clauses. In the covering clause they are silent — implying agreement that an unsupervised slaughter is no slaughter and needs no covering. In the oto v’et bno clause they forbid slaughtering the offspring — implying the unsupervised slaughter may well be valid. What distinguishes the first clause from the second?
Key Terms:
- מַאי שְׁנָא רֵישָׁא… סֵיפָא = ‘what is different about the first clause… the latter clause’ — the charge of internal inconsistency
Segment 9
TYPE: תירוץ ראשון
Perhaps: requiring covering would broadcast that the slaughter was valid, and people would eat from it
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רֵישָׁא, אִי אָמְרִינַן חַיָּיבִין לְכַסּוֹת, אָמְרִי: שְׁחִיטָה מְעַלַּיְיתָא הִיא, וְאָתֵי לְמֵיכַל מִשְּׁחִיטָתָן.
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: Actually, it is uncertain whether this slaughter is valid or not. With regard to the first clause, if we say one is obligated to cover the blood from an unsupervised slaughter, people might say this is because the slaughter performed by these people is proper, and they will come to eat meat from their slaughter, and it is in fact forbidden to eat from their slaughter. Therefore, the Rabbis did not require the covering of the blood.
קלאוד על הדף:
A first harmonization: the status is genuinely doubtful, and the Rabbis calibrate each ruling to avoid misleading the public. If they required covering an unsupervised slaughter, onlookers would say the slaughter must have been proper — and would come to eat from meat that is in fact forbidden. So for covering they ruled leniently, exempt; while for the offspring they could afford the stringency of forbidding.
Key Terms:
- אָתֵי לְמֵיכַל מִשְּׁחִיטָתָן = people will come to eat from their slaughter — the feared inference from a visible act of covering
Segment 10
TYPE: קושיא
But forbidding the offspring broadcasts the same message!
Hebrew/Aramaic:
סֵיפָא נָמֵי, כֵּיוָן דְּקָאָמְרִי רַבָּנַן אָסוּר לִשְׁחוֹט אַחֲרֵיהֶם, אָמְרִי: שְׁחִיטָה מְעַלַּיְיתָא הִיא, וְאָתֵי לְמֵיכַל מִשְּׁחִיטָתָן!
English Translation:
The Gemara challenges: If so, then with regard to the latter clause of the mishna as well, since the Rabbis say it is prohibited to slaughter the offspring of the mother after them, people might say this is because the slaughter performed by these people is proper, and they will come to eat meat from their slaughter.
קלאוד על הדף:
The harmonization is immediately tested: in the latter clause too, once the Rabbis forbid slaughtering the offspring, observers will conclude that the mother’s slaughter was a proper one — and will come to eat from it. Why does the public-inference concern operate in the first clause but not the second?
Key Terms:
- שְׁחִיטָה מְעַלַּיְיתָא הִיא = ‘it is a proper slaughter’ — the erroneous conclusion the public might draw
Segment 11
TYPE: תירוץ וקושיא
The offspring’s non-slaughter has innocent explanations — but so does covering the blood!
Hebrew/Aramaic:
סֵיפָא, אָמְרִי: בִּשְׂרָא דְּלָא קָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ. רֵישָׁא נָמֵי, אָמְרִי: לְנַקֵּר חֲצֵירוֹ הוּא צָרִיךְ!
English Translation:
The Gemara rejects this: With regard to the latter clause, prohibiting the slaughter of the offspring will not cause people to conclude the unsupervised slaughter of the mother by disqualified people was valid. Rather, they will say: The reason the offspring is not slaughtered is because the owner does not need the meat. The Gemara asks: But with regard to the first clause as well, covering the blood will not lead one to conclude that the unsupervised slaughter was valid, as people will say: He is covering the blood because he needs to clean his courtyard of the blood. If so, let the Rabbis deem one obligated to cover the blood.
קלאוד על הדף:
The defense: not slaughtering the offspring invites an innocent reading — ‘the owner simply does not need the meat today’ — so no one infers the mother’s slaughter was valid. But the Gemara turns the same key in the first clause: covering blood also has an innocent reading — ‘he is cleaning his courtyard.’ If ambiguous acts do not mislead, let the Rabbis require covering as well.
Key Terms:
- לְנַקֵּר חֲצֵירוֹ = to clean his courtyard — the innocent explanation available for covering blood
Segment 12
TYPE: דחייה
The innocent readings fail: slaughter on a dungheap, or one who comes to consult the court
Hebrew/Aramaic:
שָׁחַט בְּאַשְׁפָּה, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? בָּא לִימָּלֵךְ, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?
English Translation:
The Gemara rejects this: But if a disqualified person slaughtered the animal in a garbage dump, what can be said to allow the covering of the blood? Obviously, people will not assume one covers the blood in order to clean a garbage dump. Similarly, if one comes to consult the court, what can be said? That is, if one sees from a distance that a disqualified person slaughtered an animal and the blood is uncovered, and he comes to consult the court with regard to the obligation to cover the blood, if the court tells him to cover the blood he might conclude that this is because the unsupervised slaughter was valid. Accordingly, since there are scenarios in which one might mistakenly conclude that the unsupervised slaughter of inept people is valid, the Rabbis concede that one is exempt from covering the blood of such an act of slaughter in all cases.
קלאוד על הדף:
The innocent-explanation defense collapses in edge cases. If the disqualified person slaughtered on a garbage heap, no one covers blood there to tidy up — covering would only signal a valid slaughter. And if an onlooker comes to consult the court about covering, a ruling to cover reads as a ruling that the slaughter was valid. Since such scenarios exist, the Rabbis (on this reading) waived covering across the board.
Key Terms:
- שָׁחַט בְּאַשְׁפָּה = he slaughtered on a garbage dump — where covering has no housekeeping explanation
- בָּא לִימָּלֵךְ = he comes to consult — asking the court, whose answer will be read as a ruling on the slaughter’s validity
Segment 13
TYPE: קושיא
By that logic, the consultation problem afflicts the second clause too
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְלִיטַעְמָיךְ, סֵיפָא נָמֵי, בָּא לִימָּלֵךְ – מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: But according to your reasoning that the Rabbis are concerned for the aforementioned scenarios, then with regard to the latter clause as well, if one comes to consult the court with regard to the slaughter of the offspring, what can be said? That is, if one sees a disqualified person slaughter the mother, and he comes to ask the court whether he may slaughter the offspring on the same day, if the court prohibits him from slaughtering it he might conclude that this is because the slaughter of the mother was valid. Why, then, do the Rabbis prohibit one from slaughtering the offspring?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara turns the argument on itself: if courtroom optics drive the halacha, the same problem arises in the oto v’et bno clause. One who saw the unsupervised slaughter and comes to ask whether he may slaughter the offspring will hear ‘forbidden’ — and conclude the mother’s slaughter was valid. Why did that concern not move the Rabbis to permit the offspring? The whole optics-based harmonization is buckling.
Key Terms:
- וְלִיטַעְמָיךְ = ‘and according to your reasoning’ — turning a proposed rationale against its own proponent
Segment 14
TYPE: מסקנא
Rather: the Rabbis dispute both clauses — they waited for Rabbi Meir to finish, then disagreed with everything
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא, רַבָּנַן אַכּוּלַּהּ מִילְּתָא פְּלִיגִי, וְנָטְרִי לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר עַד דְּמַסֵּיק לַהּ לְמִילְּתָא, וַהֲדַר פְּלִיגִי עִילָּוֵיהּ.
English Translation:
The Gemara concludes: Rather, it must be that the Rabbis disagree concerning the entire matter, i.e., they disagree with regard to covering the blood as well, and hold that if a disqualified person slaughtered an animal while unsupervised, one must cover the blood; and the Rabbis waited for Rabbi Meir until he concluded his statement, and then they disagreed with him on both accounts.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara abandons harmonization: the Rabbis in fact disagree about the entire mishna. They hold that an unsupervised slaughter by the disqualified trio is possibly valid across the board — one must cover the blood, and one may not slaughter the offspring. Their silence in the first clause was courtesy, not consent: they waited for Rabbi Meir to complete his whole statement and then disputed all of it. The mishna’s format records the flow of the debate, not a clause-by-clause agreement.
Key Terms:
- נָטְרִי לֵיהּ… עַד דְּמַסֵּיק לַהּ לְמִילְּתָא = they waited for him until he finished his statement — the dispute covers both clauses despite its placement
Segment 15
TYPE: קושיא
The Rabbis are consistently stringent — but what is Rabbi Meir’s reasoning?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בִּשְׁלָמָא רַבָּנַן לְחוּמְרָא, אֶלָּא רַבִּי מֵאִיר – מַאי טַעְמָא?
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: If so, granted, the opinion of the Rabbis is understandable, as they consistently rule stringently. That is, although it is prohibited to consume the meat of an unsupervised slaughter performed by a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, the Rabbis require one to cover the blood and prohibit one to slaughter the offspring, due to concern that the person may have performed a valid slaughter. But with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Meir that one is exempt from covering the blood and that one may slaughter the offspring on the same day, what is the reason he does not rule stringently due to uncertainty?
קלאוד על הדף:
With the positions clarified, the Rabbis are intelligible: faced with doubt, they rule stringently in both directions — cover the blood, and do not slaughter the offspring (though eating the meat remains forbidden). But Rabbi Meir now needs explanation: he is lenient on both counts — no covering, and the offspring may be slaughtered. Why does the doubt not trouble him?
Key Terms:
- לְחוּמְרָא = toward stringency — resolving the doubt restrictively in both clauses
Segment 16
TYPE: תירוץ
Rabbi Meir treats their slaughter as certainly invalid — lashes for neveila — because most of their actions are bungled
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מְחַיֵּיב הָיָה רַבִּי מֵאִיר עַל שְׁחִיטָתָן מִשּׁוּם נְבֵלָה. מַאי טַעְמָא? אָמַר רַבִּי אַמֵּי: הוֹאִיל וְרוֹב מַעֲשֵׂיהֶן מְקוּלְקָלִים.
English Translation:
Rabbi Ya’akov says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Rabbi Meir would deem one liable to receive lashes for eating from the slaughter of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, due to violation of the prohibition against eating from an animal carcass. According to Rabbi Meir there is no uncertainty with regard to such slaughter, and it is not considered an act of slaughter at all. Consequently, one may become liable to receive lashes for its consumption. The Gemara asks: What is the reason? Rabbi Ami says: Since the majority of actions of a deaf-mute, imbecile, and a minor are bungled, i.e., they are performed incompetently, it can be assumed that their slaughter was performed improperly as well.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yaakov quotes Rabbi Yochanan: Rabbi Meir would impose lashes on one who eats from the trio’s unsupervised slaughter, for eating neveila. For him there is no doubt at all: the animal is a carcass. Rabbi Ami supplies the basis — rov ma’aseihen mekulkalin, the majority of the actions of a deaf-mute, imbecile, and minor are bungled. A majority converts the doubt into a presumption of invalidity strong enough to ground lashes.
Key Terms:
- מְחַיֵּיב הָיָה רַבִּי מֵאִיר מִשּׁוּם נְבֵלָה = Rabbi Meir would impose liability for neveila — the slaughter is treated as certainly invalid
- רוֹב מַעֲשֵׂיהֶן מְקוּלְקָלִים = most of their actions are bungled — the statistical basis for the presumption
Segment 17
TYPE: קושיא
Why insist on a majority? Rabbi Meir joins even a minority to a presumptive status!
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא לְרַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ לְרַב פָּפָּא: מַאי אִירְיָא רוֹב? אֲפִילּוּ מִיעוּט נָמֵי, דְּהָא רַבִּי מֵאִיר חָיֵישׁ לְמִיעוּטָא, סְמוֹךְ מִיעוּטָא לַחֲזָקָה, וְאִתְּרַע לֵיהּ רוּבָּא?
English Translation:
Rav Pappa said to Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, and some say that Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rav Pappa: Why did Rabbi Ami specifically state that the reasoning of Rabbi Meir is based on the assumption that the majority of their actions are bungled? Even if only a minority of their actions are bungled and the majority are performed competently, Rabbi Meir would also maintain that the animal is considered a carcass, as Rabbi Meir is concerned for a minority when it can be combined with a presumptive status. If so, append the minority to the presumptive status of an animal prior to its slaughter, i.e., that it is prohibited for consumption, and the majority of competent acts of slaughter is thereby weakened.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Pappa and Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua (in either direction of attribution) challenge Rabbi Ami’s formulation: why did he need a majority of bungled actions? Rabbi Meir famously chayish l’miuta — takes even a minority into account — when it can be joined to a chazaka. Here, join the minority of bungled slaughters to the animal’s presumptive status of being forbidden while alive, and the majority of competent slaughters is undermined regardless.
Key Terms:
- חָיֵישׁ לְמִיעוּטָא = he is concerned for the minority — Rabbi Meir’s known methodological stance
- סְמוֹךְ מִיעוּטָא לַחֲזָקָה = join the minority to the presumption — minority plus chazaka can outweigh a majority
Segment 18
TYPE: ראיה (נמשכת)
The proof that Rabbi Meir weighs minorities: the child beside the dough
Hebrew/Aramaic:
דִּתְנַן: תִּינוֹק שֶׁנִּמְצָא בְּצַד הָעִיסָּה וּבָצֵק בְּיָדוֹ, רַבִּי מֵאִיר מְטַהֵר, וַחֲכָמִים מְטַמְּאִין, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ שֶׁל תִּינוֹק לְטַפֵּחַ. וְאָמְרִינַן: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר? קָסָבַר: רוֹב תִּינוֹקוֹת מְטַפְּחִין, וּמִיעוּט אֵין מְטַפְּחִין, וְעִיסָּה זוֹ בְּחֶזְקַת טׇהֳרָה עוֹמֶדֶת,
English Translation:
The Gemara proves that Rabbi Meir is concerned for the minority: As we learned in a mishna (Teharot 3:8): In the case of a ritually impure child who is found alongside ritually pure started dough, and he has risen dough in his hand that may have been removed from the larger portion of started dough, Rabbi Meir deems the started dough pure. This is because there is no proof the child touched it; he might have been given the piece by someone else. And the Rabbis deem it impure, as they assume he touched the started dough. The child is presumed to be impure because it is the manner of a child to handle items. And we say with regard to this mishna: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Meir? He holds that a majority of children handle items, in this case the dough, that are within reach, and a minority do not handle items within reach, and the dough itself retains a presumptive status of purity since its impurity has not been definitively determined.
קלאוד על הדף:
The challengers cite the mishna in Teharot: an impure child is found beside pure started dough with a piece of dough in his hand. Rabbi Meir deems the dough pure; the Rabbis deem it impure, since children typically handle whatever is in reach. The stated reasoning: most children handle, a minority do not, and the dough stands in a presumption of purity — the analysis completes on the next amud, showing Rabbi Meir joining the minority to the chazaka.
Key Terms:
- תִּינוֹק שֶׁנִּמְצָא בְּצַד הָעִיסָּה = a child found beside the dough — the test case for minority-plus-presumption reasoning
- דַּרְכּוֹ שֶׁל תִּינוֹק לְטַפֵּחַ = it is a child’s way to handle things — the majority behavior grounding the Rabbis’ stringency
Amud Bet (86b)
Segment 1
TYPE: סיום הראיה
Join the minority to the presumption and the majority is weakened — so why did Rabbi Ami need a majority?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
סְמוֹךְ מִיעוּטָא לַחֲזָקָה וְאִיתְּרַע לֵיהּ רוּבָּא.
English Translation:
One appends the minority of children who do not handle items within reach to the presumptive status of purity of the dough, and consequently the force of the majority of children who handle items within reach is weakened. Therefore, the dough is considered pure. Similarly, with regard to slaughter performed by inept people, why does Rabbi Ami state that the reason behind Rabbi Meir’s opinion is due to a majority? Let even a minority of bungled acts of slaughter join with the presumptive prohibited status of the animal to render this animal a carcass.
קלאוד על הדף:
The dough proof concludes: Rabbi Meir joins the minority of children who do not handle to the dough’s presumption of purity, and the majority of handling children is thereby weakened — the dough stays pure. The challenge to Rabbi Ami lands: in our mishna too, even a minority of bungled slaughters joined to the animal’s presumptive prohibition should suffice for Rabbi Meir; why ground his ruling in a majority?
Key Terms:
- אִיתְּרַע לֵיהּ רוּבָּא = the majority is weakened — minority plus presumption neutralizes the statistical majority
Segment 2
TYPE: תירוץ
The answer: minority-plus-presumption can declare a doubt pure — not permit a prohibition, and certainly not ground lashes
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִם אָמְרוּ סְפֵק טוּמְאָה לְטַהֵר, יֹאמְרוּ סְפֵק אִיסּוּר לְהַתִּיר?
English Translation:
The Gemara responds that the two cases are not comparable: If they said one may append the minority to the presumptive status with regard to a case of uncertain ritual impurity in order to render the dough pure, will they say that one may rely on a minority in the case of an uncertain prohibition in order to permit it? In other words, without the fact that a majority of the acts of slaughter of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor are bungled, Rabbi Meir could neither deem one exempt from covering the blood nor allow one to slaughter the offspring immediately. Consequently, it is due only to the majority that Rabbi Meir deems one liable for violation of the prohibition against consuming an animal carcass when consuming meat from their slaughter.
קלאוד על הדף:
The resolution draws a boundary between domains. In the dough case, minority-plus-chazaka merely leaves an uncertain impurity in its pure state — a passive, lenient outcome. Here the technique would have to actively permit — exempt from covering, allow the offspring — and, for the neveila lashes, to punish. If they said ‘an uncertain impurity — to purify,’ will they say ‘an uncertain prohibition — to permit’? Only the majority of bungled acts, a genuine statistical presumption, lets Rabbi Meir treat the slaughter as certainly invalid and impose lashes for neveila.
Key Terms:
- סְפֵק טוּמְאָה לְטַהֵר = an uncertain impurity — to purify: the lenient, passive use of minority-plus-presumption
- סְפֵק אִיסּוּר לְהַתִּיר = an uncertain prohibition — to permit: the active leniency the technique cannot deliver
Segment 3
TYPE: בעיא
Rebbi ruled like Rabbi Meir and also like the Rabbis — which ruling came last?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הוֹרָה רַבִּי כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר, וְהוֹרָה רַבִּי כַּחֲכָמִים. הֵי מִינַּיְיהוּ דְּאַחֲרִיתָא?
English Translation:
§ With regard to the dispute in the mishna, the Gemara notes: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi ruled in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who held that if a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor slaughtered a mother animal, one may subsequently slaughter its offspring; and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi also ruled in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who held that it is prohibited to slaughter it. The Gemara asks: Which of these two rulings is the later, definitive ruling, and which ruling is the retracted one?
קלאוד על הדף:
A report complicates the pesak: Rebbi at one time ruled like Rabbi Meir (the offspring may be slaughtered after an unsupervised slaughter by the trio) and at another time like the Rabbis (it is forbidden). Two contradictory rulings from the same authority mean one is a retraction. The question that will occupy the coming passage: which of them is the later, definitive ruling?
Key Terms:
- הֵי מִינַּיְיהוּ דְּאַחֲרִיתָא = ‘which of them is the later one?’ — the later ruling of an authority supersedes the earlier
Segment 4
TYPE: מעשה
Rabbi Ami rebukes Rabbi Abba and Rabbi Zeira for standing outside the study hall
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תָּא שְׁמַע: דְּרַבִּי אַבָּא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא וְרַבִּי זֵירָא הֲווֹ קָיְימִי בְּשׁוּקָא דְּקֵיסָרִי, אַפִּתְחָא דְּבֵי מִדְרְשָׁא. נְפַק רַבִּי אַמֵּי אַשְׁכְּחִינְהוּ, אֲמַר לְהוּ: לָאו אָמֵינָא לְכוּ בְּעִידָּן בֵּי מִדְרְשָׁא לָא תְּקִימוּ אַבָּרַאי, דִּילְמָא אִיכָּא אִינָשׁ דְּמִיצְטַרְכָא לֵיהּ שְׁמַעְתָּא וְאָתֵי לְאִיטְּרוֹדֵי.
English Translation:
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from an incident: Rabbi Abba, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, and Rabbi Zeira were standing in the marketplace of Caesarea, at the entrance to the study hall. Rabbi Ami exited the study hall and found the two of them standing there. Rabbi Ami said to them: Have I not told you that at the time when the study hall is in session you should not stand outside, as perhaps there is a person inside the study hall who requires clarification of a halakha, and he will become bothered by it because you will not be inside to assist in offering the proper explanation?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara answers with a story. Rabbi Abba son of Rabbi Chiyya bar Abba and Rabbi Zeira were standing in the marketplace of Caesarea at the study hall’s entrance. Rabbi Ami emerged and rebuked them: have I not told you not to stand outside while the study hall is in session? Someone inside may need a halacha clarified and be left struggling. The rebuke — a lesson in scholarly responsibility in its own right — sets up the scene inside.
Key Terms:
- שׁוּקָא דְּקֵיסָרִי = the marketplace of Caesarea — outside the study hall of Rabbi Ami’s circle
- אָתֵי לְאִיטְּרוֹדֵי = he will become troubled — left struggling for want of the absent scholars’ help
Segment 5
TYPE: המשך המעשה
Inside, the students debate our very question — and Rabbi Zeira laments the missed chance to ask the elder
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי זֵירָא עָל, רַבִּי אַבָּא לָא עָל. יָתְבִי וְקָא מִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: הֵי מִינַּיְיהוּ אַחְרִיתָא? אֲמַר לְהוּ רַבִּי זֵירָא: לָא שְׁבַקְתּוּן לִי דֶּאֱישַׁיְּילֵיהּ לְסָבָא, דִּילְמָא שְׁמִיעַ לֵיהּ מֵאֲבוּהּ, וַאֲבוּהּ מִינֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, דְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא כֹּל תְּלָתִין יוֹמִין קָא מַהְדַּר תַּלְמוּדֵיהּ קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן.
English Translation:
Rabbi Zeira entered the study hall, whereas Rabbi Abba did not enter. The students were sitting and raising a dilemma: Which of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s two rulings is the later one? Rabbi Zeira said to them: You did not let me know that this is your dilemma while I was outside, which would have allowed me to ask the elder one, i.e., Rabbi Abba, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, since perhaps he heard the answer from his father, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba. And perhaps his father heard it from Rabbi Yoḥanan, as Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba would review his studies in front of Rabbi Yoḥanan every thirty days.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Zeira entered; Rabbi Abba did not. The students inside were debating precisely our dilemma: which of Rebbi’s rulings is the later? Rabbi Zeira exclaimed: you did not tell me while I was still outside, so that I could have asked the elder — Rabbi Abba — who may have heard it from his father Rabbi Chiyya bar Abba, who reviewed his learning before Rabbi Yochanan every thirty days. The chain of transmission — son from father, father from Rabbi Yochanan, refreshed monthly — was standing in the marketplace, and the question missed it.
Key Terms:
- כֹּל תְּלָתִין יוֹמִין קָא מַהְדַּר תַּלְמוּדֵיהּ = he reviewed his learning every thirty days — Rabbi Chiyya bar Abba’s monthly review before Rabbi Yochanan
- סָבָא = the elder — Rabbi Abba, bearer of his father’s traditions
Segment 6
TYPE: פשיטת הבעיא
The resolution: Rabbi Elazar’s message to the exile — ‘Rebbi ruled like Rabbi Meir’ — must report the later ruling
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַאי הָוֵי עֲלַהּ? תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּשָׁלַח רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר לַגּוֹלָה: הוֹרָה רַבִּי כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר. וְהָא כְּרַבָּנַן נָמֵי אוֹרִי! אֶלָּא לָאו שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ הָא דְּאַחֲרִיתָא? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: What conclusion was reached about it? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof: Rabbi Elazar sent a message to the Jews in exile, i.e., Babylonia: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi ruled in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. The Gemara challenges: But Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi also ruled in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. Why did Rabbi Elazar disregard that ruling? The Gemara concludes: Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from Rabbi Elazar’s message that this ruling of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, which is in accordance with Rabbi Meir, is the later one? The Gemara affirms: One may in fact conclude from here that this is so.
קלאוד על הדף:
What was concluded? Rabbi Elazar sent word to the Babylonian exile: ‘Rebbi ruled in accordance with Rabbi Meir.’ But Rebbi also ruled like the Rabbis — why report only one ruling? It must be that the Rabbi Meir ruling is the later, operative one, and that is why it alone was worth transmitting. The Gemara affirms: conclude from it so. The lenient ruling — the offspring may be slaughtered after the trio’s unsupervised slaughter — is Rebbi’s final word.
Key Terms:
- שָׁלַח רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר לַגּוֹלָה = Rabbi Elazar sent to the exile — a formal transmission of pesak to Babylonia
- שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ = conclude from it — the inference stands
Segment 7
TYPE: משנה
One covering suffices for a hundred animals, a hundred birds, or an animal and a bird together; Rabbi Yehuda separates the species
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְנִי׳ שָׁחַט מֵאָה חַיּוֹת בְּמָקוֹם אֶחָד – כִּסּוּי אֶחָד לְכוּלָּן, מֵאָה עוֹפוֹת בְּמָקוֹם אֶחָד – כִּסּוּי אֶחָד לְכוּלָּן, חַיָּה וָעוֹף בְּמָקוֹם אֶחָד – כִּסּוּי אֶחָד לְכוּלָּן. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: שָׁחַט חַיָּה – יְכַסֶּנָּה, וְאַחַר כָּךְ יִשְׁחוֹט אֶת הָעוֹף.
English Translation:
MISHNA: If one slaughtered one hundred undomesticated animals in one place, one covering of the blood suffices for all the animals and there is no obligation to cover the blood of each animal separately. Likewise, if one slaughtered one hundred birds in one place, one covering of the blood suffices for all the birds. If one slaughtered an undomesticated animal and a bird in one place, one covering for all of the blood is sufficient. Rabbi Yehuda says: If one slaughtered an undomesticated animal, he should cover its blood immediately and only thereafter he should slaughter the bird.
קלאוד על הדף:
The perek’s next mishna addresses batch slaughter. One who slaughtered a hundred undomesticated animals in one place — one covering suffices for all; a hundred birds — one covering; even an animal and a bird together — one covering for all the blood. Rabbi Yehuda dissents on the mixed case: one who slaughtered an animal should cover its blood first, and only then slaughter the bird — each species claims its own covering.
Key Terms:
- כִּסּוּי אֶחָד לְכוּלָּן = one covering for them all — the mitzva attaches to the blood collectively, not per animal
- יְכַסֶּנָּה וְאַחַר כָּךְ יִשְׁחוֹט = he covers it and then slaughters — Rabbi Yehuda interposes the covering between species
Segment 8
TYPE: ברייתא
The source: ‘chaya’ and ‘of’ are inclusive terms — many or few
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גְּמָ׳ תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: חַיָּה – כֹּל מַשְׁמַע חַיָּה, בֵּין מְרוּבָּה וּבֵין מוּעֶטֶת; עוֹף – כֹּל מַשְׁמַע עוֹף, בֵּין מְרוּבֶּה וּבֵין מוּעָט; מִכָּאן אָמְרוּ: שָׁחַט מֵאָה חַיּוֹת בְּמָקוֹם אֶחָד – כִּסּוּי אֶחָד לְכוּלָּן, מֵאָה עוֹפוֹת בְּמָקוֹם אֶחָד – כִּסּוּי אֶחָד לְכוּלָּן, חַיָּה וָעוֹף בְּמָקוֹם אֶחָד – כִּסּוּי אֶחָד לְכוּלָּן.
English Translation:
GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to the mitzva of covering the blood: “An undomesticated animal or bird” (Leviticus 17:13). “Undomesticated animal” is inclusive, i.e., any number of animals is included in the term undomesticated animal, whether many or few. Likewise, “bird” is inclusive, i.e., any amount is included in the term bird, whether many or few. From here the Rabbis stated: If one slaughtered one hundred undomesticated animals in one place, one covering of the blood suffices for all the animals. Likewise, if one slaughtered one hundred birds in one place, one covering of the blood suffices for all the birds. If one slaughtered an undomesticated animal and a bird in one place, one covering for all of the blood is sufficient.
קלאוד על הדף:
The baraita grounds the first opinion in the verse’s wording: ‘chaya’ — undomesticated animal — bears its full range of meaning, whether many or few; likewise ‘of’ — bird — many or few. The singular nouns are categorical, covering any quantity. From here the Sages derived the mishna’s rulings: a hundred animals, a hundred birds, or an animal with a bird in one place — one covering for them all.
Key Terms:
- כֹּל מַשְׁמַע = its full range of meaning — the categorical singular embraces any number
Segment 9
TYPE: ברייתא (המשך)
Rabbi Yehuda’s source: ‘an undomesticated animal OR bird’ — the ‘or’ separates them
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: שָׁחַט חַיָּה – יְכַסֶּנָּה, וְאַחַר כָּךְ יִשְׁחוֹט אֶת הָעוֹף, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״חַיָּה אוֹ עוֹף״.
English Translation:
The baraita continues: Rabbi Yehuda says: If one slaughtered an undomesticated animal, he should cover its blood immediately and only thereafter he should slaughter the bird, as it is stated: “An undomesticated animal or bird” (Leviticus 17:13). The term “or” indicates that each type must be attended to separately.
קלאוד על הדף:
The baraita records Rabbi Yehuda’s derivation: the verse says ‘chaya O of’ — an undomesticated animal or a bird — and the disjunctive ‘or’ teaches separation: cover the animal’s blood, then slaughter the bird. For Rabbi Yehuda the species are two distinct obligations that may not be merged under one covering.
Key Terms:
- אוֹ = ‘or’ — the disjunction Rabbi Yehuda reads as mandating separate coverings
Segment 10
TYPE: שקלא וטריא
The Rabbis’ reply: the ‘or’ is needed to teach that each species alone obligates covering
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמְרוּ לוֹ: הֲרֵי הוּא אוֹמֵר ״כִּי נֶפֶשׁ כׇּל בָּשָׂר דָּמוֹ בְנַפְשׁוֹ הוּא״, מַאי קָא מְהַדְּרִי לֵיהּ? הָכִי קָאָמְרִי לֵיהּ רַבָּנַן: הַאי ״אוֹ״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְחַלֵּק.
English Translation:
The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yehuda: But the next verse states: “For as to the life of all flesh, the blood thereof is all one with the life thereof.” The Gemara asks: What are the Rabbis responding to Rabbi Yehuda with this statement? The Gemara explains: This is what the Rabbis are saying to him: This term “or” that interposes between an undomesticated animal and a bird is needed to separate them, in order to indicate that the obligation to cover the blood applies after slaughtering either an undomesticated animal or a bird. If not for the term “or” one might have thought the obligation to cover the blood takes effect only after slaughtering both an undomesticated animal and a bird. Accordingly, one cannot derive from this term that the blood of an undomesticated animal and a bird must be covered separately.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Rabbis counter Rabbi Yehuda by reassigning his proof-text: the ‘or’ is needed l’chalek — to divide — teaching that the covering obligation arises for an animal alone or a bird alone. Without it, one might have thought the mitzva applies only after slaughtering both an animal and a bird. Once the ‘or’ is spent on that basic teaching, nothing remains to require separate coverings. (Their citation of the next verse, ‘for the life of all flesh, its blood is its life,’ serves the coming exchange.)
Key Terms:
- לְחַלֵּק = to divide — establishing that either species independently triggers the mitzva
Segment 11
TYPE: שקלא וטריא (המשך)
Rabbi Yehuda: division is derived from ‘its blood’; the Rabbis: ‘its blood’ can denote many
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה: לְחַלֵּק – מִ״דָּמוֹ״ נָפְקָא, וְרַבָּנַן: ״דָּמוֹ״ טוּבָא מַשְׁמַע, דִּכְתִיב: ״כִּי נֶפֶשׁ כׇּל בָּשָׂר דָּמוֹ בְנַפְשׁוֹ הוּא״.
English Translation:
And Rabbi Yehuda responds to this: The source for separating the obligations with regard to an undomesticated animal and a bird is derived from the verse: “And he shall pour out its blood” (Leviticus 17:13). The verse makes reference to the blood of only one animal, indicating that the obligation applies after slaughtering either a bird or an undomesticated animal. And the Rabbis respond that “its blood” also indicates many, as the term: Blood, can refer to any amount of blood. This is demonstrated by that which is written: “For as to the life of all flesh, the blood thereof is all one with the life thereof” (Leviticus 17:14).
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yehuda deflects: the either/or teaching flows from ‘damo’ — ‘and he shall pour out its blood,’ in the singular — freeing the ‘or’ to require separate coverings. The Rabbis respond that ‘damo’ cannot carry that weight: the singular ‘blood’ denotes any quantity, as in the very next verse — ‘for the life of all flesh, its blood [damo] is its life’ — where one word spans the blood of all flesh. The exchange ends in a standoff of texts, with the halacha following the first opinion.
Key Terms:
- דָּמוֹ = ‘its blood’ — singular in form, but capable of denoting the blood of many
Segment 12
TYPE: מימרא וקושיא
Rabbi Chanina: Rabbi Yehuda concedes one blessing suffices — challenged from the students of Rav
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא: מוֹדֶה הָיָה רַבִּי יְהוּדָה לְעִנְיַן בְּרָכָה, שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְבָרֵךְ אֶלָּא בְּרָכָה אַחַת. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: מַאי שְׁנָא מִתַּלְמִידֵי דְּרַב?
English Translation:
§ Rabbi Ḥanina says: Although Rabbi Yehuda holds that one first covers the blood of an undomesticated animal before slaughtering the bird, Rabbi Yehuda would concede with regard to the matter of the blessing over their slaughter, i.e., that one recites only one blessing. The Gemara questions this assertion: Ravina said to Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, and some say that Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: In what way is this case different from the incident that occurred with the students of Rav?
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Chanina qualifies the dispute: even Rabbi Yehuda, who requires covering between the animal and the bird, concedes that one blessing over the slaughter covers both — the interposed covering does not sever the acts. Ravina (or Rav Acha son of Rava) challenges from an incident of Rav’s students: how does this differ from the rule about the cup of blessing?
Key Terms:
- לְעִנְיַן בְּרָכָה = with regard to the blessing — whether the interruption forces a new birkat ha’shechita
Segment 13
TYPE: מעשה וקושיא
Rav Beruna and Rav Chananel: once one says ‘bring the cup for Grace,’ drinking requires a new blessing — so covering should force a new blessing too
Hebrew/Aramaic:
דְּרַב בְּרוֹנָא וְרַב חֲנַנְאֵל תַּלְמִידֵי דְּרַב הֲווֹ יָתְבִי בִּסְעוֹדְתָּא, קָאֵי עֲלַיְיהוּ רַב יֵיבָא סָבָא, אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ: הַב לִיבָרֵיךְ. הֲדוּר אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ: הַב לִישְׁתֵּי. אֲמַר לְהוּ רַב יֵיבָא סָבָא: הָכִי אָמַר רַב, כֵּיוָן דַּאֲמַר ״הַב לִיבָרֵיךְ״ אִיתְּסַר לֵיהּ לְמִשְׁתֵּי חַמְרָא. הָכָא נָמֵי, כֵּיוָן דְּאִיטַּפַּל לֵיהּ לְכִסּוּי אִיחַיַּיב לֵיהּ לִבְרָכָה.
English Translation:
As it occurred that Rav Beruna and Rav Ḥananel, the students of Rav, were sitting together at a meal, and Rav Yeiva the Elder stood over them to serve them. They said to him: Give us a cup of wine over which to recite the blessings of Grace after Meals. They then changed their mind and said to him: Give us a cup of wine to drink. Rav Yeiva the Elder said to them that this is what Rav said: Once someone at a meal says: Give me a cup over which to recite the blessings of Grace after Meals, it is prohibited for him to drink any more wine, since he has expressed his desire to conclude his meal. If he now wishes to drink more wine, he must recite a blessing before drinking it. Ravina asks: Here too, since he is required to cover the blood of the undomesticated animal before slaughtering the bird, there is an interruption between the acts of slaughter, and he has therefore become obligated to recite a new blessing before slaughtering the bird.
קלאוד על הדף:
The incident: Rav Beruna and Rav Chananel, students of Rav, sat at a meal with Rav Yeiva the Elder serving. They said ‘give us the cup to recite Grace,’ then changed their minds — ‘give us the cup to drink.’ Rav Yeiva quoted Rav: once one says ‘bring the cup for Grace,’ drinking is forbidden until a new blessing is recited — declaring the meal over severs it. The challenge to Rabbi Chanina: here too, once one turns to the covering, he has closed the act of slaughtering — let a new blessing be required for the bird. The difficulty stands as the daf ends, continuing on 87a.
Key Terms:
- הַב לִיבָרֵיךְ = ‘give us [the cup] to recite Grace’ — the declaration that closes the meal
- אִיטַּפַּל לֵיהּ לְכִסּוּי = he occupied himself with the covering — the interruption claimed to sever the two slaughters