Chullin Daf 85 (חולין דף פ״ה)
Daf: 85 | Amudim: 85a – 85b | Date: Loading...
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (85a)
Segment 1
TYPE: מסקנת הבירור
The shofar’s uncertain case: one who is doubtfully a man, doubtfully a woman
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא סְפֵק אִישׁ סְפֵק אִשָּׁה.
English Translation:
Rather, it must be that the uncertainty in the case of the sounding of the shofar concerns whether a particular individual is a man or a woman, e.g., a tumtum, whose sexual organs are indeterminate. Although a woman is not obligated in the mitzva of sounding the shofar, a tumtum is in fact obligated, despite the uncertainty of sex. It is therefore possible to derive from the sounding of the shofar that if one slaughters a koy, an animal whose status as a domesticated or undomesticated animal is uncertain, on a Festival, one covers its blood.
קלאוד על הדף:
The analysis carried over from 84b concludes: the ‘uncertain shofar obligation’ that overrides Yom Tov is not a doubtful day but a doubtful person — a tumtum, whose concealed anatomy leaves it uncertain whether the individual is a man (obligated to sound the shofar) or a woman (exempt). Such a person sounds the shofar on Rosh Hashana despite the doubt. This gives the Sages’ rebuttal real force: a doubtful obligation of shofar does override the Festival, so Rabbi Yosei’s inference — that the koy’s doubtful covering obligation cannot override Yom Tov — has a genuine counterexample.
Key Terms:
- טוּמְטוּם = a person of indeterminate anatomy — doubtfully male, doubtfully female — obligated in shofar out of doubt
- סְפֵק אִישׁ סְפֵק אִשָּׁה = doubtfully a man, doubtfully a woman — the uncertainty is in the person, not the day
Segment 2
TYPE: ביאור שיטת רבי יוסי
Rabbi Yosei follows his own view: even a definite woman may sound the shofar
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי לְטַעְמֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר: אִשָּׁה וַדָּאִית נָמֵי תָּקְעָה. דְּתַנְיָא: בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל סוֹמְכִין, וְלֹא בְּנוֹת יִשְׂרָאֵל סוֹמְכוֹת.
English Translation:
The Gemara notes: And Rabbi Yosei, who does not accept this refutation, conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as he says: One who is definitely a woman may also sound the shofar on Rosh HaShana. As it is taught in a baraita concerning the verse that discusses a burnt offering: “Speak to the sons of Israel…and he shall place his hands upon the head of the burnt offering” (Leviticus 1:2–4). The verse indicates that the sons of Israel place their hands upon the head of an offering, but the daughters of Israel do notplace their hands.
קלאוד על הדף:
Why is Rabbi Yosei unmoved by the tumtum counterexample? Because he is consistent with his own position: even a definite woman may sound the shofar on Rosh Hashana. If a woman’s sounding involves no desecration of the day, then a tumtum’s shofar-blowing proves nothing about doubtful obligations overriding Yom Tov — it is simply permitted conduct, doubt or no doubt. The source cited is the baraita on semikha: ‘Speak to the sons of Israel… and he shall lay his hand’ — the sons of Israel lay hands on offerings, not the daughters.
Key Terms:
- לְטַעְמֵיהּ = follows his own reasoning — a sage’s position in one dispute explains his stance in another
- סְמִיכָה = laying hands upon an offering’s head with one’s full weight before its slaughter
Segment 3
TYPE: ברייתא (המשך)
Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon: for women, laying hands is optional
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי יוֹסֵי וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמְרִים: נָשִׁים סוֹמְכוֹת רְשׁוּת.
English Translation:
Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon say: It is optional for women to place their hands on the head of an offering before it is slaughtered. Even though women are not obligated to place their hands, doing so is not considered to be performing labor with a sacrificial item, an act normally prohibited, despite the fact that one performs the placing of the hands by leaning with all of his weight on the animal. Similarly, Rabbi Yosei holds that although women are not obligated in the sounding of the shofar, it is optional for them to sound it, and it is not considered a desecration of the Festival.
קלאוד על הדף:
The baraita concludes: Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon say women may lay hands optionally (reshut). Though exempt, a woman who performs semikha does not thereby misuse a consecrated animal. The same logic governs the shofar: a woman’s voluntary sounding is not a desecration of the Festival. For Rabbi Yosei, then, the tumtum who sounds the shofar demonstrates nothing about the power of doubtful obligations — and his kal vachomer about the koy survives the Sages’ rebuttal on his own terms.
Key Terms:
- נָשִׁים סוֹמְכוֹת רְשׁוּת = women lay hands optionally — voluntary performance of a mitzva from which one is exempt is permitted
- רְשׁוּת = optional — neither obligated nor forbidden
Segment 4
TYPE: פירכא
Ravina: even for the Sages, shofar is no proof — its definite obligation overrides Shabbat in the Temple
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רָבִינָא: וּלְמַאי דְּקָאָמְרִי רַבָּנַן נָמֵי אִית לֵיהּ פִּירְכָא, מָה לִתְקִיעַת שׁוֹפָר שֶׁכֵּן וַדָּאָהּ דּוֹחֶה שַׁבָּת בַּמִּקְדָּשׁ, תֹּאמַר בְּכִיסּוּי דְּלֵיתֵיהּ כְּלָל!
English Translation:
Ravina said: And even according to what the Sages said, that a woman may not sound the shofar on Rosh HaShana but a tumtum is nevertheless obligated due to uncertainty, there is a refutation to their claim as well. One cannot derive from this that the obligation to cover the blood of a koy overrides a Festival. What is notable about the sounding of the shofar? It is notable in that its definite obligation overrides Shabbat in the Temple, as it was sounded in the Temple even when Rosh HaShana occurred on Shabbat, and it is therefore understandable that its uncertain obligation overrides a Festival as well. Can you say the same with regard to the mitzva of covering the blood, which does not override Shabbat in any instance?
קלאוד על הדף:
Ravina adds that even on the Sages’ premises — a woman may not sound the shofar, and the tumtum’s sounding is truly a doubtful obligation overriding the Festival — the rebuttal fails. Shofar is a poor comparison for covering blood: the shofar’s definite obligation overrides Shabbat in the Temple, where it was sounded even on a Shabbat Rosh Hashana. A mitzva with that strength may well have its doubtful case override Yom Tov. Covering the blood never overrides Shabbat anywhere — so no inference from shofar to the koy can stand.
Key Terms:
- וַדָּאָהּ דּוֹחֶה שַׁבָּת בַּמִּקְדָּשׁ = its definite obligation overrides Shabbat in the Temple — the shofar’s unique strength
- פִּירְכָא = a refutation — a disanalogy that breaks a comparison
Segment 5
TYPE: דיוק בפירכא
Rabbi Elazar HaKappar’s refutation is re-examined: is circumcision performed on other nights?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הֵשִׁיב רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר הַקַּפָּר בְּרִיבִּי: מָה לְמִילָה שֶׁכֵּן אֵינָהּ נוֹהֶגֶת בְּלֵילֵי יָמִים טוֹבִים. בְּלֵילֵי יָמִים טוֹבִים הוּא דְּלָא נָהֲגָא, בִּשְׁאָר לֵילֵי נָהֲגָא?
English Translation:
The Gemara continues its analysis of the baraita: Rabbi Elazar HaKappar the Distinguished responded with another refutation to Rabbi Yosei’s a fortiori inference: One cannot infer from the mitzva of circumcision that an uncertain obligation to cover the blood of a koy does not override a Festival. What is notable about circumcision? It is notable in that it is not in effect on Festival nights. Can you say the same with regard to the mitzva of covering the blood, which is in effect on Festival nights? The Gemara asks: Does Rabbi Elazar HaKappar mean to say that the mitzva of circumcision is not in effect only on Festival nights, but it is in effect on other, non-Festival nights? Isn’t circumcision always performed during the day?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara returns to Rabbi Elazar HaKappar’s refutation from 84b — circumcision ‘is not in effect on Festival nights’ while covering is — and presses its wording: only on Festival nights it is not in effect, implying it is performed on other nights? But circumcision is never performed at night; it is a daytime mitzva across the board. The formulation must be repaired.
Key Terms:
- בְּלֵילֵי יָמִים טוֹבִים = on Festival nights — the overly narrow wording that triggers the challenge
Segment 6
TYPE: תיקון הפירכא
The corrected refutation: circumcision does not apply at night as by day — covering does. Rabbi Abba’s tribute stands
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא, מָה לְמִילָה – שֶׁכֵּן אֵינָהּ נוֹהֶגֶת בַּלֵּילוֹת כְּבַיָּמִים, תֹּאמַר בְּכִסּוּי – שֶׁנּוֹהֵג בַּלֵּילוֹת כְּבַיָּמִים! אָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא: זֶה אֶחָד מִן הַדְּבָרִים שֶׁאָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא אֵין עֲלֵיהֶן תְּשׁוּבָה, וְהֵשִׁיב רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי תְּשׁוּבָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: Rather, Rabbi Elazar HaKappar meant the following: What is notable about circumcision? It is notable in that it is not in effect at night as it is by day. Can you say a similar halakha with regard to the mitzva of covering the blood, which is in effect at night as it is by day? Rabbi Abba said: This a fortiori inference drawn by Rabbi Yosei is one of the matters with regard to which Rabbi Ḥiyya says that there is no refutation for them, and Rabbi Elazar HaKappar the Distinguished successfully responded with a refutation.
קלאוד על הדף:
The refutation is restated precisely: circumcision is notable in that it does not apply at night as it does by day — it is temporally limited — while covering the blood applies at night just as by day. A broader mitzva cannot be bounded by inference from a narrower one, so Rabbi Yosei’s kal vachomer fails. Rabbi Abba’s tribute is repeated: this was one of the arguments Rabbi Chiyya declared unanswerable, and Rabbi Elazar HaKappar the Distinguished answered it. With that, the koy discussion closes and the mishna of unfit slaughter follows.
Key Terms:
- אֵינָהּ נוֹהֶגֶת בַּלֵּילוֹת כְּבַיָּמִים = does not apply at night as by day — the corrected formulation of circumcision’s limitation
Segment 7
TYPE: משנה
The mishna: four unfit slaughters — Rabbi Meir obligates covering, the Rabbis exempt
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְנִי׳ הַשּׁוֹחֵט וְנִמְצֵאת טְרֵיפָה, וְהַשּׁוֹחֵט לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, וְהַשּׁוֹחֵט חוּלִּין בִּפְנִים וְקָדָשִׁים בַּחוּץ, חַיָּה וָעוֹף הַנִּסְקָלִים – רַבִּי מֵאִיר מְחַיֵּיב, וַחֲכָמִים פּוֹטְרִים.
English Translation:
MISHNA: In the case of one who slaughters an undomesticated animal or a bird and it is discovered to be an animal with a wound that would have caused it to die within twelve months [tereifa]; and in the case of one who slaughters an undomesticated animal or a bird for the sake of idol worship; and in the case of one who slaughters a non-sacred animal or bird inside the Temple courtyard or a sacrificial bird outside the Temple courtyard; or in the case of one who slaughters an undomesticated animal or a bird that was sentenced to be stoned, e.g., for killing a person; in all these cases, even though it is prohibited to eat any of these animals or birds, Rabbi Meir deems one obligated to cover their blood, and the Rabbis deem one exempt from doing so because, in their opinion, slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted for consumption is not considered an act of slaughter.
קלאוד על הדף:
The new mishna presents the defining machloket of this perek. Four cases of slaughter that cannot yield permitted meat: one slaughters and the animal is found to be a tereifa; one slaughters for idol worship; one slaughters non-sacred animals inside the Temple courtyard or sacrificial birds outside it; and one slaughters an animal sentenced to stoning. Rabbi Meir obligates covering the blood — an unfit slaughter is still slaughter; the Rabbis exempt — shechita she’einah re’uya is not slaughter. The Gemara will reveal that these ‘Rabbis’ are Rabbi Shimon, promoted editorially by Rebbi.
Key Terms:
- טְרֵיפָה = an animal with a fatal defect that would kill it within twelve months — forbidden even after valid slaughter
- חַיָּה וָעוֹף הַנִּסְקָלִים = an animal or bird sentenced to stoning (e.g., for killing a person) — benefit from it is forbidden
Segment 8
TYPE: משנה (סיום)
No covering where there was no act of slaughter: botched slaughter, stabbing, tearing loose
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הַשּׁוֹחֵט וְנִתְנַבְּלָה בְּיָדוֹ, הַנּוֹחֵר וְהַמְעַקֵּר – פָּטוּר מִלְּכַסּוֹת.
English Translation:
One who slaughters an animal or bird and it became a carcass by his hand, i.e., the slaughter was performed incorrectly, and one who stabs the animal or bird, and one who tears loose the windpipe and the gullet, are exempt from covering the blood, as no act of slaughter took place, and one is obligated to cover blood only after a valid slaughter.
קלאוד על הדף:
The mishna’s final clause is common ground: one whose slaughter went wrong and produced a carcass (nitnabla b’yado), one who stabs the animal (nocher), and one who tears loose the windpipe and gullet (me’aker) are exempt from covering. Here no one disputes: the covering obligation attaches to shechita, and these deaths are not failed-but-real slaughters — they are not slaughter at all. This clause becomes the hinge of the Rabbi Chiyya flax story at the daf’s end.
Key Terms:
- נוֹחֵר = one who stabs the animal to death rather than slaughtering
- מְעַקֵּר = one who tears loose the windpipe and gullet — killing without an act of shechita
- נִתְנַבְּלָה בְּיָדוֹ = it became a carcass by his hand — an invalid slaughter that renders the animal a neveila
Segment 9
TYPE: מימרא
Rebbi saw Rabbi Meir’s view as correct for oto v’et bno and Rabbi Shimon’s for covering — and taught each as ‘the Rabbis’
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: רָאָה רַבִּי דְּבָרָיו שֶׁל רַבִּי מֵאִיר בְּאוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ, וּשְׁנָאוֹ בִּלְשׁוֹן חֲכָמִים, וּדְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בְּכִסּוּי הַדָּם, וּשְׁנָאוֹ בִּלְשׁוֹן חֲכָמִים.
English Translation:
GEMARA: With regard to the dispute in the mishna about whether an act of slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted renders one obligated to cover the blood, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, the redactor of the Mishna, saw as correct the statement of Rabbi Meir, that ineffective slaughter is considered an act of slaughter, with regard to the prohibition against slaughtering a mother and its offspring on the same day, and taught that halakha in the mishna (81b) using the term: The Rabbis, so that it would be accepted. And he saw as correct the statement of Rabbi Shimon, that ineffective slaughter is not considered an act of slaughter with regard to the mitzva of covering the blood, and taught that halakha in the mishna here using the term: The Rabbis.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Chiyya bar Abba reports Rabbi Yochanan’s remarkable window into the Mishna’s redaction: Rebbi ‘saw’ — deemed correct — Rabbi Meir’s view (unfit slaughter is slaughter) for oto v’et bno, and taught it anonymously in the language of ‘the Rabbis’ (81b); and he saw Rabbi Shimon’s view (unfit slaughter is not slaughter) as correct for kisui hadam, and taught it here as ‘the Rabbis.’ The anonymous majority in each mishna is an editorial construction designed to fix the halacha — stringent for the prohibition, lenient for the mitzva.
Key Terms:
- רָאָה רַבִּי = ‘Rebbi saw’ — the redactor endorsed a minority view and canonized it anonymously
- שְׁנָאוֹ בִּלְשׁוֹן חֲכָמִים = taught it in the language of ‘the Sages’ — anonymity confers majority authority
Segment 10
TYPE: שאלה ותשובה
Rabbi Meir’s source for oto v’et bno: the gezeira shava shechita-shechita from offerings slaughtered outside
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר בְּאוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ? אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי: גָּמַר שְׁחִיטָה שְׁחִיטָה מִשְּׁחוּטֵי חוּץ.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: What is the reason that Rabbi Meir holds that ineffective slaughter is considered an act of slaughter in the case of a mother and its offspring? Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: He derives his opinion by means of a verbal analogy of the terms slaughter and slaughter, from the case of sacrificial animals slaughtered outside the Temple. The verse states with regard to a mother and its offspring: “It and its offspring you shall not slaughter [lo tishḥatu] in one day” (Leviticus 22:28), and the verse states with regard to sacrificial animals: “Or that is slaughtered [yishḥat] outside the camp” (Leviticus 17:3).
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara asks for Rabbi Meir’s reasoning in oto v’et bno. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi answers: a verbal analogy between ‘you shall not slaughter’ (lo tishchatu, Vayikra 22:28) and ‘that is slaughtered outside the camp’ (yishchat, Vayikra 17:3) — the case of shechutei chutz, offerings slaughtered outside the Temple.
Key Terms:
- שְׁחוּטֵי חוּץ = sacrificial animals slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard — a capital transgression whose ‘slaughter’ can never permit the meat
Segment 11
TYPE: המשך הדרשה
Just as there an unfit slaughter is slaughter, so here
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מָה הָתָם – שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה שְׁמָהּ שְׁחִיטָה, אַף הָכָא נָמֵי – שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה שְׁמָהּ שְׁחִיטָה.
English Translation:
Accordingly, just as there, with regard to one who slaughters an offering outside the Temple it is a case of slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted, as one is prohibited from deriving any benefit from such meat, and it is nevertheless considered an act of slaughter to render one liable for slaughtering it outside the Temple, so too here, in the case of a mother and its offspring, an act of slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted is considered an act of slaughter, and one is liable.
קלאוד על הדף:
The analogy’s yield: the slaughter of an offering outside the Temple can never render its meat permitted — benefit from it is forbidden — and yet the Torah calls it slaughter and imposes liability for it. So too in oto v’et bno: an act of slaughter that cannot permit the meat still counts as slaughter, and one who slaughters mother and offspring is liable even where one of the slaughters was invalid for eating.
Key Terms:
- שְׁמָהּ שְׁחִיטָה = ‘it is called slaughter’ — the act has full halachic status regardless of whether it permits the meat
Segment 12
TYPE: שאלה ותשובה
Rabbi Shimon’s source: ‘slaughter [tevo’ach] and prepare’ — slaughter that readies meat for eating
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, מַאי טַעְמָא? אָמַר רַבִּי מָנִי בַּר פַּטִּישׁ: גָּמַר מִ״טְּבוֹחַ טֶבַח וְהָכֵן״, מָה לְהַלָּן שְׁחִיטָה רְאוּיָה, אַף כָּאן שְׁחִיטָה רְאוּיָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Shimon, what is the reason he holds that an ineffective slaughter is not considered an act of slaughter? Rabbi Mani bar Pattish said: Rabbi Shimon derives his opinion from the verse: “Slaughter [tevo’aḥ] and prepare; for the men shall dine with me at noon” (Genesis 43:16). Just as there, the verse is referring to an act of slaughter that is fit to render the meat permitted, so too here, in the case of a mother and its offspring, only an act of slaughter that is fit to render the meat permitted is considered an act of slaughter.
קלאוד על הדף:
And Rabbi Shimon? Rabbi Mani bar Pattish points to Yosef’s command: ‘Slaughter [tevo’ach] a slaughtering and prepare, for the men shall dine with me at noon’ (Bereishit 43:16). There, slaughter means an act fit to yield a meal — shechita re’uya. So in oto v’et bno: only slaughter fit to permit the meat is ‘slaughter,’ and an unfit act carries no liability.
Key Terms:
- טְבוֹחַ טֶבַח וְהָכֵן = ‘slaughter and prepare’ (Bereishit 43:16) — slaughter in the service of a meal, the paradigm of fit slaughter
Segment 13
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Why does Rabbi Meir not derive from tevo’ach? One derives shechita from shechita, not from tevicha
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר נָמֵי, לִיגְמַר מִ״טְּבוֹחַ״? דָּנִין שְׁחִיטָה מִשְּׁחִיטָה, וְאֵין דָּנִין שְׁחִיטָה מִטְּבִיחָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara suggests: And as for Rabbi Meir as well, let him derive from “tevo’aḥ” that only an effective slaughter is considered an act of slaughter. The Gemara responds: According to Rabbi Meir, one derives the halakha with regard to a term of sheḥita from another instance of a term of sheḥita, and one does not derive the halakha with regard to the term of sheḥita from the term of teviḥa.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara asks why Rabbi Meir prefers the shechutei chutz analogy over Yosef’s tevo’ach. The answer is methodological: a gezeira shava runs along identical terms. The prohibition of oto v’et bno uses the root sh-ch-t; one derives shechita from shechita, and not shechita from tevicha — a different verb, even if it denotes the same act.
Key Terms:
- דָּנִין שְׁחִיטָה מִשְּׁחִיטָה = one derives ‘slaughter’ from ‘slaughter’ — verbal analogies require matching terms
Segment 14
TYPE: קושיא
Does the term matter? The school of Rabbi Yishmael equated ‘returning’ and ‘coming’
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מָה נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ? הָא תָּנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל: ״וְשָׁב הַכֹּהֵן״ ״וּבָא הַכֹּהֵן״ – זוֹ הִיא שִׁיבָה זוֹ הִיא בִּיאָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: Being that both terms refer to slaughter, what is the difference which one is used; didn’t the school of Rabbi Yishmael teach a verbal analogy with regard to leprosy of houses: The verse states: “And the priest shall return [veshav] on the seventh day” (Leviticus 14:39), and another verse with regard to the priest’s visit seven days later states: “And the priest shall come [uva] and look” (Leviticus 14:44). This returning and this coming have the same meaning and one can therefore derive by verbal analogy that the halakha that applies if the leprosy had spread at the conclusion of the first week applies if it had spread again by the end of the following week.
קלאוד על הדף:
The methodology is challenged from the school of Rabbi Yishmael: in the laws of house-leprosy the Torah says ‘and the priest shall return’ (veshav) and later ‘and the priest shall come’ (uva), and the school taught: this returning is this coming — the two different verbs are treated as equivalent for a verbal analogy. Apparently synonymous terms can sustain a gezeira shava; why then should tevicha not teach about shechita?
Key Terms:
- זוֹ הִיא שִׁיבָה זוֹ הִיא בִּיאָה = ‘this is returning, this is coming’ — different verbs of like meaning joined in one analogy
Segment 15
TYPE: תירוץ
Synonyms serve only where no identical term exists
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָנֵי מִילֵּי – הֵיכָא דְּלֵיכָּא דְּדָמֵי לֵיהּ, אֲבָל אִיכָּא דְּדָמֵי לֵיהּ – מִדְּדָמֵי לֵיהּ יָלְפִינַן.
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: This statement of the school of Rabbi Yishmael applies only where there are no other terms that are identical to it from which one could derive a verbal analogy. But if there is another term that is identical to it, we derive the verbal analogy from the term that is identical to it. Accordingly, Rabbi Meir derives a verbal analogy from the instance of sheḥita that appears with regard to sacrificial animals that are slaughtered outside the Temple.
קלאוד על הדף:
The answer preserves both rules: the school of Rabbi Yishmael’s equation applies only where no identical term is available — there is no second ‘returning’ to pair with. But where an identical term exists, one derives from the identical term. Since the Torah offers shechita at shechutei chutz, Rabbi Meir derives from it and has no need for tevo’ach.
Key Terms:
- מִדְּדָמֵי לֵיהּ יָלְפִינַן = ‘we derive from that which is identical to it’ — an exact verbal match takes precedence over a synonym
Segment 16
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
And Rabbi Shimon? One derives chullin from chullin, not chullin from kodashim
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן נָמֵי לִיגְמַר מִשְּׁחוּטֵי חוּץ? דָּנִין חוּלִּין מֵחוּלִּין, וְאֵין דָּנִין חוּלִּין מִקֳּדָשִׁים.
English Translation:
The Gemara suggests: And as for Rabbi Shimon as well, let him derive from the case of sacrificial animals that were slaughtered outside the Temple that ineffective slaughter is considered an act of slaughter. The Gemara responds: Rabbi Shimon holds that one derives the halakha with regard to the slaughter of non-sacred animals from another instance of the slaughter of non-sacred animals, and one does not derive the halakha with regard to the slaughter of non-sacred animals from an instance of the slaughter of sacrificial animals. The prohibition against slaughtering a mother and its offspring on the same day is stated primarily with regard to non-sacred animals (see 78a).
קלאוד על הדף:
The symmetric question: why does Rabbi Shimon not learn from shechutei chutz, which shares the term shechita? His answer is contextual rather than lexical: oto v’et bno is stated primarily about non-sacred animals, and one derives the laws of chullin from a chullin context — Yosef’s meal — not from the sacrificial world of shechutei chutz. The two tannaim disagree about which resemblance governs: the matching word or the matching subject.
Key Terms:
- דָּנִין חוּלִּין מֵחוּלִּין = one derives non-sacred law from a non-sacred source — context outweighs terminology for Rabbi Shimon
Segment 17
TYPE: תשובת רבי מאיר וסיכום
Rabbi Meir: oto v’et bno applies to kodashim too — and this is what Rebbi endorsed
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר: אַטּוּ אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ בְּקָדָשִׁים מִי לָא נָהֵיג? הַיְינוּ דְּקָאָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא: רָאָה רַבִּי דְּבָרָיו שֶׁל רַבִּי מֵאִיר בְּאוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ, וּשְׁנָאוֹ בִּלְשׁוֹן חֲכָמִים.
English Translation:
The Gemara continues: And Rabbi Meir would respond: Is this to say that the prohibition against slaughtering a mother and its offspring on the same day does not apply to sacrificial animals? Rather, since the prohibition also applies to sacrificial animals, one can derive its halakha from the case of sacrificial animals that were slaughtered outside the Temple. The Gemara comments: This is what Rabbi Ḥiyya was referring to when he said that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi saw as correct the statement of Rabbi Meir with regard to the halakha of a mother and its offspring, and taught it in the mishna using the term: The Rabbis.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Meir’s rejoinder: is oto v’et bno not in effect for sacrificial animals? Indeed it is — the previous perek established that it applies to kodashim (78a) — so a sacrificial source is no foreign context, and the shechita-shechita analogy stands. The Gemara closes the loop: this is the argument Rebbi found compelling when he ‘saw Rabbi Meir’s words’ for oto v’et bno and enshrined them anonymously as ‘the Rabbis.’
Key Terms:
- אַטּוּ בְּקָדָשִׁים מִי לָא נָהֵיג = ‘does it not apply to sacrificial animals?’ — the prohibition spans both realms, validating the sacrificial source
Segment 18
TYPE: שאלה ותשובה
Rabbi Meir’s source for covering: the gezeira shava shefikha-shefikha
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר בְּכִסּוּי הַדָּם? אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ: גָּמַר שְׁפִיכָה שְׁפִיכָה מִשְּׁחוּטֵי חוּץ, מָה לְהַלָּן – שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה שְׁמָהּ שְׁחִיטָה, אַף כָּאן – שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה שְׁמָהּ שְׁחִיטָה.
English Translation:
§ The Gemara resumes its discussion of the dispute in the mishna: What is the reason that Rabbi Meir holds one is obligated in the mitzva of covering the blood in a case of ineffective slaughter? Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Rabbi Meir derives this from a verbal analogy between the terms pouring and pouring, from the case of a sacrificial animal that was slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard. One verse states with regard to covering the blood: “And he shall pour out its blood” (Leviticus 17:13), and one verse states with regard to sacrificial animals slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard: “He has poured blood” (Leviticus 17:4). Accordingly, just as there, with regard to offerings slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, it is a case of slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted but is nevertheless considered an act of slaughter, so too here, with regard to covering the blood, an act of slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted is considered an act of slaughter.
קלאוד על הדף:
The inquiry turns to kisui hadam. Reish Lakish supplies Rabbi Meir’s derivation: a verbal analogy of ‘pouring’ — ‘and he shall pour out its blood’ by covering (Vayikra 17:13) and ‘he has poured blood’ by shechutei chutz (Vayikra 17:4). Just as there the unfit slaughter counts as slaughter, so for covering: even a slaughter that cannot permit the meat — a tereifa, an idolatrous slaughter — obligates covering the blood.
Key Terms:
- שְׁפִיכָה שְׁפִיכָה = ‘pouring-pouring’ — the verbal analogy linking covering the blood to offerings slaughtered outside
Segment 19
TYPE: שקלא וטריא
Rabbi Shimon: ‘that may be eaten’ is written! Rabbi Meir: that excludes an impure bird — and Rabbi Shimon’s retort
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: ״אֲשֶׁר יֵאָכֵל״ כְּתִיב, וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר: הָהוּא לְמַעוֹטֵי עוֹף טָמֵא הוּא דַּאֲתָא, וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: עוֹף טָמֵא מַאי טַעְמָא – דְּלָאו בַּר אֲכִילָה הוּא, טְרֵפָה נָמֵי – לָאו בַּר אֲכִילָה הוּא.
English Translation:
The Gemara continues: And Rabbi Shimon would respond: It is written with regard to covering the blood: “An undomesticated animal or bird that may be eaten” (Leviticus 17:13), indicating that the verse is referring specifically to slaughter fit to render the meat permitted for consumption. And Rabbi Meir holds: That phrase comes to exclude a ritually impure bird from the mitzva of covering the blood. And Rabbi Shimon would respond: What is the reason an impure bird is not included in the mitzva of covering the blood? It is because it is not fit for consumption. If so, a tereifa should also not be included in the mitzva of covering the blood, since it is also not fit for consumption.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Shimon counters from the covering verse itself: ‘an undomesticated animal or bird that may be eaten’ (asher ye’achel) — the mitzva speaks of slaughter that permits eating. Rabbi Meir deflects: that phrase excludes only the ritually impure bird, a species never eatable. Rabbi Shimon closes the trap: why is the impure bird excluded? Because it is not fit for eating — then the tereifa, equally unfit for eating, must be excluded by the same logic. The phrase cannot exclude one inedible creature and not the other.
Key Terms:
- אֲשֶׁר יֵאָכֵל = ‘that may be eaten’ (Vayikra 17:13) — Rabbi Shimon’s anchor: covering presupposes edibility
- עוֹף טָמֵא = a ritually impure bird species — Rabbi Meir’s proposed target of the exclusion
Segment 20
TYPE: סיכום
And this is what Rebbi endorsed for covering the blood
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהַיְינוּ דְּאָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא: רָאָה רַבִּי דְּבָרָיו שֶׁל רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בְּכִסּוּי הַדָּם, וּשְׁנָאוֹ בִּלְשׁוֹן חֲכָמִים.
English Translation:
The Gemara comments: And this is what Rabbi Ḥiyya is saying when he said that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi saw as correct the statement of Rabbi Shimon with regard to the halakha of covering the blood, and taught it in the mishna using the term: The Rabbis.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara again closes the editorial loop: Rabbi Shimon’s argument — that ‘asher ye’achel’ ties the covering obligation to slaughter fit for eating — is what Rebbi found compelling when he ‘saw Rabbi Shimon’s words’ for kisui hadam and taught them anonymously as ‘the Rabbis.’ The mishna’s asymmetry is now fully explained: same conceptual question, opposite rulings, each fixed by the redactor where he judged the reasoning strongest.
Key Terms:
- הַיְינוּ דְּאָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא = ‘this is what Rabbi Chiyya meant’ — the derivations just given are the grounds of Rebbi’s editorial choices
Segment 21
TYPE: מימרא (נמשכת)
Rabbi Abba begins a statement — completed on the next amud
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא:
English Translation:
§ Rabbi Abba says:
קלאוד על הדף:
The amud ends mid-attribution: ‘Rabbi Abba says.’ His teaching — a double qualification showing that neither Rabbi Meir nor Rabbi Shimon holds his principle across the board — opens amud bet and drives its entire first half.
Key Terms:
- אָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא = ‘Rabbi Abba says’ — the daf breaks mid-attribution; the teaching follows on 85b
Amud Bet (85b)
Segment 1
TYPE: מימרא
Rabbi Abba: each tanna concedes at the extreme — Rabbi Meir that it does not permit eating, Rabbi Shimon that it purifies from neveila
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לֹא לַכֹּל אָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה שְׁמָהּ שְׁחִיטָה: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי מֵאִיר שֶׁאֵין מַתִּירָתָהּ בַּאֲכִילָה; וְלֹא לַכֹּל אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה לֹא שְׁמָהּ שְׁחִיטָה: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן שֶׁמְּטַהַרְתָּהּ מִידֵי נְבֵלָה.
English Translation:
Not with regard to all halakhot did Rabbi Meir say an act of slaughter that is not fit, e.g., where one slaughters a tereifa, is considered an act of slaughter, as Rabbi Meir does concede that such an act of slaughter does not render the meat of the animal permitted for consumption. And not with regard to all halakhot did Rabbi Shimon say an act of slaughter that is not fit is not considered an act of slaughter, as Rabbi Shimon does concede that such an act of slaughter renders the animal pure from having the impure status of an unslaughtered animal carcass.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Abba’s teaching: neither position is total. Rabbi Meir, who calls unfit slaughter ‘slaughter,’ concedes it does not render the meat permitted for eating — a slaughtered tereifa remains forbidden. And Rabbi Shimon, who denies unfit slaughter the name ‘slaughter,’ concedes that it purifies the animal from the tumah of a carcass — a slaughtered tereifa is not metamei like a neveila. Each principle governs liabilities and mitzvot, not the brute facts of edibility and purity.
Key Terms:
- אֵין מַתִּירָתָהּ בַּאֲכִילָה = it does not permit the meat for eating — Rabbi Meir’s concession
- מְטַהַרְתָּהּ מִידֵי נְבֵלָה = it purifies it from carcass status — Rabbi Shimon’s concession: no neveila-tumah
Segment 2
TYPE: קושיא
The first concession seems obvious: can slaughter permit a tereifa?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר מָר: לֹא לַכֹּל אָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה שְׁמָהּ שְׁחִיטָה, מוֹדֶה רַבִּי מֵאִיר שֶׁאֵין מַתִּירָתָהּ בַּאֲכִילָה. פְּשִׁיטָא! טְרֵפָה בִּשְׁחִיטָה מִי מִישְׁתַּרְיָא?
English Translation:
The Gemara analyzes this statement: The Master said that not with regard to all halakhot did Rabbi Meir say an act of slaughter that is not fit is considered an act of slaughter, as Rabbi Meir concedes that such an act of slaughter does not render the meat of the animal permitted for consumption. The Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious? Can a tereifa become permitted for consumption through slaughter?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara probes the necessity of Rabbi Abba’s first clause. That an unfit slaughter does not permit eating — is this not trivial? A tereifa is forbidden because of its fatal defect; no act of slaughter, however valid, could ever make it edible. What is Rabbi Abba adding?
Key Terms:
- פְּשִׁיטָא = ‘it is obvious!’ — the standard challenge to a seemingly redundant teaching
Segment 3
TYPE: תירוץ
The case: a live nine-month fetus found inside a slaughtered tereifa
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לָא צְרִיכָא, לְשׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַטְּרֵפָה וּמָצָא בָּהּ בֶּן תִּשְׁעָה חַי; סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הוֹאִיל דְּאָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר: שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה שְׁמָהּ שְׁחִיטָה, תַּהֲנֵי לֵיהּ שְׁחִיטַת אִמּוֹ וְלָא לִיבְעֵי שְׁחִיטָה, קָמַשְׁמַע לַן.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: No, this statement of Rabbi Abba is necessary in a case where one slaughtered a tereifa and found a living nine-month-old fetus inside it. It might enter your mind to say: Since Rabbi Meir said an act of slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted is considered an act of slaughter, the slaughter of its mother should be effective to render the meat of the fetus permitted for consumption, as it normally does when the mother is not a tereifa; and the fetus, after it is born, should not require its own slaughter. Rabbi Abba therefore teaches us that according to Rabbi Meir, slaughter that does not render the meat of the mother permitted for consumption does not render the fetus permitted either.
קלאוד על הדף:
The teaching earns its place in a subtle case: one slaughtered a tereifa and found within it a living, fully gestated fetus. One might reason: since Rabbi Meir counts unfit slaughter as slaughter, the mother’s slaughter should serve the fetus — as a mother’s slaughter ordinarily permits her fetus (ben pekua) — and the fetus should need no slaughter of its own. Rabbi Abba teaches otherwise: a slaughter that cannot permit the mother cannot permit her fetus either.
Key Terms:
- בֶּן תִּשְׁעָה חַי = a live nine-month fetus — fully gestated, discovered at its mother’s slaughter
- תַּהֲנֵי לֵיהּ שְׁחִיטַת אִמּוֹ = ‘let its mother’s slaughter avail it’ — the rejected reasoning
Segment 4
TYPE: קושיא
But Rabbi Meir requires slaughter for every ben pekua!
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְתִסְבְּרָא? וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר: בֶּן פְּקוּעָה טָעוּן שְׁחִיטָה!
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: And how can you understand that without Rabbi Abba’s statement, one would have thought that according to Rabbi Meir, the fetus does not require its own slaughter? But doesn’t Rabbi Meir say that a fetus removed from its mother’s womb after the mother was properly slaughtered [ben pekua], requires slaughter, as the slaughter of the mother does not permit the fetus?
קלאוד על הדף:
The case collapses on inspection: for Rabbi Meir no fetus is ever permitted by its mother’s slaughter — he holds a ben pekua requires its own slaughter even when the mother is perfectly kosher. The erroneous reasoning Rabbi Abba supposedly blocks could never arise within Rabbi Meir’s own system. For whom, then, is the teaching needed?
Key Terms:
- בֶּן פְּקוּעָה = a fetus removed alive from its slaughtered mother — for Rabbi Meir, always requiring its own slaughter
Segment 5
TYPE: תירוץ
The teaching addresses Rebbi, who combines Rabbi Meir on unfit slaughter with the Rabbis on ben pekua
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּרַבִּי סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר וְסָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבָּנַן. סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר, דְּאָמַר: שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה שְׁמָהּ שְׁחִיטָה, וְסָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבָּנַן, דְּאָמְרִי: שְׁחִיטַת אִמּוֹ מְטַהַרְתּוֹ.
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: The statement of Rabbi Abba is not necessary for the opinion of Rabbi Meir, but it is for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. This is because Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir in one instance, and holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis in another. In a case where one slaughtered a mother and its offspring on the same day he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says an act of slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted is considered an act of slaughter. And with regard to a ben pekua, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who say the proper slaughter of the mother renders the fetus kosher, i.e., the fetus does not require its own ritual slaughter.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Abba speaks to Rebbi’s composite position. Rebbi rules like Rabbi Meir that unfit slaughter is slaughter (for oto v’et bno), and like the Rabbis that a mother’s valid slaughter fully permits her fetus — a ben pekua needs no slaughter. In that combination the danger is real: perhaps a tereifa mother’s slaughter, being ‘slaughter,’ permits her fetus too.
Key Terms:
- סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר וְסָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבָּנַן = he holds like Rabbi Meir in one matter and like the Rabbis in another — Rebbi’s composite pesak
Segment 6
TYPE: מסקנא
For Rebbi the teaching is needed: the tereifa’s slaughter does not serve her fetus
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כֵּיוָן דַּאֲמוּר רַבָּנַן שְׁחִיטַת אִמּוֹ מְטַהַרְתּוֹ, תַּהֲנֵי לֵיהּ שְׁחִיטַת אִמּוֹ וְלָא לִיבְעֵי שְׁחִיטָה, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
English Translation:
Therefore, since the Rabbis say the proper slaughter of the mother renders the fetus kosher, one might conclude that with regard to a tereifa as well, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds the slaughter of the mother should be effective to render the meat of the fetus permitted for consumption, and it should not require its own slaughter. In light of this, Rabbi Abba teaches us that although Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi agrees with Rabbi Meir that an ineffective slaughter is considered an act of slaughter, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that in the case of a tereifa the slaughter of the mother is not effective for the fetus.
קלאוד על הדף:
The conclusion: since the Rabbis (and Rebbi with them) hold a mother’s slaughter renders her fetus permitted, one might extend this to the tereifa mother whose slaughter Rebbi counts as ‘slaughter.’ Rabbi Abba teaches us otherwise: the name ‘slaughter’ creates liability, but only a slaughter that permits the mother extends to permit her fetus. The live fetus of a slaughtered tereifa requires its own shechita.
Key Terms:
- קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן = ‘it teaches us’ — the formula marking what the dictum truly adds
Segment 7
TYPE: קושיא
The second concession also seems obvious: a slaughtered tereifa does not defile as a carcass
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְלֹא לַכֹּל אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה לֹא שְׁמָהּ שְׁחִיטָה, מוֹדֶה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן שֶׁמְּטַהַרְתָּהּ מִידֵי נְבֵלָה. פְּשִׁיטָא! דְּאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ בְּמַתְנִיתָא תָּנָא: ״וְכִי יָמוּת מִן הַבְּהֵמָה״, מִקְצָת בְּהֵמָה מְטַמְּאָה וּמִקְצָת בְּהֵמָה אֵינָהּ מְטַמְּאָה, וְאֵי זוֹ זוֹ – טְרֵפָה שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ.
English Translation:
The Gemara addresses the second statement of Rabbi Abba: And not with regard to all halakhot did Rabbi Shimon say an act of slaughter that is not fit is not considered an act of slaughter, as Rabbi Shimon concedes that such an act of slaughter renders the animal pure from having the impure status of an unslaughtered animal carcass. The Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious? As Rav Yehuda says that Rav says, and some say it was taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to an animal carcass: “And if there dies of the animals…he that touches its carcass shall be unclean” (Leviticus 11:39). The word “of” indicates that some animals transmit impurity as a carcass and some animals do not transmit impurity. And which animal does not? That is a tereifa that one slaughtered.
קלאוד על הדף:
Now Rabbi Abba’s second clause is challenged as redundant. Rav Yehuda quoting Rav (or a baraita) expounds ‘and if there dies of the animals’ (Vayikra 11:39): ‘of the animals’ — some animals convey carcass-tumah and some do not; and which does not? A tereifa that one slaughtered. Scripture itself teaches that slaughter saves a tereifa from neveila status — what does Rabbi Shimon’s ‘concession’ add?
Key Terms:
- מִקְצָת בְּהֵמָה = ‘of the animals’ — the partitive that excludes the slaughtered tereifa from carcass-tumah
Segment 8
TYPE: תירוץ
The case: a tereifa slaughtered as chullin in the Temple courtyard — where Rabbi Shimon permits benefit
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לָא צְרִיכָא, לְשׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַטְּרֵפָה וְהִיא חוּלִּין בַּעֲזָרָה. דְּתַנְיָא: הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַטְּרֵפָה, וְכֵן הַשּׁוֹחֵט וְנִמְצֵאת טְרֵיפָה, זֶה וָזֶה חוּלִּין בַּעֲזָרָה – רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מַתִּיר בַּהֲנָאָה, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹסְרִין.
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: No, Rabbi Abba’s statement is necessary in the case of one who slaughters a tereifa, and it is a non-sacred animal in the Temple courtyard. As it is taught in a baraita: In the case of one who slaughters a known tereifa, and likewise one who slaughters an animal and it was found to be a tereifa, and this and that were non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard, Rabbi Shimon permits one to derive benefit from them, as one is not considered to have transgressed the prohibition against slaughtering a non-sacred animal in the Temple courtyard. And the Rabbis prohibit one to derive benefit from them.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Abba’s clause earns its place in a compound case: a tereifa that was a non-sacred animal slaughtered in the Temple courtyard. The baraita records that for chullin ba’azara found to be tereifa, Rabbi Shimon permits deriving benefit — for him no transgression of chullin-in-the-courtyard occurred, since the unfit act was no ‘slaughter’ at all.
Key Terms:
- חוּלִּין בַּעֲזָרָה = non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard — forbidden for benefit
- מַתִּיר בַּהֲנָאָה = permits deriving benefit — Rabbi Shimon’s leniency in the tereifa case
Segment 9
TYPE: מסקנא
Lest one say it is no slaughter at all — it still purifies from neveila
Hebrew/Aramaic:
סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא, הוֹאִיל וְאָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: מוּתָּר בַּהֲנָאָה, אַלְמָא לָאו שְׁחִיטָה הִיא כְּלָל, אֵימָא: מִידֵי נְבֵלָה נָמֵי לָא מְטַהֲרָה, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
English Translation:
Accordingly, it might enter your mind to say: Since Rabbi Shimon says it is permitted to derive benefit from such an animal, evidently slaughtering a tereifa is not considered slaughter at all. Therefore, say that slaughter does not have the ability to purify the tereifa from having the status of a ritually impure animal carcass either. Rabbi Abba therefore teaches us that even according to Rabbi Shimon, the slaughter is effective to remove it from the status of a carcass.
קלאוד על הדף:
The danger Rabbi Abba forestalls: since Rabbi Shimon permits benefit — treating the act as no slaughter whatsoever for the courtyard prohibition — one might conclude the act is void entirely, and the slaughtered tereifa should defile as a carcass. Rabbi Abba teaches us: even for Rabbi Shimon the act remains a physical shechita that purifies from neveila-tumah. His principle strips the act of its legal name, not of its bodily effect.
Key Terms:
- לָאו שְׁחִיטָה הִיא כְּלָל = ‘it is not slaughter at all’ — the overreading of Rabbi Shimon that Rabbi Abba blocks
Segment 10
TYPE: שאלה ותשובה
Rav Pappa to Abaye: does Rabbi Shimon hold chullin ba’azara is Torah law? Yes — from the burning requirement
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא לְאַבָּיֵי: וְסָבַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן חוּלִּין בַּעֲזָרָה דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא הִיא? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִין, וְהָתְנַן רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: חוּלִּין שֶׁנִּשְׁחֲטוּ בַּעֲזָרָה יִשָּׂרְפוּ בָּאֵשׁ, וְכֵן חַיָּה שֶׁנִּשְׁחֲטָה בָּעֲזָרָה. אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא – הַיְינוּ דְּגָזְרִינַן חַיָּה אַטּוּ בְּהֵמָה.
English Translation:
Rav Pappa said to Abaye: And does Rabbi Shimon hold that the prohibition against deriving benefit from non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard is by Torah law? Abaye said to Rav Pappa: Yes he does. And we learned in a mishna (Temura 33b) that Rabbi Shimon says: Non-sacred animals that were slaughtered in the Temple courtyard shall be burned in the fire. And likewise, an undomesticated animal that was slaughtered in the Temple courtyard shall be burned in the fire. Abaye continues: Granted, if you say the meat of a non-sacred domesticated animal slaughtered in the Temple courtyard is forbidden by Torah law, this is the reason why we decree that the meat of an undomesticated animal is prohibited as well, due to the Torah prohibition against deriving benefit from the meat of a domesticated animal.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Pappa asks Abaye: does Rabbi Shimon hold that the prohibition of non-sacred slaughter in the courtyard is deoraita? Abaye answers yes, and proves it from the mishna in Temura: Rabbi Shimon says non-sacred animals slaughtered in the courtyard are burned, and likewise an undomesticated animal. If the domesticated-animal prohibition is Torah law, the extension to the chaya is intelligible — a rabbinic decree protecting a Torah prohibition.
Key Terms:
- דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא = by Torah law — as opposed to rabbinic enactment
- יִשָּׂרְפוּ בָּאֵשׁ = they shall be burned — the disposal that signals a serious, Torah-level prohibition
Segment 11
TYPE: המשך הראיה
If it were rabbinic, the chaya decree would be a decree upon a decree
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ דְּרַבָּנַן, בְּהֵמָה מַאי טַעְמָא? דִּילְמָא אָתֵי לְמֵיכַל קָדָשִׁים בַּחוּץ, הִיא גּוּפַהּ גְּזֵרָה, וַאֲנַן נֵיקוּם וְנִגְזוֹר גְּזֵירָה לִגְזֵירָה?
English Translation:
But if you say the meat of domesticated animals is forbidden by rabbinic law then the mishna is difficult: What is the reason the meat of a non-sacred domesticated animal is forbidden? It is forbidden lest one see someone consuming this meat outside the Temple courtyard and arrive at the erroneous conclusion that it is permitted to partake of sacrificial meat outside the Temple courtyard. If so, the prohibition against deriving benefit from the meat of a non-sacred domesticated animal is itself a rabbinic decree, and will we then proceed to issue a decree prohibiting one to derive benefit from a non-sacred undomesticated animal in order to prevent the violation of a decree?
קלאוד על הדף:
The proof sharpens: if chullin ba’azara were only rabbinic — a decree lest onlookers come to eat sacrificial meat outside — then the chaya extension collapses. The beheima prohibition would itself be a protective decree, and extending it to the chaya would be a gezeira on a gezeira, which we do not enact. Rabbi Shimon’s burning of the chaya thus proves he holds the core prohibition to be Torah law — and Rabbi Abba’s second clause guards a real deoraita case.
Key Terms:
- גְּזֵירָה לִגְזֵירָה = a decree upon a decree — protective legislation stacked on protective legislation, which the Sages do not enact
Segment 12
TYPE: מעשה
Moths in Rabbi Chiyya’s flax: Rebbi advises slaughtering a bird over the soaking water
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי חִיָּיא נְפַל לֵיהּ יָאנִיבָא בְּכִיתָּנֵיהּ, אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: שְׁקוֹל עוֹפָא וּשְׁחוֹט עַל בּוּבִיתָא דְּמַיָּא, דְּמוֹרַח דְּמָא וְשָׁבֵיק לֵיהּ.
English Translation:
§ The mishna teaches that one who stabs an undomesticated animal or bird, or who tears loose its windpipe and gullet, is exempt from covering the blood. With regard to this the Gemara relates: Moths infested the flax of Rabbi Ḥiyya. He came before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi to ask how to get rid of the moths. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: Take a bird and slaughter it over the tub of water in which the flax was soaked, as the moths will smell the blood and leave the flax.
קלאוד על הדף:
The daf closes with a story that tests the mishna’s final clause. Moths (yaniva) infested Rabbi Chiyya’s flax. He came before Rebbi, who advised: take a bird and slaughter it over the tub of water in which the flax soaks — the moths will smell the blood and abandon the flax. A practical remedy — but one that seems to collide with the laws of covering the blood.
Key Terms:
- יָאנִיבָא = moths/worms that infest flax
- בּוּבִיתָא דְּמַיָּא = the tub of water in which flax is soaked
Segment 13
TYPE: קושיא
How could he? One who slaughters for the blood must cover it — let him stab or tear loose instead
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הֵיכִי עָבֵיד הָכִי? וְהָתַנְיָא: הַשּׁוֹחֵט וְצָרִיךְ לַדָּם – חַיָּיב לְכַסּוֹת. כֵּיצַד יַעֲשֶׂה? אוֹ נוֹחֲרוֹ, אוֹ עוֹקְרוֹ.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: How could Rabbi Ḥiyya do this? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: One who slaughters a bird or an undomesticated animal, and does so only because he needs the blood, is nevertheless obligated to cover the blood and may not use it for any other purpose? Rather, how should one who needs the blood act? He either stabs it or tears loose its windpipe and its gullet, so that it is not killed with an act of slaughter. How, then, could Rabbi Ḥiyya use the blood of the bird that he slaughtered to rid his flax of the moths?
קלאוד על הדף:
The difficulty: a baraita rules that one who slaughters because he needs the blood is obligated to cover it — and covering it would bury the very blood the remedy requires. The baraita itself prescribes the workaround: one who needs the blood should stab (nocher) or tear loose (oker) — kill without shechita, so no covering obligation ever arises. How then did Rebbi advise slaughtering the bird over the water?
Key Terms:
- הַשּׁוֹחֵט וְצָרִיךְ לַדָּם = one who slaughters and needs the blood — obligated to cover it nonetheless
- אוֹ נוֹחֲרוֹ אוֹ עוֹקְרוֹ = he stabs it or tears it loose — the sanctioned ways to obtain blood without triggering covering
Segment 14
TYPE: שתי מסורות
Rav Dimi: ‘go render it a tereifa’; Ravin: ‘go tear it loose’
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כִּי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי אָמַר: ״צֵא טְרוֹף״ אֲמַר לֵיהּ, כִּי אֲתָא רָבִין אָמַר: ״צֵא נְחוֹר״ אֲמַר לֵיהּ.
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael, he said that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to Rabbi Ḥiyya: Go out and render the bird a tereifa, and then slaughter it, as the mishna teaches that one who slaughters a tereifa is not required to cover its blood. When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael, he said that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to Rabbi Ḥiyya: Go out and tear loose the bird’s windpipe and gullet.
קלאוד על הדף:
Two traditions repair the story. When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael he reported that Rebbi told Rabbi Chiyya ‘go out and wound it’ — render the bird a tereifa first, then slaughter it: per our mishna (the Rabbis/Rabbi Shimon), slaughtering a tereifa carries no covering obligation, leaving the blood usable. When Ravin came he reported ‘go out and tear it loose’ — kill by ikkur, no shechita and no covering. On either version Rebbi’s advice conformed to the mishna’s rules.
Key Terms:
- צֵא טְרוֹף = ‘go render it a tereifa’ — wound the bird fatally first, so its slaughter obligates no covering
- צֵא נְחוֹר = ‘go tear it loose / stab it’ — kill without shechita, avoiding the mitzva entirely
Segment 15
TYPE: קושיא
According to ‘go render it tereifa’ — why not say ‘tear it loose’?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לְמַאן דְּאָמַר ״צֵא טְרוֹף״, מַאי טַעְמָא לָא אָמַר ״צֵא נְחוֹר״?
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: According to the one who says that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to Rabbi Ḥiyya: Go out and render the bird a tereifa, what is the reason that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi did not say: Go out and tear loose its windpipe and gullet?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara probes the first tradition: if Rebbi’s goal was usable blood, tearing loose is the simpler advice — why prescribe the roundabout course of wounding the bird and then slaughtering it? The question opens the daf’s final analysis, which will test whether Rebbi’s choice reveals his positions on bird-slaughter and the definition of shechita.
Key Terms:
- מַאי טַעְמָא לָא אָמַר = ‘why did he not say’ — pressing an authority’s choice between two available rulings
Segment 16
TYPE: דחיית הסבר
Not because bird-slaughter is non-Torah — Rebbi derives bird shechita from ‘as I have commanded you’
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְכִי תֵּימָא, קָסָבַר אֵין שְׁחִיטָה לָעוֹף מִן הַתּוֹרָה, וּנְחִירָתוֹ זוֹ הִיא שְׁחִיטָתוֹ, וְהָתַנְיָא: רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: ״כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוִּיתִךָ״ – מְלַמֵּד שֶׁנִּצְטַוָּה מֹשֶׁה עַל הַוֶּשֶׁט וְעַל הַקָּנֶה, וְעַל רוֹב אֶחָד בָּעוֹף, וְעַל רוֹב שְׁנַיִם בַּבְּהֵמָה.
English Translation:
And if you would say the reason is because Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that slaughter of a bird is not obligatory by Torah law, and consequently the tearing loose of its windpipe and gullet is considered its slaughter such that he would be required to cover the blood, this is untenable. As isn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The verse states: “And you shall slaughter…as I have commanded you” (Deuteronomy 12:21). This teaches that Moses was previously commanded concerning the mitzvot of slaughter, i.e., he was taught about the gullet and the windpipe, that the cutting of these simanim constitutes slaughter, and about the requirement to cut the majority of one siman of a bird, and about the requirement to cut the majority of two simanim of an animal. If so, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that the slaughter of a bird is obligatory by Torah law.
קלאוד על הדף:
A proposed explanation is struck down. Say Rebbi holds there is no Torah requirement of shechita for birds — then nechira would itself constitute the bird’s ‘slaughter’ and trigger covering, so he avoided prescribing it. Untenable: Rebbi himself expounds ‘and you shall slaughter… as I have commanded you’ (Devarim 12:21) — Moshe was commanded orally about the gullet and windpipe, a majority of one siman for a bird and of two for an animal. Bird-slaughter is Torah law for Rebbi, and the true reason for ‘go render it tereifa’ must lie elsewhere — the discussion continues on 86a.
Key Terms:
- אֵין שְׁחִיטָה לָעוֹף מִן הַתּוֹרָה = ‘there is no Torah-law slaughter for birds’ — the rejected premise
- כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוִּיתִךָ = ‘as I have commanded you’ (Devarim 12:21) — the source that shechita’s details were given orally to Moshe