Chullin Daf 38 (חולין דף ל״ח)
Daf: 38 | Amudim: 38a – 38b | Date: Loading...
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (38a)
Segment 1
TYPE: גמרא
The cliffhanger from 37b resolves: Rav’s students report his teaching, and Shmuel responds with a broader principle.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גּוֹעָה וְהֵטִילָה רֶיעִי וְכִשְׁכְּשָׁה בְּאׇזְנָהּ – הֲרֵי זֶה פִּירְכּוּס. אֲמַר לְהוּ: אִצְטְרִיכָא לֵיהּ לְאַבָּא לְאֹזוֹזֵי אוּנֵּי, שֶׁאֲנִי אוֹמֵר כֹּל שֶׁאֵינָהּ [עוֹשָׂה] דְּבָרִים שֶׁהַמֵּתָה עוֹשָׂה.
English Translation:
If the animal lows, or excreted excrement, or wiggled its ear during the slaughter, that is a convulsion, and the slaughter renders eating the flesh of the animal permitted. Shmuel said to them: Is it necessary according to Abba, i.e., Rav, for the animal to move its ears during the slaughter, which requires a considerable life force? As I say: Any movements of the animal that are not matters that the death of the animal engenders are convulsions sufficient to render the slaughter valid.
קלאוד על הדף:
The cliffhanger from the end of 37b resolves: Rav’s students report his teaching — lowing, excreting, or ear-wiggling all count as פירכוס. Shmuel responds with characteristic gentle critique (“Abba” was his affectionate name for Rav): why did Rav need to demand ear-wiggling, which requires substantial life-force? Shmuel offers a much broader principle: any movement that is NOT one of the involuntary motions of a dying animal counts as a valid sign of life.
Key Terms:
- גּוֹעָה = Lowing/mooing — a vocalization indicating active vitality
- כִּשְׁכְּשָׁה בְּאׇזְנָהּ = “Wiggled its ear” — a fine motor movement requiring strength
- אַבָּא = “Abba” — Shmuel’s term of endearment for Rav (literally “father,” but more like “the master”)
- דְּבָרִים שֶׁהַמֵּתָה עוֹשָׂה = “Things a dying animal does” — involuntary agonal motions that don’t count
Segment 2
TYPE: גמרא
Rav Anan defines Shmuel’s criterion: bending a straight foreleg counts as life, but straightening a bent one does not.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַאי נִינְהוּ דְּבָרִים שֶׁהַמֵּתָה עוֹשָׂה? אָמַר רַב עָנָן: לְדִידִי מִפָּרְשָׁא לִי מִינֵּיהּ דְּמָר שְׁמוּאֵל – הָיְתָה יָדָהּ כְּפוּפָה וּפְשָׁטַתָּה – דָּבָר שֶׁהַמֵּתָה עוֹשֶׂה, פְּשׁוּטָה וּכְפָפַתָּה – דְּבָרִים שֶׁאֵין הַמֵּתָה עוֹשָׂה.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: What are matters that the death of the animal engenders? Rav Anan said: This was explained to me from Master Shmuel himself: If the animal’s foreleg was bent, and the animal straightened it, that is a matter that the death of the animal engenders. But if its foreleg was straight and the animal bent it, that is among the matters that the death of the animal does not engender and is a convulsion sufficient to render the slaughter valid.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Anan provides Shmuel’s own clarification: the body has natural agonal motions in death (muscles relaxing, limbs straightening), but ACTIVE flexion (bending a straight limb) requires real muscular volition and indicates life. So: bent → straight = death-motion (invalid); straight → bent = vital motion (valid). The principle: only active, “uphill” motions count as proof of life.
Key Terms:
- רַב עָנָן = A first-generation Babylonian Amora, direct student of Shmuel
- לְדִידִי מִפָּרְשָׁא לִי מִינֵּיהּ = “It was explained to me by him myself” — a first-hand transmission formula
- כְּפוּפָה / פְּשׁוּטָה = Bent / straight — the two states the foreleg can be in
Segment 3
TYPE: קושיא
The Gemara challenges Shmuel’s novelty — isn’t the mishna already saying this?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן? תְּנֵינָא: בְּהֵמָה דַּקָּה שֶׁפָּשְׁטָה יָדָהּ וְלֹא הֶחְזִירָה – פְּסוּלָה, שֶׁאֵינָהּ אֶלָּא הוֹצָאַת נֶפֶשׁ; הָא הֶחְזִירָה – כְּשֵׁרָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: What is Shmuel teaching us with that statement? We already learn in the mishna: The slaughter of a small animal that during its slaughter extended its foreleg that was bent and did not restore it to the bent position is not valid, as extending the foreleg is nothing other than part of the natural course of removal of the animal’s soul from its body and not a convulsion indicating life. But one may infer that if the animal does restore its foreleg to the bent position, that indicates life and the slaughter is valid.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara presses: what new information does Shmuel’s principle add? The mishna already teaches that extending a bent foreleg without retracting it disqualifies the slaughter — implying that retracting it would qualify. So what does Shmuel’s “straight-bent = valid” really contribute?
Key Terms:
- מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן = “What is he teaching us?” — the standard challenge to apparent redundancy
- הוֹצָאַת נֶפֶשׁ = “Removal of the soul” — the involuntary motion of agony, not vitality
Segment 4
TYPE: תירוץ
The mishna alone might restrict valid motion to bent → straight → bent cycles; Shmuel teaches straight → bent alone suffices.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִי מִמַּתְנִיתִין, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: דַּוְקָא דְּכַיְיפָה וּפָשְׁטָה וַהֲדַר כָּיְיפָה לַהּ, אֲבָל פְּשׁוּטָה וּכְפָפַתָּה – לָא, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: If the halakha is learned from the mishna alone, I would say that it is specifically in a case where the animal’s foreleg had been bent, and the animal now straightens it and then bends it, that the slaughter is valid. But if the foreleg had been straight and the animal bent it, the slaughter is not valid. Therefore, Shmuel teaches us that if its foreleg was straight and the animal bent it; that is a convulsion sufficient to render the slaughter valid.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara defends Shmuel’s novelty. The mishna’s wording could suggest that validity requires the full bent→straight→bent cycle (the foreleg starts bent, gets extended, then is retracted). Shmuel teaches the more lenient point: even if the foreleg started straight and the animal merely bent it, that single act of active flexion is enough. The mishna implies the cycle; Shmuel asserts the single bend.
Key Terms:
- דְּכַיְיפָה וּפָשְׁטָה וַהֲדַר כָּיְיפָה = “Bent, straightened, then bent again” — the full mishnaic cycle
- פְּשׁוּטָה וּכְפָפַתָּה = “Straight, and [the animal] bent it” — Shmuel’s added lenient case
Segment 5
TYPE: קושיא
A baraita challenges Rav: Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei deny lowing, excreting, and tail-wagging as valid signs.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מֵיתִיבִי: רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר, הָיָה רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: גּוֹעָה בִּשְׁעַת שְׁחִיטָה – אֵין זֶה פִּירְכּוּס. רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר מִשְּׁמוֹ: אֲפִילּוּ הֵטִילָה רֶיעִי וְכִשְׁכְּשָׁה בִּזְנָבָהּ – אֵין זֶה פִּירְכּוּס. קַשְׁיָא גּוֹעָה אַגּוֹעָה, קַשְׁיָא רֶיעִי אַרֶיעִי!
English Translation:
The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita to Rav’s statement cited earlier. Rabbi Yosei says that Rabbi Meir would say: If an animal lows during its slaughter, that is not a convulsion sufficient to render the slaughter valid. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, says in the name of Rabbi Yosei: Even if the animal excreted excrement or wagged its tail, that is not a convulsion sufficient to render the slaughter valid. The Gemara now clarifies: Rabbi Yosei’s statement in the baraita that if an animal lows it is not a convulsion sufficient to render the slaughter valid is difficult, as it contradicts the statement of Rav that if an animal lows it is a convulsion. And Rabbi Elazar’s statement in the baraita that if an animal excreted excrement it is not a convulsion sufficient to render the slaughter valid is difficult, as it contradicts the statement of Rav that if an animal excreted excrement it is a convulsion.
קלאוד על הדף:
A baraita objects to Rav (and to the Rabbis of the mishna, who allow tail-wagging). Rabbi Meir says lowing during slaughter is NOT a valid sign. Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Yosei adds: even excreting or tail-wagging are not valid. Two head-on contradictions emerge: גועה (lowing) vs. גועה, ריעי (excrement) vs. ריעי. The Gemara must reconcile.
Key Terms:
- מֵיתִיבִי = “They raise an objection” — a formal challenge from a Tannaitic source
- קַשְׁיָא X אַX = “X contradicts X” — the Talmudic formula for a head-on textual conflict
Segment 6
TYPE: תירוץ
Resolution: strong vs. weak versions of each sign — a hearty low and forceful excretion show life; muted ones don’t.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גּוֹעָה אַגּוֹעָה לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא דְּעָבֵי קָלַהּ, הָא דְּעָמֵי קָלַהּ. רֶיעִי אַרֶיעִי נָמֵי לָא קַשְׁיָא: כָּאן בְּשׁוֹתֶתֶת, כָּאן בְּמַתְרֶזֶת.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: The apparent contradiction between the opinion that when an animal lows it is a convulsion and the opinion that when an animal lows it is not a convulsion is not difficult. This opinion, that it is a convulsion, is referring to a case where the animal’s voice is rich and powerful, a clear indication of life; that opinion, that it is not a convulsion, is referring to a case where the animal’s voice is muted, which is not an indication of life. The apparent contradiction between the opinion that when an animal excreted excrement it is a convulsion and the opinion that when an animal excreted excrement it is not a convulsion is also not difficult. Here, the opinion that it is not a convulsion is referring to a case where the animal expels the excrement in a trickle. That is not an indication of life. There, the opinion that it is a convulsion is referring to a case where the animal expels the excrement with force. That is an indication of life.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara resolves both contradictions with the same elegant distinction: it depends on the QUALITY of the sign. A rich, full-bodied low (עָבֵי קָלַהּ) shows real lung power and counts as a vital sign; a weak, thin low (עָמֵי קָלַהּ) doesn’t. Forceful expulsion of waste (מַתְרֶזֶת) requires intact muscle control and shows life; mere trickling (שׁוֹתֶתֶת) is just relaxation. Each sign exists on a spectrum.
Key Terms:
- עָבֵי קָלַהּ = “Its voice is thick/full” — a robust vocalization
- עָמֵי קָלַהּ = “Its voice is muted/thin” — a feeble vocalization
- שׁוֹתֶתֶת / מַתְרֶזֶת = Trickling / forceful — the two modes of excretion
Segment 7
TYPE: גמרא
Rav Chisda: “end of slaughter” actually means anytime mid-slaughter — only the very beginning is excluded.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: פִּירְכּוּס שֶׁאָמְרוּ – בְּסוֹף שְׁחִיטָה. מַאי בְּסוֹף שְׁחִיטָה? בְּאֶמְצַע שְׁחִיטָה, לְאַפּוֹקֵי תְּחִלַּת שְׁחִיטָה דְּלָא.
English Translation:
§ The Gemara continues its definition of convulsion that indicates life. Rav Chisda said: I was taught that the convulsion that the Sages said is an indication of life is a convulsion at the conclusion of the act of slaughter. Rav Chisda elaborates: What is the meaning of: At the conclusion of the act of slaughter? It means even in the midst of the slaughter. The Sages said that it must be at the conclusion of the slaughter only to exclude convulsions at the beginning of the act of slaughter, which are not an indication of life.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Chisda opens a new debate about WHEN during the slaughter the פירכוס must occur. His view: “end of slaughter” is a loose phrase — it really includes any point in the middle, and only excludes movements at the very beginning. A motion mid-slaughter still proves life persisted past the critical moment. The next segments will see this contested by other Amoraim.
Key Terms:
- בְּסוֹף שְׁחִיטָה = “At the end of slaughter” — Rav Chisda reads this loosely
- בְּאֶמְצַע שְׁחִיטָה = “In the middle of slaughter” — Rav Chisda’s actual meaning
- תְּחִלַּת שְׁחִיטָה = “Beginning of slaughter” — the excluded zone where motion proves nothing
Segment 8
TYPE: גמרא
Rav Chisda’s proof from the mishna: the “extending without retracting” rule must refer to mid-slaughter motion.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: מְנָא אָמֵינָא לַהּ? דִּתְנַן: בְּהֵמָה דַּקָּה שֶׁפָּשְׁטָה יָדָהּ וְלֹא הֶחְזִירָה – פְּסוּלָה. אֵימַת? אִילֵּימָא בְּסוֹף שְׁחִיטָה, כֹּל הָכִי תֵּיחֵי וְתֵיזִיל? אֶלָּא לָאו בְּאֶמְצַע שְׁחִיטָה?
English Translation:
Rav Chisda said: From where do I say that a convulsion in the midst of the act of slaughter is an indication of life? It is from the mishna, as we learned: The slaughter of a small animal that when being slaughtered extended its foreleg that was bent and did not restore it to the bent position is not valid, as extending the foreleg is only part of the natural course of removal of the animal’s soul from its body and not a convulsion indicating life. Rav Chisda elaborates: When did the animal extend its foreleg but not restore it? If we say that it occurred at the conclusion of the slaughter, must the animal continue living for so extended a period that it restores its leg to its bent position after the slaughter is complete? Is the slaughter truly not valid otherwise? Rather, is it not that the mishna is referring to a case where the animal extends its foreleg in the middle of the slaughter? If so, then when it restores its leg as well, it is considered a convulsion that indicates life.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Chisda anchors his view in the mishna. The mishna disqualifies a slaughter where the animal extended its foreleg but didn’t retract it. When could this happen? Not at the very end — you couldn’t expect the animal to keep living long enough to retract its leg after the slaughter is complete. So the mishna must be describing mid-slaughter movement: an animal that extends mid-slaughter and doesn’t retract is invalid, but if it does retract, that mid-slaughter motion validates it.
Key Terms:
- מְנָא אָמֵינָא לַהּ = “From where do I derive this?” — the formula introducing textual support
- תֵּיחֵי וְתֵיזִיל = “Will it keep living and going?” — sarcastic rhetorical objection
Segment 9
TYPE: גמרא
Rava rebuts Rav Chisda: failure to retract at the end retrospectively proves the soul left BEFORE that moment.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: לְעוֹלָם בְּסוֹף שְׁחִיטָה, שֶׁאֲנִי אוֹמֵר: כֹּל שֶׁאֵינָהּ עוֹשֶׂה כֵּן בְּסוֹף שְׁחִיטָה – בְּיָדוּעַ שֶׁנִּשְׁמָתָהּ נְטוּלָה הֵימֶנָּה קוֹדֶם לָכֵן.
English Translation:
Rava said to Rav Chisda: That is no proof. Actually, one could explain that the mishna is referring to a case where the animal extends its foreleg but did not restore it to the bent position at the conclusion of the slaughter, as I say with regard to any animal that does not do so at the conclusion of the slaughter, it is known that its soul was taken from it before that moment, and it was not alive.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava rejects Rav Chisda’s reading. The mishna CAN be interpreted as referring strictly to the end of slaughter, with a retrospective logic: if the animal fails to retract its foreleg at the slaughter’s end, this is decisive proof that its soul had already departed at some earlier point in the slaughter. Failure to retract at the end is a marker that life ended too soon. Rav Chisda’s textual proof therefore doesn’t hold.
Key Terms:
- לְעוֹלָם = “Actually” — the formula maintaining the original reading despite the challenge
- בְּיָדוּעַ שֶׁנִּשְׁמָתָהּ נְטוּלָה = “It is known its soul was [already] taken” — a retrospective diagnostic principle
Segment 10
TYPE: גמרא
Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak’s even more lenient view: פירכוס even at the very beginning suffices.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק אָמַר: פִּירְכּוּס שֶׁאָמְרוּ – בִּתְחִלַּת שְׁחִיטָה.
English Translation:
Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak said: The convulsion that the Sages said is an indication of life is a convulsion even at the beginning of the act of slaughter.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak takes the most lenient position in the three-way debate. Even movement at the very BEGINNING of slaughter qualifies as פירכוס. This is more permissive than both Rav Chisda’s mid-slaughter view and Rava’s strict end-of-slaughter view. The next segment supplies his textual support.
Key Terms:
- בִּתְחִלַּת שְׁחִיטָה = “At the beginning of slaughter” — Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak’s permissive window
- רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק = A later Babylonian Amora, known for sharp halachic minimalism
Segment 11
TYPE: גמרא
Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak’s proof: the night-slaughter case with bloody walls — read via Shmuel — implies beginning-of-slaughter spurting suffices.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: מְנָא אָמֵינָא לַהּ? דִּתְנַן, אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: הַשּׁוֹחֵט בַּלַּיְלָה, וּלְמָחָר מָצָא כְּתָלִים מְלֵאִים דָּם – כְּשֵׁרָה, שֶׁזִּינְּקָה, וּכְמִדַּת רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר. וְאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: כּוֹתְלֵי בֵּית שְׁחִיטָה שָׁנִינוּ. אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא בִּתְחִלַּת שְׁחִיטָה – שַׁפִּיר, אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ בְּסוֹף שְׁחִיטָה, לֵיחוּשׁ דִּלְמָא בִּתְחִלַּת שְׁחִיטָה זִינְּקָה.
English Translation:
Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak explained further and said: From where do I say that this is so? It is from the mishna, as we learned that Rabbi Shimon says: In the case of one who slaughters at night and the next day he awoke and found walls full of blood, the slaughter is valid, as it is clear that the blood spurted, and this is in accordance with the rule of Rabbi Eliezer. And Shmuel said with regard to the walls mentioned in the statement of Rabbi Shimon: It is the walls of the place of the slaughter, i.e., the walls of the neck, not the walls of the house, that we learned. Granted, if you say that a convulsion even at the beginning of the act of slaughter is an indication of life, this works out well. But if you say that a convulsion is an indication of life only at the conclusion of the act of slaughter, let us be concerned that perhaps the blood spurted onto the walls of the neck at the beginning of the act of slaughter, and there was no indication of life.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak’s proof draws on a chain: the mishna’s night-slaughter case (37a) ruled the slaughter valid based on bloodied walls. Shmuel reinterprets “walls” as the walls of the neck itself, not of the room. If only END-of-slaughter spurting validated, we should worry the blood might have spurted only at the BEGINNING and gone unobserved. Since we don’t worry, beginning-of-slaughter spurting must qualify.
Key Terms:
- כּוֹתְלֵי בֵּית שְׁחִיטָה = “Walls of the slaughter-place” — Shmuel’s reinterpretation: the neck’s inner walls
- לֵיחוּשׁ דִּלְמָא = “We should worry that perhaps…” — the logical lever Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak deploys
Segment 12
TYPE: גמרא
A challenge to Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak: perhaps spurting is a uniquely strong sign, valid even at the beginning.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְדִלְמָא שָׁאנֵי זִינּוּק, דַּעֲדִיף.
English Translation:
The Gemara rejects that proof. But perhaps spurting is different, as it is superior as an indication of life to extending or bending a foreleg, and therefore, although extending or bending a foreleg is a sufficient indicator of life only at the conclusion of the act of slaughter, spurting is a sufficient indicator even at the beginning of the act of slaughter.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara challenges Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak’s inference. Perhaps the night-slaughter case proves only that זינוק (blood-spurting) qualifies at the beginning — because spurting is uniquely strong as a vital sign. Other lesser signs (foreleg motion etc.) might still require end-of-slaughter timing. So Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak’s general principle wouldn’t be supported.
Key Terms:
- זִינּוּק דַּעֲדִיף = “Spurting is superior” — the proposed special status that limits the inference
- שָׁאנֵי = “Is different” — the formula isolating a case as exceptional
Segment 13
TYPE: גמרא
Is spurting really stronger? The mishna’s “דייה אם זינקה” framing suggests it’s a LESSER sign than convulsions.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּמִי עֲדִיף? וְהָתְנַן, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: דַּיָּיהּ אִם זִינְּקָה, קַל מִדְּרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, וַעֲדִיף מִדְּרַבָּנַן.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: And is spurting superior? But didn’t we learn in the mishna: Rabbi Eliezer says it is sufficient if blood spurted from the neck, indicating that spurting of blood is a less substantive indication of life than those indications mentioned in the statement of Rabban Gamliel, who requires that the animal convulse with its foreleg and with its hind leg? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Eliezer’s requirement of spurting is less substantive than the requirements of Rabban Gamliel as an indication of life, but superior to the requirement of the Rabbis as an indication of life, where the Rabbis require that the animal convulse either with its foreleg or with its hind leg.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara probes the claim that spurting is “superior.” But Rabbi Eliezer’s “it is sufficient if it spurted” phrasing implies spurting is LESS substantive than Rabban Gamliel’s two-leg convulsion. The Gemara answers nuancedly: spurting is less than Rabban Gamliel’s standard but MORE than the Rabbis’ (single-limb or tail). It sits in the middle of the hierarchy.
Key Terms:
- דַּיָּיהּ אִם זִינְּקָה = “It suffices if it spurted” — Rabbi Eliezer’s modest framing suggests spurting is a fallback
- קַל מִדְּרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, וַעֲדִיף מִדְּרַבָּנַן = “Lighter than Rabban Gamliel, superior to the Rabbis” — the middle slot
Segment 14
TYPE: קושיא
A chain-of-transmission objection: is spurting really superior to the Rabbis’ criterion?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רָבִינָא: אָמַר לִי סַמָּא בַּר חִילְקַאי, אַקְשִׁי בַּהּ אֲבוּהּ דְּבַר אַבּוּבְרָם, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ אֲחוּהּ דְּבַר אַבּוּבְרָם: וּמִדְּרַבָּנַן מִי עֲדִיף? וְהָא תְּנַן: וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: עַד שֶׁתְּפַרְכֵּס אוֹ בַיָּד אוֹ בָרֶגֶל.
English Translation:
Ravina said: Samma bar Chilkai said to me that the father of bar Abuveram, and some say that it was the brother of bar Abuveram, raises a difficulty: And is blood spurting superior to the requirement of the Rabbis as an indication of life? But didn’t we learn in the mishna: And the Rabbis say: It is permitted only in a case where it convulses with its foreleg or with its hind leg, or in a case where it wags its tail?
קלאוד על הדף:
A meandering chain of transmission delivers a fresh objection. Ravina heard from Samma bar Chilkai that some unnamed relative of bar Abuveram (father? brother? — even the chain isn’t sure) challenged the claim that spurting outranks the Rabbis’ threshold. The Rabbis say “only if it convulses with foreleg, hind leg, or tail” — their use of “only” (עַד) suggests their standard is the minimum, and spurting might not even meet it.
Key Terms:
- רָבִינָא = A late, sixth-generation Babylonian Amora, often paired with Rav Ashi in the final layer of the Talmud
- סַמָּא בַּר חִילְקַאי = A relatively obscure figure whose teaching reaches the editors only via Ravina’s report
Segment 15
TYPE: גמרא
Linguistic analysis: the Rabbis must be responding to Rabbi Eliezer, not Rabban Gamliel.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבָּנַן אַהֵי קָיְימִי? אִילֵּימָא אַדְּרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל – ״כֵּיוָן שֶׁפִּירְכְּסָה״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!
English Translation:
Ravina elaborates: To which statement of the tanna’im in the mishna do the Rabbis stand and respond? If we say that they are responding to the statement of Rabban Gamliel, who requires that the animal convulse with its foreleg and with its hind leg, the Rabbis should have said: Once the animal convulsed with its foreleg or with its hind leg or it wagged its tail, indicating that this is sufficient.
קלאוד על הדף:
Ravina parses the mishna’s grammar carefully. If the Rabbis were responding to Rabban Gamliel’s strict standard (lessening it), they should have said “כיון ש…” (“once it has convulsed”) — the language of leniency. Instead, they say “עד ש…” (“only if it convulses”), which is the language of restriction — so they must be responding to a MORE lenient view, namely Rabbi Eliezer’s spurting standard.
Key Terms:
- אַהֵי קָיְימִי = “To whom are they responding/relating?” — the analytic question
- כֵּיוָן שֶׁ… / עַד שֶׁ… = “Once that…” / “Only if…” — the linguistic markers of leniency vs. restriction
Segment 16
TYPE: גמרא
The objection sharpened: since the Rabbis respond to Rabbi Eliezer with “only,” spurting must be LESS than their limb-convulsion standard.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא אַדְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, וְאִי עֲדִיף, מַאי ״עַד״?
English Translation:
Rather, it is obvious that the Rabbis are responding to the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. And if Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion is superior to that of the Rabbis as an indication of life, what is the meaning of: It is permitted only in a case where it convulses with its foreleg or with its hind leg or it wags its tail? In that case too, the Rabbis should have said: Once the animal convulses with its foreleg or with its hind leg or it wags its tail. Apparently, blood spurting is a less substantive indication of life, and the proof of Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak remains valid: If spurting at the beginning of the act of slaughter is a sufficient indication of life to render the slaughter valid, then all the more so, extending and bending a limb are also sufficient indications of life.
קלאוד על הדף:
The objection lands. The Rabbis MUST be responding to Rabbi Eliezer (Rabban Gamliel ruled out in segment 15). Their use of “עד” (restriction-language) tells us they are TIGHTENING Rabbi Eliezer’s standard: spurting alone isn’t enough — convulsion of a limb is required. So spurting is LESS substantive than convulsion, not more. This restores Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak’s proof: if spurting (a weaker sign!) qualifies at the beginning of slaughter, then certainly stronger signs do.
Key Terms:
- פְּשִׁיטָא = “Obviously” — the conclusion of the linguistic argument
- מַאי ״עַד״ = “What does ‘only’ mean?” — the rhetorical hammer of the objection
Segment 17
TYPE: גמרא
Rava holds the strict view — end of slaughter only — and prepares to derive it from the seven-days-with-mother verse.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רָבָא אָמַר: פִּירְכּוּס שֶׁאָמְרוּ – בְּסוֹף שְׁחִיטָה. אָמַר רָבָא: מְנָא אָמֵינָא לַהּ? דְּתַנְיָא: ״שׁוֹר
English Translation:
Rava said: The convulsion that the Rabbis said is an indication of life is a convulsion at the conclusion of the act of slaughter. Rava said: From where do I say that this is the case? It is as it is taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “When a bull or a sheep or a goat is born, it shall be seven days under its mother; and from the eighth day and onward it may be accepted for an offering to the Lord” (Leviticus 22:27). The phrase “a bull
קלאוד על הדף:
The amud closes with Rava taking the strictest view: פירכוס at the END of slaughter only — neither middle nor beginning. He begins to support this from a baraita parsing “שור או כשב או עז” (Vayikra 22:27), which excludes several disqualified-from-sacrifice cases. The derivation completes on 38b.
Key Terms:
- רָבָא = A leading fourth-generation Babylonian Amora, often taking analytically stricter positions
- דְּתַנְיָא: ״שׁוֹר = “As it is taught: ‘A bull…’” — the opening of the derivation continued on 38b
Amud Bet (38b)
Segment 1
TYPE: ברייתא
The baraita on Vayikra 22:27 enumerates five categories excluded from sacrifice — the last being the orphan.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אוֹ כֶשֶׂב״ – פְּרָט לְכִלְאַיִם, ״אוֹ עֵז״ – פְּרָט לְנִדְמֶה, ״כִּי יִוָּלֵד״ – פְּרָט לְיוֹצֵא דּוֹפֶן, ״שִׁבְעַת יָמִים״ – פְּרָט לִמְחוּסַּר זְמַן, ״תַּחַת אִמּוֹ״ – פְּרָט לַיָּתוֹם.
English Translation:
or a sheep” is to the exclusion of an animal born to parents of diverse kinds, which may not be brought as an offering. The phrase “or a goat” is to the exclusion of an animal that resembles another species of animal. “When it is born”; this is to the exclusion of an animal born by caesarean section. “It shall be seven days”; this is to the exclusion of an animal whose time has not yet arrived. “Under its mother”; this is to the exclusion of an animal that is an orphan.
קלאוד על הדף:
The baraita unpacks each phrase of Vayikra 22:27 as a separate exclusion: “or a sheep” excludes mixed-breeds (כלאים); “or a goat” excludes look-alikes (נדמה); “when it is born” excludes caesarean (יוצא דופן); “seven days” excludes a too-young animal (מחוסר זמן); “under its mother” excludes an orphan (יתום). The last — the orphan — is what Rava will use for his derivation about end-of-slaughter vitality.
Key Terms:
- כִּלְאַיִם = An animal born of mixed-breed parents — disqualified from sacrifice
- נִדְמֶה = An animal that resembles a different species (e.g., a sheep that looks like a goat)
- יוֹצֵא דּוֹפֶן = Born by caesarean section — bypassing the normal birth canal
- יָתוֹם = “Orphan” — an animal whose mother died during or right after birth
Segment 2
TYPE: גמרא
Rava narrows the case of “orphan” — two simple readings are ruled out.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הַאי יָתוֹם הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא דִּילִידְתֵּיהּ אִמֵּיהּ וַהֲדַר מִתָה, לְעוֹלָם תֵּיחֵי וְתֵיזִיל? אֶלָּא דְּמִתָה וַהֲדַר יְלִידְתֵּיהּ, מִ״כִּי יִוָּלֵד״ נָפְקָא.
English Translation:
Rava elaborates: What are the circumstances of this orphan? If we say that its mother gave birth to it and then died, this is unreasonable. Will the mother continue living forever? Rather, perhaps the reference is to a case where the mother died and then gave birth to it. The Gemara rejects that possibility, as the fact that this animal is disqualified from sacrifice is derived from the phrase: “When it is born,” since after the mother’s death the newborn animal can emerge from the womb only by means of caesarean section.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava analyzes the “orphan” case. It can’t be that the mother gave birth then died sometime later — surely the verse doesn’t require the mother to live forever! It also can’t be that the mother died and then the calf was extracted — that would already be excluded by “כי יולד” (caesarean exclusion). So the orphan must refer to a very specific scenario, identified in the next segment.
Key Terms:
- לְעוֹלָם תֵּיחֵי וְתֵיזִיל = “Will it live forever?” — the same rhetorical objection used by Rav Chisda about animals
- מִ״כִּי יִוָּלֵד״ נָפְקָא = “It is derived from ‘when it is born’” — already excluded by another phrase
Segment 3
TYPE: גמרא
Rava completes the proof: the orphan case requires the mother to be alive at birth’s END — paralleling end-of-slaughter vitality.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא, זֶה פֵּירַשׁ לְמִיתָה וְזֶה פֵּירַשׁ לְחַיִּים. אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא בָּעֵינַן חִיּוּתָא בְּסוֹף לֵידָה – הַיְינוּ דְּאִיצְטְרִיךְ קְרָא לְמַעוֹטֵי, אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ לָא בָּעֵינַן חִיּוּתָא בְּסוֹף לֵידָה, לְמָה לֵיהּ? מִ״כִּי יִוָּלֵד״ נָפְקָא!
English Translation:
Rather, it is obvious that the reference is to a case where the mother died at the conclusion of the birth, at which point this mother withdrew for death and that newborn withdrew for life. Granted, if you say that we require life at the conclusion of the birth, that is why a verse was necessary to exclude the orphan. But if you say that we do not require life at the conclusion of the birth, and the verse is excluding only an animal that was born after its mother’s death, why is this verse necessary to exclude it? It can be derived from the phrase: “When it is born.” It may be derived from here that in any situation where the animal must be alive, it must remain alive until the end of the process. That is the case with regard to the slaughter of an animal in danger of imminent death as well. The slaughter is valid only if there is an indication of life at the end of the act of slaughter.
קלאוד על הדף:
The “orphan” case must be: mother and calf emerged from a single process where the mother died right at the END of birth — “this one [the mother] turned to death, that one [the calf] turned to life.” Why does the verse exclude this case? Only because we REQUIRE that the mother be alive at the END of the birth. Rava reads this as a general principle: any halachic process requiring life requires life at its END. Slaughter is no different — פירכוס must occur at the end.
Key Terms:
- זֶה פֵּירַשׁ לְמִיתָה וְזֶה פֵּירַשׁ לְחַיִּים = “This [the mother] turned to death, this [the calf] to life” — the precise scenario the verse addresses
- חִיּוּתָא בְּסוֹף לֵידָה = “Life at the end of birth” — the principle Rava generalizes to slaughter
Segment 4
TYPE: גמרא
Rava issues a halachic ruling tracking a particular baraita’s elaboration of the mishna.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רָבָא: הִלְכְתָא כִּי הָא מַתְנִיתָא – בְּהֵמָה דַּקָּה שֶׁפָּשְׁטָה יָדָהּ וְלֹא הֶחְזִירָה, פְּסוּלָה.
English Translation:
§ The mishna teaches: The slaughter of a small animal in danger of imminent death that during the slaughter extended its foreleg that was bent and did not restore it to the bent position is not valid, as extending the foreleg is only part of the natural course of removal of the animal’s soul from its body and not a convulsion indicating life. Rava says that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion expressed in this baraita: The slaughter of a small animal that extended its foreleg that was bent and did not restore it to the bent position is not valid.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava issues a practical halachic ruling: the halacha follows a particular baraita whose details he is about to lay out. The headline rule: a small animal that extends its foreleg without retracting it during slaughter is invalid — exactly tracking the mishna. The next segments unpack the baraita’s three-tier system: small vs. large livestock vs. birds.
Key Terms:
- הִלְכְתָא כִּי הָא מַתְנִיתָא = “The halacha follows this baraita” — formal pesak language
- בְּהֵמָה דַּקָּה = Small livestock (sheep, goat) — the most stringent category
Segment 5
TYPE: ברייתא
The baraita’s three-tier hierarchy: small livestock stringent, large livestock lenient, birds most lenient.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? בַּיָּד, אֲבָל בָּרֶגֶל, בֵּין פָּשְׁטָה וְלֹא כָּפְפָה, בֵּין כָּפְפָה וְלֹא פָּשְׁטָה – כְּשֵׁרָה. בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? בְּדַקָּה, אֲבָל בְּגַסָּה, בֵּין בַּיָּד בֵּין בָּרֶגֶל, בֵּין פָּשְׁטָה וְלֹא כָּפְפָה, בֵּין כָּפְפָה וְלֹא פָּשְׁטָה – כְּשֵׁרָה. וְעוֹף, אֲפִילּוּ לֹא רִפְרֵף אֶלָּא גַּפּוֹ, וְלֹא כִּשְׁכֵּשׁ אֶלָּא זְנָבוֹ – הֲרֵי זֶה פִּירְכּוּס.
English Translation:
The baraita continues: In what case is this statement said? It is with regard to the foreleg. But with regard to the hind leg, whether the animal extended it and did not restore it to the bent position or the animal bent it but did not extend it, the slaughter is valid. In what case is this statement, about extending the foreleg, said? It is with regard to a small animal. But with regard to a large animal, whether the convulsion involves its foreleg or its hind leg, and whether the animal extended it and did not restore it to the bent position or the animal bent it but did not extend it, the slaughter is valid. And with regard to a bird, even if it fluttered [rifref] only its wing or wagged only its tail, that is a convulsion and an indication of life.
קלאוד על הדף:
The baraita’s three-tier hierarchy: (1) Small livestock: only the foreleg’s specific bent-straight-bent cycle is strict; hind-leg motion either way validates. (2) Large livestock: any foreleg OR hind-leg motion in either direction validates. (3) Birds: even just fluttering a wing or wagging the tail counts as פירכוס. The progression reflects the relative ease of detecting life in different sized animals.
Key Terms:
- בְּהֵמָה גַסָּה = Large livestock (cattle) — given the most lenient treatment among quadrupeds
- רִפְרֵף = Fluttered — the avian-specific motion that suffices for birds
- גַּפּוֹ = “Its wing” — sufficient even alone for a bird’s פירכוס
Segment 6
TYPE: גמרא
Most of the baraita is already implied by the mishna; what Rava genuinely adds is the BIRD case.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן? כּוּלְּהוּ תְּנַנְהִי! בְּהֵמָה דַּקָּה שֶׁפָּשְׁטָה יָדָהּ וְלֹא הֶחְזִירָה – פְּסוּלָה, שֶׁאֵינָהּ אֶלָּא הוֹצָאַת נֶפֶשׁ. יָד – אִין, רֶגֶל – לָא; דַּקָּה – אִין, גַּסָּה – לָא. עוֹף אִיצְטְרִיכָא לֵיהּ, דְּלָא תְּנַן.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: What is Rava teaching us in ruling in accordance with the baraita? He is teaching us all of those halakhot we learned in the mishna: The slaughter of a small animal that when being slaughtered extended its foreleg that was bent and did not restore it to the bent position is not valid, as extending the foreleg is only part of the natural course of removal of the animal’s soul from its body and not a convulsion indicating life. It may be inferred from the mishna that with regard to movement of a foreleg alone, yes, it is not an indication of life, but movement of a hind leg, no, it is an indication of life. With regard to a small animal, yes, this is the halakha; with regard to a large animal, no, this is not the halakha, and extending a hind leg does indicate life. The Gemara answers: It was necessary for Rava to teach the halakha in the baraita with regard to a bird, as we did not learn it in the mishna.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara questions Rava’s novelty — most of the baraita is already implicit in the mishna. The small/large livestock and foreleg/hind-leg distinctions can be inferred from the mishna’s careful wording (“a small animal that extended its foreleg…”). What Rava really adds is the BIRD case (עוף) — wing-fluttering and tail-wagging as sufficient פירכוס — which the mishna doesn’t address.
Key Terms:
- כּוּלְּהוּ תְּנַנְהִי = “We’ve already learned all these” — the redundancy challenge
- עוֹף אִיצְטְרִיכָא לֵיהּ = “Birds were necessary [to add]” — what Rava’s ruling genuinely contributes
Segment 7
TYPE: משנה
A new mishna: when a Jew slaughters for a gentile — does the gentile’s presumed avodah zarah intent invalidate the slaughter?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הַשּׁוֹחֵט לְנׇכְרִי – שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה, וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר פּוֹסֵל. אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: אֲפִילּוּ שְׁחָטָהּ לֶאֱכוֹל לְנׇכְרִי מֵחֲצַר כָּבֵד שֶׁלָּהּ – פְּסוּלָה, שֶׁסְּתָם מַחְשֶׁבֶת נׇכְרִי לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה.
English Translation:
MISHNA: In the case of a Jew who slaughters the animal of a gentile for a gentile, his slaughter is valid, and Rabbi Eliezer deems it not valid. Rabbi Eliezer says: Even if the Jew slaughtered the animal with the intent to feed the gentile from its diaphragm [mechatzar kaved], its slaughter is not valid, as the unspecified intent of a gentile is to slaughter the animal for idol worship, and it is prohibited to derive benefit from it.
קלאוד על הדף:
A new mishna shifts topics entirely — from physical signs of life to mental intent. When a Jew slaughters an animal for a gentile (a common commercial situation), is the slaughter valid? The Tanna Kamma says yes. Rabbi Eliezer says no — even if the Jew intended only that the gentile eat the harmless diaphragm portion, the gentile’s presumed intent (default-categorized as עבודה זרה) invalidates the entire slaughter, rendering the meat forbidden for benefit (הנאה) and not just for consumption.
Key Terms:
- חֲצַר כָּבֵד = The diaphragm/liver-region — a peripheral, non-prized part of the animal
- סְתָם מַחְשֶׁבֶת נׇכְרִי לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה = “The default intent of a gentile is for idol worship” — Rabbi Eliezer’s controversial presumption
Segment 8
TYPE: משנה
Rabbi Yosei’s קל וחומר: if even in kodashim the priest’s intent (not the owner’s) decides — then surely in chulin only the slaughterer’s intent counts.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: קַל וָחוֹמֶר הַדְּבָרִים, וּמָה בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁהַמַּחְשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁין – אֵין הַכֹּל הוֹלֵךְ אֶלָּא אַחַר הָעוֹבֵד, מְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין מַחְשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת בְּחוּלִּין – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא הַכֹּל הוֹלֵךְ אֶלָּא אַחַר הַשּׁוֹחֵט?
English Translation:
Rabbi Yosei says: The matter of the intent of the gentile is irrelevant in this case, as can be derived by means of an a fortiori inference. If in a place where intent while slaughtering the animal invalidates the slaughter, i.e., in sacrificial animals, such as when slaughtering an offering with the intent to sacrifice it beyond its designated time, everything follows only the intent of the priest performing the service and not the intent of the owner, then in a place where intent does not invalidate the slaughter, i.e., in non-sacred animals, is it not right that everything should follow only the intent of the one who slaughters the animal?
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yosei opposes Rabbi Eliezer with an elegant קל וחומר. In sacrifices (kodashim), intent is highly potent — wrong intent renders the offering פגול. Yet even there, only the PRIEST’S intent matters, not the owner’s. In non-sacred slaughter (chulin), where intent has far less halachic potency overall, surely only the SLAUGHTERER’S intent should count. Therefore the gentile’s intent — whatever it might be — is irrelevant when a Jew is doing the actual slaughtering.
Key Terms:
- קַל וָחוֹמֶר = An a fortiori inference — if X applies in a lighter case, surely in a heavier case
- הָעוֹבֵד / הַשּׁוֹחֵט = “The one performing the service” / “the slaughterer” — the active agent, not the owner
Segment 9
TYPE: גמרא
The Gemara grounds the dispute in a Tannaitic question: does an OWNER’s intent render an offering piggul?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָנֵי תַּנָּאֵי אִית לְהוּ דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי, דְּתַנְיָא: אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי: שָׁמַעְתִּי שֶׁהַבְּעָלִים מְפַגְּלִין.
English Translation:
GEMARA: In explanation of the dispute between the first tanna and Rabbi Eliezer, the Gemara explains: These tanna’im hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei, says: I heard that the owners, and not only the priest, render an offering piggul by means of improper intent. The same is true with regard to non-sacred slaughter, where the owners’ intent for idol worship invalidates the slaughter, even if the slaughterer has no intent for idol worship.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara opens by tracing the mishna’s dispute to a Tannaitic split. The Tanna Kamma and Rabbi Eliezer both accept Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Yosei’s principle that owners — not just the slaughterer — can render an offering פיגול through bad intent. By extension, in non-sacred slaughter the gentile-owner’s idolatrous intent can invalidate. (Rabbi Yosei’s קל וחומר must therefore disagree even with that premise.)
Key Terms:
- רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי = Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Yosei — a Tanna who transmitted his father’s teachings
- בְּעָלִים מְפַגְּלִין = “Owners render [the offering] piggul” — owners’ intent can invalidate sacrifices
- פִּגּוּל = An offering rendered unfit by improper intent of consumption-time or place
Segment 10
TYPE: גמרא
The three positions clarified: the dispute is about default presumption + about whether owner’s intent crosses to the slaughterer.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מִיהוּ תַּנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: אִי שַׁמְעִינֵיהּ דְּחַשֵּׁיב – אִין, אִי לָא – לָא, סְתָם מַחְשֶׁבֶת נׇכְרִי לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה לָא אָמְרִינַן. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר סָבַר: אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא שַׁמְעִינֵיהּ דְּחַשֵּׁיב, סְתָם מַחְשֶׁבֶת נׇכְרִי לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה אָמְרִינַן. וַאֲתָא רַבִּי יוֹסֵי לְמֵימַר: אַף עַל גַּב דְּשַׁמְעִינֵיהּ דְּחַשֵּׁיב, זֶה מְחַשֵּׁב וְזֶה עוֹבֵד לָא אָמְרִינַן.
English Translation:
But the first tanna holds that if we heard the gentile say that he intends the animal for idol worship, yes, his intent invalidates the slaughter, and if the gentile did not voice his intent before us, his intent does not invalidate the slaughter, as we do not say that the unspecified intent of a gentile is for idol worship. Rabbi Eliezer holds: Although we did not hear the gentile say that he intends the animal for idol worship, the slaughter is not valid, as we say the unspecified intent of a gentile is for idol worship. And Rabbi Yosei comes to say that even though we heard the gentile say that he intends the animal for idol worship, in a case where this owner has intent for idol worship and that other person is performing the slaughter, we do not say that the intent of the owner invalidates the slaughter.
קלאוד על הדף:
The first version maps out three positions clearly. (1) Tanna Kamma: only EXPLICIT idolatrous intent invalidates; we don’t assume סתם. (2) Rabbi Eliezer: even unspoken/default gentile intent counts as עבודה זרה. (3) Rabbi Yosei: even explicit owner-intent doesn’t transfer to a slaughtering Jew — the slaughterer’s intent alone matters. So Tanna Kamma and Rabbi Eliezer disagree about the default presumption; Rabbi Yosei goes further by denying that owner-intent transfers at all.
Key Terms:
- זֶה מְחַשֵּׁב וְזֶה עוֹבֵד = “This one [the owner] intends, and that one [the slaughterer] performs” — the structure that distinguishes Rabbi Yosei’s view
- שַׁמְעִינֵיהּ דְּחַשֵּׁיב = “We heard him intend” — explicit declaration vs. mere presumption
Segment 11
TYPE: גמרא
An alternative reading: the entire dispute is about EXPLICIT intent — what carries from Temple-slaughter to chulin?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: בִּדְשַׁמְעִינֵיהּ דְּחַשֵּׁיב פְּלִיגִי, תַּנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: כִּי אָמְרִינַן ״זֶה מְחַשֵּׁב וְזֶה עוֹבֵד״ – הָנֵי מִילֵּי בִּפְנִים, אֲבָל בְּחוּץ לֹא, חוּץ מִפְּנִים
English Translation:
There are those who say an alternative explanation of the mishna. It is with regard to a case where we heard the gentile say that he intends the animal for idol worship that the tanna’im disagree. The first tanna holds that when we say in a case where this owner has improper intent and that other person is performing the slaughter that the intent of the owner invalidates the slaughter, this statement applies only inside the Temple, in the slaughter of offerings. But with regard to non-sacred slaughter outside the Temple, the intent of the owner does not invalidate the slaughter, as with regard to deriving the halakhot of non-sacred slaughter outside the Temple from the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple,
קלאוד על הדף:
The איכא דאמרי gives a second reading: ALL the Tannaim are talking about a case where the gentile’s intent IS explicit. The dispute is only about whether the “owner’s intent invalidates” principle applies outside the Temple. The Tanna Kamma now holds: this rule applies only IN the Temple (פנים) — sacrificial slaughter — but not outside (חוץ), in chulin. The daf ends mid-sentence, with the logical question of carrying inside-Temple rules to outside-Temple slaughter to be completed on 39a.
Key Terms:
- אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי = “Some say [alternatively]” — the formula introducing a second recension of the same dispute
- פְּנִים / חוּץ = “Inside [the Temple] / outside” — the spatial dichotomy underlying many halachic transfers
- חוּץ מִפְּנִים = “[Deriving] outside from inside” — the unfinished logical operation to be completed on 39a