Chullin Daf 68 (חולין דף ס״ח)
Daf: 68 | Amudim: 68a – 68b | Date: Loading...
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (68a)
Segment 1
TYPE: משנה
The mishna: a fetus’s extended foreleg brought back is permitted by the mother’s slaughter; an extended head is ‘born’
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְנִי׳ בְּהֵמָה הַמְקַשָּׁה לֵילֵד, וְהוֹצִיא הָעוּבָּר אֶת יָדוֹ וְהֶחְזִירוֹ – מוּתָּר בַּאֲכִילָה. הוֹצִיא אֶת רֹאשׁוֹ, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהֶחְזִירוֹ – הֲרֵי זֶה כְּיָלוּד.
English Translation:
MISHNA: When a pregnant kosher animal is slaughtered, the slaughter also renders the consumption of its fetus permitted. Even if an animal was encountering difficulty giving birth and meanwhile the fetus extended its foreleg outside the mother animal’s womb and then brought it back inside, and then the mother animal was slaughtered, the consumption of the fetus is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. But if the fetus extended its head outside the womb, even if it then brought it back inside, the halakhic status of that fetus is like that of a newborn, and the slaughter of the mother animal does not permit the consumption of the fetus. Rather, it requires its own slaughter.
קלאוד על הדף:
The fourth chapter (Behemah ha-Mekasheh Leiled) opens with the rule that slaughtering a pregnant animal also permits its fetus. The mishna refines this for a fetus that partly emerges during a difficult birth: if it extended a foreleg and drew it back before the slaughter, the fetus is still permitted by the mother’s slaughter. But if it extended its head — even momentarily — it is legally a yalud (a born animal) and requires its own slaughter; the mother’s slaughter no longer permits it.
Key Terms:
- הַמְקַשָּׁה לֵילֵד = an animal struggling/in difficulty to give birth
- עוּבָּר = the fetus
- הֶחְזִירוֹ = drew it [the limb] back in
- כְּיָלוּד = like a born [animal] — requiring its own slaughter
Segment 2
TYPE: משנה
Pieces severed from the fetus in the womb are permitted by the slaughter; pieces of the mother’s own organs are not — the general rule
Hebrew/Aramaic:
חוֹתֵךְ מֵעוּבָּר שֶׁבְּמֵעֶיהָ – מוּתָּר בַּאֲכִילָה, מִן הַטְּחוֹל וּמִן הַכְּלָיוֹת – אָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה. זֶה הַכְּלָל: דָּבָר שֶׁגּוּפָהּ – אָסוּר, וְשֶׁאֵינָהּ גּוּפָהּ – מוּתָּר.
English Translation:
If, prior to slaughtering an animal, one severs pieces from a fetus that is in the womb and leaves those pieces in the womb, their consumption is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. By contrast, if one severs pieces of the spleen or of the kidneys of an animal and then slaughters it, then even if those pieces are left inside the animal their consumption is prohibited, because an organ severed from a living being is not permitted by the subsequent slaughter of the animal. This is the principle: An item that is part of an animal’s body that was severed prior to its slaughter is prohibited even after slaughter, and an item that is not part of its body, i.e., its fetus, is permitted by virtue of its slaughter.
קלאוד על הדף:
The mishna’s second ruling distinguishes the fetus from the mother’s own body. Pieces cut from the fetus while it lies in the womb are permitted by the mother’s slaughter (the fetus is not ‘her body’). But pieces cut from the mother’s own spleen or kidneys before slaughter remain forbidden as ever min ha-chai (a limb from a living animal), since slaughter does not retroactively permit what was already severed. The principle (zeh ha-kelal): what is part of her body is forbidden, what is not her body (the fetus) is permitted.
Key Terms:
- חוֹתֵךְ = one who cuts/severs [pieces]
- טְחוֹל / כְּלָיוֹת = the spleen / the kidneys (the mother’s own organs)
- דָּבָר שֶׁגּוּפָהּ = something that is part of her [the mother’s] body — forbidden
- שֶׁאֵינָהּ גּוּפָהּ = what is not her body (the fetus) — permitted
Segment 3
TYPE: מימרא
Rav: the extended foreleg itself remains forbidden even after being drawn back and the mother slaughtered
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: וְאֵבֶר עַצְמוֹ אָסוּר.
English Translation:
GEMARA: The Gemara qualifies the first ruling of the mishna: Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: But as for the limb itself, i.e., the foreleg, its consumption is prohibited, even though the fetus brought it back inside prior to the slaughter.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav qualifies the mishna’s first ruling. Even though the rest of the fetus is permitted when the foreleg is drawn back before slaughter, the limb itself (the foreleg that emerged) remains forbidden. This is the central thesis of the sugya — that emergence from the womb permanently forbids the part that left — and the Gemara will spend the next segments testing it against the mishna and baraitot.
Key Terms:
- וְאֵבֶר עַצְמוֹ אָסוּר = ‘but the limb itself is forbidden’ — Rav’s qualification
- רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב = Rav Yehuda citing Rav
Segment 4
TYPE: דרשה
Rav’s source: ‘flesh in the field, a tereifa’ — flesh that left its boundary is forbidden like a tereifa
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַאי טַעְמָא? דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״וּבָשָׂר בַּשָּׂדֶה טְרֵפָה לֹא תֹאכֵלוּ״, כֵּיוָן שֶׁיָּצָא בָּשָׂר חוּץ לִמְחִיצָתוֹ – נֶאֱסָר.
English Translation:
What is the reason for this? It is as the verse states: “And flesh, in the field, a tereifa, you shall not eat” (Exodus 22:30). A tereifa is an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months; its consumption is prohibited even if it is ritually slaughtered. The Gemara interprets the verse as teaching a principle: Once flesh whose permitted status is dependent on being within a certain area, e.g., sacrificial meat within the Temple courtyard, has gone outside of its boundary, i.e., the area in which it is permitted, which the verse describes as being “in the field,” it becomes permanently prohibited, like a tereifa. Likewise, the permitted status of a fetus is dependent on its being within the womb when the mother animal is slaughtered. Accordingly, if any part of the fetus leaves the womb before the slaughter, it is rendered permanently prohibited.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav derives his ruling from ‘u-vasar ba-sadeh tereifa lo tochelu’ (Exodus 22:30), read not literally but as a principle: flesh whose permitted status depends on staying within a boundary becomes forbidden — like a tereifa — once it leaves that boundary (‘in the field’). A fetus’s permission depends on being inside the womb at the moment of slaughter; so a limb that left the womb has crossed its boundary and is permanently forbidden, even if drawn back.
Key Terms:
- בָּשָׂר בַּשָּׂדֶה טְרֵפָה = ‘flesh in the field, a tereifa’ (Exodus 22:30)
- חוּץ לִמְחִיצָתוֹ = outside its boundary/partition
- נֶאֱסָר = it becomes forbidden
Segment 5
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Challenge from the mishna (‘permitted’) — answered: ‘permitted’ refers to the rest of the fetus, not the limb
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תְּנַן: בְּהֵמָה הַמְקַשָּׁה לֵילֵד, וְהוֹצִיא הָעוּבָּר אֶת יָדוֹ וְהֶחְזִירוֹ – מוּתָּר בַּאֲכִילָה. מַאי לָאו אַאֵבֶר? לָא, אַעוּבָּר.
English Translation:
We learned in the mishna: If an animal was encountering difficulty giving birth and as a result the fetus extended its foreleg outside the mother animal’s body but then brought it back, and then the animal was slaughtered, the consumption of the fetus is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. The Gemara assumes: What, is the mishna not referring to the entire fetus, including the limb, i.e., the foreleg, when it states that its consumption is permitted by the slaughter? This would contradict Rav’s ruling. The Gemara answers: No, the mishna is referring to the rest of the fetus, apart from the foreleg.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara challenges Rav from the mishna itself: it says the fetus whose foreleg was drawn back is ‘permitted’ — does that not include the limb, contradicting Rav? The answer: ‘permitted’ refers only to the rest of the fetus (a-ubar), not to the emerged foreleg, which remains forbidden as Rav held.
Key Terms:
- מַאי לָאו אַאֵבֶר = ‘is it not [referring] to the limb?’ — the challenge
- אַעוּבָּר = [no — it refers] to the [rest of the] fetus
Segment 6
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
If only the rest of the fetus, why mention drawing it back? For stylistic parallel with the head-clause
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִי אַעוּבָּר, מַאי אִירְיָא הֶחְזִירוֹ? אֲפִילּוּ לֹא הֶחְזִירוֹ נָמֵי! הוּא הַדִּין אַף עַל גַּב דְּלֹא הֶחְזִירוֹ. וְאַיְּידֵי דְּקָא בָּעֵי מִיתְנֵא סֵיפָא: הוֹצִיא אֶת רֹאשׁוֹ אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהֶחְזִירוֹ – הֲרֵי זֶה כְּיָלוּד, תְּנָא נָמֵי רֵישָׁא הֶחְזִירוֹ.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: If the mishna is referring to the rest of the fetus, why state specifically that the fetus brought back its foreleg? Even if it did not bring it back the rest of the fetus would still be permitted. The Gemara answers: The same is true, that the rest of the fetus is permitted, even if it did not bring back its foreleg. But since the tanna of the mishna wants to teach in the latter clause: If the fetus extended its head, even though it brought it back, the halakhic status of that fetus is like that of a newborn and is permitted only through its own slaughter, therefore he also taught in the first clause that the fetus brought back its foreleg, for stylistic reasons, despite the fact that the ruling is not limited to that case.
קלאוד על הדף:
If the mishna’s ‘permitted’ concerns only the rest of the fetus, why specify that the foreleg was drawn back — the rest is permitted regardless? The Gemara answers that the detail is included only for stylistic parallelism (ayidi) with the latter clause about the head (‘even though he drew it back’), not because drawing back the foreleg changes the rest of the fetus’s status.
Key Terms:
- מַאי אִירְיָא הֶחְזִירוֹ = ‘why specifically [state that] he drew it back?’
- אַיְּידֵי = since/owing to [the parallel clause] — a stylistic motive
- סֵיפָא = the latter clause (about the head)
Segment 7
TYPE: קושיא
What does the head-clause teach? That an emerged head is a birth — but that is already known from a Bekhorot mishna
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְסֵיפָא, מַאי קָמַשְׁמַע לַן? דְּכֵיוָן דְּיָצָא רֹאשׁוֹ הָוְיָא לַהּ לֵידָה? תְּנֵינָא: אֵיזֶהוּ בְּכוֹר לְנַחֲלָה וְאֵינוֹ בְּכוֹר לְכֹהֲנִים – הַבָּא אַחַר נְפָלִים, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁיָּצָא רֹאשׁוֹ חַי, אוֹ בֶּן תִּשְׁעָה שֶׁיָּצָא רֹאשׁוֹ מֵת.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: And concerning this latter clause itself, what does it teach us? Does it teach that once the fetus extended its head, that is considered a birth? But we have already learned this in a mishna (Bekhorot 46a): Who is considered a firstborn with regard to inheritance but is not considered a firstborn with regard to the requirement to be redeemed by giving five shekels to the priests? It is a son who came after the miscarriage of an underdeveloped fetus. The mishna adds that the category of stillbirth includes the case of a child who did not reach full term, even if its head emerged alive, or a fully developed, nine-month-old fetus whose head emerged dead.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara probes the latter clause: does it merely teach that an emerged head counts as birth? That is already taught in Bekhorot (46a) regarding the firstborn — a child following a miscarriage ‘whose head emerged’ is treated as already born. If the definition of birth-by-head is known elsewhere, the mishna’s head-clause seems to teach nothing new.
Key Terms:
- הָוְיָא לַהּ לֵידָה = it counts as a birth
- בְּכוֹר לְנַחֲלָה = a firstborn for inheritance [purposes]
- נְפָלִים = miscarriages / non-viable births
Segment 8
TYPE: גמרא
The inference: a head emerging alive is a birth — so subsequent children aren’t even firstborn for inheritance
Hebrew/Aramaic:
טַעְמָא דְּרֹאשׁוֹ מֵת, הָא רֹאשׁוֹ חַי – הַבָּא אַחֲרָיו בְּכוֹר לְנַחֲלָה נָמֵי לָא הָוֵי.
English Translation:
The Gemara infers from the final clause of the mishna: The reason a son born following the miscarriage is considered a firstborn with regard to inheritance is that the head of the miscarriage emerged only after it was already dead. But if its head had initially emerged alive, even if it then died before being fully delivered, the son born after him would not be considered a firstborn even with regard to inheritance. Apparently, this is because the emergence of the head alive is considered a birth, and therefore any subsequent child cannot be considered the firstborn. Evidently, it is unnecessary for the mishna here to teach this definition of a birth.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara sharpens the inference from Bekhorot. The mishna there permits the next child to count as firstborn-for-inheritance only because the miscarried head emerged dead; had it emerged alive, the subsequent child would not be a firstborn even for inheritance — proving that a head emerging alive already constitutes a legal birth. This reinforces that the definition of birth-by-head is established and seemingly redundant here.
Key Terms:
- טַעְמָא דְּרֹאשׁוֹ מֵת = ‘the reason is that its head [emerged] dead’
- רֹאשׁוֹ חַי = its head [emerged] alive — already a birth
Segment 9
TYPE: גמרא
A proposed answer: the Bekhorot mishna teaches birth for humans; ours teaches it applies to animals too
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְכִי תֵּימָא, אַשְׁמְעִינַן בְּאָדָם, וְקָא מַשְׁמַע לַן בִּבְהֵמָה.
English Translation:
And if you would say that the mishna there teaches us the definition of birth with regard to a person, and the mishna here teaches us that the same definition applies to an animal, another problem remains, as the Gemara will presently explain.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara floats a defense of the head-clause: perhaps Bekhorot defines birth-by-head only for a person (adam), and our mishna is needed to extend the same definition to an animal (behemah). The next segment explains why each case would otherwise need its own source — and then why this defense ultimately fails.
Key Terms:
- אַשְׁמְעִינַן בְּאָדָם = it taught us [the rule] regarding a person
- וְקָא מַשְׁמַע לַן בִּבְהֵמָה = and [our mishna] teaches us [it] regarding an animal
Segment 10
TYPE: גמרא
Why each needs its own source: an animal has no concealed prozdor; a person’s face has unique significance
Hebrew/Aramaic:
דְּאָדָם מִבְּהֵמָה לָא יָלֵיף, דְּאֵין פְּרוֹזְדוֹר לִבְהֵמָה, וּבְהֵמָה מֵאָדָם לָא יָלְפָא, דַּחֲשִׁיב פַּרְצוּף פָּנִים דִּידֵיהּ.
English Translation:
Before explaining the problem with this suggestion, the Gemara explains why it is necessary to teach the definition with regard to both people and animals: Because the definition of birth with regard to a person cannot be derived from that of an animal, as an animal does not have a concealed opening [prozdor] to the womb, unlike women, whose thighs conceal the opening to their womb. Consequently, even if the definition were stated with regard to an animal, one might limit it to animals, as that stage is immediately visible; whereas in women it is not. And conversely, the definition of birth with regard to an animal cannot be derived from that of a person, as the form of a person’s face is significant because people are created in the image of God, and their faces bear the mark of their intelligence, which is not true of animals. Consequently, perhaps the emergence of the head alone is considered a birth only with regard to a person.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara explains why human and animal birth-definitions cannot simply be derived from one another. One could not learn the human case from the animal, because a woman has a concealed vestibule (prozdor) — her thighs hide the womb’s opening — whereas an animal does not, so visibility differs. And one could not learn the animal case from the human, because a person’s facial form (partzuf panim) carries special significance (the image of God), which an animal lacks. Hence, in principle, each would need its own teaching.
Key Terms:
- פְּרוֹזְדוֹר = the vestibule/concealed opening of the womb
- פַּרְצוּף פָּנִים = the form of the face — significant for a person
- לָא יָלֵיף / לָא יָלְפָא = one cannot derive [one from the other]
Segment 11
TYPE: קושיא
But the animal case is also already known — from the placenta mishna (77a): an emerged placenta indicates a possible birth
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָא נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא: שִׁלְיָא שֶׁיָּצְתָה מִקְצָתָהּ – אֲסוּרָה בַּאֲכִילָה, כְּסִימָן וָלָד בָּאִשָּׁה כָּךְ סִימָן וָלָד בַּבְּהֵמָה!
English Translation:
The Gemara proceeds to explain why the above suggestion is not a solution: With regard to this halakha also, that the emergence of the head of an animal is considered a birth, we have already learned it in a mishna (77a): If part of a placenta emerged from the womb of an animal before it was slaughtered, its consumption is prohibited even after the mother animal is slaughtered. The reason for this is just as the placenta is an indication of the presence of a fetus in a woman, so too, it is an indication of the presence of a fetus in an animal. Consequently, it is possible that the part of the placenta that emerged contained the head of the fetus, and accordingly it would be considered to have been born. The slaughter of the mother animal would therefore not permit it for consumption. Evidently, it is unnecessary for the mishna here to teach the definition of a birth even with regard to an animal.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara undercuts the proposed defense: the animal birth-definition is also already taught elsewhere — in the mishna (77a) that a partially-emerged placenta (shilya) forbids the fetus, since the placenta indicates a fetus and may have carried the head out. Just as the placenta is a siman valad (sign of offspring) in a woman, so in an animal. So the animal case, too, is established, and the head-clause of our mishna still seems to teach nothing new.
Key Terms:
- שִׁלְיָא = the placenta
- סִימָן וָלָד = a sign/indication of [the presence of] offspring
- מִקְצָתָהּ = part of it [emerged]
Segment 12
TYPE: גמרא
The renewed challenge to Rav: if the latter clause is not novel, the first clause must be teaching the limb’s permission
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא הֶחְזִירוֹ דְּרֵישָׁא דַּוְקָא, תְּנָא סֵיפָא אַטּוּ רֵישָׁא.
English Translation:
The Gemara has established that the latter clause does not teach any novelty. Accordingly, it returns to challenging Rav’s ruling: Granted, the mishna is understood if you say that the statement that the fetus brought its foreleg back inside the mother animal, which is mentioned in the first clause of the mishna, is written specifically in order to teach the novelty that the foreleg is permitted if it was brought back before the slaughter, in contrast to Rav’s ruling. If so, then one can claim the mishna taught it in the latter clause due to the first clause, so that they would be parallel stylistically, and no novelty is necessary in the latter clause.
קלאוד על הדף:
Having shown the latter (head) clause is not novel, the Gemara returns to pressing Rav. If the first clause’s ‘drew back the foreleg’ is meant specifically — to permit the foreleg — then the head-clause could be taught merely for parallelism. This framing sets up the dilemma in the next segment: the mishna’s structure seems to require that the first clause be teaching a genuine novelty about the limb, against Rav.
Key Terms:
- הֶחְזִירוֹ דְּרֵישָׁא דַּוְקָא = ‘drew it back’ in the first clause is meant precisely/exclusively
- תְּנָא סֵיפָא אַטּוּ רֵישָׁא = he taught the latter clause on account of the first
Segment 13
TYPE: קושיא
If neither clause is novel, why mention drawing the limb/head back at all? This presses Rav
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ: לָא דְּרֵישָׁא דַּוְקָא, וְלָא דְּסֵיפָא דַּוְקָא, לְמָה לֵיהּ לְמִתְנְיַיהּ כְּלָל?
English Translation:
But if you say the first clause is not written specifically and does not teach a novelty, but rather the mishna is referring to the permitted status of the rest of the fetus, which is permitted even if it does not bring back its foreleg, and you also say the latter clause is not written specifically to teach a novelty, since the definition of birth is already taught in a mishna elsewhere, then why does it need to teach the halakha that the foreleg or head were brought back at all? Perforce, the first clause must be referring to the permitted status of the foreleg and limiting it specifically to the case where it was brought back inside. This contradicts Rav’s ruling.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara completes the difficulty: if neither the first clause (read as about the rest of the fetus) nor the latter clause (already-known birth definition) teaches anything new, then why mention drawing the foreleg or head back at all? It seems the first clause must be teaching that the drawn-back foreleg is itself permitted — directly contradicting Rav. The next segment resolves this with Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak’s distinction.
Key Terms:
- לָא דְּרֵישָׁא דַּוְקָא = the first clause is not meant exclusively [about the limb]
- לְמָה לֵיהּ לְמִתְנְיַיהּ = why does he need to teach it at all?
Segment 14
TYPE: תירוץ
Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak: the novelty is the ‘place of the cut’ (mekom chatach) — needed if the limb wasn’t drawn back
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לָא, לְעוֹלָם אַעוּבָּר, וְכִדְאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: לֹא נִצְרְכָה אֶלָּא לִמְקוֹם חֲתָךְ. הָכָא נָמֵי, לֹא נִצְרְכָה אֶלָּא לִמְקוֹם חֲתָךְ.
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: No; actually, the mishna is referring to the permitted status of the rest of the fetus, but nevertheless, the statement that the fetus brought back its foreleg does teach a novelty. This is similar to that which Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said, in explanation of a ruling in a baraita cited below, that it is necessary only with regard to the location of a cut limb on the fetus’s body. If the foreleg were to be severed at precisely the point that lay on the boundary between the inside and the outside of the womb, then the location of the cut on the fetus’s body would also be prohibited. Here too, one can explain that the ruling is necessary only with regard to the location of the cut, and it teaches that if the fetus did not bring back its foreleg, then not only is the foreleg prohibited but the location of the cut is also prohibited.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak rescues Rav. The mishna does concern the rest of the fetus, yet still teaches a novelty — about the mekom chatach (the location of the cut). If the emerged foreleg were severed exactly at the boundary line, the spot on the fetus’s body where it was cut would also be forbidden (as having been ‘outside’). The mishna teaches that drawing the foreleg back protects even that cut-point; only if the limb was not drawn back is the cut-location forbidden along with the limb.
Key Terms:
- מְקוֹם חֲתָךְ = the place/spot of the cut on the fetus’s body
- לֹא נִצְרְכָה אֶלָּא = ‘it is necessary only [for this case]’
- רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק = the Amora who supplies the resolution
Segment 15
TYPE: ברייתא
A baraita: foreleg drawn back then mother slaughtered — permitted; mother slaughtered then drawn back — forbidden
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תָּא שְׁמַע: בְּהֵמָה הַמְקַשָּׁה לֵילֵד, הוֹצִיא עוּבָּר אֶת יָדוֹ וְהֶחְזִירָהּ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ שָׁחַט אֶת אִמּוֹ – מוּתָּר בַּאֲכִילָה. שָׁחַט אֶת אִמּוֹ וְאַחַר כָּךְ הֶחְזִירָהּ – אָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a challenge to Rav’s ruling from a baraita: If an animal was encountering difficulty giving birth, and as a result the fetus extended its foreleg outside the mother animal’s body and then brought it back inside and then afterward one slaughtered its mother, its consumption is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. But if one first slaughtered its mother, and only afterward did the fetus return its foreleg back inside, its consumption is prohibited.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara brings a baraita as a fresh challenge to Rav. Sequence matters: if the foreleg was drawn back before the mother was slaughtered, the fetus is permitted; but if the mother was slaughtered first and only then the foreleg was drawn back, it is forbidden — because at the moment of slaughter the limb was outside its boundary. The timing relative to slaughter is decisive.
Key Terms:
- וְאַחַר כָּךְ שָׁחַט אֶת אִמּוֹ = ‘and afterward he slaughtered its mother’
- שָׁחַט אֶת אִמּוֹ וְאַחַר כָּךְ הֶחְזִירָהּ = slaughtered the mother and only then drew it back — forbidden
Segment 16
TYPE: ברייתא
The baraita continues: foreleg extended and severed, then mother slaughtered — the outer part impure/forbidden, the inner pure/permitted
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הוֹצִיא אֶת יָדוֹ וַחֲתָכוֹ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ שָׁחַט אֶת אִמּוֹ – שֶׁבַּחוּץ טָמֵא וְאָסוּר, וְשֶׁבִּפְנִים טָהוֹר וּמוּתָּר.
English Translation:
If the fetus extended its foreleg outside and one cut it off, and then afterward one slaughtered its mother, then the part of the foreleg that was outside and was cut off is ritually impure and its consumption is prohibited, as it has the status of a limb cut from a living animal, which is forbidden. And the rest of the fetus that was inside is ritually pure and its consumption is permitted by virtue the slaughter of the mother animal.
קלאוד על הדף:
The baraita’s next case: the foreleg was extended, severed while outside, and only then the mother slaughtered. The severed outer piece is tamei ve-asur — impure and forbidden, with the status of ever min ha-chai (a limb from the living). The rest of the fetus, which was inside at slaughter, is tahor u-mutar — pure and permitted by the mother’s slaughter. The two pieces are judged separately by where each was at the moment of slaughter.
Key Terms:
- וַחֲתָכוֹ = and he severed it
- שֶׁבַּחוּץ טָמֵא וְאָסוּר = the [part] that was outside is impure and forbidden
- שֶׁבִּפְנִים טָהוֹר וּמוּתָּר = the [part] that was inside is pure and permitted
Segment 17
TYPE: ברייתא
If the mother was slaughtered first and the foreleg severed only after (clause begins; the dispute concludes on 68b)
Hebrew/Aramaic:
שָׁחַט אֶת אִמּוֹ וְאַחַר כָּךְ חֲתָכוֹ –
English Translation:
If one slaughtered its mother and only afterward cut off the foreleg that had been extended outside,
קלאוד על הדף:
The baraita turns to the reverse order: the mother was slaughtered first, and only afterward was the emerged foreleg severed. The status of the surrounding flesh in this case is the subject of a tannaitic dispute (Rabbi Meir vs. the Sages) over whether the dead foreleg conveys carcass-impurity to the flesh it touches. The ruling itself runs onto 68b.
Key Terms:
- שָׁחַט אֶת אִמּוֹ וְאַחַר כָּךְ חֲתָכוֹ = slaughtered the mother and only afterward severed it
Amud Bet (68b)
Segment 1
TYPE: ברייתא
Rabbi Meir: the surrounding flesh is impure as ‘contact with a carcass’ (the dead foreleg was never validly slaughtered)
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הַבָּשָׂר מַגַּע נְבֵלָה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.
English Translation:
then the flesh of both the mother animal and the fetus, excluding the foreleg, is impure due to contact with a carcass. Since the foreleg of the now dead fetus was not permitted through an act of slaughtering, it is regarded as a carcass. It therefore imparts impurity to the rest of the flesh, which was in contact with it. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
קלאוד על הדף:
Completing the baraita: Rabbi Meir holds that since the foreleg of the (now dead) fetus was never permitted by a valid slaughter, it has the status of a neveila (carcass). It therefore conveys carcass-impurity to the rest of the flesh it touched — the flesh is maga neveila (one that touched a carcass). The emerged limb, unredeemed by the mother’s slaughter, contaminates by contact.
Key Terms:
- מַגַּע נְבֵלָה = [flesh that has had] contact with a carcass
- רַבִּי מֵאִיר = Rabbi Meir, who imposes carcass-impurity
Segment 2
TYPE: ברייתא
The Sages: it is only ‘contact with a slaughtered tereifa’ — forbidden to eat but not conveying carcass-impurity
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: מַגַּע טְרֵפָה שְׁחוּטָה.
English Translation:
And the Rabbis say: Although the slaughter of the mother animal does not permit the consumption of the foreleg, it does serve to prevent the foreleg from imparting the ritual impurity of a carcass. Accordingly, the flesh has the status of having been in contact with a slaughtered tereifa. By Torah law, consumption of the animal is prohibited but it does not impart ritual impurity. The Sages decreed it to be impure in that it disqualifies sacrificial flesh with which it comes in contact.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Sages disagree with Rabbi Meir. Though the mother’s slaughter cannot permit the emerged foreleg, it does spare it from carcass-status: the limb is treated as a tereifa shechuta (a slaughtered tereifa), which is forbidden to eat but does not convey carcass-impurity by Torah law. The touched flesh is therefore only maga tereifa shechuta — disqualifying for sacrificial use by rabbinic decree, but not a true carcass-contamination.
Key Terms:
- מַגַּע טְרֵפָה שְׁחוּטָה = contact with a slaughtered tereifa
- וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים = and the Sages say [against Rabbi Meir]
Segment 3
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
The baraita’s first clause (‘permitted’) challenges Rav — answered again: it refers to the rest of the fetus
Hebrew/Aramaic:
קָתָנֵי מִיהָא רֵישָׁא: הוֹצִיא עוּבָּר אֶת יָדוֹ וְהֶחְזִירָהּ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ שָׁחַט אֶת אִמּוֹ – מוּתָּר בַּאֲכִילָה; מַאי לָאו אַאֵבֶר? לָא, אַעוּבָּר.
English Translation:
The Gemara explains the challenge to Rav’s ruling: In any event, the first clause of the baraita teaches: If the fetus extended its foreleg outside the mother animal’s body and then brought it back inside and then afterward one slaughtered its mother, its consumption is permitted. What, is it not referring to the limb, i.e., the foreleg, and the baraita rules that it is permitted, in contradiction to Rav’s ruling? The Gemara responds: No, it is referring to the rest of the fetus.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara presses Rav from the baraita’s opening: ‘foreleg drawn back, then mother slaughtered — permitted.’ Does ‘permitted’ include the limb, against Rav? As before, the answer is that ‘permitted’ refers to the rest of the fetus (a-ubar), not the emerged foreleg.
Key Terms:
- מַאי לָאו אַאֵבֶר = ‘is it not about the limb?’
- אַעוּבָּר = [no —] about the [rest of the] fetus
Segment 4
TYPE: קושיא
Then why is the latter clause (‘slaughtered, then drawn back — forbidden’) forbidden, if it’s only the rest of the fetus?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִי אַעוּבָּר, אֵימָא סֵיפָא: שָׁחַט אֶת אִמּוֹ וְאַחַר כָּךְ הֶחְזִירוֹ – אָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה; וְאִי עוּבָּר, אַמַּאי אָסוּר?
English Translation:
The Gemara questions this: If the baraita is referring to the fetus, say the latter clause: If one first slaughtered its mother, and only afterward the fetus returned its foreleg inside, its consumption is prohibited. The Gemara explains the question: And if it is referring to the fetus, why should it be prohibited in this case?
קלאוד על הדף:
If the baraita concerns only the rest of the fetus, the Gemara asks about its second clause: ‘slaughtered the mother, then drew the foreleg back — forbidden.’ Why should the rest of the fetus be forbidden merely because the limb was returned after slaughter? This difficulty is resolved, again, by the mekom-chatach reading.
Key Terms:
- אַמַּאי אָסוּר = ‘why is it forbidden?’
- שָׁחַט אֶת אִמּוֹ וְאַחַר כָּךְ הֶחְזִירוֹ = slaughtered, then drew it back
Segment 5
TYPE: תירוץ
Resolved via mekom chatach: it forbids the cut-location too, not the rest of the fetus — Rav stands
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כִּדְאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: לֹא נִצְרְכָה אֶלָּא לִמְקוֹם חֲתָךְ, הָכָא נָמֵי לֹא נִצְרְכָה אֶלָּא לִמְקוֹם חֲתָךְ.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: The baraita is referring to the fetus, and should be explained in a manner similar to that which Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said, in explanation of a ruling in a baraita cited below, that it is necessary only with regard to the location of the cut limb on the fetus’s body. If the foreleg was severed at precisely the point that lay on the boundary between the inside and outside when it was extended outside the womb, the location of the cut on the fetus’s body is also prohibited. Here too, one can explain that this ruling is necessary only with regard to the location of the cut, and it teaches that if the fetus did not return its foreleg, then not only is the foreleg prohibited but the location of the cut is prohibited as well. The foreleg itself, though, is prohibited even if it was brought back inside before the slaughter.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak’s distinction resolves it: the baraita’s ‘forbidden’ refers to the mekom chatach, the spot where the limb meets the body. Since the limb was returned only after slaughter (when it was outside at the decisive moment), not only the limb but its cut-location on the fetus is forbidden. The rest of the fetus remains permitted, and Rav’s view (the limb itself is always forbidden) stands intact.
Key Terms:
- לֹא נִצְרְכָה אֶלָּא לִמְקוֹם חֲתָךְ = ‘it is necessary only for the place of the cut’
Segment 6
TYPE: קושיא
Avimi’s baraita on ‘hoof’/‘hooves’ (parsa/parsot): drawing back a hoof permits — seemingly against Rav
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִינִי? וְהָא כִּי אֲתָא אֲבִימִי מִבֵּי חוֹזָאֵי, אֲתָא וְאַיְיתִי מַתְנִיתָא בִּידֵיהּ: פַּרְסָה הֶחְזִיר – אֱכוֹל, פְּרָסוֹת הֶחְזִיר – אֱכוֹל. מַאי לָאו הֶחְזִיר פַּרְסָה – אֲכוּל פַּרְסָה?
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: Is that so? But when Avimi came from Bei Ḥozai he came and brought a baraita with him: One of the sources (see 69a) that the slaughter of a pregnant animal also serves to permit the consumption of the fetus is the verse: “And every animal that has a split hoof and is cloven into two hooves, chews the cud, of the animals, it you may eat” (Deuteronomy 14:6). The verse mentions both “hoof” in the singular and “hooves” in the plural to teach that sometimes one may eat two hooves and sometimes only one, as follows: If the fetus extended two of its hooves outside the womb, if it returned one hoof one may eat, if it brought back both hooves one may eat. What, is it not that the baraita means that if it brought back one hoof one may eat that hoof, and likewise if it brought back both hooves one may eat both of them, in contradiction to Rav’s ruling?
קלאוד על הדף:
A stronger challenge: Avimi brought from Bei Chozai a baraita deriving the fetus-permission from ‘parsa… parsot’ (hoof/hooves, Deuteronomy 14:6). It reads the singular and plural to teach: ‘if it drew back one hoof — eat; if it drew back both hooves — eat.’ This seems to say the returned hooves themselves may be eaten — directly against Rav, who forbids the emerged limb even when returned.
Key Terms:
- אֲבִימִי מִבֵּי חוֹזָאֵי = Avimi [who came] from Bei Chozai
- פַּרְסָה / פְּרָסוֹת = a hoof (singular) / hooves (plural)
- הֶחְזִיר – אֱכוֹל = ‘if he drew [it] back — eat’
Segment 7
TYPE: תירוץ
Answered: ‘eat’ means eat the rest of the fetus; the novelty (RNbY) is again the mekom chatach
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לֹא, הֶחֱזִיר פַּרְסָה – אֱכוֹל עוּבָּר. אִי עוּבָּר, מַאי אִירְיָא הֶחְזִיר? אֲפִילּוּ לֹא הֶחֱזִיר נָמֵי! אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: לֹא נִצְרְכָה אֶלָּא לִמְקוֹם חֲתָךְ.
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: No, it means that if it brought back one hoof or even both, one may eat the rest of the fetus but not the hooves. The Gemara objects: If it is referring to the permitted status of the fetus, why does it specifically state that it brought back the hoof? Even if it did not bring it back the fetus would be permitted. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said the ruling of the baraita is necessary only with regard to the location of the cut limb on the body of the fetus. If the limb were to be severed at precisely the point that lay on the boundary between the inside and the outside when it was extended outside the womb, then the location of the cut on the fetus’s body would also be prohibited, but only if the fetus had not brought back that limb before the mother animal was slaughtered.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara deflects: Avimi’s baraita means that drawing back a hoof permits the rest of the fetus, not the hoof itself. To the objection that the rest is permitted regardless of return, Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak again answers: the novelty is the mekom chatach — drawing the hoof back also protects the cut-location, which would otherwise be forbidden. The hoof itself stays forbidden, consistent with Rav.
Key Terms:
- אֱכוֹל עוּבָּר = ‘eat the [rest of the] fetus’
- לֹא נִצְרְכָה אֶלָּא לִמְקוֹם חֲתָךְ = necessary only for the place of the cut
Segment 8
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
But the baraita uses TWO derivations — one must permit the limb! Answered: one for mekom chatach, one for a kalut fetus
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהָא תְּרֵי קְרָאֵי קָא נָסֵיב לַהּ! מַאי לָאו חַד לְאֵבֶר, וְחַד לִמְקוֹם חֲתָךְ? לָא, חַד לִמְקוֹם חֲתָךְ, וְחַד לְקָלוּט בִּמְעֵי פָרָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara persists: But even given Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak’s claim the baraita adduces two verses, i.e., the mention of hoof and hooves. What, is it not that one serves to permit the limb, in contradiction to Rav’s ruling, and the other one serves to permit the location of the cut, in accordance with Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak’s ruling? The Gemara responds: No; one mention does serve to permit the location of the cut, but the other one serves to permit a fetus with non-cloven hooves [kalut] found inside the womb of a cow that was slaughtered. Although the fetus does not bear the distinguishing characteristics of a kosher species, it is nevertheless permitted by virtue of the slaughter of its mother.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara presses: Avimi’s baraita derives from two textual cues (hoof and hooves) — surely one teaches the cut-location and the other permits the limb, against Rav. The Gemara answers no: one cue teaches the mekom chatach, and the other teaches an unrelated point — that a kalut (a fetus with non-cloven hooves) found inside a slaughtered cow is permitted, even though it lacks a kosher sign.
Key Terms:
- תְּרֵי קְרָאֵי = two scriptural [derivations]
- חַד לִמְקוֹם חֲתָךְ = one for the place of the cut
- קָלוּט בִּמְעֵי פָרָה = a non-cloven-hoofed [fetus] in a cow’s womb
Segment 9
TYPE: גמרא
The kalut point is needed per Rabbi Shimon: a born kalut is forbidden, but inside the womb it’s permitted by the slaughter
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: קָלוּט בֶּן פָּרָה אָסוּר. הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּיָצָא לַאֲוִיר הָעוֹלָם, אֲבָל בִּמְעֵי אִמּוֹ – שְׁרֵי.
English Translation:
And it is necessary to have a specific source to permit this according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as Rabbi Shimon says: A calf with non-cloven hooves born from a kosher cow is forbidden, as the calf does not bear the distinguishing characteristics of a kosher species. The verse teaches that this matter applies only where the fetus emerged into the airspace of the world, i.e., it was born before the mother animal was slaughtered. But if it was still inside its mother’s womb when the mother was slaughtered, it is permitted.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara explains why the kalut derivation is necessary specifically according to Rabbi Shimon, who holds that a kalut (non-cloven-hoofed) calf born from a kosher cow is forbidden, lacking the kosher sign. The verse teaches that this stringency applies only to a kalut that emerged ‘into the air of the world’ (was born); a kalut still in the womb when the mother is slaughtered is permitted by that slaughter. Thus the second textual cue is genuinely needed and does not, after all, permit the emerged limb.
Key Terms:
- רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן = Rabbi Shimon, who forbids a born kalut
- יָצָא לַאֲוִיר הָעוֹלָם = emerged into the air of the world (was born)
- בִּמְעֵי אִמּוֹ שְׁרֵי = [but] in its mother’s womb it is permitted
Segment 10
TYPE: מימרא
Ulla in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: against Rav — the limb itself is permitted
Hebrew/Aramaic:
עוּלָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: וְאֵבֶר עַצְמוֹ מוּתָּר.
English Translation:
§ The Gemara attempted to challenge Rav’s ruling that once a limb of a fetus is extended outside the mother animal’s body it becomes prohibited even if it was then brought back, but did not find a conclusive refutation. It now presents a dissenting opinion: Ulla says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: And even the limb itself is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal.
קלאוד על הדף:
Having failed to refute Rav from the sources, the Gemara presents the opposing view. Ulla in the name of Rabbi Yochanan rules that even the emerged limb itself is permitted by the mother’s slaughter (provided it was drawn back). This is the direct counter-thesis to Rav, and the next segments give Rabbi Yochanan’s reasoning and then test it.
Key Terms:
- עוּלָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן = Ulla in the name of Rabbi Yochanan
- וְאֵבֶר עַצְמוֹ מוּתָּר = ‘and the limb itself is permitted’
Segment 11
TYPE: גמרא
Rav Yehuda objects (Rav and Shmuel forbid it!); Ulla’s deference and Rabbi Yochanan’s reasoning from ‘basar ba-sadeh’
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב יְהוּדָה לְעוּלָּא: וְהָא רַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ אֵבֶר עַצְמוֹ אָסוּר! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאן יָהֵיב לַן מֵעַפְרָא דְּרַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל וּמָלֵינַן עַיְינִין, אֶלָּא הָכִי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַכֹּל הָיוּ בִּכְלַל ״בָּשָׂר בַּשָּׂדֶה טְרֵפָה לֹא תֹאכֵלוּ״,
English Translation:
Rav Yehuda said to Ulla: But Rav and Shmuel both say the limb itself is prohibited; how can you say otherwise? Ulla said to him: Who will give us some of the dust of the graves of Rav and Shmuel and we will fill our eyes with it; such is the greatness of those Sages. But I follow the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, and this is what Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Initially one would assume all flesh that is permitted due to being within a certain boundary, e.g., a fetus inside its mother’s womb, the flesh of offerings of the most sacred order within the Temple courtyard, and the flesh of offerings of lesser sanctity within Jerusalem, was included in the verse: “And flesh, in the field, a tereifa, you shall not eat” (Exodus 22:30). The verse is interpreted to teach that if such flesh leaves its boundaries it is rendered forbidden, even should it subsequently return.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Yehuda objects that both Rav and Shmuel forbid the limb. Ulla responds with a famous expression of reverence — ‘who will give us of the dust of Rav and Shmuel to fill our eyes?’ — yet maintains Rabbi Yochanan’s view. Rabbi Yochanan reasons: all boundary-dependent flesh (the fetus in the womb, most-holy offerings in the courtyard, lesser offerings in Jerusalem) was initially included in ‘basar ba-sadeh tereifa’ — flesh that leaves its boundary and returns would be forbidden.
Key Terms:
- רַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל = Rav and Shmuel (who both forbid the limb)
- מַאן יָהֵיב לַן מֵעַפְרָא = ‘who will give us of the dust [of their graves]?’ — an expression of reverence
- הַכֹּל הָיוּ בִּכְלַל = all were [initially] included in [the verse]
Segment 12
TYPE: דרשה
Rabbi Yochanan: since the chatat verse singled out ‘returned is forbidden,’ only the chatat is so — all else, once returned, is permitted
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כְּשֶׁפָּרַט לְךָ הַכָּתוּב גַּבֵּי חַטָּאת שֶׁיָּצְתָה חוּץ לִמְחִיצָתָהּ וְחָזְרָה – אָסוּר, חַטָּאת הוּא דִּפְרַט רַחֲמָנָא בָּהּ, אֲבָל כֹּל מִילֵּי – כֵּיוָן דַּהֲדוּר – שְׁרֵי.
English Translation:
Once another verse applies the concept for you specifically with regard to a sin offering, teaching that if it went outside of its boundary and returned it is prohibited (see Leviticus 10:18), then it is apparent that the Merciful One specifically applied the concept to a sin offering. But with regard to all other items that left their boundary, once they are brought back they are permitted, including the limb of a fetus that was extended outside the womb and then was brought back.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yochanan completes his derivation. Since a separate verse singles out the sin-offering (chatat) to teach that flesh which left its boundary and returned is forbidden (Leviticus 10:18), that singling-out implies the rule is exclusive to the chatat. For everything else — including a fetus’s limb — once it is returned, it is permitted. Hence the emerged-then-returned foreleg is permitted, against Rav.
Key Terms:
- חַטָּאת = the sin-offering, singled out by the verse
- פְּרַט רַחֲמָנָא = the Torah specified/singled out
- כֵּיוָן דַּהֲדוּר שְׁרֵי = ‘since they returned, [they are] permitted’
Segment 13
TYPE: קושיא
A baraita refutes: ‘tereifa’ is written precisely so that, unlike maaser sheni and bikkurim, returned flesh is NOT permitted
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מֵיתִיבִי: ״בָּשָׂר בַּשָּׂדֶה טְרֵפָה לֹא תֹאכֵלוּ״, מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר? לְפִי שֶׁמָּצִינוּ בְּמַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי וּבִכּוּרִים, שֶׁאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁיָּצְאוּ חוּץ לִמְחִיצָתָן וְחָזְרוּ – מוּתָּרִין, יָכוֹל אַף זֶה כֵּן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״טְרֵפָה״.
English Translation:
The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Ulla and Rabbi Yoḥanan from a baraita: It is derived from the verse: “And flesh, in the field, a tereifa, you shall not eat,” that flesh that leaves the boundary in which it is permitted is thereby rendered forbidden like a tereifa. Why must the verse state that it is like a tereifa? The baraita explains: Since we find with regard to second tithe and first fruits that even though they went outside of their boundary, which is the city of Jerusalem and the only place where it is permitted to eat them, nevertheless if they are brought back to there they are once again permitted, one might have thought that also with regard to this prohibition, that of flesh that leaves its boundary, it is so, i.e., if it is brought back it once again becomes permitted for consumption. Therefore, the verse states: “A tereifa.”
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara brings a baraita that refutes Rabbi Yochanan (and Ulla). ‘Basar ba-sadeh tereifa lo tochelu’ — why does it say tereifa? Because one might have thought boundary-flesh works like maaser sheni and bikkurim, which, though forbidden outside Jerusalem, become permitted again if returned. The word ‘tereifa’ teaches the opposite: such flesh, once it leaves, is not re-permitted by returning.
Key Terms:
- מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי וּבִכּוּרִים = second tithe and first-fruits — permitted again if returned to Jerusalem
- יָכוֹל אַף זֶה כֵּן = ‘one might think this too is so’ [— that returning re-permits]
- תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר טְרֵפָה = ‘the verse states: tereifa’ [to teach otherwise]
Segment 14
TYPE: גמרא (תיובתא)
Rabba: like a tereifa, once flesh leaves its boundary it can never regain permission — Ulla is conclusively refuted
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַאי תַּלְמוּדָא? אָמַר רַבָּה: כִּטְרֵפָה, מָה טְרֵפָה – כֵּיוָן שֶׁנִּטְרְפָה שׁוּב אֵין לָהּ הֶיתֵּר, אַף בָּשָׂר – כֵּיוָן שֶׁיָּצָא חוּץ לִמְחִיצָתוֹ שׁוּב אֵין לוֹ הֶיתֵּר! תְּיוּבְתָּא דְעוּלָּא, תְּיוּבְתָּא.
English Translation:
The Gemara clarifies: What is the biblical derivation from the term “a tereifa”? Rabba said: The verse indicates that the prohibition of flesh that left its boundary is like the prohibition of a tereifa. Just as with regard to a tereifa, once an animal is mortally wounded, rendering it a tereifa, it can no longer regain a permitted status, so too with regard to flesh referred to in the verse: Once it has gone outside of its boundary it can no longer regain permitted status. Accordingly, if the limb of a fetus was extended outside the womb it would thereby become permanently prohibited, contradicting the opinion of Ulla and Rabbi Yoḥanan. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the statement of Ulla is indeed a conclusive refutation.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabba explains the baraita’s derivation: the comparison to a tereifa is precise. Just as a tereifa, once mortally wounded, can never regain a permitted status, so too flesh that has left its boundary can never be re-permitted — even by returning. This directly contradicts Rabbi Yochanan/Ulla, and the Gemara declares: teyuvta de-Ulla, teyuvta — Ulla’s view is conclusively refuted. Rav’s ruling (the limb stays forbidden) prevails.
Key Terms:
- כִּטְרֵפָה = like a tereifa
- שׁוּב אֵין לָהּ הֶיתֵּר = it can never again become permitted
- תְּיוּבְתָּא דְעוּלָּא תְּיוּבְתָּא = ‘the refutation of Ulla is a [conclusive] refutation’
Segment 15
TYPE: גמרא
Analyzing the baraita: where do we find that maaser sheni and bikkurim, once returned, are re-permitted?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר מָר: לְפִי שֶׁמָּצִינוּ בְּמַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי וּבִכּוּרִים. הֵיכָן מָצִינוּ?
English Translation:
The Gemara analyzes the baraita, which states: The Master said: Since we find with regard to second tithe and first fruits that although they left their boundary, if they are brought back there they are again permitted. The Gemara asks: Where did we find this, i.e., what is the source for this halakha?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara turns to verify a premise of the refuting baraita: where is the source that maaser sheni and bikkurim, though forbidden when taken outside Jerusalem, become permitted again if returned? The next segment supplies the verse. This is the contrast-case against which the tereifa derivation defines boundary-flesh as irreversibly forbidden.
Key Terms:
- הֵיכָן מָצִינוּ = ‘where do we find [this]?’
- מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי וּבִכּוּרִים = second tithe and first-fruits
Segment 16
TYPE: דרשה
The source: ‘you may not eat within your gates…’ — only there is it forbidden; once returned to Jerusalem it is permitted
Hebrew/Aramaic:
דִּכְתִיב: ״לֹא תוּכַל לֶאֱכֹל בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ מַעְשַׂר דְּגָנֶךָ וְגוֹ׳״, בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ הוּא דְּלָא תֵּיכוּל, אֲבָל יָצְאוּ חוּץ לִמְחִיצָתָן וְחָזְרוּ – מוּתָּרִין.
English Translation:
The Gemara explains that it is written: “You may not eat within your gates the tithe of your grain, or of your wine, or of your oil, or the firstborn of your herd or of your flock, nor any of your vows that you have vowed, nor your voluntary offerings, nor the offering of your hand. But you shall eat them before the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 12:17–18). The phrase “the tithe of your grain, or of your wine, or of your oil” is referring to second tithe, and the phrase “the offering of your hand” is referring to first fruits. The verse states that all the items listed may be eaten only “before the Lord your God,” i.e., within the city of Jerusalem. The prohibition stated in the verse is that within your gates, i.e., outside of Jerusalem, you may not eat these items. But by inference, if these items went outside of their boundary, i.e., outside of Jerusalem, and then were brought back, they are permitted.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara cites Deuteronomy 12:17–18: ‘you may not eat within your gates the tithe of your grain… but you shall eat them before the Lord your God.’ The prohibition is specifically ‘within your gates’ (outside Jerusalem); by inference, if the maaser sheni or bikkurim are brought back into Jerusalem (‘before the Lord’), they become permitted again. This establishes the reversible-boundary case that the tereifa-derivation contrasts with.
Key Terms:
- בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ = ‘within your gates’ (outside Jerusalem) — where it is forbidden
- מַעְשַׂר דְּגָנֶךָ = ‘the tithe of your grain’ (= second tithe)
- יָצְאוּ וְחָזְרוּ מוּתָּרִין = [if] they left and returned, they are permitted
Segment 17
TYPE: גמרא
The Eretz-Yisrael version of the Rav/R’Yochanan dispute: ‘is there birth for limbs?’ (yesh/ein leidah le-evarim)
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בְּמַעְרְבָא מַתְנוּ הָכִי, רַב אָמַר: יֵשׁ לֵידָה לְאֵבָרִים, וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אֵין לֵידָה לְאֵבָרִים.
English Translation:
§ The Gemara explained the dispute between Rav and Rabbi Yoḥanan in the way in which it was taught in Babylonia. The Gemara notes that in the West, Eretz Yisrael, they taught the dispute like this: Rav says there is a concept of birth with regard to limbs. When a limb is extended outside the womb, it is considered born and is independent of the mother animal. Consequently, it can never be permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says that there is no concept of birth with regard to limbs. Since the limb is never considered to have been born, as long as it is inside the mother animal when the mother animal is slaughtered it will be permitted by virtue of that slaughter.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara notes that in the West (Eretz Yisrael) the same Rav/Rabbi Yochanan dispute was framed differently — not as ‘left its boundary’ but as leidah le-evarim (birth for limbs). Rav holds yesh leidah le-evarim: an emerged limb is itself ‘born’ and independent of the mother, so the slaughter can never permit it. Rabbi Yochanan holds ein leidah le-evarim: a limb is never ‘born,’ so as long as it is inside at the moment of slaughter it is permitted.
Key Terms:
- בְּמַעְרְבָא = in the West (Eretz Yisrael)
- יֵשׁ לֵידָה לְאֵבָרִים = ‘there is birth for limbs’ (Rav)
- אֵין לֵידָה לְאֵבָרִים = ‘there is no birth for limbs’ (Rabbi Yochanan)
Segment 18
TYPE: גמרא
The practical difference between the two framings: whether the minority of the limb left inside is also forbidden
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ לְמֵיסַר מִיעוּט אֵבֶר שֶׁבִּפְנִים.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: What is the difference between these two versions which explain why Rav deemed the limb forbidden? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is in a case in which only the majority of a limb was extended outside the womb. In that case, the issue is whether or not to prohibit the minority of the limb that remained inside. If the limb is forbidden because it is considered to have been born, the entire limb would be forbidden and not just the part that was extended. If the limb is forbidden because it left its boundary, then only the part that extended outside the womb would be forbidden.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara asks what turns on the two framings of Rav’s view. The difference (nafka mina) concerns a limb the majority of which emerged, with a minority still inside. If the limb is forbidden because it is ‘born’ (the Eretz-Yisrael framing), the whole limb — including the inner minority — is forbidden. If it is forbidden because it ‘left its boundary’ (the Babylonian framing), then only the emerged part is forbidden and the inner minority remains permitted.
Key Terms:
- מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ = what is the [practical] difference between them?
- מִיעוּט אֵבֶר שֶׁבִּפְנִים = the minority of the limb that is inside
Segment 19
TYPE: בעיא
A dilemma (per ‘ein leidah’): if limbs emerged and were each returned until they total a majority, is the fetus ‘born’?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: לְדִבְרֵי הָאוֹמֵר אֵין לֵידָה לְאֵבָרִים, הוֹצִיא הָעוּבָּר אֶת יָדוֹ וְהֶחְזִירָהּ, וְחָזַר וְהוֹצִיא אֶת יָדוֹ וְהֶחְזִירָהּ, עַד שֶׁהִשְׁלִימוֹ לְרוּבּוֹ, מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן הָא נְפַק לֵיהּ רוּבָּא, אוֹ דִלְמָא כֵּיוָן דַּהֲדַר הָדַר?
English Translation:
A dilemma was raised before the Sages: According to the statement of the one who says there is no concept of birth with regard to limbs, if the fetus extended its foreleg outside the womb and brought it back, and again it extended its other foreleg outside and brought it back, and continued to extend parts of its body outside until the total amount that had been outside the womb constituted the majority of the fetus, what is the halakha? Do we say that ultimately the majority of the fetus has left the womb and the entire fetus should be regarded as having been born, and consequently the slaughter of its mother can no longer permit its being consumed? Or perhaps, since it brought each limb back, the limbs are considered to have been brought back; therefore, the majority of the fetus is not considered to have left the womb and it is not regarded as having been born. In that case, the slaughter of its mother would still permit its being consumed.
קלאוד על הדף:
A dilemma is raised according to the view ein leidah le-evarim: if the fetus extended one limb and drew it back, then another and drew it back, and so on until the parts that emerged cumulatively constitute the majority of the fetus — is it considered born? Do we say a majority ultimately left (so it is born, and the slaughter no longer permits it), or, since each part was returned, the majority is not deemed to have left? The question probes whether cumulative, sequential emergence equals birth.
Key Terms:
- עַד שֶׁהִשְׁלִימוֹ לְרוּבּוֹ = until [the emerged parts] completed a majority of it
- הָא נְפַק לֵיהּ רוּבָּא = ‘a majority has [after all] left’
- כֵּיוָן דַּהֲדַר הָדַר = ‘since it was returned, it is [deemed] returned’
Segment 20
TYPE: בעיא
A further dilemma: if each emerged limb was severed (not returned) until a majority — does birth require a majority all at once?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִם תִּמְצֵי לוֹמַר, כֵּיוָן דַּהֲדַר הָדַר, הוֹצִיא עוּבָּר אֶת יָדוֹ וַחֲתָכָהּ, וְחָזַר וְהוֹצִיא אֶת יָדוֹ וַחֲתָכָהּ, עַד שֶׁהִשְׁלִימוֹ לְרוּבּוֹ, מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן הָא נָפֵיק לֵיהּ רוּבָּא, אוֹ דִלְמָא רוּבָּא בְּבַת אַחַת בָּעֵינַן?
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: If you want to say that since it brought back each limb, they are considered to have been brought back and the majority of the fetus is not considered to have left the womb, the following dilemma still arises: If the fetus extended its foreleg outside and someone severed it, and again it extended its other foreleg outside and someone severed it, and this continued with its other limbs until the total amount outside the womb constituted the majority of the fetus, what is the halakha? Do we say that since the majority of the fetus has left the womb, the entire fetus should be regarded as having been born and therefore the slaughter of its mother can no longer permit it? Or perhaps, in order for the fetus to be regarded as having been born we require a majority of the fetus to leave simultaneously, which does not exist in this case.
קלאוד על הדף:
If one resolves the prior dilemma leniently (returning counts as not-having-left), a sharper dilemma follows: what if each emerged limb was severed rather than returned, until the severed parts total a majority of the fetus? Do we say a majority has now left (so it is born)? Or do we require the majority to emerge all at once (be-vat achat) for it to count as birth — which never happened here, since the parts left piecemeal? The question isolates whether simultaneity is essential to birth-by-majority.
Key Terms:
- וַחֲתָכָהּ = and he severed it [rather than returning it]
- רוּבָּא בְּבַת אַחַת בָּעֵינַן = ‘do we require a majority [to emerge] all at once?‘
Segment 21
TYPE: גמרא
‘Come and hear’ — the Gemara turns to the mishna for a proof (resolution continues on the next daf)
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תָּא שְׁמַע:
English Translation:
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna:
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara begins to resolve the dilemmas with ta shema — ‘come and hear’ a proof from the mishna. The proof-text and its analysis run onto the next daf, so the amud closes mid-inquiry, with the resolution of the cumulative-emergence dilemmas deferred to daf 69.
Key Terms:
- תָּא שְׁמַע = ‘come and hear’ — introducing a proof