Chullin Daf 73 (חולין דף ע״ג)
Daf: 73 | Amudim: 73a – 73b | Date: Loading...
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (73a)
Segment 1
TYPE: גמרא
Conclusion of Ravina’s principle from 72b: “stands to be cut” = already cut.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כְּחָתוּךְ דָּמֵי.
English Translation:
is regarded as though it were cut. Therefore, it is regarded as though the foreleg had already been severed from the body of the fetus, and the point of contact between them is not considered to be a concealed area. Rather, it is regarded as if the foreleg and fetus were two separate items that came into contact with each other. Consequently, the former can impart impurity to the latter.
קלאוד על הדף:
This completes Ravina’s principle carried over from 72b: since the protruding foreleg is destined to be cut off, it is legally “as though already cut” (ke-chatuch dami). Consequently its junction with the fetus is not a concealed area (beit ha-setarim) but an exposed surface, so the leg — a carcass — can defile the adjoining flesh even according to Rabbi Yosei. This resolves how Rabbi Meir’s carcass-contact ruling stands without relying on his minority view about concealed-area contact.
Key Terms:
- כְּחָתוּךְ דָּמֵי = “it is regarded as though cut” — an item destined to be severed is treated as already severed
- בֵּית הַסְּתָרִים = a concealed area — internal contact that normally does not transmit impurity, sidestepped here
Segment 2
TYPE: גמרא
Whose view is “stands to be cut”? A Mikvaot mishna attributes it to Rabbi Meir.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כְּמַאן? כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר, דִּתְנַן: כָּל יְדוֹת הַכֵּלִים שֶׁהֵן אֲרוּכּוֹת וְעָתִיד לְקׇצְצָן – מַטְבִּיל עַד מָקוֹם מִדָּה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is this halakhic principle that Ravina cites? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, as we learned in a mishna (Mikvaot 10:5): When a vessel is immersed in a ritual bath, it is purified only if all parts of the vessel are submerged at the same time. But with regard to any handles of vessels that are too long and therefore will ultimately be cut off, one must immerse them only until the point of their eventual size. Even though the part of the handle that will be cut off is not submerged, the vessel is nevertheless purified; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Evidently, Rabbi Meir holds that even though the handle is still physically attached, since that part of the handle stands to be cut off, it is already regarded as though it were cut off. Consequently, immersing the handle up until that point is regarded as immersing the entire vessel.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara traces Ravina’s “stands to be cut” principle to a named source: a Mikvaot mishna about overlong vessel-handles. Rabbi Meir rules that one need only immerse the handle up to its intended final length, treating the excess (destined to be trimmed) as if already gone — even the unsubmerged surplus does not block the vessel’s purification. This shows the principle is Rabbi Meir’s, raising the worry that Ravina’s reconciliation works only for him, not for the Rabbis.
Key Terms:
- יְדוֹת הַכֵּלִים = the handles of vessels — the surplus destined to be trimmed off
- מָקוֹם מִדָּה = “the point of [intended] measure” — the handle’s eventual finished length, up to which immersion suffices
Segment 3
TYPE: גמרא
The Rabbis require immersing the whole vessel — apparently rejecting the principle.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: עַד שֶׁיַּטְבִּיל אֶת כּוּלּוֹ.
English Translation:
And the Rabbis say that the vessel is not purified until he immerses all of it, including the handle. Apparently, the Rabbis do not hold that an item that stands to be cut is regarded as though it was already cut, and Ravina’s explanation is in accordance only with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Rabbis in that mishna require the entire vessel, handle-surplus included, to be immersed — showing they reject “stands to be cut is as though cut,” at least for utensils. This sharpens the problem: Ravina invoked the principle precisely to reconcile the fetal-leg mishna with Rabbi Yosei (one of “the Rabbis”), yet the Rabbis seem to deny that very principle. The next segment must show the principle still applies here.
Key Terms:
- עַד שֶׁיַּטְבִּיל אֶת כּוּלּוֹ = “until he immerses all of it” — the Rabbis’ demand, rejecting the “as-though-cut” shortcut for vessels
Segment 4
TYPE: תירוץ
Even the Rabbis agree food-connections are disregarded, so the principle holds.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבָּנַן, חִבּוּרֵי אֳכָלִין כְּמַאן דְּמִפַּרְתִי דָּמֵי, וּנְגִיעִי בַּהֲדָדֵי.
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: You may even say that Ravina’s explanation is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. The disagreement between the Rabbis and Rabbi Meir concerns utensils, but even the Rabbis agree that the connections between two pieces of food are disregarded, and the item is considered as though it is already separated into two pieces that are touching one another, and so ritual impurity can be imparted from one piece to another. Similarly, the fetus and the foreleg are considered like food in this regard. Therefore, it is considered as if they have already been separated and are touching, allowing the foreleg to impart impurity to the fetus.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara rescues Ravina’s reconciliation by confining the Rabbis’ objection to utensils. The Rabbis deny “as-though-cut” only for vessels, whose integrity matters; but for food, all agree that the joint between two pieces is legally treated as already separated (chibburei ochlin), so one piece can defile the other by contact. Since the fetus and its leg are flesh, they count as food — their junction is disregarded, and the leg defiles the flesh even for the Rabbis.
Key Terms:
- חִבּוּרֵי אֳכָלִין = “food-connections” — the junction between two attached pieces of food, legally treated as already separated
- כְּמַאן דְּמִפַּרְתִי דָּמֵי = “as though they are separated” — the joined food is regarded as two touching pieces
Segment 5
TYPE: גמרא
Why does the mishna say “severed”? Ulla needs it; Ravina explains it as stylistic.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בִּשְׁלָמָא לְעוּלָּא, הַיְינוּ דְּקָתָנֵי ״חֲתָכָהּ״, אֶלָּא לְרָבִינָא, מַאי ״חֲתָכָהּ״? אַיְּידֵי דִּתְנָא רֵישָׁא ״חֲתָכָהּ״, תְּנָא נָמֵי סֵיפָא ״חֲתָכָהּ״.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the explanation of Ulla that the fetus was rendered impure at the time of separation of the flesh of the fetus from the limb, this explanation is consistent with that which the mishna teaches, that the foreleg was severed from the body of the fetus. But according to the explanation of Ravina, the connection between the foreleg and fetus is like that of food, and even if the foreleg was never severed from the fetus it would still impart impurity to the fetus. What, then, is the reason the mishna states it was severed? The Gemara answers: Since the mishna needed to teach in the first clause that the foreleg was severed, it also taught in the latter clause that it was severed, for stylistic consistency, even though the halakha would apply even were it not severed.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara tests the two reconciliations against the mishna’s wording “he severed it.” Ulla fits neatly — impurity transfers at the moment of separation, so severing is essential. Ravina is harder: on his food-connection view the leg would defile the flesh even without severing, so why mention it? The answer is stylistic parallelism: because the mishna’s first clause (leg cut before slaughter) had to specify severing, the second clause echoes “severed” for symmetry, though the law would hold regardless.
Key Terms:
- חֲתָכָהּ = “he severed it” — the mishna’s wording, essential for Ulla but merely stylistic for Ravina
- אַיְּידֵי דְּתָנָא רֵישָׁא = “since it taught it in the first clause” — the principle that a later clause mirrors an earlier one’s phrasing
Segment 6
TYPE: גמרא
Does a slaughtered tereifa defile at all? Yes — Shmuel’s father’s decree.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: מַגַּע טְרֵפָה שְׁחוּטָה. טְרֵפָה שְׁחוּטָה מִי מְטַמְּיָא? אִין, כְּדַאֲבוּהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל, דְּאָמַר אֲבוּהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל: טְרֵפָה שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ מְטַמְּאָה בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁין.
English Translation:
§ The mishna states: And the Rabbis say: The flesh of a fetus that extended its foreleg outside the mother’s womb and whose mother was subsequently slaughtered has ritual impurity due to having been in contact with a tereifa that was slaughtered. The Gemara asks: Does a slaughtered tereifa impart impurity? The Gemara answers: Yes, and this is in accordance with the statement of Shmuel’s father, as Shmuel’s father says: The Sages decreed that a tereifa that one slaughtered imparts impurity to sacrificial animals, i.e., it will disqualify them if it comes in contact with them.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara presses the Rabbis’ own label: they called the flesh “in contact with a slaughtered tereifa” — but by Torah law a validly slaughtered tereifa conveys no impurity at all, so how can it defile? The answer invokes Shmuel’s father: the Sages imposed a rabbinic-level impurity on a slaughtered tereifa specifically with respect to sacrificial foods (be-mukdashin), which it disqualifies on contact. So the Rabbis’ ruling is a limited, decree-based impurity, not full carcass-defilement — lighter than Rabbi Meir’s position.
Key Terms:
- טְרֵפָה שְׁחוּטָה = a slaughtered tereifa — Torah-pure, but rabbinically able to disqualify sacrificial food
- מְטַמְּאָה בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁין = “imparts impurity with regard to sacrificial foods” — the narrow scope of the Sages’ decree
- אֲבוּהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל = Shmuel’s father, the Amora who reports this decree
Segment 7
TYPE: משנה
The Rabbis’ analogy restated: the mother’s slaughter purifies the fetus.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מָה מָצִינוּ בִּטְרֵפָה שֶׁשְּׁחִיטָתָהּ מְטַהַרְתָּהּ, אַף שְׁחִיטַת בְּהֵמָה תְּטַהֵר אֶת הָעוּבָּר.
English Translation:
§ The mishna cites the Rabbis’ rationale for their opinion: Just as we found in the case of a tereifa that its slaughter renders it ritually pure according to Torah law, i.e., it prevents it from having the ritual impurity of a carcass, despite not rendering the animal permitted for consumption, so too, the slaughter of the mother animal should render the limb of its fetus that left the womb ritually pure, despite the fact that it is prohibited for consumption.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara restates the Rabbis’ governing analogy (mah matzinu): a tereifa proves that slaughter can strip carcass-impurity without permitting consumption. Applied here, the mother’s slaughter should purify the protruding fetal leg from carcass status even though the leg remains forbidden to eat. This is the claim Rabbi Meir will now contest across a series of baraitot, the daf presenting several versions of the exchange.
Key Terms:
- מָה מָצִינוּ = “just as we find” — argument by analogy from the tereifa to the fetal leg
- שְׁחִיטָתָהּ מְטַהַרְתָּהּ = “its slaughter purifies it” — removing carcass-impurity even where consumption stays forbidden
Segment 8
TYPE: ברייתא
A baraita version of Rabbi Meir’s rebuttal: purity should imply permission.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תַּנְיָא, אָמַר לָהֶן רַבִּי מֵאִיר: וְכִי מִי טִיהֲרוֹ לְאֵבֶר זֶה מִידֵי נְבֵלָה? שְׁחִיטַת אִמּוֹ! אִם כֵּן, תַּתִּירֶנּוּ בַּאֲכִילָה!
English Translation:
The mishna itself proceeds to cite Rabbi’s Meir’s response to this claim. The Gemara here cites a different version of his response based on that which is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Meir said to the Rabbis: But what renders this limb pure from the impurity of a carcass? You might say it is the slaughter of its mother, but if so, the act of slaughter should also permit it even for consumption.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara brings a baraita giving Rabbi Meir’s counter in a sharper form. He challenges the Rabbis to name what purifies the leg: if their answer is “the mother’s slaughter,” then that same slaughter should also permit the leg for eating — yet all agree the leg stays forbidden. For Rabbi Meir, purity and permission travel together on the leg; since it is not permitted, it is not purified either, and remains a defiling carcass.
Key Terms:
- מִי טִיהֲרוֹ … מִידֵי נְבֵלָה = “what purified it from carcass-status?” — Rabbi Meir’s demand for the source of purity
- תַּתִּירֶנּוּ בַּאֲכִילָה = “let it permit it for eating” — his claim that whatever purifies should also permit
Segment 9
TYPE: ברייתא
The Rabbis reply: slaughter shields non-body parts even more than body parts.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמְרוּ לוֹ: הַרְבֵּה מַצֶּלֶת עַל שֶׁאֵינוֹ גּוּפָהּ יוֹתֵר מִגּוּפָהּ, שֶׁהֲרֵי שָׁנִינוּ: חוֹתֵךְ מִן הָעוּבָּר שֶׁבְּמֵעֶיהָ – מוּתָּר בַּאֲכִילָה, מִן הַטְּחוֹל וּמִן הַכְּלָיוֹת – אָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה.
English Translation:
The Rabbis said to him: The slaughter of an animal has a greater effect in shielding that which is not part of its body from having the ritual impurity of a carcass than that which is part of its body, as is apparent from that which we learned in the mishna (68a): If, prior to slaughtering an animal, one severs pieces from a fetus that is in its womb, leaving those pieces in the womb, their consumption is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. By contrast, if one severs pieces of the spleen or of the kidneys of an animal and then slaughtered it, then even if those pieces were left inside the animal, their consumption is prohibited.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Rabbis turn Rabbi Meir’s “not part of the body” logic on its head. Far from being a weakness, being a non-body part is an advantage: slaughter shields non-body items more than body parts. Proof — severed fetal pieces left in the womb are permitted by the mother’s slaughter, whereas severed pieces of her own spleen or kidneys are forbidden. So the fetus (a non-body entity) is better protected than the mother’s own organs, and its leg should be purified all the more.
Key Terms:
- הַרְבֵּה מַצֶּלֶת עַל שֶׁאֵינוֹ גּוּפָהּ = “it shields the non-body part more” — the Rabbis’ counter that non-body status aids protection
- טְחוֹל וּכְלָיוֹת = spleen and kidneys — the mother’s own severed organs, which slaughter does not permit
Segment 10
TYPE: גמרא
Rava emends the baraita, inserting the tereifa-proof exchange.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַאי קָאָמַר? אָמַר רָבָא, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ כְּדִי: חַסּוֹרֵי מְחַסְּרָא וְהָכִי קָתָנֵי, אָמַר לָהֶן רַבִּי מֵאִיר: וְכִי מִי טִהֲרוֹ לְאֵבֶר זֶה מִידֵּי נְבֵלָה? שְׁחִיטַת אִמּוֹ, אִם כֵּן תַּתִּירֶנּוּ בַּאֲכִילָה! אָמְרוּ לוֹ: טְרֵפָה תּוֹכִיחַ, שֶׁשְּׁחִיטָתָהּ מְטַהַרְתָּהּ מִידֵי נְבֵלָה וְאֵינָהּ מַתִּירָתָהּ בַּאֲכִילָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara clarifies the response of the Rabbis: What are the Rabbis saying? Rava said, and some say it unattributed [kedi] to any particular Sage, that the baraita is incomplete, and this is what it is teaching: Rabbi Meir said to the Rabbis: But what renders this limb pure from the impurity of a carcass? You might say it is the slaughter of its mother, but if so, it should also permit it even for consumption. In response the Rabbis said to him: Let the halakha of a tereifa prove the point, as its slaughter renders it pure from the impurity of a carcass but it does not permit it for consumption. Similarly, the slaughter of the mother animal should render pure even the foreleg of its fetus, even if it does not permit it for consumption.
קלאוד על הדף:
The baraita as quoted seems to skip a step — the Rabbis’ “spleen and kidneys” reply does not directly answer Rabbi Meir’s challenge. Rava emends it (chasorei mechasra), restoring the missing middle: the Rabbis first answer Rabbi Meir’s “purity should mean permission” by pointing to the tereifa, which slaughter purifies without permitting. Only then does the fuller give-and-take (Rabbi Meir’s “not its body” and the spleen/kidney rejoinder) make sense. Rava is reconstructing the baraita’s intended flow.
Key Terms:
- חַסּוֹרֵי מְחַסְּרָא = “it is deficient [and should read…]” — the standard device for emending an incomplete baraita
- טְרֵפָה תּוֹכִיחַ = “let the tereifa prove [it]” — the Rabbis’ proof that slaughter can purify without permitting
Segment 11
TYPE: גמרא
The reconstructed continuation: Rabbi Meir’s “not its body” and the Rabbis’ rejoinder.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר לָהֶן: לֹא, אִם טִיהֲרָה שְׁחִיטַת טְרֵפָה אוֹתָהּ, דָּבָר שֶׁהִיא גּוּפָהּ, תְּטַהֵר אֶת הָאֵבֶר דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ גּוּפָהּ? אָמְרוּ לוֹ: הַרְבֵּה מַצֶּלֶת עַל שֶׁאֵינוֹ גּוּפָהּ יוֹתֵר מִגּוּפָהּ, שֶׁהֲרֵי שָׁנִינוּ: חוֹתֵךְ מִן הָעוּבָּר שֶׁבְּמֵעֶיהָ – מוּתָּר בַּאֲכִילָה, מִן הַטְּחוֹל וּמִן הַכְּלָיוֹת – אָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה.
English Translation:
Rabbi Meir said to them: No, even if the slaughter of a tereifa renders the animal itself pure from having the impurity of a carcass, that is true with regard to something that is part of its own body. Does it necessarily follow that it should also render pure the limb of its fetus, which is something that is not part of its own body? The Rabbis said to him: The slaughter of an animal has a greater effect in shielding that which is not part of its body from having the impurity of a carcass than that which is part of its body, as is apparent from that which we learned in the mishna at the beginning of the chapter: If one severs pieces from a fetus that is in an animal’s womb and then slaughters the mother animal, their consumption is permitted. By contrast, if one severs pieces of the spleen or of the kidneys of an animal and then slaughters it, their consumption is prohibited.
קלאוד על הדף:
This is the continuation Rava restored. Rabbi Meir concedes the tereifa proof but blocks it with a disanalogy: a tereifa’s slaughter purifies the tereifa’s own body, whereas the fetal leg is not part of the mother’s body. The Rabbis answer with the spleen/kidney contrast, showing slaughter actually protects non-body items (the fetus) more than body-parts (the mother’s organs) — so “not its body” is no barrier. The debate now reads as a coherent exchange.
Key Terms:
- דָּבָר שֶׁהִיא גּוּפָהּ / שֶׁאֵינוֹ גּוּפָהּ = “part of its body / not part of its body” — Rabbi Meir’s dividing line, which the Rabbis invert
- חַסּוֹרֵי מְחַסְּרָא = (still operative) the emended text now running as a full dialogue
Segment 12
TYPE: ברייתא
A second baraita confirms Rava’s reconstruction (with the tereifa proof).
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: אָמַר לָהֶן רַבִּי מֵאִיר: וְכִי מִי טִיהֲרוֹ לְאֵבֶר זֶה מִידֵּי נְבֵלָה? אָמְרוּ לוֹ: שְׁחִיטַת אִמּוֹ. אִם כֵּן, תַּתִּירֶנּוּ בַּאֲכִילָה! אָמְרוּ לוֹ: טְרֵפָה תּוֹכִיחַ, שֶׁשְּׁחִיטָתָהּ מְטַהַרְתָּהּ מִידֵי נְבֵלָה וְאֵינָהּ מַתִּירָתָהּ בַּאֲכִילָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara notes that this clarification of Rava is also taught explicitly in a baraita: Rabbi Meir said to the Rabbis: But what renders this limb pure from the impurity of a carcass? The Rabbis said to him: It is the slaughter of its mother. Rabbi Meir responded: But if so, it should also permit it even for consumption. In response the Rabbis said to him: Let the halakha of a tereifa prove the point, as its slaughter renders it pure from the impurity of a carcass but it does not permit it for consumption. Similarly, the slaughter of the mother animal should render pure even the foreleg of its fetus, even if it does not permit it for consumption.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara supports Rava’s emendation by citing a second baraita (tanya nami hachi) that already contains the tereifa-proof step explicitly. Its presence confirms that Rava did not invent the missing exchange but restored a genuinely attested version of the debate. This is the Talmud’s standard validation move: a reconstructed reading is vindicated when an independent source is found teaching it outright.
Key Terms:
- תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי = “it is also taught thus” — a corroborating baraita confirming a proposed reading
- טְרֵפָה תּוֹכִיחַ = “let the tereifa prove it” — the pivotal proof now attested directly in the baraita
Segment 13
TYPE: ברייתא
A third version: Rabbi Meir adds the hanging limb to the tereifa comparison.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר לָהֶן: אִם טִיהֲרָה שְׁחִיטַת טְרֵפָה אוֹתָהּ וְאֶת הָאֵבֶר הַמְדוּלְדָּל בָּהּ, דָּבָר שֶׁגּוּפָהּ, תְּטַהֵר אֶת הָעוּבָּר שֶׁאֵינוֹ גּוּפָהּ?
English Translation:
Rabbi Meir said to them: Even if the slaughter of a tereifa renders the animal itself pure, and likewise the slaughter of any animal renders the limb that was partially cut from it but still hangs from it pure from imparting the impurity of a carcass despite being prohibited for consumption, that is the halakha with regard to something that is part of its own body. Does it necessarily follow that it should also render pure the limb of its fetus, which is something that is not part of its own body?
קלאוד על הדף:
In this fuller version, Rabbi Meir strengthens his own position by conceding even more: not only does slaughter purify the tereifa’s body, it even purifies a partially-severed limb still hanging from the animal (eiver ha-meduldal) — yet all these are part of its body. His point stands sharper: since slaughter’s purifying power is demonstrably tied to the animal’s own body, it cannot reach the fetal leg, which is external. Crucially, this line — assuming a hanging limb IS purified by slaughter — will become the crux of the Reish Lakish / Rabbi Yoḥanan dispute that follows.
Key Terms:
- אֵבֶר הַמְדוּלְדָּל = a limb partially severed but still dangling from the animal — purified by slaughter on this version
- דָּבָר שֶׁגּוּפָהּ = “part of its body” — the common feature (tereifa + hanging limb) that Rabbi Meir says the fetal leg lacks
Segment 14
TYPE: ברייתא
The Rabbis’ recurring rejoinder: slaughter shields non-body parts even more.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמְרוּ לוֹ: הַרְבֵּה מַצֶּלֶת עַל שֶׁאֵינוֹ גּוּפָהּ יוֹתֵר מִגּוּפָהּ, שֶׁהֲרֵי שָׁנִינוּ: חוֹתֵךְ מִן הָעוּבָּר שֶׁבְּמֵעֶיהָ – מוּתָּר בַּאֲכִילָה, מִן הַטְּחוֹל וּמִן הַכְּלָיוֹת – אָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה.
English Translation:
The Rabbis said to him: The slaughter of an animal has a greater effect in shielding that which is not part of its body from imparting the ritual impurity of a carcass than that which is part of its body, as is apparent from that which we have learned in the mishna above: If one severed pieces from a fetus that was in an animal’s womb and then slaughtered the mother animal, their consumption is permitted. But if one severed pieces of the spleen or of the kidneys of an animal and then slaughtered it, their consumption is prohibited.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Rabbis give their standard rejoinder once more: slaughter shields non-body items more than body-parts, proven by the fetus-pieces (permitted) versus the spleen/kidneys (forbidden). The repetition across the daf’s several baraita-versions is not redundant to the Gemara — each version subtly differs in what Rabbi Meir concedes, and the third version’s inclusion of the hanging limb sets up the coming Amoraic dispute over whether that concession is really shared by both Tannaim.
Key Terms:
- הַרְבֵּה מַצֶּלֶת = “it shields much [more]” — the Rabbis’ recurring principle favoring non-body items
- מוּתָּר / אָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה = permitted / forbidden for consumption — the fetus-pieces vs. spleen-and-kidneys contrast
Segment 15
TYPE: גמרא
Reish Lakish: the fetus-dispute extends to hanging limbs too.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ: כְּמַחְלוֹקֶת בְּעוּבָּרִין, כָּךְ מַחְלוֹקֶת בְּאֵיבָרִין.
English Translation:
§ Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Just as there is a dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis with regard to fetuses, concerning whether the slaughter of the mother prevents a limb that emerged from the womb from having the impurity of a carcass, so too, they have a parallel dispute with regard to limbs of an animal that were partially cut from it but still hanging from it, whether the slaughter of the animal prevents such limbs from having the impurity of a carcass.
קלאוד על הדף:
Reish Lakish maps the Tannaitic dispute onto a second case. Just as Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis argue over the fetal leg, they argue in the same way over a hanging limb (eiver ha-meduldal): the Rabbis say the animal’s slaughter purifies it from carcass-impurity, Rabbi Meir says it does not. On his reading the two Tannaim disagree in both cases alike, treating fetal leg and hanging limb as parallel.
Key Terms:
- כְּמַחְלוֹקֶת בְּעוּבָּרִין כָּךְ מַחְלוֹקֶת בְּאֵיבָרִין = “as the dispute over fetuses, so over limbs” — Reish Lakish extends the machloket to hanging limbs
- רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ = Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who reads the dispute as spanning both cases
Segment 16
TYPE: גמרא
Rabbi Yoḥanan: they dispute only the fetal leg; all agree on the hanging limb.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: מַחְלוֹקֶת בְּאֵבֶר דְּעוּבָּר, אֲבָל בְּאֵבֶר דִּבְהֵמָה – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל שְׁחִיטָה עוֹשָׂה נִיפּוּל.
English Translation:
And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Their dispute is only with regard to a limb of a fetus that emerged from the womb, but with regard to a limb hanging from an animal, everyone agrees that the slaughter of the animal renders such a limb as though it had already fallen off prior to the slaughter, and the slaughter does not prevent the limb from having the impurity of a carcass.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yoḥanan restricts the dispute to the fetal leg alone. On the hanging limb, he says, both Tannaim agree — the slaughter “makes it fall” (osah nippul), i.e., treats the dangling limb as if it had dropped off before the slaughter, so slaughter does NOT save it from carcass-impurity. (Note this is the version that will be corrected on 73b; the emended text reverses “does” to “does not.”) The core claim is that fetal leg and hanging limb are not truly parallel, contra Reish Lakish.
Key Terms:
- שְׁחִיטָה עוֹשָׂה נִיפּוּל = “slaughter makes it fall” — treats the hanging limb as already fallen before slaughter
- אֵבֶר דִּבְהֵמָה / אֵבֶר דְּעוּבָּר = “a limb of the animal / of the fetus” — the two cases Rabbi Yoḥanan distinguishes
Segment 17
TYPE: גמרא
Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina explains Rabbi Yoḥanan: the fetal leg has a remedy by return.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבָּנַן? הַאי אִית לֵיהּ תַּקַּנְתָּא בַּחֲזָרָה, וְהָא לֵית לֵיהּ תַּקַּנְתָּא בַּחֲזָרָה.
English Translation:
Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: What is the reason for the distinction made by Rabbi Yoḥanan concerning the opinion of the Rabbis that the slaughter of an animal renders pure the limb of its fetus, but does not render pure a limb hanging from the animal itself? The reason is that this limb of the fetus that emerged from its womb has a means of rectification by returning back inside the womb, in accordance with the opinion that it will then be permitted for consumption by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. But this hanging limb does not have a means of rectification by returning, as it cannot be reattached to the animal’s body.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina supplies the rationale for Rabbi Yoḥanan’s distinction (on the Rabbis’ side). The fetal leg has a “remedy by return” (takanta ba-chazara): had it been drawn back into the womb before the slaughter, it would have been fully permitted — so the Rabbis grant slaughter the power to purify it. A hanging limb has no such remedy: it cannot be reattached, so nothing could have restored it, and slaughter offers it no purification. Potential reversibility is what distinguishes the two cases. (This whole line of analysis is reworked once the dispute is re-stated on 73b.)
Key Terms:
- תַּקַּנְתָּא בַּחֲזָרָה = “a remedy by returning” — the fetal leg could be reinserted and thereby permitted; the hanging limb cannot
- רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא = the Amora explaining the reasoning behind Rabbi Yoḥanan’s distinction
Segment 18
TYPE: קושיא
An objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan from the baraita’s “hanging limb” premise.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מֵיתִיבִי: אָמַר לָהֶם רַבִּי מֵאִיר: לֹא, אִם טִיהֲרָה שְׁחִיטַת טְרֵפָה אוֹתָהּ וְאֶת הָאֵבֶר הַמְדוּלְדָּל בָּהּ – דָּבָר שֶׁגּוּפָהּ, תְּטַהֵר אֶת הָעוּבָּר – דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ גּוּפָהּ?
English Translation:
The Gemara raises an objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion from the baraita cited above: Rabbi Meir said to them: No, even if the slaughter of a tereifa renders pure the animal itself and similarly the slaughter of any animal renders pure the limb that is hanging from it from having the impurity of a carcass, this is true with regard to something that is part of its own body. Does it necessarily follow that it should also render pure the limb of its fetus, which is something that is not part of its own body?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara objects to Rabbi Yoḥanan from the third baraita (segment 13). There Rabbi Meir explicitly grants that slaughter purifies a hanging limb — the very point Rabbi Yoḥanan claims Rabbi Meir denies (holding all agree slaughter does NOT save the hanging limb). If Rabbi Meir himself concedes the hanging limb is purified, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s reading collapses. The daf ends on this difficulty, whose resolution — including a re-statement of the whole dispute — opens 73b.
Key Terms:
- מֵיתִיבִי = “they raised an objection” — a challenge from a tannaitic source
- אֵבֶר הַמְדוּלְדָּל = the hanging limb, which the baraita has Rabbi Meir concede is purified — contradicting Rabbi Yoḥanan
Amud Bet (73b)
Segment 1
TYPE: גמרא
The objection resolves for Reish Lakish but not (yet) for Rabbi Yoḥanan.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ, לְדִבְרֵיהֶם קָאָמַר לְהוּ: לְדִידִי לָא שְׁנָא אֵבֶר דְּעוּבָּר וְלָא שְׁנָא אֵבֶר דִּבְהֵמָה, כִּי הֲדָדֵי נִינְהוּ.
English Translation:
Rabbi Meir’s statement appears inconsistent with his opinion, as he holds that a hanging limb is not rendered pure by slaughtering the animal. The Gemara suggests that this difficulty can be resolved only according to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish’s version of the Rabbis’ opinion, but not according to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s version. Granted, according to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, one can explain that Rabbi Meir was speaking in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis, as follows: According to my own opinion, there is no difference with regard to the limb of a fetus, and there is no difference with regard to a limb hanging from an animal; they are the same in that the slaughter of the animal does not render either of them pure. Accordingly, Rabbi Meir must have been speaking in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis that a limb hanging from an animal is rendered pure by the animal’s slaughter.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara shows the objection is answerable for Reish Lakish but damaging to Rabbi Yoḥanan. For Reish Lakish, Rabbi Meir was arguing le-divreihem — “on your own premises”: you Rabbis grant that slaughter purifies the hanging limb, yet even so you should concede the fetal leg differs. Rabbi Meir himself, of course, thinks neither is purified. This dialogical reading keeps Rabbi Meir consistent, so the baraita poses no problem for Reish Lakish.
Key Terms:
- לְדִבְרֵיהֶם קָאָמַר = “he speaks according to their view” — arguing from the opponent’s premises, not one’s own
- כִּי הֲדָדֵי נִינְהוּ = “they are alike” — for Rabbi Meir, fetal leg and hanging limb are equally unpurified
Segment 2
TYPE: גמרא
The Gemara concedes: on Rabbi Yoḥanan’s version, the baraita is a real difficulty.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, קַשְׁיָא.
English Translation:
But according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who holds that both the Rabbis and Rabbi Meir agree that a limb hanging from an animal is not rendered pure by the animal’s slaughter, Rabbi Meir’s statement is difficult, as it is inconsistent with both his opinion and the Rabbis’ opinion. The Gemara concedes the challenge.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara admits defeat for the current formulation of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s view. If, as he claims, everyone agrees the hanging limb is NOT purified by slaughter, then the baraita’s Rabbi Meir (who assumes it IS purified) fits neither Tanna — an outright contradiction. The concession (kashya) forces the Gemara, in the next segment, to re-state the entire Reish Lakish / Rabbi Yoḥanan dispute with the wording reversed.
Key Terms:
- קַשְׁיָא = “it is difficult” — an unresolved (though not fatal) objection prompting a re-statement
- דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל = “the words of all” — Rabbi Yoḥanan’s claim of unanimity, which the baraita seems to contradict
Segment 3
TYPE: גמרא
The dispute is re-stated: Rabbi Yoḥanan now says all agree slaughter does NOT purify the hanging limb.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא, אִי אִתְּמַר הָכִי אִתְּמַר: אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ: כְּמַחְלוֹקֶת בְּעוּבָּרִים, כָּךְ מַחֲלוֹקֶת בְּאֵיבָרִין, וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: מַחְלוֹקֶת בְּאֵבֶר דְּעוּבָּר, אֲבָל בְּאֵבֶר דִּבְהֵמָה – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל אֵין שְׁחִיטָה עוֹשָׂה נִיפּוּל.
English Translation:
Rather, if such a dispute was stated, it was stated like this: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Just as there is a dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis with regard to fetuses whose limbs emerged from the womb, so too, they have a parallel dispute with regard to limbs hanging from an animal. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Their dispute is only with regard to the limb of a fetus that emerged from the womb; but with regard to a limb hanging from an animal, everyone agrees that the slaughter of the animal does not render such a limb as though it had already fallen off prior to the slaughter, and does not impart the impurity of a carcass. According to this version of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s understanding of the dispute, Rabbi Meir’s statement is consistent even with his own opinion.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara emends Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement to escape the difficulty. In the corrected version, he says all agree that slaughter does NOT “make the hanging limb fall” — i.e., slaughter does not treat it as pre-fallen, so it does NOT acquire carcass-impurity; it stays protected. Now the baraita’s Rabbi Meir, who purifies the hanging limb, is fully consistent with his own view. Reish Lakish still holds the two cases are disputed in parallel; Rabbi Yoḥanan holds only the fetal leg is disputed, with the hanging limb agreed to be spared.
Key Terms:
- אֵין שְׁחִיטָה עוֹשָׂה נִיפּוּל = “slaughter does not make it fall” — the corrected ruling: the hanging limb is not treated as pre-fallen, so it is not carcass-impure
- אִי אִתְּמַר הָכִי אִתְּמַר = “if it was stated, it was stated thus” — the formula introducing an emended version of a reported dispute
Segment 4
TYPE: גמרא
The new rationale (on Rabbi Meir’s side): the hanging limb IS part of the body.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר? הַאי גּוּפָהּ, וְהַאי לָאו גּוּפָהּ.
English Translation:
Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: What is the reason for the distinction made by Rabbi Yoḥanan concerning the opinion of Rabbi Meir, that the slaughter of an animal does not render pure the limb of its fetus, but it does render pure a limb hanging from the animal itself? It is that this hanging limb is part of the animal’s body, but that, the limb of the fetus, is not part of its body.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina now re-explains the distinction on Rabbi Meir’s side (matching the emended version). Rabbi Meir purifies the hanging limb but not the fetal leg for a simple reason: the hanging limb is part of the animal’s own body, which slaughter can reach, whereas the fetal leg is external to it. This is the very “part of its body / not part of its body” (gufah / lav gufah) criterion Rabbi Meir voiced in the baraita — now shown to underlie Rabbi Yoḥanan’s reading consistently.
Key Terms:
- הַאי גּוּפָהּ וְהַאי לָאו גּוּפָהּ = “this is its body, that is not its body” — the hanging limb belongs to the animal; the fetal leg does not
- רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא = the Amora supplying the rationale, now on Rabbi Meir’s side of the emended dispute
Segment 5
TYPE: גמרא
A related dictum: death “makes it fall,” but slaughter does not.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב יִצְחָק בַּר יוֹסֵף אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַכֹּל מוֹדִים שֶׁמִּיתָה עוֹשָׂה נִיפּוּל, וְאֵין שְׁחִיטָה עוֹשָׂה נִיפּוּל.
English Translation:
§ The Gemara continues to elucidate the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis. Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Everyone agrees that the death of an animal by means other than slaughter renders a limb as though it had already fallen off prior to the animal’s death. Therefore, it will not have the impurity of a carcass, but it will have the impurity of a limb taken from a living animal. And likewise, everyone agrees that the slaughter of the animal does not render a limb as though it had already fallen off prior to the slaughter, and therefore it will not have the impurity of a carcass.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef reports a further Rabbi Yoḥanan dictum drawing a sharp asymmetry between death and slaughter. If the animal dies (not by slaughter), a hanging limb is treated as having fallen off just before death — so it escapes carcass-impurity but carries eiver min ha-chai (limb-from-a-living-animal) impurity. If the animal is slaughtered, the limb is NOT treated as pre-fallen, so it has no carcass-impurity at all. Death and slaughter thus produce opposite effects on the dangling limb’s status.
Key Terms:
- מִיתָה עוֹשָׂה נִיפּוּל = “death makes it fall” — natural death treats the hanging limb as pre-fallen (→ eiver min ha-chai)
- אֵין שְׁחִיטָה עוֹשָׂה נִיפּוּל = “slaughter does not make it fall” — slaughter does not, so no carcass-impurity attaches
- אֵבֶר מִן הַחַי = a limb from a living animal — its impurity, which the pre-fallen limb carries after death
Segment 6
TYPE: קושיא
What does the dictum add? Both halves seem already taught in a mishna.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? אִילֵימָא בְּאֵבֶר דְּעוּבָּר – מִיפְלָג פְּלִיגִי! אֶלָּא בְּאֵבֶר דִּבְהֵמָה – מִיתָה תְּנֵינָא, שְׁחִיטָה תְּנֵינָא.
English Translation:
The Gemara clarifies: What are we dealing with here? If we say we are dealing with a limb of its fetus that emerged from its womb, Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis explicitly disagree with regard to this case. Rather, we are dealing with a limb hanging from an animal. But if so, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement is unnecessary. With regard to a hanging limb, we already learn about the effect of the death of the animal in a mishna elsewhere, and we already learn about the effect of the slaughter of the animal in a mishna elsewhere.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara probes what Rabbi Yoḥanan’s “everyone agrees” dictum adds. It cannot concern the fetal leg, since there Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis openly disagree — so it must concern the hanging limb. But then it seems superfluous: a mishna (on 127b) already teaches both the death-effect and the slaughter-effect on a hanging limb. The challenge sets up the Gemara’s demonstration that the dictum is nonetheless necessary against a possible misreading of that mishna.
Key Terms:
- בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן = “what are we dealing with?” — the Gemara isolating the dictum’s subject
- תְּנֵינָא = “we already learned it” — the redundancy charge, since a mishna teaches both effects
Segment 7
TYPE: משנה
The death-effect is already taught: a hanging limb after death has eiver-min-ha-chai impurity.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מִיתָה תְּנֵינָא: מֵתָה הַבְּהֵמָה – הַבָּשָׂר צָרִיךְ הֶכְשֵׁר, וְהָאֵבֶר מְטַמֵּא מִשּׁוּם אֵבֶר מִן הַחַי, וְאֵינוֹ מְטַמֵּא מִשּׁוּם אֵבֶר מִן הַנְּבֵלָה; דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.
English Translation:
The Gemara elaborates: We already learn about the effect of the death of an animal in the mishna (127b): If the animal died without slaughter, any hanging flesh needs to be rendered susceptible to contracting ritual impurity in order to become impure. This is accomplished by coming in contact with liquid, with the owner’s approval. The reason is that its halakhic status is that of flesh severed from a living animal, which is ritually pure and does not have the status of an unslaughtered carcass. And a hanging limb imparts impurity as a limb severed from a living animal, but does not impart impurity as a limb from a carcass; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Evidently, Rabbi Meir holds that upon the animal’s death, anything hanging from the animal is considered as though it had already fallen off before the animal’s death. Since the mishna does not record that the Rabbis disagree, it would appear that they agree.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara documents the death-half of the dictum from the mishna on 127b. When an animal dies (unslaughtered), its hanging flesh is mere flesh-from-a-living-animal — pure until made susceptible (hekhsher) by liquid — and the hanging limb defiles only as eiver min ha-chai, not as a carcass-limb. This shows death “makes it fall” (treats it as pre-fallen), and the absence of dissent implies all agree. So the death-half was indeed already taught.
Key Terms:
- צָרִיךְ הֶכְשֵׁר = “needs to be made susceptible” — flesh from a living animal is pure until wetted by liquid
- אֵבֶר מִן הַחַי / מִן הַנְּבֵלָה = limb from a living animal vs. limb from a carcass — the limb has the former impurity, not the latter
Segment 8
TYPE: משנה
The slaughter-effect is also already taught (Rabbi Meir vs Rabbi Shimon on blood-hekhsher).
Hebrew/Aramaic:
שְׁחִיטָה נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא: נִשְׁחֲטָה בְּהֵמָה – הוּכְשְׁרוּ בְּדָמֶיהָ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: לֹא הוּכְשְׁרוּ.
English Translation:
Likewise, we already learn about the effect of the slaughter of an animal in the same mishna: If the animal is slaughtered, they, the limb and the flesh hanging from it, are thereby rendered susceptible to impurity, by coming in contact with its blood. Blood is one of the seven liquids that render foods susceptible to impurity and its presence is considered to be with the approval of the owner, as it makes the meat look redder and fresher; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon says: They were not rendered susceptible to impurity through the animal’s own blood, but only once they were wet with another liquid, with the owner’s approval. It is apparent that both opinions in that mishna agree that the limb does not have the impurity of a limb severed from a living animal. Evidently, they hold that the slaughter does not render the hanging limb as though it had already fallen off beforehand.
קלאוד על הדף:
The slaughter-half is likewise attested: upon slaughter, the hanging limb and flesh need hekhsher (Rabbi Meir: the animal’s own blood suffices; Rabbi Shimon: only another liquid). The very fact that they still require hekhsher proves the limb has no independent impurity — meaning slaughter does NOT treat it as pre-fallen (which would have given it eiver-min-ha-chai impurity needing no hekhsher). Both effects being already in the mishna, the redundancy question against Rabbi Yoḥanan stands, pending the answer that follows.
Key Terms:
- הוּכְשְׁרוּ בְּדָמֶיהָ = “made susceptible by its blood” — Rabbi Meir’s view that the animal’s blood wets and enables impurity
- רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן = holds the blood does not count; a separate liquid is needed for hekhsher
Segment 9
TYPE: תירוץ
The dictum is needed: without it, “made susceptible” could refer to the flesh alone.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִי מֵהַהִיא, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: מַאי ״הוּכְשְׁרוּ״ – אַבָּשָׂר.
English Translation:
Given that the mishna has already taught both halakhot, what was the necessity of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement? The Gemara answers: If these halakhot were derived only from that mishna, I would say that actually, slaughter does render a hanging limb as though it had already fallen off beforehand, and such a limb would have the impurity of a limb severed from a live animal. If so, what does the mishna mean when it states: They are rendered susceptible to impurity by coming in contact with its blood? Ostensibly, the intention is that both the limb and the flesh must be rendered susceptible to impurity, which indicates that the limb does not have any impurity of its own. The Gemara explains: One would have explained that the need to be rendered susceptible to impurity is referring only to the flesh, as flesh severed from a living animal does not have any impurity of its own.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara defends the necessity of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s dictum. Without it, one could reread the mishna: “made susceptible” might apply only to the hanging flesh (which has no impurity of its own), while the limb, on this alternative, WAS treated as pre-fallen by slaughter and thus carries eiver-min-ha-chai impurity needing no hekhsher. Rabbi Yoḥanan’s explicit statement — slaughter does not make the limb “fall” — forecloses that misreading. So his dictum adds precision the mishna alone leaves open.
Key Terms:
- מַאי הוּכְשְׁרוּ אַבָּשָׂר = “‘made susceptible’ refers to the flesh [only]” — the alternative reading the dictum rules out
- הֶכְשֵׁר = making food susceptible to impurity by contact with liquid
Segment 10
TYPE: גמרא
The plural “made susceptible” is reinterpreted as two kinds of flesh.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהָא ״הוּכְשְׁרוּ״ קָתָנֵי, מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: חַד לְבָשָׂר הַפּוֹרֵשׁ מִן הַבְּהֵמָה, וְחַד לְבָשָׂר הַפּוֹרֵשׁ מִן הָאֵבֶר.
English Translation:
The Gemara objects: But the mishna teaches: They are rendered susceptible, in the plural, which is apparently referring to both the flesh and the limb, which were mentioned previously in the mishna. The Gemara explains: You might say that the plural is used because the statement is referring to two types of hanging flesh that upon slaughter are considered to have been separated from a living animal: One is for flesh that separates from the body of the animal, and the other one is for flesh that separates from the hanging limb. Neither type has its own impurity, so they must be rendered susceptible to impurity by coming in contact with liquid.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara defends the alternative reading against the plural “made susceptible.” Rather than proving both limb and flesh need hekhsher, the plural can be parsed as two varieties of flesh — flesh separating from the animal’s body and flesh separating from the hanging limb — both being impurity-less flesh-from-a-living-animal. On this parse the limb itself is still excluded and could carry its own eiver-min-ha-chai impurity. So the plural does not by itself refute the misreading; Rabbi Yoḥanan’s dictum is still required.
Key Terms:
- הַפּוֹרֵשׁ מִן הַבְּהֵמָה / מִן הָאֵבֶר = flesh separating “from the animal” vs. “from the limb” — the two kinds the plural could denote
- מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא = “you might have said” — introducing the reading the dictum must exclude
Segment 11
TYPE: גמרא
Why both kinds of flesh must be stated — the severe-impurity concern.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּמַאי אוּלְמֵיהּ דְּהַאי מֵהַאי? סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא, הוֹאִיל וּמְטַמֵּא טוּמְאָה חֲמוּרָה אַגַּב אָבִיו, אֵימָא לָא לִיבְעֵי הֶכְשֵׁר, קָמַשְׁמַע לַן.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: But in what way is it more compelling to apply the halakha to this type of flesh than to that type, making it necessary to state the halakha with regard to both? The Gemara answers: It might enter your mind to say that since flesh that is attached to a limb severed from a living animal imparts the same severe form of ritual impurity as the limb on account of being a part of it, one might say that once the flesh is separated from the limb it does not need to then be rendered susceptible to impurity. To reject this possibility, the mishna uses the plural form to teach us that this type of flesh does need to be rendered susceptible to impurity.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara justifies why the mishna needed to mention both kinds of flesh separately. One might have thought flesh attached to a severed limb “inherits” the limb’s severe eiver-min-ha-chai impurity, so that even after detaching it would defile on its own and need no hekhsher. The plural teaches otherwise: this flesh too, once separated, is ordinary impurity-less flesh requiring hekhsher. This completes the defense of the alternative reading — and thus the necessity of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s dictum.
Key Terms:
- טוּמְאָה חֲמוּרָה אַגַּב אָבִיו = “severe impurity on account of its ‘parent’ [limb]” — the flesh’s borrowed severe status while attached
- לָא לִיבְעֵי הֶכְשֵׁר = “it should not need hekhsher” — the mistaken inference the plural comes to reject
Segment 12
TYPE: גמרא
Rav Yosef endorses the dictum, citing Rabba bar bar Ḥana and the “flesh in the field” verse.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: נְקוֹט דְּרַב יִצְחָק בַּר יוֹסֵף בִּידָךְ, דְּרַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה קָאֵי כְּוָותֵיהּ. דְּתַנְיָא: ״וּבָשָׂר בַּשָּׂדֶה טְרֵפָה לֹא תֹאכֵלוּ״ – לְהָבִיא הָאֵבֶר וְהַבָּשָׂר הַמְדוּלְדָּלִין בִּבְהֵמָה וּבְחַיָּה וּבְעוֹף, וּשְׁחָטָן, שֶׁהֵן אֲסוּרִין. וְאָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן:
English Translation:
§ Rav Yosef said: Take the statement that Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says, i.e., that the slaughter of an animal does not render a hanging limb as though it had already fallen off prior to the slaughter, in your hand, i.e., accept it as correct, as Rabba bar bar Ḥana also holds in accordance with this opinion. As it is taught in a baraita: “And flesh that is torn in the field, you shall not eat” (Exodus 22:30). This serves to include the case of the limb or the flesh that was partially cut off but was still hanging on a domesticated animal or on an undomesticated animal or on a bird, and one slaughtered them; it is derived that they are prohibited as limbs severed from a living animal. And Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says with regard to the ruling of this baraita:
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Yosef urges that Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef’s ruling — slaughter does not “make the hanging limb fall” — be held firmly, because Rabba bar bar Ḥana (also citing Rabbi Yoḥanan) supports it. The proof-text is “flesh torn in the field, you shall not eat” (Exodus 22:30), read to include a partially-severed limb or flesh on any animal or bird that was then slaughtered: it stays forbidden as eiver min ha-chai. Since slaughter did not convert it into permitted or carcass-flesh, slaughter clearly does not treat the hanging limb as pre-fallen. The daf breaks off as Rabba bar bar Ḥana’s own comment on this baraita begins, continuing onto the next page.
Key Terms:
- נְקוֹט … בִּידָךְ = “hold [it] in your hand” — a formula endorsing a ruling as authoritative
- וּבָשָׂר בַּשָּׂדֶה טְרֵפָה = “flesh torn in the field” (Exodus 22:30) — read to include a hanging limb/flesh even after slaughter
- רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה = the Amora whose supporting statement (via Rabbi Yoḥanan) clinches the ruling