Chullin Daf 114 (חולין דף קי״ד)
Daf: 114 | Amudim: 114a – 114b | Date: Loading...
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (114a)
Segment 1
TYPE: גמרא
Conclusion of the prior view: no lashes for eating implies no lashes for cooking.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כֵּיוָן דְּעַל אֲכִילָה לָא לָקֵי, אַבִּישּׁוּל נָמֵי לָא לָקֵי.
English Translation:
This link between cooking and eating indicates that since one is not flogged for eating forbidden fat cooked in milk, as agreed upon above, one also is not flogged for cooking the two together.
קלאוד על הדף:
Continuing directly from 113b, this completes the first version of the dispute over cooking ḥelev (forbidden fat) in milk. Because the Torah expressed the eating prohibition in the language of cooking, the two are bound together: since there is no flogging for eating (an already-prohibited item, so issur ḥal al issur does not add liability), there is likewise no flogging for cooking. The two acts stand or fall together.
Key Terms:
- אֲכִילָה / בִּישּׁוּל (akhila / bishul) = eating / cooking
- לָא לָקֵי (la lakei) = one is not flogged
- חֵלֶב (ḥelev) = forbidden fat (already prohibited to eat)
Segment 2
TYPE: גמרא
The reverse version (ika d’amri): all agree on flogging for cooking; they dispute eating.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: אַבִּישּׁוּל – כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּלָקֵי, כִּי פְּלִיגִי אַאֲכִילָה. מַאן דְּאָמַר אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה – דְּהָא אֵין אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר, וּמַאן דְּאָמַר לוֹקֶה – לְהָכִי אַפְּקַהּ רַחֲמָנָא לַאֲכִילָה בִּלְשׁוֹן בִּישּׁוּל, כֵּיוָן דְּאַבִּישּׁוּל לָקֵי – אַאֲכִילָה נָמֵי לָקֵי.
English Translation:
And some say the opposite: With regard to cooking, everyone agrees that one is flogged for this act, since the principle of a prohibition not taking effect where another prohibition already exists is not relevant. When they disagree, it is with regard to eating. The one who says he is not flogged applies the principle that a prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition already exists, and the fat was already prohibited for consumption in its own right before being cooked with milk. And the one who says he is flogged holds that it was for this reason that the Merciful One expressed the prohibition of eating meat cooked in milk using the language of cooking, to teach that since one is flogged for cooking forbidden fat in milk, one also is flogged for eating the product.
קלאוד על הדף:
An alternative account (ika d’amri) inverts the previous framing. Here everyone agrees one is flogged for cooking ḥelev in milk (cooking is a fresh prohibition, so issur ḥal al issur is irrelevant). The dispute is over eating. One holds there is no flogging for eating (the ḥelev prohibition already exists). The other holds that since the Torah phrased eating as “cooking,” and cooking is punishable, eating is punishable too. The link runs in the opposite direction from Segment 1.
Key Terms:
- וְאִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי (v’ika d’amri) = “and some say” (an alternative version of the dispute)
- אֵין אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר = a prohibition does not take effect where another already exists
- אַפְּקַהּ … בִּלְשׁוֹן בִּישּׁוּל = [the Torah] expressed it in the language of cooking
Segment 3
TYPE: תירוץ
A third reading: the two Sages address different acts and do not actually disagree.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: מָר אֲמַר חֲדָא, וּמָר אֲמַר חֲדָא, וְלָא פְּלִיגִי.
English Translation:
The Gemara suggests a third explanation of the dispute between Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi: And if you wish, say that one Sage said one statement and one Sage said another statement, and they do not disagree, as they are referring to different cases. The Sage who said that one is flogged is referring to the transgression of cooking forbidden fat with milk, whereas the one who said one is not flogged is referring to the consumption of forbidden fat with milk. Everyone agrees that a prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition already exists, and therefore one is flogged only for cooking forbidden fat in milk, but not for eating the two together.
קלאוד על הדף:
A third resolution dissolves the dispute entirely. Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi are not contradicting each other but addressing different acts: “flogged” refers to cooking (a fresh prohibition), “not flogged” refers to eating (where the ḥelev prohibition already exists). On this reading both agree ein issur ḥal al issur, and the apparent machloket is only a difference of subject.
Key Terms:
- מָר אֲמַר חֲדָא, וּמָר אֲמַר חֲדָא = one Sage said one thing, the other said another (not a real dispute)
- וְלָא פְּלִיגִי (v’la pligi) = and they do not disagree
Segment 4
TYPE: קושיא
A Tosefta lists items exempt from lashes when cooked in milk: whey, blood, bones, etc.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מֵיתִיבִי: הַמְבַשֵּׁל בְּמֵי חָלָב – פָּטוּר, דָּם שֶׁבִּשְּׁלוֹ בְּחָלָב – פָּטוּר, הַעֲצָמוֹת וְהַגִּידִים וְהַקַּרְנַיִם וְהַטְּלָפַיִם שֶׁבִּשְּׁלָן בְּחָלָב – פָּטוּר.
English Translation:
The Gemara raises an objection from a Tosefta (8:3): One who cooks meat in whey, the liquid leftover after milk has been curdled, is exempt from lashes, as whey is not defined as milk for purposes of the prohibition. Likewise, for blood that one cooked in milk, he is exempt, as blood is not considered meat. Similarly, with regard to the bones, the tendons, the horns, and the hooves that one cooked in milk, he is exempt.
קלאוד על הדף:
A Tosefta enumerates cases exempt from lashes: cooking meat in whey (mei ḥalav — not true “milk”), cooking blood in milk (blood is not “meat”), and cooking bones, tendons, horns, or hooves in milk (none is “meat”). This list of exemptions sets up the next segment’s proof, since the Tosefta then turns to items that do incur liability.
Key Terms:
- מֵי חָלָב (mei ḥalav) = whey (liquid remaining after milk curdles)
- פָּטוּר (patur) = exempt (from lashes)
- עֲצָמוֹת / גִּידִים / קַרְנַיִם / טְלָפַיִם = bones / tendons / horns / hooves
Segment 5
TYPE: קושיא
But the Tosefta rules one IS liable for cooking piggul, notar, or impure meat in milk.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הַפִּגּוּל, וְהַנּוֹתָר, וְהַטָּמֵא, שֶׁבִּשְּׁלָן בְּחָלָב – חַיָּיב!
English Translation:
The Tosefta continues: By contrast, with regard to prohibited piggul meat, i.e., meat from an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to sprinkle its blood or partake of its meat beyond its designated time, and similarly prohibited notar, meat from an offering whose period for consumption has expired, and the prohibited impure meat of an offering, that one cooked in milk, he is liable to be flogged for violating the prohibition of meat cooked in milk. This indicates that the prohibition applies to items already prohibited for consumption, contrary to the above opinion attributed to Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Tosefta then rules that cooking piggul, notar, or impure sacrificial meat in milk does incur liability — even though each is already prohibited for consumption. This directly challenges the amoraic position that ein issur ḥal al issur, since here a meat-in-milk prohibition attaches to already-forbidden meat.
Key Terms:
- פִּגּוּל (piggul) = an offering invalidated by wrong intent (of time or place)
- נוֹתָר (notar) = sacrificial meat left past its permitted time
- טָמֵא (tamei) = ritually impure sacrificial meat
- חַיָּיב (ḥayav) = liable (to lashes)
Segment 6
TYPE: תירוץ
Resolution: this tanna holds issur chal al issur; the amoraim hold otherwise.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הַאי תַּנָּא סָבַר אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: This tanna of the baraita maintains in general that a prohibition takes effect where another prohibition already exists, whereas Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi are of the opposite opinion. It is conceivable that these Sages, who are amora’im, disagree with that tanna, as the issue of whether a prohibition takes effect where another prohibition already exists is a well-known dispute among the tanna’im themselves.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara resolves the objection by attributing the Tosefta to a tanna who holds issur ḥal al issur — a prohibition does take effect atop an existing one. Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi, as amora’im, may side with the opposing tannaitic view. Since this is a recognized dispute among the Tannaim themselves, there is no contradiction; each amora simply follows one side.
Key Terms:
- הַאי תַּנָּא סָבַר = this tanna holds/maintains
- אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר (issur ḥal al issur) = a prohibition takes effect where another already exists
Segment 7
TYPE: גמרא
The whey exemption supports Reish Lakish: whey is not “milk” for basar b’chalav.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הַמְבַשֵּׁל בְּמֵי חָלָב פָּטוּר, מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, דִּתְנַן: מֵי חָלָב הֲרֵי הֵן כְּחָלָב, וְהַמּוֹחַל הֲרֵי הוּא כְּשֶׁמֶן. אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא לְהַכְשִׁיר אֶת הַזְּרָעִים, אֲבָל לְעִנְיַן בִּישּׁוּל בָּשָׂר בְּחָלָב – מֵי חָלָב אֵינוֹ כְּחָלָב.
English Translation:
§ It was stated in the above baraita: One who cooks meat in whey is exempt from lashes. The Gemara comments: This ruling supports the opinion of Reish Lakish, as we learned in a mishna, with regard to liquids that render food susceptible to ritual impurity (Makhshirin 6:5): The halakhic status of whey is like that of milk, which is one of the liquids that render food susceptible to impurity, and the halakhic status of olive secretion is like that of oil, which also renders food susceptible to impurity. With regard to this mishna, Reish Lakish says: They taught this halakha only with regard to rendering seeds, i.e., produce, susceptible to impurity. But with regard to cooking meat in milk, the halakhic status of whey is not like that of milk.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Tosefta’s whey exemption supports Reish Lakish. A mishna in Makhshirin classifies whey (mei ḥalav) as “milk” and olive secretion (moḥal) as “oil” for the laws of rendering produce susceptible to impurity (hekhsher zera’im). Reish Lakish limits that equivalence: whey counts as milk only for susceptibility to impurity, not for basar b’chalav, where whey is not milk — exactly as the Tosefta’s exemption reflects.
Key Terms:
- מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ (mesaya lei) = it supports/corroborates
- הַכְשִׁיר אֶת הַזְּרָעִים = rendering produce susceptible to ritual impurity
- מוֹחַל (moḥal) = olive secretion/juice
- מֵי חָלָב אֵינוֹ כְּחָלָב = whey is not [considered] milk (for meat-in-milk)
Segment 8
TYPE: ברייתא
A baraita asks how we know the prohibition extends beyond a goat’s own mother’s milk.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ״ – אֵין לִי אֶלָּא בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ, בַּחֲלֵב פָּרָה וְרָחֵל מִנַּיִן?
English Translation:
§ The Sages taught in a baraita: From the phrase “in its mother’s milk” I have derived only that the prohibition applies to the mother goat’s milk. From where do I derive that it also applies to the milk of a cow and a ewe?
קלאוד על הדף:
A baraita begins the derivation of the prohibition’s scope. The verse “in its mother’s milk” literally speaks only of a goat cooked in its own mother’s milk. The baraita asks how we know the prohibition also covers cooking a kid in the milk of a cow (para) or ewe (raḥel) — other kosher species. The answer will proceed by kal vaḥomer.
Key Terms:
- תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן (tanu rabanan) = “the Sages taught” (introducing a baraita)
- אֵין לִי אֶלָּא = “I have derived only” (a limited starting point)
- פָּרָה וְרָחֵל (para v’raḥel) = a cow and a ewe
Segment 9
TYPE: ברייתא
A kal vachomer from the mother, capped by an extra verse to include cow and ewe.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַרְתָּ, קַל וָחוֹמֶר: וּמָה אִמּוֹ, שֶׁלֹּא נֶאֶסְרָה עִמּוֹ בְּהַרְבָּעָה – נֶאֶסְרָה עִמּוֹ בְּבִשּׁוּלוֹ, פָּרָה וְרָחֵל, שֶׁנֶּאֶסְרוּ עִמּוֹ בְּהַרְבָּעָה – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁנֶּאֶסְרוּ עִמּוֹ בְּבִשּׁוּלוֹ! תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ״.
English Translation:
You can say an a fortiori inference: Just as a kid’s mother, which is not prohibited for mating with the kid, as they are of the same species, is nevertheless prohibited for cooking with it, as stated in the verse, is it not right that a cow or a ewe, which are prohibited for mating with it, as they are of different species, should be prohibited for cooking with it? Therefore, the verse states elsewhere: “In its mother’s milk,” a second time, to include a cow and a ewe.
קלאוד על הדף:
The baraita builds a kal vaḥomer: the kid’s mother, permitted to mate with it (same species), is nonetheless forbidden to cook with it; all the more so a cow or ewe, which are forbidden to mate with the kid (different species, kilayim), should be forbidden to cook with it. Yet the baraita concludes that a second verse (“in its mother’s milk”) is still needed to include cow and ewe — setting up the Gemara’s question of why the kal vaḥomer alone does not suffice.
Key Terms:
- קַל וָחוֹמֶר (kal vaḥomer) = an a fortiori inference (from lenient to stringent)
- הַרְבָּעָה (harba’a) = mating/crossbreeding
- תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר = “the verse teaches” (a scriptural source overriding the inference)
Segment 10
TYPE: קושיא
If the kal vachomer works, why is a verse needed at all?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהָא לְמָה לִי קְרָא? הָא אָתְיָא לֵיהּ!
English Translation:
The Gemara challenges the conclusion of the baraita. But why do I need a verse? It was just derived through the a fortiori inference.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara presses: if the kal vaḥomer already establishes that cow and ewe milk are included, the extra verse seems superfluous. This objection is standard when Scripture supplies a source for something an inference already yields, and it forces a clarification of what defect in the inference the verse repairs.
Key Terms:
- לְמָה לִי קְרָא = why do I need a verse?
- הָא אָתְיָא לֵיהּ = it has already been derived (by the inference)
Segment 11
TYPE: תירוץ
Rav Ashi: the inference is refutable, so the verse is needed after all.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר מֵעִיקָּרָא דְּדִינָא פִּירְכָא, מֵהֵיכָא קָא מַיְיתֵית לַהּ? מֵאִמּוֹ, מָה לְאִמּוֹ שֶׁכֵּן נֶאֶסְרָה עִמּוֹ בִּשְׁחִיטָה, תֹּאמַר בְּפָרָה שֶׁלֹּא נֶאֶסְרָה עִמּוֹ בִּשְׁחִיטָה? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ״.
English Translation:
Rav Ashi said: It is needed because one can say that the refutation of the a fortiori inference is present from the outset, i.e., there is a difficulty with the comparison: From where do you derive the inference? It is derived from its mother goat, which the baraita presents as being treated more leniently than a cow or ewe since it may be mated with a kid. But there is a stringent aspect of the mother goat not shared by a cow or ewe: What is unique about its mother? It is unique in that it is prohibited for slaughter with it, since one may not slaughter an animal and its mother on the same day (see Leviticus 22:28). Will you say the same about a cow, which is not prohibited for slaughter with it? Therefore, the verse states: “In its mother’s milk,” to include a cow and a ewe.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Ashi explains why the verse is still required: the kal vaḥomer can be refuted from the start (pirka me’ikara). The mother has a stringency the cow and ewe lack — she is forbidden to be slaughtered together with her offspring on the same day (oto v’et beno, Leviticus 22:28). Perhaps the mother’s milk-prohibition rests on that unique stringency, which would not transfer to a cow or ewe. The extra verse is therefore needed to include them independently of the flawed inference.
Key Terms:
- פִּירְכָא (pirka) = a refutation/objection to an inference
- מֵעִיקָּרָא דְּדִינָא = from the outset of the argument
- נֶאֶסְרָה עִמּוֹ בִּשְׁחִיטָה = forbidden to be slaughtered with it (on the same day)
Segment 12
TYPE: ברייתא
Another baraita: how do we know the milk of an older sister is included?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תַּנְיָא אִידַּךְ: ״בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ״ – אֵין לִי אֶלָּא בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ, בַּחֲלֵב אֲחוֹתוֹ גְּדוֹלָה מִנַּיִן?
English Translation:
§ The above baraita accounts for two of the Torah’s three mentions of the phrase “in its mother’s milk.” The Gemara now addresses the third. It is taught in another baraita: From one instance of the phrase “in its mother’s milk” I have derived only that the prohibition applies to the milk of its mother, if the mother is less than a year old and has not yet entered the pen for the purpose of its owner’s separating the annual animal tithe. From where do I derive that it also applies to the milk of its older sister, i.e., one that is more than a year old that has already entered the pen for the animal tithe in the previous year?
קלאוד על הדף:
A second baraita accounts for the third mention of the phrase, asking about the milk of the kid’s older sister (aḥoto gedola) — one over a year old that has already passed through the tithing pen. The verse literally covers only the mother; a further derivation is needed to extend the prohibition to a sister’s milk. Again the method is kal vaḥomer.
Key Terms:
- תַּנְיָא אִידַּךְ (tanya idakh) = “it is taught in another (baraita)”
- אֲחוֹתוֹ גְּדוֹלָה (aḥoto gedola) = its older sister
- דִּיר לְהִתְעַשֵּׂר = the pen for [animal] tithing (ma’aser behema)
Segment 13
TYPE: ברייתא
A kal vachomer from the mother to the older sister, again capped by a verse.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַרְתָּ קַל וָחוֹמֶר, וּמָה אִמּוֹ שֶׁנִּכְנְסָה עִמּוֹ לְדִיר לְהִתְעַשֵּׂר – נֶאֶסְרָה עִמּוֹ בְּבִשּׁוּל, אֲחוֹתוֹ שֶׁלֹּא נִכְנְסָה עִמּוֹ לְדִיר לְהִתְעַשֵּׂר – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁנֶּאֶסְרָה עִמּוֹ בְּבִשּׁוּל! תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ״.
English Translation:
You can say an a fortiori inference: Just as a kid’s mother, which enters the pen to be tithed with it, is nevertheless prohibited for cooking with it, is it not right that its sister, which does not enter the pen to be tithed with it, should be prohibited for cooking with it? Therefore, the verse states elsewhere: “In its mother’s milk,” a third time, to include the older sister in the prohibition.
קלאוד על הדף:
The kal vaḥomer here: the mother enters the tithing pen together with the kid (a link that might have exempted her), yet she is forbidden for cooking with it; all the more so the older sister, which does not enter the pen with it, should be forbidden. Once more the baraita concludes that a third verse is needed to actually include the sister — prompting the same objection as before.
Key Terms:
- נִכְנְסָה עִמּוֹ לְדִיר = enters the pen with it (for tithing)
- לְהִתְעַשֵּׂר (l’hit’aser) = to be tithed
- אֵינוֹ דִּין (eino din) = “is it not right/logical” (the kal vaḥomer conclusion)
Segment 14
TYPE: תירוץ
Rav Ashi again: the slaughter-stringency refutes the inference, so a verse is needed.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהָא לְמָה לִי קְרָא, הָא אָתְיָא לַיהּ? אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר מֵעִיקָּרָא דְּדִינָא פִּירְכָא, מֵהֵיכָא קָא מַיְיתֵית לַהּ? מֵאִמּוֹ, מָה לְאִמּוֹ, שֶׁכֵּן נֶאֶסְרָה עִמּוֹ בִּשְׁחִיטָה, תֹּאמַר בַּאֲחוֹתוֹ גְּדוֹלָה, שֶׁלֹּא נֶאֶסְרָה עִמּוֹ בִּשְׁחִיטָה? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ״.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: But why do I need a verse? It was just derived from the a fortiori inference. Rav Ashi said: It is needed because one can say that the refutation of that a fortiori inference is present from the outset. From where do you derive the inference? It is derived from its mother. But one may respond: What is unique about its mother? It is unique in that it is prohibited for slaughter with it on the same day. Will you say the same halakhot apply to its older sister, which is not prohibited for slaughter with it? Therefore, the verse states: “In its mother’s milk,” including the older sister.
קלאוד על הדף:
Parallel to Segment 11, Rav Ashi answers that the sister-inference too is refutable from the outset. The mother uniquely carries the oto v’et beno slaughter-stringency, which the older sister lacks. Perhaps that stringency underlies the mother’s milk-prohibition, so it cannot be transferred by inference to the sister. Hence the third verse is needed to include the older sister explicitly.
Key Terms:
- מָה לְאִמּוֹ (mah l’imo) = “what is [unique] about the mother?” (the refuting distinction)
- נֶאֶסְרָה עִמּוֹ בִּשְׁחִיטָה = forbidden to be slaughtered with it (the mother’s unique stringency)
Segment 15
TYPE: גמרא
The younger sister is derived from the combination of mother and older sister.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אַשְׁכְּחַן אֲחוֹתוֹ גְּדוֹלָה, אֲחוֹתוֹ קְטַנָּה מִנַּיִן? אָתְיָא מִבֵּינַיָּא.
English Translation:
The Gemara continues: We have found a source for the halakha that its older sister is included in the prohibition of meat cooked in milk. From where is it derived that the same applies to its younger sister, one that has not yet entered the pen for the tithe? The Gemara responds: It is derived from between them, i.e., from the combination of the mother and the older sister.
קלאוד על הדף:
Having sourced the older sister, the Gemara asks about the younger sister (aḥoto ketana), which has not yet entered the tithing pen. It answers “atya mibeinaya” — derived from between them, i.e., by combining the mother and the older sister via a binyan av. The next segment spells out how this combined derivation works and why neither source alone suffices.
Key Terms:
- אַשְׁכְּחַן (ashkeḥan) = “we have found” (a source has been established)
- אֲחוֹתוֹ קְטַנָּה (aḥoto ketana) = its younger sister
- אָתְיָא מִבֵּינַיָּא (atya mibeinaya) = derived from between them (from the two combined)
Segment 16
TYPE: גמרא
Each source alone is refutable, but their common element supplies the derivation.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מֵהֵי תֵּיתֵי? תֵּיתֵי מֵאִמּוֹ – מָה לְאִמּוֹ שֶׁכֵּן נֶאֶסְרָה עִמּוֹ בִּשְׁחִיטָה? אֲחוֹתוֹ גְּדוֹלָה תּוֹכִיחַ. מָה לַאֲחוֹתוֹ גְּדוֹלָה שֶׁלֹּא נִכְנְסָה עִמּוֹ לְדִיר לְהִתְעַשֵּׂר? אִמּוֹ תּוֹכִיחַ.
English Translation:
The Gemara elaborates on the need for both cases in order to derive the third: From which of the two cases should it be derived? If it should be derived from its mother, one can claim: What is unique about its mother? It is unique in that it is prohibited for slaughter with it on the same day, unlike the younger sister. One may respond: Its older sister can prove the point, since it is not prohibited for slaughter with the kid, but it is still included in the prohibition of meat cooked in milk. But this can be refuted as well: What is unique about its older sister? It is unique in that it does not enter the pen to be tithed with it, unlike the younger sister. One may respond that its mother can then prove the point, as it can enter the pen to be tithed with the kid and is still included in the prohibition.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara constructs the binyan av. Deriving the younger sister from the mother alone fails (the mother uniquely carries the slaughter-stringency); but the older sister proves the point, since she lacks that stringency yet is included. Deriving from the older sister alone fails (she uniquely lacks the tithing-pen link); but the mother proves the point, since she has that link yet is included. Each source covers the other’s weakness.
Key Terms:
- מֵהֵי תֵּיתֵי = “from which [source] should it be derived?”
- תּוֹכִיחַ (tokhiaḥ) = “let it prove” (one case answers the objection to the other)
- בִּנְיַן אָב (binyan av) = a paradigm-derivation built from a common feature
Segment 17
TYPE: גמרא
The common denominator: both are meat and forbidden to cook in milk — so is the younger sister.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְחָזַר הַדִּין, לֹא רְאִי זֶה כִּרְאִי זֶה, וְלֹא רְאִי זֶה כִּרְאִי זֶה, הַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן: שֶׁהוּא בָּשָׂר, וְאָסוּר לְבַשֵּׁל בְּחָלָב, אַף אֲנִי אָבִיא אֲחוֹתוֹ קְטַנָּה, שֶׁהוּא בָּשָׂר, וְאָסוּר לְבַשֵּׁל בְּחָלָב.
English Translation:
And consequently, the inference has reverted to its starting point: The aspect of this case is not like the aspect of that case and the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case; their common element is that both the mother and older sister are meat and it is prohibited to cook them in milk. If so, I will also include its younger sister in the prohibition, since it is also meat, and therefore it is prohibited to cook it in milk.
קלאוד על הדף:
The classic binyan av formula: neither case is exactly like the other, but their common element (ha’tzad ha’shaveh) is that each is meat forbidden to cook in milk. Since the younger sister shares that common feature — she too is meat — she is included in the prohibition. The distinguishing stringencies drop out, and the shared essence governs.
Key Terms:
- וְחָזַר הַדִּין (v’ḥazar hadin) = the argument reverts (to its common ground)
- הַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה (ha’tzad ha’shaveh) = the common element/denominator
- אַף אֲנִי אָבִיא = “so I too will include”
Segment 18
TYPE: קושיא
If so, the older sister too could be derived from a binyan av — so why the third verse?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִי הָכִי, אֲחוֹתוֹ גְּדוֹלָה נָמֵי תֵּיתֵי מִבֵּינַיָּא.
English Translation:
The Gemara challenges: If so, the inclusion of its older sister in the prohibition can also be derived from between them, i.e., from the combination of the kid’s mother and a cow. Although both a cow and the mother possess unique stringencies not shared by the older sister, i.e., the prohibition of mating and of slaughtering with the kid, respectively, neither possesses both stringencies, and the halakha with regard to the older sister can be derived from their common element, i.e., that they are both meat and prohibited to cook in milk, as stated above. If so, what need is there to derive this halakha from the verse?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara turns the binyan av back on the earlier step: if the younger sister can be derived from a common element, then the older sister too could be derived from the combination of the mother and a cow — neither of which possesses both distinguishing stringencies — via their shared feature of being meat. If so, the third verse used to include the older sister (Segment 14) seems unnecessary, reopening the question of why Scripture bothered.
Key Terms:
- אִי הָכִי (i hakhi) = “if so” (pressing a consequence of the prior conclusion)
- תֵּיתֵי מִבֵּינַיָּא = it could be derived from between them (the two combined)
Segment 19
TYPE: תירוץ
Yes — the older sister is derived from a binyan av; the freed verse teaches the mother’s own milk.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִין הָכִי נָמֵי, אֶלָּא ״בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ״ לְמָה לִי? מִבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא: ״בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ״ – אֵין לִי אֶלָּא בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ,
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: Yes, it is indeed so; the halakha with regard to the older sister is derived from the common denominator of the mother and a cow. Rather, why do I need the verse’s additional mention of the phrase “in its mother’s milk?” It is necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: When the verse states: “In its mother’s milk,” I have derived only the prohibition to cook the kid in its mother’s milk;
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara concedes: yes, the older sister can indeed be derived by a binyan av from the mother and a cow. So the “freed” third verse is redirected to a new teaching, introduced by a baraita: it will establish that even the mother’s own meat may not be cooked in her own milk (not only the kid’s meat in her milk). The full derivation continues on 114b.
Key Terms:
- אִין הָכִי נָמֵי (in hakhi nami) = “yes, indeed so” (conceding the point)
- מִבְּעֵי לֵיהּ (mib’ei lei) = it is needed/required (for a different teaching)
- לְכִדְתַנְיָא (l’khid’tanya) = “for that which is taught” (in a baraita)
Amud Bet (114b)
Segment 1
TYPE: ברייתא
The mother’s own meat in her own milk — derived by kal vachomer, then capped by a verse.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הִיא עַצְמָהּ בַּחֲלָבָהּ מִנַּיִן? אָמַרְתָּ קַל וְחוֹמֶר: וּמָה בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁלֹּא נֶאֱסַר פְּרִי עִם פְּרִי בִּשְׁחִיטָה, נֶאֱסָר פְּרִי עִם הָאֵם בִּשְׁחִיטָה, מְקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱסַר פְּרִי עִם פְּרִי בְּבִשּׁוּל – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁנֶּאֱסַר פְּרִי עִם הָאֵם בְּבִשּׁוּל? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ״.
English Translation:
from where is it derived that the meat of a mother animal may not itself be cooked in its own milk? Say an a fortiori inference: Just as with regard to an issue where the fruit is not prohibited with the fruit, i.e., slaughter, as it is permitted to slaughter two offspring of one mother on one day, the fruit is nevertheless prohibited for slaughter with the mother, is it not right that with regard to an issue where the fruit is prohibited with the fruit, i.e., cooking, as it is prohibited to cook a mother’s offspring with its milk, the fruit, i.e., the milk, should be prohibited for cooking with the mother? Therefore, the verse states: “In its mother’s milk,” to prohibit the cooking of the meat of the mother in its own milk.
קלאוד על הדף:
The baraita now derives that the mother’s own meat may not be cooked in her own milk. The kal vaḥomer: regarding slaughter, two offspring (peri im peri) may be slaughtered on one day, yet an offspring may not be slaughtered with the mother on one day — so where “fruit with fruit” is permitted, “fruit with mother” is still forbidden. Regarding cooking, “fruit with fruit” (the kid in milk) is forbidden; all the more so “fruit with the mother” (her meat in her milk) should be forbidden. Even so, the verse is invoked to establish it.
Key Terms:
- הִיא עַצְמָהּ בַּחֲלָבָהּ = the [mother] herself in her own milk
- פְּרִי עִם פְּרִי / פְּרִי עִם הָאֵם = fruit (offspring/milk) with fruit / with the mother
- בִּשְׁחִיטָה / בְּבִשּׁוּל = regarding slaughter / regarding cooking
Segment 2
TYPE: קושיא
Why a verse if the kal vachomer works? Rav Achadvoi: the horse-and-mule case refutes it.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָא לְמָה לִי קְרָא, הָא אָתְיָא לַהּ? אָמַר רַב אַחָדְבוּי בַּר אַמֵּי: מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר, סוּס בֶּן סוּסְיָא אֲחִי פִּרְדָּה יוֹכִיחַ, שֶׁאָסוּר פְּרִי עִם פְּרִי, וּמוּתָּר פְּרִי עִם הָאֵם.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: Why do I need a verse? It was just derived a fortiori. Rav Aḥadvoi bar Ami said: The verse is necessary because one can say that the case of a horse born of both a stallion and mare but which is the brother of a mule, i.e., its mother also bore a mule after being impregnated by a donkey, proves this a fortiori inference invalid. As here the fruit is prohibited with the fruit, but the fruit is permitted with the mother. One may not mate a horse with a mule, but one may mate a horse with its mother.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Aḥadvoi challenges the kal vaḥomer with a counterexample from mating law. Consider a horse (born of horse parents) whose mare-mother later bore a mule (by a donkey): the horse may not be mated with its mule “sibling” (peri im peri forbidden), yet the horse may be mated with its mother (peri im ha’em permitted). This inverts the assumed pattern, so the kal vaḥomer is not airtight — hence a verse is genuinely needed.
Key Terms:
- סוּס בֶּן סוּסְיָא (sus ben susya) = a horse, offspring of a mare
- אֲחִי פִּרְדָּה (aḥi pirda) = brother of a mule
- יוֹכִיחַ (yokhiaḥ) = “let it prove/refute” (a counterexample)
Segment 3
TYPE: דחייה
Rejection: there the father’s seed causes the prohibition, not the mother-offspring link.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָתָם, זֶרַע הָאָב הוּא דְּקָא גָרֵים.
English Translation:
The Gemara rejects this: There it is the seed of the father that effects the prohibition of mating the mule with the daughter horse. The two may not be paired for reasons unrelated to their status as offspring of one mother. This ruling therefore proves nothing about the hypothesis that if two fruit cannot be paired, one can learn by a fortiori inference that the fruit cannot be paired with the mother.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara deflects the counterexample. In the horse-mule case, the ban on pairing the horse with the mule stems from the father’s seed (the donkey producing a different, non-matchable species), not from the maternal relationship. Since the prohibition there is unrelated to the mother-offspring dynamic, it says nothing about the kal vaḥomer, which concerns pairings determined by the mother.
Key Terms:
- הָתָם (hatam) = there (in that case)
- זֶרַע הָאָב (zera ha’av) = the seed/lineage of the father
- דְּקָא גָרֵים (d’ka garim) = which causes/effects (the prohibition)
Segment 4
TYPE: גמרא
Proof of the deflection: the mule-and-mare case shows paternity governs mating law.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
דְּהָא פֶּרֶד בֶּן סוּסְיָא אֲחִי פִּרְדָּה יוֹכִיחַ, שֶׁמּוּתָּר פְּרִי עִם פְּרִי, וְאָסוּר פְּרִי עִם הָאֵם.
English Translation:
And this explanation must be true, as the case of a mule born of a donkey and a mare and which is the brother of a female mule proves. As here one fruit is permitted with the other fruit, i.e., one may mate the male and female mules since they are of the same species, and yet the fruit is prohibited to be mated with the mother, i.e., the mare. This case illustrates that the prohibition of crossbreeding is contingent on paternity, and does not rest solely on the relation between the mother and the fruit.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara supports its deflection with a further case: a mule (born of a mare and a donkey) whose sibling is a female mule. The two mules may be mated (same species — peri im peri permitted), yet the mule may not be mated with its mother the mare (different species — peri im ha’em forbidden). This confirms that mating prohibitions track paternity/species, not the maternal bond, so the horse-mule counterexample cannot undermine the kal vaḥomer.
Key Terms:
- פֶּרֶד בֶּן סוּסְיָא (pered ben susya) = a mule, offspring of a mare
- מוּתָּר פְּרִי עִם פְּרִי = fruit-with-fruit is permitted (the two mules, same species)
- אָסוּר פְּרִי עִם הָאֵם = fruit-with-mother is forbidden (mule with the mare)
Segment 5
TYPE: קושיא
Mar b’rei d’Ravina: the slave-and-freedwoman case refutes the inference.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא אָמַר מָר בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבִינָא: מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר, עֶבֶד בֶּן שִׁפְחָה אֲחִי מְשׁוּחְרֶרֶת יוֹכִיחַ, שֶׁאָסוּר פְּרִי עִם פְּרִי, וּמוּתָּר פְּרִי עִם הָאֵם!
English Translation:
Rather, Mar, son of Ravina, said: The a fortiori inference is invalid because one can say that the case of a male Canaanite slave born of a female slave and who is the brother of a female freed slave proves it invalid. As here the fruit is prohibited with the fruit, i.e., the slave may not engage in sexual intercourse with his freed sister, and yet the fruit is permitted with his slave mother.
קלאוד על הדף:
Mar son of Ravina offers a different counterexample, from the law of a Canaanite slave. A male slave born of a slave-woman has a “sister” who was freed (a full Jewess): he may not have relations with the freed sister (peri im peri forbidden), yet he may (in slave-law terms) be paired with his still-enslaved mother (peri im ha’em permitted). Again the assumed pattern is inverted, seemingly refuting the kal vaḥomer.
Key Terms:
- עֶבֶד בֶּן שִׁפְחָה (eved ben shifḥa) = a slave, son of a female slave
- אֲחִי מְשׁוּחְרֶרֶת (aḥi meshuḥreret) = brother of a freed slave-woman
- מָר בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבִינָא = Mar, son of Ravina
Segment 6
TYPE: דחייה
Rejection: there the manumission causes the prohibition, not the maternal link.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָתָם גֵּט שִׁיחְרוּר הוּא דְּקָא גָרֵים, דְּהָא עֶבֶד בֶּן מְשׁוּחְרֶרֶת אֲחִי שִׁפְחָה יוֹכִיחַ, שֶׁמּוּתָּר פְּרִי עִם פְּרִי, וְאָסוּר פְּרִי עִם הָאֵם.
English Translation:
The Gemara rejects this as well: There it is the bill of manumission that effects the prohibition. The slave is prohibited to his sister only because she has been freed, not because they are both fruit of one mother, as the case of a male slave, son of a female freed slave, and the brother of a female slave proves. As here the fruit is permitted with the fruit, i.e., he is permitted to his sister, since they are both slaves, and yet the fruit is prohibited with his released mother, as she is now considered a full-fledged Jew. Clearly the prohibition is entirely contingent on the emancipation of one of the slaves, irrespective of their relationship.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara deflects this too. The slave’s prohibition to his freed sister stems from the bill of manumission (get shiḥrur) that made her a Jewess, not from their shared mother. This is proven by the mirror case: a slave born of a freed mother whose sibling remains a slave may be paired with that enslaved sister (peri im peri permitted), yet may not be paired with his now-freed mother (peri im ha’em forbidden). The variable is emancipation, not maternity — so the counterexample fails.
Key Terms:
- גֵּט שִׁיחְרוּר (get shiḥrur) = a bill of manumission (freeing a slave)
- מְשׁוּחְרֶרֶת (meshuḥreret) = a freed slave-woman (now a full Jewess)
- דְּקָא גָרֵים = which effects/causes (the prohibition)
Segment 7
TYPE: קושיא
Rav Idi bar Avin: diverse seeds refute it — until shown they too require the “mother,” the ground.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב אִידִי בַּר אָבִין: מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר, כִּלְאֵי זְרָעִים יוֹכִיחוּ, שֶׁאָסוּר פְּרִי עִם פְּרִי, וּמוּתָּר פְּרִי עִם הָאֵם. כְּלוּם נֶאֱסָר פְּרִי עִם פְּרִי אֶלָּא עַל יְדֵי הָאֵם? דְּהָא חִיטֵּי וּשְׂעָרֵי בְּכַדָּא וְלָא מִיתַּסְרוּ.
English Translation:
Rather, Rav Idi bar Avin said: The a fortiori inference is invalid because one can say that the case of diverse kinds of seeds proves it invalid. As it is prohibited to sow fruit of one species with fruit of another species, and yet it is permitted to sow all types of fruit with the mother, i.e., the ground, from which all fruit grows. The Gemara rejects this as well: Isn’t fruit of one species with fruit of another species prohibited only by means of the mother, i.e., the ground? The prohibition of sowing diverse seeds applies only when they are both sown in the ground, as wheat and barley can be placed in a single jug and they are not prohibited.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Idi bar Avin proposes kilayim (diverse seeds) as a counterexample: sowing two species together is forbidden (peri im peri forbidden), yet any seed may be sown in the ground — the “mother” from which all grows (peri im ha’em permitted). The Gemara rejects this: the diverse-seed prohibition only takes effect through the ground (the “mother”) — wheat and barley placed together in a jug are not forbidden. So here too the “mother” is the operative factor, and the case does not refute the kal vaḥomer.
Key Terms:
- כִּלְאֵי זְרָעִים (kilei zera’im) = forbidden mixtures of seeds
- הָאֵם (ha’em) = “the mother” — here, the ground/soil
- חִיטֵּי וּשְׂעָרֵי (ḥitei u’sa’arei) = wheat and barley
Segment 8
TYPE: תירוץ
Rav Ashi: the verse is needed because meat-with-milk of one body is unlike two separate bodies.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר, מָה לִפְרִי עִם פְּרִי, שֶׁכֵּן שְׁנֵי גּוּפִים, תֹּאמַר בִּפְרִי עִם הָאֵם, שֶׁכֵּן גּוּף אֶחָד, מִשּׁוּם הָכִי אִיצְטְרִיךְ קְרָא.
English Translation:
Rather, Rav Ashi said: The a fortiori inference is invalid because one can say: What is unique about fruit with fruit, e.g., the kid and its mother’s milk, which are prohibited for cooking together? They are unique in that they are two separate bodies that were never unified. Must you say the same prohibition of pairing applies to the fruit with the mother, i.e., the mother’s meat and its milk, which were once one body? Due to this reason, the extra verse stating: “In its mother’s milk,” was necessary to include the meat and milk of the same animal in the prohibition.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Ashi supplies the decisive reason the verse is needed. “Fruit with fruit” (a kid’s meat and another animal’s milk) involves two distinct bodies (shnei gufim), which are readily prohibited together. But “fruit with the mother” — the mother’s own meat cooked in her own milk — involves what was once a single body (guf eḥad), and one might have thought a substance is not forbidden with itself. The extra verse is therefore genuinely required to forbid the mother’s meat in her own milk.
Key Terms:
- שְׁנֵי גּוּפִים (shnei gufim) = two separate bodies
- גּוּף אֶחָד (guf eḥad) = one [single] body
- אִיצְטְרִיךְ קְרָא (itztrikh kra) = the verse is [genuinely] needed
Segment 9
TYPE: גמרא
Rav Ashi: eating meat-in-milk is forbidden from “you shall not eat any abomination.”
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: מִנַּיִן לְבָשָׂר בְּחָלָב שֶׁאָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״לֹא תֹאכַל כׇּל תּוֹעֵבָה״ – כֹּל שֶׁתִּעַבְתִּי לָךְ הֲרֵי הוּא בְּבַל תֹּאכַל.
English Translation:
§ Rav Ashi says: From where is it derived that meat cooked in milk is prohibited for consumption, even though the verse explicitly prohibits only cooking? It is derived from a verse, as it is stated elsewhere: “You shall not eat any abominable thing” (Deuteronomy 14:3). This verse teaches that with regard to any practice that I have made abominable, i.e., forbidden, to you, the product is prohibited for consumption.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Ashi supplies the source for the eating prohibition. The “kid in its mother’s milk” verse forbids only cooking; yet “lo tokhal kol to’eva” (“you shall not eat any abomination,” Deuteronomy 14:3) teaches that whatever the Torah has rendered abominable (to’eva) is included in “you shall not eat.” Since meat-in-milk is an abomination, eating it is forbidden — deriving the eating prohibition from a general verse rather than the cooking verse itself.
Key Terms:
- לֹא תֹאכַל כׇּל תּוֹעֵבָה = “you shall not eat any abomination” (Deuteronomy 14:3)
- תּוֹעֵבָה (to’eva) = an abomination (a category the verse forbids eating)
- בְּבַל תֹּאכַל = under the [prohibition] “you shall not eat”
Segment 10
TYPE: גמרא
Rabbi Abbahu/Rabbi Elazar: “shall not eat” implies benefit too, unless the verse specifies.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאֵין לִי אֶלָּא בַּאֲכִילָה, בַּהֲנָאָה מִנַּיִן? כִּדְרַבִּי אֲבָהוּ, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״לֹא יֹאכַל״, ״לֹא תֹאכַל״, ״לֹא תֹּאכְלוּ״ – אֶחָד אִיסּוּר אֲכִילָה וְאֶחָד אִיסּוּר הֲנָאָה בַּמַּשְׁמָע, עַד שֶׁיִּפְרוֹט לְךָ הַכָּתוּב, כְּדֶרֶךְ שֶׁפָּרַט לְךָ בִּנְבֵלָה לַגֵּר בִּנְתִינָה וְלַגּוֹי בִּמְכִירָה.
English Translation:
And I have derived only that meat cooked in milk is prohibited with regard to consumption; from where do I derive that it is also prohibited with regard to benefit? It is derived in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Abbahu, as Rabbi Abbahu says that Rabbi Elazar says: Wherever it is stated, “He shall not eat,” or “you,” in the singular, “shall not eat,” or “you,” in the plural, “shall not eat,” both a prohibition against eating and a prohibition against deriving benefit are indicated. This is so unless the verse specifies for you that one may derive benefit, in the manner that it specified for you with regard to an animal carcass, from which the verse explicitly permits one to derive benefit, as it states: “You may sell it to a foreigner” (Deuteronomy 14:21). Accordingly, one may provide such meat to a gentile resident alien in Eretz Yisrael by giving it to him as a gift, and to any other gentile by sale.
קלאוד על הדף:
The benefit prohibition (issur hana’a) is derived from Rabbi Abbahu (citing Rabbi Elazar): any “lo tokhal” formulation implies both a ban on eating and a ban on deriving benefit, unless Scripture explicitly permits benefit — as it does for a carcass (nevelah), which may be given to a ger toshav or sold to a gentile. Since no such permission accompanies meat-in-milk, its benefit prohibition stands. The next segments unpack the carcass exception.
Key Terms:
- הֲנָאָה (hana’a) = benefit/enjoyment (a separate prohibition from eating)
- בַּמַּשְׁמָע (bamashma) = is implied/included in the meaning
- עַד שֶׁיִּפְרוֹט לְךָ הַכָּתוּב = until the verse specifies otherwise for you
- גֵּר / גּוֹי (ger / goy) = a resident alien / a gentile
Segment 11
TYPE: ברייתא
The carcass verse permits giving to a ger and selling to a gentile; Rabbi Meir expands both.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
דְּתַנְיָא: ״לֹא תֹאכְלוּ כׇּל נְבֵלָה לַגֵּר אֲשֶׁר בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ תִּתְּנֶנָּה וַאֲכָלָהּ אוֹ מָכוֹר לְנׇכְרִי״ – אֵין לִי אֶלָּא לְגֵר בִּנְתִינָה, וּלְגוֹי בִּמְכִירָה; לְגֵר בִּמְכִירָה מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לַגֵּר תִּתְּנֶנָּה אוֹ מָכוֹר״.
English Translation:
As it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “You shall not eat of any unslaughtered animal carcass; you may give it to the resident alien who is within your gates, that he may eat it; or you may sell it to a foreigner; for you are a sacred people to the Lord your God.” From this verse I have derived only that it is permitted to provide such meat to a resident alien through giving and to a gentile through selling. From where is it derived that it is permitted to transfer an unslaughtered animal to a resident alien through selling as well? The verse states: “You may give it to the stranger…or you may sell it,” indicating that one has the option to do either of these.
קלאוד על הדף:
A baraita expounds the carcass verse (Deuteronomy 14:21). Read simply, it permits giving nevelah to a ger toshav and selling it to a gentile. The baraita asks how we know one may also sell to a ger; the answer is that the verse’s phrasing “give it… or sell it” indicates the two options are interchangeable, so selling to a ger is likewise permitted. The exposition continues in the next segment.
Key Terms:
- נְבֵלָה (nevelah) = an unslaughtered carcass
- גֵּר (ger) = a resident alien (ger toshav)
- בִּנְתִינָה / בִּמְכִירָה = by giving / by selling
Segment 12
TYPE: ברייתא
Rabbi Meir: both giving and selling to both; Rabbi Yehuda: read the verse literally.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לְגוֹי בִּנְתִינָה מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״תִּתְּנֶנָּה… אוֹ מָכוֹר לְנׇכְרִי״. נִמְצָא אֶחָד גֵּר וְאֶחָד גּוֹי, בֵּין בִּמְכִירָה בֵּין בִּנְתִינָה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: דְּבָרִים כִּכְתָבָן, לְגֵר בִּנְתִינָה וְלַגּוֹי בִּמְכִירָה.
English Translation:
The baraita continues: From where is it derived that it is permitted to a gentile through giving as well? The verse states: “You may give it…or you may sell it to a foreigner.” Consequently, one finds that he may transfer an animal carcass to both a resident alien and a gentile, both through selling or through giving. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: These matters are to be understood as they are written; one may transfer an unslaughtered animal carcass to a resident alien only through giving, and to a gentile only through selling.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Meir completes the symmetric reading: the verse’s flexible phrasing permits both giving and selling to both a ger and a gentile. Rabbi Yehuda disagrees, holding devarim kikhtavan — the words are to be taken literally: giving to a ger and selling to a gentile only, without interchange. This tannaitic dispute over how loosely to read “give… or sell” is analyzed next.
Key Terms:
- נִמְצָא (nimtza) = “it emerges/one finds” (the conclusion)
- דְּבָרִים כִּכְתָבָן (devarim kikhtavan) = the words as [literally] written
- רַבִּי מֵאִיר / רַבִּי יְהוּדָה = Rabbi Meir / Rabbi Yehuda
Segment 13
TYPE: גמרא
Rabbi Yehuda’s reasoning: the word “or” would be superfluous on Rabbi Meir’s reading.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה? אִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ כִּדְקָאָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר, לִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא ״לֹא תֹאכְלוּ כׇל נְבֵלָה לַגֵּר אֲשֶׁר בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ תִּתְּנֶנָּה וַאֲכָלָהּ וּמָכוֹר״ – ״אוֹ״ לְמָה לִי? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ לִדְבָרִים כִּכְתָבָן הוּא דַּאֲתָא: לְגֵר בִּנְתִינָה, וְלַגּוֹי בִּמְכִירָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? The Gemara responds: Rabbi Yehuda holds that if it enters your mind to understand the verse in accordance with that which Rabbi Meir says, then let the Merciful One write: You shall not eat of any animal carcass, you may give it to the resident alien who is within your gates that he may eat it and also you may sell it to a foreigner. Why do I need the word “or” between these two options? Learn from it that it comes to teach that the matters are to be understood as they are written: To a resident alien through giving alone, and to any other gentile through selling.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara explains Rabbi Yehuda’s reasoning. Had the Torah intended Rabbi Meir’s interchangeable reading, it could have written “give it… and sell it” (u’makhor), joining the clauses. The disjunctive “or” (o) must therefore be teaching that each clause stands on its own: giving specifically to a ger, selling specifically to a gentile — devarim kikhtavan. The word “or” is Rabbi Yehuda’s textual anchor.
Key Terms:
- מַאי טַעְמָא (mai ta’ama) = “what is the reasoning?”
- ״אוֹ״ לְמָה לִי = why is the word “or” needed?
- שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ (shema minah) = infer from this
Segment 14
TYPE: גמרא
Rabbi Meir: “or” prioritizes the ger; Rabbi Yehuda: priority is logic, not a verse.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר אָמַר לָךְ: הַאי ״אוֹ״ לְהַקְדִּים נְתִינָה דְּגֵר לִמְכִירָה דְּגוֹי. וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, לְהַקְדִּים נְתִינָה דְגֵר לִמְכִירָה דְּגוֹי לָא צְרִיךְ קְרָא, סְבָרָא הוּא: זֶה אַתָּה מְצוֶּּוה לְהַחְיוֹתוֹ, וְזֶה אִי אַתָּה מְצוֶּּוה לְהַחֲיוֹתוֹ.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: And how does Rabbi Meir explain the wording of the verse? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Meir could say to you that this word “or” teaches one to prioritize to giving to a resident alien over selling to a gentile. And Rabbi Yehuda holds that the priority of giving to a resident alien over selling to a gentile does not require a verse, as it is based on logical reasoning: You are commanded by the Torah to sustain this resident alien, but you are not commanded to sustain that gentile.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Meir accounts for “or” differently: it teaches that giving to a ger takes priority over selling to a gentile (a matter of preference, not exclusivity). Rabbi Yehuda counters that such priority needs no verse — it follows from sevara (reason): one is commanded to sustain a ger toshav (“to keep him alive”) but not a gentile. Thus each Sage assigns the word “or” a distinct function: Rabbi Yehuda to literal exclusivity, Rabbi Meir to mere priority.
Key Terms:
- לְהַקְדִּים (l’hakdim) = to give priority/precedence
- סְבָרָא (sevara) = logical reasoning (needing no verse)
- מְצוֶּה לְהַחְיוֹתוֹ = commanded to sustain/keep him alive (the ger, not the gentile)
Segment 15
TYPE: סימן
A mnemonic for the coming series of “abomination”-based derivations.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
(סִימָן: שַׁבָּת, חוֹרֵשׁ, וְכִלְאֵי זְרָעִים, אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ, וְשִׁילּוּחַ הַקֵּן).
English Translation:
§ The Gemara provides a mnemonic device for the topics that will be discussed: Shabbat; plows; and diverse kinds of seeds; a mother and its offspring; and sending away of the mother bird from the nest.
קלאוד על הדף:
A siman previews the topics the Gemara will raise against Rav Ashi’s broad principle (that anything the Torah calls “abomination” or otherwise forbids yields a food prohibition): Shabbat, plowing (ḥoresh), kilei zera’im (diverse seeds), oto v’et beno (a mother and its offspring slaughtered the same day), and shiluaḥ haken (sending away the mother bird). Each will test the limits of Rav Ashi’s derivation.
Key Terms:
- סִימָן (siman) = mnemonic for a coming series of cases
- אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ = “it and its offspring” (Leviticus 22:28)
- שִׁילּוּחַ הַקֵּן (shiluaḥ haken) = sending away the mother bird from the nest
Segment 16
TYPE: קושיא
The Gemara begins to press Rav Ashi’s sweeping principle.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה,
English Translation:
Rav Ashi stated above that the product of any practice described in the Torah as abominable is prohibited for consumption. The Gemara asks: If that is so,
קלאוד על הדף:
This opening fragment (ela me’ata — “but now, if so”) launches the Gemara’s challenge to Rav Ashi’s principle that anything the Torah forbids or calls abominable produces a food prohibition. The mnemonic’s cases will be marshaled to test whether the principle over-generates — e.g., would it forbid eating something merely because it was produced through a Shabbat violation or a forbidden plowing? The full challenge unfolds on the next daf.
Key Terms:
- אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה (ela me’ata) = “but now, if so” (introducing a reductio challenge)