Chullin Daf 113 (חולין דף קי״ג)
Daf: 113 | Amudim: 113a – 113b | Date: Loading...
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (113a)
Segment 1
TYPE: קושיא
Why did Rava derive his ruling from the verse rather than from Shmuel’s more obvious principle?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְלֵימָא לֵיהּ מִדִּשְׁמוּאֵל, דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: מָלִיחַ הֲרֵי הוּא כְּרוֹתֵחַ, וְכָבוּשׁ הֲרֵי הוּא כִּמְבוּשָּׁל!
English Translation:
The Gemara objects: But let Rava say to him the same ruling by instead citing the seemingly more relevant statement of Shmuel, as Shmuel said: A salted food imparts its flavor like a boiling food, and a marinated food is as absorbent as a cooked food. Clearly, the kosher meat absorbed flavor from the meat of the tereifa as it would have had they been cooked together.
קלאוד על הדף:
Continuing directly from 112b, the Gemara challenges Rava’s derivation of the prohibition of kosher meat salted with tereifa from the verse “hatemeim.” Why not simply invoke Shmuel’s familiar rule that salted is like boiling (maliaḥ k’roteaḥ) and marinated is like cooked (kavush kimvushal)? On that principle alone the two salted meats should transmit flavor as if cooked together, prohibiting the kosher meat.
Key Terms:
- מָלִיחַ כְּרוֹתֵחַ (maliaḥ k’roteaḥ) = salted is like boiling (transmits taste as heat does)
- כָּבוּשׁ כִּמְבוּשָּׁל (kavush kimvushal) = marinated is like cooked
Segment 2
TYPE: תירוץ
The verse adds what Shmuel’s rule alone would miss: juices and gravy, not only blood.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִי מִדִּשְׁמוּאֵל, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: הָנֵי מִילֵּי – דָּמָן, אֲבָל צִירָן וְרוֹטְבָן – לָא, קָמַשְׁמַע לַן.
English Translation:
The Gemara explains: Had Rava based his ruling only on Shmuel’s statement, I would say in response: This statement applies only to the absorption of the blood of the meat, but kosher meat is not prohibited if it absorbs only the juices and gravy of the meat of the tereifa. Since in this case the meat is salted in a perforated vessel, the blood from each piece runs out and is not absorbed by the other, and one might think that the kosher meat remains permitted. Rava’s interpretation of the verse in Leviticus teaches us that the juices and gravy of the meat of the tereifa must also be taken into account.
קלאוד על הדף:
Shmuel’s rule addresses blood transfer, but in a perforated vessel the blood drains away and is not reabsorbed. One might therefore permit the kosher meat. Rava’s verse-derivation is needed precisely to extend the prohibition to the tzir (salting juice) and rotev (gravy) of the tereifa, which are absorbed even when the blood itself has drained off. The two teachings are thus not redundant.
Key Terms:
- צִיר (tzir) = the juice/brine expelled by salting
- רוֹטֵב (rotev) = gravy
- קָמַשְׁמַע לַן = it teaches us (something new the prior principle would not)
Segment 3
TYPE: קושיא
A baraita seems to contradict Rava: a kosher fish salted with a non-kosher fish is permitted.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מֵיתִיבִי: דָּג טָהוֹר שֶׁמְּלָחוֹ עִם דָּג טָמֵא – מוּתָּר. מַאי לָאו שֶׁהָיוּ שְׁנֵיהֶן מְלוּחִין? לָא, כְּגוֹן שֶׁהָיָה טָהוֹר מָלִיחַ וְטָמֵא תָּפֵל.
English Translation:
The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: A kosher fish that one salted together with a non-kosher fish is permitted. What, is it not referring to a case where they were both salted and expel juices? This indicates that the kosher fish is not prohibited by the juices of the non-kosher fish, contrary to Rava’s statement. The Gemara responds: No, this is referring to a case where the kosher fish was salted and the non-kosher fish was unsalted. Since an unsalted fish does not emit juices, the kosher fish does not absorb the flavor of the non-kosher fish.
קלאוד על הדף:
A baraita permitting a kosher fish salted with a non-kosher fish seems to refute Rava. The Gemara deflects: the baraita speaks only of a case where the kosher fish alone was salted (maliaḥ) and the non-kosher fish was unsalted (tafel). An unsalted fish emits no tzir, so there is nothing forbidden for the kosher fish to absorb — consistent with Rava.
Key Terms:
- דָּג טָהוֹר / טָמֵא (dag tahor / tamei) = a kosher / non-kosher fish
- מָלִיחַ (maliaḥ) = salted
- תָּפֵל (tafel) = unsalted, bland
Segment 4
TYPE: קושיא
The baraita’s second clause implies the first clause treats both as salted.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהָא מִדְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: אֲבָל אִם הָיָה טָהוֹר מָלִיחַ וְטָמֵא תָּפֵל, מִכְּלָל דְּרֵישָׁא בְּשֶׁשְּׁנֵיהֶם מְלוּחִין עָסְקִינַן! פָּרוֹשֵׁי קָא מְפָרֵשׁ: טָהוֹר שֶׁמְּלָחוֹ עִם דָּג טָמֵא – מוּתָּר, כֵּיצַד? שֶׁהָיָה טָהוֹר מָלִיחַ וְטָמֵא תָּפֵל.
English Translation:
The Gemara challenges: But from the fact that the latter clause teaches: But if the kosher fish was salted and the non-kosher fish was unsalted the kosher fish remains permitted, it may be inferred that in the first clause we are dealing with a case where they are both salted. The Gemara responds: The latter clause is explaining the halakha of the first clause. The baraita should be read as follows: A kosher fish that one salted together with a non-kosher fish is permitted. How so? This is the halakha if the kosher fish was salted and the non-kosher fish was unsalted.
קלאוד על הדף:
If the baraita’s second (seifa) clause specifies “kosher salted, non-kosher unsalted,” the first (reisha) clause would seem to cover a different case — both salted — and permit it, refuting Rava. The Gemara answers that the seifa is not a new case but an explanation (parushei mefaresh) of the reisha: “permitted” in the reisha means specifically the salted-with-unsalted case.
Key Terms:
- רֵישָׁא / סֵיפָא (reisha / seifa) = the first / latter clause of a teaching
- פָּרוֹשֵׁי קָא מְפָרֵשׁ = it is explaining (the seifa clarifies the reisha)
- כֵּיצַד (keitzad) = “how so?” (introducing a clarifying case)
Segment 5
TYPE: גמרא
Supporting logic: if both-salted were permitted, stating the easier case would be superfluous.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָכִי נָמֵי מִסְתַּבְּרָא, דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ רֵישָׁא שְׁנֵיהֶם מְלוּחִים – הַשְׁתָּא שְׁנֵיהֶם מְלוּחִים שְׁרֵי, טָהוֹר מָלִיחַ וְטָמֵא תָּפֵל מִיבַּעְיָא?
English Translation:
The Gemara notes: So, too, it is reasonable that this is the meaning of the baraita, as if it enters your mind that the first clause is referring to a case where both of them are salted, one can claim: Now that the baraita has stated that even if both of them are salted the kosher fish is permitted, is it necessary to state that the same applies in the less problematic case where the kosher fish was salted and the non-kosher fish was unsalted?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara buttresses its reading with a logical argument. If the reisha already permitted the harder case (both salted), there would be no need to repeat the obvious easier case (only kosher salted). The apparent redundancy shows that the reisha itself must refer only to the salted-with-unsalted case — which is exactly the point the seifa clarifies.
Key Terms:
- מִסְתַּבְּרָא (mistabra) = it is reasonable/logical
- מִיבַּעְיָא (mibba’ya) = is it necessary to state? (a rhetorical objection from redundancy)
Segment 6
TYPE: דחייה
Rebuttal: the seifa may deliberately restate the case to prevent a wrong inference.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִי מִשּׁוּם הָא לָא אִירְיָא, תְּנָא סֵיפָא לְגַלּוֹיֵי רֵישָׁא, דְּלָא תֵּימָא רֵישָׁא טָהוֹר מָלִיחַ וְטָמֵא תָּפֵל, אֲבָל שְׁנֵיהֶם מְלוּחִין אָסוּר, תְּנָא סֵיפָא טָהוֹר מָלִיחַ וְטָמֵא תָּפֵל, מִכְּלָל דְּרֵישָׁא שְׁנֵיהֶן מְלוּחִין, וַאֲפִילּוּ הָכִי שְׁרֵי.
English Translation:
The Gemara rejects this: If it is due to that reason, there is no conclusive argument. It is possible that the first clause of the baraita is indeed referring to a case where both fish are salted, and the tanna of the baraita nevertheless taught the latter clause to shed light on the first clause, so that you should not say: The first clause is referring only to a case where the kosher fish was salted and the non-kosher fish was unsalted, but if they were both salted, then the kosher fish is prohibited. To rule this out, he taught the latter clause, which explicitly makes reference to a case where the kosher fish was salted and the non-kosher fish unsalted, which by inference indicates that the first clause is referring to a case where they are both salted, and teaches that even so the kosher fish is permitted.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara rebuts its own supporting argument. The seifa could serve a different purpose: to reveal (l’galuyei) that the reisha means both-salted. Without the seifa, one might read the reisha narrowly and think both-salted is forbidden; the seifa’s explicit salted-with-unsalted case implies by contrast that the reisha permits even both-salted. On this reading, the baraita does contradict Rava, and the challenge is not yet resolved.
Key Terms:
- לָא אִירְיָא (la iria) = there is no conclusive proof
- לְגַלּוֹיֵי (l’galuyei) = to reveal/disclose (the meaning of the reisha)
Segment 7
TYPE: קושיא
A third clause: if the non-kosher fish is salted and the kosher unsalted, the kosher is forbidden — implying both-salted is permitted.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תָּא שְׁמַע מִסֵּיפָא דְּסֵיפָא: אֲבָל אִם הָיָה טָמֵא מָלִיחַ וְטָהוֹר תָּפֵל – אָסוּר. טָמֵא מָלִיחַ וְטָהוֹר תָּפֵל הוּא דְּאָסוּר, הָא שְׁנֵיהֶן מְלוּחִין – שְׁרֵי.
English Translation:
The Gemara further suggests: Come and hear proof against Rava’s ruling from the latter clause of the latter clause, i.e., the third clause of that baraita: But if the non-kosher fish was salted and the kosher fish was unsalted, the kosher fish is prohibited. One can infer from here that it is only if the non-kosher fish is salted and the kosher fish is unsalted that the kosher fish is prohibited. But if they were both salted, then the kosher fish is permitted, contrary to Rava’s ruling.
קלאוד על הדף:
A fresh challenge from the baraita’s third clause (seifa d’seifa): if only the non-kosher fish is salted and the kosher is unsalted, the kosher is forbidden — since only the non-kosher emits tzir, which the unsalted kosher fish absorbs. By precise inference (diyuk), this implies that where both are salted, the kosher is permitted, again contradicting Rava.
Key Terms:
- סֵיפָא דְּסֵיפָא (seifa d’seifa) = the latter part of the latter clause (the third case)
- הָא … שְׁרֵי = the implied inverse: “but [in the other case] it is permitted”
Segment 8
TYPE: דחייה
Rebuttal: the third clause uses parallel wording only for symmetry, teaching nothing about both-salted.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אַיְּידֵי דִּתְנָא רֵישָׁא: טָהוֹר מָלִיחַ וְטָמֵא תָּפֵל, תְּנָא נָמֵי סֵיפָא: טָמֵא מָלִיחַ וְטָהוֹר תָּפֵל.
English Translation:
The Gemara rejects this: Perhaps the last section of the baraita uses this language only since it teaches in the former clause, i.e., the second clause: If the kosher fish was salted and the non-kosher fish unsalted, etc. The baraita therefore taught the last clause as well using parallel language: If the non-kosher fish was salted and the kosher fish unsalted, etc. But nothing can be derived from here with regard to a case where both fish were salted.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara answers that the third clause’s phrasing is dictated by stylistic parallelism (ayidei): because the second clause spoke of “kosher salted, non-kosher unsalted,” the third naturally mirrors it with “non-kosher salted, kosher unsalted.” The wording is a matter of literary balance, not a deliberate teaching about the both-salted case, so no inference against Rava can be drawn.
Key Terms:
- אַיְּידֵי (ayidei) = “since/on account of” (a phrasing chosen for parallelism, not for its own inference)
Segment 9
TYPE: סימן
A mnemonic for the three forthcoming statements of Shmuel.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
(סִימָן: בִּישְׂרָא דְּמַנַּח נַפְקוּתָא).
English Translation:
§ The Gemara provides a mnemonic for remembering the three halakhot stated by Shmuel below: The manner in which blood is expelled from meat; salted meat that is placed on a vessel; an animal whose neck is broken before its soul departs.
קלאוד על הדף:
A siman (mnemonic) helps the reader track Shmuel’s next three rulings: bisra (meat — how blood is drawn out), d’manaḥ (that is placed — the perforated vessel), and nafkuta (departing soul — the broken neck). Such mnemonics are a standard Talmudic memory aid for a series of independent statements.
Key Terms:
- סִימָן (siman) = mnemonic device for a series of teachings
Segment 10
TYPE: גמרא
Shmuel: meat is rid of blood only by thorough salting and rinsing; the order of washing.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: אֵין הַבָּשָׂר יוֹצֵא מִידֵי דָּמוֹ, אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן מוֹלְחוֹ יָפֶה יָפֶה, וּמְדִיחוֹ יָפֶה יָפֶה. אִתְּמַר: רַב הוּנָא אָמַר: מוֹלֵחַ וּמֵדִיחַ. בְּמַתְנִיתָא תְּנָא: מֵדִיחַ וּמוֹלֵחַ וּמֵדִיחַ. וְלָא פְּלִיגִי, הָא דְּחַלְלֵיהּ בֵּי טַבָּחָא, הָא דְּלָא חַלְלֵיהּ בֵּי טַבָּחָא. רַב דִּימִי מִנְּהַרְדְּעָא מָלַח לֵיהּ בְּמִילְחָא גְּלָלְנִיתָא, וּמְנַפֵּיץ לֵיהּ.
English Translation:
Shmuel says: Meat cannot be rid of its blood unless one salts it thoroughly and rinses it thoroughly in water. It was stated: Rav Huna says: One must salt and rinse the meat in water. And it was taught in a baraita: One must rinse the meat, and salt it, and then rinse it again. The Gemara adds: And these two rulings do not disagree. This ruling of Rav Huna is referring to a case where one already washed the meat in the slaughterhouse before salting, whereas that baraita is referring to a case where one did not wash the meat in the slaughterhouse. The Gemara relates: Rav Dimi of Neharde’a would salt meat with coarse salt and then shake the salt off the meat.
קלאוד על הדף:
This is the foundational source for the laws of koshering meat by melichah (salting). Shmuel requires thorough salting and thorough rinsing. Rav Huna’s “salt then rinse” and the baraita’s “rinse, salt, rinse” are reconciled: the initial rinse is needed only if the meat was not washed at the slaughterhouse. Rav Dimi’s practice illustrates the technique — coarse salt (which draws blood without dissolving away), later shaken off.
Key Terms:
- יוֹצֵא מִידֵי דָּמוֹ = rid of its blood
- מוֹלֵחַ / מֵדִיחַ (moleaḥ / mediaḥ) = salting / rinsing
- בֵּי טַבָּחָא (bei tabaḥa) = the slaughterhouse/butcher’s
- מִילְחָא גְּלָלְנִיתָא (milḥa g’lalnita) = coarse salt
Segment 11
TYPE: גמרא
Rav Mesharshiyya: the intestines are not presumed to hold blood.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא: אֵין מַחֲזִיקִין דָּם בִּבְנֵי מֵעַיִים. תַּרְגְּמַאּ אַכַּרְכְּשָׁא וּמְעַיָּיא וְהַדְרָא דְּכַנְתָּא.
English Translation:
Rav Mesharshiyya says: One does not presume that there is blood in the intestines, and therefore they are not prohibited if they have not been salted. The Gemara comments: The Sages interpreted this statement as referring to the rectum, the intestines, and the spiral colon.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Mesharshiyya rules that we do not assume (ein maḥzikin) blood resides in the intestines, so they need no salting on that account. The Sages specify which organs are meant: the karkasha (rectum), me’aya (intestines), and hadra d’kanta (spiral colon). These hollow organs are presumed free of retained blood.
Key Terms:
- אֵין מַחֲזִיקִין (ein maḥzikin) = we do not presume/assume (the presence of)
- בְּנֵי מֵעַיִים (b’nei me’ayim) = the intestines
- כַּרְכְּשָׁא / מְעַיָּיא / הַדְרָא דְּכַנְתָּא = rectum / intestines / spiral colon
Segment 12
TYPE: גמרא
Shmuel: salted meat must be placed only on a perforated vessel.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: אֵין מַנִּיחִין בָּשָׂר מָלִיחַ אֶלָּא עַל גַּבֵּי כְּלִי מְנוּקָּב.
English Translation:
Shmuel says: One may place salted meat only on a perforated vessel, so that the expelled blood can run out. But if the vessel is not perforated then the blood will pool and be reabsorbed by the meat.
קלאוד על הדף:
The second of Shmuel’s three statements: meat being salted to draw out its blood must rest on a keli menukav (perforated vessel), so the expelled blood drains away. On an unperforated vessel the blood would pool and be reabsorbed, defeating the purpose of salting. This is a cornerstone of practical melichah procedure.
Key Terms:
- כְּלִי מְנוּקָּב (keli menukav) = a perforated vessel (allows blood to drain)
Segment 13
TYPE: גמרא
Rav Sheshet salted piece by piece; the Gemara concludes there is no real difference.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַב שֵׁשֶׁת מָלַח לֵיהּ גַּרְמָא גַּרְמָא. תְּרֵי מַאי טַעְמָא לָא? מִשּׁוּם דְּפָרֵישׁ מֵהַאי וּבָלַע הַאי? חַד נָמֵי פָּרֵישׁ מֵהַאי גִּיסָא וּבָלַע הַאי גִּיסָא! אֶלָּא לָא שְׁנָא.
English Translation:
The Gemara relates: Rav Sheshet would salt meat one bone, i.e., one piece, at a time. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that he would not salt two together? Could it be because the blood leaves this piece and that piece absorbs it? If so, with regard to one piece as well, one could claim that the blood leaves this side of the piece and that side absorbs it. Rather, there is no difference between one piece and two pieces, and one may salt even several pieces together.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Sheshet’s stringency of salting one piece at a time is examined. If the worry is that one piece’s blood is reabsorbed by another, the same worry would apply within a single piece (one side to the other). Since that reasoning proves too much, the Gemara concludes there is no difference (la shna) — blood being expelled does not simultaneously get reabsorbed, so several pieces may be salted together.
Key Terms:
- גַּרְמָא גַּרְמָא (garma garma) = piece by piece (literally, bone by bone)
- לָא שְׁנָא (la shna) = there is no difference
Segment 14
TYPE: גמרא
Shmuel (from Rabbi Ḥiyya): breaking the neck before death traps blood, cheats buyers.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל, מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי חִיָּיא: הַשּׁוֹבֵר מַפְרַקְתָּהּ שֶׁל בְּהֵמָה קוֹדֶם שֶׁתֵּצֵא נַפְשָׁהּ – הֲרֵי זֶה מַכְבִּיד אֶת הַבָּשָׂר, וְגוֹזֵל אֶת הַבְּרִיּוֹת, וּמַבְלִיעַ דָּם בָּאֵבָרִים.
English Translation:
Shmuel says in the name of Rabbi Ḥiyya: One who breaks the neck of an animal after it is slaughtered but before its soul departs thereby makes the meat heavy. The meat expels blood at the time of slaughter, but if one breaks the animal’s neck, excess blood is trapped inside and weighs down the meat. And by this action he robs people, as he causes blood to be absorbed in the animal’s limbs, and since he sells the meat by weight, people will pay extra to acquire the same amount of edible meat.
קלאוד על הדף:
The third statement. Breaking an animal’s neck (mafrakta) before its soul has fully departed causes blood that would have flowed out to be trapped and absorbed in the limbs. This has three consequences: it makes the meat heavier, robs buyers (who pay by weight for blood they cannot eat), and embeds blood in the flesh. The concern spans both monetary honesty and the practical extraction of blood.
Key Terms:
- מַפְרַקְתָּהּ (mafrakta) = the neck/nape of the animal
- קוֹדֶם שֶׁתֵּצֵא נַפְשָׁהּ = before its soul departs (before it fully dies)
- מַכְבִּיד / גּוֹזֵל / מַבְלִיעַ = makes heavy / robs / causes to be absorbed
Segment 15
TYPE: בעיא
Is the trapped-blood meat forbidden to eat, or only a matter of theft? Tequ.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: הֵיכִי קָאָמַר? מַכְבִּיד אֶת הַבָּשָׂר, וְגוֹזֵל אֶת הַבְּרִיּוֹת מִשּׁוּם דְּמַבְלִיעַ דָּם בָּאֵבָרִים – הָא לְדִידֵיהּ שַׁפִּיר דָּמֵי, אוֹ דִלְמָא לְדִידֵיהּ נָמֵי אֲסִיר? תֵּיקוּ.
English Translation:
A dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to what case is he speaking? Does Shmuel mean that there is only one problem with this practice, namely, that it renders the meat heavy and robs people since he causes blood to be absorbed in the animal’s limbs? If so, it may be inferred that if one wishes to keep the meat for himself, one may well do so, since he is robbing no one. Or perhaps Shmuel is referring to two prohibitions, first, that the blood trapped in the meat renders it prohibited for consumption, and second, that of robbery. If so, then even if one wants to keep the meat for himself, it is also prohibited. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara asks whether Shmuel’s concern is purely monetary (robbing buyers) — in which case one who keeps the meat for himself has no problem — or whether the trapped blood also renders the meat forbidden to eat, which would apply even to one’s own consumption. The question is left unresolved (teiku), so in practice one treats the stringency as possibly applying even for personal use.
Key Terms:
- אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ (ibba’ya l’hu) = a dilemma was raised
- לְדִידֵיהּ (l’didei) = for himself (his own consumption)
- תֵּיקוּ (teiku) = the question stands unresolved
Segment 16
TYPE: משנה
Placing bird meat with cheese on one’s table violates no Torah prohibition.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְנִי׳ הַמַּעֲלֶה אֶת הָעוֹף עִם הַגְּבִינָה עַל הַשֻּׁלְחָן – אֵינוֹ עוֹבֵר בְּלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה.
English Translation:
MISHNA: One who places the meat of birds with cheese on the table upon which he eats does not thereby violate a Torah prohibition.
קלאוד על הדף:
A new mishna opens the topic of bird meat and milk. Merely placing bird meat and cheese together on the eating table transgresses no Torah negative commandment (lo ta’aseh). This lays the groundwork for the Gemara’s discussion of whether bird-meat-in-milk is forbidden by Torah law or only rabbinically.
Key Terms:
- הַמַּעֲלֶה עַל הַשֻּׁלְחָן = one who places [it] on the table
- לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה (lo ta’aseh) = a Torah negative commandment/prohibition
Segment 17
TYPE: גמרא
The mishna implies bird-and-milk is only rabbinic, matching Rabbi Akiva.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גְּמָ׳ הָא אוֹכְלוֹ – עוֹבֵר בְּלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: בְּשַׂר עוֹף בְּחָלָב דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא! אֵימָא: הַמַּעֲלֶה אֶת הָעוֹף עִם הַגְּבִינָה עַל הַשּׁוּלְחָן – אֵינוֹ בָּא לִידֵי לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה.
English Translation:
GEMARA: The Gemara suggests: Since the mishna mentions only that placing meat of birds and milk on one table does not violate a Torah prohibition, one may consequently infer that if one eats them together he does violate a Torah prohibition. If so, learn from the mishna that meat of birds in milk is prohibited by Torah law, contrary to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who maintains that it applies by rabbinic law. The Gemara responds: Say that the mishna should be understood as follows: One who places bird meat with cheese on the table will not thereby come to violate a Torah prohibition, since eating the two together is a rabbinic prohibition, as Rabbi Akiva maintains.
קלאוד על הדף:
By precise inference (diyuk), the mishna’s wording — “placing” is not forbidden — might imply that “eating” bird-and-milk is a Torah prohibition, contradicting Rabbi Akiva (who holds it is only rabbinic). The Gemara rereads the mishna: placing them together will not lead one to a Torah violation, because even eating them is merely rabbinic. The mishna is thus consistent with Rabbi Akiva.
Key Terms:
- שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ (shema minah) = learn/infer from this
- דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא (d’oraita) = by Torah law
- אֵינוֹ בָּא לִידֵי = will not come to [violate]
Segment 18
TYPE: משנה
The scope of the meat-in-milk prohibition; Rabbi Akiva excludes wild animals and birds.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְנִי׳ בְּשַׂר בְּהֵמָה טְהוֹרָה בַּחֲלֵב בְּהֵמָה טְהוֹרָה – אָסוּר לְבַשֵּׁל וְאָסוּר בַּהֲנָאָה. בְּשַׂר בְּהֵמָה טְהוֹרָה בַּחֲלֵב בְּהֵמָה טְמֵאָה, בְּשַׂר בְּהֵמָה טְמֵאָה בַּחֲלֵב בְּהֵמָה טְהוֹרָה – מוּתָּר לְבַשֵּׁל וּמוּתָּר בַּהֲנָאָה. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: חַיָּה וָעוֹף אֵינָם מִן הַתּוֹרָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״לֹא תְבַשֵּׁל גְּדִי בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ״ שָׁלֹשׁ פְּעָמִים – פְּרָט לְחַיָּה, וּלְעוֹף, וּבְהֵמָה טְמֵאָה.
English Translation:
MISHNA: It is prohibited to cook the meat of a kosher animal in the milk of any kosher animal, not merely the milk of its mother, and deriving benefit from that mixture is prohibited. It is permitted to cook the meat of a kosher animal in the milk of a non-kosher animal, or the meat of a non-kosher animal in the milk of a kosher animal, and deriving benefit from that mixture is permitted. Rabbi Akiva says: Cooking the meat of an undomesticated animal or bird in milk is not prohibited by Torah law, as it is stated: “You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk” (Exodus 23:19, 34:26; Deuteronomy 14:21) three times. The repetition of the word “kid” three times excludes an undomesticated animal, a bird, and a non-kosher animal.
קלאוד על הדף:
The core mishna of basar b’ḥalav. Kosher meat cooked in kosher milk is forbidden both to cook and to benefit from (asur baHana’ah). Mixtures involving one non-kosher component (non-kosher milk or non-kosher meat) are entirely permitted, even to cook and benefit, since the Torah prohibition is limited to fully kosher meat and milk. Rabbi Akiva reads the threefold repetition of “gedi” (kid) as excluding wild animals (ḥaya), birds (of), and non-kosher animals from the Torah prohibition.
Key Terms:
- אָסוּר בַּהֲנָאָה (asur baHana’ah) = forbidden to derive benefit from
- בְּהֵמָה טְהוֹרָה / טְמֵאָה = kosher / non-kosher domesticated animal
- חַיָּה (ḥaya) = a wild/undomesticated animal
- גְּדִי (gedi) = a kid (young goat); the Torah’s term for the prohibited meat
Segment 19
TYPE: משנה
Rabbi Yosei HaGelili derives the prohibition’s scope from the juxtaposition with carcass.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי אוֹמֵר: נֶאֱמַר ״לֹא תֹאכְלוּ כׇל נְבֵלָה״, וְנֶאֱמַר ״לֹא תְבַשֵּׁל גְּדִי בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ״, אֶת שֶׁאָסוּר מִשּׁוּם נְבֵלָה אָסוּר לְבַשֵּׁל בְּחָלָב. עוֹף שֶׁאָסוּר מִשּׁוּם נְבֵלָה, יָכוֹל יְהֵא אָסוּר לְבַשֵּׁל בְּחָלָב? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ״ – יָצָא עוֹף שֶׁאֵין לוֹ חֲלֵב אֵם.
English Translation:
Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says that it is stated: “You shall not eat of any animal carcass” (Deuteronomy 14:21), and in the same verse it is stated: “You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk.” This indicates that meat of an animal that is subject to be prohibited due to the prohibition of eating an unslaughtered carcass is prohibited for one to cook in milk. Consequently, with regard to meat of birds, which is subject to be prohibited due to the prohibition of eating an unslaughtered carcass, one might have thought that it would be prohibited to cook it in milk. Therefore, the verse states: “In its mother’s milk,” excluding a bird, which has no mother’s milk.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yosei HaGelili derives the scope differently, from the juxtaposition in Deuteronomy 14:21 of “you shall not eat any carcass (nevelah)” with “you shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk.” Whatever is subject to the carcass prohibition (i.e., proper kosher species requiring shechitah) is included in meat-in-milk. Birds are subject to nevelah, so one might include them — but “in its mother’s milk” excludes birds, which have no mother’s milk. Thus birds are exempt from the Torah prohibition on textual grounds specific to milk.
Key Terms:
- נְבֵלָה (nevelah) = an unslaughtered carcass (forbidden meat)
- תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר = “the verse teaches” (introducing a scriptural qualification)
- שֶׁאֵין לוֹ חֲלֵב אֵם = which has no mother’s milk (birds do not nurse)
Segment 20
TYPE: גמרא
Rabbi Elazar: “gedi” unqualified includes even a cow or ewe — from Yehuda’s goat-kid.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גְּמָ׳ מְנָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי? אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: אָמַר קְרָא ״וַיִּשְׁלַח יְהוּדָה אֶת גְּדִי הָעִזִּים״,
English Translation:
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rabbi Elazar said: The verse states: “And Judah sent the kid of the goats” (Genesis 38:20).
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara asks the scriptural source for the mishna’s ruling that “gedi” includes all kosher domesticated animals, not only goats. Rabbi Elazar cites “va’yishlaḥ Yehuda et gedi ha’izim” (“Judah sent the kid of the goats”) — the fact that Scripture had to specify “of the goats” implies that “gedi” alone would not be limited to goats. The argument continues on 113b.
Key Terms:
- מְנָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי = from where are these matters (derived)?
- גְּדִי הָעִזִּים (gedi ha’izim) = a kid of the goats (the specification implies gedi alone is broader)
Segment 21
TYPE: גמרא
Continuation: since “gedi” is qualified only here, unqualified it includes a cow or ewe.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כָּאן גְּדִי עִזִּים, הָא כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר גְּדִי סְתָם – אֲפִילּוּ פָּרָה וְרָחֵל בַּמַּשְׁמָע.
English Translation:
One may infer that here, since this verse specifies that it is referring to a kid of the goats, consequently, anywhere the word “kid” is stated without specification, it means even a cow or a ewe. Accordingly, the prohibition of meat cooked in milk applies to all kosher domesticated animals.
קלאוד על הדף:
Completing Rabbi Elazar’s derivation: because the verse must add “of the goats” to restrict gedi to a goat, it follows that gedi setam (unqualified) encompasses even a cow (para) or a ewe (raḥel). Hence the meat-in-milk prohibition, phrased with the unqualified gedi, extends to all kosher behemot, exactly as the mishna ruled.
Key Terms:
- גְּדִי סְתָם (gedi setam) = the word “kid” without qualification
- פָּרָה וְרָחֵל (para v’raḥel) = a cow and a ewe
- בַּמַּשְׁמָע (bamashma) = is included in the meaning
Segment 22
TYPE: גמרא
A second verse also qualifies “gedi”; why not derive the opposite from it?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְלֵילַף מִינֵּיהּ? כְּתִיב קְרָא אַחֲרִינָא: ״וְאֵת עֹרֹת גְּדָיֵי הָעִזִּים״ – כָּאן ״גְּדָיֵי הָעִזִּים״, הָא כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״גְּדִי״ סְתָם – אֲפִילּוּ פָּרָה וְרָחֵל בַּמַּשְׁמָע.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: But why not derive from that verse that in general, every instance of the word “kid” is referring to a goat, including the prohibition of meat cooked in milk? The Gemara answers: This cannot be, as another verse is written: “And the skins of the kids of the goats” (Genesis 27:16). This indicates that only here they are kids of the goats, but anywhere the word “kid” is stated without specification, it means even a cow or a ewe.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara notes a second verse that likewise qualifies gedi — “the skins of the kids of the goats” (Genesis 27:16). One might have derived from a single such verse that gedi always means goat, but the presence of a second qualifying verse teaches the reverse: only where Scripture specifies “of the goats” is it a goat; the unqualified gedi is broad. The very need to specify in two places proves gedi setam is inclusive.
Key Terms:
- וְלֵילַף מִינֵּיהּ = “let us derive from it” (a proposed alternative inference)
- גְּדָיֵי הָעִזִּים (gedayei ha’izim) = the kids of the goats (a second qualifying verse)
Segment 23
TYPE: גמרא
The two verses are “two verses that come as one,” which do not teach a general rule.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְלֵילַף מִינֵּיהּ? הָווּ לְהוּ שְׁנֵי כְּתוּבִין הַבָּאִין כְּאֶחָד, וְכׇל שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִים הַבָּאִים כְּאֶחָד – אֵין מְלַמְּדִין.
English Translation:
The Gemara objects: But let us derive from this verse as well that on the contrary, the word “kid” is always referring to a goat. The Gemara explains: These two examples are two verses that come as one, i.e., to teach the same matter, and as a rule, any two verses that come as one do not teach their common element to other cases.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara invokes the exegetical principle of shenei ketuvim haba’im k’eḥad — two verses teaching the same point. When Scripture states a rule twice for the same purpose, we do not generalize the common element to other cases (ein melamdin). Here, both goat-qualifications teach the same thing, so they cannot be used to establish that gedi universally means goat; the unqualified gedi remains broad.
Key Terms:
- שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִים הַבָּאִים כְּאֶחָד = two verses that come as one (teaching the same matter)
- אֵין מְלַמְּדִין (ein melamdin) = they do not teach (their common feature to other cases)
Amud Bet (113b)
Segment 1
TYPE: גמרא
Explaining the inference: the specified “goat” limits only itself.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כָּאן גְּדִי עִזִּים, הָא כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר גְּדִי סְתָם – אֲפִילּוּ פָּרָה וְרָחֵל בַּמַּשְׁמָע.
English Translation:
One may infer that here, since this verse specifies that it is referring to a kid of the goats, consequently, anywhere the word “kid” is stated without specification, it means even a cow or a ewe. Accordingly, the prohibition of meat cooked in milk applies to all kosher domesticated animals.
קלאוד על הדף:
Amud bet opens by restating the operative inference from the two qualifying verses: wherever Scripture writes gedi with the specification “of the goats,” it means a goat only there; wherever gedi appears unqualified, it includes even a cow or a ewe. This confirms the mishna’s broad scope for the meat-in-milk prohibition across all kosher domesticated animals.
Key Terms:
- גְּדִי סְתָם (gedi setam) = the unqualified word “kid” (broadly inclusive)
Segment 2
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
For those who say two-as-one do teach, the doubled definite article supplies the exclusion.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר אֵין מְלַמְּדִין, אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר מְלַמְּדִין, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? תְּרֵי מִיעוּטֵי כְּתִיבִי: ״עִזִּים״, ״הָעִזִּים״.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says this principle that two verses that come as one do not teach their common element to other cases, but according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do teach their common element to other cases, what is there to say? The Gemara answers: Two exclusions are written, as both of the verses cited use the term “the goats.” The verses could have stated simply: Goats, but state “the goats,” with the definite article, teaching that it is only in these cases that the reference is specifically to a goat.
קלאוד על הדף:
The prior answer works only for the opinion that two-as-one do not teach a generalization. For the opinion that they do teach, the Gemara supplies a different mechanism: both verses write ha’izim (“the goats”) with the definite article rather than plain izim. These two mi’utim (exclusions) restrict the goat-meaning to their own contexts, leaving the unqualified gedi inclusive. The doubled definite article does the exegetical work.
Key Terms:
- הָנִיחָא (hanicha) = “this works well [for one opinion]” (introducing a difficulty for another)
- מִיעוּט (mi’ut) = an exclusion (a scriptural limitation)
- עִזִּים / הָעִזִּים (izim / ha’izim) = goats / the goats (the definite article creates the exclusion)
Segment 3
TYPE: גמרא
Shmuel: the three mentions of “gedi” each include an additional prohibited item.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: ״גְּדִי״ – לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַחֵלֶב, ״גְּדִי״ – לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַמֵּתָה, ״גְּדִי״ – לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַשְּׁלִיל.
English Translation:
§ Shmuel says: Each of the Torah’s three mentions of the prohibition of not cooking a kid in its mother’s milk serves to include a different case. The first mention of the word “kid” serves to include liability for cooking in milk and eating forbidden fats, beyond the liability for eating forbidden fat per se. The second mention of the word “kid” likewise serves to include additional liability for cooking in milk and eating the meat of a dead animal carcass. Finally, the third mention of the word “kid” serves to include liability for cooking in milk and eating an animal fetus.
קלאוד על הדף:
Shmuel expounds the three appearances of gedi to include (l’rabbot) three items in the meat-in-milk prohibition: ḥelev (forbidden fat), meta (carcass meat), and shelil (a fetus found in a slaughtered animal). Each, though already prohibited or unusual, is nonetheless subject to meat-in-milk liability. This sets up the puzzle that three words yield six derashot.
Key Terms:
- לְרַבּוֹת (l’rabbot) = to include (expand the prohibition to another case)
- חֵלֶב (ḥelev) = forbidden fat
- מֵתָה (meta) = carcass meat (nevelah)
- שְׁלִיל (shelil) = a fetus (found within a slaughtered animal)
Segment 4
TYPE: גמרא
Each mention also excludes an item: blood, placenta, non-kosher animal.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
״גְּדִי״ – לְהוֹצִיא אֶת הַדָּם, ״גְּדִי״ – לְהוֹצִיא אֶת הַשִּׁלְיָא, ״גְּדִי״ – לְהוֹצִיא אֶת הַטְּמֵאָה.
English Translation:
Each mention excludes a case as well: The first mention of the word “kid” serves to exclude liability for cooking in milk and consuming blood. The second mention of the word “kid” serves to exclude liability for cooking in milk and eating the placenta of an animal. The third mention of the word “kid” serves to exclude liability for cooking in milk and eating the meat of a non-kosher animal.
קלאוד על הדף:
The same three mentions of gedi also serve to exclude (l’hotzi) three items from meat-in-milk liability: dam (blood), shilya (placenta), and temeah (a non-kosher animal). Blood and placenta are not “meat,” and a non-kosher animal is outside the kosher-meat category, so none incurs the specific meat-in-milk penalty. Now three words have produced six teachings, prompting the next objection.
Key Terms:
- לְהוֹצִיא (l’hotzi) = to exclude (from the prohibition)
- דָּם (dam) = blood
- שִׁלְיָא (shilya) = placenta
- טְמֵאָה (temeah) = a non-kosher animal
Segment 5
TYPE: גמרא
A third derashah set: “its mother’s milk” excludes male, slaughtered, and non-kosher milk.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
״בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ״ – וְלֹא בַּחֲלֵב זָכָר, ״בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ״ – וְלֹא בַּחֲלֵב שְׁחוּטָה, ״בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ״ – וְלֹא בַּחֲלֵב טְמֵאָה.
English Translation:
Furthermore, the first instance of the phrase “in its mother’s milk” indicates that one is not liable for cooking meat in the milk of a male animal, in the rare case that a male might produce milk. The second instance of the phrase “in its mother’s milk” indicates that one is not liable for cooking meat in the milk of an already slaughtered animal, since it is considered milk only if given while the animal is alive. The third instance of the phrase “in its mother’s milk” indicates that one is not liable for cooking meat in the milk of a non-kosher animal.
קלאוד על הדף:
The three occurrences of “baḥalev imo” (“in its mother’s milk”) each exclude a type of milk: that of a male (ḥalev zakhar), that of a slaughtered animal (ḥalev sheḥuta, milk taken after death), and that of a non-kosher animal (ḥalev temeah). Only milk of a living kosher mother triggers the Torah prohibition. This third series completes the exegetical grid built on the verse’s repeated phrases.
Key Terms:
- בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ = “in its mother’s milk”
- חֲלֵב זָכָר / שְׁחוּטָה / טְמֵאָה = milk of a male / a slaughtered animal / a non-kosher animal
Segment 6
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Three “gedi” words, six derashot: Shmuel holds a prohibition takes effect on a prohibition.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָא תְּלָתָא ״גְּדִי״ כְּתִיבִי, וַאֲנַן שִׁיתָּא דָּרְשִׁינַן! קָסָבַר שְׁמוּאֵל אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר, וְאִיסּוּר חֵלֶב וּמֵתָה מֵחַד קְרָא נָפְקִי. דָּם נָמֵי לָאו ״גְּדִי״ הוּא, וְשִׁלְיָא נָמֵי פִּירְשָׁא בְּעָלְמָא הוּא. פָּשׁוּ לְהוּ תְּרֵי: חַד לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַשְּׁלִיל, וְחַד לְמַעוֹטֵי בְּהֵמָה טְמֵאָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara challenges: The word “kid” is written only three times, and yet we expound it to teach six different halakhot. The Gemara responds: Shmuel maintains that a prohibition takes effect even where another prohibition already exists, and therefore the prohibition of forbidden fat in milk and the prohibition of a dead animal carcass in milk are both derived from one verse, as both are applications of the prohibition to an already prohibited item. The exclusion of blood from the prohibition also does not require its own verse, as blood is not considered a kid at all, and likewise there is no need for a verse to exclude a placenta from the prohibition, as it is merely a secretion of the animal, rather than a kind of meat. Therefore, two mentions of “kid” are left; one serves to include a fetus, and one serves to exclude a non-kosher animal.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara objects that three gedi words cannot yield six teachings. The resolution: Shmuel holds issur ḥal al issur (a prohibition can take effect atop an existing one), so ḥelev and meta both derive from a single word (both being “already prohibited” items). Blood needs no verse — it is not “gedi” (meat) at all — and placenta is mere secretion (pirsha), not meat. That leaves two words: one to include shelil (fetus) and one to exclude a non-kosher animal. Three words, properly counted, suffice.
Key Terms:
- אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר (issur ḥal al issur) = a prohibition takes effect where another already exists
- פִּירְשָׁא (pirsha) = mere secretion/waste (not classified as meat)
- פָּשׁוּ לְהוּ תְּרֵי = two [words] remain
Segment 7
TYPE: קושיא
But Shmuel elsewhere seems to deny issur ḥal al issur — the impure priest and impure teruma.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְסָבַר שְׁמוּאֵל אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר? וְהָאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: מִנַּיִן לְכֹהֵן טָמֵא שֶׁאָכַל תְּרוּמָה טְמֵאָה שֶׁאֵינוֹ בְּמִיתָה? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״וּמֵתוּ בוֹ כִּי יְחַלְּלֻהוּ״ – פְּרַט לָזוֹ שֶׁמְּחוּלֶּלֶת וְעוֹמֶדֶת.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: And does Shmuel really maintain that a prohibition takes effect where another prohibition already exists? But didn’t Shmuel say in the name of Rabbi Elazar: From where is it derived that an impure priest who partakes of impure teruma, i.e., the portion of produce designated for the priest, is not punished with death at the hand of Heaven as he would had the teruma been ritually pure? It is derived from a verse, as it is stated, with regard to the prohibition of an impure priest partaking of teruma: “And die therein if they desecrate it” (Leviticus 22:9), to the exclusion of this case of teruma that is impure, which was already desecrated before the priest ate it. Here, it seems, since impure teruma is already prohibited for consumption, the added prohibition of an impure priest partaking of teruma does not take effect.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara challenges Shmuel’s position from his own teaching (via Rabbi Elazar): an impure priest who eats impure teruma is not liable to death, because “and die therein if they desecrate it” excludes teruma that is already desecrated (meḥulelet). This implies that a new prohibition (impure priest eating) does not attach to an already-prohibited item (impure teruma) — the opposite of issur ḥal al issur. Shmuel appears to contradict himself.
Key Terms:
- תְּרוּמָה (teruma) = the priestly portion of produce
- מְחוּלֶּלֶת וְעוֹמֶדֶת = already desecrated (its sanctity already voided)
- בְּמִיתָה (b’mita) = liable to death at the hand of Heaven
Segment 8
TYPE: תירוץ
Three resolutions: a special exclusion, a special inclusion, or teacher vs. student.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: בְּעָלְמָא אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר, וְשָׁאנֵי הָתָם דְּמִיעֵט רַחֲמָנָא ״וּמֵתוּ בוֹ״. אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: בְּעָלְמָא קָסָבַר שְׁמוּאֵל אֵין אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר, וְשָׁאנֵי הָכָא דְּרַבִּי רַחֲמָנָא ״גְּדִי״.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that in general Shmuel maintains that a prohibition takes effect where another prohibition already exists, and it is different there, with regard to teruma, as the Merciful One expressly excludes impure teruma by the phrase “and die therein if they desecrate it,” and in this case the teruma is already desecrated. And if you wish, say that in general Shmuel maintains that a prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition already exists, and here, the case of meat cooked in milk, is different, as the Merciful One expressly includes the meat of an animal carcass and forbidden fat by the repetition of the word “kid.”
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara offers two harmonizations. First (ibba’it eima): Shmuel generally holds issur ḥal al issur, and teruma is the exception, where the verse specially excludes the already-desecrated case. Second: Shmuel generally holds ein issur ḥal al issur, and meat-in-milk is the exception, where the repeated gedi specially includes ḥelev and meta. Either way, the two rulings can coexist as governed by their respective special verses.
Key Terms:
- אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא (ibba’it eima) = “if you wish, say” (offering an alternative resolution)
- שָׁאנֵי (shani) = it is different (a distinguishing exception)
- דְּרַבִּי רַחֲמָנָא / דְּמִיעֵט רַחֲמָנָא = the Torah specially includes / excludes
Segment 9
TYPE: תירוץ
A third resolution: the two statements reflect Shmuel’s own view versus his teacher’s.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: הָא דִידֵיהּ, הָא דְרַבֵּיהּ.
English Translation:
And if you wish, say that this statement of Shmuel with regard to meat cooked in milk is his own opinion, as he maintains that a prohibition takes effect where another prohibition already exists, and that statement with regard to teruma is his teacher’s, i.e., Rabbi Elazar’s, opinion, as he holds that a prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition already exists.
קלאוד על הדף:
A third answer resolves the tension by attribution: the meat-in-milk exposition is Shmuel’s own opinion (holding issur ḥal al issur), whereas the teruma ruling was reported in the name of his teacher Rabbi Elazar (who holds ein issur ḥal al issur). Since Shmuel was merely transmitting his teacher’s view in the latter, there is no true contradiction between the two statements.
Key Terms:
- הָא דִידֵיהּ, הָא דְרַבֵּיהּ = “this is his own [view], that is his teacher’s [view]”
- רַבֵּיהּ (rabbei) = his teacher (Rabbi Elazar)
Segment 10
TYPE: בעיא
Rav Aḥadvoi asks Rav: cooking meat in the milk of a goat that has not yet nursed.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַב אַחָדְבוּי בַּר אַמֵּי מֵרַב: הַמְבַשֵּׁל בַּחֲלֵב גְּדִי שֶׁלֹּא הֵנִיקָה, מַהוּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִדְּאִיצְטְרִיכָא לִשְׁמוּאֵל לְמֵימַר ״בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ״ – וְלֹא בַּחֲלֵב זָכָר, זָכָר הוּא דְּלָא אָתֵי לִכְלַל אֵם, אֲבָל הַאי, כֵּיוָן דְּבָא לִכְלַל אֵם – אָסוּר.
English Translation:
§ Rav Aḥadvoi bar Ami raised a dilemma to Rav: If one cooks meat in milk of a goat that has not yet nursed, but that is about to give birth and already has milk, what is the halakha? Rav said to him: From the fact that it was necessary for Shmuel to say that the phrase “in its mother’s milk” teaches: And not in the milk of a male animal, one can infer that it is only the milk of a male that is excluded, as the male cannot attain the status of a mother. But in this case, since the goat will attain the status of a mother, it is prohibited to cook meat in its milk.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Aḥadvoi asks about milk from a female goat that has milk but has not yet nursed (shelo henika). Rav answers by contrast with Shmuel’s exclusion of a male: only a male is exempt, because a male can never become a mother. But a young female, since she is capable of attaining motherhood (ba likhlal em), counts as a potential mother — so cooking meat in her milk is prohibited.
Key Terms:
- שֶׁלֹּא הֵנִיקָה (shelo henika) = that has not [yet] nursed
- בָּא לִכְלַל אֵם (ba likhlal em) = comes into the category of a mother (is capable of motherhood)
Segment 11
TYPE: גמרא
Dispute of Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi: is one flogged for cooking ḥelev in milk?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִתְּמַר: הַמְבַשֵּׁל חֵלֶב בְּחָלָב, רַבִּי אַמֵּי וְרַבִּי אַסִּי – חַד אָמַר: לוֹקֶה, וְחַד אָמַר: אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה. לֵימָא בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי, דְּמַאן דְּאָמַר לוֹקֶה קָסָבַר: אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר, וּמַאן דְּאָמַר אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה קָסָבַר: אֵין אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר.
English Translation:
It was stated: With regard to one who cooks forbidden fat in milk, Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi disagree as to the halakha. One says that he is flogged for violating the prohibition of meat cooked in milk, and one says that he is not flogged. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that they disagree about this: That the one who says he is flogged maintains that a prohibition takes effect where another prohibition already exists, and the one who says he is not flogged maintains that a prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition already exists.
קלאוד על הדף:
A dispute between Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi concerning one who cooks ḥelev (forbidden fat, already prohibited to eat) in milk: is he flogged for the meat-in-milk violation? The Gemara proposes that they divide over issur ḥal al issur — the one who says “flogged” holds a prohibition attaches to an already-prohibited item; the one who says “not flogged” denies it. This frames the debate through the same principle expounded above.
Key Terms:
- הַמְבַשֵּׁל חֵלֶב בְּחָלָב = one who cooks forbidden fat in milk
- לוֹקֶה (lokeh) = is flogged (liable to lashes)
- קָמִיפַּלְגִי (kamiplagi) = they disagree/differ
Segment 12
TYPE: תירוץ
Rejection: all agree there is no flogging for eating; the dispute is only about cooking.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אֵין אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר, אַאֲכִילָה דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּלָא לָקֵי, כִּי פְּלִיגִי אַבִּשּׁוּל. מַאן דְּאָמַר לוֹקֶה – חַד אִיסּוּרָא הוּא, וּמַאן דְּאָמַר אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה – לְהָכִי אַפְּקַהּ רַחֲמָנָא לַאֲכִילָה בִּלְשׁוֹן בִּישּׁוּל,
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: No; everyone agrees that a prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition already exists, and therefore everyone agrees that one is not flogged for eating the mixture. When they disagree, it is with regard to cooking. The one who says he is flogged holds that one who cooks violates only one prohibition, that of cooking meat in milk, since it is permitted to cook forbidden fat without eating it. Consequently, this is not a case of a prohibition taking effect where another prohibition already exists. And the one who says he is not flogged holds that it was for this reason that the Merciful One expressed the prohibition of eating meat cooked in milk in the Torah using the language of cooking: “You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk.”
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara reframes the dispute. Everyone actually holds ein issur ḥal al issur, so no one is flogged for eating ḥelev-in-milk (the eating prohibition cannot pile onto the existing ḥelev prohibition). The disagreement is only about cooking. One view: cooking ḥelev is not otherwise forbidden, so cooking it in milk is a single, fresh prohibition — hence flogging. The other view: the Torah phrased even the eating prohibition as “cooking,” binding the two together such that the cooking act is not independently punishable here. The argument continues beyond this daf.
Key Terms:
- דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא (d’kulei alma) = according to everyone
- אֲכִילָה / בִּישּׁוּל (akhila / bishul) = eating / cooking
- אַפְּקַהּ … בִּלְשׁוֹן בִּישּׁוּל = [the Torah] expressed it in the language of cooking