Chullin Daf 115 (חולין דף קט״ו)
Daf: 115 | Amudim: 115a – 115b | Date: Loading...
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (115a)
Segment 1
TYPE: קושיא
Testing Rav Ashi’s principle: shouldn’t food cooked on Shabbat be forbidden as “abominable”?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַעֲשֵׂה שַׁבָּת לִיתַּסְרוּ, דְּהָא ״תִּיעַבְתִּי לְךָ״ הוּא.
English Translation:
then let the product of an action that desecrates Shabbat, e.g., food cooked on Shabbat, be prohibited for consumption, as desecration of Shabbat is a practice of which God states: I have made it abominable to you, in that it is prohibited to cook on Shabbat. How can this food be prohibited only to the one who cooked it as a penalty by rabbinic law, but be permitted to others (see 15a)?
קלאוד על הדף:
Continuing directly from 114b, the Gemara challenges Rav Ashi’s principle that anything the Torah calls “abominable” (ti’avti) yields a food prohibition. If so, food cooked on Shabbat should be Torah-forbidden to all, yet the halakha (daf 15a) is that it is only rabbinically penalized and only for the one who cooked it. This begins the systematic testing of the principle against the cases previewed in the mnemonic on 114b.
Key Terms:
- מַעֲשֵׂה שַׁבָּת (ma’aseh Shabbat) = the product of an act that desecrates Shabbat
- תִּיעַבְתִּי לְךָ (ti’avti lakh) = “I have made it abominable to you”
Segment 2
TYPE: תירוץ
Shabbat’s product is permitted: “it is sacred” — but its products are not.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר קְרָא: ״כִּי קֹדֶשׁ הִיא לָכֶם״ – הִיא קֹדֶשׁ, וְאֵין מַעֲשֶׂיהָ קֹדֶשׁ.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: A product of the desecration of Shabbat is an exception to the rule, as the verse states with regard to Shabbat: “For it is sacred to you” (Exodus 31:14). One may infer: It, Shabbat itself, is sacred, but the products of actions that desecrate it are not sacred, i.e., not prohibited.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara resolves the Shabbat case by a scriptural inference: “ki kodesh hi lakhem” (“for it is sacred to you”) teaches that Shabbat itself is sacred, but ein ma’aseha kodesh — its products are not rendered sacred/forbidden. This special verse carves out Shabbat from Rav Ashi’s principle, so food cooked on Shabbat is not Torah-forbidden to all.
Key Terms:
- כִּי קֹדֶשׁ הִיא לָכֶם = “for it is sacred to you” (Exodus 31:14)
- אֵין מַעֲשֶׂיהָ קֹדֶשׁ = its products are not sacred/forbidden
Segment 3
TYPE: קושיא
Shouldn’t the produce of forbidden plowing or muzzled threshing be forbidden?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
חוֹרֵשׁ בְּשׁוֹר וּבַחֲמוֹר, וְחוֹסֵם פִּי פָרָה וְדָשׁ בָּהּ, לִיתַּסְרוּ, דְּהָא ״תִּיעַבְתִּי לְךָ״ הוּא!
English Translation:
The Gemara raises another difficulty: If one plows with an ox and with a donkey together, thereby violating the prohibition in Deuteronomy 22:10, or if one muzzles the mouth of a cow and threshes with it, thereby violating the prohibition in Deuteronomy 25:4, the seeds or threshed grain should be prohibited for consumption according to the above principle, as these are both practices I have made abominable to you.
קלאוד על הדף:
The next test cases: plowing with an ox and donkey yoked together (kilayim, Deuteronomy 22:10) and threshing with a muzzled cow (Deuteronomy 25:4). By Rav Ashi’s principle, the resulting produce should be forbidden. These are less severe prohibitions than Shabbat, so their resolution will follow a fortiori.
Key Terms:
- חוֹרֵשׁ בְּשׁוֹר וּבַחֲמוֹר = plowing with an ox and a donkey (forbidden mixture)
- חוֹסֵם פִּי פָרָה וְדָשׁ בָּהּ = muzzling a cow’s mouth while threshing with it
Segment 4
TYPE: תירוץ
A fortiori from Shabbat: if Shabbat’s products are permitted, all the more so these.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הַשְׁתָּא, וּמָה שַׁבָּת דַּחֲמִירָא, מַעֲשֶׂיהָ מוּתָּרִים; הָנֵי, לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: Now that it has been established that products of desecration of Shabbat are permitted, one can derive the following using an a fortiori inference: Just as with regard to Shabbat, which is treated more stringently, the products of prohibited actions are permitted; is it not all the more so with regard to these prohibitions of plowing with an ox and a donkey and threshing with a muzzled animal, which are treated less stringently, that the products of prohibited actions should be permitted?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara resolves the plowing and muzzling cases by kal vaḥomer from Shabbat. If even Shabbat — a more severe prohibition (punishable by karet/stoning) — does not forbid its products, then all the more so these lighter prohibitions do not forbid theirs. The Shabbat exception thus generalizes to milder cases of “abominable” acts.
Key Terms:
- הַשְׁתָּא (hashta) = “now [that this is established]”
- דַּחֲמִירָא (daḥamira) = which is more stringent
- לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן (lo kol shekein) = “is it not all the more so?” (a fortiori)
Segment 5
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Diverse seeds: permitted, learned from the special “burning” of vineyard-kilayim.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כִּלְאֵי זְרָעִים לִיתַּסְרוּ, דְּהָא ״תִּיעַבְתִּי לְךָ״ הוּא! מִדְּגַלִּי רַחֲמָנָא גַּבֵּי כִּלְאֵי הַכֶּרֶם ״פֶּן תִּקְדַּשׁ״ – ״פֶּן תּוּקַד אֵשׁ״, מִכְּלָל דְּכִלְאֵי זְרָעִים שְׁרוּ.
English Translation:
The Gemara challenges: Diverse kinds of seeds sown together should be prohibited for consumption, as this is a matter whose practice I have made abominable to you. The Gemara explains: One learns otherwise from the fact that the Merciful One revealed with regard to diverse kinds in a vineyard: “You shall not sow your vineyard with two kinds of seed; lest the growth of the seed that you will sow be forfeited [pen tikdash]” (Deuteronomy 22:9). The Sages read the phrase “be forfeited [pen tikdash]” as though it states: Lest it be burned [pen tukad esh], indicating that diverse kinds in a vineyard must be destroyed so that no benefit is derived from them. Since this is stated specifically with regard to a vineyard, one can conclude by inference that other diverse kinds of seeds are permitted.
קלאוד על הדף:
Diverse seeds (kilei zera’im) are next. The Gemara derives that they are permitted from the fact that the Torah singles out vineyard-kilayim for destruction: “pen tikdash” (“lest it be forfeited,” Deuteronomy 22:9), read as “pen tukad esh” (“lest it be burned”). Since only vineyard-kilayim are explicitly forbidden for benefit, ordinary diverse seeds are permitted by implication. This special stringency for the vineyard proves the leniency elsewhere.
Key Terms:
- כִּלְאֵי זְרָעִים (kilei zera’im) = diverse kinds of seeds sown together
- כִּלְאֵי הַכֶּרֶם (kilei hakerem) = diverse kinds in a vineyard
- פֶּן תִּקְדַּשׁ / פֶּן תּוּקַד אֵשׁ = “lest it be forfeited” read as “lest it be burned”
Segment 6
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Perhaps seeds are forbidden to eat though permitted to benefit? No — juxtaposed to animal kilayim.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאֵימָא: כִּלְאֵי כֶרֶם אֲסוּרִין בֵּין בַּאֲכִילָה בֵּין בַּהֲנָאָה, כִּלְאֵי זְרָעִים בַּאֲכִילָה אֲסִירִי, בַּהֲנָאָה שְׁרוּ. אִיתַּקּוּשׁ לְכִלְאֵי בְהֵמָה, דִּכְתִיב: ״בְּהֶמְתְּךָ לֹא תַרְבִּיעַ כִּלְאַיִם שָׂדְךָ לֹא תִזְרַע כִּלְאָיִם״, מָה בְּהֶמְתְּךָ – הַיּוֹצֵא מִמֶּנָּה מוּתֶּרֶת, אַף שָׂדְךָ – הַיּוֹצֵא מִמֶּנּוּ מוּתָּר.
English Translation:
The Gemara objects: But say instead that the uniqueness of diverse kinds in a vineyard is that they are prohibited both for consumption and for benefit, whereas diverse kinds of seeds are prohibited for consumption but are permitted for benefit. The Gemara responds: One cannot say that diverse kinds of seeds are prohibited for consumption, as they are juxtaposed in the Torah to diverse kinds of animals, whose offspring are permitted. As it is written: “You shall not let your cattle mate with a diverse kind; you shall not sow your field with two kinds of seed” (Leviticus 19:19). The juxtaposition teaches that just as with regard to your cattle, the animal that comes from diverse species is permitted, so too, with regard to your field, that produce that comes from diverse seeds is permitted.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara considers a middle position: perhaps diverse seeds are forbidden to eat but permitted to benefit. It rejects this via the juxtaposition (hekesh) in Leviticus 19:19, which pairs “you shall not crossbreed your cattle” with “you shall not sow your field with mixed seed.” Just as the offspring of crossbred animals is permitted (even to eat), so the produce of mixed seeds is permitted. The hekesh forecloses any prohibition on diverse-seed produce.
Key Terms:
- אִיתַּקּוּשׁ (itakush) = it is juxtaposed/linked (a hekesh derivation)
- כִּלְאֵי בְהֵמָה (kilei behema) = crossbreeding of animals
- הַיּוֹצֵא מִמֶּנָּה (hayotzei mimena) = that which comes forth from it (the offspring/produce)
Segment 7
TYPE: גמרא
And how do we know crossbred animal offspring is permitted? From its being barred from the altar.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְכִלְאֵי בְהֵמָה גּוּפַיְיהוּ מְנָא לַן? מִדַּאֲסַר רַחֲמָנָא כִּלְאַיִם לַגָּבוֹהַּ, מִכְּלָל דִּלְהֶדְיוֹט שְׁרֵי.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: And with regard to diverse kinds of animals themselves, from where do we derive that their offspring is permitted? The Gemara answers: From the fact that the Merciful One prohibits the offspring of diverse kinds of animals for sacrifice to the Most High upon the altar (see 38b), learn by inference that they are permitted to ordinary people for consumption.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara traces the chain back one step: how do we know crossbred animal offspring is itself permitted (the anchor of the previous hekesh)? Because the Torah bars such offspring specifically from the altar (lagavoha, “to the Most High”). The very need to forbid it for sacrifice implies that for ordinary human use (l’hedyot) it is permitted — otherwise the altar-prohibition would be superfluous.
Key Terms:
- לַגָּבוֹהַּ (lagavoha) = “to the Most High” (for the altar/sacrifice)
- לְהֶדְיוֹט (l’hedyot) = for the ordinary person (non-sacred use)
- מִכְּלָל (mikhlal) = by implication/inference
Segment 8
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Oto v’et beno: the offspring is permitted, learned from the “premature” altar prohibition.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ לִיתְּסַר! מִדַּאֲסַר רַחֲמָנָא מְחוּסַּר זְמַן לַגָּבוֹהַּ, מִכְּלָל דִּלְהֶדְיוֹט שְׁרֵי.
English Translation:
The Gemara raises another difficulty: A mother and its offspring slaughtered on the same day should be prohibited for consumption, as this too is a practice made abominable. The Gemara answers: From the fact that the Merciful One prohibits an animal whose time has not yet arrived, i.e., that is less than eight days old, as an offering to the Most High (Leviticus 22:27), learn by inference that such animals are permitted to ordinary people for consumption. The offspring of a mother slaughtered that day is also considered an animal whose time has not yet arrived, since the prohibition against slaughtering it is limited to that day.
קלאוד על הדף:
The oto v’et beno case (slaughtering a mother and offspring on one day) is resolved similarly. The Torah forbids an animal “before its time” (meḥusar zeman — under eight days old) for the altar; by implication such an animal is permitted for ordinary consumption. The second-slaughtered animal in an oto v’et beno violation is likewise a “time-deferred” case (forbidden only that day), so it too is permitted to eat, escaping Rav Ashi’s principle.
Key Terms:
- אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ = “it and its offspring” (not slaughtered the same day; Leviticus 22:28)
- מְחוּסַּר זְמַן (meḥusar zeman) = lacking its time (an animal under eight days old)
Segment 9
TYPE: תירוץ
Shiluach haken: the freed mother bird is permitted — the Torah would not command a mishap.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
שִׁילּוּחַ הַקֵּן לִיתְּסַר! לֹא אָמְרָה תּוֹרָה ״שַׁלַּח״ לְתַקָּלָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara raises a final difficulty: If one violated the mitzva that mandates sending away the mother bird from the nest, as it is stated: “You shall not take the mother with the young. You shall in any way let the mother go” (Deuteronomy 22:6–7), and the court instructed him to set the mother bird free, that mother bird should be prohibited to all, as this practice is also abominable. The Gemara responds: The Torah did not say: Send it away, if doing so could lead to a mishap. If the bird were prohibited, the Torah would not have commanded one to send it away, as others might eat it unwittingly.
קלאוד על הדף:
The final test case is shiluaḥ haken (Deuteronomy 22:6–7). If sending away the mother bird made her forbidden, someone might later catch and eat her unwittingly. The Gemara resolves this with the principle “lo amra Torah ‘shalaḥ’ l’takala” — the Torah would not command an act (releasing the bird) that leads to a stumbling block. Therefore the freed bird remains permitted, completing the survey that carves out these cases from Rav Ashi’s sweeping rule.
Key Terms:
- שִׁילּוּחַ הַקֵּן (shiluaḥ haken) = sending away the mother bird from the nest
- לְתַקָּלָה (l’takala) = [leading] to a mishap/stumbling block
- לֹא אָמְרָה תּוֹרָה שַׁלַּח לְתַקָּלָה = the Torah did not command “send away” so as to cause a mishap
Segment 10
TYPE: גמרא
Reish Lakish: the eating prohibition of meat-in-milk from “boiled in any way.”
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: מִנַּיִן לְבָשָׂר בְּחָלָב שֶׁאָסוּר? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״אַל תֹּאכְלוּ מִמֶּנּוּ נָא וּבָשֵׁל מְבֻשָּׁל״, שֶׁאֵין תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״מְבֻשָּׁל״. מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״מְבֻשָּׁל״? לוֹמַר לְךָ יֵשׁ לְךָ בִּשּׁוּל אַחֵר שֶׁהוּא כָּזֶה, וְאֵי זֶה – זֶה בָּשָׂר בְּחָלָב.
English Translation:
§ Reish Lakish says: From where is it derived that meat cooked in milk is prohibited for consumption? The verse states with regard to the Paschal offering: “You shall not eat it partially roasted, nor boiled in any way” (Exodus 12:9). As there is no need for the verse to state: “Boiled in any way,” since it could simply have stated: “Boiled.” What is the meaning when the verse states: “Boiled in any way?” It is included to tell you that there is another manner of cooking, the product of which is prohibited like this one. And which cooking is this? This is meat cooked in milk.
קלאוד על הדף:
Reish Lakish offers a distinctive source for the eating prohibition of basar b’chalav. In the Paschal offering verse, “u’vashel mevushal” (“nor boiled in any way,” Exodus 12:9) is redundant — “boiled” alone would suffice. The extra “mevushal” teaches that there is another kind of “cooking” forbidden like this one — namely, meat cooked in milk. Reish Lakish thereby derives the meat-in-milk eating prohibition from the Pesaḥ verse.
Key Terms:
- נָא (na) = partially roasted/underdone
- וּבָשֵׁל מְבֻשָּׁל = “nor boiled in any way” (Exodus 12:9; the redundant “mevushal”)
- בִּשּׁוּל אַחֵר (bishul aḥer) = another [manner of] cooking (meat in milk)
Segment 11
TYPE: גמרא
Rabbi Yochanan objects: why derive a new source when Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi already taught one?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן:
English Translation:
Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Reish Lakish:
קלאוד על הדף:
This opening phrase introduces Rabbi Yoḥanan’s challenge to Reish Lakish, completed on 115b. Rabbi Yoḥanan will object that Reish Lakish need not have invented a new derivation, since Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi (Rabbi) already taught a source for the meat-in-milk eating prohibition — sparking the extended debate over which verse grounds the prohibition and whether it covers benefit as well.
Key Terms:
- אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן = Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him (introducing an objection)
Amud Bet (115b)
Segment 1
TYPE: גמרא
Rabbi Yochanan: Rabbi already derived it from the doubled “you shall not eat it.”
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כְּעוּרָה זוֹ שֶׁשָּׁנָה רַבִּי? ״לֹא תֹּאכְלֶנּוּ״ – בְּבָשָׂר בְּחָלָב הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר.
English Translation:
Is that derivation that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught ugly, that you derive a new one? The verse states with regard to an animal’s blood: “You shall not eat it; you shall pour it upon the earth as water” (Deuteronomy 12:24), and the next verse adds: “You shall not eat it; that it may go well with you, and with your children after you.” Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi teaches that the redundant second verse is not referring to the prohibition of blood. Rather, the verse is speaking of the prohibition of meat cooked in milk, teaching that it is prohibited for consumption.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yoḥanan protests: is Rabbi’s derivation so “ugly” (ke’ura) that Reish Lakish needed a new one? Rabbi expounded the doubled “lo tokhlenu” (“you shall not eat it”) in Deuteronomy 12:24–25: the first refers to blood, but the redundant second refers to meat cooked in milk, teaching that it is forbidden to eat. Rabbi Yoḥanan thus prefers this existing source over Reish Lakish’s Pesaḥ-verse derivation.
Key Terms:
- כְּעוּרָה (ke’ura) = ugly/unseemly (a rhetorical dismissal of a needless new derivation)
- שֶׁשָּׁנָה רַבִּי (sheshana Rabbi) = that Rabbi [Yehuda HaNasi] taught
- לֹא תֹּאכְלֶנּוּ (lo tokhlenu) = “you shall not eat it” (the doubled phrase)
Segment 2
TYPE: גמרא
How Rabbi knows the verse means meat-in-milk: derived from context (davar halamed me’inyano).
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אַתָּה אוֹמֵר בְּבָשָׂר בְּחָלָב הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר, אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא בְּאֶחָד מִכׇּל הָאִיסּוּרִין שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה? אָמַרְתָּ: צֵא וּלְמַד מִשְּׁלֹשׁ עֶשְׂרֵה מִדּוֹת שֶׁהַתּוֹרָה נִדְרֶשֶׁת בָּהֶן, דָּבָר הַלָּמֵד מֵעִנְיָנוֹ. בַּמֶּה הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר? בִּשְׁנֵי מִינִין, אַף כָּאן בִּשְׁנֵי מִינִין.
English Translation:
Do you say that the verse is speaking of the prohibition of meat cooked in milk? Or perhaps it is only referring to one of the other prohibitions in the Torah? You say: Go out and learn from the thirteen hermeneutical principles, one of which is: A matter that is derived from its context. To what are the adjacent verses referring? They are referring to consecrated animals that were redeemed, which are a combination of two types: They are non-sacred in that they may be eaten, but they are prohibited for shearing and work, like consecrated animals. Here too, one may conclude that the verse is referring to a prohibition that involves two types of food, i.e., the prohibition of meat cooked in milk.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara defends Rabbi’s reading using one of the thirteen hermeneutical principles: davar halamed me’inyano (a matter derived from its context). The surrounding verses discuss redeemed consecrated animals — a hybrid of two statuses (permitted to eat, yet restricted like sacred property). By contextual analogy, the redundant “lo tokhlenu” must likewise concern something combining two kinds — meat and milk. Context, not arbitrary choice, identifies the referent.
Key Terms:
- שְׁלֹשׁ עֶשְׂרֵה מִדּוֹת = the thirteen hermeneutical principles
- דָּבָר הַלָּמֵד מֵעִנְיָנוֹ = a matter derived from its context
- בִּשְׁנֵי מִינִין (bishnei minin) = involving two kinds/species (meat and milk)
Segment 3
TYPE: גמרא
Reish Lakish’s defense: his source adds the benefit prohibition, not only eating.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִי מֵהַהִיא – הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: הָנֵי מִילֵּי בַּאֲכִילָה, אֲבָל בַּהֲנָאָה – לָא; קָמַשְׁמַע לַן.
English Translation:
Reish Lakish replied to Rabbi Yoḥanan: My exposition is still necessary, since if the source for the prohibition of eating meat cooked in milk were from that verse cited by Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi alone, I would say that this statement applies only to the prohibition of eating meat cooked in milk, but not to that of deriving benefit from it. The verse cited with regard to the Paschal offering teaches us that even deriving benefit is prohibited, just as it is prohibited to derive benefit from a disqualified Paschal offering.
קלאוד על הדף:
Reish Lakish defends his derivation as non-redundant. From Rabbi’s verse one would learn only the eating prohibition. His own source — the Pesaḥ verse (“boiled in any way”) — teaches more: since a disqualified Paschal offering is forbidden even for benefit (issur hana’a), linking meat-in-milk to it establishes that meat-in-milk too is forbidden for benefit, not merely for eating. His exposition thus supplies what Rabbi’s does not.
Key Terms:
- אִי מֵהַהִיא = “if [only] from that [verse]” (Rabbi’s source alone)
- הֲנָאָה (hana’a) = benefit (the additional prohibition Reish Lakish’s source supplies)
- קָמַשְׁמַע לַן = it teaches us (the new point)
Segment 4
TYPE: גמרא
Where does Rabbi derive the benefit prohibition? A gezera shava from “kadosh”/“kadesh.”
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְרַבִּי, בַּהֲנָאָה מְנָא לֵיהּ? נָפְקָא לֵיהּ מֵהָכָא: נֶאֱמַר כָּאן ״כִּי עַם קָדוֹשׁ אַתָּה לַה׳״, וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן ״וְלֹא יִהְיֶה קָדֵשׁ בִּבְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל״, מָה לְהַלָּן בַּהֲנָאָה, אַף כָּאן בַּהֲנָאָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, from where does he derive that meat cooked in milk is prohibited for benefit? The Gemara responds: He derives it from here, as it is stated here: “For you are a sacred [kadosh] people unto the Lord your God. You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk” (Deuteronomy 14:21). And it is stated below: “Neither shall there be a sodomite [kadesh] of the sons of Israel” (Deuteronomy 23:18). The similar expressions teach that just as below, the prohibition of sodomy is a prohibition that involves enjoyment, i.e., deriving benefit, not eating, so too here, meat cooked in milk is prohibited with regard to deriving benefit.
קלאוד על הדף:
Since Reish Lakish’s source supplies the benefit prohibition, the Gemara asks where Rabbi derives it. Rabbi uses a gezera shava linking “kadosh” (“you are a sacred people,” Deuteronomy 14:21, adjacent to the meat-in-milk verse) with “kadesh” (Deuteronomy 23:18). Just as the latter context involves a prohibition of benefit/enjoyment rather than eating, so meat-in-milk is forbidden for benefit. Each Sage thus has a full account of both prohibitions.
Key Terms:
- גְּזֵרָה שָׁוָה (gezera shava) = a verbal analogy between shared words in two verses
- קָדוֹשׁ / קָדֵשׁ (kadosh / kadesh) = “sacred” / the linked term in Deuteronomy 23:18
- מְנָא לֵיהּ (mena lei) = “from where does he derive it?”
Segment 5
TYPE: גמרא
The school of Rabbi Eliezer: the carcass verse’s placement bans cooking-then-selling.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
דְּבֵי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר תָּנָא: ״לֹא תֹאכְלוּ כׇל נְבֵלָה [וְגוֹ׳]״, אָמְרָה תּוֹרָה: כְּשֶׁתִּמְכְּרֶנָּה – לֹא תְּבַשְּׁלֶנָּה וְתִמְכְּרֶנָּה.
English Translation:
The school of Rabbi Eliezer taught: The verse states: “You shall not eat of any animal carcass; you may give it to the stranger who is within your gates, that he may eat it; or you may sell it to a foreigner; for you are a sacred people to the Lord your God; you shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk” (Deuteronomy 14:21). The Torah stated the prohibition of meat cooked in milk after the halakha of an animal carcass to teach that when you sell a carcass to a gentile, you shall not cook it in milk and then sell it, i.e., meat cooked in milk is prohibited for benefit and may not be sold.
קלאוד על הדף:
The school of Rabbi Eliezer derives the benefit prohibition from the placement of the meat-in-milk clause immediately after the carcass-selling clause (Deuteronomy 14:21). The juxtaposition teaches: when you sell a permitted carcass to a gentile, do not first cook it in milk and then sell it. Since even selling (a form of benefit) is barred, meat-in-milk is asur baHana’a. The verse’s structure itself encodes the benefit prohibition.
Key Terms:
- דְּבֵי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר (d’vei Rabbi Eliezer) = the school/academy of Rabbi Eliezer
- נְבֵלָה (nevelah) = an unslaughtered carcass (permitted to sell)
- כְּשֶׁתִּמְכְּרֶנָּה = “when you sell it” (but not after cooking it in milk)
Segment 6
TYPE: גמרא
The school of Rabbi Yishmael: three verses for the three prohibitions.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל תָּנָא: ״לֹא תְבַשֵּׁל גְּדִי בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ״ שָׁלֹשׁ פְּעָמִים, אֶחָד לְאִיסּוּר אֲכִילָה, וְאֶחָד לְאִיסּוּר הֲנָאָה, וְאֶחָד לְאִיסּוּר בִּשּׁוּל.
English Translation:
The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: The Torah states three times: “You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk” (Exodus 23:19, 34:26; Deuteronomy 14:21). One verse serves to teach the prohibition against eating meat cooked in milk, and one serves to teach the prohibition against deriving benefit from it, and one serves to teach the prohibition against cooking meat in milk.
קלאוד על הדף:
The school of Rabbi Yishmael offers the cleanest derivation: the verse appears three times, corresponding to three distinct prohibitions — eating (akhila), benefit (hana’a), and cooking (bishul). Each repetition supplies one prohibition. This is the source the Shulchan Aruch cites for the threefold structure of the meat-in-milk laws.
Key Terms:
- דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל (d’vei Rabbi Yishmael) = the school of Rabbi Yishmael
- שָׁלֹשׁ פְּעָמִים = three times
- אֲכִילָה / הֲנָאָה / בִּישּׁוּל = eating / benefit / cooking
Segment 7
TYPE: ברייתא
Isi ben Yehuda: the eating prohibition from a gezera shava with tereifa.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תַּנְיָא, אִיסִי בֶּן יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: מִנַּיִן לְבָשָׂר בְּחָלָב שֶׁאָסוּר? נֶאֱמַר כָּאן ״כִּי עַם קָדוֹשׁ אַתָּה״, וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן ״וְאַנְשֵׁי קֹדֶשׁ תִּהְיוּן לִי וּבָשָׂר בַּשָּׂדֶה טְרֵפָה לֹא תֹאכֵלוּ״, מָה לְהַלָּן אָסוּר, אַף כָּאן אָסוּר.
English Translation:
It is taught in a baraita: Isi ben Yehuda says: From where is it derived that it is prohibited to eat meat cooked in milk? It is stated here: “For you are a sacred people unto the Lord your God. You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk” (Deuteronomy 14:21). And it is stated below: “And you shall be sacred men unto Me; therefore you shall not eat any flesh that is torn of animals in the field [tereifa]; you shall cast it to the dogs” (Exodus 22:30). Just as below it is prohibited to eat a tereifa, so too here it is prohibited to eat meat cooked in milk.
קלאוד על הדף:
Isi ben Yehuda derives the eating prohibition through a gezera shava on the word “kadosh/kodesh”: “you are a sacred people” (Deuteronomy 14:21, by the meat-in-milk verse) links to “you shall be sacred men… you shall not eat tereifa” (Exodus 22:30). Just as tereifa is forbidden to eat, so meat-in-milk is forbidden to eat. This is yet another tannaitic route to the eating prohibition.
Key Terms:
- אִיסִי בֶּן יְהוּדָה (Isi ben Yehuda) = the tanna offering this derivation
- טְרֵפָה (tereifa) = flesh of a fatally-wounded animal (forbidden to eat)
- נֶאֱמַר כָּאן… וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן = “it is stated here… and stated there” (a gezera shava formula)
Segment 8
TYPE: ברייתא
Isi’s kal vachomer for the benefit prohibition, from orla.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאֵין לִי אֶלָּא בַּאֲכִילָה, בַּהֲנָאָה מִנַּיִן? אָמַרְתָּ קַל וְחוֹמֶר: וּמָה עׇרְלָה שֶׁלֹּא נֶעֶבְדָה בָּהּ עֲבֵירָה – אֲסוּרָה בַּהֲנָאָה, בָּשָׂר בְּחָלָב שֶׁנֶּעֶבְדָה בּוֹ עֲבֵירָה – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁאָסוּר בַּהֲנָאָה!
English Translation:
And from this I have derived only that it is prohibited for consumption. From where do I derive that it is prohibited for benefit as well? You can say it can be derived by an a fortiori inference: Just as with regard to the prohibition against eating the fruit of a tree during the first three years after its planting [orla], which is treated less stringently as no sin has been committed in the planting of the tree and its production of fruit, it is prohibited for benefit, is it not right that meat cooked in milk, with regard to which a sin has been committed, should be prohibited for benefit?
קלאוד על הדף:
Isi ben Yehuda derives the benefit prohibition by kal vaḥomer from orla (fruit of a tree’s first three years): orla is forbidden even for benefit, though no sin was involved in its growth; all the more so meat-in-milk, which involves an actual transgression (cooking), should be forbidden for benefit. The rest of the daf tests and refines this inference against competing cases.
Key Terms:
- עׇרְלָה (orla) = fruit of a tree’s first three years (forbidden to eat and to benefit)
- שֶׁלֹּא נֶעֶבְדָה בָּהּ עֲבֵירָה = in which no sin was committed
- שֶׁנֶּעֶבְדָה בּוֹ עֲבֵירָה = in which a sin was committed (the cooking)
Segment 9
TYPE: פירכא
Refutation: orla is unique — it never had a permitted moment.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מָה לְעׇרְלָה, שֶׁכֵּן לֹא הָיְתָה לָהּ שְׁעַת הַכּוֹשֶׁר.
English Translation:
The Gemara rejects this, as orla exhibits a unique stringency: What is unique about orla? It is unique in that it never had a time when it was fit. The same cannot be said about meat and milk, which were each permitted on their own before being cooked together.
קלאוד על הדף:
The kal vaḥomer from orla is refuted by a distinguishing stringency: orla never had a “moment of fitness” (she’at hakosher) — it was forbidden from the moment it grew. Meat and milk, by contrast, were each permitted on their own before being combined. Since orla is stricter in this respect, its benefit-prohibition cannot be extended to meat-in-milk by a fortiori.
Key Terms:
- מָה לְעׇרְלָה (mah l’orla) = “what is [unique] about orla?” (a refuting distinction)
- שְׁעַת הַכּוֹשֶׁר (she’at hakosher) = a moment when it was fit/permitted
Segment 10
TYPE: פירכא
Chametz on Pesach proves it — but chametz is unique (karet).
Hebrew/Aramaic:
חָמֵץ בַּפֶּסַח יוֹכִיחַ, שֶׁהָיְתָה לוֹ שְׁעַת הַכּוֹשֶׁר, וְאָסוּר בַּהֲנָאָה. מָה לְחָמֵץ בַּפֶּסַח, שֶׁכֵּן עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת.
English Translation:
The Gemara suggests: Let leavened bread on Passover prove the point, as it had a time when it was fit, before Passover, and yet it is prohibited for benefit. The Gemara rejects this inference as well: What is unique about consumption of leavened bread on Passover? It is unique in that it is punishable by karet, unlike the prohibition of meat cooked in milk.
קלאוד על הדף:
To repair the inference, the Gemara offers ḥametz on Pesaḥ as a “proof” (yokhiaḥ): it had a moment of fitness (before Pesaḥ) yet is forbidden for benefit — so the she’at hakosher objection fails. But ḥametz too is uniquely strict: eating it is punishable by karet, unlike meat-in-milk. So ḥametz cannot alone establish the benefit prohibition for the milder meat-in-milk.
Key Terms:
- חָמֵץ בַּפֶּסַח (ḥametz baPesaḥ) = leavened bread on Passover (forbidden to eat and benefit)
- יוֹכִיחַ (yokhiaḥ) = “let it prove” (a case that repairs an inference)
- כָּרֵת (karet) = excision, a severe divine punishment
Segment 11
TYPE: גמרא
Diverse kinds in a vineyard prove it — no karet, yet forbidden for benefit.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כִּלְאֵי הַכֶּרֶם יוֹכִיחוּ, שֶׁאֵין עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת, וְאָסוּר בַּהֲנָאָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara comments: Let the prohibition of diverse kinds in a vineyard prove the point, as it is not punishable by karet, and yet it is prohibited to derive benefit from the product.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara adds a third case: kilei hakerem (diverse kinds in a vineyard). It is not punishable by karet, yet it is forbidden for benefit — so it answers the ḥametz objection (that only karet-level prohibitions bar benefit). Together with the earlier cases, this builds toward deriving the meat-in-milk benefit prohibition from a common element, which the Gemara now scrutinizes.
Key Terms:
- כִּלְאֵי הַכֶּרֶם (kilei hakerem) = diverse kinds in a vineyard (forbidden for benefit, no karet)
- יוֹכִיחוּ (yokhiḥu) = “let them prove” (plural)
Segment 12
TYPE: קושיא
Why not derive everything by a fortiori from orla instead of a gezera shava?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לְמָה לִי גְּזֵירָה שָׁוָה? לַיְיתֵי כּוּלַּהּ בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר מֵעׇרְלָה: וּמָה עׇרְלָה, שֶׁלֹּא נֶעֶבְדָה בָּהּ עֲבֵירָה, אֲסוּרָה בֵּין בַּאֲכִילָה בֵּין בַּהֲנָאָה; בָּשָׂר בְּחָלָב, שֶׁנֶּעֶבְדָה בּוֹ עֲבֵירָה, אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁאָסוּר בֵּין בַּאֲכִילָה בֵּין בַּהֲנָאָה!
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: Why do I need both Isi ben Yehuda’s verbal analogy to teach the prohibition of consumption and the a fortiori inference to teach the prohibition of benefit? Let all of it, both the prohibition of consumption and the prohibition against deriving benefit, be derived by an a fortiori inference from orla: Just as orla, which is treated less stringently, as no sin has been committed in the tree’s planting, is nevertheless prohibited both for consumption and for benefit; is it not right that meat cooked in milk, with regard to which a sin has been committed, should be prohibited both for consumption and for benefit?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara asks why Isi needs both the gezera shava (for eating) and the kal vaḥomer (for benefit) — why not derive everything, eating and benefit alike, by one a fortiori from orla? Since orla (no sin involved) is forbidden for both eating and benefit, meat-in-milk (a sin involved) should be too. If the single inference sufficed, the gezera shava would be superfluous.
Key Terms:
- לְמָה לִי גְּזֵירָה שָׁוָה = why do I need the verbal analogy?
- לַיְיתֵי כּוּלַּהּ בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר = “let all of it be derived by a fortiori”
Segment 13
TYPE: תירוץ
The inference alone fails: plowing/muzzling involve a sin yet their products are permitted.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר: חוֹרֵשׁ בְּשׁוֹר וּבַחֲמוֹר, וְחוֹסֵם פִּי פָרָה וְדָשׁ בָּהּ יוֹכִיחַ, שֶׁנֶּעֶבְדָה בָּהֶם עֲבֵירָה וּשְׁרוּ.
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: That inference would be invalid because one could say: The cases of one who plows with an ox and with a donkey, and one who muzzles the mouth of a cow and threshes with it prove it invalid. As in those cases, a sin has been committed through them, and yet benefit from the products of these actions is permitted. One cannot refute a verbal analogy with logical reasoning.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara answers why the a fortiori from orla cannot stand alone: it can be refuted by the plowing and muzzling cases (from 115a), where a sin is committed yet the resulting produce is permitted — showing that “a sin was committed” does not by itself entail prohibition. Hence the eating prohibition must come from a gezera shava (which logic cannot refute), and only the benefit prohibition rides on the inference. The two derivations are complementary, not redundant.
Key Terms:
- מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר = “because one can say” (introducing a refutation)
- יוֹכִיחַ (yokhiaḥ) = “let it prove” (a refuting counterexample)
- וּשְׁרוּ (u’sheru) = and they [the products] are permitted
Segment 14
TYPE: קושיא
Why invoke kilei hakerem — let orla and chametz combine in a binyan av?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לְמָה לִי לְמֵימַר ״כִּלְאֵי הַכֶּרֶם יוֹכִיחוּ״, לֵימָא ״עׇרְלָה תּוֹכִיחַ״, וְלִיהְדַּר דִּינָא וְלֵיתֵי בְּמָה הַצַּד.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks further: Why do I need to say, as was stated above, that the case of diverse kinds in a vineyard proves that benefit from meat and milk is prohibited? At that point, two other cases, orla and leavened bread on Passover, had already been offered as proof. Although they were rejected because they both possess a unique stringency, each lacks the stringency possessed by the other. Therefore, let us say that the case of orla proves that the stringency for consumption of leavened bread on Passover, i.e., the penalty of karet, is irrelevant, and vice versa. And let the inference revert to its starting point, and let the halakha with regard to meat cooked in milk be derived by analogy from the common element of the two sources, i.e., the prohibition against both consumption and benefit.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara asks why the kilei hakerem case was needed at all. Orla and ḥametz were each rejected for a unique stringency (orla never had a fit moment; ḥametz carries karet), but each lacks the other’s stringency. So orla could offset ḥametz’s karet and vice versa, and the benefit prohibition could be derived from their common element (mah hatzad) — making the kilei hakerem case unnecessary. This launches the analysis of what refutes a mah-hatzad derivation.
Key Terms:
- וְלִיהְדַּר דִּינָא = “let the argument revert” (to a combined derivation)
- בְּמָה הַצַּד (b’mah hatzad) = by the common element (of two sources)
Segment 15
TYPE: תירוץ
Rav Ashi: nevelah refutes it — forbidden to eat, yet permitted for benefit.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר, נְבֵלָה תּוֹכִיחַ, שֶׁאֲסוּרָה בַּאֲכִילָה וּמוּתֶּרֶת בַּהֲנָאָה.
English Translation:
Rav Ashi said: Such a derivation cannot be suggested, because one can say that the case of an unslaughtered animal carcass proves it invalid, as an animal carcass is prohibited for consumption and yet it is permitted for benefit.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Ashi blocks the mah-hatzad derivation from orla and ḥametz with a counterexample: nevelah (a carcass) is forbidden to eat yet permitted for benefit. This shows one cannot infer “forbidden to eat → forbidden to benefit” from the common element of orla and ḥametz, since nevelah breaks that link. Hence the kilei hakerem case was indeed necessary — though the next segment challenges Rav Ashi’s method.
Key Terms:
- נְבֵלָה תּוֹכִיחַ = “let a carcass prove it” (a refuting external case)
- אֲסוּרָה בַּאֲכִילָה וּמוּתֶּרֶת בַּהֲנָאָה = forbidden to eat but permitted for benefit
Segment 16
TYPE: גמרא
Rav Mordechai: a mah-hatzad is refuted only from within, not by an external case.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב מָרְדֳּכַי לְרַב אָשֵׁי: הָכִי אָמְרִינַן מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: כֹּל ״מָה הַצַּד״ – מִגּוּפוֹ פָּרְכִינַן, מֵעָלְמָא לָא פָּרְכִינַן.
English Translation:
Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi: We say in the name of Reish Lakish as follows: For any analogy derived from the common element of two sources, one can refute the analogy only by invoking conflicting details of the two sources themselves, e.g., here, some stringency shared by orla and leavened bread, but not by meat cooked in milk. One cannot refute the analogy from an external case, as you do.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Mordechai challenges Rav Ashi’s use of nevelah, citing a rule in the name of Reish Lakish: a mah-hatzad (common-element) derivation can be refuted only from within (mi’gufo) — by a stringency shared by the two source cases but absent in the target — not by an external case (me’alma) like nevelah. By this rule, Rav Ashi’s nevelah objection is illegitimate, reopening why the kilei hakerem case was needed.
Key Terms:
- רַב מָרְדֳּכַי (Rav Mordechai) = the amora citing Reish Lakish’s methodological rule
- מִגּוּפוֹ פָּרְכִינַן = we refute [only] from within it (the two sources)
- מֵעָלְמָא לָא פָּרְכִינַן = we do not refute from an external case
Segment 17
TYPE: קושיא
If so, derive it by mah-hatzad — refuted: both grow from the ground.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִי הָכִי, תֵּיתֵי בְּמָה הַצַּד? מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ: מָה לְהַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן – שֶׁכֵּן גִּדּוּלֵי קַרְקַע.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: If so, then the question remains: Why not let the halakha be derived by analogy from the common element of orla and leavened bread on Passover? The Gemara responds: Because the analogy can be refuted as follows: What is unique about the common element of orla and leavened bread? It is unique in that they both involve produce that grows from the ground, whereas meat and milk do not grow from the ground.
קלאוד על הדף:
Given Rav Mordechai’s rule, why not derive the benefit prohibition from the common element of orla and ḥametz? The Gemara supplies an internal refutation (mi’gufo): both orla and ḥametz are gidulei karka (products that grow from the ground), a feature meat-and-milk lacks. This shared-but-inapplicable stringency blocks the mah-hatzad — consistent with Reish Lakish’s rule — so the derivation from those two alone fails.
Key Terms:
- גִּדּוּלֵי קַרְקַע (gidulei karka) = things that grow from the ground
- לְמִיפְרַךְ (l’mifrakh) = to refute (from within)
Segment 18
TYPE: קושיא
But then kilei hakerem is also “grows from the ground” — the same refutation applies!
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִי הָכִי, הַשְׁתָּא נָמֵי אִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ: מָה לְכִלְאֵי הַכֶּרֶם, שֶׁכֵּן גִּדּוּלֵי קַרְקַע?
English Translation:
The Gemara counters: If so, then even now that the Gemara has invoked diverse kinds in a vineyard to prove the point, the derivation can be refuted in the same manner: What is unique about the prohibition of diverse kinds in a vineyard? It is unique in that it involves produce that grows from the ground.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara presses: if “grows from the ground” refutes the orla-plus-ḥametz derivation, the same objection applies to kilei hakerem, which is likewise a ground-product. So how does adding kilei hakerem help? This forces a more precise account of exactly when a mah-hatzad can be refuted — supplied by Rav Mordechai in the next segment.
Key Terms:
- הַשְׁתָּא נָמֵי (hashta nami) = “now too” (the same objection recurs)
- גִּדּוּלֵי קַרְקַע = grows from the ground (the shared feature)
Segment 19
TYPE: גמרא
Rav Mordechai: a single-source kal vachomer is refuted only by a stringency, not any feature.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב מָרְדֳּכַי לְרַב אָשֵׁי: הָכִי אָמְרִינַן מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: כֹּל מָה הַצַּד פָּרְכִינַן כֹּל דְּהוּ, לֹא אִם אָמַרְתָּ חֲדָא מֵחֲדָא – קַל וָחוֹמֶר פָּרְכִינַן, כֹּל דְּהוּ – לָא פָּרְכִינַן.
English Translation:
Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi: We say in the name of Reish Lakish as follows: For any analogy derived from the common element of two sources, one can refute the analogy by invoking any factor shared by the two source cases but not by the target case. But this is insufficient to refute an analogy to a single source from a single source using the standard formulation: No, if you say the halakha applies to the source case, which possesses a unique factor X, must you say the same of the target case, which does not? One can refute such analogies using this formulation only by way of an a fortiori inference, i.e., if the unique factor X is a stringency. But one cannot refute it by simply mentioning any unique factor, e.g., that diverse kinds in a vineyard grow from the ground.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Mordechai refines the methodology. A mah-hatzad (two-source) derivation can be refuted by any shared feature (kol d’hu) of the sources absent in the target. But a one-to-one analogy (ḥada meḥada) can be refuted only by a stringency (via a fortiori) — not by an incidental feature like “grows from the ground.” Since kilei hakerem is invoked as a single case, its ground-growing feature is not a stringency and so cannot refute the derivation. The distinction turns on single-source versus common-element inferences.
Key Terms:
- כֹּל דְּהוּ (kol d’hu) = any [shared] feature whatsoever
- חֲדָא מֵחֲדָא (ḥada meḥada) = one [case derived] from one (a single-source analogy)
- קַל וָחוֹמֶר פָּרְכִינַן = we refute [it only] by way of an a fortiori (i.e., a stringency)
Segment 20
TYPE: קושיא
But kilei hakerem joins orla and chametz — so all three share “grows from the ground.”
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְלִיפְרוֹךְ לְכוּלְּהוּ, מָה לְכוּלְּהוּ שֶׁכֵּן גִּדּוּלֵי קַרְקַע!
English Translation:
The Gemara counters: But one need not invoke the case of diverse kinds in a vineyard by itself, since it is invoked in addition to the cases of orla and leavened bread. Consequently, this is effectively a derivation from the common element of all three sources, not from one single case to another. If so, let us refute the derivation from all of them: What is unique about all of the cases? They are unique in that they involve produce that grows from the ground.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara raises a further difficulty. Kilei hakerem is not a lone source but joins orla and ḥametz, making the derivation a mah-hatzad from all three. By Rav Mordechai’s earlier rule, a mah-hatzad can be refuted by any shared feature — and all three grow from the ground (gidulei karka), which meat-and-milk lacks. So this shared feature should refute the whole derivation, again threatening the benefit prohibition’s proof.
Key Terms:
- וְלִיפְרוֹךְ לְכוּלְּהוּ = “let us refute [it] from all of them” (the three combined)
- מָה לְכוּלְּהוּ = “what is [unique] about all of them?” (the shared feature)
Segment 21
TYPE: גמרא
Rav Mordechai introduces a further principle in the name of Reish Lakish (continued next daf).
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא, אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב מָרְדֳּכַי לְרַב אָשֵׁי, הָכִי אָמְרִינַן מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ:
English Translation:
Rather, Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi: We say in the name of Reish Lakish as follows:
קלאוד על הדף:
The daf closes with Rav Mordechai introducing yet another refinement of the refutation rules, again in the name of Reish Lakish, to resolve the “all three grow from the ground” objection. The full principle — distinguishing how and when a multi-source mah-hatzad may be refuted by a shared feature — continues onto the next daf, where the analysis of the meat-in-milk benefit derivation is completed.
Key Terms:
- אֶלָּא (ela) = “rather” (introducing a corrected formulation)
- מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ = in the name of Reish Lakish