Chullin Daf 116 (חולין דף קט״ז)
Daf: 116 | Amudim: 116a – 116b | Date: Loading...
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (116a)
Segment 1
TYPE: גמרא
Rules of refutation: single-source vs. two-source inferences.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
חֲדָא מֵחֲדָא קוּלָּא וְחוּמְרָא פָּרְכִינַן, כֹּל דְּהוּ לָא פָּרְכִינַן, חֲדָא מִתַּרְתֵּי אֲפִילּוּ כֹּל דְּהוּ פָּרְכִינַן.
English Translation:
As stated above, for any a fortiori inference of a single source from a single source, one can refute the derivation by invoking a unique leniency in the supposedly stringent case and a stringency in the lenient one, but one cannot refute it by simply mentioning any aspect unique to the first source. And for inferences of one source from two other sources one can even refute the derivation by mentioning any aspect unique to the first source.
קלאוד על הדף:
Continuing directly from 115b, the Gemara lays out the rules of refutation (pircha) that Rav Mordechai cited in the name of Reish Lakish. A single-source-from-single-source inference (ḥada meḥada) can be refuted only by pointing to a leniency-stringency imbalance, not by any incidental unique feature. But a one-from-two derivation (a mah hatzad from two sources) can be refuted by any shared feature (kol d’hu) of the two sources absent in the target. The stringency of the refutation depends on how many sources the inference rests on.
Key Terms:
- חֲדָא מֵחֲדָא (ḥada meḥada) = one [derived] from one (a single-source analogy)
- קוּלָּא וְחוּמְרָא (kula v’ḥumra) = leniency and stringency (the imbalance that can refute)
- כֹּל דְּהוּ (kol d’hu) = any [shared] feature whatsoever
Segment 2
TYPE: גמרא
Rules for a three-source inference; why the kilei hakerem derivation stands.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
חֲדָא מִתְּלָת, אִי הָדַר דִּינָא וְאָתֵי בְּמָה הַצַּד – פָּרְכִינַן כֹּל דְּהוּ, וְאִי לָא – קוּלָּא וְחוּמְרָא פָּרְכִינַן, כֹּל דְּהוּ לָא פָּרְכִינַן.
English Translation:
For inferences of one source from three other sources, as suggested here, only if the inference reverts to its starting point, as each source possesses its own unique stringency, and the halakha is then derived by analogy from the common element of all of them, can one refute the inference by mentioning any factor unique to the source cases. But if the inference does not revert, one can refute the derivation only by invoking a leniency and a stringency, but one cannot refute it by mentioning any unique factor. The suggested inference does not revert, since the prohibition of diverse kinds in a vineyard possesses no stringent element that the other sources lack. Therefore, the fact that all the source cases involve produce is immaterial, and the inference from diverse kinds in a vineyard stands.
קלאוד על הדף:
The rules extend to a three-source inference (ḥada mitlat). If the argument “reverts” (hadar dina) — each source having a unique stringency, forcing a common-element derivation — then any shared feature can refute it. But if it does not revert (because one source, kilei hakerem, adds no unique stringency), only a leniency-stringency imbalance can refute, not an incidental shared feature like “grows from the ground.” Since kilei hakerem contributes no new stringency, the derivation is a straightforward single-case analogy and the “grows from the ground” objection fails. The benefit prohibition for meat-in-milk thus stands.
Key Terms:
- חֲדָא מִתְּלָת (ḥada mitlat) = one [derived] from three (a three-source inference)
- הָדַר דִּינָא (hadar dina) = the argument reverts (to a common-element derivation)
- בְּמָה הַצַּד (b’mah hatzad) = by the common element
Segment 3
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Objection: kilei hakerem never had a fit moment. Rav Adda: its very roots are forbidden.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְלִפְרוֹךְ: מָה לְכִלְאֵי הַכֶּרֶם, שֶׁכֵּן לֹא הָיְתָה לָהֶן שְׁעַת הַכּוֹשֶׁר? אָמַר רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה: זֹאת אוֹמֶרֶת – כִּלְאֵי הַכֶּרֶם עִיקָּרָן נֶאֱסָר, וְהָיְתָה לָהֶן שְׁעַת הַכּוֹשֶׁר קוֹדֶם הַשְׁרָשָׁה.
English Translation:
The Gemara suggests: But let one refute the inference as follows: What is unique about diverse kinds in a vineyard? They are unique in that they had no time that they were fit. The produce is forbidden as soon as it begins to grow, whereas meat and milk are prohibited only when they are cooked together. Rav Adda bar Ahava said: If this suggestion was not employed, that is to say that even the roots of diverse kinds in a vineyard are prohibited, including the seeds and saplings from which the hybrid plants grow. And they too had a time when they were fit, before taking root. Consequently, the premise of the question must be false.
קלאוד על הדף:
One might refute the derivation by noting that kilei hakerem has a unique stringency: it never had a “moment of fitness” (she’at hakosher), since the produce is forbidden from the moment it grows. Rav Adda bar Ahava counters that this very refutation implies that even the roots (ikaran) of kilei hakerem are forbidden — and those roots did have a fit moment before taking root. Since kilei hakerem thus does have a she’at hakosher, the objection collapses. This carries a substantive halakhic implication about when vineyard-kilayim become forbidden.
Key Terms:
- שְׁעַת הַכּוֹשֶׁר (she’at hakosher) = a moment when it was fit/permitted
- עִיקָּרָן (ikaran) = their roots/base
- הַשְׁרָשָׁה (hashrasha) = taking root
Segment 4
TYPE: קושיא
Rav Shemaya objects from a mishna: only the added growth is forbidden.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מֵתִיב רַב שְׁמַעְיָה בַּר זְעֵירָא: הַמַּעֲבִיר עָצִיץ נָקוּב בַּכֶּרֶם, אִם הוֹסִיף מָאתַיִם – אָסוּר. הוֹסִיף – אִין, לֹא הוֹסִיף – לָא.
English Translation:
Rav Shemaya bar Zeira raises an objection to this conclusion from a mishna (Kilayim 7:8): If one transfers a perforated pot with seeds in it into a vineyard, if the size of the plant growing in the pot increases by one two-hundredth of its previous size, such that the permitted original plant is less than two hundred times the amount of the prohibited growth and insufficient to nullify it, the produce is prohibited, due to the prohibition against planting diverse kinds in a vineyard. One may infer: If it increases, yes, it is prohibited; but if it does not increase, no, it is permitted. Apparently, only the additional growth is prohibited, not the planted seeds or saplings.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Shemaya challenges Rav Adda from a mishna in Kilayim: a perforated pot (atzitz nakuv) of seeds brought into a vineyard makes the produce forbidden only if it grew by 1/200 there. The inference — grew, forbidden; did not grow, permitted — implies that only the added growth is forbidden, not the original planted seeds. This contradicts Rav Adda’s claim that the very roots of kilei hakerem are forbidden.
Key Terms:
- עָצִיץ נָקוּב (atzitz nakuv) = a perforated pot (halachically connected to the ground)
- הוֹסִיף מָאתַיִם = increased by one two-hundredth (the ratio that fails to nullify)
- מֵתִיב (metiv) = raises an objection
Segment 5
TYPE: תירוץ
Abaye: two phrases in the verse teach two cases — planted in vs. brought in.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: תְּרֵי קְרָאֵי כְּתִיבִי, כְּתִיב ״פֶּן תִּקְדַּשׁ הַמְּלֵאָה״, וּכְתִיב ״הַזֶּרַע״.
English Translation:
Abaye said: Two verses are written, i.e., two separate terms in one verse indicate two separate prohibitions: The verse states: “You shall not sow your vineyard with two kinds of seed, lest the growth of the seed that you will sow be forfeited together with the increase of the vineyard” (Deuteronomy 22:9). It is written: “Lest the growth be forfeited,” indicating that it is prohibited only if it has grown, and it is written: “Of the seed,” from which it can be inferred that it is prohibited immediately when it is planted and takes root.
קלאוד על הדף:
Abaye reconciles the two positions. The verse (Deuteronomy 22:9) contains two phrases: “pen tikdash hamelea” (“lest the growth be forfeited”) implies prohibition only upon growth, while “hazera” (“the seed”) implies prohibition immediately upon taking root. Each phrase governs a different scenario, which he distinguishes in the next segment. Both Rav Adda and the mishna are thus correct, in their respective cases.
Key Terms:
- תְּרֵי קְרָאֵי (trei kra’ei) = two [phrases in the] verse (teaching two things)
- פֶּן תִּקְדַּשׁ הַמְּלֵאָה = “lest the growth be forfeited” (prohibition upon growth)
- הַזֶּרַע (hazera) = “the seed” (prohibition upon taking root)
Segment 6
TYPE: תירוץ
The reconciliation: planted in the vineyard — forbidden at rooting; brought in — only if it grows.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָא כֵּיצַד? זָרוּעַ מֵעִיקָּרוֹ – בְּהַשְׁרָשָׁה, זָרוּעַ וּבָא, הוֹסִיף – אִין, לֹא הוֹסִיף – לָא.
English Translation:
How can these texts be reconciled? Abaye explains: If it was planted initially in the vineyard, it becomes prohibited immediately upon taking root. But in a case where it was planted elsewhere and brought into the vineyard later, e.g., in a perforated pot, then one must distinguish: If its size increases in the vineyard, yes, the growth is prohibited; if its size does not increase, no, it is not prohibited.
קלאוד על הדף:
Abaye’s resolution: seed sown from the outset in the vineyard (zarua me’ikaro) is forbidden immediately upon taking root — consistent with Rav Adda. But seed planted elsewhere and only later brought in (zarua u’va, as in the perforated pot) is forbidden only if it grows further in the vineyard — consistent with the mishna. The two verses map onto the two planting scenarios, harmonizing the sources.
Key Terms:
- זָרוּעַ מֵעִיקָּרוֹ = sown [in the vineyard] from the outset (forbidden at rooting)
- זָרוּעַ וּבָא = sown [elsewhere] and brought in (forbidden only if it grows)
Segment 7
TYPE: ברייתא
A dissenting tanna: meat-in-milk is forbidden to eat but permitted for benefit.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כִּי הַאי תַּנָּא, דְּתַנְיָא: רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: בָּשָׂר בְּחָלָב אָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה וּמוּתָּר בַּהֲנָאָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״כִּי עַם קָדוֹשׁ אַתָּה״, וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן: ״וְאַנְשֵׁי קֹדֶשׁ תִּהְיוּן לִי״.
English Translation:
The Gemara notes: The mishna, which states that meat cooked in milk is prohibited for benefit, is not in accordance with the opinion of this tanna, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: It is prohibited to eat meat cooked in milk but it is permitted to derive benefit from it, as it is stated: “For you are a holy people to the Lord your God; you shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk” (Deuteronomy 14:21). And the verse states elsewhere: “And you shall be holy people to Me; therefore you shall not eat any flesh that is torn by animals [tereifa] in the field; you shall throw it to the dogs” (Exodus 22:30).
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara notes a dissenting view. Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda, in the name of Rabbi Shimon, holds that meat-in-milk is forbidden only to eat, not to benefit — the opposite of the mishna. He uses the same gezera shava on “kadosh/kodesh” as Isi ben Yehuda (115b) but draws a different conclusion, developed in the next segment. This shows the benefit prohibition was itself a subject of tannaitic dispute.
Key Terms:
- מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כִּי הַאי תַּנָּא = the mishna is not according to this tanna
- רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יְהוּדָה מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן = Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda in the name of Rabbi Shimon
- מוּתָּר בַּהֲנָאָה = permitted for benefit
Segment 8
TYPE: ברייתא
The gezera shava: like tereifa (eat forbidden, benefit permitted), so meat-in-milk.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מָה לְהַלָּן אָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה וּמוּתָּר בַּהֲנָאָה, אַף כָּאן אָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה וּמוּתָּר בַּהֲנָאָה.
English Translation:
The use of the word “holy” in both verses indicates that just as there, with regard to a tereifa, it is prohibited to eat it but one is permitted to derive benefit from it, as one may give it to the dogs, so too here, with regard to meat cooked in milk, it is prohibited to eat it but one is permitted to derive benefit from it.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Shimon’s gezera shava draws the parallel fully: since a tereifa is forbidden to eat but permitted for benefit (one may “throw it to the dogs,” Exodus 22:30), so too meat-in-milk is forbidden to eat but permitted for benefit. This is precisely the point on which he diverges from the mishna and from Isi ben Yehuda, who used the same verses to reach the eating prohibition but derived benefit elsewhere. The mishna’s ruling that meat-in-milk is asur baHana’a follows the majority against Rabbi Shimon.
Key Terms:
- מָה לְהַלָּן… אַף כָּאן = “just as there… so too here” (the gezera shava conclusion)
- טְרֵפָה (tereifa) = a fatally-wounded animal (eat forbidden, benefit permitted)
Segment 9
TYPE: גמרא
Rabbi Akiva’s derivation reconsidered: how does he have verses to spare for chaya, of, tamei?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: חַיָּה וָעוֹף וְכוּ׳. הָנֵי – הָא אַפְּקִינְהוּ לִכְדִשְׁמוּאֵל.
English Translation:
§ The mishna states: Rabbi Akiva says: Cooking the meat of an undomesticated animal or a bird in milk is not prohibited by Torah law, as it is stated: “You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk” (Exodus 23:19, 34:26; Deuteronomy 14:21), three times, excluding an undomesticated animal, a bird, and a non-kosher animal. The Gemara raises a difficulty: Other halakhot have already been derived from these mentions of the word “kid,” in accordance with the statement of Shmuel (see 113b).
קלאוד על הדף:
Returning to the mishna (from 113a), the Gemara questions Rabbi Akiva. He reads the three mentions of “gedi” as excluding a wild animal (ḥaya), a bird (of), and a non-kosher animal (tamei). But Shmuel (113b) already used those same three mentions to include ḥelev, meta, and shelil. How can Rabbi Akiva have all three “gedi” words available for his own exclusions?
Key Terms:
- חַיָּה וָעוֹף (ḥaya v’of) = a wild animal and a bird
- אַפְּקִינְהוּ לִכְדִשְׁמוּאֵל = they were already expounded for Shmuel’s teaching
- טְמֵאָה (temeah) = a non-kosher animal
Segment 10
TYPE: תירוץ
Rabbi Akiva holds issur chal al issur, so those words are freed for his exclusions.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
קָסָבַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר, חֵלֶב וּמֵתָה לָא צְרִיכִי קְרָא, שְׁלִיל – גְּדִי מְעַלְּיָא הוּא, אִיַּיתַּרוּ לְהוּ כּוּלְּהוּ – פְּרָט לְחַיָּה, וְעוֹף, וְלִבְהֵמָה טְמֵאָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: Rabbi Akiva maintains in general that a prohibition takes effect even where another prohibition already exists, and therefore forbidden fat and the meat of a dead animal, which are already prohibited, do not require a verse to teach that the prohibition of meat and milk applies to them. Furthermore, there is no need to derive from a verse that a fetus is included, as it is a full-fledged kid. Consequently, all three mentions of the word remain for him to expound that they serve to exclude an undomesticated animal and a bird and a non-kosher animal.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara resolves it: Rabbi Akiva holds issur ḥal al issur (a prohibition takes effect on an existing one), so ḥelev and meta need no verse to be included — the meat-in-milk prohibition attaches to them automatically. A fetus (shelil) is a “full-fledged kid” and needs no verse either. That frees all three “gedi” mentions for Rabbi Akiva’s exclusions of ḥaya, of, and non-kosher animals. Each Sage’s stance on issur ḥal al issur determines how the verses are apportioned.
Key Terms:
- אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר (issur ḥal al issur) = a prohibition takes effect where another exists
- גְּדִי מְעַלְּיָא (gedi me’alya) = a full-fledged kid (a fetus counts as one)
- אִיַּיתַּרוּ (iyaytaru) = they remain/are left over (for his derivations)
Segment 11
TYPE: גמרא
What divides Rabbi Yosei HaGelili from Rabbi Akiva? The status of a wild animal.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי אוֹמֵר: נֶאֱמַר ״לֹא תֹאכְלוּ״. מַאי אִיכָּא בֵּין רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא?
English Translation:
§ The mishna further teaches that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: It is stated: “You shall not eat of any animal carcass” (Deuteronomy 14:21), and in the same verse it is stated: “You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk.” This indicates that the meat of an animal that is subject to be prohibited due to the prohibition of eating an unslaughtered carcass is prohibited to cook in milk. Consequently, one might have thought it is prohibited to cook in milk the meat of a bird, which is subject to this prohibition. Therefore, the verse states: “In its mother’s milk,” to exclude a bird, which has no mother’s milk. The Gemara asks: What difference is there between the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who excludes a bird from the prohibition of meat and milk due to the phrase “in its mother’s milk,” and the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who comes to the same conclusion as Rabbi Yosei HaGelili based upon the phrase “You shall not cook a kid”?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara compares Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and Rabbi Akiva, who both exclude birds from the Torah prohibition of meat-in-milk but by different textual routes — Rabbi Yosei from “in its mother’s milk” (a bird has none), Rabbi Akiva from the threefold “gedi.” Since they reach the same conclusion about birds, the Gemara asks what practical difference (mai ika beinaihu) their differing derivations produce.
Key Terms:
- לֹא תֹאכְלוּ כׇל נְבֵלָה = “you shall not eat any carcass” (the juxtaposed verse)
- מַאי אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ (mai ika beinaihu) = what is the [practical] difference between them?
- שֶׁאֵין לוֹ חֲלֵב אֵם = which has no mother’s milk (excluding a bird)
Segment 12
TYPE: גמרא
The wild animal: Rabbi Yosei says Torah-forbidden, Rabbi Akiva says only rabbinic.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ חַיָּה: רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי סָבַר חַיָּה דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא סָבַר חַיָּה דְּרַבָּנַן.
English Translation:
The Gemara explains: There is a difference between them with regard to an undomesticated animal. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili maintains that the prohibition of cooking the meat of an undomesticated animal in milk applies by Torah law, as an undomesticated animal has mother’s milk, but Rabbi Akiva maintains that the prohibition of cooking the meat of an undomesticated animal in milk applies only by rabbinic law, as it is excluded by the phrase: “You shall not cook a kid.”
קלאוד על הדף:
The practical difference is the wild animal (ḥaya). Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds cooking a ḥaya in milk is Torah-forbidden, since a ḥaya has mother’s milk (his exclusion only removes birds). Rabbi Akiva holds it is only rabbinically forbidden, since his threefold-”gedi” reading excludes ḥaya along with birds and non-kosher animals. Their differing derivations yield genuinely different halakha for wild-animal meat.
Key Terms:
- חַיָּה (ḥaya) = a wild/undomesticated animal
- דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא / דְּרַבָּנַן = by Torah law / by rabbinic law
Segment 13
TYPE: גמרא
Alternatively, they differ over whether birds are even rabbinically forbidden.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא, עוֹף אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ: רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא סָבַר חַיָּה וָעוֹף אֵינָן מִן הַתּוֹרָה, הָא מִדְּרַבָּנַן אֲסִירִי, וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי סָבַר עוֹף אֲפִילּוּ מִדְּרַבָּנַן נָמֵי לָא אֲסִיר.
English Translation:
If you wish, say instead that there is a difference between them with regard to the meat of a bird itself: Rabbi Akiva maintains that the prohibitions of an undomesticated animal and a bird do not apply by Torah law; but it may be inferred from his statement that they are prohibited by rabbinic law. And Rabbi Yosei HaGelili maintains that a bird is not prohibited even by rabbinic law.
קלאוד על הדף:
An alternative account (ibba’it eima) locates the difference in the bird itself. Rabbi Akiva holds ḥaya and of are only exempt from Torah law but remain rabbinically forbidden. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds a bird is not forbidden even rabbinically. This reading sets up the following narrative, where a community actually ate bird-meat-in-milk, following Rabbi Yosei HaGelili.
Key Terms:
- אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא (ibba’it eima) = “if you wish, say [instead]” (an alternative resolution)
- מִדְּרַבָּנַן אֲסִירִי = they are rabbinically forbidden
- אֲפִילּוּ מִדְּרַבָּנַן נָמֵי לָא אֲסִיר = not forbidden even rabbinically
Segment 14
TYPE: ברייתא
A baraita: local custom followed the lenient rulings — bird-in-milk was eaten.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: בִּמְקוֹמוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הָיוּ כּוֹרְתִין עֵצִים לַעֲשׂוֹת פֶּחָמִין לַעֲשׂוֹת בַּרְזֶל, בִּמְקוֹמוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי הָיוּ אוֹכְלִין בְּשַׂר עוֹף בְּחָלָב.
English Translation:
The Gemara notes: That distinction is also taught in a baraita: In the locale of Rabbi Eliezer, where his ruling was followed, they would cut down trees on Shabbat to prepare charcoal from them with which to light a fire to fashion iron tools with which to circumcise a child on Shabbat. In Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion, not only does the mitzva of circumcision override Shabbat, but also any action required for the preparation of the tools necessary for the circumcision likewise overrides Shabbat. The baraita adds: In the locale of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili they would eat bird meat cooked in milk. Evidently, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili maintains that the prohibition of meat cooked in milk does not include birds.
קלאוד על הדף:
A baraita corroborates that halakha followed local authority. In Rabbi Eliezer’s region they performed all circumcision-related preparations on Shabbat; in Rabbi Yosei HaGelili’s region they ate bird-meat-in-milk — confirming that Rabbi Yosei permitted birds even rabbinically. Communities followed their local Sage’s ruling as fully authoritative, a principle relevant to the narrative that follows.
Key Terms:
- תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי = “it is also taught thus” (a corroborating baraita)
- בִּמְקוֹמוֹ שֶׁל (bimkomo shel) = in the locale/region of
- הָיוּ אוֹכְלִין בְּשַׂר עוֹף בְּחָלָב = they would eat bird meat cooked in milk
Segment 15
TYPE: מעשה
Levi is served peacock head in milk and says nothing; Rabbi challenges him.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לֵוִי אִיקְּלַע לְבֵי יוֹסֵף רִישְׁבָּא, אַיְיתוֹ לְקַמֵּיהּ רֵישָׁא דְּטַוָּוסָא בַּחֲלָבָא, וְלָא אֲמַר לְהוּ וְלָא מִידֵּי. כִּי אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אַמַּאי לָא תְּשַׁמְּתִינְהוּ?
English Translation:
The Gemara relates: Levi happened to come to the house of Yosef the bird hunter [rishba]. They served him the head of a peacock [tayvasa] in milk and he did not say anything to them. When Levi came before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: Why did you not excommunicate these people who eat bird meat cooked in milk, contrary to the decree of the Sages?
קלאוד על הדף:
A narrative illustrates the tension. Levi visited Yosef the bird-hunter and was served peacock (tavasa) head cooked in milk, but said nothing. When he later reported this to Rabbi (Yehuda HaNasi), Rabbi rebuked him: why did you not excommunicate (teshamtinhu) them for violating the Sages’ decree against bird-meat-in-milk? Rabbi assumes the rabbinic prohibition applies universally.
Key Terms:
- אִיקְּלַע (iklaʿ) = happened to come/visited
- רֵישָׁא דְּטַוָּוסָא (reisha d’tavasa) = the head of a peacock
- תְּשַׁמְּתִינְהוּ (teshamtinhu) = excommunicate them (place them under a ban)
Segment 16
TYPE: מעשה
Levi’s defense: the locale followed Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira, who ruled like Rabbi Yosei HaGelili.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אַתְרֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בְּתֵירָא הוּא, וְאָמֵינָא: דְּרַשׁ לְהוּ כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי, דְּאָמַר: יָצָא עוֹף שֶׁאֵין לוֹ חֲלֵב אֵם.
English Translation:
Levi said to him: It was in the locale of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira, and I said: Perhaps he taught them that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who said that the phrase “in its mother’s milk” serves to exclude a bird, which does not have mother’s milk. If so, I could not prohibit it to them, and I certainly could not excommunicate them for following their ruling.
קלאוד על הדף:
Levi defends his silence: the incident occurred in the region of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira, who may well have taught his community to follow Rabbi Yosei HaGelili — permitting bird-in-milk since a bird has no mother’s milk. Since the people were following a legitimate local ruling, Levi could neither forbid the food to them nor excommunicate them. The episode affirms the authority of local halakhic practice.
Key Terms:
- אַתְרֵיהּ (atrei) = his locale/region
- רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בְּתֵירָא = the local authority whose ruling the community followed
- דְּרַשׁ לְהוּ (darash l’hu) = he taught/expounded for them
Segment 17
TYPE: משנה
Mishna: rennet (keivah) of a gentile’s animal or a carcass; curdling with stomach-skin.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְנִי׳ קֵבַת גּוֹי וְשֶׁל נְבֵלָה – הֲרֵי זוֹ אֲסוּרָה. הַמַּעֲמִיד בְּעוֹר שֶׁל קֵבָה כְּשֵׁרָה,
English Translation:
MISHNA: The congealed milk in the stomach of the animal of a gentile and of an unslaughtered animal carcass is prohibited. With regard to one who curdled milk by using the skin of the stomach of a kosher animal as a coagulant to make cheese, which may then have the taste of meat cooked in milk,
קלאוד על הדף:
A new mishna turns to keivah — the rennet/congealed milk in an animal’s stomach, used to curdle cheese. It states that the keivah of a gentile’s animal or of a carcass (nevelah) is forbidden. It then raises the case of curdling milk using the skin of a kosher animal’s stomach (which contains meat), which could create a meat-in-milk problem. The mishna’s ruling on this, and its apparent tension with the carcass clause, drive the Gemara’s discussion on 116b.
Key Terms:
- קֵבָה (keivah) = the stomach/abomasum; the rennet (congealed milk) within it
- גּוֹי / נְבֵלָה (goy / nevelah) = a gentile [-owned animal] / an unslaughtered carcass
- הַמַּעֲמִיד (hama’amid) = one who curdles/coagulates (milk into cheese)
- עוֹר שֶׁל קֵבָה = the skin/lining of the stomach
Amud Bet (116b)
Segment 1
TYPE: משנה
The mishna concluded: stomach-skin that imparts flavor forbids the cheese; suckled milk follows its source.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִם יֵשׁ בְּנוֹתֵן טַעַם – הֲרֵי זוֹ אֲסוּרָה. כְּשֵׁרָה שֶׁיָּנְקָה מִן הַטְּרֵפָה – קֵבָתָהּ אֲסוּרָה. טְרֵפָה שֶׁיָּנְקָה מִן הֶכְשֵׁרָהּ – קֵבָתָהּ מוּתֶּרֶת, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁכָּנוּס בְּמֵעֶיהָ.
English Translation:
if the measure of the skin is enough to impart flavor to the milk, that cheese is prohibited. In the case of a kosher animal that suckled milk from a tereifa, the milk in its stomach is prohibited, as the milk is from the tereifa. If it was a tereifa that suckled milk from a kosher animal, the milk in its stomach is permitted, as the milk is from the kosher animal. In both cases, the milk that an animal suckles has the status of the animal from which it was suckled, and not that of the animal which suckled, because the milk is collected in its innards and is not an integral part of its body.
קלאוד על הדף:
The mishna concludes two rulings. First, if the stomach-skin used to curdle cheese is enough to impart flavor (notein ta’am), the cheese is forbidden as meat-in-milk. Second, suckled milk in the stomach takes the status of its source, not of the animal that suckled: a kosher animal that nursed from a tereifa has forbidden stomach-milk, while a tereifa that nursed from a kosher animal has permitted stomach-milk — because the milk is merely “collected in its innards” (kanus b’me’eha), not part of the body.
Key Terms:
- נוֹתֵן טַעַם (notein ta’am) = imparting [enough] flavor (the threshold to forbid)
- יָנְקָה (yanka) = suckled/nursed
- כָּנוּס בְּמֵעֶיהָ (kanus b’me’eha) = collected/gathered in its innards (not integral to the body)
Segment 2
TYPE: גמרא
Why distinguish gentile’s animal from carcass? Rav Huna: a kid bought from a gentile, feared to have suckled a tereifa.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גְּמָ׳ אַטּוּ קֵבַת גּוֹי לָאו נְבֵלָה הִיא? אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: הָכָא בְּלוֹקֵחַ גְּדִי מִן הַגּוֹי עָסְקִינַן, וְחָיְישִׁינַן שֶׁמָּא יָנַק מִן הַטְּרֵפָה.
English Translation:
GEMARA: The mishna makes reference to the stomach of the animal of a gentile and that of an unslaughtered carcass. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that the stomach of an animal slaughtered by a gentile is not itself a carcass? Why does the tanna of the mishna differentiate between them? Rav Huna said: The mishna here is not referring to an animal slaughtered by a gentile. Rather, we are dealing with a Jew who purchases a kid from a gentile and slaughters it himself. Therefore, the kid is not prohibited as a carcass, but we are concerned that perhaps it suckled from a tereifa animal, and it is therefore prohibited.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara asks why the mishna lists a gentile’s animal separately from a carcass — a gentile’s slaughtered animal is itself a nevelah (invalid slaughter), so the distinction seems redundant. Rav Huna reinterprets: the mishna refers to a Jew who bought a live kid from a gentile and slaughtered it kosher. The kid is not a carcass, but there is concern (ḥayshinan) that it may have suckled from a tereifa, contaminating its stomach-milk. The next segment tests this concern.
Key Terms:
- אַטּוּ … לָאו נְבֵלָה הִיא = “is it not [itself] a carcass?” (challenging the redundancy)
- לוֹקֵחַ גְּדִי מִן הַגּוֹי = one who buys a kid from a gentile
- חָיְישִׁינַן שֶׁמָּא (ḥayshinan shema) = we are concerned lest
Segment 3
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
We don’t fear suckling from a tereifa (uncommon); rather, from a non-kosher animal.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּמִי חָיְישִׁינַן שֶׁמָּא יָנַק מִן הַטְּרֵפָה? וְהָתְנַן: לוֹקְחִים בֵּיצִים מִן הַגּוֹיִם, וְאֵין חוֹשְׁשִׁין לֹא מִשּׁוּם נְבֵלָה וְלֹא מִשּׁוּם טְרֵפָה! אֶלָּא אֵימָא: חָיְישִׁינַן שֶׁמָּא יָנַק מִן הַטְּמֵאָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: And are we concerned that perhaps it suckled from an animal that is a tereifa? But didn’t we learn in a baraita (Tosefta 3:8): One may purchase eggs from gentiles, and we are not concerned that perhaps the eggs came from a carcass nor that they came from a tereifa. The Gemara answers: Indeed, there is no concern that the kid might have suckled from a tereifa. Rather, say that we are concerned that perhaps it suckled from a non-kosher animal, and therefore the milk in its stomach is prohibited.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara challenges Rav Huna: we do not generally fear a tereifa, as shown by the rule that one may buy eggs from gentiles without concern for nevelah or tereifa. It therefore revises the concern: not suckling from a tereifa, but from a non-kosher animal (temeah). A kid bought from a gentile might have nursed from a non-kosher species, forbidding its stomach-milk. The distinction between tereifa and non-kosher hinges on frequency, addressed next.
Key Terms:
- לוֹקְחִים בֵּיצִים מִן הַגּוֹיִם = one may buy eggs from gentiles (without concern)
- אֶלָּא אֵימָא (ela eima) = “rather, say” (a corrected formulation)
- טְמֵאָה (temeah) = a non-kosher animal
Segment 4
TYPE: גמרא
Why fear non-kosher but not tereifa? Tereifa is uncommon; non-kosher animals are common.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּמַאי שְׁנָא טְרֵפָה דְּלָא חָיְישִׁינַן, וּמַאי שְׁנָא טְמֵאָה דְּחָיְישִׁינַן? טְרֵפָה לָא שְׁכִיחָא, טְמֵאָה שְׁכִיחָא.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: And what is different about a tereifa that we are not concerned that perhaps the animal suckled from it, and what is different about a non-kosher animal that we are concerned? The Gemara answers: A tereifa animal is not common, whereas a non-kosher animal is common, and it is therefore more likely that the young animal suckled from one.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara explains the asymmetry. We fear suckling from a non-kosher animal but not from a tereifa because a tereifa is uncommon (lo sheḥiḥa) — most animals are healthy — whereas non-kosher animals are common (sheḥiḥa) in a gentile’s holdings. Halachic concern (ḥashash) tracks statistical likelihood: we worry about the frequent scenario, not the rare one.
Key Terms:
- מַאי שְׁנָא (mai shna) = “what is different?” (why treat the two cases differently?)
- לָא שְׁכִיחָא / שְׁכִיחָא = not common / common (the basis for the distinction)
Segment 5
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
If non-kosher suckling is common, why not fear it for our own animals? We keep them apart.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִי שְׁכִיחָא, אֲפִילּוּ גַּבֵּי דִּידַן נֵיחוּשׁ! אֲנַן דְּבָדְלִינַן מִינַּיְיהוּ, וְכִי חָזֵינַן לְהוּ מַפְרְשִׁינַן לְהוּ – לָא גְּזַרוּ בְּהוּ רַבָּנַן. אִינְהוּ דְּלָא בְּדִילִי מִינַּיְיהוּ, וְכִי חָזוּ לְהוּ לָא מַפְרְשִׁי לְהוּ – גְּזַרוּ בְּהוּ רַבָּנַן.
English Translation:
The Gemara raises a difficulty: If suckling from a non-kosher animal is common, then let us be concerned even with regard to our own animals. The Gemara responds: We Jews, who separate ourselves from non-kosher animals, when we see them we immediately distance our suckling animals from them. Therefore, the Sages did not issue a decree with regard to animals purchased from Jews. But as for the gentiles, who do not separate themselves from non-kosher animals, when they see them they do not distance their kosher animals from them. Consequently, the Sages issued a decree with regard to animals purchased from a gentile.
קלאוד על הדף:
If non-kosher suckling is common, why not fear it for Jewish-owned animals too? Because Jews keep away from non-kosher animals (badlinan) and actively separate their young from them when noticed, so the Sages issued no decree on Jewish-owned animals. Gentiles do not keep such distance, so the Sages decreed on animals bought from a gentile. The decree tracks the realistic behavior of the animal’s owner.
Key Terms:
- בָּדְלִינַן מִינַּיְיהוּ = we keep separate/distant from them (non-kosher animals)
- מַפְרְשִׁינַן לְהוּ = we separate them (our young from the non-kosher animals)
- גְּזַרוּ בְּהוּ רַבָּנַן = the Sages decreed concerning them
Segment 6
TYPE: גמרא
Shmuel’s reading: the mishna teaches one law — the keivah of gentile slaughter is like a carcass.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: חֲדָא קָתָנֵי, קֵבַת שְׁחִיטַת גּוֹי – נְבֵלָה.
English Translation:
And Shmuel said a different explanation of the mishna’s language: The tanna of the mishna is teaching only one halakha: The congealed milk in the stomach of an animal slaughtered by a gentile is like a carcass, and it is therefore prohibited.
קלאוד על הדף:
Shmuel reads the mishna’s opening differently: rather than two items (gentile’s animal and carcass), it teaches one integrated halakha — “the keivah of a gentile’s slaughter is [like] a carcass.” A gentile’s slaughter renders the animal a nevelah, and its stomach-milk is forbidden as such. The next segment surfaces an apparent contradiction from Shmuel’s own view on cheese.
Key Terms:
- חֲדָא קָתָנֵי (ḥada katanei) = it teaches [only] one [halakha]
- קֵבַת שְׁחִיטַת גּוֹי = the rennet of an animal slaughtered by a gentile
- נְבֵלָה (nevelah) = a carcass (invalid slaughter)
Segment 7
TYPE: קושיא
But Shmuel elsewhere implies rennet itself is permitted — contradiction?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּמִי אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל הָכִי? וְהָאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: מִפְּנֵי מָה אָסְרוּ גְּבִינַת הַגּוֹיִם – מִפְּנֵי שֶׁמַּעֲמִידִין אוֹתָהּ בְּעוֹר קֵבַת נְבֵלָה. הָא קֵבָה גּוּפַהּ שַׁרְיָא!
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: And did Shmuel actually say this? Does he hold that the milk in the stomach of an unslaughtered animal is prohibited as if it were part of its body? But didn’t Shmuel say: For what reason did the Sages prohibit the cheese of gentiles? It is because they curdle it with the skin of the stomach of a carcass. One may infer consequently that congealed milk, or rennet, from the stomach of a gentile’s animal is itself permitted and would not render the cheese prohibited if used as a coagulant.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara challenges Shmuel from his own statement. Shmuel elsewhere explained that gentile cheese is forbidden because it is curdled with the skin of a carcass’s stomach (or kevat nevelah) — implying that the rennet (keivah) itself is permitted; only the skin is the problem. This contradicts his ruling here that the keivah of a gentile-slaughtered animal is forbidden as a carcass.
Key Terms:
- גְּבִינַת הַגּוֹיִם (gevinat hagoyim) = the cheese of gentiles
- עוֹר קֵבַת נְבֵלָה = the skin of a carcass’s stomach
- הָא קֵבָה גּוּפַהּ שַׁרְיָא = but the rennet itself is permitted (the implication)
Segment 8
TYPE: תירוץ
Resolved: before and after Rabbi Yehoshua’s retraction on why gentile cheese is forbidden.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לָא קַשְׁיָא: כָּאן – קוֹדֶם חֲזָרָה, כָּאן – לְאַחַר חֲזָרָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: That is not difficult. Elsewhere (Avoda Zara 29b), Rabbi Yehoshua teaches two reasons for the prohibition on gentile cheese. Initially, he held it to be prohibited because it is curdled using rennet from the stomach of an animal carcass. He later adopted the opinion that such rennet is permitted, and that the cheese is prohibited because it is curdled using rennet from the stomach of calves used for idol worship, which is prohibited. Therefore, the mishna here, which states that the rennet in a carcass’s stomach is itself prohibited, was taught before Rabbi Yehoshua’s retraction, while Shmuel’s statement there, that the Sages prohibited gentile cheese only because it is curdled with the skin of the stomach of a carcass, was after Rabbi Yehoshua’s retraction.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara resolves the contradiction chronologically. Rabbi Yehoshua (Avoda Zara 29b) first held gentile cheese forbidden because of carcass-rennet, then retracted (ḥazara), holding rennet permitted and cheese forbidden for a different reason (idolatrous calves). The mishna (rennet of a carcass forbidden) reflects the view before the retraction; Shmuel’s cheese statement (rennet permitted) reflects the view after. Both are Shmuel’s, at different stages of the halakha’s development.
Key Terms:
- חֲזָרָה (ḥazara) = a retraction/reversal (of an earlier ruling)
- קוֹדֶם חֲזָרָה / לְאַחַר חֲזָרָה = before the retraction / after the retraction
Segment 9
TYPE: קושיא
How does the tereifa clause (milk permitted) square with the carcass clause (forbidden)?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כְּשֵׁרָה שֶׁיָּנְקָה מִן הַטְּרֵפָה [וְכוּ׳]. וְהָא קָתָנֵי רֵישָׁא: קֵבַת גּוֹי וְשֶׁל נְבֵלָה הֲרֵי זוֹ אֲסוּרָה?
English Translation:
§ The mishna teaches: In the case of a kosher animal that suckled milk from a tereifa, the milk in its stomach is prohibited, whereas if a tereifa suckled milk from a kosher animal, the milk in its stomach is permitted. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But doesn’t the first clause of the mishna teach: The congealed milk in the stomach of the animal of a gentile and of a carcass is prohibited? What is the difference between the milk found in the stomach of a tereifa in the second clause and the milk found in the stomach of an unslaughtered carcass in the first clause?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara notes an internal tension in the mishna. The later clause permits the stomach-milk of a tereifa that nursed from a kosher animal (the milk follows its kosher source). Yet the opening clause forbids the stomach-milk of a carcass. If stomach-milk merely follows its source, why is carcass-stomach-milk forbidden? The two clauses seem to treat stomach-milk inconsistently.
Key Terms:
- רֵישָׁא (reisha) = the opening clause (carcass stomach-milk forbidden)
- מוּתֶּרֶת (muteret) = permitted (the tereifa-nursed-from-kosher case)
Segment 10
TYPE: תירוץ
Rav Chisda: the carcass clause is a rabbinic stringency — it “looks like eating carcasses.”
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: רֵישָׁא נִרְאֶה כְּאוֹכֵל נְבֵלוֹת, הָכָא אִיכָּא שְׁחִיטָה.
English Translation:
Rav Ḥisda said: In fact, milk found in the stomach of a carcass is not itself prohibited. The first clause of the mishna prohibits it only because one who partakes of it looks like one who eats carcasses, which is repulsive. By contrast, here, with regard to a tereifa, the consumption of milk found in its stomach is less repulsive, as here there is at least slaughter of the animal.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Ḥisda resolves it: the carcass-stomach-milk is not intrinsically forbidden. The reisha forbids it only because eating it “looks like eating carcasses” (nir’e k’okhel nevelot) — an appearance-based rabbinic stringency. A tereifa, by contrast, was at least slaughtered, so eating its stomach-milk does not carry that repulsive appearance and is permitted. The distinction rests on optics, not on the milk’s intrinsic status.
Key Terms:
- נִרְאֶה כְּאוֹכֵל נְבֵלוֹת = appears like one who eats carcasses
- אִיכָּא שְׁחִיטָה = there is [at least] slaughter (mitigating the repulsive appearance)
Segment 11
TYPE: קושיא
Rava objects: a tereifa should be forbidden all the more, since one might come to eat it.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: וְלָאו כֹּל דְּכֵן הוּא? וּמָה נְבֵלָה דִּמְאִיסָה, דְּאִי שָׁרֵית לֵיהּ קֵבָתָהּ לָא אָתֵי לְמֵיכַל מִינַּהּ, אָמְרַתְּ לָא. טְרֵפָה שְׁחוּטָה, דְּאִי שָׁרֵית אָתֵי לְמֵיכַל מִינַּהּ, לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?
English Translation:
Rava said to Rav Ḥisda: But is it not possible to claim a fortiori that milk found in the stomach of a tereifa should be prohibited? Just as with regard to a carcass, which is so repulsive that even if you permit the milk in its stomach people will not come to partake of the meat, you nevertheless said the milk is not permitted for consumption, is it not all the more so with regard to a tereifa that has been slaughtered, which is not as repulsive, such that if you permit the milk in its stomach people might come to partake of it?
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava refutes Rav Ḥisda with a reverse kal vaḥomer. A carcass is so repulsive that permitting its stomach-milk would not tempt anyone to eat the carcass meat itself — yet the mishna forbids it. A tereifa (which was slaughtered) is less repulsive, so permitting its stomach-milk might well lead one to eat the tereifa meat. All the more so, then, the tereifa’s stomach-milk should be forbidden — the opposite of the mishna’s ruling. Rav Ḥisda’s appearance-based distinction cannot stand.
Key Terms:
- וְלָאו כֹּל דְּכֵן הוּא = “is it not all the more so?” (a reverse a fortiori)
- מְאִיסָה (me’isa) = repulsive/disgusting
- אָתֵי לְמֵיכַל מִינַּהּ = one might come to eat from it
Segment 12
TYPE: תירוץ
Rabbi Yochanan: also before/after the retraction — “a mishna does not move from its place.”
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב יִצְחָק, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: לָא קַשְׁיָא, כָּאן קוֹדֶם חֲזָרָה, כָּאן לְאַחַר חֲזָרָה, וּמִשְׁנָה לֹא זָזָה מִמְּקוֹמָהּ.
English Translation:
Rather, Rav Yitzḥak said that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This question is not difficult. The first clause of the mishna here, which teaches that the milk in the stomach of a carcass is prohibited, was taught before Rabbi Yehoshua’s retraction cited above, whereas the latter clause there, that milk from the stomach of a tereifa is permitted, was taught after Rabbi Yehoshua’s retraction. A mishna can sometimes preserve an older ruling and then immediately teach a contradictory later ruling, because a mishna does not move from its place. Since the first clause of the mishna was already canonized, it was not removed, despite Rabbi Yehoshua’s change of opinion.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yoḥanan (via Rav Yitzḥak) resolves the mishna’s internal tension using the same retraction. The reisha (carcass-milk forbidden) was formulated before Rabbi Yehoshua’s ḥazara; the seifa (tereifa-milk permitted) after it. The two clauses coexist because “a mishna does not move from its place” (mishna lo zaza mimkomah) — once a ruling is canonized in the mishna’s text, it is preserved even when a later clause reflects a changed halakha. This is a key principle about the mishna’s editorial layering.
Key Terms:
- מִשְׁנָה לֹא זָזָה מִמְּקוֹמָהּ = a mishna does not move from its place (canonized text is preserved)
- קוֹדֶם / לְאַחַר חֲזָרָה = before / after the retraction
Segment 13
TYPE: גמרא
Rabbi Yochanan: one may curdle with carcass-rennet but not gentile-slaughter-rennet.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מַעֲמִידִין בְּקֵבַת נְבֵלוֹת, וְאֵין מַעֲמִידִין בְּקֵבַת שְׁחִיטַת גּוֹי. אָמַר לְפָנָיו רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בַּר אַבָּא: כְּמַאן? כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, דְּאָמַר סְתָם מַחְשֶׁבֶת גּוֹי לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה.
English Translation:
§ Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One may curdle milk with rennet extracted from the stomach of carcasses, but one may not curdle milk with rennet from the stomach of animals slaughtered by a gentile. Rabbi Shimon bar Abba said before Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who said: A gentile’s presumed intention during slaughter is for idol worship. Therefore, the prohibition against deriving benefit from an animal slaughtered in idol worship applies to it, and this prohibition includes the contents of its stomach that are not actually part of its body. By contrast, a carcass is prohibited only for consumption, and the prohibition does not extend to the contents of its stomach.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yoḥanan (via Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba) rules one may curdle cheese with carcass-rennet but not with the rennet of a gentile’s slaughter. Rabbi Shimon bar Abba objects that this follows only Rabbi Eliezer, who holds a gentile’s presumed intent in slaughtering is for idolatry (avoda zara) — making the animal forbidden even for benefit, extending to its stomach-contents. A carcass, by contrast, is forbidden only to eat, not to benefit, so its rennet may be used.
Key Terms:
- מַעֲמִידִין בְּקֵבַת נְבֵלוֹת = one may curdle with carcass-rennet
- סְתָם מַחְשֶׁבֶת גּוֹי לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה = a gentile’s presumed intent is for idolatry
- עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה (avoda zara) = idol worship (which forbids even benefit)
Segment 14
TYPE: גמרא
Rabbi Chiyya bar Abba: yes, it can only be Rabbi Eliezer’s view.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: וְאֶלָּא כְּמַאן?
English Translation:
Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to Rabbi Shimon bar Abba: Rather, in accordance with whose opinion could this ruling be? Of course it is the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba concedes the point directly: yes, of course the ruling follows Rabbi Eliezer — there is no other view it could reflect. The ruling that gentile-slaughter-rennet is forbidden (unlike carcass-rennet) depends entirely on the premise that a gentile’s slaughter carries a presumption of idolatrous intent, forbidding benefit. This frames the alternative report that follows.
Key Terms:
- וְאֶלָּא כְּמַאן = “rather, according to whom [else]?” (affirming it must be Rabbi Eliezer)
Segment 15
TYPE: גמרא
A later report: Rabbi Yochanan permits both rennets, disregarding Rabbi Eliezer.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כִּי אֲתָא רַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר רַב יִצְחָק, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מַעֲמִידִין בֵּין בְּקֵבַת נְבֵלָה, בֵּין בְּקֵבַת שְׁחִיטַת גּוֹי, שֶׁלֹּא לָחוֹשׁ לְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר.
English Translation:
The Gemara relates: When Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One may curdle milk both with rennet from the stomach of a carcass and with rennet from the stomach of an animal slaughtered by a gentile, as there is no need to be concerned for the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. According to this account, Rabbi Yoḥanan does not maintain that a gentile’s presumed intention is for idol worship.
קלאוד על הדף:
A competing transmission, brought by Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak from Eretz Yisrael, reports Rabbi Yoḥanan more leniently: one may curdle cheese with either carcass-rennet or gentile-slaughter-rennet, since we need not be concerned for Rabbi Eliezer’s view about idolatrous intent. On this account Rabbi Yoḥanan rejects the presumption of avoda zara, so gentile-slaughter-rennet is permitted like carcass-rennet. The two reports set up the final ruling.
Key Terms:
- כִּי אֲתָא (ki ata) = when [he] came (bringing a tradition from Eretz Yisrael)
- שֶׁלֹּא לָחוֹשׁ לְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר = not to be concerned for Rabbi Eliezer’s view
Segment 16
TYPE: הלכה
The ruling: not with carcass-stomach-skin, but rennet from any of these is fine — it is mere secretion.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהִלְכְתָא: אֵין מַעֲמִידִין בָּעוֹר קֵבַת נְבֵלָה, אֲבָל מַעֲמִידִין בְּקֵבַת נְבֵלָה, וּבְקֵבַת שְׁחִיטַת גּוֹי, וּבְקֵבַת כְּשֵׁרָה שֶׁיָּנְקָה מִן הַטְּרֵפָה, וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן בְּקֵבַת טְרֵפָה שֶׁיָּנְקָה מִן הַכְּשֵׁרָה. מַאי טַעְמָא? חָלָב הַמְכוּנָּס בָּהּ פִּירְשָׁא בְּעָלְמָא הוּא.
English Translation:
The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is: One may not curdle milk with the skin of the stomach of a carcass, but one may curdle milk with rennet from the stomach of a carcass and with rennet from the stomach of an animal slaughtered by a gentile, and with rennet from the stomach of a kosher animal that suckled from a tereifa, and all the more so with rennet from the stomach of a tereifa animal that suckled from a kosher animal. What is the reason for these lenient rulings? The milk collected in a stomach is merely secretion and is not considered food that can be prohibited.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara issues its final ruling (v’hilkheta). One may not curdle cheese with the skin of a carcass’s stomach (which is actual flesh), but one may use the rennet (keivah) from a carcass, from a gentile’s slaughter, from a kosher animal that nursed from a tereifa, and all the more so from a tereifa that nursed from a kosher animal. The reason: the milk collected in the stomach is mere secretion (pirsha b’alma) — not classified as food and therefore not subject to prohibition. This is the practical, enduring halakha of rennet.
Key Terms:
- וְהִלְכְתָא (v’hilkheta) = “and the [final] halakha is”
- אֵין מַעֲמִידִין בָּעוֹר = one may not curdle with the skin (actual flesh)
- פִּירְשָׁא בְּעָלְמָא (pirsha b’alma) = mere secretion (not food, not subject to prohibition)
Segment 17
TYPE: משנה
A new mishna: comparing the stringencies of forbidden fat (chelev) and blood (dam).
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְנִי׳ חוֹמֶר בַּחֵלֶב מִבַּדָּם, וְחוֹמֶר בַּדָּם מִבַּחֵלֶב. חוֹמֶר בַּחֵלֶב – שֶׁהַחֵלֶב
English Translation:
MISHNA: Although animal fats and blood are similar in that they are both prohibited by Torah law and punishable by karet, there are elements more stringent in the prohibition of fat than in that of blood, and likewise there are elements more stringent in the prohibition of blood than in that of fat. The elements more stringent in the prohibition of fat are the following: The first is that with regard to fat of an offering,
קלאוד על הדף:
A new mishna opens the topic of comparing ḥelev (forbidden fat) and dam (blood). Both are Torah prohibitions punishable by karet, yet each has stringencies (ḥumrot) the other lacks. The mishna begins to enumerate where ḥelev is stricter than dam — the first instance concerning the fat of an offering — with the comparison continuing on the next daf. This transition moves the masechet from meat-and-milk into the laws of forbidden fats and blood.
Key Terms:
- חוֹמֶר (ḥomer) = a stringency (an aspect where one prohibition is stricter)
- חֵלֶב / דָּם (ḥelev / dam) = forbidden fat / blood
- כָּרֵת (karet) = excision (the divine punishment both prohibitions share)