Chullin Daf 104 (דף ק״ד)
Daf: 104 | Amudim: 104a – 104b | Date: 21 Tevet 5786
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (104a)
Segment 1
TYPE: משנה
Fish and grasshoppers are permitted to one who vowed against meat
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הַנּוֹדֵר מִן הַבָּשָׂר מוּתָּר בִּבְשַׂר דָּגִים וַחֲגָבִים.
English Translation:
And one who takes a vow that meat is prohibited to him is permitted to eat the meat of fish and grasshoppers.
קלאוד על הדף:
The mishna continues from 103b, addressing vows. One who vows abstention from “meat” (בָּשָׂר) may still eat fish and grasshoppers, since these are not colloquially considered meat. This clause becomes the springboard for the Gemara’s analysis of how vows track common usage versus halakhic categories.
Key Terms:
- One who vows (הַנּוֹדֵר) = a person who takes a personal prohibition upon himself
- Meat (בָּשָׂר) = flesh; in vows, defined by common speech
- Fish and grasshoppers (דָּגִים וַחֲגָבִים) = permitted to the one who vowed
Segment 2
TYPE: גמרא וקושיא
The mishna’s implication about birds contradicts Rabbi Akiva
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גְּמָ׳ הָא עוֹף אָסוּר מִדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, כְּמַאן? דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, דְּאִי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא – הָאָמַר: חַיָּה וָעוֹף אֵינוֹ מִן הַתּוֹרָה.
English Translation:
GEMARA: Since the mishna does not distinguish between the meat of animals and that of birds, it may consequently be inferred that the meat of birds cooked in milk is prohibited by Torah law, just like the meat of animals. In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? It is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, as, if you say it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, didn’t he say that the prohibition of the meat of undomesticated animals and birds cooked in milk is not by Torah law?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara reads the earlier mishna (103b): since it forbids “all meat” in milk without exception for birds, it implies birds in milk are prohibited by Torah law. But Rabbi Akiva holds the meat of wild animals and birds in milk is only rabbinic. So the mishna’s first clause seems not to follow Rabbi Akiva.
Key Terms:
- Bird (עוֹף) = fowl; poultry
- By Torah law (מִדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא) = biblically prohibited
- Undomesticated animal (חַיָּה) = wild (non-domesticated) beast
Segment 3
TYPE: גמרא
The latter clause of the mishna DOES follow Rabbi Akiva
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֵימָא סֵיפָא: הַנּוֹדֵר מִן הַבָּשָׂר – מוּתָּר בִּבְשַׂר דָּגִים וַחֲגָבִים, הָא עוֹף אָסוּר, אֲתָאן לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, דְּאָמַר: כֹּל מִילֵּי דְּמִימְּלִיךְ עֲלֵיהּ שָׁלִיחַ – בַּר מִינֵיהּ הוּא.
English Translation:
The Gemara continues: But say the latter clause of the mishna: One who takes a vow that meat is forbidden to him is permitted to eat the meat of fish and grasshoppers. It may consequently be inferred that it is prohibited for him to eat birds. If so, here we arrive at the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who said: Anything about which an agent sent to purchase a given item would inquire, being unsure whether it qualifies as that type of item, is considered its type.
קלאוד על הדף:
The latter clause permits only fish and grasshoppers — implying birds ARE forbidden to the one who vowed against meat. This aligns with Rabbi Akiva’s principle: anything an agent would ask about (uncertain whether it counts) is considered part of the category. Thus the mishna seems internally contradictory — its first clause opposes Rabbi Akiva, its last clause follows him.
Key Terms:
- Latter clause (סֵיפָא) = the concluding portion of the mishna
- Agent (שָׁלִיחַ) = an emissary sent to purchase
- Would inquire about (דְּמִימְּלִיךְ עֲלֵיהּ) = would ask whether to buy it
Segment 4
TYPE: ברייתא
The gourds and vegetables dispute: the Rabbis’ challenge to Rabbi Akiva
Hebrew/Aramaic:
דְּתַנְיָא: הַנּוֹדֵר מִן הַיָּרָק, מוּתָּר בַּדִּלּוּעִין, וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹסֵר. אָמְרוּ לוֹ לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: וַהֲלֹא אוֹמֵר אָדָם לִשְׁלוּחוֹ ״קַח לָנוּ יָרָק״, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר ״לֹא מָצָאתִי אֶלָּא דִּלּוּעִין״!
English Translation:
As it is taught in a mishna (Nedarim 54a): One who takes a vow that vegetables are forbidden to him is permitted to eat gourds, as people do not typically consider gourds a type of vegetable, but Rabbi Akiva deems it prohibited for him to eat gourds. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Akiva: But it is a common occurrence that a person says to his agent: Purchase vegetables for us, and the agent, after failing to find vegetables, returns and says: I found only gourds. This indicates that gourds are not considered vegetables.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara imports the source dispute. The Rabbis permit gourds to one who vows off vegetables (gourds aren’t vegetables); Rabbi Akiva forbids them. The Rabbis prove their point: an agent sent for vegetables reports “I found only gourds” — showing gourds are a distinct, non-vegetable category.
Key Terms:
- Vegetable (יָרָק) = greens; garden produce
- Gourds (דִּלּוּעִין) = squash-type produce, the disputed item
- Purchase for us (קַח לָנוּ) = the agent’s instruction
Segment 5
TYPE: תירוץ
Rabbi Akiva’s rejoinder: the agent’s very question proves gourds ARE vegetables
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר לָהֶן: כֵּן הַדָּבָר, כְּלוּם אוֹמֵר ״לֹא מָצָאתִי אֶלָּא קִטְנִית״?! אֶלָּא שֶׁדִּלּוּעִין בִּכְלַל יָרָק, וְאֵין קִטְנִית בִּכְלַל יָרָק. רֵישָׁא רַבָּנַן, וְסֵיפָא רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא!
English Translation:
Rabbi Akiva said to them: The matter is so, and that proves that my opinion is correct. Does the agent return and say: I found only legumes? Rather, it is evident that gourds are included in the category of vegetables, although they differ from other vegetables, and therefore, the agent explains that he found only gourds, and asks whether he should purchase them. But legumes are not included in the category of vegetables, and that is why an agent would not even ask about them. Therefore, Rabbi Akiva should also hold that one who takes a vow that meat is forbidden to him is prohibited from eating birds. And if so, the first clause of the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Akiva, and the latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Akiva turns the proof around: the agent asks specifically about gourds precisely because they are a borderline vegetable — he would never bother asking about legumes (קִטְנִית), which are clearly outside the category. The agent’s inquiry itself proves gourds are within “vegetables.” This confirms the mishna’s internal split: first clause = Rabbis, last clause = Rabbi Akiva.
Key Terms:
- Legumes (קִטְנִית) = beans/pulses, clearly not vegetables
- Included in the category (בִּכְלַל) = belongs to that grouping
- First clause (רֵישָׁא) = the opening portion of the mishna
Segment 6
TYPE: תירוץ
Rav Yosef: the whole mishna is Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, citing different Tannaim
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: רַבִּי הִיא, וְנָסֵיב לַהּ אַלִּיבָּא דְתַנָּאֵי, בִּנְדָרִים סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, בְּבָשָׂר בְּחָלָב סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבָּנַן.
English Translation:
Rav Yosef said: That is not difficult. The entire mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and he formulates the mishna according to the opinions of different tanna’im. In the latter clause, with regard to vows, he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, whereas in the first clause, with regard to meat cooked in milk, he holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Yosef resolves the tension: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi (the editor of the Mishna) drew from different Tannaitic opinions in each clause. For vows, he follows Rabbi Akiva (birds forbidden); for meat-in-milk, he follows the Rabbis (birds in milk are only rabbinic). This is a known editorial technique — a single mishna reflecting divergent authorities.
Key Terms:
- Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi (רַבִּי) = the redactor of the Mishna
- Formulates according to different Tannaim (נָסֵיב אַלִּיבָּא דְתַנָּאֵי) = drew each clause from a different authority
Segment 7
TYPE: תירוץ
Rav Ashi: the entire mishna is Rabbi Akiva, reread
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: כּוּלַּהּ רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא הִיא, וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: כׇּל הַבָּשָׂר אָסוּר לְבַשֵּׁל בְּחָלָב, מֵהֶן מִדִּבְרֵי תוֹרָה וּמֵהֶן מִדִּבְרֵי סוֹפְרִים, חוּץ מִבְּשַׂר דָּגִים וַחֲגָבִים, שֶׁאֵינָם לֹא מִדִּבְרֵי תוֹרָה וְלֹא מִדִּבְרֵי סוֹפְרִים.
English Translation:
Rav Ashi said a different explanation: The entire mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, as indicated by the latter clause, concerning vows. And as for the first part of the mishna, this is what it is saying: It is prohibited to cook any meat cooked in milk, some types of meat by Torah law, i.e., that of domesticated animals, and some types of meat by rabbinic law, i.e., that of undomesticated animals and birds. This prohibition applies to all types of meat except for the meat of fish and grasshoppers, which are not prohibited, neither by Torah law nor by rabbinic law.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Ashi offers a unifying reading: the whole mishna follows Rabbi Akiva. The first clause doesn’t claim all meat-in-milk is Torah-level; rather it means “all meat is forbidden in milk — some biblically (domesticated animals), some rabbinically (wild animals and birds) — except fish and grasshoppers, which are neither.” This reconciles the mishna with Rabbi Akiva throughout.
Key Terms:
- By rabbinic law (מִדִּבְרֵי סוֹפְרִים) = a Sages’ decree
- Neither… nor (לֹא… וְלֹא) = wholly outside the prohibition
Segment 8
TYPE: גמרא ודיון
Rav Yosef: placing birds with cheese being forbidden shows birds-in-milk is Torah law
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאָסוּר לְהַעֲלוֹת [וְכוּ׳]. אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ בְּשַׂר עוֹף בְּחָלָב דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ דְּרַבָּנַן – אֲכִילָה גּוּפַהּ גְּזֵירָה, וַאֲנַן נִגְזַר הַעֲלָאָה אַטּוּ אֲכִילָה?
English Translation:
§ The mishna teaches further: And it is prohibited to place any meat with cheese on one table. Rav Yosef said: Conclude from this clause that eating the meat of birds cooked in milk is prohibited by Torah law. As, if it enters your mind that the prohibition against eating it applies merely by rabbinic law, this would be because the consumption of the meat of birds cooked in milk is itself a rabbinic decree, lest one come to eat the meat of an animal in milk. And would we decree against placing birds together with cheese on one table due to the possibility of consumption, which is itself a decree? The Sages do not enact one decree to prevent the violation of another decree.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Yosef argues from the placement prohibition: the mishna forbids even setting bird-meat with cheese on the table. If eating birds-in-milk were merely rabbinic (a decree lest one eat animal-in-milk), then forbidding placement would be a decree-upon-a-decree — which the Sages don’t make. So bird-in-milk must be Torah law. This introduces the principle: no גזירה לגזירה.
Key Terms:
- To place / bring up (לְהַעֲלוֹת) = to set on the table together
- Conclude from this (שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ) = derive from this teaching
- Decree to prevent a decree (גְּזֵירָה אַטּוּ גְּזֵירָה) = a second-order rabbinic safeguard
Segment 9
TYPE: גמרא וראיה
Proof that the Sages don’t decree upon a decree: challa from outside Eretz Yisrael
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּמְנָא תֵּימְרָא דְּלָא גָּזְרִינַן גְּזֵירָה לִגְזֵירָה? דִּתְנַן: חַלַּת חוּצָה לָאָרֶץ
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: And from where do you say that we do not issue one rabbinic decree to prevent violation of another rabbinic decree? The source is as we learned in a mishna (Ḥalla 4:8): Ḥalla from outside of Eretz Yisrael, which must be eaten by a priest,
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara seeks a source for the no-decree-upon-a-decree rule. It cites the mishna about challa (the priestly dough portion) separated outside the Land of Israel — a topic that will demonstrate the principle, continued on 104b. The sentence breaks mid-thought, carrying into the next amud.
Key Terms:
- From where do you say (וּמְנָא תֵּימְרָא) = what is the source
- Challa (חַלָּה) = the dough-portion given to priests
- Outside Eretz Yisrael (חוּצָה לָאָרֶץ) = the diaspora, where challa is only rabbinic
Amud Bet (104b)
Segment 1
TYPE: גמרא וראיה
Challa outside the Land may sit with a non-priest and go to any priest
Hebrew/Aramaic:
נֶאֱכֶלֶת עִם הַזָּר עַל הַשֻּׁלְחָן, וְנִיתֶּנֶת לְכׇל כֹּהֵן שֶׁיִּרְצֶה.
English Translation:
may be eaten with a non-priest present at the same table. The Sages did not issue a decree prohibiting this lest the non-priest partake of the ḥalla, as the separation of ḥalla outside of Eretz Yisrael is itself a rabbinic decree. This proves that the Sages do not issue one decree to prevent violation of another decree. And similarly, ḥalla from outside of Eretz Yisrael may be given to any priest that one wishes, even an uneducated priest who would not guard its state of ritual purity. This is in contrast to ḥalla from Eretz Yisrael, which may be given only to priests who observe the halakhot of ritual purity.
קלאוד על הדף:
The proof completes: diaspora challa may be eaten with a non-priest at the table (no decree lest the non-priest eat it), and may be given to any priest regardless of purity practices. Since diaspora challa is itself only rabbinic, forbidding these would be a decree-upon-a-decree — which the Sages decline. Rav Yosef’s principle is thus supported.
Key Terms:
- Non-priest (זָר) = a non-kohen, forbidden to eat challa
- Any priest he wishes (לְכׇל כֹּהֵן שֶׁיִּרְצֶה) = even one lax about purity
Segment 2
TYPE: קושיא
Abaye’s objection: the proof only works if the diaspora-challa were in the Land
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: בִּשְׁלָמָא אִי אַשְׁמוֹעִינַן חַלַּת חוּצָה לָאָרֶץ בָּאָרֶץ, דְּאִיכָּא לְמִיגְזַר מִשּׁוּם חַלַּת הָאָרֶץ דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, וְלָא גָּזְרִינַן – אִיכָּא לְמִשְׁמָע מִינַּהּ.
English Translation:
Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Granted, your inference would be valid if the mishna in tractate Ḥalla had taught us this with regard to ḥalla from outside of Eretz Yisrael that had been brought into Eretz Yisrael. As in that case, there could be reason to decree against eating it while a non-priest is at the same table, despite the fact that the non-priest eating it is prohibited only by rabbinic law, due to the concern that one might come to eat ḥalla from Eretz Yisrael, which is prohibited to the non-priest by Torah law, at the same table as a non-priest; and yet we do not decree against this practice. If so, there would be grounds to learn from this mishna that the Sages do not issue one decree to prevent violation of another decree.
קלאוד על הדף:
Abaye challenges the proof. It would only demonstrate the principle if the diaspora challa were located IN the Land — where there’d be a real reason to decree (lest one confuse it with Torah-level Land challa), yet the Sages don’t. Only then would leniency prove they avoid decree-upon-decree.
Key Terms:
- Granted (בִּשְׁלָמָא) = the concessive “if only it were the case that…”
- There is reason to decree (אִיכָּא לְמִיגְזַר) = a genuine ground for a safeguard exists
Segment 3
TYPE: קושיא
But the mishna speaks of diaspora challa remaining abroad — where no decree is needed anyway
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא חוּצָה לְאָרֶץ, מִשּׁוּם דְּלֵיכָּא לְמִיגְזַר הוּא. אֲבָל הָכָא, אִי שָׁרֵית לֵיהּ לְאַסּוֹקֵי עוֹף וּגְבִינָה, אָתֵי לְאַסּוֹקֵי בָּשָׂר וּגְבִינָה, וּמֵיכַל בָּשָׂר בְּחָלָב דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא.
English Translation:
But the mishna actually teaches this halakha with regard to ḥalla from outside of Eretz Yisrael that remains there. It therefore proves nothing about compound decrees, as it can be claimed that the practice is permitted only because there is no reason to decree. Since by Torah law the obligation of ḥalla does not apply outside of Eretz Yisrael, there is no chance that such behavior will lead to transgression of Torah law. But here, if you permit one to place the meat of birds and cheese on the same table, some might come to place the meat of domesticated animals and cheese on a single table and to eat this meat cooked in milk, thereby transgressing a prohibition by Torah law.
קלאוד על הדף:
Abaye completes his objection: the mishna speaks of diaspora challa that stays abroad — where there’s simply no reason to decree at all (no Torah-level challa nearby to confuse it with). So the leniency proves nothing. In our case, though, permitting bird-and-cheese on the table could lead to animal-and-cheese and actual Torah-forbidden eating — so a decree here would be justified.
Key Terms:
- There is no reason to decree (לֵיכָּא לְמִיגְזַר) = no genuine ground for a safeguard
- Might come to place (אָתֵי לְאַסּוֹקֵי) = the slippery-slope concern
Segment 4
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Rav Sheshet: this is still cold-in-cold — Abaye: lest one use a boiling stewpot
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: סוֹף סוֹף צוֹנֵן בְּצוֹנֵן הוּא! אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: גְּזֵירָה שֶׁמָּא יַעֲלֶה בְּאִילְפָּס רוֹתֵחַ.
English Translation:
Rav Sheshet objects to the premise of Rav Yosef’s inference: Even if one were to posit that the meat of birds in milk is prohibited by Torah law, ultimately this is still a decree issued due to another decree, as it is a case of cold food in another cold food, consumption of which is itself prohibited by rabbinic law. Abaye said: It is a rabbinic decree, lest one place the meat with cheese in a boiling stewpot, which is a manner of cooking and therefore prohibited by Torah law.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Sheshet objects: placing meat and cheese on a table is only cold-touching-cold, whose prohibition is itself rabbinic — so forbidding placement is again a decree-upon-a-decree. Abaye answers: the placement decree guards against putting them together in a boiling stewpot (אילפס רותח), which IS actual cooking and Torah-forbidden.
Key Terms:
- Cold in cold (צוֹנֵן בְּצוֹנֵן) = neither item is hot; only rabbinically forbidden
- Boiling stewpot (אִילְפָּס רוֹתֵחַ) = a hot vessel in which cooking occurs
Segment 5
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
But a stewpot is a secondary vessel — rather, lest one use a primary vessel
Hebrew/Aramaic:
סוֹף סוֹף, כְּלִי שֵׁנִי הוּא, וּכְלִי שֵׁנִי אֵינוֹ מְבַשֵּׁל! אֶלָּא גְּזֵירָה שֶׁמָּא יַעֲלֶה בְּאִילְפָּס רִאשׁוֹן.
English Translation:
The Gemara counters: Ultimately, even a stewpot is only a secondary vessel, i.e., not the vessel that was on the fire, and as a rule, a secondary vessel does not cook. Rather, one must say that it is a rabbinic decree, lest one place the meat with cheese in a stewpot that is a primary vessel, i.e., that was on the fire. This is certainly cooking meat in milk, and it is prohibited by Torah law.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara refines further: even a stewpot is typically a secondary vessel (כלי שני), which does not halakhically cook. So the decree must guard against a primary vessel (כלי ראשון) — one still on or fresh from the fire — where placing meat and cheese IS real cooking, Torah-forbidden. This anchors the placement prohibition in a genuine Torah-level risk.
Key Terms:
- Secondary vessel (כְּלִי שֵׁנִי) = a vessel food was transferred into; does not cook
- Primary vessel (כְּלִי רִאשׁוֹן / אִילְפָּס רִאשׁוֹן) = the vessel on the fire; does cook
Segment 6
TYPE: משנה
Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel on placing bird-meat with cheese
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְנִי׳ הָעוֹף עוֹלֶה עִם הַגְּבִינָה עַל הַשּׁוּלְחָן, וְאֵינוֹ נֶאֱכָל, דִּבְרֵי בֵּית שַׁמַּאי. וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: לֹא עוֹלֶה וְלֹא נֶאֱכָל. אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: זוֹ מִקּוּלֵּי בֵּית שַׁמַּאי וּמֵחוּמְרֵי בֵּית הִלֵּל.
English Translation:
MISHNA: The meat of birds may be placed with cheese on one table but may not be eaten together with it; this is the statement of Beit Shammai. And Beit Hillel say: It may neither be placed on one table nor be eaten with cheese. Rabbi Yosei said: This is one of the disputes involving leniencies of Beit Shammai and stringencies of Beit Hillel.
קלאוד על הדף:
A new mishna records the classic dispute. Beit Shammai: bird-meat may share the table with cheese (though not be eaten together). Beit Hillel: neither placed nor eaten together. Rabbi Yosei flags this as one of the rare cases where Beit Shammai is lenient and Beit Hillel stringent — an inversion of their usual roles.
Key Terms:
- Beit Shammai / Beit Hillel (בֵּית שַׁמַּאי / בֵּית הִלֵּל) = the two great schools
- Leniencies of Beit Shammai (מִקּוּלֵּי בֵּית שַׁמַּאי) = the unusual cases where Shammai is lenient
Segment 7
TYPE: משנה
Which table? The eating table, not the preparation table
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בְּאֵיזֶה שׁוּלְחָן אָמְרוּ? בְּשׁוּלְחָן שֶׁאוֹכֵל עָלָיו, אֲבָל בְּשׁוּלְחָן שֶׁסּוֹדֵר עָלָיו אֶת הַתַּבְשִׁיל – נוֹתֵן זֶה בְּצַד זֶה, וְאֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ.
English Translation:
The mishna elaborates: With regard to which table are these halakhot stated? It is with regard to a table upon which one eats. But on a table upon which one prepares the cooked food, one may place this meat alongside that cheese or vice versa, and need not be concerned that perhaps they will be mixed and one will come to eat them together.
קלאוד על הדף:
The mishna limits the prohibition to the dining table, where the risk of eating them together is real. On a preparation/serving table, one may set meat beside cheese without concern, since no eating occurs there.
Key Terms:
- Table one eats on (שׁוּלְחָן שֶׁאוֹכֵל עָלָיו) = the dining table, where the concern applies
- Table for arranging food (שׁוּלְחָן שֶׁסּוֹדֵר עָלָיו אֶת הַתַּבְשִׁיל) = the prep/serving surface
Segment 8
TYPE: גמרא וקושיא
Rabbi Yosei seems identical to the first Tanna — what does he add?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גְּמָ׳ רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַיְינוּ תַּנָּא קַמָּא? וְכִי תֵּימָא: אֲכִילָה גּוּפַהּ אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ, דְּקָאָמַר תַּנָּא קַמָּא: בְּהַעֲלָאָה קָא מִיפַּלְגִי, בַּאֲכִילָה לָא פְּלִיגִי, וַאֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: אֲכִילָה גּוּפַהּ מִקּוּלֵּי בֵּית שַׁמַּאי וּמֵחוּמְרֵי בֵּית הִלֵּל.
English Translation:
GEMARA: The Gemara challenges: The opinion of Rabbi Yosei is identical to that of the first tanna. And if you would say that there is a difference between them with regard to the permissibility of eating itself, as the first tanna says that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree with regard to placing meat of birds with cheese on one table, which indicates that with regard to eating they do not disagree, and Rabbi Yosei said in response to this that they also disagree with regard to the permissibility of eating meat of birds in milk, and this is itself one of the disputes involving leniencies of Beit Shammai and stringencies of Beit Hillel, one can refute this claim.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara asks why Rabbi Yosei is quoted at all — he seems to repeat the first Tanna. One might suggest they differ on eating: the first Tanna implies the schools dispute only placement (both forbid eating), while Rabbi Yosei implies they dispute eating too. But the Gemara will refute this reading.
Key Terms:
- First Tanna (תַּנָּא קַמָּא) = the anonymous opening authority
- What is between them (אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ) = the practical difference in their views
Segment 9
TYPE: ברייתא
A baraita shows Rabbi Yosei quotes the same wording — so no dispute on eating
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהָתַנְיָא, רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: שִׁשָּׁה דְּבָרִים מִקּוּלֵּי בֵּית שַׁמַּאי וּמֵחוּמְרֵי בֵּית הִלֵּל, וְזוֹ אַחַת מֵהֶן – עוֹף עוֹלֶה עִם הַגְּבִינָה עַל הַשּׁוּלְחָן, וְאֵינוֹ נֶאֱכָל, דִּבְרֵי בֵּית שַׁמַּאי. וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: לֹא עוֹלֶה וְלֹא נֶאֱכָל!
English Translation:
The refutation is as follows: Isn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei says that six matters are included as the disputes involving leniencies of Beit Shammai and stringencies of Beit Hillel, and this is one of them: The meat of birds is placed with cheese on one table, but it may not be eaten together with it; this is the statement of Beit Shammai. And Beit Hillel say: It may neither be placed on one table nor be eaten with cheese. Evidently, Rabbi Yosei agrees that even according to Beit Shammai the meat of birds may not be eaten with cheese.
קלאוד על הדף:
A baraita refutes the suggested difference: Rabbi Yosei himself lists this among six Shammai-lenient/Hillel-stringent cases, quoting the exact same language — that even Beit Shammai forbids eating bird with cheese, disputing only placement. So Rabbi Yosei does NOT hold the schools disagree on eating.
Key Terms:
- Six matters (שִׁשָּׁה דְּבָרִים) = the enumerated Shammai-lenient cases
- Baraita (ברייתא) = a Tannaitic teaching outside the Mishna
Segment 10
TYPE: גמרא ומימרא
What Rabbi Yosei adds: crediting the first Tanna brings redemption
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא, הָא קָמַשְׁמַע לַן: מַאן תַּנָּא קַמָּא? רַבִּי יוֹסֵי – כׇּל הָאוֹמֵר דָּבָר בְּשֵׁם אוֹמְרוֹ מֵבִיא גְּאוּלָּה לָעוֹלָם, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״וַתֹּאמֶר אֶסְתֵּר לַמֶּלֶךְ בְּשֵׁם מׇרְדֳּכָי״.
English Translation:
Rather, this is what the mishna teaches us: Who is the first tanna? It is Rabbi Yosei. The identification is important, since whoever reports a statement in the name of the one who said it brings redemption to the world. As it is stated with respect to the incident of Bigthan and Teresh: “And Esther reported it to the king in the name of Mordecai” (Esther 2:22), and Mordecai was later rewarded for saving the king’s life, paving the way for the miraculous salvation.
קלאוד על הדף:
The resolution: the anonymous first Tanna IS Rabbi Yosei — the mishna names him afterward to teach who authored the opening view. This models the maxim that citing a teaching in its author’s name brings redemption to the world, proven from Esther, who reported the plot “in the name of Mordecai,” setting the salvation in motion.
Key Terms:
- Whoever reports in the name of its author (הָאוֹמֵר דָּבָר בְּשֵׁם אוֹמְרוֹ) = attributing a teaching properly
- Brings redemption (מֵבִיא גְּאוּלָּה) = advances the world’s salvation
Segment 11
TYPE: גמרא ומימרא
Agra: bird and cheese may be eaten freely — without hand-washing or mouth-wiping
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תְּנָא אַגְרָא חֲמוּהּ דְּרַבִּי אַבָּא: עוֹף וּגְבִינָה נֶאֱכָלִין בְּאַפִּיקוֹרַן. הוּא תָנֵי לַהּ, וְהוּא אָמַר לַהּ: בְּלֹא נְטִילַת יָדַיִם וּבְלֹא קִינּוּחַ הַפֶּה.
English Translation:
The Sage Agra, the father-in-law of Rabbi Abba, taught: The meat of birds and cheese may be eaten freely [apikoren], i.e., there is no need to be strict in this matter. The Gemara notes: He, Agra, teaches it and he says it, i.e., explains his statement: The meat of birds and cheese may be eaten without washing one’s hands and without wiping the mouth between the consumption of each.
קלאוד על הדף:
Agra teaches that bird-meat and cheese may be eaten “freely” (בְּאַפִּיקוֹרַן) — and, uniquely, he supplies his own definition: one may eat them in succession without washing hands or wiping the mouth in between. This introduces the practical laws of separating between meat and dairy.
Key Terms:
- Freely / apikoren (בְּאַפִּיקוֹרַן) = without stringency; permissively
- Wiping the mouth (קִינּוּחַ הַפֶּה) = cleansing the mouth between foods
Segment 12
TYPE: גמרא ומעשה
Rav Yitzchak eats cheese then meat without washing — the household objects
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַב יִצְחָק בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא אִיקְּלַע לְבֵי רַב אָשֵׁי, אַיְיתוֹ לֵיהּ גְּבִינָה – אֲכַל, אַיְיתוֹ לֵיהּ בִּשְׂרָא – אֲכַל, וְלָא מְשָׁא יְדֵיהּ. אָמְרִי לֵיהּ: וְהָא תָּאנֵי אַגְרָא חֲמוּהּ דְּרַבִּי אַבָּא: עוֹף וּגְבִינָה נֶאֱכָלִין בְּאֶפִּיקוֹרֶן, עוֹף וּגְבִינָה – אִין, בָּשָׂר וּגְבִינָה – לָא!
English Translation:
The Gemara relates: Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Mesharshiyya, happened to come to the house of Rav Ashi. They brought him cheese, and he ate it. Next they brought him meat, and he ate it without first washing his hands. The members of Rav Ashi’s household said to him: But didn’t Agra, the father-in-law of Rabbi Abba, teach only that the meat of birds and cheese may be eaten freely? One can infer that with regard to the meat of birds and cheese, yes, one may eat them without washing one’s hands in between, but with regard to the meat of domesticated animals and cheese, no, one may not.
קלאוד על הדף:
A story tests Agra’s teaching. Rav Yitzchak eats cheese then (animal) meat without washing his hands. The household challenges him: Agra permitted only BIRD and cheese without washing — implying animal-meat and cheese DO require washing in between. His practice seems to overreach.
Key Terms:
- Happened to come (אִיקְּלַע) = arrived as a guest
- Yes… no (אִין… לָא) = the inferred limitation of Agra’s leniency
Segment 13
TYPE: גמרא ותירוץ
Rav Yitzchak: Agra’s rule applies at night; by day one can see the hands are clean
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לְהוּ: הָנֵי מִילֵּי בְּלֵילְיָא, אֲבָל בִּימָמָא הָא חָזֵינָא.
English Translation:
Rav Yitzḥak said to them: This statement of Agra applies only if one eats them at night, as one cannot see whether some of the food of the previous dish still remains on his hands, and he must therefore wash them. But if one eats by day, I can see that no food remains on his hands, and consequently there is no need to wash them.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Yitzchak defends himself: Agra’s requirement to wash applies only at night, when one cannot visually confirm the hands are clean. By day, one can simply look and verify no residue remains — so no washing is needed. The concern is residual food, not a formal ritual, hence sight suffices.
Key Terms:
- This applies (הָנֵי מִילֵּי) = the rule is limited to
- By day I can see (בִּימָמָא הָא חָזֵינָא) = daylight allows visual verification
Segment 14
TYPE: ברייתא ודיון
Beit Shammai: wipe the mouth; Beit Hillel: rinse — what do these mean?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תַּנְיָא: בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: מְקַנֵּחַ, וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: מֵדִיחַ. מַאי ״מְקַנֵּחַ״ וּמַאי ״מֵדִיחַ״?
English Translation:
It is taught in a baraita: Beit Shammai say: Between the consumption of meat and milk one must wipe out his mouth, and Beit Hillel say that he must rinse his mouth. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the word: Wipe [mekane’aḥ], and what is the meaning of the word: Rinse [mediaḥ]?
קלאוד על הדף:
A baraita records another Shammai–Hillel dispute on separating meat and milk: Beit Shammai require wiping the mouth (מְקַנֵּחַ), Beit Hillel require rinsing it (מֵדִיחַ). The Gemara poses the question — what exactly do “wipe” and “rinse” denote? — which will be resolved on the next daf, carrying the sugya forward.
Key Terms:
- Wipe / mekane’aḥ (מְקַנֵּחַ) = cleaning the mouth with a solid (e.g., bread)
- Rinse / mediaḥ (מֵדִיחַ) = washing the mouth with liquid