Chullin Daf 128 (חולין דף קכ״ח)
Daf: 128 | Amudim: 128a – 128b | Date: Loading...
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (128a)
Segment 1
TYPE: קושיא
The Tevul Yom mishna has Rabbi Meir requiring that the large piece rise with the small.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: אִם אוֹחֵז בַּקָּטָן וְגָדוֹל עוֹלֶה עִמּוֹ – הֲרֵי הוּא כָּמוֹהוּ, וְאִם לָאו – אֵינוֹ כָּמוֹהוּ.
English Translation:
Rabbi Meir says: If when one grasps the small piece, the large piece ascends with it, it is considered one and the same; but if it does not ascend with it, it is not considered one and the same. This statement of Rabbi Meir is not in accordance with his statement in the mishna that a partially severed limb is part of the body of the animal and is rendered susceptible to impurity along with the body even if one lifts the partially severed limb and the body of the animal does not ascend with it.
קלאוד על הדף:
The contradiction Rabbi Yochanan began raising at the end of 127b is now stated in full. In the mishna of Tevul Yom, Rabbi Meir holds that a small piece counts as one with the larger only if lifting the small brings the large up with it — precisely the test he appeared to reject in our mishna, where he treats a dangling limb as part of the animal regardless. The same sage seems to hold opposite views of the same criterion.
Key Terms:
- אוֹחֵז בַּקָּטָן = one grasps the small piece
- הֲרֵי הוּא כָּמוֹהוּ = it is one and the same as it
- טְבוּל יוֹם (tevul yom) = one who immersed that day and awaits nightfall to complete purification
Segment 2
TYPE: תירוץ
Rabbi Yochanan: the attributions in that mishna are reversed.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מוּחְלֶפֶת הַשִּׁיטָה.
English Translation:
And Rabbi Yochanan resolves the contradiction and says: The attribution of the opinions in tractate Tevul Yom is reversed. Indeed, Rabbi Meir holds that even if when one lifts the smaller piece, the larger piece does not ascend with it, it is still the same item. Therefore, it is apparent that Rabbi Yochanan explains the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon in the mishna in accordance with the explanation of Abaye.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yochanan resolves with muchlefet hashita — the opinions in Tevul Yom are transposed, and what is recorded there in Rabbi Meir’s name in fact belongs to his disputant. Rabbi Meir consistently holds that a small piece remains one with the whole even when the whole does not rise with it. The resolution also settles a question left open on the previous daf: since Rabbi Yochanan needs Rabbi Meir to hold that position, he must be reading the Meir-Shimon machloket as Abaye did rather than as Rabba did.
Key Terms:
- מוּחְלֶפֶת הַשִּׁיטָה = the attribution is reversed — the opinions are transposed
- שִׁיטָה (shita) = the arrangement or attribution of opinions in a source
Segment 3
TYPE: קושיא
Why a contradiction at all? Perhaps tevul yom impurity is different.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּמַאי קוּשְׁיָא? דִּילְמָא שָׁנֵי לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר בֵּין טְבוּל יוֹם לִשְׁאָר טוּמְאוֹת.
English Translation:
With regard to the contradiction between the two statements of Rabbi Meir, the Gemara asks: What is the difficulty? Perhaps Rabbi Meir distinguishes between the impurity of one who immersed that day and other types of impurity. The impurity of one who immersed that day is a more lenient type of impurity, because he has already immersed and need only wait until the end of the day in order to consume sacrificial offerings. Therefore, there is reason to be more lenient when he touches a partially severed piece of food and to rule that the entire food item does not become impure.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara questions whether the contradiction was ever real. Tevul yom is the mildest grade of impurity — the person has already immersed and needs only nightfall to be fully pure — so Rabbi Meir might reasonably rule leniently there about what counts as connected, while ruling stringently for graver impurities. If so, his two statements never conflicted and no reversal is needed.
Key Terms:
- שָׁנֵי לֵיהּ = he distinguishes / it is different for him
- שְׁאָר טוּמְאוֹת = other impurities — the graver categories
- מַאי קוּשְׁיָא = what is the difficulty? — questioning whether an objection holds
Segment 4
TYPE: ברייתא
A baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi equates tevul yom with other impurities.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תַּנְיָא, רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: אֶחָד טְבוּל יוֹם וְאֶחָד שְׁאָר טוּמְאוֹת.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: One cannot make such a distinction between different types of impurity because it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: With regard to both the impurity of one who immersed that day and other types of impurity, the halakhot of contact are the same; whatever is considered contact that transmits impurity with regard to one type of impurity transmits impurity for all types of impurity.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara answers with a baraita in which Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi states that tevul yom and the other impurities are governed alike in the laws of contact — whatever counts as connecting contact for one counts for all. On that view the proposed distinction is unavailable and the contradiction stands.
Key Terms:
- אֶחָד… וְאֶחָד = both this and that — a formula equating two categories
- רַבִּי (Rabbi) = Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, the redactor of the Mishna
Segment 5
TYPE: קושיא
But perhaps only Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi equates them, while Rabbi Meir does not.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְדִילְמָא, לְרַבִּי לָא שָׁנֵי לֵיהּ, וּלְרַבִּי מֵאִיר שָׁנֵי לֵיהּ?
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: But perhaps Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi does not distinguish between the impurity of one who immersed that day and other types of impurity and Rabbi Meir does distinguish in such a manner. Therefore, there is no contradiction between the statements of Rabbi Meir.
קלאוד על הדף:
The answer is immediately pressed. A baraita establishing that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi draws no distinction says nothing about Rabbi Meir, who may well draw one. The contradiction Rabbi Yochanan raised would then dissolve after all, and his reversal would be unnecessary.
Key Terms:
- וְדִילְמָא (vedilma) = and perhaps — reopening a possibility just closed
- לְרַבִּי לָא שָׁנֵי לֵיהּ = for Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi there is no distinction
Segment 6
TYPE: תירוץ
Rabbi Yoshiya: Rabbi Yochanan spoke according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s view.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה, הָכִי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: לְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי מוּחְלֶפֶת הַשִּׁיטָה.
English Translation:
Rabbi Yoshiya said: This is what Rabbi Yochanan meant to say: According to the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who does not distinguish between the impurity of one who immersed that day and other types of impurity, there is a contradiction between the two statements of Rabbi Meir, and the attribution of the opinions in the mishna in tractate Tevul Yom is reversed.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yoshiya supplies the missing qualification. Rabbi Yochanan never claimed the contradiction was absolute; he meant that according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who equates the impurities, Rabbi Meir’s two statements cannot both stand and the Tevul Yom attributions must be reversed. Locating an amoraic claim within a particular tannaitic framework is a standard way of preserving it against a challenge like the one just raised.
Key Terms:
- לְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי = according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s view
- הָכִי אָמַר = this is what he said — clarifying the intent of a statement
Segment 7
TYPE: מימרא
Rava’s explanation: does a handle work for hechsher as well as for impurity?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רָבָא אָמַר: בְּיֵשׁ יָד לְטוּמְאָה, וְאֵין יָד לְהֶכְשֵׁר, קָמִיפַּלְגִי.
English Translation:
Rava said a different explanation of the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon: The mishna is discussing a case where the blood from the slaughter came into contact with the body of the animal but not with the partially severed limb, and both tanna’im agree that an animal constitutes a handle for its limb. They disagree with regard to the principle that there is a status of a handle, i.e., a handle is considered part of the item itself, with regard to transmitting impurity to the attached food, but there is no status of a handle with regard to rendering the attached food susceptible to impurity, as in that regard the handle is considered a separate item.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava offers the third reading of the Meir-Shimon dispute, after Rabba’s and Abaye’s on 127b. On his account both tannaim agree that the animal’s body is a yad, a handle, for the dangling limb. What divides them is the scope of a handle’s power: yesh yad letumah ve’ein yad lehechsher, whether a handle serves only to transmit impurity to the attached food or also to render it susceptible in the first place.
Key Terms:
- יָד (yad) = a handle — an attached part through which impurity or susceptibility passes
- הֶכְשֵׁר (hechsher) = rendering food susceptible to impurity through contact with a liquid
- קָמִיפַּלְגִי = they disagree
Segment 8
TYPE: ביאור
Rabbi Shimon limits the handle to impurity; Rabbi Meir extends it to both.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מָר סָבַר יֵשׁ יָד לְטוּמְאָה וְאֵין יָד לְהֶכְשֵׁר, וּמָר סָבַר יֵשׁ יָד לְטוּמְאָה וּלְהֶכְשֵׁר.
English Translation:
One Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds that there is a status of a handle with regard to transmitting impurity, but there is no status of a handle with regard to rendering the attached food susceptible to impurity. Therefore, although the body of the animal constitutes a handle vis-a-vis the limb, it does not render the limb susceptible to impurity. And one Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that there is a status of a handle both with regard to transmitting impurity and with regard to rendering the attached food susceptible to impurity. Therefore, the body of the animal renders the limb susceptible to impurity.
קלאוד על הדף:
The two positions are assigned. Rabbi Shimon holds a handle operates for transmitting impurity but not for conferring susceptibility, so the blood on the animal’s body leaves the limb unprepared. Rabbi Meir holds it operates for both, so the limb is rendered susceptible along with the body. The distinction is fine but consequential: conducting an existing status is treated as a lesser act than creating one.
Key Terms:
- יֵשׁ יָד לְטוּמְאָה = there is a handle for impurity — it conducts impurity
- וְאֵין יָד לְהֶכְשֵׁר = but there is no handle for rendering susceptible
Segment 9
TYPE: מימרא
Rav Pappa’s explanation: does wetting before designation count?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: בְּהֶכְשֵׁר קוֹדֶם מַחְשָׁבָה קָמִיפַּלְגִי.
English Translation:
Rav Pappa said a different explanation of the dispute: Both tanna’im hold that a handle renders the attached food susceptible to impurity. Yet, the mishna is discussing a case where the slaughter took place before the owner of the animal designated its meat for the consumption of a gentile. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon disagree with regard to whether an item can be rendered susceptible to impurity before intention, i.e., before one intends to use it as food. Rabbi Shimon holds that since the animal came in contact with the blood of the slaughter before the owner intended to use it as food, it is not rendered susceptible to impurity. Rabbi Meir holds that the susceptibility to impurity takes effect such that when the owner considers it as food it will be susceptible to impurity.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Pappa relocates the dispute again. Both tannaim accept that a handle confers susceptibility; the case is one where the slaughter, and therefore the wetting, preceded the owner’s designation of the meat as food. The question is hechsher kodem machshava — whether liquid contact that precedes the intention to use something as food can render it susceptible at all, or whether the sequence must run the other way.
Key Terms:
- הֶכְשֵׁר קוֹדֶם מַחְשָׁבָה = susceptibility preceding intention
- מַחְשָׁבָה (machshava) = intention — designating an item as food
Segment 10
TYPE: ברייתא
Rabbi Akiva’s original teaching about forbidden fat in the villages.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
דִּתְנַן, אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: כָּךְ הָיָה רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא שׁוֹנֶה – חֵלֶב שְׁחוּטָה בַּכְּפָרִים צָרִיךְ מַחְשָׁבָה, וְאֵין צָרִיךְ הֶכְשֵׁר, שֶׁכְּבָר הוּכְשַׁר בַּשְּׁחִיטָה.
English Translation:
This dispute is also found in that which we learned in a baraita (Tosefta, Okatzin 3:2): Rabbi Yehuda says that Rabbi Akiva would teach this halakha: Fat forbidden in consumption for a Jew from an animal slaughtered in the villages requires intention, i.e., designation, for consumption, for it to become susceptible to impurity. This is because the population in such places is small and there is an abundance of meat, so people do not generally consume the fat. Consequently, unless the Jewish owner intends for a gentile to consume it, it is not considered food. But the fat does not require contact with a liquid in order to be rendered susceptible to impurity, as it was already rendered susceptible by the blood of slaughter even though it came into contact with the blood before the Jew designated it for consumption.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Pappa grounds his reading in a Tosefta. Rabbi Yehuda reports that Rabbi Akiva originally taught that the forbidden fat of an animal slaughtered in the villages requires machshava — since in villages, where meat is plentiful, such fat is not ordinarily eaten — but requires no separate hechsher, because the slaughter-blood already wet it. That the wetting preceded the designation was, on this teaching, no obstacle.
Key Terms:
- חֵלֶב שְׁחוּטָה בַּכְּפָרִים = forbidden fat of an animal slaughtered in the villages
- שֶׁכְּבָר הוּכְשַׁר בַּשְּׁחִיטָה = for it was already rendered susceptible by the slaughter
Segment 11
TYPE: ברייתא
Rabbi Yehuda’s challenge from the endives, and Rabbi Akiva’s retraction.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַרְתִּי לְפָנָיו: לִמַּדְתָּנוּ רַבֵּינוּ, עוּלְשִׁין שֶׁלִּקְּטָן וְהִדִּיחָן לַבְּהֵמָה, וְנִמְלַךְ עֲלֵיהֶן לָאָדָם – צְרִיכוֹת הֶכְשֵׁר שֵׁנִי. וְחָזַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא לִהְיוֹת שׁוֹנֶה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה.
English Translation:
Rabbi Yehuda continues: I said before him: You taught us, our teacher, that in a case of endives that one picked and rinsed in water for the consumption of an animal, and one later reconsidered and decided to designate them for human consumption, the endives need to come into contact with liquid a second time in order to be rendered susceptible to impurity, as food designated for animal consumption does not contract impurity. Evidently, for a food item to become susceptible to impurity, its contact with liquid must occur after one designated it as food. And Rabbi Akiva then retracted his previous statement and taught the halakha in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yehuda challenged his teacher from a ruling Rabbi Akiva had himself taught: endives picked and rinsed as animal feed, then redesignated for human consumption, require a second rinsing, since food designated for animals cannot contract impurity. The implication is that wetting must follow designation. Rabbi Akiva accepted the objection and retracted, teaching thereafter in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda — a teacher publicly revising his position on a student’s argument.
Key Terms:
- עוּלְשִׁין (ulshin) = endives
- הֶכְשֵׁר שֵׁנִי = a second rendering-susceptible — a further contact with liquid
- וְחָזַר (vechazar) = and he retracted
Segment 12
TYPE: מסקנא
Rav Pappa: Rabbi Meir holds like the original teaching, Rabbi Shimon like the retraction.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מָר סָבַר לַהּ כְּמֵעִיקָּרָא, וּמָר סָבַר לַהּ כַּחֲזָרָה.
English Translation:
Rav Pappa concludes: Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon disagree in the same manner. One Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds in accordance with that which Rabbi Akiva taught originally, and one Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds in accordance with that which Rabbi Akiva taught after his retraction of his original statement.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Pappa completes his reading by mapping the tannaim onto the two stages of Rabbi Akiva’s position. Rabbi Meir follows the original teaching, that wetting before designation suffices; Rabbi Shimon follows the retraction, that it does not. A dispute between two later tannaim is thus traced to a change of mind in their teacher’s own lifetime, with each preserving a different phase of it.
Key Terms:
- כְּמֵעִיקָּרָא = like the original position
- כַּחֲזָרָה = like the retraction
Segment 13
TYPE: מימרא
Rav Acha son of Rav Ika: the blood was wiped between the two simanim.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִיקָא אָמַר: בְּנִתְקַנֵּחַ הַדָּם בֵּין סִימָן לְסִימָן קָמִיפַּלְגִי.
English Translation:
Rav Acha, son of Rav Ika, said another explanation of the dispute: The mishna is discussing a case where the blood of slaughter came into contact with a partially severed limb, and the blood of slaughter is one of the liquids that render food susceptible to impurity. But slaughter is valid only if one cuts the two simanim, the windpipe and the gullet, or the majority of the two simanim, and the tanna’im disagree with regard to a case where the blood in question was wiped off between the cutting of the first siman and the second siman.
קלאוד על הדף:
The fourth explanation supposes that the blood did reach the limb, but was wiped away between the cutting of the first siman and the second. Since a valid slaughter requires both the windpipe and the gullet, the status of blood shed after only the first cut becomes the question — and that turns on when slaughter legally begins.
Key Terms:
- נִתְקַנֵּחַ הַדָּם = the blood was wiped off
- סִימָן (siman) = the windpipe or the gullet, the two organs severed in slaughter
Segment 14
TYPE: ביאור
Is slaughter one act from beginning to end, or only its conclusion?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מָר סָבַר יֶשְׁנָהּ לִשְׁחִיטָה מִתְּחִלָּה וְעַד סוֹף, וְהַאי דַּם שְׁחִיטָה הוּא, וּמָר סָבַר אֵינָהּ לִשְׁחִיטָה אֶלָּא לְסוֹף, וְהַאי דַּם מַכָּה הוּא.
English Translation:
One Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that slaughter is defined from the beginning to the end of its performance, and this blood that splashed on the limb is considered blood of slaughter. And one Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds that slaughter is defined only as the conclusion of its performance, and this blood from the first siman is considered the blood of a wound and does not render the limb susceptible to impurity.
קלאוד על הדף:
The positions are drawn. Rabbi Meir holds slaughter is a single act mitechila ve’ad sof, from start to finish, so blood shed after the first cut is genuine slaughter-blood and confers susceptibility. Rabbi Shimon holds slaughter exists only at its completion, so that earlier blood is merely dam makka, the blood of a wound, which does not. The question of when a halachic act legally begins reaches well beyond purity.
Key Terms:
- מִתְּחִלָּה וְעַד סוֹף = from beginning to end — a single continuous act
- דַּם מַכָּה = the blood of a wound — not slaughter-blood
Segment 15
TYPE: מימרא
Rav Ashi: does the slaughter render susceptible, or the blood?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: בִּשְׁחִיטָה מַכְשֶׁרֶת וְלֹא דָּם קָמִיפַּלְגִי.
English Translation:
Rav Ashi said another explanation of the dispute: The case is where the blood of slaughter came in contact with the partially severed limb, but Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon disagree with regard to the principle that the slaughter itself renders the limb susceptible to impurity, and not the blood of slaughter. Rabbi Shimon holds that the blood of slaughter is not one of the liquids that render food susceptible to impurity. But the slaughter itself renders the meat of the animal susceptible to impurity, because it prepares the meat for consumption. Therefore, since a partially severed limb is not prepared for consumption by the slaughter, as it remains forbidden, the slaughter does not render it susceptible to impurity. Rabbi Meir maintains that the blood of slaughter is one of the liquids that render food susceptible to impurity, and therefore, the limb is rendered susceptible.
קלאוד על הדף:
The fifth explanation reframes the mechanism entirely. On Rav Ashi’s reading Rabbi Shimon holds shechita machsheret velo dam — it is the act of slaughter that renders meat susceptible, by preparing it for consumption, and not the blood at all. Since the dangling limb remains forbidden and is therefore not prepared, slaughter does nothing for it. Rabbi Meir holds the blood itself is one of the seven liquids and does the work directly.
Key Terms:
- שְׁחִיטָה מַכְשֶׁרֶת וְלֹא דָּם = the slaughter renders susceptible, not the blood
- שִׁבְעָה מַשְׁקִין = the seven liquids that render food susceptible to impurity
Segment 16
TYPE: בעיא
Rabba’s dilemma: is a living animal a handle for its own dangling limb?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בָּעֵי רַבָּה: בְּהֵמָה בְּחַיֶּיהָ, מַהוּ שֶׁתֵּעָשֶׂה יָד לְאֵבֶר? תֵּיקוּ.
English Translation:
§Earlier (127b), Rabba explained that Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon disagree with regard to whether the body of an animal constitutes a handle for its limb. With regard to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who holds that it does constitute a handle, Rabba raises a dilemma: What is the halakha if an animal with a partially severed limb came into contact with a source of impurity during its lifetime? In such a case, where the animal is not susceptible to contract impurity because it is alive but the partially severed limb is susceptible to contract impurity as food, does the animal constitute a handle for its limb and transmit the impurity to the limb? The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
קלאוד על הדף:
The daf now turns to a series of unresolved questions about the reach of yad, and Rabba opens it. On Rabbi Meir’s view that the animal is a handle for its limb, what happens when a living animal with a dangling limb touches a source of impurity? The animal itself cannot contract impurity while alive, but the limb can, as food. Does the animal nonetheless conduct impurity to it? The Gemara answers teiku — unresolved.
Key Terms:
- בְּחַיֶּיהָ (bechayeha) = during its lifetime — while the animal is still alive
- תֵּיקוּ (teiku) = let it stand — a question left unresolved
Segment 17
TYPE: משנה
The cucumber in an unperforated flowerpot that grew out over the ground.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הֲרֵי אָמְרוּ, קִישּׁוּת שֶׁנְּטָעָהּ בְּעָצִיץ וְהִגְדִּילָה וְיָצָאת חוּץ לֶעָצִיץ – טְהוֹרָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara introduces a similar dilemma. Abaye says: The Sages said in the mishna (Okatzin 2:9): In the case of an impure cucumber that one planted in an unperforated flowerpot, such that the cucumber is considered detached from the ground and susceptible to impurity as food, and the cucumber grew and went out beyond the edge of the flowerpot such that part of the cucumber is overlying the ground, the entire cucumber is considered attached to the ground and therefore becomes pure.
קלאוד על הדף:
Abaye introduces his dilemma with a mishna from Okatzin. An impure cucumber is planted in an unperforated pot, so that it counts as detached from the ground and can bear food impurity; it then grows out past the pot’s rim so that part of it lies over the ground. The first view holds the whole cucumber thereby becomes attached to the ground and pure.
Key Terms:
- קִישּׁוּת (kishut) = a cucumber
- עָצִיץ שֶׁאֵינוֹ נָקוּב = an unperforated flowerpot — whose contents count as detached from the ground
Segment 18
TYPE: משנה
Rabbi Shimon: each part keeps its own status.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: וְכִי מָה טִיבָהּ לְטַהֵר? אֶלָּא הַטָּמֵא בְּטוּמְאָתוֹ, וְטָהוֹר בְּטׇהֳרָתוֹ.
English Translation:
Rabbi Shimon says: What is the nature of the impurity of the cucumber that it is rendered pure in such a case? Rather, the part of the cucumber that is inside the flowerpot and impure remains in its state of impurity, and the part of the cucumber that is outside the flowerpot and pure remains in its state of purity.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Shimon objects that there is no reason for the impurity simply to vanish. Instead each portion retains what it had — hatamei betum’ato vetahor betohorato, the impure part stays impure and the pure part stays pure. A single cucumber is thus split down the middle into two statuses, which is exactly the configuration Abaye’s question needs.
Key Terms:
- הַטָּמֵא בְּטוּמְאָתוֹ = the impure part in its impurity
- וְטָהוֹר בְּטׇהֳרָתוֹ = and the pure part in its purity
Segment 19
TYPE: בעיא
Abaye’s dilemma: does the outside part serve as a handle for the inside?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בָּעֵי אַבָּיֵי: מַהוּ שֶׁתֵּעָשֶׂה יָד לַחֲבֶרְתָּהּ? תֵּיקוּ.
English Translation:
Based on this mishna, Abaye raises a dilemma according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon: What is the halakha if the part of the cucumber outside of the flowerpot comes into contact with a source of impurity? Does the part of the cucumber outside the flowerpot constitute a handle for its counterpart inside the flowerpot and transmit impurity to it? The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
קלאוד על הדף:
Abaye now asks, on Rabbi Shimon’s view, what happens when the outer portion of the cucumber — the pure one, lying over the ground — touches a source of impurity. Does it act as a handle conducting that impurity to the inner portion? Teiku. The structure matches Rabba’s question exactly, transposed from an animal to a plant.
Key Terms:
- לַחֲבֶרְתָּהּ (lachaverta) = for its counterpart — the other portion of the same object
- מַהוּ שֶׁתֵּעָשֶׂה יָד = what is the law — does it become a handle?
Segment 20
TYPE: בעיא
Rabbi Yirmeya opens a third dilemma, from the half-gourd.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: הֲרֵי אָמְרוּ הַמִּשְׁתַּחֲוֶה לַחֲצִי דַלַּעַת אֲסָרָהּ, בָּעֵי רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה:
English Translation:
The Gemara relates another dilemma based on the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yirmeya says: The Sages said that one who bows down to a half of a gourd, worshipping it as a divinity, renders that half of the gourd forbidden, i.e., it is prohibited to derive benefit from it, because it was worshipped as an idol. The other half, though, is not forbidden. Based on this ruling, Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma:
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yirmeya brings the same structure into a third area of law. The Sages ruled that one who bows to half a gourd renders that half forbidden for benefit, while the other half remains permitted — so a single vegetable again holds two statuses. His question begins here and completes on 128b.
Key Terms:
- הַמִּשְׁתַּחֲוֶה (hamishtachaveh) = one who bows down — worshipping an object
- אֲסָרָהּ (asarah) = he rendered it forbidden — prohibited for benefit
Amud Bet (128b)
Segment 1
TYPE: בעיא
The gourd dilemma completed — and left unresolved.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַהוּ שֶׁתֵּעָשֶׂה יָד לַחֲבֶרְתָּהּ? תֵּיקוּ.
English Translation:
According to Rabbi Shimon, an item that is forbidden due to idol worship is not susceptible to impurity as food (see 129a). What is the halakha if the forbidden part of the gourd comes into contact with a source of impurity? Does the forbidden part constitute a handle for its permitted counterpart and transmit impurity to it? The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
קלאוד על הדף:
The question finishes: does the forbidden half serve as a handle for the permitted half, conducting impurity to it? An object forbidden through worship is not susceptible to food impurity, so the two halves again differ in status. Teiku — the third unresolved question in the series.
Key Terms:
- לַחֲבֶרְתָּהּ (lachaverta) = for its counterpart — the other half of the gourd
- דָּבָר הָאָסוּר = a forbidden object — here, one rendered forbidden through worship
Segment 2
TYPE: משנה
The fig branch hanging by its bark.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: הֲרֵי אָמְרוּ יִחוּר שֶׁל תְּאֵנָה שֶׁנִּפְשַׁח וּמְעוֹרֶה בִּקְלִיפָּתָהּ – רַבִּי יְהוּדָה מְטַהֵר, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אִם יָכוֹל לִחְיוֹת – טָהוֹר, וְאִם לָאו – טָמֵא.
English Translation:
The Gemara discusses a similar dilemma. Rav Pappa says: The Sages said in a mishna (Okatzin 3:8): In the case of a branch of a fig tree that was mainly detached from the tree and which remains attached only to the bark of the tree, Rabbi Yehuda holds that the figs on the branch are considered as if they are still attached to the tree. Therefore, he deems them not susceptible to impurity. And the Rabbis say: If one is able to reattach the branch to the tree such that the branch can continue to live and produce fruit, then it is considered as if it is attached to the tree and the fruit on it is not susceptible to impurity. But if not, then the fruit is susceptible to impurity.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Pappa introduces the fourth case from a mishna in Okatzin. A fig branch mostly severed and clinging by its bark divides the tannaim: Rabbi Yehuda treats the figs as still attached and not susceptible to impurity, while the Rabbis make it depend on viability — if the branch could still live, the figs are not susceptible; if not, they are.
Key Terms:
- יִחוּר (yichur) = a branch or shoot
- שֶׁנִּפְשַׁח (shenifshach) = that was mostly severed / split off
- אִם יָכוֹל לִחְיוֹת = if it is able to live — the Rabbis’ criterion
Segment 3
TYPE: בעיא
Rav Pappa’s dilemma: a viable branch bearing a non-viable one.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בָּעֵי רַב פָּפָּא: מַהוּ שֶׁיֵּעָשֶׂה יָד לַחֲבֵירוֹ? תֵּיקוּ.
English Translation:
With regard to this mishna, Rav Pappa raises a dilemma: According to the Rabbis, who distinguish between a branch that can be reattached and one that cannot, what is the halakha in the case of a branch that is mainly detached from a tree but can be reattached, and a second branch grows out from that branch, and is mainly detached from it and cannot be reattached? In such a case, the branch that can be reattached to the tree is not susceptible to contracting impurity, but the branch attached to it is. If the branch that is not susceptible to contract impurity comes into contact with a source of impurity, does it constitute a handle for the other branch and transmit impurity to it? The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Pappa constructs the split-status case on the Rabbis’ view. A branch that could still be reattached is not susceptible to impurity; a second branch growing from it, itself mostly severed and beyond saving, is susceptible. If the non-susceptible branch touches a source of impurity, does it act as a handle for the susceptible one? Teiku — the fourth.
Key Terms:
- לַחֲבֵירוֹ (lachavero) = for its fellow — the other branch
- מַהוּ שֶׁיֵּעָשֶׂה יָד = what is the law — does it become a handle?
Segment 4
TYPE: משנה
The stone in the corner wall shared by two houses.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא, הֲרֵי אָמְרוּ: אֶבֶן שֶׁבַּזָּוִית, כְּשֶׁהוּא חוֹלֵץ – חוֹלֵץ אֶת כּוּלָּהּ, וּכְשֶׁהוּא נוֹתֵץ – נוֹתֵץ אֶת שֶׁלּוֹ וּמַנִּיחַ אֶת שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ.
English Translation:
The Gemara discusses another similar dilemma. Rabbi Zeira says: The Sages said in a mishna (Nega’im 13:2): In the case of a large stone that is situated in the corner of a wall shared by two houses, where the stone is visible from inside both houses, if a leprous mark appears in one of the houses on the stone, when one extracts the stone he must extract the entire stone, even the part of the stone that is part of the neighbor’s wall. But when one destroys his house, after a reappearance of the leprous mark, he must destroy only the part of a stone that is in his house, and leaves the part of a stone that belongs to his neighbor.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Zeira brings the fifth and most striking case, from Nega’im. A large stone sits in the corner of a wall shared by two houses and is visible from inside both. If a leprous mark appears in one house, the owner removing the stone (cholaitz) must take the whole stone, including his neighbor’s portion; but if he must later demolish (notaitz), he demolishes only his own part and leaves his neighbor’s standing. The two procedures treat the same stone differently.
Key Terms:
- חוֹלֵץ (cholaitz) = he extracts / removes the stone
- נוֹתֵץ (notaitz) = he demolishes
- נֶגַע (nega) = a leprous mark — a ritual status affecting houses, garments and skin
Segment 5
TYPE: בעיא
Rabbi Zeira’s dilemma: does the neighbor’s half conduct the impurity?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בָּעֵי רַבִּי זֵירָא: מַהוּ שֶׁתֵּעָשֶׂה יָד לַחֲבֶרְתָּהּ? תֵּיקוּ.
English Translation:
With regard to this mishna Rabbi Zeira raises a dilemma: What is the halakha in such a case with regard to the transmission of impurity from the leprous house to the adjacent house? Does half of the stone in the adjacent house constitute a handle for the other half and impart impurity such that one who enters the neighbor’s house becomes impure just as one who enters the leprous house? Or perhaps there is no halakha of a handle with regard to the impurity of a leprous house. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Zeira asks whether the half of the stone standing in the neighbor’s house serves as a handle for the afflicted half, so that entering the neighbor’s house would render one impure as though entering the afflicted house itself. Teiku. With this the series closes: five sages, five areas of law — a living animal, a cucumber, a gourd, a fig branch, a shared wall — all probing one concept, and all left open.
Key Terms:
- בַּיִת הַמְנוּגָּע = a house afflicted with a leprous mark
- תֵּיקוּ (teiku) = let it stand — the fifth unresolved question in the series
Segment 6
TYPE: שאלה
What distinguishes a limb from a living animal from a limb of a carcass?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מֵתָה הַבְּהֵמָה. מַאי אִיכָּא בֵּין אֵבֶר מִן הַחַי לְאֵבֶר מִן הַנְּבֵלָה?
English Translation:
§The mishna teaches: If the animal died, the hanging flesh needs to be rendered susceptible to impurity via contact with a liquid in order to become impure, as its halakhic status is that of flesh severed from a living animal, which is ritually pure and does not have the status of an unslaughtered carcass. The hanging limb imparts impurity as a limb severed from a living animal but does not impart impurity as the limb of an unslaughtered carcass. The Gemara asks: What difference is there between the impurity of a limb from a living animal and the impurity of a limb from a carcass?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara returns to the mishna. Both a limb severed from a living animal and a limb of a carcass impart impurity, so the mishna’s careful distinction between them requires a practical difference to justify it.
Key Terms:
- אֵבֶר מִן הַחַי = a limb from a living animal
- אֵבֶר מִן הַנְּבֵלָה = a limb of an unslaughtered carcass
Segment 7
TYPE: תשובה
The difference is flesh that separates from the limb.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ בָּשָׂר הַפּוֹרֵשׁ מִמֶּנּוּ, דְּאִילּוּ בָּשָׂר הַפּוֹרֵשׁ מֵאֵבֶר מִן הַחַי – לֹא מְטַמֵּא, מֵאֵבֶר מִן הַנְּבֵלָה – מְטַמֵּא.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: The difference between them is with regard to flesh that separates from the limb of an animal, as flesh that separates from a limb severed from the living does not impart impurity, just like flesh that separates directly from a living animal. By contrast, an olive-bulk of flesh that separates from the limb of a carcass imparts impurity like the flesh of a carcass.
קלאוד על הדף:
The answer is basar haporesh mimenu. Flesh cut away from a limb of a living animal does not impart impurity, exactly as flesh cut from the living animal itself does not. Flesh cut from a carcass limb does impart impurity, as carcass flesh. The limbs behave alike; what they yield does not.
Key Terms:
- בָּשָׂר הַפּוֹרֵשׁ מִמֶּנּוּ = flesh that separates from it
- אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ = there is a difference between them — the practical consequence
Segment 8
TYPE: דרשה
Rav: ‘from the animal’ includes a limb torn from a living animal.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֵבֶר מִן הַחַי דִּמְטַמֵּא, מַאי קְרָא? אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: ״וְכִי יָמוּת מִן הַבְּהֵמָה״.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: What is the verse from which it is derived that a limb severed from the living imparts impurity? Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: With regard to the impurity of a carcass it is written: “And if some animal [min habehema] of which you may eat dies, he who touches its carcass shall be impure until evening” (Leviticus 11:39). The phrase “some animal [min habehema],” which also means: From an animal, is interpreted as indicating that a limb torn from an animal is included in the impurity discussed in the verse.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Yehuda in Rav’s name supplies the scriptural source. Vayikra 11:39 reads vechi yamut min habehema — and the word min, from, is read as pointing to a part taken from an animal rather than the whole. A limb severed from the living is thereby included in the impurity the verse describes.
Key Terms:
- מִן הַבְּהֵמָה (min habehema) = from the animal — read as indicating a part of it
- וְכִי יָמוּת = and if it dies (Vayikra 11:39)
Segment 9
TYPE: קושיא
But that phrase is needed to exclude a slaughtered tereifa.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהַאי מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לִכְאִידַּךְ דְּרַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב, דְּאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ בְּמַתְנִיתָא תָּנָא: ״וְכִי יָמוּת מִן הַבְּהֵמָה״ – מִקְצָת בְּהֵמָה מְטַמְּאָה, וּמִקְצָת בְּהֵמָה אֵינָהּ מְטַמְּאָה, וְאֵיזוֹ זוֹ? זוֹ טְרֵפָה שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ!
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: How can Rav interpret this verse in such a manner? This verse is necessary for another halakha that Rav Yehuda said that Rav said, as Rav Yehuda said that Rav said, and some say it was taught in a baraita: In the verse: “And if some animal [min habehema] of which you may eat dies, he who touches its carcass shall be impure until evening,” the phrase “some animal [min habehema]” indicates that some dead animals impart impurity as a carcass, and some dead animals do not impart impurity as a carcass. And which is that animal that does not impart impurity as a carcass? That is an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [tereifa] that one slaughtered. Even though slaughter does not render the animal permitted to be eaten, it removes the animal from the category of a carcass with regard to impurity.
קלאוד על הדף:
A difficulty arises because the same phrase already carries another teaching of Rav’s: min habehema implies that some dead animals impart carcass impurity and some do not — the exception being a tereifa that was properly slaughtered, which remains forbidden to eat but is removed from the category of a carcass for impurity. One phrase cannot obviously yield two derashot.
Key Terms:
- טְרֵפָה שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ = a tereifa that one slaughtered
- מִקְצָת בְּהֵמָה = part of the category of animals — some but not all
Segment 10
TYPE: תירוץ
Two words rather than one: the verse yields both teachings.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִם כֵּן, לִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא ״מִבְּהֵמָה״, מַאי ״מִן הַבְּהֵמָה״? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ תַּרְתֵּי.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: If so, if the verse teaches only one of the two halakhot, let the Merciful One write mibehema, in one Hebrew word. What is the verse teaching when it states: “Min habehema,” with two Hebrew words? It is teaching that one should conclude two conclusions from it.
קלאוד על הדף:
The resolution turns on orthography. Had the Torah intended only one teaching it could have written mibehema as a single word; writing min habehema as two words signals that both derashot are intended. Counting words to license a second reading is a standard technique, and it lets the verse serve both purposes at once.
Key Terms:
- לִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא = let the Merciful One write — proposing a more economical wording
- שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ תַּרְתֵּי = conclude two things from it
Segment 11
TYPE: ברייתא
Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: only what the body does not regenerate.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִי הָכִי, אֲפִילּוּ בָּשָׂר נָמֵי? לָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ, דְּתַנְיָא: יָכוֹל יְהֵא בָּשָׂר הַפּוֹרֵשׁ מִן הַחַי טָמֵא? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״וְכִי יָמוּת מִן הַבְּהֵמָה״ – מָה מִיתָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ עוֹשָׂה חֲלִיפִין, אַף כֹּל שֶׁאֵינוֹ עוֹשֶׂה חֲלִיפִין, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי.
English Translation:
The Gemara challenges: If so, if this verse teaches that a limb from a living animal imparts impurity, one can also derive from it that even flesh from a living animal imparts impurity. The Gemara responds: It should not enter your mind to derive this, as it is taught in a baraita: One might have thought that flesh that separates from a living animal is impure like a carcass. Therefore, the verse states: “And if some animal of which you may eat dies.” Just as death does not generate a replacement, i.e., life is not regenerated from the dead, so too any element of an animal that dies and does not generate a replacement assumes the impurity of a carcass. An animal does not replace a severed limb but it does replace severed flesh; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei.
קלאוד על הדף:
If the verse includes a limb, why not flesh as well? A baraita gives three answers, and the first is Rabbi Yosei HaGelili’s. Reading vechi yamut, he reasons that just as death generates no replacement, only what the body cannot regenerate falls under carcass impurity. An animal does not regrow a severed limb but does replace severed flesh, so flesh is excluded.
Key Terms:
- חֲלִיפִין (chalifin) = a replacement — what the body regenerates
- מָה מִיתָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ עוֹשָׂה חֲלִיפִין = just as death generates no replacement
Segment 12
TYPE: ברייתא
Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: sinews and bones, or flesh too.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: ״בְּהֵמָה״, מָה בְּהֵמָה – גִּידִים וַעֲצָמוֹת, אַף כֹּל – גִּידִים וַעֲצָמוֹת. רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: ״בְּהֵמָה״ מָה בְּהֵמָה – בָּשָׂר גִּידִים וַעֲצָמוֹת, אַף כֹּל – בָּשָׂר גִּידִים וַעֲצָמוֹת.
English Translation:
Rabbi Akiva says: One can derive this halakha from the word “animal” in the verse. Just as an animal contains sinews and bones, so too, any element of an animal that contains sinews and bones imparts impurity. Therefore, a limb, which contains sinews and bones, imparts impurity, but flesh, which does not contain sinews and bones, does not impart impurity. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: One can derive this halakha from the word “animal” in the verse. Just as an animal contains flesh, sinews, and bones, so too, any element of an animal that contains flesh, sinews, and bones imparts impurity.
קלאוד על הדף:
The baraita’s remaining two views both derive from the word behema itself, differing on how much of the animal a part must reproduce. Rabbi Akiva reasons that an animal is a structure of sinews and bones, so only a part sharing that composition imparts impurity — a limb qualifies, flesh does not. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi reads the same word more demandingly: an animal comprises flesh, sinews and bones, so only a part containing all three qualifies. His is the strictest of the three criteria, and the next segment shows exactly where it bites.
Key Terms:
- גִּידִים וַעֲצָמוֹת = sinews and bones — Rabbi Akiva’s criterion
- בָּשָׂר גִּידִים וַעֲצָמוֹת = flesh, sinews and bones — Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s criterion
- בְּהֵמָה (behema) = an animal — the word from which both derive
Segment 13
TYPE: נפקא מינה
Between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Akiva: the leg joint.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַאי אִיכָּא בֵּין רַבִּי לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא? אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ אַרְכוּבָּה.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: What difference is there between the opinions of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Akiva? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is with regard to the leg joint, which contains sinews and bones but no flesh. According to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi it does not impart impurity when it separates from a living animal, but according to Rabbi Akiva it does.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara locates where the two criteria diverge. The arkuva, the leg joint, consists of sinew and bone with no flesh — so on Rabbi Akiva’s test it imparts impurity when severed from a living animal, while on Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s stricter test, which also requires flesh, it does not. Testing competing definitions against a concrete anatomical case is how the Gemara makes an abstract disagreement operative.
Key Terms:
- אַרְכוּבָּה (arkuva) = the leg joint — sinew and bone without flesh
- מַאי אִיכָּא בֵּין = what is the difference between — asking for the practical consequence
Segment 14
TYPE: נפקא מינה
Between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: the kidney and the upper lip.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בֵּין רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא לְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי, מַאי אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: כּוּלְיָא וְנִיב שְׂפָתַיִם אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: What practical difference is there between the opinions of Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yosei HaGelili? Rav Pappa said: The practical difference between them is with regard to the kidney and the upper lip that separate from a living animal. According to Rabbi Yosei these parts of the animal impart impurity because the animal does not generate a replacement for them; according to Rabbi Akiva they do not impart impurity, because they do not contain bones.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Pappa supplies the second divergence. The kidney and the niv sefatayim, the upper lip, contain no bones, so Rabbi Akiva excludes them; but the body does not regenerate them, so Rabbi Yosei HaGelili’s test includes them. Each pairing of the three opinions is thus given its own test case, and the three criteria are shown to be genuinely distinct rather than three ways of saying one thing.
Key Terms:
- כּוּלְיָא (kulya) = a kidney
- נִיב שְׂפָתַיִם = the upper lip
- רַב פָּפָּא = Rav Pappa, who identifies the second divergence
Segment 15
TYPE: ברייתא
The same three-way dispute for creeping animals, beginning with Rabbi Yosei HaGelili.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תַּנְיָא נָמֵי גַּבֵּי שְׁרָצִים כְּהַאי גַּוְונָא: יָכוֹל בָּשָׂר הַפּוֹרֵשׁ מִן הַשְּׁרָצִים יְהֵא טָמֵא? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״בְּמוֹתָם״ – מָה מִיתָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ עוֹשָׂה חֲלִיפִין, אַף כֹּל שֶׁאֵינָהּ עוֹשָׂה חֲלִיפִין. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי.
English Translation:
The Gemara states a different halakha where these three tanna’im express the same opinions. So too, it is taught in a baraita with regard to creeping animals like this case: One might have thought that flesh that separates from a creeping animal during its lifetime should be impure like a creeping animal carcass. Therefore, the verse states with regard to creeping animal carcasses: “And upon whatever any of them falls when they are dead shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:32). The word “dead” teaches that just as death does not generate a replacement, so too any element of a creeping animal that dies and does not generate a replacement imparts the impurity of a creeping animal carcass, excluding flesh; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili.
קלאוד על הדף:
A parallel baraita runs the identical argument for a sheretz. Might flesh separating from a living creeping animal be impure like a sheretz carcass? Rabbi Yosei HaGelili derives from bemotam (Vayikra 11:32) the same regeneration test he applied to animals: just as death leaves nothing replaced, only what the body cannot regenerate imparts impurity, which excludes flesh.
Key Terms:
- בְּמוֹתָם (bemotam) = when they are dead (Vayikra 11:32)
- שְׁרָצִים (sheratzim) = creeping animals whose carcasses impart impurity
- חֲלִיפִין (chalifin) = a replacement — what the body regenerates
Segment 16
TYPE: ברייתא
Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi likewise, from the word sheretz.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: ״שֶׁרֶץ״, מָה שֶׁרֶץ – גִּידִים וַעֲצָמוֹת, אַף כֹּל – גִּידִים וַעֲצָמוֹת. רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: ״שֶׁרֶץ״, מָה שֶׁרֶץ – בָּשָׂר גִּידִים וַעֲצָמוֹת, אַף כֹּל – בָּשָׂר גִּידִים וַעֲצָמוֹת.
English Translation:
Rabbi Akiva says: One can derive this halakha from the term “creeping animal.” Just as a creeping animal contains sinews and bones, so too any element of a creeping animal that contains sinews and bones imparts impurity. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: One can derive this halakha from the term “creeping animal.” Just as a creeping animal contains flesh, sinews, and bones, so too, any element of a creeping animal that contains flesh, sinews, and bones imparts impurity.
קלאוד על הדף:
The other two positions reappear unchanged, now derived from the word sheretz rather than behema. Rabbi Akiva requires sinews and bones; Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi requires flesh, sinews and bones. That all three sages hold the same methodological commitments across both categories shows these are principled criteria rather than ad hoc readings of a particular verse.
Key Terms:
- שֶׁרֶץ (sheretz) = a creeping animal — the word from which these derivations are made
- מָה שֶׁרֶץ = just as a creeping animal — the opening of the comparison
Segment 17
TYPE: נפקא מינה
And the same two practical differences apply.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בֵּין רַבִּי לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ אַרְכוּבָּה. בֵּין רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא לְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי מַאי אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: כּוּלְיָא וְנִיב שְׂפָתַיִם אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ.
English Translation:
The Gemara comments: The practical difference between the opinions of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Akiva is with regard to the leg joint, which contains sinews and bones but no flesh. What difference is there between the opinions of Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yosei HaGelili? Rav Pappa said: The practical difference between them is with regard to the kidney and the upper lip, which contain no bones and which are not regenerated by the creeping animal.
קלאוד על הדף:
The divergences are identical to those in the animal case: the leg joint separates Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi from Rabbi Akiva, and Rav Pappa again names the kidney and upper lip as separating Rabbi Akiva from Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. The exact repetition raises the obvious question the next segments answer — why teach the same dispute twice.
Key Terms:
- אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ = there is a difference between them
- אַרְכוּבָּה (arkuva) = the leg joint — the first test case, repeated
Segment 18
TYPE: צריכותא
Why both are needed: a sheretz imparts impurity at a lentil-bulk.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּצְרִיכָא, דְּאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן בְּהֵמָה – הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דְּלֹא מְטַמֵּא מֵחַיִּים, מִשּׁוּם דְּלֹא מְטַמֵּא בְּכַעֲדָשָׁה, אֲבָל שֶׁרֶץ דִּמְטַמֵּא בְּכַעֲדָשָׁה – אֵימָא לְטַמֵּא מֵחַיִּים.
English Translation:
And it is necessary to teach this halakha both with regard to flesh that separates from a living animal and with regard to flesh that separates from a creeping animal. As if the baraita had taught us this halakha only with regard to an animal, one might have said that this is the reason that flesh that separates from a living animal does not impart impurity: It is because an animal carcass does not impart impurity in the measure of a lentil-bulk, but rather only in the measure of an olive-bulk. But with regard to a creeping animal, which imparts impurity even in the measure of a lentil-bulk, say that flesh that separates from it while it is living should impart impurity.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara explains that neither case could have been derived from the other. Had only the animal been taught, one might attribute the exclusion of living flesh to the fact that carcass impurity requires a full olive-bulk; a sheretz, which imparts impurity at the smaller measure of a lentil-bulk, might then have included living flesh after all.
Key Terms:
- כַּעֲדָשָׁה (ka’adasha) = a lentil-bulk — the measure at which a sheretz imparts impurity
- כְּזַיִת (k’zayit) = an olive-bulk — the measure for carcass impurity
- אַשְׁמְעִינַן = had it taught us — positing a narrower set of sources
Segment 19
TYPE: צריכותא
And an animal imparts impurity by carrying, so both teachings are necessary.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאִי אַשְׁמְועִינַן שֶׁרֶץ, מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא מְטַמֵּא בְּמַשָּׂא – לֹא מְטַמֵּא מֵחַיִּים, אֲבָל בְּהֵמָה, דִּמְטַמֵּא בְּמַשָּׂא – אֵימָא תְּטַמֵּא מֵחַיִּים, צְרִיכָא.
English Translation:
And if the baraita had taught us this halakha only with regard to a creeping animal, one might have said that flesh that separates from a creeping animal does not impart impurity because a creeping animal does not impart impurity via carrying, and therefore flesh that separates from it while it is living does not impart impurity. But with regard to an animal, which imparts impurity via carrying, say that flesh that separates from it while it is living should impart impurity. Therefore, it is necessary to teach this halakha in both cases.
קלאוד על הדף:
The converse fails equally. Had only the sheretz been taught, one might attribute the exclusion to the fact that a sheretz does not impart impurity by carrying; an animal, which does, might then have included living flesh. Since each case carries a stringency the other lacks, neither can generate the other and both teachings stand as necessary.
Key Terms:
- מַשָּׂא (masa) = carrying — a mode of impurity that does not apply to a sheretz
- צְרִיכָא (tzericha) = it is necessary — the demonstration that both sources are required
Segment 20
TYPE: ברייתא
Cutting flesh from a severed limb: cut first and it stays pure.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הַחוֹתֵךְ כְּזַיִת בָּשָׂר מֵאֵבֶר מִן הַחַי, חֲתָכוֹ וְאַחַר כָּךְ חִישֵּׁב עָלָיו – טָהוֹר.
English Translation:
§The Gemara continues to discuss flesh that separates from a living animal. The Sages taught in a baraita: In the case of one who severs an olive-bulk of flesh from a limb severed from the living, the flesh does not impart the impurity of a carcass but it does impart impurity as food if one designated it as food before it came into contact with a source of impurity. Therefore, if one severed the flesh from the limb and afterward intended it to be used for the consumption of a gentile, the flesh remains pure because at the time he designated the flesh as food it was not in contact with a source of impurity.
קלאוד על הדף:
A baraita turns to flesh cut from a limb that was itself severed from a living animal. Such flesh carries no carcass impurity, but it can bear food impurity once designated as food. The first clause gives the lenient case: if he cut the flesh away and only afterward designated it, it remains pure, since at the moment it became food it was no longer in contact with the impure limb.
Key Terms:
- הַחוֹתֵךְ (hachotech) = one who cuts
- כְּזַיִת בָּשָׂר = an olive-bulk of flesh
- חֲתָכוֹ וְאַחַר כָּךְ חִישֵּׁב = he cut it and afterward designated it
Segment 21
TYPE: ברייתא
But designate first and then cut, and it is impure.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
חִישֵּׁב עָלָיו, וְאַחַר כָּךְ חֲתָכוֹ – טָמֵא.
English Translation:
But if he intended it to be used for the consumption of a gentile and afterward severed the flesh, the flesh is impure, because it came into contact with a source of impurity, i.e., the limb, after it was designated as food.
קלאוד על הדף:
The second clause reverses the order and the outcome. If he designated the flesh as food and only then cut it away, it is impure — because while it already counted as food it was still touching the limb, which is a source of impurity. The same physical act yields opposite results depending on when the intention was formed, and it is precisely this clause that Rabbi Asi will raise in the closing exchange.
Key Terms:
- חִישֵּׁב עָלָיו וְאַחַר כָּךְ חֲתָכוֹ = he designated it and afterward cut it
- טָמֵא (tamei) = impure
- מַחְשָׁבָה (machshava) = intention — designating an item as food
Segment 22
TYPE: מעשה
Rabbi Asi asks Rabbi Zeira about the ruling — and the daf ends.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי אַסִּי לָא עָל לְבֵי מִדְרְשָׁא, אַשְׁכְּחֵיהּ לְרַבִּי זֵירָא, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאי אֲמוּר בְּבֵי מִדְרְשָׁא? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאי קַשְׁיָא לָךְ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ, דְּקָתָנֵי: חִישֵּׁב וְאַחַר כָּךְ חֲתָכוֹ טָמֵא.
English Translation:
One day Rabbi Asi did not go to the study hall. He found Rabbi Zeira, and said to him: What was said today in the study hall? Rabbi Zeira said to him: What matter is difficult for you that you think may have been discussed in the study hall? Rabbi Asi said to him: I find difficult that which is taught in a baraita: If one intended flesh from a limb that was severed from a living animal to be used for the consumption of a gentile, and afterward he severed the flesh from the limb, the flesh is impure.
קלאוד על הדף:
The daf closes with a scene from the study hall. Rabbi Asi, having missed the day’s session, met Rabbi Zeira and asked what had been discussed; Rabbi Zeira, in the manner of a good teacher, asked in return what was troubling him. Rabbi Asi named the second clause — designate first, then cut, and it is impure — and the page ends before his difficulty is stated, resuming on 129a.
Key Terms:
- בֵּי מִדְרְשָׁא = the study hall
- מַאי קַשְׁיָא לָךְ = what is difficult for you? — inviting a student to state his own question