Chullin Daf 129 (חולין דף קכ״ט)
Daf: 129 | Amudim: 129a – 129b | Date: Loading...
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (129a)
Segment 1
TYPE: קושיא
Rabbi Asi’s difficulty: contact at a concealed surface should not transmit.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
טוּמְאַת בֵּית הַסְּתָרִים הִיא, וְטוּמְאַת בֵּית הַסְּתָרִים לָא מְטַמְּיָא.
English Translation:
Why should the flesh be impure? Since the source of its impurity is the limb, and the location of the contact between the limb and the flesh is hidden and not visible, it constitutes contact with a source of impurity in a concealed part of the body, and the principle is that contact with a source of impurity in a concealed part of the body does not render an item impure.
קלאוד על הדף:
The question Rabbi Asi began raising at the end of 128b is now stated. The baraita ruled that flesh designated as food and then cut from a severed limb is impure — but the surface where limb and flesh met is beit hasetarim, a concealed place that is not exposed to view, and the settled rule is that contact at such a surface does not transmit impurity. On that principle the flesh should have remained pure.
Key Terms:
- טוּמְאַת בֵּית הַסְּתָרִים = impurity through a concealed place — contact at a non-visible surface
- לָא מְטַמְּיָא = it does not transmit impurity
Segment 2
TYPE: תשובה
Rabbi Zeira reports Rabbi Abba bar Memel’s answer: the baraita follows Rabbi Meir.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אַף לְדִידִי קַשְׁיָא לִי, וּשְׁאֵילְתֵּיהּ לְרַבִּי אַבָּא בַּר מֶמֶל, וְאָמַר לִי: הָא מַנִּי? רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא, דְּאָמַר: טוּמְאַת בֵּית הַסְּתָרִים מְטַמְּיָא.
English Translation:
Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Asi: This matter is difficult for me as well, and I asked Rabbi Abba bar Memel, and he said to me: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who said that contact with a source of impurity in a concealed part of the body renders an item impure.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Zeira answers that he had put the same difficulty to Rabbi Abba bar Memel, who attributed the baraita to Rabbi Meir — the one authority who holds that concealed contact does transmit impurity. Assigning an anomalous ruling to the tanna whose position accommodates it is a standard resolution, and it would settle the matter if it held.
Key Terms:
- הָא מַנִּי = whose opinion is this? — the idiom asking for an attribution
- רַבִּי אַבָּא בַּר מֶמֶל = a Palestinian amora of the third generation
Segment 3
TYPE: דחייה
Rabbi Asi rejects it: Rabbi Meir distinguishes cases requiring hechsher.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: וְלָאו זִימְנִין סַגִּיאִין אַמְרַהּ קַמַּאי, וַאֲמַרִי לֵיהּ: שָׁנֵי לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר בֵּין טוּמְאָה דְּבָעֲיָא הֶכְשֵׁר וּבֵין טוּמְאָה דְּלָא בָּעֲיָא הֶכְשֵׁר.
English Translation:
Rabbi Asi said to Rabbi Zeira: But hasn’t Rabbi Abba bar Memel said this answer in my presence many times? And I said to him that this answer does not explain the ruling of the baraita. The reason is that with regard to a concealed part of the body imparting impurity, Rabbi Meir differentiates between a type of impurity that requires an item to be rendered susceptible in order to take effect and a type of impurity that does not require an item to be rendered susceptible. The case in the baraita is one where the flesh was not yet rendered susceptible to impurity when it was severed from the limb, and Rabbi Meir concedes that in such a case impurity should not apply to a concealed part of the body.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Asi has heard that answer before and does not accept it. Rabbi Meir’s position on concealed contact is not unqualified: he distinguishes impurity that requires hechsher to take effect from impurity that does not, and concedes the concealed-contact rule in the former case. Since the flesh here had not yet been rendered susceptible, even Rabbi Meir would purify it. The difficulty stands.
Key Terms:
- בָּעֲיָא הֶכְשֵׁר = requiring hechsher — contact with a liquid to become susceptible
- זִימְנִין סַגִּיאִין = many times — Rabbi Asi has heard this answer before
Segment 4
TYPE: תירוץ
Rava: perhaps the flesh was already rendered susceptible before being cut.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רָבָא: וּמַאי קוּשְׁיָא? דִּלְמָא בְּשֶׁהוּכְשַׁר.
English Translation:
Rava was surprised by Rabbi Asi’s statement and said: But what is the difficulty? Perhaps the baraita is discussing a case where the flesh was rendered susceptible to impurity before it was severed from the limb.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava is surprised there is any difficulty. The baraita may simply be speaking of flesh that had already received hechsher while still attached to the limb, in which case nothing further is needed and the concealed-contact objection never arises. The proposal is economical, and it is the challenge to it that yields the daf’s central principle.
Key Terms:
- מַאי קוּשְׁיָא = what is the difficulty? — questioning whether an objection holds
- בְּשֶׁהוּכְשַׁר = where it was rendered susceptible
Segment 5
TYPE: קושיא
Rabba bar Rav Chanan: why should hechsher be needed at all?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבָּה בַּר רַב חָנָן לְרָבָא: לְמָה לִי הֶכְשֵׁר, הֲרֵי מְטַמֵּא טוּמְאָה חֲמוּרָה אַגַּב אָבִיו?
English Translation:
Rabba bar Rav Chanan said to Rava: Why do I need the flesh severed from the limb to be rendered susceptible to impurity? Flesh that is upon a limb from a living animal imparts a severe form of impurity due to its original limb, as it is considered part of the limb that was severed from a living animal, which imparts the impurity of a carcass, a severe form of impurity that is transmitted even to people and vessels. Therefore, it is not necessary to render this flesh susceptible to impurity after its separation from the limb, because the halakha is that any food item that will eventually impart a severe form of impurity does not require contact with liquid in order to be rendered susceptible to imparting a lesser form of impurity.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabba bar Rav Chanan objects that Rava’s answer concedes too much. Flesh sitting on a limb severed from a living animal already carries severe impurity by virtue of that limb, and the rule is that anything destined to convey severe impurity needs no hechsher for the lesser food impurity. On that principle the flesh should never have required wetting.
Key Terms:
- טוּמְאָה חֲמוּרָה = severe impurity — conveyed to people and vessels, not only to food
- אַגַּב אָבִיו = by virtue of its parent — through the limb it was attached to
Segment 6
TYPE: תירוץ
Rava: when it served, it served as wood.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: כְּשֶׁשִּׁימֵּשׁ, מַעֲשֵׂה עֵץ שִׁימֵּשׁ.
English Translation:
Rava said to Rabba bar Rav Chanan: This principle applies only when the more severe and more lenient forms of impurity are both impurities of food. But in the case of the baraita, the flesh needs to be rendered susceptible to impurity after it is severed from the limb, because when it initially served as part of the limb, it performed the role of wood, i.e., it had the status of flesh of the limb, which is necessary to give the limb the status of a limb severed from the living (see 128b), but it was not impure due to its status as food.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava answers with the phrase that governs the rest of the amud: keshesheimesh, ma’aseh etz shimesh — when it served, it served as wood. While attached to the limb, the flesh was not functioning as food at all; it was doing structural work, supplying the flesh that gives a limb its status as a limb. Its severe impurity in that capacity therefore cannot substitute for the hechsher it needs now that it has become food. Function, not substance, determines which category an object occupies.
Key Terms:
- כְּשֶׁשִּׁימֵּשׁ מַעֲשֵׂה עֵץ שִׁימֵּשׁ = when it served, it served as wood — functioning structurally rather than as food
- מַעֲשֵׂה עֵץ = the role of wood — a structural rather than edible function
Segment 7
TYPE: ברייתא
Abaye: a lump of leaven designated as a seat is nullified as food.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הֲרֵי אָמְרוּ כּוֹפֶת שְׂאוֹר שֶׁיִּחֲדָהּ לִישִׁיבָה – בָּטְלָה.
English Translation:
§Rava said that if a food item serves a function other than food, the principle that if it will eventually contract a severe form of impurity it does not require contact with liquid in order to be rendered susceptible to a lesser form of impurity does not apply. The Gemara now relates a number of matters that are explained with the same reasoning. Abaye said: The Sages said in a baraita: A mass of hardened leaven that one designated for the purpose of sitting upon it, not for consumption, is nullified. The item is no longer considered food and one may possess it in his house during Passover. But the item is now considered a chair, and it is subject to ritual impurity imparted by treading. It therefore is rendered impure if a zav sits on it.
קלאוד על הדף:
Abaye opens a series of five cases that would each seem to disprove the rule that food cannot carry severe impurity. The first is a kofet se’or, a mass of hardened leaven that its owner designates to sit upon. It ceases to be food — so it may be kept through Pesach — and becomes a seat, which contracts midras impurity if a zav sits on it.
Key Terms:
- כּוֹפֶת שְׂאוֹר = a mass of hardened leaven
- מִדְרָס (midras) = impurity imparted by the pressure of a zav upon an object made for sitting
- בָּטְלָה (batla) = it is nullified — it ceases to hold its former status
Segment 8
TYPE: ביאור
Abaye’s objection and its answer: it served as wood.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
טוּמְאָתָהּ לָאו דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, מָצִינוּ לָאֳכָלִין שֶׁמְּטַמְּאִין טוּמְאָה חֲמוּרָה, כְּשֶׁשִּׁימֵּשׁ – מַעֲשֵׂה עֵץ שִׁימֵּשׁ.
English Translation:
Abaye explained: Its impurity in such a case is clearly not by Torah law but by rabbinic law; as if it enters your mind that it is impure by Torah law, then we have found that food can become susceptible to a severe type of impurity. This cannot be true, because the category of food that requires contact with liquid to be susceptible to impurity is food that will not eventually impart a more severe type of impurity. Based on Rava’s reasoning, the Gemara responds: The seat imparts impurity by Torah law. When the leaven served as a chair it was not considered food, as it performed the role of wood.
קלאוד על הדף:
Abaye argues that the seat’s impurity must be rabbinic, since otherwise we would have found food bearing severe impurity, which the categories forbid. The Gemara answers with Rava’s phrase: the impurity is indeed scriptural, because while the leaven served as a chair it was not food. The same formula will resolve each of the four remaining cases.
Key Terms:
- לָאו דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא = not by Torah law — rabbinic rather than scriptural
- מָצִינוּ לָאֳכָלִין = we would have found foods — the impossible result the objection fears
Segment 9
TYPE: ברייתא
Food offered in idolatrous worship imparts tent impurity.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הֲרֵי אָמְרוּ תִּקְרוֹבֶת עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה שֶׁל אֳכָלִין מְטַמְּאִין בְּאוֹהֶל, טוּמְאָתָהּ לָאו דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא – מָצִינוּ לָאֳכָלִין שֶׁמְּטַמְּאִין טוּמְאָה חֲמוּרָה! כְּשֶׁשִּׁימֵּשׁ – מַעֲשֵׂה עֵץ שִׁימֵּשׁ.
English Translation:
Similarly, Abaye said: The Sages said in a baraita: An idolatrous offering of food imparts impurity in a tent. Abaye explained: Its impurity is not by Torah law but by rabbinic law; as if it enters your mind that it is impure by Torah law, then we have found that food can become susceptible to a severe type of impurity. The Gemara responds: The idolatrous offering imparts impurity by Torah law. When the food served as an idolatrous offering it was not considered food, as it performed the role of wood.
קלאוד על הדף:
The second case is tikrovet avoda zara, food offered in idolatrous worship, which imparts impurity in a tent. Abaye raises the same objection and receives the same answer: while serving as an offering the food was not food in the halachic sense, so its severe impurity poses no difficulty for the categories.
Key Terms:
- תִּקְרוֹבֶת עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה = an offering of idolatrous worship — forbidden and conveying impurity
- בְּאוֹהֶל (be’ohel) = in a tent — impurity filling an enclosed space
Segment 10
TYPE: ברייתא
Food attached to a vessel counts as the vessel.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הֲרֵי אָמְרוּ חִבּוּרֵי אֳכָלִין כְּכֵלִים דָּמוּ, טוּמְאָתָן לָאו דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא – מָצִינוּ לְאוֹכֶל שֶׁמְּטַמֵּא טוּמְאָה חֲמוּרָה! כְּשֶׁשִּׁימֵּשׁ – מַעֲשֵׂה עֵץ שִׁימֵּשׁ.
English Translation:
Similarly, Abaye said: The Sages said in a baraita: Foods that are connected to vessels are considered like the vessels. For example, if dough is attached to a kneading bowl and the owner wishes for the dough to remain there, the dough is considered part of the bowl. Therefore, if an olive-bulk of a corpse touches that dough, it becomes impure with the more severe impurity of a vessel, which imparts impurity to people and other vessels. Abaye explained: Their impurity is not by Torah law but by rabbinic law; as if it enters your mind that it is impure by Torah law, then we have found that food can become susceptible to a severe type of impurity. The Gemara responds: Food connected to vessels imparts impurity by Torah law. When the food served as a connection to the vessel it was not considered food, as it performed the role of wood.
קלאוד על הדף:
The third case is chiburei ochlin: dough deliberately left adhering to a kneading bowl becomes part of the bowl, so that corpse-impurity touching it renders it impure with the severer impurity of a vessel, which spreads to people and other vessels. Once again the answer is that while serving as part of the vessel the dough was not food.
Key Terms:
- חִבּוּרֵי אֳכָלִין = foods joined to vessels — treated as part of the vessel
- כְּכֵלִים דָּמוּ = they are considered like vessels
Segment 11
TYPE: ברייתא
Rav Pappa: the carcass fat covering a kidney needs both intent and hechsher.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא לְרָבָא: הָא דְּתַנְיָא, חֵלֶב נְבֵלָה בַּכְּפָרִים צָרִיךְ מַחְשָׁבָה וְהֶכְשֵׁר, טוּמְאָתוֹ אַגַּב כּוּלְיָא לָאו דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, מָצִינוּ לְאוֹכֶל שֶׁמְּטַמֵּא טוּמְאָה חֲמוּרָה!
English Translation:
Similarly, Rav Pappa said to Rava in explanation of that which is taught in a mishna (Okatzin 3:3): Fat forbidden in consumption for a Jew from an animal carcass in the villages, requires designation as food in order for it to become susceptible to contract impurity as food, and it must be rendered susceptible via contact with liquid. Rav Pappa explained: Although the forbidden fat that covers the kidney of a carcass imparts the impurity of a carcass, its impurity due to the impurity of the kidney is not by Torah law but by rabbinic law. As if it enters your mind that it is impure by Torah law, then we have found that food can impart a severe type of impurity and subsequently become susceptible to impurity as food.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Pappa brings the fourth case from Okatzin. Forbidden fat of a carcass in the villages requires both machshava, designation as food, and hechsher — even though the fat wrapping the kidney already conveys carcass impurity. If it could carry severe impurity as food, the requirement would be incoherent.
Key Terms:
- חֵלֶב נְבֵלָה בַּכְּפָרִים = forbidden fat of a carcass in the villages
- אַגַּב כּוּלְיָא = by virtue of the kidney — through the organ it covers
Segment 12
TYPE: ביאור
The same answer: while protecting the kidney it was not food.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כְּשֶׁשִּׁימֵּשׁ – מַעֲשֵׂה עֵץ שִׁימֵּשׁ.
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: The fat of a carcass imparts impurity by Torah law. When the fat served the kidney as protection and imparted the impurity of a carcass it did not serve as food, as it performed the role of wood.
קלאוד על הדף:
The resolution is stated in its own segment. When the fat served the kidney as its covering and conveyed carcass impurity in that role, it was not functioning as food but structurally — as wood. Only once designated for eating does it enter the category of food, and then it needs hechsher like any other.
Key Terms:
- כְּשֶׁשִּׁימֵּשׁ = when it served — in its structural capacity
- מַחְשָׁבָה (machshava) = intention — designating an item as food
Segment 13
TYPE: ברייתא
Rav Mattana: a house roofed with seeds.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב מַתְנָה: הֲרֵי אָמְרוּ בַּיִת שֶׁסִּכְּכוֹ בִּזְרָעִים – טָהֵרוּ. טוּמְאָתוֹ לָאו דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא – מָצִינוּ לִזְרָעִים שֶׁמְּטַמְּאִין טוּמְאָה חֲמוּרָה! כְּשֶׁשִּׁימֵּשׁ – מַעֲשֵׂה עֵץ שִׁימֵּשׁ.
English Translation:
Similarly, Rav Mattana said: The Sages said in a baraita: With regard to a house that one roofed with seeds, i.e., vegetation, if those seeds were impure, they are rendered pure when they are used as the roof of the house. The seeds are no longer considered food but rather part of the house. Therefore, if the house becomes leprous, the entire house becomes impure. Rav Mattana explained: Its impurity is not by Torah law but by rabbinic law; as if it enters your mind that it is impure by Torah law, then we have found that seeds can become susceptible to a severe type of impurity. The Gemara responds: The seeds used for the roof of the house impart impurity by Torah law. When the seeds served as the roof of the house they were not considered food, but rather performed the role of wood.
קלאוד על הדף:
The fifth and final case comes from Rav Mattana. Impure seeds used to roof a house become pure, since they cease to be food and become part of the structure — and if the house then contracts a leprous mark, the seeds share the house’s impurity. The same objection is raised, and the same answer given: as roofing they performed the role of wood.
Key Terms:
- בַּיִת שֶׁסִּכְּכוֹ בִּזְרָעִים = a house that one roofed with seeds
- טָהֵרוּ (taheru) = they became pure — losing their status as food
- זְרָעִים (zera’im) = seeds or vegetation
Segment 14
TYPE: משנה
Returning to the mishna: Rabbi Shimon deems the limb pure.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מְטַהֵר.
English Translation:
§The mishna teaches with regard to a hanging limb or flesh of a living animal that if the animal died, the hanging flesh needs to be rendered susceptible to impurity, as its halakhic status is that of flesh severed from a living animal, which is ritually pure. Rabbi Meir then states that the hanging limb imparts impurity as a limb severed from a living animal, but not as an unslaughtered carcass. And Rabbi Shimon deems the limb pure.
קלאוד על הדף:
With the principle established across five cases, the Gemara returns to the mishna of 127b. Where the animal died without slaughter, Rabbi Meir held the hanging limb conveys impurity as a limb from a living animal but not as a carcass limb; Rabbi Shimon deemed it pure. That ruling now receives scrutiny.
Key Terms:
- מְטַהֵר (metaher) = he deems it pure
- מֵתָה הַבְּהֵמָה = the animal died — without valid slaughter
Segment 15
TYPE: קושיא
Whichever way you look at it, purity seems impossible.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מָה נַפְשָׁךְ: אִי מִיתָה עוֹשָׂה נִיפּוּל – לִיטַמֵּא מִשּׁוּם אֵבֶר מִן הַחַי, אִי אֵין מִיתָה עוֹשָׂה נִיפּוּל – לִיטַמֵּא מִשּׁוּם אֵבֶר מִן הַנְּבֵלָה!
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: Whichever way you look at it, the ruling of Rabbi Shimon is difficult. If death renders a hanging limb one that has fallen off, i.e., if when the animal died of its own accord the hanging limb is considered to have fallen off its body beforehand, the limb should become impure as a limb from a living animal. If death does not render a hanging limb one that has fallen off, the limb should become impure as a limb from a carcass. How is it possible for Rabbi Shimon to deem the limb pure?
קלאוד על הדף:
The objection is a mah nafshach, a dilemma allowing no third option. Either the animal’s death counts the hanging limb as having fallen away, in which case it should convey impurity as a limb from a living animal; or it does not, in which case it should convey impurity as a limb of a carcass. There appears to be no configuration in which Rabbi Shimon can rule it pure.
Key Terms:
- מָה נַפְשָׁךְ = whichever way you look at it — a dilemma exhausting the alternatives
- נִיפּוּל (nippul) = a falling away — being reckoned as detached
Segment 16
TYPE: תירוץ
Rabbi Shimon is addressing the mishna’s first clause, not its last.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אַרֵישָׁא קָאֵי: הָאֵבֶר וְהַבָּשָׂר הַמְדוּלְדָּלִין בִּבְהֵמָה מְטַמֵּא טוּמְאַת אֳכָלִין בִּמְקוֹמָן, וּצְרִיכִין הֶכְשֵׁר, וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מְטַהֵר.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: Rabbi Shimon is not responding to Rabbi Meir’s statement in the final clause of the mishna. Rather, Rabbi Shimon is referring to the first clause of the mishna, which teaches: The limb and the flesh of an animal that were partially severed and remain hanging from the animal impart impurity as food although they remain in their place attached to the animal. But in order for them to become impure, they need to be rendered susceptible through contact with a liquid. And Rabbi Shimon deems them not susceptible to impurity at all.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara relocates the ruling. Rabbi Shimon is not responding to Rabbi Meir’s statement about the animal that died; he is responding to the mishna’s opening clause, which held that a dangling limb and flesh convey food impurity in place once rendered susceptible. Rabbi Shimon denies that they are susceptible at all. The reading dissolves the dilemma, and the search for where his ruling belongs will occupy much of 129b.
Key Terms:
- אַרֵישָׁא קָאֵי = he is addressing the first clause
- טוּמְאַת אֳכָלִין = food impurity
Segment 17
TYPE: דרשה
Rabbi Yochanan’s reason: only food you can feed to others is food.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַבִּי אַסִּי, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן? אָמַר קְרָא ״מִכׇּל הָאֹכֶל אֲשֶׁר יֵאָכֵל״, אוֹכֶל שֶׁאַתָּה יָכוֹל לְהַאֲכִילוֹ לַאֲחֵרִים – קָרוּי אוֹכֶל, אוֹכֶל שֶׁאִי אַתָּה יָכוֹל לְהַאֲכִילוֹ
English Translation:
Rabbi Asi said that Rabbi Yochanan said: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? The verse states with regard to impurity as food: “From all food which may be eaten, that on which water comes shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:34). The repetitive phrase “food which may be eaten” indicates that only food that you are able to feed to others, including gentiles, is called food with regard to being susceptible to impurity as food, but food that you are not able to feed
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Asi reports Rabbi Yochanan’s grounding for Rabbi Shimon. Vayikra 11:34 speaks of mikol ha’ochel asher ye’achel, from all food which may be eaten — and the doubled phrasing is read as a definition: only what could actually be fed to someone counts as food for purposes of impurity. The sentence breaks off here and completes on 129b.
Key Terms:
- מִכׇּל הָאֹכֶל אֲשֶׁר יֵאָכֵל = from all food which may be eaten (Vayikra 11:34)
- לְהַאֲכִילוֹ לַאֲחֵרִים = to feed it to others
Amud Bet (129b)
Segment 1
TYPE: סיום
What cannot be fed to anyone is not called food.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לַאֲחֵרִים – אֵין קָרוּי אוֹכֶל.
English Translation:
to others, such as the limb and flesh from a living animal, which are forbidden even to gentiles, is not called food.
קלאוד על הדף:
The definition completes. Food that cannot be given to anyone at all is not food in the verse’s sense — and a limb or flesh from a living animal is forbidden even to gentiles, so there is no one who may eat it. On Rabbi Shimon’s view such matter falls outside the category entirely and never becomes susceptible to impurity.
Key Terms:
- אֵין קָרוּי אוֹכֶל = it is not called food
- אֵבֶר מִן הַחַי = a limb from a living animal, forbidden to Jews and to the descendants of Noach alike
Segment 2
TYPE: קושיא
Rabbi Zeira: perhaps the reason is simply that it is still attached.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי זֵירָא לְרַבִּי אַסִּי: דִּילְמָא טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הָתָם, הוֹאִיל וּמְעוֹרֶה – מְעוֹרֶה.
English Translation:
Rabbi Zeira questioned the explanation of Rabbi Yochanan and said to Rabbi Asi: If Rabbi Shimon is discussing the first clause in the mishna, claiming that a hanging limb or flesh is pure during the lifetime of the animal, the reason for his statement is not necessarily that food that is forbidden to all people is not considered food. Perhaps the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon there is that since the flesh or limb is still attached to the animal, it is considered attached.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Zeira challenges the attribution. If Rabbi Shimon is addressing the first clause, his ruling may rest on something far simpler than a definition of food — ho’il ume’oreh, me’oreh, since the limb is still attached it counts as attached, and attached matter is not susceptible. No verse would be needed.
Key Terms:
- הוֹאִיל וּמְעוֹרֶה מְעוֹרֶה = since it is attached, it is attached
- דִּילְמָא (dilma) = perhaps — proposing an alternative explanation
Segment 3
TYPE: ראיה
He cites the fig branch, where Rabbi Asi himself gave that explanation.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
דְּתַנְיָא: יִחוּר שֶׁל תְּאֵנָה שֶׁנִּפְשַׁח וּמְעוֹרֶה בַּקְּלִיפָּה – רַבִּי יְהוּדָה מְטַהֵר, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אִם יָכוֹל לִחְיוֹת – טָהוֹר, וְאִם לָאו – טָמֵא. וְאָמְרִינַן לָךְ: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה? וְאָמְרַתְּ לַן: הוֹאִיל וּמְעוֹרֶה – מְעוֹרֶה.
English Translation:
As it is taught in a mishna (Okatzin 3:8): With regard to a branch of a fig tree that was detached from the tree and remains attached only to the bark of the tree, Rabbi Yehuda deems the figs on the branch not susceptible to impurity, as they are considered attached to the tree. And the Rabbis say: If it is possible to reattach the branch to the tree and the branch can continue to live and produce fruit, then it is considered attached to the tree, and the fruit is not susceptible to impurity. But if not, the fruit is susceptible to impurity. And we said to you, Rabbi Asi: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? And you said to us: Since the branch is still attached to the bark of the tree, it is considered attached. Therefore, the same logic applies to the statement of Rabbi Shimon.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Zeira presses the point with a source Rabbi Asi had already interpreted. In the mishna of the fig branch hanging by its bark, Rabbi Yehuda deems the figs not susceptible while the Rabbis make it depend on the branch’s viability — and when asked for Rabbi Yehuda’s reasoning, Rabbi Asi had himself answered ho’il ume’oreh. The same reasoning should serve Rabbi Shimon here.
Key Terms:
- יִחוּר שֶׁל תְּאֵנָה = a branch of a fig tree
- מְעוֹרֶה בַּקְּלִיפָּה = attached by the bark
- אִם יָכוֹל לִחְיוֹת = if it is able to live — the Rabbis’ criterion
Segment 4
TYPE: תשובה
Rabbi Asi relocates the ruling to the middle clause.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ, אַמְּצִיעֲתָא: נִשְׁחֲטָה הַבְּהֵמָה, הוּכְשְׁרָה בְּדָמֶיהָ – דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר; רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: לֹא הוּכְשְׁרוּ.
English Translation:
Rabbi Asi said to Rabbi Zeira: Rabbi Yochanan is explaining the reasoning for Rabbi Shimon’s opinion in the middle clause of the mishna, which teaches: If the animal was slaughtered, the limb and the flesh were rendered susceptible to impurity with the blood of the slaughtered animal; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon says: They were not rendered susceptible with the blood of the slaughtered animal.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Asi answers by moving Rabbi Shimon’s statement to the mishna’s middle clause, where the animal was slaughtered: Rabbi Meir holds the blood renders the limb and flesh susceptible, and Rabbi Shimon holds it does not. There the attachment argument would not apply, so Rabbi Yochanan’s verse-based reason is needed.
Key Terms:
- אַמְּצִיעֲתָא (ametzi’ata) = on the middle clause
- הוּכְשְׁרוּ בְּדָמֶיהָ = they were rendered susceptible by its blood
Segment 5
TYPE: דרשה
And the same verse is applied there.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן? אָמַר קְרָא ״מִכׇּל הָאֹכֶל אֲשֶׁר יֵאָכֵל״ – אוֹכֶל שֶׁאַתָּה יָכוֹל לְהַאֲכִילוֹ לַאֲחֵרִים – קָרוּי אוֹכֶל, אוֹכֶל שֶׁאֵין אַתָּה יָכוֹל לְהַאֲכִילוֹ לַאֲחֵרִים – אֵין קָרוּי אוֹכֶל.
English Translation:
Rabbi Asi said that Rabbi Yochanan said: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? The reason is that the verse states with regard to impurity as food: “From all food which may be eaten, that on which water comes shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:34). The phrase “food which may be eaten” indicates that only food that you can feed to others, including gentiles, is called food in this regard, but food that you cannot feed to others, such as the limb and flesh from a living animal, is not called food.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yochanan’s derivation is restated for the middle clause: mikol ha’ochel asher ye’achel defines food as what can be fed to someone, and a limb or flesh from a living animal can be fed to no one. The repetition marks that the same reason is now being tried in a second location.
Key Terms:
- מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן = what is Rabbi Shimon’s reason?
- קָרוּי אוֹכֶל = called food
Segment 6
TYPE: קושיא
Rabbi Zeira objects again: other explanations are already available there.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְדִילְמָא טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בְּהָהִיא
English Translation:
Rabbi Zeira questioned this explanation of Rabbi Yochanan as well, and said to Rabbi Asi: If it is with regard to Rabbi Shimon’s opinion in the middle clause of the mishna, perhaps the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in that clause is not that food that is forbidden to all is not called food.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Zeira is unsatisfied a second time. In the middle clause, Rabbi Shimon’s position could rest on either of the explanations already offered on 127b and 128a, without recourse to a definition of food. The objection begins here and its content is specified in the next segment.
Key Terms:
- בְּהָהִיא (behahi) = in that case — the clause under discussion
- טַעְמָא (ta’ama) = the reason or rationale for a position
Segment 7
TYPE: ביאור
Either Rava’s handle explanation or Rabbi Yochanan’s lifting test.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִי כִּדְרָבָא, אִי כִּדְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן?
English Translation:
Rather, it is either in accordance with the explanation of Rava or in accordance with the explanation of Rabbi Yochanan cited earlier (127b-128a). According to both explanations of Rabbi Shimon’s opinion, the mishna is discussing a case where only the body of the animal, but not the partially severed limb, came into contact with the blood of slaughter. According to Rava, the reason for Rabbi Shimon’s opinion is that the body of the animal serves the partially severed limb as a handle, and he holds that a handle of a food item transmits impurity to the attached food, but a handle that comes into contact with liquid does not render the attached food susceptible to impurity. And according to Rabbi Yochanan, Rabbi Shimon holds that if one grasps a small part of a large item such that the large part does not ascend with the small part, the small part is not considered part of the item with regard to impurity.
קלאוד על הדף:
The alternatives are named. On Rava’s account the animal’s body is a handle that transmits impurity but does not confer susceptibility; on Rabbi Yochanan’s account, where one lifts the small part and the large does not rise, the small part is not reckoned with the whole. Either would explain Rabbi Shimon in the middle clause without the verse, so the attribution again fails to settle.
Key Terms:
- אִי כִּדְרָבָא אִי כִּדְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן = either like Rava’s view or like Rabbi Yochanan’s
- יָד (yad) = a handle — an attached part through which impurity or susceptibility passes
Segment 8
TYPE: מסקנא
Final placement: the last clause, but concerning the flesh rather than the limb.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא, לְעוֹלָם אַסֵּיפָא, וְלָאו אַאֵבֶר, אֶלָּא אַבָּשָׂר. מֵתָה הַבְּהֵמָה – הַבָּשָׂר צָרִיךְ הֶכְשֵׁר, וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מְטַהֵר.
English Translation:
Rather, actually, one must explain the statement of Rabbi Shimon as it was explained originally, that he is referring to the latter clause of the mishna. And he is not referring to the case of a partially severed limb, but rather to the case of partially severed flesh. Therefore, the latter clause of the mishna teaches: If the animal died without slaughter, Rabbi Meir holds that the hanging flesh needs to be rendered susceptible to impurity in order to impart impurity as food, and Rabbi Shimon deems the limb not susceptible to impurity even if it came into contact with liquid.
קלאוד על הדף:
The search concludes. Rabbi Shimon’s ruling does belong to the mishna’s last clause after all — but to the hanging flesh, not the limb. Where the animal died, Rabbi Meir requires hechsher for the flesh and Rabbi Shimon holds it cannot become susceptible at all. Having tried the first clause and the middle, the Gemara returns to the last with a narrower target, and the placement finally holds.
Key Terms:
- אַסֵּיפָא (aseifa) = on the latter clause
- וְלָאו אַאֵבֶר אֶלָּא אַבָּשָׂר = not concerning the limb but concerning the flesh
Segment 9
TYPE: דרשה
And Rabbi Yochanan’s verse applies there.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן? אָמַר קְרָא ״מִכׇּל הָאֹכֶל אֲשֶׁר יֵאָכֵל״, אוֹכֶל שֶׁאַתָּה יָכוֹל לְהַאֲכִילוֹ לַאֲחֵרִים – קָרוּי אוֹכֶל, אוֹכֶל שֶׁאִי אַתָּה יָכוֹל לְהַאֲכִילוֹ לַאֲחֵרִים – אֵין קָרוּי אוֹכֶל.
English Translation:
Rabbi Yochanan said: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? The reason is that the verse states with regard to impurity as food: “From all food which may be eaten, that on which water comes shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:34). The phrase “food which may be eaten” indicates that only food that you can feed to others, including gentiles, is called food with regard to being susceptible to impurity as food, but food that you cannot feed to others, such as flesh from a living animal, which is forbidden even to gentiles, is not called food.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yochanan’s reading is stated a third and final time, now in its settled location. Flesh from a living animal is forbidden to everyone, cannot be fed to anyone, and therefore is not food — so no amount of liquid can render it susceptible. Three statements of one derasha mark the three attempted placements, and only the last stands.
Key Terms:
- מִכׇּל הָאֹכֶל אֲשֶׁר יֵאָכֵל = from all food which may be eaten
- בָּשָׂר מִן הַחַי = flesh from a living animal
Segment 10
TYPE: משנה
A new mishna: a limb and flesh hanging from a living person.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְנִי׳ הָאֵבֶר וְהַבָּשָׂר הַמְדוּלְדָּלִין בְּאָדָם – טְהוֹרִים. מֵת הָאָדָם – הַבָּשָׂר טָהוֹר. הָאֵבֶר מְטַמֵּא מִשּׁוּם אֵבֶר מִן הַחַי, וְאֵינוֹ מְטַמֵּא מִשּׁוּם אֵבֶר מִן הַמֵּת, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מְטַהֵר.
English Translation:
MISHNA: The limb and the flesh of a person that were partially severed and remain hanging from a person are ritually pure, although there is no potential for healing. If the person died, the hanging flesh is ritually pure, as its halakhic status is that of flesh severed from a living person. The hanging limb imparts impurity as a limb severed from the living and does not impart impurity as a limb from a corpse; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And Rabbi Shimon deems the flesh and the limb ritually pure.
קלאוד על הדף:
The chapter’s closing mishna transposes the whole discussion to a human being. A limb or flesh hanging partially severed from a living person is pure, even where healing is impossible. If the person dies, the hanging flesh remains pure, its status being that of flesh from a living person. The hanging limb, on Rabbi Meir’s view, conveys impurity as ever min hachai but not as a limb of a corpse; Rabbi Shimon deems both pure.
Key Terms:
- הַמְדוּלְדָּלִין בְּאָדָם = hanging from a person — partially severed
- אֵבֶר מִן הַמֵּת = a limb from a corpse
- מֵת הָאָדָם = the person died
Segment 11
TYPE: קושיא
The same dilemma arises for the human case.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גְּמָ׳ וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מָה נַפְשָׁךְ? אִי מִיתָה עוֹשָׂה נִיפּוּל – לִיטַמֵּא מִשּׁוּם אֵבֶר מִן הַחַי, וְאִי אֵין מִיתָה עוֹשָׂה נִיפּוּל – לִיטַמֵּא מִשּׁוּם אֵבֶר מִן הַמֵּת!
English Translation:
GEMARA: The Gemara challenges the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in the latter clause of the mishna: Whichever way you look at it, the ruling of Rabbi Shimon is difficult. If death renders a hanging limb fallen off, i.e., if after the person dies the hanging limb is considered to have fallen off his body beforehand, the limb should impart impurity as a limb severed from the living. And if death does not render a hanging limb fallen off, and the limb is considered attached to the body at the time of death, then the limb should impart impurity as a limb from a corpse.
קלאוד על הדף:
The objection from the animal mishna returns in identical form. Either death reckons the hanging limb as having fallen, in which case it should convey impurity as a limb from a living person; or it does not, in which case it should convey impurity as a limb of a corpse. Rabbi Shimon’s ruling of purity appears to have no room.
Key Terms:
- מָה נַפְשָׁךְ = whichever way you look at it
- עוֹשָׂה נִיפּוּל = it renders it fallen — reckoned as detached
Segment 12
TYPE: תירוץ
Rabbi Shimon is speaking generally, not about the mishna’s case.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בְּעָלְמָא קָאֵי, דְּקָאָמַר תַּנָּא קַמָּא: הָאֵבֶר מְטַמֵּא מִשּׁוּם אֵבֶר מִן הַחַי וְאֵין מְטַמֵּא מִשּׁוּם אֵבֶר מִן הַמֵּת, אַלְמָא אֵבֶר הַמֵּת בְּעָלְמָא מְטַמֵּא, וַאֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: אֵבֶר הַמֵּת בְּעָלְמָא לֹא מְטַמֵּא.
English Translation:
The Gemara explains: This statement of Rabbi Shimon is not referring directly to the case in the mishna. Rather, the statement of Rabbi Shimon is referring to the matter of a limb that separates from a corpse in general. Rabbi Shimon inferred from that which the first tanna, Rabbi Meir, said: The hanging limb imparts impurity as a limb severed from the living and does not impart impurity as a limb from a corpse, that evidently, in general the limb of a corpse imparts impurity. And in reference to this Rabbi Shimon said to him: In general, the limb of a corpse does not impart impurity, if it does not contain an olive-bulk of flesh.
קלאוד על הדף:
The answer this time is different from the one given for the animal. Rabbi Shimon is not addressing the mishna’s particular case at all; he is disputing an assumption embedded in Rabbi Meir’s phrasing. Rabbi Meir’s contrast implies that a corpse’s limb ordinarily does convey impurity, and Rabbi Shimon denies precisely that: in general a limb of a corpse conveys nothing unless it bears an olive-bulk of flesh.
Key Terms:
- בְּעָלְמָא קָאֵי = he is speaking generally — addressing the broader rule
- כְּזַיִת בָּשָׂר = an olive-bulk of flesh — the measure Rabbi Shimon requires
Segment 13
TYPE: ברייתא
Rabbi Eliezer heard that a limb from a living person conveys impurity.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
דְּתַנְיָא: אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: שָׁמַעְתִּי שֶׁאֵבֶר מִן הַחַי מְטַמֵּא. אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: מִן הַחַי וְלֹא מִן הַמֵּת? וְקַל וָחוֹמֶר – וּמָה חַי שֶׁהוּא טָהוֹר, אֵבֶר הַפּוֹרֵשׁ מִמֶּנּוּ טָמֵא; מֵת שֶׁהוּא טָמֵא, לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?
English Translation:
Another pair of tanna’im had the same dispute as Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer says: I heard that a limb severed from the living imparts impurity. Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: May one infer from this statement that a limb from a living person imparts impurity but a limb from a corpse does not? But it can be inferred a fortiori that a limb from a corpse imparts impurity: If with regard to a living person, who is pure and does not impart impurity, nevertheless a limb that separates from him is impure, then with regard to a corpse, which is impure, all the more so is it not clear that the limb that separates from it is impure?
קלאוד על הדף:
A baraita preserves the same dispute between an earlier pair. Rabbi Eliezer states simply that he has heard that ever min hachai conveys impurity. Rabbi Yehoshua presses the implication with a kal vachomer: if a limb from a living person — who is himself pure — conveys impurity, then a limb from a corpse, which is itself impure, must surely do so.
Key Terms:
- שָׁמַעְתִּי (shamati) = I have heard — reporting a received tradition
- קַל וָחוֹמֶר = an a fortiori inference — from the lighter case to the weightier
Segment 14
TYPE: אגדה
Rabbi Yehoshua reinforces from Megillat Ta’anit; Rabbi Eliezer answers: this is what I heard.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כָּתוּב בִּמְגִילַּת תַּעֲנִית: ״פִּסְחָא זְעִירָא דְּלָא לְמִסְפַּד״, הָא רַבָּה לְמִסְפַּד?! אֶלָּא כָּל דְּכֵן! הָכָא נָמֵי, כׇּל דְּכֵן! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: כָּךְ שָׁמַעְתִּי.
English Translation:
Furthermore, Rabbi Yehoshua adds that it is written in Megillat Ta’anit: On Minor Passover, i.e., the fourteenth of Iyyar, one does not eulogize. Should one infer from here that on Major Passover, i.e., the fourteenth of Nisan, it is permitted to eulogize? Clearly that is not the case. Rather, if one may not eulogize on the fourteenth of Iyyar, all the more so one may not eulogize on the fourteenth of Nisan. Here too, if a limb from a living person is impure, all the more so a limb from a corpse is impure. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Despite this reasoning, such is the ruling I heard from my teachers.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yehoshua strengthens the inference with a parallel from Megillat Ta’anit, which forbids eulogizing on Minor Passover — a rule no one would read as permitting eulogies on Major Passover; it must be kol deken, all the more so. Rabbi Eliezer offers no counter-argument. He answers kach shamati — this is what I heard — declining to surrender a received tradition to an inference, however compelling. The exchange is a pointed statement about the weight transmission carries against reasoning.
Key Terms:
- כָּךְ שָׁמַעְתִּי = this is what I heard — holding to a received tradition
- מְגִילַּת תַּעֲנִית = Megillat Ta’anit, an early list of days on which fasting and eulogy are forbidden
- כׇּל דְּכֵן = all the more so
Segment 15
TYPE: שאלה
What practically distinguishes the two kinds of limb?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּמַאי אִיכָּא בֵּין אֵבֶר מִן הַחַי לְאֵבֶר מִן הַמֵּת? כְּזַיִת בָּשָׂר וְעֶצֶם כִּשְׂעוֹרָה הַפּוֹרֵשׁ מֵאֵבֶר מִן הַחַי אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ.
English Translation:
§The mishna teaches that Rabbi Meir holds that with regard to a partially severed limb of a person, after the person dies the limb imparts impurity as a limb from a living person but not as a limb from a corpse. The Gemara asks: What difference is there between the impurity of a limb from a living person and the impurity of a limb from a corpse? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is with regard to the case of an olive-bulk of flesh, or a bone the volume of a barley grain, that separates from the severed limb of a living person.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara asks what turns on Rabbi Meir’s distinction between a limb from a living person and a limb of a corpse. The answer lies not in the limb itself but in what separates from it — an olive-bulk of flesh, or a bone the size of a barley grain.
Key Terms:
- עֶצֶם כִּשְׂעוֹרָה = a bone the size of a barley grain — the minimum measure of bone conveying impurity
- הַפּוֹרֵשׁ מֵאֵבֶר = that separates from a limb
Segment 16
TYPE: משנה
The three-way dispute of Eduyyot on flesh and bone.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
דִּתְנַן: כְּזַיִת בָּשָׂר הַפּוֹרֵשׁ מֵאֵבֶר מִן הַחַי – רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר מְטַמֵּא, וְרַבִּי נְחוּנְיָא בֶּן הַקָּנָה וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ מְטַהֲרִין. עֶצֶם כִּשְׂעוֹרָה הַפּוֹרֵשׁ מֵאֵבֶר מִן הַחַי – רַבִּי נְחוּנְיָא מְטַמֵּא, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ מְטַהֲרִין.
English Translation:
As we learned in a mishna (Eduyyot 6:3): In the case of an olive-bulk of flesh that separates from a limb severed from a living person, Rabbi Eliezer deems it impure, and Rabbi Nechunya ben HaKana and Rabbi Yehoshua deem it pure. In the case of a bone the volume of a barley-grain that separates from a limb severed from a living person, Rabbi Nechunya deems it impure, and Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua deem it pure.
קלאוד על הדף:
A mishna in Eduyyot records three positions on what separates from a limb severed from a living person. For an olive-bulk of flesh, Rabbi Eliezer deems it impure while Rabbi Nechunya ben HaKana and Rabbi Yehoshua deem it pure. For a barley-grain of bone, Rabbi Nechunya deems it impure while Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua deem it pure. Rabbi Yehoshua alone purifies in both cases.
Key Terms:
- רַבִּי נְחוּנְיָא בֶּן הַקָּנָה = a tanna of the generation of Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua
- מְטַמֵּא / מְטַהֲרִין = he deems impure / they deem pure
Segment 17
TYPE: מסקנא
The same two cases can explain Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הַשְׁתָּא דְּאָתֵית לְהָכִי, בֵּין תַּנָּא קַמָּא לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן נָמֵי, כְּזַיִת בָּשָׂר וְעֶצֶם כִּשְׂעוֹרָה אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ.
English Translation:
The Gemara comments: Now that you have arrived at this dispute between tanna’im, it is possible to say that the difference between the first tanna in the mishna, i.e., Rabbi Meir, and Rabbi Shimon is also with regard to the cases of an olive-bulk of flesh and a bone the size of a barley grain. Rabbi Meir states that the partially severed limb of a person imparts the impurity of a limb from a living person but not the impurity of a limb from a corpse. The difference between these two types of impurity is with regard to a case where either an olive-bulk of flesh or a bone the size of a barley grain was separated from the severed limb; Rabbi Nechunya holds that flesh that separated from a limb of a living person is pure, but a bone that separated from a limb of a living person is impure, and Rabbi Eliezer holds vice versa. Rabbi Meir consequently holds in accordance with one of these two opinions. Rabbi Shimon holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua that both a bone and flesh that separated from a limb of a living person are pure.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara closes the sugya by mapping the mishna’s tannaim onto these positions. Rabbi Meir, who grants the limb some impurity, follows either Rabbi Eliezer or Rabbi Nechunya; Rabbi Shimon, who purifies entirely, follows Rabbi Yehoshua, who purifies both flesh and bone. A dispute between later tannaim is thereby traced to an earlier one, which is a characteristic way for a sugya to come to rest.
Key Terms:
- הַשְׁתָּא דְּאָתֵית לְהָכִי = now that you have arrived at this — reconsidering in light of a new source
- אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ = there is a difference between them
Segment 18
TYPE: הדרן
The closing formula of perek Ha’or VeHarotev.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ הָעוֹר וְהָרוֹטֶב.
English Translation:
[Hadran] We shall return to you, “HaOr VeHaRotev” [The Hide and the Gravy].
קלאוד על הדף:
This is the hadran, the traditional formula marking the completion of a chapter. It closes perek Ha’or VeHarotev, the ninth chapter of Chullin, which opened with the components that join meat toward the egg-bulk for food impurity — hide, congealed gravy, spices, bones, sinews, horns and hooves — and moved through the status of hides, the sealed thigh bone and the egg of a creeping animal, tent-impurity and its mechanics, and finally the limb left hanging from an animal or a person. The phrase means “we shall return to you,” a learner’s undertaking to come back to this material rather than a farewell to it.
Key Terms:
- הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ (hadran alach) = we shall return to you — the Aramaic formula closing a chapter of Talmud
- הָעוֹר וְהָרוֹטֶב = Ha’or VeHarotev, “The Hide and the Gravy” — the name of the completed chapter