Chullin Daf 120 (חולין דף ק״כ)
Daf: 120 | Amudim: 120a – 120b | Date: Loading...
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (120a)
Segment 1
TYPE: הקדמה
The Gemara identifies the mishna that the dispute below is anchored to.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אַמַּתְנִיתִין: ״הָעוֹר וְהָרוֹטֶב וְהַקֵּיפֶה וְכוּ׳״ מִצְטָרְפִין לְטַמֵּא טוּמְאַת אֳכָלִין.
English Translation:
maintaining that the dispute is with regard to that which is taught in the mishna: The attached hide, and the congealed gravy attached to the meat, and the spices, and the meat residue, and the bones, and the tendons, and the horns, and the hooves all join together with the meat to constitute the requisite egg-bulk to impart the impurity of food.
קלאוד על הדף:
The sugya returns to the mishna of ha’or veharotev vehakifa (117b), which lists the non-food adjuncts of meat — hide, congealed gravy, spices, residue, bones, tendons, horns and hooves — that combine with the meat itself to make up the egg-bulk (k’beitza) required for food to carry impurity. None of these are eaten, yet the mishna counts them toward the total. The question the Gemara now presses is why they count, because the answer determines whether other adjuncts — most immediately, hair — count as well.
Key Terms:
- טוּמְאַת אֳכָלִין (tumat ochlin) = the impurity of food — the status by which foodstuffs become ritually impure and transmit impurity
- כְּבֵיצָה (k’beitza) = an egg-bulk, the minimum volume of food required to contract and impart food-impurity
- מִצְטָרְפִין (mitztarfin) = they join together / combine to make up a requisite measure
Segment 2
TYPE: מחלוקת אמוראים
Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan dispute whether a hair counts as protection.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא עֶצֶם, דְּהָוֵי שׁוֹמֵר, אֲבָל נִימָא לָא הָוְיָא שׁוֹמֵר. וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ נִימָא נָמֵי הָוְיָא שׁוֹמֵר.
English Translation:
Reish Lakish said: The Sages taught that only a bone and the other items mentioned in the mishna join together with the meat to constitute the requisite measure to impart impurity because they constitute protection for the meat. But a hair does not join together with the meat to constitute the requisite measure to impart impurity because it is not protection for the meat. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even a hair is protection for the meat and therefore joins together with the meat to constitute the requisite measure to impart impurity.
קלאוד על הדף:
Reish Lakish supplies the rationale: the listed items combine because each is a shomer, a covering that protects the food it encloses, and the Torah treats a shomer as an extension of the food itself. On that logic a hair is excluded — hair does not shield the meat. Rabbi Yochanan disagrees and rules that hair too qualifies as a shomer, which broadens the category considerably and forces the sharp objection that follows.
Key Terms:
- שׁוֹמֵר (shomer) = a protective covering that guards the food and is therefore treated as part of it for impurity
- נִימָא (nima) = a hair
- לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא = they taught this only with regard to — a formula restricting a ruling to a narrower case
Segment 3
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Can there be a shomer on top of a shomer? Answer: the hair penetrates the hide.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: וּמִי אִיכָּא שׁוֹמֵר עַל גַּבֵּי שׁוֹמֵר? חַלְחוּלֵי מְחַלְחֵל.
English Translation:
Reish Lakish said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: But the hide protects the flesh, and the hair is on top of the hide. Is the halakha of protection applicable with regard to protection that is on top of another protection? Rabbi Yoḥanan answered: The hair penetrates through the hide and touches the flesh, thereby providing protection directly for the flesh.
קלאוד על הדף:
Reish Lakish presses the structural objection: it is the hide that lies against the flesh and protects it, and the hair sits on the far side of the hide — so the hair would at most be protecting the protection, not the food. Rabbi Yochanan answers that the hide is porous: the hair roots run through the follicles (chilchulei mechalchel) and reach the flesh, so the hair protects the meat directly and is a shomer in its own right. This answer holds the position together, but it commits Rabbi Yochanan to the claim that every hide is riddled with perforations — a claim with unexpected consequences.
Key Terms:
- שׁוֹמֵר עַל גַּבֵּי שׁוֹמֵר = protection on top of protection — an adjunct that shields only another shield, not the food
- חַלְחוּלֵי מְחַלְחֵל (chilchulei mechalchel) = it perforates through — the hair passes through the thickness of the hide
Segment 4
TYPE: מתקיף
Rav Acha objects: if hides are perforated, how can tefillin be written at all?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב אַחָא: אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, תְּפִילִּין הֵיכִי כָּתְבִינַן? הָא בָּעֵינַן כְּתִיבָה תַּמָּה, וְלֵיכָּא!
English Translation:
Rav Aḥa objects to this answer: If that is so, that there are perforations in the hide through which the hairs penetrate, how can we write phylacteries? Don’t we require phylacteries to be written with a perfect writing with no perforations in the letters? And that is not possible if there are perforations in the hide.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Acha seizes on the implication of Rabbi Yochanan’s answer. Tefillin (and mezuzot and sifrei Torah) must be written with ketiva tama, writing that is whole and unbroken; if the parchment is shot through with follicle holes, no letter could ever be complete. The objection is a classic Talmudic move — testing a claim made in the law of purity against an unrelated area of practical halacha to see whether it survives.
Key Terms:
- תְּפִילִּין (tefillin) = phylacteries — the scriptural passages written on parchment and bound on arm and head
- כְּתִיבָה תַּמָּה (ketiva tama) = perfect, unbroken writing — the requirement that each letter be whole and complete
- מַתְקֵיף לַהּ = he objects to it — the standard idiom introducing a challenge
Segment 5
TYPE: תירוץ
The Eretz Yisrael tradition: a hole the ink crosses is not a hole.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִישְׁתְּמִיטְתֵּיהּ הָא דְּאָמְרִי בְּמַעְרְבָא: כׇּל נֶקֶב שֶׁהַדְּיוֹ עוֹבֵר עָלָיו – אֵינוֹ נֶקֶב.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: That halakha which they say in the West, Eretz Yisrael, escaped Rav Aḥa: Any perforation over which the ink passes and which it covers is not considered a perforation that invalidates the writing.
קלאוד על הדף:
The answer comes from the Eretz Yisrael academies (bema’arava), and the Gemara notes pointedly that it had simply escaped Rav Acha’s notice. The principle is elegantly practical: a perforation is a defect in the writing only if it interrupts the letter, so where the ink flows across it and covers it, the letter remains visually and halachically whole. This rule became the operative standard for scribal practice, and it is codified by the Rambam in Hilchot Tefillin.
Key Terms:
- בְּמַעְרְבָא (bema’arava) = in the West — the Babylonian Talmud’s term for the academies of Eretz Yisrael
- נֶקֶב (nekev) = a perforation or hole in the parchment
- דְּיוֹ (deyo) = ink
Segment 6
TYPE: איתיביה
Rabbi Yochanan attacks Reish Lakish from the mishna on 124a; the answer redefines the hair as a handle.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: עוֹר שֶׁיֵּשׁ עָלָיו כְּזַיִת בָּשָׂר, הַנּוֹגֵעַ בְּצִיב הַיּוֹצֵא מִמֶּנּוּ, וּבְשַׂעֲרָה שֶׁכְּנֶגְדּוֹ – טָמֵא. מַאי לָאו מִשּׁוּם שׁוֹמֵר? לָא, מִשּׁוּם יָד.
English Translation:
Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to the opinion of Reish Lakish opinion from the mishna taught later (124a): In the case of the hide of an animal carcass upon which there is an olive-bulk of flesh, one who touches a strand of flesh emerging from the flesh or touches a hair that is on the side of the hide opposite the flesh is ritually impure, even though he did not touch an olive-bulk of the flesh. What is the reason that one who touches the strand of flesh or the hair becomes impure? Is it not because they constitute protection for the flesh? The Gemara answers: No, it is because the hair constitutes a handle for the flesh.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yochanan brings a mishna taught later in the masechet: touching a strand of flesh (tziv) protruding from a hide, or a hair on the reverse side of a hide bearing an olive-bulk of flesh, renders one impure — which looks like proof that hair functions as a shomer. The Gemara deflects the proof by reclassifying the hair as a yad, a handle. The distinction matters: a shomer joins toward the requisite measure, while a yad merely conducts impurity by contact without adding to the volume, so the mishna no longer supports Rabbi Yochanan against Reish Lakish.
Key Terms:
- יָד (yad) = a handle — an appendage by which food is held, which conveys impurity but does not join toward the measure
- צִיב (tziv) = a strand or shred of flesh protruding from the hide
- שֶׁכְּנֶגְדּוֹ = that is opposite it — on the far side of the hide from the flesh
Segment 7
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
A single hair is useless as a handle — unless it is one hair among many.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
נִימָא אַחַת לְמַאי חַזְיָא? כִּדְאָמַר רַבִּי אִילְעָא: בִּמְלַאי שֶׁבֵּין הַמְּלָאִין, הָכִי נָמֵי בְּנִימָא שֶׁבֵּין הַנִּימִין.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: For what function is one hair fit such that it constitutes a handle? The Gemara answers: One can explain that mishna as Rabbi Ela said in explanation of a different mishna: It is stated with regard to the case of an awn among many awns. Here too, the mishna is stated with regard to the case of a hair among many hairs and not the case of a single hair. The hair serves as a handle for the flesh because one can hold the hair and lift the flesh without the hair becoming detached.
קלאוד על הדף:
If the hair is only a yad, it must actually function as one, and no one lifts a piece of meat by a single strand. The Gemara resolves this with Rabbi Ela’s principle, imported from a parallel case: the mishna speaks of a hair among many hairs, where the clump together bears the weight. The functional test for a yad is thus real usability, not formal attachment.
Key Terms:
- לְמַאי חַזְיָא = for what is it fit? — what practical use does it serve?
- נִימָא שֶׁבֵּין הַנִּימִין = a hair among many hairs — the case in which hair genuinely serves as a grip
Segment 8
TYPE: מקור
The Gemara traces Rabbi Ela’s principle to its original context: the awn on a grain stalk.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהֵיכָא אִיתְּמַר דְּרַבִּי אִילְעָא? אַהָא דִּתְנַן: הַמְּלַאי שֶׁבַּשִּׁבֳּלִין מְטַמְּאִין וּמִיטַּמְּאִין וְאֵין מִצְטָרְפִין. מְלַאי לְמַאי חֲזֵי? אָמַר רַבִּי אִילְעָא: בִּמְלַאי שֶׁבֵּין הַמְּלָאִין.
English Translation:
And where was the opinion of Rabbi Ela stated? It was stated with regard to that which we learned in a mishna: An awn that is on top of a stalk can become impure and impart impurity, but it does not join together with the grains to constitute the requisite measure to impart impurity. It was asked: For what function is an awn fit such that it is considered to be a handle for the stalk? Rabbi Ela said: The mishna is stated with regard to the case of an awn among many awns.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Ela’s rule was first stated on a mishna about the melai, the bristly awn on an ear of grain: awns can contract and transmit impurity but do not join toward the requisite measure. There too the question arose — what use is a single awn? — and there too the answer was that the mishna speaks of an awn among many. Citing the source demonstrates that the resolution here is not an ad hoc fix but an established principle in the law of handles.
Key Terms:
- מְלַאי (melai) = the awn or beard — the bristly filament on an ear of grain
- מְטַמְּאִין וּמִיטַּמְּאִין = they impart impurity and contract impurity
- וְאֵין מִצְטָרְפִין = but they do not join together toward the requisite measure
Segment 9
TYPE: ביאור מילה
Rava defines the mishna’s rotev as the fat floating on meat soup.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהָרוֹטֶב. מַאי רוֹטֶב? אָמַר רָבָא: שׁוּמְנָא.
English Translation:
§The mishna teaches: The gravy [rotev] joins together with the meat to constitute the requisite egg-bulk to impart the impurity of food, but an egg-bulk of gravy itself is not susceptible to impurity. The Gemara asks: To what is the term rotev referring? Rava said: The term rotev is referring to the fat that floats on top of a soup of cooked meat.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara now works through the mishna’s terms one at a time. Rava reads rotev as shumna, the layer of fat that rises to the top of a pot of cooked meat. The definition is immediately vulnerable, because the whole point of the mishna’s list is that these items are not food in their own right.
Key Terms:
- רוֹטֶב (rotev) = gravy — here identified as rendered fat associated with cooked meat
- שׁוּמְנָא (shumna) = fat, specifically the fat floating atop a soup of cooked meat
Segment 10
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Abaye: floating fat is edible in its own right. Rotev must be fat that oozed out and congealed.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: הוּא עַצְמוֹ יְטַמֵּא טוּמְאַת אֳכָלִין! אֶלָּא חֵלֶב דִּקְרִישׁ.
English Translation:
Abaye said to Rava: That fat itself is eaten and is therefore susceptible to impurity of food. Rather, the term rotev is referring to fat that oozed out of the meat and congealed. That fat is not eaten, but it does join together with the meat to constitute the requisite egg-bulk to impart the impurity of food.
קלאוד על הדף:
Abaye’s objection is exactly the vulnerability just noted: fat floating on soup is eaten, so it would be susceptible to food-impurity independently and would not need to join with anything. The corrected definition is chelev d’karish — fat that seeped out of the meat and set. Congealed in that state it is not eaten on its own, which is precisely why the mishna must tell us it nonetheless combines with the meat.
Key Terms:
- חֵלֶב דִּקְרִישׁ (chelev d’karish) = fat that has congealed — set fat that oozed from the meat
- הוּא עַצְמוֹ יְטַמֵּא = it would itself be susceptible to impurity — the objection that an edible item needs no combination
Segment 11
TYPE: קושיא
Why specify congealed? Reish Lakish held brine combines with a vegetable on Yom Kippur.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַאי אִירְיָא קְרִישׁ? כִּי לָא קְרִישׁ נָמֵי! דְּאָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: צִיר שֶׁעַל גַּבֵּי יָרָק מִצְטָרֵף לִכְכוֹתֶבֶת בְּיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: Why is the mishna referring specifically to congealed fat? Even in a case where the fat did not congeal it joins together with the meat to constitute the requisite egg-bulk to impart the impurity of food, as Reish Lakish said: Brine on a vegetable, even though it is a liquid, combines with the vegetable to constitute a large date-bulk [kakotevet] with regard to rendering one liable for violating the prohibition against eating on Yom Kippur. Similarly, liquid fat should combine with the meat to constitute the requisite volume to impart the impurity of food.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara challenges the restriction to congealed fat by citing Reish Lakish on Yom Kippur: brine (tzir) clinging to a vegetable joins with it toward the kakotevet, the large-date-bulk that creates liability for eating on the fast. If a liquid can combine with a solid there, liquid fat should combine with meat here. The challenge presses on whether combination is a single uniform concept across halachic domains.
Key Terms:
- צִיר (tzir) = brine — the salty liquid in which vegetables or fish are pickled
- כְּכוֹתֶבֶת (kakotevet) = a large-date-bulk — the minimum quantity of food creating liability on Yom Kippur
Segment 12
TYPE: תירוץ
Yom Kippur measures by settling the mind, not by combination.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָתָם מִשּׁוּם יַתּוֹבֵי דַּעְתָּא הוּא, בְּכֹל דְּהוּ מְיַתְּבָא דַּעְתֵּיהּ.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: Liquids and solids do not join together to constitute the requisite egg-bulk to impart the impurity of food. The reason for the halakha there, with regard to Yom Kippur, is because one is liable even for the consumption of a liquid that is not characterized as food if the mind of the one who consumes it is settled. This is because with regard to the fast of Yom Kippur the Torah is concerned with a person’s affliction, as the verse states: “You shall afflict your souls” (Leviticus 23:27). Therefore, one is liable on Yom Kippur for any eating that settles his mind.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara’s answer distinguishes the two domains at their root. Yom Kippur’s prohibition is framed by the Torah as affliction — “you shall afflict your souls” (Vayikra 23:27) — so the operative criterion is yituvei da’ata, whether the intake settles and comforts the person. Anything that relieves the affliction, liquid or solid, is included, which is why brine counts there regardless of its physical form.
Key Terms:
- יַתּוֹבֵי דַּעְתָּא (yituvei da’ata) = settling of the mind — the relief from affliction that grounds Yom Kippur liability
- בְּכֹל דְּהוּ = with anything whatsoever — any intake that produces that relief
Segment 13
TYPE: מסקנא
Impurity turns on combination, which requires a shared measure — so only congealed fat joins.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָכָא מִשּׁוּם אִיצְטְרוֹפֵי הוּא, אִי קְרִישׁ – מִצְטָרֵף, אִי לָא קְרִישׁ – לָא מִצְטָרֵף.
English Translation:
But that is not the case here with regard to impurity. For two substances to join together to impart impurity, a combination between substances that have a common requisite measure for imparting impurity is necessary. Liquid and solid foods do not have the same requisite measure. Therefore, if the fat is congealed, it joins together with the meat. If it is not congealed, it does not join together with the meat.
קלאוד על הדף:
Here the criterion is itztarofei, actual combination of two substances into one requisite quantity, and things can only combine if they are measured by the same standard. Solid food is measured by the egg-bulk while liquids are governed by their own rules, so the two never merge into a single total. Congealing changes the fat’s category from liquid to solid, and only then can it join with the meat — which is exactly why the mishna specifies congealed fat.
Key Terms:
- אִיצְטְרוֹפֵי (itztarofei) = combining — the joining of two substances toward one requisite measure
- אִי קְרִישׁ מִצְטָרֵף = if it congealed it joins — the operative rule of the sugya
Segment 14
TYPE: ביאור מילה
Rabba defines kifa as the congealed hash settling at the bottom of the pot.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהַקֵּיפֶה, מַאי קֵיפֶה? אָמַר רַבָּה: פִּירְמָא.
English Translation:
§The mishna teaches: The spices [kifa] join together with the meat to constitute the requisite egg-bulk to impart the impurity of food, but an egg-bulk of kifa itself is not susceptible to impurity. The Gemara asks: To what is the term kifa referring? Rabba said: The term kifa is referring to a congealed hash of cooked meat that settled to the bottom of the pot.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara turns to the next term. Rabba glosses kifa as pirma, the sediment of shredded meat that sinks and sets at the bottom of the cooking vessel. The definition runs into the same difficulty Rava’s did.
Key Terms:
- קֵיפֶה (kifa) = the mishna’s term, ultimately identified as spices
- פִּירְמָא (pirma) = a hash or sediment of cooked shredded meat that settles at the bottom of the pot
Segment 15
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Abaye: the hash is edible. Rav Pappa: kifa means spices.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: הוּא עַצְמוֹ יְטַמֵּא טוּמְאַת אֳכָלִין! אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: תַּבְלִין.
English Translation:
Abaye said to Rabba: That hash itself is eaten and is therefore susceptible to the impurity of food. Rather, Rav Pappa said: The term kifa is referring to spices, which are not eaten themselves but do join together with the meat to constitute the requisite egg-bulk to impart the impurity of food.
קלאוד על הדף:
Abaye repeats his move against Rabba: cooked meat sediment is eaten, so it is independently susceptible and needs no combination clause. Rav Pappa supplies the definition that fits the mishna’s logic — kifa is tavlin, the seasonings cooked with the meat, which nobody eats on their own but which are absorbed into the dish and therefore join toward the measure. With this, both of the mishna’s obscure terms are resolved along a single principle: the list consists of non-foods that nonetheless combine.
Key Terms:
- תַּבְלִין (tavlin) = spices, seasonings cooked with the meat
- טוּמְאַת אֳכָלִין = food-impurity — the status the combined measure produces
Segment 16
TYPE: ברייתא
The theme of congealing launches a new sugya: congealed blood and melted fat.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תְּנַן הָתָם: הִקְפָּה אֶת הַדָּם וַאֲכָלוֹ, אוֹ שֶׁהִמְחָה אֶת הַחֵלֶב וּגְמָעוֹ – חַיָּיב.
English Translation:
§Since the mishna mentions kifa, which, according to Rabba, is referring to a congealed substance, the Gemara discusses the halakha of one who congealed a forbidden substance and consumed it. We learned in a baraita there: One who caused blood to coagulate and ate it or melted forbidden fat and swallowed it is liable.
קלאוד על הדף:
The word kifa — a congealed substance — prompts the Gemara to introduce a baraita about deliberately changing a forbidden substance’s physical state. One who congeals blood and eats it, or melts forbidden fat (chelev) and gulps it down, is liable. The first case is a solid made from a liquid, the second a liquid made from a solid, and each raises its own difficulty, which the Gemara now separates.
Key Terms:
- הִקְפָּה (hikpa) = he congealed / caused to coagulate
- הִמְחָה (himcha) = he melted or dissolved
- חֵלֶב (chelev) = the forbidden fats of a kosher domesticated animal, punishable by karet
Segment 17
TYPE: קושיא
Blood is understandable through achshevei, but melted fat is drunk, and the Torah wrote “eating.”
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בִּשְׁלָמָא הִקְפָּה אֶת הַדָּם וַאֲכָלוֹ, כֵּיוָן דְּאַקְפְּיֵהּ אַחְשׁוֹבֵי אַחְשְׁבֵיהּ, אֶלָּא הִמְחָה אֶת הַחֵלֶב וּגְמָעוֹ – אֲכִילָה כְּתִיבָא בֵּיהּ, וְהָא לָאו אֲכִילָה הִיא!
English Translation:
The Gemara objects: Granted, one who caused blood to coagulate and ate it is liable. Although blood is not normally eaten in such a manner, since he caused the blood to coagulate, he ascribed the significance of food to it, and the Torah prohibits the eating of blood, as it is written: “You shall eat neither fat nor blood” (Leviticus 3:17). But why is one who melted forbidden fat and swallowed it liable? Eating, and not drinking, is stated in the Torah with regard to the prohibition against the consumption of forbidden fat, as it is written: “You shall eat no fat of ox or sheep or goat” (Leviticus 7:23), and this swallowing of a liquid is not eating.
קלאוד על הדף:
Congealed blood is easy: blood is not normally eaten, but by taking the trouble to congeal it a person has ascribed food-status to it — achshevei — and the Torah’s prohibition on eating blood (Vayikra 3:17) then applies. Melted fat is the hard case, because the verse forbidding chelev (Vayikra 7:23) uses the verb “you shall not eat,” and swallowing a liquid is drinking, not eating. The objection sets up Reish Lakish’s derivation, which will recur three times in the coming sugya.
Key Terms:
- אַחְשׁוֹבֵי אַחְשְׁבֵיהּ (achshevei achshevei) = he ascribed significance to it — an act that confers food-status on a non-food
- אֲכִילָה (achila) = eating — the term the Torah uses, seemingly excluding drinking
Segment 18
TYPE: דרשה
Reish Lakish: the word “nefesh” includes one who drinks.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: אָמַר קְרָא ״נֶפֶשׁ״ – לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַשּׁוֹתֶה.
English Translation:
Reish Lakish said: One is liable even for drinking the melted forbidden fat of an animal. The verse states: “For all who eat the fat of the animal that one could offer from it a fire offering to the Lord, the soul that eats it shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 7:25). The term “soul” is interpreted homiletically to include in the prohibition one who drinks the fat.
קלאוד על הדף:
Reish Lakish resolves the difficulty by exegesis. The verse on chelev concludes “the nefesh that eats it shall be cut off from his people” (Vayikra 7:25), and that extra word nefesh is read as an inclusion: liability extends beyond eating in the ordinary sense to one who drinks the substance in liquid form. This derivation is the engine of the entire sugya, and the Gemara will now show that it is repeated deliberately in two other places.
Key Terms:
- נֶפֶשׁ (nefesh) = soul / person — the term darshened to include one who drinks
- לְרַבּוֹת (leravot) = to include — the exegetical function of an apparently superfluous term
- כָּרֵת (karet) = excision — the severe punishment of being cut off, attached to eating chelev
Segment 19
TYPE: ברייתא
The identical structure appears with chametz: dissolved bread on Pesach.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תַּנְיָא נָמֵי גַּבֵּי חָמֵץ כְּהַאי גַּוְנָא: הִמְחָהוּ וּגְמָעוֹ – אִם חָמֵץ הוּא, עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת; אִם מַצָּה הִיא, אֵין אָדָם יוֹצֵא בָּהּ יְדֵי חוֹבָתוֹ בַּפֶּסַח.
English Translation:
The Gemara comments: A novelty of this kind is also taught in a baraita with regard to the prohibition against eating leavened bread on Passover: If one took bread, dissolved it in water, and swallowed this mixture on Passover, the halakha is as follows: If it is leavened bread, he is punished with karet; if it is matza, then a person does not fulfill his obligation to eat matza on Passover with this food.
קלאוד על הדף:
A second baraita treats bread dissolved in water and swallowed on Pesach, and it yields a striking asymmetry. If the bread is leavened, the one who drinks it incurs karet; if it is matza, drinking it does not fulfill the mitzva of eating matza. The same physical act is treated as eating for the prohibition and as not-eating for the obligation, which is exactly what the Gemara now unpacks.
Key Terms:
- חָמֵץ (chametz) = leavened bread, forbidden on Pesach under penalty of karet
- מַצָּה (matza) = unleavened bread, which one is obligated to eat on the first night of Pesach
- גְּמָעוֹ (gema’o) = he gulped or swallowed it — drinking rather than chewing
Segment 20
TYPE: קושיא
Matza fails because it is no longer lechem oni; but why is dissolved chametz punishable?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בִּשְׁלָמָא אִם מַצָּה הִיא אֵין אָדָם יוֹצֵא בָּהּ יְדֵי חוֹבָתוֹ בַּפֶּסַח, ״לֶחֶם עֹנִי״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא, וְהַאי לָאו לֶחֶם עֹנִי הוּא. אֶלָּא אִם חָמֵץ הוּא עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת, אֲכִילָה כְּתִיבָא בֵּיהּ!
English Translation:
The Gemara objects: Granted, if it is matza, a person does not fulfill his obligation to eat matza on Passover with this food, as the Merciful One states with regard to the prohibition against eating leavened bread on Passover: “You shall eat no leavened bread with it; seven days you shall eat unleavened bread with it, even the bread of affliction” (Deuteronomy 16:3), indicating that one must eat the bread of affliction, but this bread dissolved in water is not considered the bread of affliction. But if the bread is leavened bread, why is he punished with karet? Eating is written with regard to the prohibition against leavened bread, and in this case he did not eat it but rather drank it.
קלאוד על הדף:
The matza half is intuitive: the Torah requires lechem oni, “the bread of affliction” (Devarim 16:3), and bread dissolved into liquid is no longer bread in any recognizable sense, so the mitzva is not discharged. The chametz half is the difficulty — the prohibition too is phrased with “eating,” and here the person drank. The Gemara has set up the same problem it faced with chelev, and the same solution follows.
Key Terms:
- לֶחֶם עֹנִי (lechem oni) = bread of affliction — the Torah’s description of matza, requiring recognizable bread
- יְדֵי חוֹבָתוֹ = his obligation — the duty to eat matza on the first night of Pesach
Segment 21
TYPE: דרשה
Reish Lakish again: “nefesh” in the chametz verse includes the drinker.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: אָמַר קְרָא ״נֶפֶשׁ״ – לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַשּׁוֹתֶה.
English Translation:
Reish Lakish said: One is liable even for drinking leavened bread. The verse states: “For all who eat leavened bread from the first day until the seventh day, that soul shall be cut off from Israel” (Exodus 12:15). The term “soul” is interpreted homiletically to include in the prohibition one who drinks leavened bread.
קלאוד על הדף:
The verse warning of karet for chametz reads “that nefesh shall be cut off from Israel” (Shemot 12:15), and Reish Lakish applies the same reading: the word includes one who consumes the chametz by drinking. The exact repetition of the derivation is deliberate on the Gemara’s part — three separate verses will be shown to require three separate inclusions.
Key Terms:
- נֶפֶשׁ (nefesh) = the term darshened to include drinking, here in Shemot 12:15
- הַשּׁוֹתֶה (hashoteh) = the one who drinks
Segment 22
TYPE: תוספתא
The third case: a kosher bird carcass liquefied in fire versus in the sun.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְתַנְיָא נָמֵי גַּבֵּי נִבְלַת עוֹף טָהוֹר כְּהַאי גַּוְנָא: הִמְחָהוּ בָּאוּר – טָמֵא, בַּחַמָּה – טָהוֹר. וְהָוֵינַן בַּהּ: אֲכִילָה כְּתִיב בֵּיהּ!
English Translation:
The Gemara comments: A novelty of this kind is also taught in the Tosefta (Zavim 5:9) with regard to one who eats the unslaughtered carcass of a kosher bird: One who liquefied the carcass of an unslaughtered kosher bird in fire and drank the substance is impure. But one who liquefied it in the sun and drank it is pure. And we discussed it: Eating and not drinking is stated with regard to the impurity of a carcass, as it is written: “And every soul that eats an unslaughtered carcass or that which is mauled by an animal, whether he is native or stranger, he shall wash his garments, bathe in water, and shall be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 17:15). Why, then, does one who drinks a kosher bird carcass become impure?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Tosefta (Zavim 5:9) supplies the third instance. The carcass of an unslaughtered kosher bird — nivlat of tahor, which uniquely renders the one who eats it impure — if liquefied by fire and drunk, imparts impurity; if liquefied by the sun, it does not. Here too the Torah writes eating (Vayikra 17:15), so the same objection arises, along with a new one about the sun.
Key Terms:
- נִבְלַת עוֹף טָהוֹר (nivlat of tahor) = the unslaughtered carcass of a kosher bird, which renders the eater impure
- הִמְחָהוּ בָּאוּר = he liquefied it in fire
- בַּחַמָּה (bachama) = in the sun
Segment 23
TYPE: דרשה וקושיא
Nefesh includes the drinker here too; the sun case is excluded because the liquid putrefies.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: אָמַר קְרָא ״נֶפֶשׁ״ – לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַשּׁוֹתֶה. אִי הָכִי, בַּחַמָּה נָמֵי? בַּחַמָּה אַיסְרוֹחֵי מַסְרַח.
English Translation:
Reish Lakish said: He becomes impure because the verse states: “And every soul.” The term “soul” is interpreted homiletically to include one who drinks. The Gemara objects: If so, one who drinks a carcass that is melted in the sun should also become impure. The Gemara explains: A carcass takes a long time to melt in the sun. Therefore, the liquid becomes rotten and unfit for consumption.
קלאוד על הדף:
Reish Lakish applies his derivation a third time, from “every nefesh that eats a carcass” (Vayikra 17:15). The Gemara then asks why the sun case should differ, and answers on practical rather than exegetical grounds: melting a carcass in the sun is so slow that the substance putrefies (isrochei masrach) before it liquefies, and a putrid substance has ceased to be food at all. The exclusion is thus about the nature of the substance, not about the manner of consumption.
Key Terms:
- אַיסְרוֹחֵי מַסְרַח (isrochei masrach) = it becomes putrid — spoiled beyond the category of food
- אִי הָכִי = if so — the idiom pressing a claim to its logical consequence
Segment 24
TYPE: צריכותא
Why three verses are needed: chelev alone cannot generate chametz or neviela.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּצְרִיכִי, דְּאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא חֵלֶב – חָמֵץ לָא אָתֵי מִינֵּיהּ, שֶׁכֵּן לֹא הָיְתָה לוֹ שְׁעַת הַכּוֹשֶׁר; נְבֵלָה לָא אָתֵי מִינֵּיהּ, שֶׁכֵּן עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת.
English Translation:
The Gemara cited three instances in which Reish Lakish interpreted the term “soul” as including one who drinks. The Gemara explains: All three mentions of the term “soul” are necessary. As, if the Merciful One had written the term “soul” only with regard to forbidden fat, liability for drinking liquefied leavened bread could not have been derived from it, since the prohibition against the consumption of forbidden fat has an element of stringency that does not apply to leavened bread in that the forbidden fat had no period of fitness for consumption. Leavened bread, on the other hand, may be consumed before Passover. Likewise, impurity contracted by drinking a liquefied carcass could not be derived from the halakha of forbidden fat because the consumption of forbidden fat is punishable by karet, which is not the case with regard to the consumption of a carcass.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara now builds a tzerichuta, the systematic demonstration that no one of the three inclusions could have been derived from another. Beginning from chelev: it could not teach chametz, because chelev is stringent in never having had a period of fitness (she’at hakosher), while chametz is perfectly permitted before Pesach. And it could not teach the carcass, because chelev carries karet while eating a carcass does not.
Key Terms:
- צְרִיכִי (tzerichi) = they are necessary — the demonstration that each source is indispensable
- שְׁעַת הַכּוֹשֶׁר (she’at hakosher) = a period of fitness — a stage at which the substance was permitted for consumption
Segment 25
TYPE: צריכותא
Chametz alone cannot generate chelev or neviela either.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא חָמֵץ – חֵלֶב לָא אָתֵי מִינֵּיהּ, שֶׁכֵּן לֹא הוּתַּר מִכְּלָלוֹ, וּנְבֵלָה לָא אָתְיָא מִינֵּיהּ, שֶׁכֵּן עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת.
English Translation:
And if the Merciful One had written the term “soul” only with regard to leavened bread, liability for drinking melted forbidden fat could not be derived from it, as there are no circumstances in which the general prohibition against eating leavened bread was permitted. The consumption of forbidden fat, on the other hand, is permitted with regard to the fat of an undomesticated animal. And similarly, impurity contracted by drinking a liquefied carcass could not be derived from the halakha of leavened bread, because the halakha of leavened bread has an element of stringency that does not apply to a carcass in that its consumption is punishable by karet.
קלאוד על הדף:
Running the same test from chametz: it cannot teach chelev, because chametz is stringent in that its general prohibition was never relaxed anywhere, whereas the fat of an undomesticated animal (chelev chaya) is permitted. And it cannot teach the carcass, because chametz carries karet and the carcass does not. Each candidate source turns out to carry a stringency the target case lacks.
Key Terms:
- לֹא הוּתַּר מִכְּלָלוֹ = its general prohibition was never permitted — no case in which the category is relaxed
- חֵלֶב חַיָּה (chelev chaya) = the fat of an undomesticated animal, which is permitted for consumption
Segment 26
TYPE: צריכותא
And the carcass alone cannot generate the other two — it uniquely transmits impurity.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא בִּנְבֵלָה – הָנָךְ לָא אָתְיָא מִינַּהּ, שֶׁכֵּן מְטַמְּאָה.
English Translation:
And if the Merciful One had written the term “soul” only with regard to a carcass, those prohibitions against drinking melted fat and liquefied leavened bread could not be derived from it, because a carcass has an element of stringency that does not apply to those prohibitions in that it transmits impurity to one who eats it. Therefore, all three mentions of the term “soul” are necessary.
קלאוד על הדף:
The third leg completes the triangle: the carcass of a kosher bird is stringent in a way neither of the others is, since eating it renders the person ritually impure. A stringency unique to the source blocks the inference to lighter cases, so none of the three inclusions can be spared. All three occurrences of nefesh are therefore necessary.
Key Terms:
- מְטַמְּאָה (metam’a) = it imparts impurity — the unique stringency of the bird carcass
- הָנָךְ (hanach) = those others — the two remaining cases in the tzerichuta
Segment 27
TYPE: קושיא
Objection: derive one case from the other two. The carcass cannot be derived — both others carry karet.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
חֲדָא מֵחֲדָא לָא אָתְיָא, תֵּיתֵי חֲדָא מִתַּרְתֵּי! הֵי תֵּיתֵי? לָא לִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא בִּנְבֵלָה וְתֵיתֵי מֵהָנָךְ – מָה לְהָנָךְ שֶׁכֵּן עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת!
English Translation:
The Gemara objects: It is true that one halakha cannot be derived from either one of the others, as detailed above. Nevertheless, one can derive the halakha of one of them from the other two. The Gemara responds: This is not possible, as which halakha can one derive from the others? Let the Merciful One not write this halakha with regard to a liquefied carcass and derive it from these other prohibitions against eating forbidden fat and leavened bread. One can refute this derivation: What is notable about these other prohibitions? They are notable in that one who transgresses them is punished with karet, contrary to one who eats a carcass.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara raises the standard refinement of a tzerichuta: even if no single source suffices, two sources together often can, since a stringency shared by only one of them is neutralized. It tests this on the carcass first — and fails, because both chelev and chametz share the stringency of karet, which the carcass lacks. A stringency common to both sources still blocks the derivation.
Key Terms:
- תֵּיתֵי חֲדָא מִתַּרְתֵּי = let one be derived from two — the attempt to derive a case from a pair of sources
- הֵי תֵּיתֵי = which one could be derived? — the Gemara’s challenge to specify
Segment 28
TYPE: דחייה
Chametz cannot be derived from the other two — both lack a period of fitness.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לָא לִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא בְּחָמֵץ, וְתֵיתֵי מֵהָנָךְ – מָה לְהָנָךְ, שֶׁכֵּן לֹא הָיְתָה לָהֶן שְׁעַת הַכּוֹשֶׁר!
English Translation:
The Gemara suggests: Let the Merciful One not write this halakha with regard to dissolved leavened bread and derive it from these halakhot of forbidden fat and a carcass. The Gemara refutes the derivation: What is notable about these halakhot? They are notable in that they had no period of fitness for consumption, as opposed to leavened bread, which was fit for consumption before Passover.
קלאוד על הדף:
The second test also fails. Both chelev and the carcass share the stringency of never having had a she’at hakosher: neither was ever permitted to eat at any stage. Chametz, permitted right up until the eve of Pesach, is lighter in exactly that respect, so the pair cannot generate it.
Key Terms:
- שְׁעַת הַכּוֹשֶׁר = a period of fitness — the stage before Pesach when chametz was permitted
- לְהָנָךְ = to those — the two proposed source cases
Segment 29
TYPE: דחייה
Chelev cannot be derived either — both others were never permitted from their general prohibition.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לָא לִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא בְּחֵלֶב, וְתֵיתֵי מֵהָנָךְ – מָה לְהָנָךְ שֶׁכֵּן לֹא הוּתַּר מִכְּלָלָן, תֹּאמַר בְּחֵלֶב שֶׁהוּתַּר מִכְּלָלוֹ!
English Translation:
The Gemara suggests: Let the Merciful One not write this halakha with regard to forbidden fat and derive it from these halakhot of consuming leavened bread and a carcass. The Gemara refutes the derivation: What is notable about these halakhot? They are notable in that there are no circumstances in which their general prohibition was permitted. Shall you say the same with regard to forbidden fat, whose general prohibition was permitted in certain circumstances? Therefore, all three mentions of the term “soul” are necessary.
קלאוד על הדף:
The third test fails on the same pattern: chametz and the carcass share the stringency of never being relaxed from their general prohibition, whereas chelev is relaxed, since the fat of an undomesticated animal is permitted. With all three tests failed, the tzerichuta stands complete — and the last refutation depends on a claim about chelev being permitted that the Gemara now stops to verify.
Key Terms:
- לֹא הוּתַּר מִכְּלָלָן = their general prohibition was never permitted
- תֹּאמַר בְּחֵלֶב = shall you say the same of chelev — the formula distinguishing the target case
Segment 30
TYPE: הוה אמינא
What is the case where chelev is permitted? Not the altar — the bird carcass reaches the altar too.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּמַאי נִיהוּ? אִילֵּימָא חֵלֶב בְּהֵמָה לַגָּבוֹהַּ – נְבֵלָה נָמֵי אִשְׁתְּרַאי מְלִיקַת עוֹף לַגָּבוֹהַּ.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: And what is the case in which forbidden fat is permitted? If we say that it is the fat of a domesticated animal that is permitted to be sacrificed in the Temple to the Most High, a bird carcass is also permitted to be sacrificed in the Temple. Although pinching the nape of the neck of a bird renders it an unslaughtered carcass and forbidden for consumption, bird offerings are sacrificed to the Most High in such a manner.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara probes the premise of the last argument. If the permitted case is fat burned on the altar (lagavoha), the parallel collapses, because a bird carcass also reaches the altar: melika, pinching the nape, technically renders the bird a carcass, yet bird offerings are brought precisely that way. Both categories would then be relaxed for the Most High, and the distinction disappears.
Key Terms:
- לַגָּבוֹהַּ (lagavoha) = to the Most High — offered on the altar rather than eaten by a person
- מְלִיקָה (melika) = pinching the nape of a bird’s neck, the sacrificial procedure that renders it technically a carcass
Segment 31
TYPE: הוה אמינא
Nor the fat of a chaya to an ordinary person — the bird sin-offering is eaten by priests.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאֶלָּא חֵלֶב חַיָּה לְהֶדְיוֹט – נְבֵלָה נָמֵי אִשְׁתְּרַאי מְלִיקָה דְּחַטַּאת הָעוֹף לַכֹּהֲנִים!
English Translation:
And if the reference is rather to the forbidden fat of an undomesticated animal, which is permitted to an ordinary person, one may respond that a carcass is also permitted for a person’s consumption in a certain case, as the pinching of the nape of the neck of a bird sin offering renders it fit for consumption of the priests.
קלאוד על הדף:
The second candidate is chelev chaya permitted to an ordinary person (hedyot). This too seems to have a parallel: the bird sin-offering, killed by melika and therefore a carcass in form, is eaten by the priests. If a carcass can be eaten by human beings, the two categories are again symmetrical and the refutation in segment 29 collapses.
Key Terms:
- הֶדְיוֹט (hedyot) = an ordinary person, as opposed to the altar or a priest acting in his priestly capacity
- חַטַּאת הָעוֹף = the bird sin-offering, whose meat is consumed by the priests
Segment 32
TYPE: מסקנא
Resolution: priests eat from the table of the Most High, so that is not a case of permission to ordinary people.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לְעוֹלָם חֵלֶב חַיָּה לְהֶדְיוֹט, וּדְקָא קַשְׁיָא לָךְ כֹּהֲנִים – כֹּהֲנִים מִשֻּׁלְחַן גָּבוֹהַּ קָא זָכוּ.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: Actually, the reference is to the forbidden fat of an undomesticated animal, which is permitted to an ordinary person. And that which is difficult for you with regard to the fact that the priests eat the carcass of a bird which is brought as a sin offering is not difficult, as the priests receive their portion from the table of the Most High. Since this carcass is permitted as an offering to God, it is permitted to the priests as well. Therefore, this does not qualify as a case of an unslaughtered carcass permitted to ordinary people.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara holds its ground: the permitted case really is chelev chaya to an ordinary person, and the priestly consumption of the bird sin-offering does not undercut it. The priests do not eat as private individuals but as recipients of the altar’s portion — kohanim mishulchan gavoha ka zachu, they acquire from the table of the Most High. Priestly eating is thus an extension of the offering, not an ordinary permission, and the asymmetry that grounds the tzerichuta survives.
Key Terms:
- מִשֻּׁלְחַן גָּבוֹהַּ קָא זָכוּ = they acquire from the table of the Most High — priestly portions derive from the altar, not from ordinary permission
- כֹּהֲנִים (kohanim) = priests, who consume designated portions of certain offerings
Segment 33
TYPE: קושיא
A baraita derives the juice, gravy and sediment of sheratzim from a verse — why not learn it from the three cases?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהָא דְּתַנְיָא: ״הַטְּמֵאִים״ – לֶאֱסוֹר צִירָן וְרוֹטְבָן וְקֵיפֶה שֶׁלָּהֶן, לְמָה לִי? לִיגְמַר מֵהָנֵי!
English Translation:
§The Gemara challenges: But that which is taught in the following baraita is difficult. The Torah states with regard to the prohibition against eating creeping animals: “These are they that are impure [hatteme’im] to you among all the creeping animals” (Leviticus 11:31). The Sages interpret the letter heh in the term “hatteme’im” to forbid their juice that oozes from their carcasses, and their gravy that is produced when they are cooked, and sediments of their flesh that congeal at the bottom of the dish when cooked. The Gemara explains the challenge: Why do I need a verse to teach this halakha? Let this halakha be learned from these halakhot of melted forbidden fat, a liquefied bird carcass, and dissolved leavened bread.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara turns to a fourth case governed by the same principle. A baraita reads the definite article in hatteme’im (Vayikra 11:31) as forbidding the tzir, rotev and keipa of creeping animals — their oozing juice, cooking liquid and congealed sediment. If drinking already counts as eating in three other prohibitions, why does the Torah need a dedicated verse here?
Key Terms:
- שְׁרָצִים (sheratzim) = creeping animals, whose carcasses impart impurity
- צִיר (tzir) = the juice that oozes from the carcass
- קֵיפֶה (keipa) = the sediment that congeals at the bottom of the cooking vessel
Segment 34
TYPE: תירוץ
Without the verse, dayo would cap liability at an olive-bulk instead of a lentil-bulk.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
צְרִיכִי, דְּאִי לָא כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא – הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: דַּיּוֹ לַבָּא מִן הַדִּין לִהְיוֹת כַּנִּדּוֹן, מָה הָתָם – עַד דְּאִיכָּא כְּזַיִת, אַף הָכָא נָמֵי – עַד דְּאִיכָּא כְּזַיִת.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: It is necessary for this halakha to be written, as if the Merciful One had not written this halakha with regard to creeping animals and instead the halakha was derived from the other halakhot, I would say: It is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source. Accordingly, just as there, one who consumes melted forbidden fat, a liquefied carcass, or dissolved leavened bread is not liable until he consumes an olive-bulk, so too here, with regard to consuming the juice, gravy, and sediments of creeping animals, one is not liable until he consumes an olive-bulk. Therefore, a separate verse is necessary to teach that one is liable even for consuming a lentil-bulk of the juice, gravy, or sediments of a creeping animal, just as one is liable for consuming this measure of the creeping animal itself.
קלאוד על הדף:
The answer invokes the principle of dayo: an inference cannot yield a rule stricter than its source. Derived from chelev, chametz and the carcass, liability for the liquid of a sheretz would require an olive-bulk, since that is the measure in those cases. The dedicated verse teaches that the liquid follows the sheretz’s own measure — a lentil-bulk (k’adasha) — so the exegesis is not redundant after all. This closes amud aleph on a point of method that governs the whole of amud bet.
Key Terms:
- דַּיּוֹ לַבָּא מִן הַדִּין (dayo la’ba min hadin) = it is sufficient for the derived case to be like its source — an inference cannot exceed its origin
- כְּזַיִת (k’zayit) = an olive-bulk, the standard measure for liability in the three source cases
- כַּעֲדָשָׁה (k’adasha) = a lentil-bulk, the minimal measure at which a sheretz imparts impurity
Amud Bet (120b)
Segment 1
TYPE: קושיא
Reverse it: write the rule only by sheratzim and derive the other three from there.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְלִיכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא בִּשְׁרָצִים, וְלֵיתוֹ הָנָךְ וְלִיגְמְרוּ מִינַּיְיהוּ!
English Translation:
The Gemara objects: Let the Merciful One write the prohibition against consuming the juice, gravy, and sediments of creeping animals and let these halakhot of consuming liquefied forbidden fat, dissolved leavened bread, and a melted carcass of a bird come and be learned from it. The Torah does not need to state those halakhot explicitly.
קלאוד על הדף:
Having established that sheratzim need their own verse, the Gemara tries the economy in the other direction. If one source could serve for all four, let it be sheratzim, and let chelev, chametz and the carcass be derived from it — saving three occurrences of nefesh. The proposal is efficient, and the Gemara must show why it fails.
Key Terms:
- וְלִיכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא = let the Merciful One write — the idiom proposing a more economical scriptural arrangement
- וְלִיגְמְרוּ מִינַּיְיהוּ = and let them be learned from it
Segment 2
TYPE: דחייה
Sheratzim are stringent: their impurity operates in any amount.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ: מָה לִשְׁרָצִים, שֶׁכֵּן טוּמְאָתָן בְּמַשֶּׁהוּ.
English Translation:
The Gemara explains: It is not possible to derive those halakhot in such a manner because that derivation can be refuted: What is notable about creeping animals? They are notable in that their impurity is imparted in any amount. Those other halakhot, on the other hand, do not apply to less than an olive-bulk.
קלאוד על הדף:
The proposal is refuted by the very stringency that made the sheretz verse necessary. Sheratzim impart impurity b’mashehu, at any quantity whatsoever, whereas the other three prohibitions require an olive-bulk. A uniquely stringent source cannot generate the lighter cases, so the three nefesh derivations remain irreplaceable and the tzerichuta is complete on both sides.
Key Terms:
- בְּמַשֶּׁהוּ (b’mashehu) = in any amount — impurity that takes effect without a minimum measure
- לְמִיפְרַךְ (lemifrach) = to refute — to break an inference by identifying an unshared stringency
Segment 3
TYPE: ברייתא
A new baraita: liquids of tevel, chadash, hekdesh, sheviit and kilayim carry the produce’s status.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהָא דְּתַנְיָא: הַטֶּבֶל, וְהֶחָדָשׁ, וְהַהֶקְדֵּשׁ, וְהַשְּׁבִיעִית, וְהַכִּלְאַיִם – כּוּלָּן מַשְׁקִין הַיּוֹצְאִין מֵהֶן כְּמוֹתָן. מְנָלַן?
English Translation:
§The Gemara continues to examine the source for the status of liquids with regard to various halakhot based on that which is taught in a baraita: With regard to untithed produce; and the new crop of grain of the year, which is forbidden until after the omer offering is brought on the sixteenth of Nisan (see Leviticus 23:14); and consecrated produce; and the produce of the Sabbatical Year after the designated time when it must be removed from one’s house; and diverse kinds, i.e., the produce of a vineyard in which grains were sown; with regard to all of them, it is prohibited to consume liquid that emerges from them just as it is prohibited to consume them themselves. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara opens a fresh front. A baraita rules that for five categories of restricted produce — untithed produce, new grain before the omer, consecrated produce, Sabbatical produce after biur, and the mixed growth of a vineyard — the liquid pressed from them is forbidden exactly as the produce is: mashkin hayotzin mehen kemotan. This is the same structural claim as the earlier sugya (liquid follows solid), but in the domain of agricultural prohibitions, and the Gemara demands its source.
Key Terms:
- טֶבֶל (tevel) = untithed produce, forbidden until terumot and ma’asrot are separated
- חָדָשׁ (chadash) = the new grain crop, forbidden until the omer offering on the sixteenth of Nisan
- הֶקְדֵּשׁ (hekdesh) = consecrated property, forbidden to ordinary use
- שְׁבִיעִית (sheviit) = produce of the Sabbatical year, restricted after the time of removal
- כִּלְאַיִם (kilayim) = diverse kinds — here, grain sown in a vineyard
Segment 4
TYPE: דחייה
They cannot be derived from the earlier cases — those are prohibitions that arise on their own.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְכִי תֵּימָא: לִיגְמַר מֵהָנָךְ? מָה לְהָנָךְ – שֶׁכֵּן אִיסּוּר הַבָּא מֵאֵלָיו הָווּ.
English Translation:
And if you would say: Let those prohibitions be learned from these prohibitions of consuming the liquid that seeps from creeping animals, liquefied fat, dissolved leavened bread, and liquefied bird carcasses, one can respond that this derivation can be refuted. What is notable about these prohibitions? They are notable in that each of them is a prohibition that develops on its own without any human intervention, as opposed to the prohibitions in the baraita, which do not necessarily share this element of stringency.
קלאוד על הדף:
The obvious move is to derive the baraita’s five from the four cases already established. The Gemara blocks it: chelev, chametz, the carcass and the sheretz are all issur haba me’elav, prohibitions that come into being without any human act, and that is a stringency the produce categories do not uniformly share. The distinction between self-arising and humanly-generated prohibitions now becomes the organizing question of the sugya.
Key Terms:
- אִיסּוּר הַבָּא מֵאֵלָיו (issur haba me’elav) = a prohibition that arises on its own, without human action
- וְכִי תֵּימָא = and if you would say — the idiom introducing and then rejecting a proposal
Segment 5
TYPE: קושיא
Four of the five do arise on their own — but hekdesh requires a person to consecrate it.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תִּינַח הֵיכָא דְּאִיסּוּר בָּא מֵאֵלָיו, הֵיכָא דְּלָאו אִיסּוּר הַבָּא מֵאֵלָיו – מְנָלַן?
English Translation:
Therefore, it works out well to derive the prohibition against consuming liquids that emerged from a solid where the prohibition is one that develops on its own, such as untithed produce, the new crop, Sabbatical Year produce and diverse kinds. But with regard to consecrated produce, where the prohibition does not develop on its own but rather only after a person consecrates the produce, from where do we derive that it is prohibited to consume the liquid that emerges from the produce just as it is prohibited to consume the produce itself?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara refines the difficulty precisely. Tevel, chadash, sheviit and kilayim all become forbidden by themselves, through the passage of time or the facts of growth, so for them the derivation works. Hekdesh is the outlier: produce becomes consecrated only when a person declares it so. The rest of the sugya is a search for a source that shares that feature.
Key Terms:
- תִּינַח (tinach) = it works out well — granted for the cases that fit
- הֶקְדֵּשׁ (hekdesh) = consecrated produce, whose prohibition depends on a human act of dedication
Segment 6
TYPE: תירוץ
Derive hekdesh from bikkurim — and what is the source for bikkurim itself?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גָּמְרִינַן מִבִּכּוּרִים, וּבִכּוּרִים גּוּפַיְיהוּ מְנָלַן?
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: We learn this halakha from the case of first fruits. Consumption of first fruits is a prohibition that does not develop on its own, because the owner must set aside the first fruits. And consumption of the liquid that emerges from first fruits is prohibited like consumption of the fruit itself. The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive this halakha with regard to first fruits themselves?
קלאוד על הדף:
Bikkurim, first fruits, are the natural analogue: they too become restricted only when a person designates them, and their liquid carries their status. The Gemara accepts the analogy provisionally and immediately turns the question back one step — what establishes the rule for bikkurim? This chaining of derivations, each source becoming the next question, structures the remainder of the daf.
Key Terms:
- בִּכּוּרִים (bikkurim) = first fruits, brought to the Temple and given to the priest
- גָּמְרִינַן (gamrinan) = we derive / learn — the standard term for an inference between cases
Segment 7
TYPE: דרשה
Rabbi Yosei derives from ‘peri’ and ‘tavi’ that pressed grapes still fulfill bikkurim.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
דְּתָנֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: ״פְּרִי״ – פְּרִי אַתָּה מֵבִיא, וְאִי אַתָּה מֵבִיא מַשְׁקֶה. הֵבִיא עֲנָבִים וּדְרָכָן – מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״תָּבִיא״.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers that first fruits can be brought as wine, as Rabbi Yosei teaches: The verse states with regard to first fruits: “You shall take of the first of all the fruit of the ground, which you shall bring in from your land” (Deuteronomy 26:2). Since the verse mentions fruit, this indicates that you must bring actual fruit, and you may not bring the first fruits in the form of beverages. But if one brought grapes and he had already pressed them into wine, from where is it derived that he has fulfilled his obligation? The verse states: “You shall bring in from your land.” This superfluous term serves to teach that if one brings wine for the mitzva of first fruits, he has fulfilled his obligation.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yosei reads the two terms of Devarim 26:2 against each other. “Fruit” (peri) teaches that one brings actual fruit and not beverages, establishing the default; but the additional “you shall bring” (tavi) teaches that if a person brought grapes and had already pressed them into wine, he has nonetheless fulfilled the mitzva. Wine therefore retains the halachic identity of the fruit — the precise principle that hekdesh needs.
Key Terms:
- פְּרִי (peri) = fruit — the term restricting bikkurim to actual produce
- תָּבִיא (tavi) = you shall bring — the superfluous term including pressed wine
- מַשְׁקֶה (mashkeh) = a beverage or liquid
Segment 8
TYPE: דחייה
Bikkurim are too stringent: they require recitation and placement.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ: מָה לְבִכּוּרִים שֶׁכֵּן טְעוּנִין קְרִיָּיה וְהַנָּחָה!
English Translation:
But this derivation from the case of first fruits can be refuted: What is notable about first fruits? They are notable in that they require reciting the passage which begins: “My father was a wandering Aramean” (Deuteronomy 26:5), and placing the fruits in the Temple, whereas no such requirements exists with regard to consecrated produce.
קלאוד על הדף:
The derivation from bikkurim is refuted on the standard pattern. Bikkurim carry unique obligations — keriya, the declaration beginning “an Aramean sought to destroy my father” (Devarim 26:5), and hanacha, setting the basket down before the altar. Neither applies to hekdesh, so bikkurim are stringent in a way that blocks the inference.
Key Terms:
- קְרִיָּיה (keriya) = the recitation accompanying the bringing of first fruits
- הַנָּחָה (hanacha) = placement — setting the basket down before the altar
Segment 9
TYPE: תירוץ
Try teruma instead.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא גָּמַר מִתְּרוּמָה.
English Translation:
Rather, one can derive the prohibition against consuming the liquid that emerges from consecrated produce from the prohibition against consuming liquid that emerges from teruma, i.e., the portion of produce designated for the priest.
קלאוד על הדף:
Teruma is the alternative source: it is also a prohibition created by human designation, and its liquid also carries its status. The Gemara advances it briefly and, as before, immediately asks where teruma’s own rule comes from.
Key Terms:
- תְּרוּמָה (teruma) = the portion of produce designated for the priest, forbidden to a non-priest
- אֶלָּא גָּמַר = rather, derive it — the idiom substituting a new source after a refutation
Segment 10
TYPE: הקש
Teruma is juxtaposed to bikkurim by the phrase “u-terumat yadecha.”
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּתְרוּמָה גּוּפַהּ מְנָלַן? דְּאִיתַּקַּשׁ לְבִכּוּרִים, דְּאָמַר מָר: ״וּתְרוּמַת יָדֶךָ״ – אֵלּוּ בִּכּוּרִים.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive this halakha with regard to teruma itself? the Gemara answers: It is derived from the fact that teruma is compared to first fruits, as it is written: “You may not eat within your gates the tithe of your grain, or of your wine, or of your oil, or the firstborn of your cattle and of your flocks, or any of your vows that you will vow, or your pledges, nor the offering of your hand” (Deuteronomy 12:17), and the Master said with regard to the phrase “nor the offering [teruma] of your hand” that these are the first fruits. Since the verse uses the term “teruma” with regard to first fruits, the halakha of teruma is compared to the halakha of first fruits: Just as liquid that emerges from first fruits is forbidden like the fruit itself, so too liquid that emerges from teruma is forbidden like the produce itself. Consequently, the prohibition against consuming the liquid that emerges from consecrated produce can be derived from teruma.
קלאוד על הדף:
Teruma’s rule turns out to rest on bikkurim after all, through a hekesh. Devarim 12:17 lists “the teruma of your hand” among the items one may not eat outside Jerusalem, and the Sages identify that phrase as referring to bikkurim. The shared term links the two categories, so what is true of bikkurim’s liquids is true of teruma’s — and hekdesh can then be derived from teruma.
Key Terms:
- הֶקֵּשׁ (hekesh) = juxtaposition — an exegetical link between two subjects sharing a term or verse
- וּתְרוּמַת יָדֶךָ = the teruma of your hand — the phrase the Sages identify with bikkurim
Segment 11
TYPE: דחייה
Teruma is too stringent: a non-priest incurs death at Heaven’s hand and the added fifth.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מָה לִתְרוּמָה, שֶׁכֵּן חַיָּיבִין עָלֶיהָ מִיתָה וָחוֹמֶשׁ?
English Translation:
The Gemara refutes this derivation from teruma: What is notable about teruma? It is notable in that a non-priest is liable to receive the punishment of death at the hand of Heaven for consuming teruma, and he must restore the value of the produce he ate, adding one-fifth of its value as a fine. This element of stringency does not exist with regard to one who consumes consecrated produce.
קלאוד על הדף:
The teruma route is refuted just as the bikkurim route was. A non-priest who eats teruma is liable to mita bidei shamayim and must repay the value plus a fifth. Hekdesh does not carry those penalties, so teruma’s greater severity blocks the inference in the same way.
Key Terms:
- מִיתָה בִּידֵי שָׁמַיִם (mita bidei shamayim) = death at the hand of Heaven — the penalty for a non-priest consuming teruma
- חוֹמֶשׁ (chomesh) = the added fifth — the surcharge repaid alongside the principal
Segment 12
TYPE: קושיא ודחייה
Deriving from both together fails — they share the very same stringency.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא, גָּמַר מִתַּרְוַיְיהוּ, מִתְּרוּמָה וּבִכּוּרִים – מָה לִתְרוּמָה וּבִכּוּרִים, שֶׁכֵּן חַיָּיבִין עֲלֵיהֶם מִיתָה וָחוֹמֶשׁ!
English Translation:
Rather, one can learn the prohibition against consuming the liquid that emerges from consecrated produce from both teruma and first fruits. The Gemara refutes this derivation: What is notable about teruma and first fruits? They are notable in that a non-priest is liable to receive the punishment of death at the hand of Heaven for consuming teruma or first fruits, and he must restore the value of the produce he ate, adding one-fifth of its value as a fine. This is not true with regard to one who consumes consecrated produce.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara tries the two-source technique used earlier: perhaps teruma and bikkurim together can generate hekdesh, each neutralizing the other’s peculiarity. But the attempt fails because both share the identical stringency of mita and chomesh, so nothing is neutralized. A pair only helps when the stringency is unique to one of them.
Key Terms:
- מִתַּרְוַיְיהוּ (mitarvaihu) = from both of them — a derivation resting on two sources jointly
- חַיָּיבִין עֲלֵיהֶם מִיתָה וָחוֹמֶשׁ = one is liable for them to death and the added fifth
Segment 13
TYPE: מסקנא
The working derivation: teruma or bikkurim paired with one of the earlier cases.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא, אָתְיָא מִתְּרוּמָה וְחַד מֵהָנָךְ, אוֹ מִבִּכּוּרִים וְחַד מֵהָנָךְ.
English Translation:
Rather, the prohibition against consuming the liquid that emerges from consecrated produce is derived from teruma and one of these prohibitions, i.e., a liquefied carcass of a bird or dissolved leavened bread; or it can be derived from first fruits and one of these prohibitions.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara settles on a mixed pair. Combine teruma (or bikkurim) with one of the earlier prohibitions — the bird carcass or chametz — and the shared stringencies cancel: the produce case supplies the human-designation element, and the earlier case lacks mita and chomesh. Hekdesh’s liquids are thereby established, and the Gemara can turn to the extent of the rule.
Key Terms:
- אָתְיָא מִתְּרוּמָה וְחַד מֵהָנָךְ = it is derived from teruma and one of those — a combined derivation
- הָנָךְ (hanach) = those earlier cases — the liquefied carcass or dissolved chametz
Segment 14
TYPE: משנה
Terumot 11:2: date honey and other teruma juices — Rabbi Eliezer obligates, Rabbi Yehoshua exempts.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהָא דִּתְנַן: דְּבַשׁ תְּמָרִים, וְיֵין תַּפּוּחִים, וְחוֹמֶץ סִיתְוָונִיּוֹת, וּשְׁאָר מִינֵי פֵירוֹת שֶׁל תְּרוּמָה – רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר מְחַיֵּיב קֶרֶן וָחוֹמֶשׁ, וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ פּוֹטֵר.
English Translation:
§The Gemara elaborates on the comparison between teruma and first fruits with regard to the halakha that the status of liquid that emerges from produce is like that of the produce itself, and it explains that which we learned in a mishna (Terumot 11:2): If a non-priest ate date honey, or apple wine, or vinegar made from grapes of autumn that grow stunted at the end of the season and are unfit for wine production, or any of the other types of juice made from fruits of teruma, Rabbi Eliezer deems him obligated to repay the principal and an additional fifth, like the penalty for one who ate the teruma produce itself. And Rabbi Yehoshua deems him exempt from payment.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara now applies the teruma-bikkurim comparison to a concrete tannaitic dispute. A non-priest consumes date honey, apple wine, vinegar made from sitvaniot (stunted autumn grapes), or any other fruit juice of teruma. Rabbi Eliezer holds him liable for principal plus a fifth, exactly as if he had eaten the fruit; Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him. The disagreement is not about facts but about how a derived law inherits its source’s scope.
Key Terms:
- סִיתְוָונִיּוֹת (sitvaniot) = stunted autumn grapes, unfit for ordinary wine production
- קֶרֶן וָחוֹמֶשׁ (keren vachomesh) = principal and an added fifth — the restitution owed by a non-priest who ate teruma
Segment 15
TYPE: ביאור המחלוקת
Their dispute is over dun minah uminah versus dun minah v’okei b’atrah.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בְּמַאי פְּלִיגִי? בְּדוּן מִינַּהּ וּמִינַּהּ, וּבְדוּן מִינַּהּ וְאוֹקֵי בְּאַתְרַהּ קָמִיפַּלְגִי.
English Translation:
The Gemara explains: With regard to what principle do Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disagree? They disagree with regard to the principles governing the process of deriving one halakha from another halakha. One maintains the exegetical principle: Infer from it, and again from it, i.e., when one case is derived from another all the details of the source case are applied to the other case; and one maintains the principle: Infer from it but interpret the halakha according to its own place, i.e., one derives only the basic principle of the source case, whereas all other aspects of the source case are not applied to the case at hand.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara identifies the underlying methodological divide, one of the most consequential in the Talmud. Dun minah uminah carries every detail of the source case over to the derived case; dun minah v’okei b’atrah imports only the governing principle and then lets the derived case be shaped by its own local rules. The two principles are applied here to the transfer from bikkurim to teruma.
Key Terms:
- דּוּן מִינַּהּ וּמִינַּהּ (dun minah uminah) = infer from it and again from it — carry over all the details of the source
- דּוּן מִינַּהּ וְאוֹקֵי בְּאַתְרַהּ (dun minah v’okei b’atrah) = infer from it but establish it in its own place — import the principle, then apply local rules
Segment 16
TYPE: שיטת רבי אליעזר
Rabbi Eliezer imports both the principle and its scope from bikkurim.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר סָבַר: דּוּן מִינַּהּ וּמִינַּהּ, מָה בִּכּוּרִים – מַשְׁקִין הַיּוֹצֵא מֵהֶן כְּמוֹתָן, אַף תְּרוּמָה נָמֵי – מַשְׁקִין הַיּוֹצֵא מֵהֶן כְּמוֹתָן, וּמִינַּהּ – מָה בִּכּוּרִים אֲפִילּוּ שְׁאָר מִינִין, אַף תְּרוּמָה נָמֵי אֲפִילּוּ שְׁאָר מִינִין.
English Translation:
As Rabbi Eliezer holds: Infer from it, and again from it. Just as with regard to first fruits, the status of the liquid that emerges from them is like that of the produce itself, so too with regard to teruma, the status of the liquid that emerges from it is like that of the produce itself. And again infer from it: Just as the halakha of first fruits includes not only olives and grapes but even other types of produce from the seven species for which Eretz Yisrael is praised, and the status of liquid that emerges from that produce is like that of the produce itself, so too with regard to teruma, although oil and wine are the only liquids from which one is obligated to separate teruma, even liquid that emerges from other types of produce designated as teruma besides olives and grapes has the same status as the produce itself.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Eliezer applies dun minah uminah in two steps. First, from bikkurim: liquids carry the status of the produce. Then again from bikkurim: since bikkurim extend beyond olives and grapes to the other species for which Eretz Yisrael is praised, teruma’s liquids likewise extend beyond wine and oil. Hence a non-priest who drinks date honey or apple wine of teruma owes the principal and the fifth.
Key Terms:
- שְׁאָר מִינִין = other species — fruits besides olives and grapes
- מַשְׁקִין הַיּוֹצֵא מֵהֶן כְּמוֹתָן = the liquids that emerge from them have their status
Segment 17
TYPE: שיטת רבי יהושע
Rabbi Yehoshua imports the principle but applies teruma’s own limits.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ סָבַר, דּוּן מִינַּהּ: מָה בִּכּוּרִים – מַשְׁקִין הַיּוֹצְאִין מֵהֶן כְּמוֹתָן, אַף תְּרוּמָה – מַשְׁקִין הַיּוֹצְאִין מֵהֶן כְּמוֹתָן. וְאוֹקֵי בְּאַתְרַהּ: מָה מַשְׁקִין דְּקָדָשִׁים בִּתְרוּמָה, תִּירוֹשׁ וְיִצְהָר – אִין, מִידֵּי אַחֲרִינָא – לָא, אַף מַשְׁקִין הַיּוֹצְאִין מֵהֶן כְּמוֹתָן, תִּירוֹשׁ וְיִצְהָר – אִין, מִידֵּי אַחֲרִינָא – לָא.
English Translation:
And Rabbi Yehoshua holds: Infer from it that just as with regard to first fruits the status of the liquid that emerges from them is like that of the produce itself, so too with regard to teruma, the status of the liquid that emerges from it is like that of the produce itself. But interpret the halakha according to its own place: Just as in the case of liquids that are consecrated as teruma, with regard to wine and oil, yes, they are included, but other types are not included, so too in the case of liquid that emerges from teruma, as with regard to wine and oil, yes, they are like the produce itself, but any other type of liquid that emerges from teruma is not like the produce itself. Therefore, Rabbi Yehoshua deems exempt a non-priest who consumed any of the beverages mentioned in the mishna.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yehoshua takes the first step with Rabbi Eliezer — liquids carry the produce’s status — but then stops and reads the rule through teruma’s own framework. Since the only liquids ever consecrated as teruma are tirosh v’yitzhar, wine and oil, only those liquids inherit the produce’s status; every other fruit juice falls outside. A non-priest who drinks date honey therefore owes nothing.
Key Terms:
- תִּירוֹשׁ וְיִצְהָר (tirosh v’yitzhar) = wine and oil — the only liquids subject to teruma
- וְאוֹקֵי בְּאַתְרַהּ = and establish it in its own place — apply the derived case’s native rules
Segment 18
TYPE: משנה
Terumot 11:3: bikkurim may be brought as a beverage only from olives and grapes. Whose view?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהָא דִּתְנַן: אֵין מְבִיאִין בִּכּוּרִים מַשְׁקֶה אֶלָּא הַיּוֹצֵא מִן הַזֵּיתִים וּמִן הָעֲנָבִים – מַנִּי?
English Translation:
The Gemara cites that which we learned in a mishna (Terumot 11:3): One may bring beverages made from first fruits to the Temple only in the case of that which emerges from the olives, i.e., oil, or from the grapes, i.e., wine. The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is that mishna?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara tests the two methods against a further mishna, which restricts liquid bikkurim to oil and wine. Rabbi Eliezer, who extends teruma’s liquids to all species, should extend bikkurim’s at least as far; so the mishna appears to reflect only one of the two positions.
Key Terms:
- אֵין מְבִיאִין = one does not bring — the restriction on liquid bikkurim
- מַנִּי (mani) = whose opinion is this? — the idiom asking to identify the author of a ruling
Segment 19
TYPE: תשובה
It is Rabbi Yehoshua, deriving bikkurim from teruma in the reverse direction.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ הִיא, דְּאָמַר: דּוּן מִינַּהּ וְאוֹקֵי בְאַתְרַהּ, וְגָמַר לְהוּ לְבִכּוּרִים מִתְּרוּמָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who says: Infer from it but interpret the halakha according to its own place. He derives the halakha of liquid that emerges from teruma from first fruits only with regard to wine and oil, and in the opposite direction, he derives the halakha of liquid that emerges from first fruits from teruma. Therefore, even with regard to first fruits the status of liquid that emerges from the produce is like that of the produce itself only with regard to wine and oil. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that the halakha of liquid that emerges from teruma is derived from first fruits even with regard to other types of produce besides grapes and olives, contrary to the statement of that mishna, one may bring beverages extracted from other first fruits besides wine and oil to the Temple.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara attributes the mishna to Rabbi Yehoshua, and notes that his method runs in both directions. Having derived teruma’s rule from bikkurim and then restricted it by teruma’s local limits, he also derives bikkurim’s rule from teruma and restricts it likewise — so even bikkurim yield liquid status only for wine and oil. Rabbi Eliezer, by contrast, would permit bringing the juices of other species as bikkurim.
Key Terms:
- וְגָמַר לְהוּ לְבִכּוּרִים מִתְּרוּמָה = and he derives bikkurim from teruma — the derivation running in the reverse direction
- דּוּן מִינַּהּ וְאוֹקֵי בְּאַתְרַהּ = infer from it but establish it in its own place
Segment 20
TYPE: משנה
The same mishna: lashes for orla juice only from olives and grapes. Whose view?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהָא דִּתְנַן: אֵין סוֹפְגִין אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים מִשּׁוּם עׇרְלָה, אֶלָּא עַל הַיּוֹצֵא מִן הַזֵּיתִים וּמִן הָעֲנָבִים – מַנִּי?
English Translation:
The Gemara cites that which we learned in the same mishna (Terumot 11:3): One incurs the forty lashes due to drinking the juice squeezed from orla, i.e., the fruit of a tree during the first three years after its planting, only for that which emerges from the olives or from the grapes. The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is that mishna?
קלאוד על הדף:
The mishna’s next clause applies the same restriction to orla: one incurs the forty lashes for drinking the juice of forbidden first-three-years fruit only when it comes from olives or grapes. The Gemara asks the same question, expecting the same answer.
Key Terms:
- עׇרְלָה (orla) = the fruit of a tree during its first three years, forbidden for all benefit
- אֵין סוֹפְגִין אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים = one does not incur the forty lashes — the penalty for eating orla
Segment 21
TYPE: תשובה
Rabbi Yehoshua again — and the daf breaks off mid-sentence, continuing on 121a.
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ הִיא, דְּאָמַר: דּוּן מִינַּהּ וְאוֹקֵי בְּאַתְרַהּ, וְגָמַר לְהוּ לְבִכּוּרִים מִתְּרוּמָה,
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who says: Infer from it but interpret the halakha according to its own place, and he derives the halakha of liquid that emerges from first fruits from teruma. Therefore, even with regard to first fruits, the status of liquid that emerges from the produce is like that of the produce itself only with regard to wine and oil.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara answers that this clause too follows Rabbi Yehoshua, on the same reasoning: bikkurim are derived from teruma, so only wine and oil carry the produce’s status, and only they generate lashes for orla. The sentence is cut off by the page break and resumes on 121a, where the Gemara completes the analysis of orla and its measures.
Key Terms:
- דּוּן מִינַּהּ וְאוֹקֵי בְּאַתְרַהּ = infer from it but establish it in its own place — Rabbi Yehoshua’s governing principle
- הַיּוֹצֵא מִן הַזֵּיתִים וּמִן הָעֲנָבִים = that which emerges from olives and from grapes — oil and wine