Bechorot Daf 10 (בכורות דף י׳)
Daf: 10 | Amudim: 10a – 10b | Date: Loading...
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (10a)
Segment 1
TYPE: קושיא
If R’ Shimon permits benefit from basar b’chalav, why does he need the שעת הכושר reason at all?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִי הָכִי, בָּשָׂר בְּחָלָב מַאי אִירְיָא דְּהָיְתָה לָהּ שְׁעַת הַכּוֹשֶׁר? תִּיפּוֹק לִי דְּאוֹכֶל שֶׁאַתָּה יָכוֹל לְהַאֲכִילוֹ לַאֲחֵרִים הוּא!
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: If so, if this is indeed Rabbi Shimon’s opinion, why, then, does he specifically state that meat cooked in milk is susceptible to impurity because it had a period of susceptibility to contracting impurity before they were cooked together? Derive this halakha from the fact that it is food that you can feed to others, as Rabbi Shimon maintains that deriving benefit from meat and milk cooked together is not prohibited.
קלאוד על הדף:
The daf opens inside Rava’s proof from the previous amud. Rava had cited the baraita in which R’ Shimon exempts items forbidden in benefit from טומאת אוכלין, conceding only basar b’chalav on the grounds that it once had a period of fitness. The Gemara now presses on that concession: if R’ Shimon holds — as he does — that benefit from basar b’chalav is permitted, then the concession needs no special reasoning at all, since permitted food is straightforwardly food one may feed to others. The objection matters because Rava’s whole inference rests on reading the baraita’s list of exceptions precisely.
Key Terms:
- שְׁעַת הַכּוֹשֶׁר = a period of fitness — a window in which the item was permitted, fixing its status as food
- תִּיפּוֹק לִי = let it follow for me — the Gemara’s formula for a simpler derivation that makes a stated reason redundant
- מַאי אִירְיָא = why specifically — why frame the ruling around one reason when another is readier
Segment 2
TYPE: ברייתא
R’ Shimon ben Yehuda in R’ Shimon’s name: basar b’chalav is forbidden to eat but permitted in benefit
Hebrew/Aramaic:
דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: בָּשָׂר בְּחָלָב אָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה וּמוּתָּר בַּהֲנָאָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״כִּי עַם קָדוֹשׁ אַתָּה לַה׳ אֱלֹהֶיךָ״, וּלְהַלָּן הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״וְאַנְשֵׁי קֹדֶשׁ תִּהְיוּן לִי״, מָה לְהַלָּן אָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה וּמוּתָּר בַּהֲנָאָה, אַף כָּאן אָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה וּמוּתָּר בַּהֲנָאָה!
English Translation:
As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: With regard to meat cooked in milk, eating it is forbidden and deriving benefit from it is permitted, as it is stated: “For you are a holy people to the Lord your God; you shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk” (Deuteronomy 14:21). And elsewhere the verse states: “And you shall be holy men to Me; therefore you shall not eat any flesh that is torn by animals in the field” (Exodus 22:30). Just as there, with regard to an animal torn by animals, which is forbidden as a tereifa, i.e., an animal possessing a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months, eating it is forbidden but deriving benefit from it is permitted, so too here, with regard to meat cooked in milk, where the verse mentions being holy just as the other verse did, eating it is forbidden but deriving benefit from it is permitted.
קלאוד על הדף:
The supporting baraita establishes the premise of the objection. R’ Shimon’s position is derived by a gezeira shava built on the word קדושה: the milk-and-meat prohibition is introduced by כי עם קדוש אתה לה׳ אלוקיך, and the tereifa prohibition by ואנשי קדש תהיון לי. Since a tereifa is forbidden to eat while benefit from it is permitted, the shared term transfers that same configuration to basar b’chalav. Note that this is a minority view — the accepted halacha follows those who forbid benefit from basar b’chalav — but within R’ Shimon’s system it is exactly what generates the objection.
Key Terms:
- בָּשָׂר בְּחָלָב = meat cooked together with milk
- טְרֵיפָה = an animal with a mortal defect, forbidden to eat but permitted in benefit
- אָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה וּמוּתָּר בַּהֲנָאָה = forbidden to eat but permitted in benefit — the configuration transferred by the gezeira shava
- מִשּׁוּם = in the name of — marking a transmitted attribution
Segment 3
TYPE: תירוץ
חדא ועוד קאמר — the baraita gives one reason and adds a second
Hebrew/Aramaic:
חֲדָא וְעוֹד קָאָמַר: חֲדָא — דְּאוֹכֶל שֶׁאַתָּה יָכוֹל לְהַאֲכִילוֹ לַאֲחֵרִים הוּא, וְעוֹד — לְדִידֵיהּ נָמֵי הֲרֵי הָיְתָה לוֹ שְׁעַת הַכּוֹשֶׁר.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: The baraita that cites Rabbi Shimon’s opinion states one reason why meat cooked in milk is susceptible to impurity and adds another. One reason is because it is food that you can feed to others. Therefore, it is called food for the purpose of being susceptible to impurity. And another reason is because even for him, i.e., a Jew, although eating the milk and meat is currently prohibited, it had a time when it was fit for consumption, i.e., before they were cooked together, and therefore they remain susceptible to impurity.
קלאוד על הדף:
The resolution is a familiar Talmudic move: a source may pile up reasons without any of them being strictly necessary. R’ Shimon’s baraita offers both that basar b’chalav is food one may feed to others, and that even for a Jew it had a שעת הכושר before the cooking. The second reason is the more robust, since it holds even for one who rejects R’ Shimon ben Yehuda’s lenient reading of the benefit prohibition. With the objection cleared, the baraita’s list can now be read as Rava wants to read it.
Key Terms:
- חֲדָא וְעוֹד קָאָמַר = he states one reason and adds another — a source giving cumulative rather than minimal grounds
- לְדִידֵיהּ = for him, i.e. for the Jew, as against what may be fed to others
Segment 4
TYPE: גמרא
Rava’s proof restated: the baraita’s silence about peter chamor is decisive
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאִם אִיתָא דִּלְאַחַר עֲרִיפָה שָׁרֵי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, לִיתְנֵי: וּמוֹדֶה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בְּפֶטֶר חֲמוֹר וּבָשָׂר בְּחָלָב שֶׁמִּטַּמְּאִין טוּמְאַת אֳוכָלִין!
English Translation:
The opinion of Rabbi Shimon that all items from which deriving benefit is prohibited are not susceptible to the impurity of food except for meat cooked in milk has been elucidated. Rava now proceeds to explain his proof that even according to Rabbi Shimon, deriving benefit from a firstborn donkey after the breaking of its neck is forbidden: And if it is so, that after breaking the neck of the firstborn donkey Rabbi Shimon deems it permitted for one to derive benefit from it, let the tanna teach: And Rabbi Shimon concedes with regard to a firstborn donkey and meat cooked in milk, that they are susceptible to the impurity of food. Since a firstborn donkey is not listed as an exception, Rabbi Shimon must hold that it is prohibited to derive benefit from it after its neck is broken, and it is therefore not susceptible to impurity.
קלאוד על הדף:
Now the argument lands. The baraita lists R’ Shimon’s single exception as basar b’chalav alone. If R’ Shimon held that benefit from a firstborn donkey were permitted after arifa, the carcass would be no less food than basar b’chalav, and the baraita would have had to read: and R’ Shimon concedes regarding peter chamor and basar b’chalav. Its omission from the exception list is therefore evidence that R’ Shimon treats the post-arifa carcass as forbidden in benefit, which is precisely Rabba’s claim.
Key Terms:
- לִיתְנֵי = let it teach — the objection that a source should have included an item it omitted
- וּמוֹדֶה = and he concedes — the formula introducing the exception in the baraita
- עֲרִיפָה = breaking the neck from behind — the alternative to redeeming a firstborn donkey
Segment 5
TYPE: גמרא
The qualification: the case is one where no one intended the meat to be eaten
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִי דְּחַשֵּׁיב עֲלֵיהּ — הָכִי נָמֵי; הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן — דְּלָא חַשֵּׁיב עֲלֵיהּ.
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: If it is a case where the one who broke the neck of the donkey intended at the time that people would eat from it, so too it would be susceptible to the impurity of food according to Rabbi Shimon, as it is permitted to derive benefit from it. Here we are dealing with a case where he did not intend for it to be eaten, as even gentiles do not usually consume the meat of a donkey, and it therefore is not considered food.
קלאוד על הדף:
A proof of this kind needs its case defined narrowly, and the Gemara supplies the limit. If the person who performed the arifa had actually formed the intention that the meat be eaten, the carcass would indeed be susceptible even for R’ Shimon, since intent alone can confer the status of food. The baraita must therefore be speaking of the ordinary case, where no such intent was formed — and donkey meat is not a food that people, gentiles included, normally eat, so nothing in the situation supplies intent on its own.
Key Terms:
- חַשֵּׁיב עֲלֵיהּ = he formed intent regarding it, i.e. designated it as food
- הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן = with what are we dealing here — the Gemara’s formula for narrowing a case
Segment 6
TYPE: גמרא
So why do the Rabbanan deem it susceptible? הואיל ואיסורו חישובו
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְטַעְמָא מַאי מְטַמְּאִי רַבָּנַן? אַמְרוּהָ רַבָּנַן קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב שֵׁשֶׁת: הוֹאִיל וְאִיסּוּרוֹ חִישּׁוּבוֹ.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: But if he did not intend for anyone to eat it, what is the reason the Rabbis deem the flesh susceptible to the impurity of food? The Sages said before Rav Sheshet: It is susceptible to the impurity of food because the prohibition to eat it serves as intent to treat it as food, i.e., the very fact that it is forbidden renders it significant enough to be deemed a food.
קלאוד על הדף:
If intent is what makes something food and no intent was formed, the tanna kamma’s ruling that the carcass IS susceptible needs explaining. The Sages before Rav Sheshet propose a striking principle: הואיל ואיסורו חישובו, the prohibition itself does the work of intent. On this view the Torah’s bothering to forbid an item is what marks it as significant enough to be classed as food, so that a forbidden item never needs anyone’s designation. The next five segments will test this principle against the mishnayot and find it wanting.
Key Terms:
- הוֹאִיל וְאִיסּוּרוֹ חִישּׁוּבוֹ = since its prohibition constitutes its significance — the prohibition substitutes for intent
- רַב שֵׁשֶׁת = a Babylonian amora of the third generation, noted for his mastery of baraitot
- מַחְשָׁבָה = intent — the mental designation of an item as food
Segment 7
TYPE: קושיא
First challenge, from Teharot 1:1: the carcass of a kosher bird requires intent
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּלְרַבָּנַן מִי אָמַר הוֹאִיל וְאִיסּוּרוֹ חִישּׁוּבוֹ? וְהָא תְּנַן: שְׁלֹשָׁה עָשָׂר דְּבָרִים אָמְרוּ בְּנִבְלַת עוֹף טָהוֹר, וְזוֹ אַחַת מֵהֶן — צְרִיכָה מַחְשָׁבָה, וְאֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה הֶכְשֵׁר.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: But according to the Rabbis, did they actually say that an item is susceptible to the impurity of food since its prohibition serves as its intent? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Teharot 1:1) that the Sages stated thirteen matters concerning the unslaughtered carcass of a kosher bird, and this is one of them: It requires explicit intent that it will be eaten in order to become susceptible to the impurity of food, as most gentiles are unaccustomed to eating it, but it does not require contact with liquid to be rendered susceptible to ritual impurity.
קלאוד על הדף:
The mishna listing thirteen rulings about נבלת עוף טהור states that it requires מחשבה but not הכשר — that is, someone must designate it as food, though it need not be wetted. The asymmetry is telling: the requirement of intent is stated precisely because such a carcass is not ordinarily eaten. But a נבלה is forbidden, so on the principle just proposed the prohibition should have supplied the intent automatically.
Key Terms:
- נִבְלַת עוֹף טָהוֹר = the carcass of a kosher bird that died without shechita
- הֶכְשֵׁר = being rendered susceptible by contact with one of the seven liquids
- נְבֵלָה = an animal or bird that died without valid slaughter
Segment 8
TYPE: תירוץ
That mishna is R’ Shimon, who does not hold איסורו חישובו
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאִי אִיסּוּרוֹ חִישּׁוּבוֹ, לְמָה לִּי מַחְשָׁבָה? הָא מַנִּי? רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא.
English Translation:
And if the logic of: Its prohibition serves as its intent, is accepted, why do I need the intent here, as an unslaughtered carcass is forbidden to be eaten? The Gemara answers: In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who does not hold that its prohibition serves as its intent.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara deflects the first challenge by attribution rather than by argument: the mishna in Teharot reflects R’ Shimon’s view, and R’ Shimon is the one who rejects איסורו חישובו in the first place. The Rabbanan, who accept it, would not require intent there. This answer will be offered twice more and will then fail, which is what gives the sequence its shape — the Gemara is testing how far a single attributional escape can be stretched.
Key Terms:
- הָא מַנִּי = in accordance with whose opinion is this — the Gemara’s request to attribute an anonymous ruling
- לְמָה לִּי מַחְשָׁבָה = why do I need intent — the force of the objection
Segment 9
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Second challenge, from Uktzin 3:3: a non-kosher carcass and village chelev require intent
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תָּא שְׁמַע: נִבְלַת בְּהֵמָה טְמֵאָה בְּכׇל מָקוֹם, וְנִבְלַת עוֹף טָהוֹר וְהַחֵלֶב בַּכְּפָרִים — צְרִיכִים מַחְשָׁבָה, וְאֵינָם צְרִיכִים הֶכְשֵׁר. וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ אִיסּוּרוֹ חִישּׁוּבוֹ, לְמָה לִּי מַחְשָׁבָה? הָא מַנִּי? רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא.
English Translation:
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from another mishna (Okatzin 3:3): A carcass of a non-kosher animal, such as a horse or donkey, found in any location; or an unslaughtered carcass of a kosher bird or the fat of a kosher animal found in the villages, where the local gentiles are unaccustomed to eating it, all require intent to consume it in order to become susceptible to the impurity of food, but they do not require being rendered susceptible to impurity by coming in contact with liquid. And if you say its prohibition serves as its intent, why do I need intent? All these foods are forbidden for consumption by a Jew. The Gemara responds: In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.
קלאוד על הדף:
The mishna in Uktzin extends the same pattern more broadly: the carcass of a non-kosher animal anywhere, and the carcass of a kosher bird or chelev in the villages, all require intent but not hechsher. The geographical distinction is the key to the mishna’s logic — in villages the local population does not eat these items, so nothing in the environment supplies the status of food and explicit intent becomes necessary. Once again all of these are forbidden items, so the principle should have made intent superfluous. The Gemara again answers that the mishna is R’ Shimon.
Key Terms:
- בְּהֵמָה טְמֵאָה = a non-kosher animal, such as a horse or donkey
- חֵלֶב = forbidden fats of a kosher animal
- בַּכְּפָרִים = in the villages, where such items are not customarily eaten
Segment 10
TYPE: קושיא
Third challenge: the marketplace clause implies that a non-kosher carcass requires intent
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תָּא שְׁמַע: נִבְלַת בְּהֵמָה טְהוֹרָה בְּכׇל מָקוֹם, וְנִבְלַת עוֹף הַטָּהוֹר וְהַחֵלֶב בַּשְּׁוָוקִים — אֵינָן צְרִיכִין מַחְשָׁבָה וְלֹא הֶכְשֵׁר. הָא טְמֵאָה בָּעֲיָא מַחְשָׁבָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the continuation of the same mishna: An unslaughtered carcass of a kosher animal found in any location, or the unslaughtered carcass of a kosher bird found in any location, or the fat of a kosher animal found in the marketplaces, i.e., in a large city that has marketplaces, where some people do eat it, do not require intent for consumption in order to be regarded as subject to impurity, as they are presumed to be food for gentiles; nor do they require contact with liquid in order for them to be rendered susceptible to impurity. The Gemara infers that only the carcass of a kosher animal does not require intent, but the carcass of a non-kosher animal requires intent. If its prohibition serves as its intent, why does it require intent for consumption?
קלאוד על הדף:
The continuation of the same mishna rules that the carcass of a kosher animal anywhere, and a kosher bird’s carcass or chelev in the marketplaces, require neither intent nor hechsher — in a large city there are people who eat such things, so they are presumed to be food already. But the inference from the contrast is unavoidable: a non-kosher carcass, which the mishna did not include, does require intent. The objection is thus re-raised from the positive clause rather than from the negative one.
Key Terms:
- בַּשְּׁוָוקִים = in the marketplaces — a large city where such items find consumers
- נִבְלַת בְּהֵמָה טְהוֹרָה = the carcass of a kosher animal that died without shechita
- הָא טְמֵאָה בָּעֲיָא מַחְשָׁבָה = but a non-kosher carcass does require intent — the inference from the mishna’s silence
Segment 11
TYPE: קושיא
The attributional escape closes: the seifa is explicitly R’ Shimon, so the reisha is not
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְכִי תֵּימָא: הָא מַנִּי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא — הָא מִדְּסֵיפָא רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הָוֵי, רֵישָׁא לָאו רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן. דְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: אַף הַגָּמָל וְהָאַרְנֶבֶת וְהַשָּׁפָן וְהַחֲזִיר אֵינָן צְרִיכִין לֹא מַחְשָׁבָה וְלֹא הֶכְשֵׁר. וְאָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: מָה טַעַם? הוֹאִיל וְיֵשׁ בָּהֶן סִימָנֵי טׇהֳרָה.
English Translation:
And if you would say: In accordance with whose opinion is this, it is also in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon; one could respond that since the latter clause is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon it follows that the former clause, which is written without attribution, is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. As the latter clause teaches: Rabbi Shimon says even the meat of the camel, and the hare, and the rock badger, and the pig do not require intent or contact with liquid to be rendered susceptible to impurity. And Rabbi Shimon said: What is the reason? The reason is that they have some characteristics of kosher animals (see Leviticus 11:4-7). If so, the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis cannot be based on whether the prohibition of the animal serves as its intent.
קלאוד על הדף:
This is the segment that breaks the principle. One cannot answer a fourth time that the mishna is R’ Shimon, because the mishna’s own concluding clause is attributed to him by name: R’ Shimon says the camel, hare, rock-badger and pig require neither intent nor hechsher, and his stated reason is הואיל ויש בהן סימני טהרה — they carry partial kosher signs. Since the seifa is R’ Shimon, the anonymous reisha must be the Rabbanan. And R’ Shimon’s own reason is about kosher signs, not about prohibition serving as intent, so the dispute between him and the Rabbanan cannot be about איסורו חישובו at all.
Key Terms:
- סֵיפָא / רֵישָׁא = the latter clause and the former clause of a single source
- סִימָנֵי טׇהֳרָה = indicators of kosher status — the camel chews the cud, the pig has split hooves
- הַגָּמָל וְהָאַרְנֶבֶת וְהַשָּׁפָן וְהַחֲזִיר = the camel, hare, rock-badger and pig, each of which has one of the two kosher signs
Segment 12
TYPE: מסקנא / חזרה
Rava retracts: nobody holds איסורו חישובו, and arifa itself supplies no intent
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא אָמְרִינַן אִיסּוּרוֹ חִישּׁוּבוֹ, וְאִי דְּעַרְפֵיהּ מִיעְרָף — הָכִי נָמֵי,
English Translation:
Rather, Rava says: Everyone, including the Rabbis, agrees that we do not say its prohibition serves as its intent. And with regard to a firstborn donkey, if one broke its neck, so too, the Rabbis hold that it is not susceptible to the impurity of food, since the one who broke its neck did not intend for it to be eaten.
קלאוד על הדף:
אלא אמר רבא marks a retraction and a fresh start. Rava abandons the principle entirely: all parties agree that prohibition does not substitute for intent. And on that footing the case of a donkey whose neck was actually broken is conceded on both sides — the man performing arifa is fulfilling a commandment of disposal, not preparing a meal, so no intent exists and even the Rabbanan would not deem the carcass susceptible. The dispute must therefore concern some other case, which the Gemara will identify in the opening line of the next amud; the segment breaks off mid-sentence.
Key Terms:
- אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא = rather, Rava says — a formula marking the abandonment of a prior explanation
- דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא = everyone agrees
- דְּעַרְפֵיהּ מִיעְרָף = where he actually performed arifa on it
Amud Bet (10b)
Segment 1
TYPE: תירוץ
The real case: a donkey slaughtered for shechita practice, matching the Nimos / R’ Eliezer dispute
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? כְּגוֹן שֶׁשְּׁחָטוֹ לְהִתְלַמֵּד בּוֹ, וּבִפְלוּגְתָּא דְּנִימוֹס וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: Here, we are dealing with a case where he slaughtered the firstborn donkey in order to teach himself how to properly slaughter an animal, and not in order to eat it. In this case, Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis disagree whether the prohibition against a Jew’s consuming it serves as intent that it be treated as food. And they disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Nimos and Rabbi Eliezer.
קלאוד על הדף:
The sentence broken off at the end of 10a completes here, and the reconstruction is elegant. The dispute does not concern a donkey whose neck was broken but one that was slaughtered — שחטו — for the purpose of learning to perform shechita. That act is deliberate and skilled, which is exactly what makes the status of the resulting flesh arguable: there was purposeful action but no culinary intent. The Gemara identifies this as the same question tannaim had already debated in a different setting, between Nimos and R’ Eliezer.
Key Terms:
- לְהִתְלַמֵּד בּוֹ = in order to train himself in it, i.e. to practise shechita
- שְׁחָטוֹ = he slaughtered it by valid shechita, as against breaking its neck
- פְּלוּגְתָּא = a dispute
Segment 2
TYPE: ברייתא
R’ Yosei reports Nimos on the crow slaughtered for practice; R’ Eliezer’s counter-statement
Hebrew/Aramaic:
דְּתַנְיָא, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: סָח לִי נִימוֹס, אָחִיו שֶׁל רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ הַגַּרְסִי, שֶׁהַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הָעוֹרֵב לְהִתְלַמֵּד בּוֹ — דָּמוֹ מַכְשִׁיר. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: דַּם שְׁחִיטָה לְעוֹלָם מַכְשִׁיר.
English Translation:
As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei says: Nimos, the brother of Rabbi Yehoshua HaGarsi, once related to me that in the case of one who slaughters a crow in order to teach himself how to slaughter a bird properly, its blood renders other foods susceptible to impurity, as blood is one of the seven liquids that is capable of rendering foods susceptible to impurity. Rabbi Eliezer says: The blood that comes from the slaughter of an animal always renders food susceptible to impurity.
קלאוד על הדף:
The baraita preserves an unusually personal transmission: R’ Yosei reports a conversation with Nimos, brother of R’ Yehoshua HaGarsi. Nimos ruled that one who slaughters a crow for practice produces blood that is מכשיר — blood being one of the seven liquids that render food susceptible to impurity. R’ Eliezer states, apparently in reply, that slaughter-blood always renders food susceptible. The two statements look identical on their face, which is the puzzle the next segment takes up.
Key Terms:
- נִימוֹס = a tanna, brother of R’ Yehoshua HaGarsi, cited here by R’ Yosei
- עוֹרֵב = a crow — a non-kosher bird
- מַכְשִׁיר = renders susceptible, i.e. functions as one of the seven liquids that enable food impurity
- דַּם שְׁחִיטָה = the blood that issues from a valid slaughter
Segment 3
TYPE: קושיא
Is R’ Eliezer not simply repeating the tanna kamma?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הַיְינוּ תַּנָּא קַמָּא! אֶלָּא לָאו אִיסּוּרוֹ חִישּׁוּבוֹ אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: Isn’t this statement of Rabbi Eliezer identical to the statement of the first tanna, i.e., Nimos? Both hold that the blood of slaughter renders food susceptible to impurity. Rather, isn’t the difference between them with regard to whether concerning the crow its prohibition serves as its intent that it should be used as food?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara presses the obvious point: if both sages hold that slaughter-blood renders food susceptible, R’ Eliezer has contributed nothing. Since the Gemara assumes a disputant always disputes something, the difference must lie elsewhere — and the proposal is that it lies precisely in איסורו חישובו, the principle just rejected in Rava’s name but now recovered as a genuine tannaitic disagreement.
Key Terms:
- הַיְינוּ תַּנָּא קַמָּא = this is identical to the first tanna — the objection that a stated view adds nothing
- אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ = there is a difference between them — the Gemara locating the substance of a dispute
Segment 4
TYPE: גמרא
The tanna kamma: the blood works on other foods, but the crow itself still needs intent
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תַּנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: דָּמוֹ מַכְשִׁיר לְעָלְמָא, אֲבָל לְגוּפֵיהּ בָּעֵי מַחְשָׁבָה.
English Translation:
Accordingly, the first tanna holds that the prohibition against consuming a crow does not render it a food. Therefore, its blood renders foods in general susceptible to impurity, but to render the crow itself a food, intent to eat it is also required, as people do not generally consume the meat of crows.
קלאוד על הדף:
Nimos’s position is carefully bounded. The blood functions as a liquid and does its work on whatever it touches, so it renders other foods susceptible. But whether the crow’s own flesh counts as food is a separate question, and for that the crow needs מחשבה, since crow is not something people eat. Nimos thus keeps the two issues apart: the liquid’s efficacy and the carcass’s status are independent.
Key Terms:
- לְעָלְמָא = for the world at large, i.e. with respect to other foods
- לְגוּפֵיהּ = for itself, i.e. with respect to the crow’s own flesh
Segment 5
TYPE: גמרא
R’ Eliezer: even the crow itself needs no intent, since its prohibition is its significance
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וַאֲתָא רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר לְמֵימַר: דַּם שְׁחִיטָה לְעוֹלָם מַכְשִׁיר, וַאֲפִילּוּ לְגוּפֵיהּ נָמֵי לָא בָּעֵי מַחְשָׁבָה.
English Translation:
And Rabbi Eliezer comes to say that the blood of slaughter always renders other foods susceptible to impurity, and even with regard to the crow itself, intent to consume it is not required, as he holds that its prohibition serves as intent to consume it. Likewise, Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis disagree with regard to a firstborn donkey in a case where it is slaughtered only in order to teach oneself how to slaughter properly. According to Rabbi Shimon, intent to eat it is required in order to render it susceptible to the impurity of food, while according to the Rabbis the prohibition to eat it in this case serves as intent for it to be used as food.
קלאוד על הדף:
R’ Eliezer’s לעולם is now read as an extension: not only does slaughter-blood always work on other foods, it needs no supplement even for the slaughtered creature itself. The crow requires no designation because its prohibition already marks it as significant. Transposed to our sugya, the Rabbanan hold the same about a donkey slaughtered for practice, while R’ Shimon requires intent — and the machloket on the daf is thereby anchored in an established tannaitic dispute.
Key Terms:
- לְעוֹלָם מַכְשִׁיר = always renders susceptible — read as extending to the slaughtered creature itself
- רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר = R’ Eliezer ben Hyrcanus, a tanna of the second generation
Segment 6
TYPE: קושיא
Perhaps R’ Eliezer’s reason is that a crow, unlike a donkey, has kosher signs
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מִמַּאי? דִּילְמָא טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הָתָם — דְּשָׁאנֵי עוֹרֵב, הוֹאִיל וְיֵשׁ בּוֹ סִימָנֵי טׇהֳרָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: From where is it inferred that the dispute between Nimos and Rabbi Eliezer is with regard to this issue? Perhaps the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer there is that a crow is different, since it has some indicators of a kosher bird, and is therefore considered food. By contrast, with regard to a donkey, which has no indicators of a kosher animal, slaughtering it in order to learn how to slaughter properly does not render it food.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara now attacks its own reconstruction. R’ Eliezer may not be invoking איסורו חישובו at all: a crow is a bird, and birds bear partial indicators of kosher status, which could be what makes its flesh count as food. A donkey has no such indicators whatever. If so, the crow dispute cannot be transposed to the donkey, and the sugya’s identification fails.
Key Terms:
- מִמַּאי = from where — the Gemara’s challenge to an inference just drawn
- דְּשָׁאנֵי עוֹרֵב = that a crow is different — a distinction that blocks the analogy
Segment 7
TYPE: גמרא
Support that kosher signs are halachically significant: R’ Shimon’s own reason
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּמְנָלַן דְּסִימָנֵי טׇהֳרָה מִילְּתָא הִיא? דְּקָתָנֵי עֲלַהּ דְּהַהִיא, אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: מָה טַעַם? הוֹאִיל וְיֵשׁ בּוֹ סִימָנֵי טׇהֳרָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara presents support for this explanation: And from where do we derive that indicators of a kosher animal are considered a significant matter concerning the impurity of food? As a baraita teaches with regard to the mishna cited on 10a that Rabbi Shimon says: What is the reason that the meat of the camel, hare, rock-badger, and pig are automatically susceptible to impurity of food without any other conditions? It is because they have some indicators of kosher animals.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara substantiates the alternative reading by pointing back to the mishna cited on 10a. There R’ Shimon exempted the camel, hare, rock-badger and pig from requiring intent, and his reason was explicitly הואיל ויש בהן סימני טהרה. Since kosher signs demonstrably carry weight in the law of food impurity by R’ Shimon’s own testimony, it is entirely plausible that R’ Eliezer relies on them for the crow.
Key Terms:
- מִילְּתָא הִיא = it is a significant matter — it carries halachic weight
- דְּקָתָנֵי עֲלַהּ = as it is taught regarding it — a baraita commenting on a mishna
Segment 8
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
If kosher signs suffice, why specify ‘for practice’? The case was framed for Nimos’s sake
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְכִי תֵּימָא: אִי מִשּׁוּם סִימָנֵי טׇהֳרָה, מַאי אִירְיָא לְהִתְלַמֵּד? אֲפִילּוּ לְהִתְעַסֵּק נָמֵי! אִין הָכִי נָמֵי, וּמִשּׁוּם נִימוֹס.
English Translation:
And if you would say that if the meat of the crow is susceptible to the impurity of food because of its kosher indicators, why do Rabbi Eliezer and Nimos specifically disagree in the case where it was slaughtered in order to teach oneself how to slaughter properly? Even if the one who slaughtered it acted unawares, Rabbi Eliezer should hold that its flesh should be suceptible to impurity. The response would be that yes, this is indeed so according to Rabbi Eliezer, and they disagreed in this case only because of the opinion of Nimos, who holds that even where one slaughtered the crow intentionally, if he slaughtered it in order to teach himself how to slaughter properly the crow is not susceptible to impurity.
קלאוד על הדף:
A sharp follow-up: if R’ Eliezer’s ruling rests on kosher signs, the crow should count as food however it was slaughtered, even להתעסק — casually or unawares — and there would be no reason to specify the practice case. The Gemara concedes the point (אין הכי נמי) and explains the framing: the case was set up as a practice-slaughter not for R’ Eliezer’s benefit but for Nimos’s, since Nimos holds that even a deliberate practice-slaughter fails to make the crow food. The specification belongs to the stricter of the two positions.
Key Terms:
- לְהִתְעַסֵּק = acting casually or unawares, without deliberate purpose
- אִין הָכִי נָמֵי = yes, that is indeed so — the Gemara conceding a challenge while preserving the source
- וּמִשּׁוּם נִימוֹס = and because of Nimos, i.e. the case was framed to accommodate his position
Segment 9
TYPE: קושיא
A baraita that appears to refute Rabba outright: R’ Shimon permits benefit after arifa
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: לֹא רָצָה לִפְדּוֹתוֹ — עוֹרְפוֹ בְּקוֹפִיץ מֵאֲחוֹרָיו וְקוֹבְרוֹ, וְאָסוּר בַּהֲנָאָה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מַתִּיר!
English Translation:
The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita to the opinion of Rabba, who holds that even according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon it is prohibited to derive benefit from a firstborn donkey following the breaking of its neck: If one does not want to redeem his firstborn donkey with a lamb, he breaks the donkey’s neck from behind with a cleaver and buries the donkey, and it is prohibited to derive benefit from the donkey; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. And Rabbi Shimon deems it permitted for one to derive benefit from the donkey.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara now turns from the impurity discussion back to the central claim, and produces what looks like a fatal objection. A baraita describes the procedure — one who declines to redeem breaks the neck with a cleaver from behind and buries the animal — and then states that it is forbidden in benefit, adding: this is R’ Yehuda’s view, and R’ Shimon permits. Since the whole clause is framed around the arifa, R’ Shimon appears to permit benefit precisely where Rabba said he concedes.
Key Terms:
- אֵיתִיבֵיהּ = he raised an objection against him from a source
- קוֹפִיץ = a cleaver, the implement prescribed for arifa
- מֵאֲחוֹרָיו = from behind — arifa is performed from the back of the neck
- וְקוֹבְרוֹ = and he buries it — the disposal of a carcass forbidden in benefit
Segment 10
TYPE: תירוץ
First resolution: read the clause as referring to the living animal
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֵימָא: וּמֵחַיִּים אָסוּר בַּהֲנָאָה, וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מַתִּיר.
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: Say the baraita means: And while the donkey is still alive it is prohibited to derive benefit from it; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. And Rabbi Shimon deems it permitted. Perhaps Rabbi Shimon agrees that following the breaking of its neck, it is prohibited to derive benefit from it.
קלאוד על הדף:
The proposed reading rescues Rabba by relocating the prohibition. The baraita’s statement that it is forbidden in benefit is not a comment on the freshly broken carcass but a separate ruling about the animal during its life — R’ Yehuda forbids, R’ Shimon permits, exactly the machloket already established. On this reading the baraita says nothing about the post-arifa state, and Rabba’s claim survives untouched.
Key Terms:
- אֵימָא = say, i.e. read the source as follows — a reinterpretation rather than an emendation
- מֵחַיִּים = from its lifetime, i.e. while the animal is alive
Segment 11
TYPE: קושיא
But the seifa is about the living animal, so the reisha must not be
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהָא מִדְּסֵיפָא מֵחַיִּים הָוֵי, רֵישָׁא לָאו מֵחַיִּים.
English Translation:
The Gemara challenges: But from the fact that the latter clause of the baraita is referring to the prohibition to derive benefit while the donkey is alive it is apparent that the first clause, due to which this objection was raised, is not referring to deriving benefit while it is still alive.
קלאוד על הדף:
The reinterpretation runs into the baraita’s own structure. If the latter clause deals with the living animal, then the former clause presumably does not — a source does not ordinarily state the same scenario twice in succession. This is the same reisha-seifa reasoning the Gemara deployed on 10a against the איסורו חישובו principle, applied now in the opposite direction.
Key Terms:
- מִדְּסֵיפָא = from the fact that the latter clause is such, the former must be otherwise
- רֵישָׁא = the opening clause of a source
Segment 12
TYPE: ברייתא
The seifa: forbidden modes of killing, and the prohibition on shearing and labor
Hebrew/Aramaic:
דְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: לֹא יְמִיתֶנּוּ, לֹא בְּקָנֶה וְלֹא בְּמַגָּל וְלֹא בְּקַרְדּוֹם וְלֹא בִּמְגֵירָה, וְלֹא יַכְנִיסֶנּוּ לַחֶדֶר וְיִנְעוֹל דֶּלֶת לְפָנָיו בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁיָּמוּת, וְאָסוּר בְּגִיזָּה וַעֲבוֹדָה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מַתִּיר!
English Translation:
As the latter clause teaches: One may not kill the firstborn donkey with a reed, nor with a sickle, nor with an ax, nor with a saw; nor may one put it in a room and close the door so that it will die from starvation. These are not the manners of killing the animal mandated by the Torah, which requires one to break its neck. And shearing the donkey or using it for labor is prohibited; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. And Rabbi Shimon deems it permitted to shear it and to perform labor with it. Since the latter clause mentions the prohibition against shearing and working the animal, which applies only when the animal is still alive, the first clause must be referring to a case where the animal was already dead.
קלאוד על הדף:
The seifa is quoted to prove the point. It rules out killing the donkey with a reed, sickle, axe or saw, and rules out shutting it in a room to starve — none of these is the arifa the Torah prescribes, which must be a specific act performed with a cleaver from behind. It then states that shearing and labor are forbidden, R’ Yehuda’s view against R’ Shimon’s. Since one can only shear or work a living animal, the seifa plainly concerns the animal’s lifetime, and by the preceding logic the reisha must concern the carcass.
Key Terms:
- גִּיזָּה וַעֲבוֹדָה = shearing and labor — the two classic forms of benefit from an animal’s body
- לֹא יְמִיתֶנּוּ = he shall not kill it — the modes of killing that do not constitute valid arifa
- מַגָּל / קַרְדּוֹם / מְגֵירָה = sickle, axe, saw — implements unfit for arifa
Segment 13
TYPE: תירוץ
The resolution: both clauses concern the living animal, but different kinds of benefit
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רֵישָׁא וְסֵיפָא מֵחַיִּים, רֵישָׁא — בַּהֲנָאַת דָּמָיו, סֵיפָא — בַּהֲנָאַת גּוּפוֹ.
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: The first clause and the latter clause are both referring to a case where the animal is alive, but the first clause is referring to the prohibition against deriving benefit from its value by renting or selling it, while the latter clause is referring to deriving benefit from the animal itself by shearing it or performing labor with it.
קלאוד על הדף:
The final answer dissolves the reisha-seifa pressure by finding a different distinction between the clauses. Both speak of the living animal, but they address two categories of benefit: הנאת דמיו, benefit derived from the animal’s monetary value by renting or selling it, and הנאת גופו, benefit derived from its body by shearing or working it. The baraita states the machloket twice because it concerns two distinct forms of hana’ah, not because one clause is about a carcass.
Key Terms:
- הֲנָאַת דָּמָיו = benefit from its value — renting it out or selling it
- הֲנָאַת גּוּפוֹ = benefit from its body — shearing it or using it for labor
Segment 14
TYPE: גמרא
וצריכא — why both cases had to be stated
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּצְרִיכָא, דְּאִי תְּנָא הֲנָאַת דָּמָיו — בְּהָהוּא קָא שָׁרֵי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, אֲבָל בַּהֲנָאַת גּוּפוֹ אֵימָא מוֹדֶה לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה. וְאִי תְּנָא בַּהֲנָאַת גּוּפוֹ — בְּהָהִיא קָאָסַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, אֲבָל בַּהֲנָאַת דָּמָיו אֵימָא מוֹדֶה לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן. צְרִיכָא.
English Translation:
And it is necessary to state the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon in both cases, as had the tanna taught only the case of deriving benefit from its value one would think that in that case Rabbi Shimon deems deriving benefit permitted; but in the case of deriving benefit from the donkey itself, say that Rabbi Shimon concedes to Rabbi Yehuda that it is forbidden. And had the tanna taught only the case of deriving benefit from the animal itself one would think that in that case Rabbi Yehuda deems deriving benefit forbidden; but in the case of deriving benefit from its value, say that he concedes to Rabbi Shimon. Therefore, it is necessary to teach the dispute in both instances.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara supplies the standard justification for apparent redundancy. From the monetary case alone one might have supposed R’ Shimon permits only there, conceding that bodily use is forbidden; from the bodily case alone one might have supposed R’ Yehuda forbids only there, conceding that monetary benefit is permitted. Each clause blocks an inference the other would have invited, so both are necessary. With this the objection to Rabba is fully neutralized.
Key Terms:
- צְרִיכָא = it is necessary — the justification that neither of two cases could be inferred from the other
- אֵימָא מוֹדֶה = say that he concedes — the inference the second clause exists to forestall
Segment 15
TYPE: גמרא
Rav Nachman in the name of Rabba bar Avuh endorses Rabba’s position
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְכֵן אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן לְאַחַר עֲרִיפָה שֶׁהוּא אָסוּר.
English Translation:
The Gemara cites an additional amora who agrees with Rabba: And similarly, Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: Rabbi Shimon concedes that after breaking the donkey’s neck it is prohibited to derive benefit from it.
קלאוד על הדף:
Having survived the objection, Rabba’s ruling gains an independent supporter. Rav Nachman, transmitting Rabba bar Avuh, states the same halacha in the same words: R’ Shimon concedes that after arifa benefit is forbidden. The Gemara now gives Rav Nachman two opportunities to prove it, and both will be contested — the first rebutted outright, the second answered in both directions.
Key Terms:
- רַב נַחְמָן = a Babylonian amora of the second generation, head of the court at Nehardea
- רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ = a Babylonian amora, a student of Rav and Rav Nachman’s father-in-law
Segment 16
TYPE: ברייתא
First proof: the gezeira shava עריפה / עריפה with the eglah arufah
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: מְנָא אָמֵינָא לַהּ? דְּתַנְיָא: ״וַעֲרַפְתּוֹ״, נֶאֱמַר כָּאן עֲרִיפָה, וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן עֲרִיפָה, מָה לְהַלָּן אָסוּר — אַף כָּאן אָסוּר.
English Translation:
And Rav Naḥman said: From where do I say it? As it is taught in a baraita that the Torah states: “And if you do not redeem it, then you shall break its neck” (Exodus 13:13). The expression of breaking the neck is stated here, and the expression of breaking the neck is stated there with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken (see Deuteronomy 21:4). Just as there, in the case of the heifer whose neck is broken, it is prohibited to derive benefit from it following the ceremony, so too here, it is prohibited to derive benefit from a firstborn donkey following the breaking of its neck.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Nachman’s first proof is a baraita that reads וערפתו in Shemot 13:13 against the arifa of the eglah arufah in Devarim 21:4. The verbal analogy carries the consequence from the calf, which is unambiguously forbidden in benefit after the ceremony, to the firstborn donkey. This is the same derivation Rabba cited on the previous daf; here it is deployed specifically as evidence about which tanna the baraita represents.
Key Terms:
- וַעֲרַפְתּוֹ = and you shall break its neck (Shemot 13:13)
- נֶאֱמַר כָּאן… וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן = it is stated here and it is stated there — the standard formula of a gezeira shava
- עֶגְלָה עֲרוּפָה = the calf whose neck is broken over an unsolved murder (Devarim 21:1-9)
Segment 17
TYPE: גמרא
The attribution argument: the baraita must be R’ Shimon, since R’ Yehuda needs no such verse
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַנִּי? אִילֵימָא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה — מֵחַיִּים מֵיסָר אָסַר! אֶלָּא לָאו רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא?
English Translation:
The Gemara clarifies: Who is the tanna cited in this baraita? If we say that it is Rabbi Yehuda, that is difficult, as he holds that it is already prohibited to derive benefit from a firstborn donkey while it is still alive. Why, then, would the verse need to forbid it again following the breaking of its neck? Rather, is it not the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, indicating that he concedes that deriving benefit from the donkey is prohibited following the breaking of its neck?
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Nachman’s inference turns on economy of derivation. R’ Yehuda already forbids benefit from the living donkey, so for him the post-arifa prohibition follows without argument — a verse teaching it would be superfluous. The baraita’s derivation is therefore only intelligible on R’ Shimon’s premises, where the living animal is permitted and something is needed to forbid the carcass. Hence R’ Shimon concedes post-arifa.
Key Terms:
- מֵיסָר אָסַר = he already forbids it — the redundancy that makes the attribution implausible
- אִילֵימָא = if we were to say — introducing an attribution the Gemara will reject
Segment 18
TYPE: קושיא
Rav Sheshet’s rebuttal: Safra already explained it — the baraita is R’ Yehuda after all
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: סָפְרָא חַבְרָיךְ תַּרְגּוּמַהּ: לְעוֹלָם רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, וְאִיצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: עֲרִיפָה בִּמְקוֹם פְּדִיָּיה עוֹמֶדֶת, מָה פְּדִיָּיה מַתֶּרֶת — אַף עֲרִיפָה מַתֶּרֶת, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
English Translation:
Rav Sheshet said to Rav Naḥman: Safra, your colleague, interpreted it as follows: Actually, Rabbi Yehuda is the tanna cited, and it was necessary for the verse to prohibit deriving benefit after the donkey’s death as well, as it might enter your mind to say that breaking the neck stands in place of redeeming the donkey, as it is stated: “And if you do not redeem it, then you shall break its neck” (Exodus 13:13). Therefore, it could be claimed that just as redemption permits one to derive benefit from the firstborn donkey, so too, breaking the neck permits one to derive benefit from it. Therefore, the verse teaches us that breaking the neck does not permit one to derive benefit from it.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Sheshet dismantles the proof by citing a colleague’s existing interpretation, addressing Rav Nachman with the memorable ספרא חבריך תרגומה. The verse is needed even for R’ Yehuda, because one might have reasoned that עריפה במקום פדייה עומדת — the Torah presents arifa as the alternative to redemption, so it could plausibly function as redemption does and release the animal. The verse forecloses that reading. The first proof collapses.
Key Terms:
- סָפְרָא חַבְרָיךְ תַּרְגּוּמַהּ = Safra your colleague interpreted it — citing an existing explanation to block an inference
- עֲרִיפָה בִּמְקוֹם פְּדִיָּיה עוֹמֶדֶת = arifa stands in the place of redemption
- קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן = it teaches us — what the verse comes to exclude
Segment 19
TYPE: ברייתא
Second proof: Levi’s rationale for arifa — he caused the kohen a loss, so let his own be lost
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: מְנָא אָמֵינָא לַהּ? מִדְּתָנֵי לֵוִי: הוּא הִפְסִיד מָמוֹנוֹ שֶׁל כֹּהֵן, לְפִיכָךְ יוּפְסַד מָמוֹנוֹ.
English Translation:
Rav Naḥman said: From where do I say that Rabbi Shimon holds it is prohibited to derive benefit from a firstborn donkey following the breaking of its neck? I say it from that which Levi teaches in a baraita with regard to the reason the Torah commands that the donkey’s neck be broken: He, the owner, caused a loss of the money of a priest by not giving him a lamb in exchange for the donkey. Therefore, his money shall also be lost.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Nachman tries again from a baraita of Levi that explains why the Torah commands arifa at all. The answer is measure for measure: by withholding the lamb the owner deprived the kohen of property, and the Torah responds by depriving him of the donkey. The teaching is striking as a piece of moral reasoning — arifa is framed not as a ritual but as a penalty calibrated to the wrong.
Key Terms:
- לֵוִי = a tanna of the transitional generation and a colleague of Rebbi, compiler of his own baraitot
- הִפְסִיד מָמוֹנוֹ שֶׁל כֹּהֵן = he caused the loss of the kohen’s money
- יוּפְסַד מָמוֹנוֹ = let his own money be lost — the measure-for-measure rationale
Segment 20
TYPE: גמרא
The attribution argument again: for R’ Yehuda nothing remains to lose
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַנִּי? אִילֵימָא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה — הָא מַיפְסַד וְקָאֵי! אֶלָּא לָאו רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא?
English Translation:
The Gemara clarifies: Whose opinion is followed in this baraita? If we say it is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, the donkey’s monetary value is already lost, as it was already prohibited to derive benefit from it while it was alive. Rather, is it not the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? This indicates that breaking the neck of the donkey renders deriving benefit from it prohibited.
קלאוד על הדף:
The same economy argument is applied to Levi’s baraita. If the tanna were R’ Yehuda, the owner’s loss would already be complete before the arifa, since he could never benefit from the animal in the first place; the arifa would add no penalty and Levi’s rationale would be empty. So the baraita should be R’ Shimon, which means arifa is what creates the prohibition — again supporting Rabba.
Key Terms:
- הָא מַיפְסַד וְקָאֵי = it already stands lost — the objection that nothing further is forfeited
Segment 21
TYPE: תירוץ
The Gemara declines to decide: it may be either tanna
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן.
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: If you wish, say the baraita follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and if you wish, say instead that it follows the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, even if he holds that it is permitted to derive benefit from a firstborn donkey after its neck is broken.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rather than accepting Rav Nachman’s inference, the Gemara offers איבעית אימא in both directions. The baraita can be read as R’ Yehuda or as R’ Shimon, and the next two segments supply a coherent account of the loss on each reading. Because the source fits both, it proves nothing about which tanna holds what, and Rav Nachman’s second proof fares no better than his first.
Key Terms:
- אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא = if you wish, say — offering alternative readings without deciding between them
Segment 22
TYPE: גמרא
On R’ Yehuda: the loss is the דביני ביני margin
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, אַפְּסֵידָא דְּבֵינֵי בֵּינֵי.
English Translation:
The Gemara explains: If you wish, say the baraita follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and it is referring to the loss of the difference between the value of the donkey while it is alive and the value of the lamb given as redemption to the priest, which is less than that of the donkey. This value, which the owner would have gained had he redeemed the donkey, is lost once the donkey is not redeemed.
קלאוד על הדף:
Even for R’ Yehuda there is something real to forfeit. Had the owner redeemed, he would have handed over a cheap lamb and received back an expensive donkey now free of all restriction, pocketing the difference — the דביני ביני that figured in the kiddushin discussion on 9b. By refusing to redeem he loses that margin, and Levi’s rationale is satisfied without any post-arifa prohibition.
Key Terms:
- אַפְּסֵידָא דְּבֵינֵי בֵּינֵי = the loss of the in-between amount — the margin between the donkey’s value and the lamb’s
Segment 23
TYPE: גמרא
On R’ Shimon: the loss is simply the depreciation of death
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, לִפְחַת מִיתָה.
English Translation:
And if you wish, say instead that it is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, and although he permits deriving benefit from the donkey after the breaking of its neck, there is nevertheless a depreciation of value caused by the death of the animal, as a dead donkey is worth less than a live one.
קלאוד על הדף:
The other reading works equally well. Grant that R’ Shimon permits benefit even from the carcass; the owner has still lost real value, because a dead donkey is worth considerably less than a live one. That פחת מיתה is loss enough to sustain Levi’s measure-for-measure account. With both readings viable, the baraita is neutral and the question remains open.
Key Terms:
- פְּחַת מִיתָה = the depreciation caused by death — the drop in value from a live animal to a carcass
Segment 24
TYPE: גמרא
The amoraic alignment: Reish Lakish with Rabba, R’ Yochanan against
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְכֵן אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן לְאַחַר עֲרִיפָה שֶׁהוּא אָסוּר, וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, וְאִי תֵּימָא רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אֲמַר: עֲדַיִין הִיא מַחְלוֹקֶת.
English Translation:
The Gemara comments: And Reish Lakish similarly says that Rabbi Shimon concedes that deriving benefit from a firstborn donkey after the breaking of its neck is prohibited, in accordance with the statements of Rabba and Rav Naḥman. But Rabbi Yoḥanan, and some say Rabbi Elazar, says: The matter is still subject to dispute, i.e., Rabbi Shimon disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda even after the death of the firstborn donkey, and permits deriving benefit from it even then.
קלאוד על הדף:
The sugya’s central question is never settled by proof, only by counting authorities. Reish Lakish joins Rabba and Rav Nachman: R’ Shimon concedes after arifa. R’ Yochanan — or, in an alternative transmission, R’ Elazar — holds עדיין היא מחלוקת, that the dispute survives the animal’s death and R’ Shimon permits benefit even then. The disagreement between R’ Yochanan and Reish Lakish here follows their familiar pattern of opposition in the Yerushalmi academy.
Key Terms:
- עֲדַיִין הִיא מַחְלוֹקֶת = it is still a dispute — the tannaitic machloket extends to the later stage as well
- רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ = R’ Shimon ben Lakish, an amora of Eretz Yisrael and R’ Yochanan’s principal disputant
- וְאִי תֵּימָא = and some say — an alternative attribution of a statement
Segment 25
TYPE: איכא דמתני
An alternative placement of Rav Nachman’s ruling: the mishna in Kiddushin
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִיכָּא דְּמַתְנֵי לַהּ לְהָא דְּרַב נַחְמָן, אַהָא: ״הַמְקַדֵּשׁ בְּפֶטֶר חֲמוֹר אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת״. לֵימָא מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן? אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ: לְאַחַר עֲרִיפָה, וְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל.
English Translation:
There are those who teach that which Rav Naḥman said concerning the opinion of Rabbi Shimon with regard to this, i.e., the mishna in Kiddushin (56b): In the case of one who betroths a woman with a firstborn donkey, the woman is not betrothed, as it is prohibited to derive benefit from the donkey. Let us say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as he holds that one is permitted to derive benefit from a firstborn donkey. Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: It is referring to a case of betrothal after the breaking of the donkey’s neck, and all agree, even Rabbi Shimon, that it is prohibited to derive benefit from it at that stage.
קלאוד על הדף:
Some transmit Rav Nachman’s statement not as a comment on Rabba’s claim but as a resolution of a difficulty in the mishna at Kiddushin 56b, which rules that one who betroths a woman with a firstborn donkey has not betrothed her. That ruling presupposes that no benefit may be derived, which appears to exclude R’ Shimon. Rav Nachman answers that the mishna speaks of a donkey after arifa, where all agree the prohibition applies, so the mishna need not be assigned to one tanna at all.
Key Terms:
- אִיכָּא דְּמַתְנֵי = some teach it — an alternative placement of a transmitted statement
- הַמְקַדֵּשׁ בְּפֶטֶר חֲמוֹר = one who betroths a woman with a firstborn donkey
- דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל = the words of all, i.e. unanimously accepted
Segment 26
TYPE: איכא דאמרי
A sharper version: the mishna appears to fit neither tanna
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִיכָּא דְאָמְרִי: הָא מַנִּי? לָא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְלָא רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן. אִי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן — תִּיקְדַּשׁ בְּכוּלֵּיהּ, אִי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה — תִּיקְדַּשׁ בְּהָךְ דְּבֵינֵי בֵּינֵי!
English Translation:
There are those who say that the discussion with regard to the mishna proceeded as follows: In accordance with whose opinion is this? Ostensibly, it is neither the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda nor that of Rabbi Shimon. If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who permits deriving benefit from a firstborn donkey, the woman should be betrothed with the entire value. If it follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, she should be betrothed with that difference between the value of the donkey after being redeemed, which remains hers, and the value of the lamb that must be given to the priest in exchange for the donkey.
קלאוד על הדף:
The alternative version states the difficulty more aggressively. On R’ Shimon’s view, benefit is permitted and the woman should be betrothed with the donkey’s entire value. On R’ Yehuda’s view she should still be betrothed — not with the whole value but with the דביני ביני margin, exactly as the Gemara concluded on 9b. Either way the mishna’s flat ruling that she is not betrothed seems unsupportable, and a more specific case is needed.
Key Terms:
- תִּיקְדַּשׁ בְּכוּלֵּיהּ = let her be betrothed with all of it, i.e. with the donkey’s full value
- דְּבֵינֵי בֵּינֵי = the in-between — the margin between the donkey’s value and the redeeming lamb’s
Segment 27
TYPE: תירוץ
Rabba bar Avuh in the name of Rav: R’ Yehuda, where the donkey is worth only a shekel
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ אָמַר רַב: לְעוֹלָם רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, וּכְגוֹן שֶׁאֵינוֹ שָׁוֶה אֶלָּא שֶׁקֶל, וְסָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר יְהוּדָה. דְּתַנְיָא: ״תִּפְדֶּה״ ״תִּפְדֶּה״ — תִּפְדֶּה מִיָּד, תִּפְדֶּה כׇּל שֶׁהוּא. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אֵין פְּדִיָּיה פְּחוּתָה מִשֶּׁקֶל.
English Translation:
Rabba bar Avuh says that Rav says: Actually, it follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and is referring to a case where the firstborn donkey is worth only a shekel, the same value as a lamb suitable for redemption, in which case there is no difference between the value of the donkey and that of the lamb. And Rabbi Yehuda holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda that one may not redeem a firstborn donkey with a lamb that is less than the value of a shekel, as it is taught in a baraita: When the Torah states: “You shall redeem,” with regard to a firstborn donkey, it teaches that you shall redeem it immediately, and you shall redeem it for any amount. Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda says: There is no redemption for less than a shekel.
קלאוד על הדף:
The resolution closes the margin to zero. If the donkey is worth exactly a shekel, and R’ Yehuda holds with R’ Yosei bar Yehuda that no redemption may be effected for less than a shekel, then the lamb costs precisely what the donkey is worth and there is no דביני ביני left over. Nothing of value passes to the woman and the betrothal fails. This introduces the baraita on תפדה that occupies the rest of the daf.
Key Terms:
- שֶׁקֶל = a shekel, equal to two dinarim; here the floor value for a redemption
- רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר יְהוּדָה = a tanna of the fifth generation, son of R’ Yehuda bar Ilai
- אֵין פְּדִיָּיה פְּחוּתָה מִשֶּׁקֶל = there is no redemption for less than a shekel
Segment 28
TYPE: קושיא
Is the baraita’s ‘immediately, any amount’ not self-evident?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר מָר: ״תִּפְדֶּה״ ״תִּפְדֶּה״ — תִּפְדֶּה מִיָּד, תִּפְדֶּה כׇּל שֶׁהוּא. פְּשִׁיטָא!
English Translation:
The Gemara analyzes the baraita: The Master said that the verse: “You shall redeem,” teaches that you shall redeem it immediately, and you shall redeem it for any amount. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious? Why is it necessary to derive these halakhot from the verse?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara turns to analyse the baraita it has just quoted. Its first clause derives from the doubled תפדה that redemption must be performed at once and may be effected with any value whatever. Both conclusions look like the default position — no delay was ever stipulated and no sum was ever named — so the Gemara asks why a derivation is needed at all.
Key Terms:
- פְּשִׁיטָא = it is obvious — the objection that a derivation teaches nothing new
- תִּפְדֶּה = you shall redeem — the doubled verb generating both derivations
- כׇּל שֶׁהוּא = any amount whatsoever
Segment 29
TYPE: תירוץ
It was necessary against the hekesh to the human firstborn
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִיצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הוֹאִיל וְאִיתַּקַּשׁ לִבְכוֹר אָדָם, מָה בְּכוֹר אָדָם אַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים וְחָמֵשׁ, הַאי נָמֵי אַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים וְחָמֵשׁ.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: It was necessary, as it might enter your mind to say that since the mitzva of redeeming a firstborn donkey is juxtaposed with that of redeeming a woman’s firstborn son in the verse: “Yet you shall redeem the firstborn of man, and the firstborn of non-kosher animals you shall redeem” (Numbers 18:15), it should be inferred that just as a woman’s firstborn son is redeemed after the baby is thirty days old and involves giving the monetary value of five sela to a priest, as stated in the next verse: “And their redemption-money, from a month old you shall redeem them, it shall be, according to your valuation, five shekels of silver” (Numbers 18:16), this firstborn donkey too should be redeemed after it is thirty days old, and a lamb whose value is at least five sela should be given to the priest.
קלאוד על הדף:
The derivation earns its place by blocking a genuinely attractive inference. Bamidbar 18:15 places the two redemptions in a single verse — the firstborn of man and the firstborn of the non-kosher animal — and the very next verse fixes the human redemption at thirty days and five shekels of silver. The juxtaposition invites transferring both figures to the donkey. The doubled תפדה forecloses it on both counts.
Key Terms:
- הֶיקֵּשׁ = a juxtaposition of two laws in a single verse, inviting the transfer of details between them
- בְּכוֹר אָדָם = a woman’s firstborn son, redeemed at pidyon haben
- אַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים וְחָמֵשׁ = after thirty days and for five sela — the terms of pidyon haben
Segment 30
TYPE: גמרא
The conclusion restated: immediately, and for any amount
Hebrew/Aramaic:
קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: ״תִּפְדֶּה״ — מִיָּד, ״תִּפְדֶּה״ — כׇּל שֶׁהוּא.
English Translation:
Therefore, the baraita teaches us: “You shall redeem,” indicating that the redemption of the donkey must be done immediately after its birth, and that you shall redeem it for any amount.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara restates the two derivations now that their purpose is clear. Each occurrence of תפדה does one job: the redemption must be immediate rather than deferred to the thirtieth day, and it may be effected with any value rather than requiring five sela. The two rulings stand against the two details the hekesh would have imported.
Key Terms:
- מִיָּד = immediately, i.e. from birth and without the thirty-day wait
Segment 31
TYPE: קושיא
R’ Yosei bar Yehuda’s shekel is difficult either way
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אֵין פְּדִיָּיה פְּחוּתָה מִשֶּׁקֶל. מִמָּה נַפְשָׁךְ: אִי מַקֵּישׁ לִבְכוֹר אָדָם — חָמֵשׁ לִיבְעֵי, וְאִי לָא מַקֵּישׁ — שֶׁקֶל מְנָא לֵיהּ?
English Translation:
The baraita also states that Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda says: There is no redemption for less than a shekel. The Gemara asks: Whichever way you look at it, this statement is difficult: If Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda holds that the verse compares a firstborn donkey to a woman’s firstborn son, he should require a lamb worth five sela, and if the verse does not compare them, from where does Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda derive that a lamb worth a shekel is necessary?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara turns to the dissenting view and finds it caught between two positions. If R’ Yosei bar Yehuda accepts the hekesh to the human firstborn, he should have required the full five sela rather than a single shekel. And if he rejects the hekesh, then nothing constrains the value at all and the shekel has no source. The ממה נפשך leaves him no evident footing.
Key Terms:
- מִמָּה נַפְשָׁךְ = whichever way you take it — a dilemma with no favourable branch
- מְנָא לֵיהּ = from where does he derive it
Segment 32
TYPE: תירוץ
Rava: the shekel comes from וכל ערכך יהיה בשקל הקדש
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לְעוֹלָם לָא מַקֵּישׁ, אָמַר רָבָא: אָמַר קְרָא ״וְכׇל עֶרְכְּךָ יִהְיֶה בְּשֶׁקֶל הַקֹּדֶשׁ״, כׇּל עֲרָכִין שֶׁאַתָּה מַעֲרִיךְ לֹא יְהוּ פְּחוּתִין מִשֶּׁקֶל.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: Actually, the verse does not compare them, and the reason a lamb worth a shekel is required is due to that which Rava says: The verse states with regard to redemption of consecrated property: “And all your valuations shall be with the shekel of the Sanctuary” (Leviticus 27:25), which indicates that all valuations that you assess should not be less than the value of a shekel.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava breaks the dilemma by supplying a third source. R’ Yosei bar Yehuda makes no hekesh at all; his shekel comes from the verse governing valuations of consecrated property, וכל ערכך יהיה בשקל הקדש (Vayikra 27:25), read as a general floor — every valuation one assesses must be at least a shekel. The rule is not specific to peter chamor but applies wherever the Torah asks for an assessment of worth.
Key Terms:
- וְכׇל עֶרְכְּךָ יִהְיֶה בְּשֶׁקֶל הַקֹּדֶשׁ = and all your valuations shall be in the sacred shekel (Vayikra 27:25)
- עֲרָכִין = valuations — assessments of monetary worth prescribed by the Torah
- שֶׁקֶל הַקֹּדֶשׁ = the sacred shekel, the standard unit of Torah valuation
Segment 33
TYPE: קושיא
And the Rabbanan hold that that verse… — the daf breaks off mid-sentence
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְרַבָּנַן: הַהוּא
English Translation:
And the Rabbis who disagree with him hold that that verse
קלאוד על הדף:
The daf ends in the middle of the Gemara’s question. Having grounded R’ Yosei bar Yehuda’s shekel in Vayikra 27:25, the Gemara must now explain how the Rabbanan, who permit redemption with any amount, read that same verse — since they cannot simply ignore a verse their disputant relies on. The answer comes on 11a, and the sugya continues from there.
Key Terms:
- וְרַבָּנַן = and the Rabbanan — the majority view, here holding תפדה כל שהוא
- הַהוּא = that one, i.e. that verse — the answer breaks off here and resumes on 11a