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Chullin Daf 107 (חולין דף ק״ז)

Daf: 107 | Amudim: 107a – 107b | Date: Loading...


📖 Breakdown

Amud Aleph (107a)

Segment 1

TYPE: מימרא ולישני

Rabbi Avina’s ruling to the people of Pakta da’Aravot, and whether he agrees with Rav

Hebrew/Aramaic:

פַּקְתָּא דַּעֲרָבוֹת: כְּגוֹן אַתּוּן דְּלָא שְׁכִיחִי לְכוּ מַיָּא, מְשׁוּ יְדַיְיכוּ מִצַּפְרָא וְאַתְנוֹ עֲלַיְיהוּ לְכוּלֵּאּ יוֹמָא. אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: בִּשְׁעַת הַדְּחָק – אִין, שֶׁלֹּא בִּשְׁעַת הַדְּחָק – לָא, וּפְלִיגָא דְּרַב. וְאִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: אֲפִילּוּ שֶׁלֹּא בִּשְׁעַת הַדְּחָק נָמֵי, וְהַיְינוּ דְּרַב.

English Translation:

the valley of Aravot [pakta da’aravot], where there was a shortage of water: People such as you, for whom water is scarce, should wash your hands in the morning and stipulate with regard to them for the entire day. Some say that Rabbi Avina maintains that in exigent circumstances, yes, one should act in this manner, but when one is not in exigent circumstances, he should not do so. And according to this explanation, Rabbi Avina disagrees with the opinion of Rav, who permitted this practice to all. And some say that Rabbi Avina ruled that one may do so even when not in exigent circumstances, and Rabbi Avina’s opinion is identical to that of Rav.

קלאוד על הדף:

The daf opens by completing the statement of Rabbi Avina left hanging at the end of 106b. Addressing the inhabitants of a valley where water was scarce, he permitted the morning washing with a stipulation to serve the whole day. The Gemara then offers two readings of his scope: one that he permitted it only bishe’at hadechak, under duress, which would put him at odds with Rav’s blanket permission, and one that he permitted it universally, making him identical to Rav. This kind of paired lishna, offering opposite readings of a single ruling, is how the Gemara preserves genuine uncertainty about a tradition’s reach rather than forcing a resolution.

Key Terms:

  • פַּקְתָּא דַּעֲרָבוֹת = the valley of Aravot — a locale where water was scarce, making the stipulation practically necessary
  • שְׁעַת הַדְּחָק = a time of duress or pressing need — a circumstance that can justify relying on a leniency one would not otherwise use
  • אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי = some say — the formula introducing an alternative version of a tradition

Segment 2

TYPE: מימרא

Rav Pappa on the irrigation channel: water must come from human force

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: הַאי אֲרִיתָּא דְּדַלָּאֵי, אֵין נוֹטְלִין מִמֶּנּוּ לַיָּדַיִם, דְּלָא אָתוּ מִכֹּחַ גַּבְרָא. וְאִי מְקָרַב לְגַבֵּי דַּוְלָא, דְּקָאָתוּ מִכֹּחַ גַּבְרָא – נוֹטְלִין מִמֶּנּוּ לַיָּדַיִם.

English Translation:

Rav Pappa said: With regard to this irrigation channel [arita dedalla’ei], into which water is poured from a river using buckets, and which then transports the water to the fields, one may not wash his hands in it. The reason is that this water does not come from a person’s force, i.e., it is not poured on the hands by a direct act, as it moves by force of the current in the channel. But if one draws his hands near the bucket itself, in such a manner that the water poured on his hands comes from a person’s force before it begins to flow in the channel, then one may wash his hands with it.

קלאוד על הדף:

Rav Pappa introduces a foundational requirement of netilat yadayim: the water must arrive on the hands mikoach gavra, by human agency. Water flowing through an irrigation channel moves under its own momentum, so holding one’s hands in the current does not constitute a valid washing even though the water originally came from a bucket. But if one positions his hands close enough to the bucket that the pouring itself still counts as a human act, the washing is valid. The principle distinguishes pouring, which requires an actor, from immersion, which does not.

Key Terms:

  • כֹּחַ גַּבְרָא = human force — the requirement that the water be applied to the hands by a person’s direct act rather than by its own flow
  • אֲרִיתָּא דְּדַלָּאֵי = an irrigation channel fed by buckets, which carries water to the fields under its own current

Segment 3

TYPE: מימרא

The perforated bucket: valid for immersion, invalid as a vessel for pouring

Hebrew/Aramaic:

וְאִי בְּזִיעַ דַּוְלָא, בְּכוֹנֵס מַשְׁקֶה, מֵילָף לָיְיפִי, וּמְטַבֵּיל בָּהּ אֶת הַיָּדַיִם. וְאָמַר רָבָא: כְּלִי שֶׁנִּיקַּב בְּכוֹנֵס מַשְׁקֶה – אֵין נוֹטְלִין מִמֶּנּוּ לַיָּדַיִם.

English Translation:

And if the bucket in which the water is drawn from the river is perforated with a hole large enough to enable liquid to enter the vessel when it is placed in the river, the presence of this hole connects the water in the channel to the water in the river, as they touch through that hole. And therefore, one may immerse his hands in that channel as he would in the river itself. Yet the perforated bucket is invalid for the washing of the hands by pouring, since it is no longer considered a vessel. As Rava says: With regard to a vessel that is perforated with a hole large enough to enable liquid to enter, one may not wash his hands with it.

קלאוד על הדף:

The discussion turns on a neat inversion. A bucket perforated with a hole large enough to admit liquid loses its status as a keli, a vessel, and therefore cannot be used to pour water on the hands. Yet that same hole connects the water inside it to the river water outside, so the channel it feeds is halachically continuous with the river and one may immerse his hands in it. The identical physical fact — the hole — disqualifies the object for one mode of washing and qualifies the water for the other, because pouring depends on the vessel while immersion depends on the water’s connection to a natural source.

Key Terms:

  • כּוֹנֵס מַשְׁקֶה = a hole large enough to admit liquid — the threshold at which a vessel ceases to be a valid keli
  • כְּלִי = a vessel — required for washing by pouring, and lost once the object is perforated

Segment 4

TYPE: קושיא

An apparent contradiction between two statements of Rava about the revi’it

Hebrew/Aramaic:

וְאָמַר רָבָא: כְּלִי שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ רְבִיעִית – אֵין נוֹטְלִין מִמֶּנּוּ לַיָּדַיִם. אִינִי? וְהָאָמַר רָבָא: כְּלִי שֶׁאֵין מַחְזִיק רְבִיעִית – אֵין נוֹטְלִין מִמֶּנּוּ לַיָּדַיִם, הָא מַחְזִיק – אַף עַל גַּב דְּלֵית בֵּיהּ.

English Translation:

And Rava says: With regard to a vessel that does not have a quarter-log of water in it, one may not wash his hands with it. The Gemara asks: Is that so? But doesn’t Rava say: With regard to a vessel that cannot contain a quarter-log of water, one may not wash his hands with it. It may be consequently inferred that as long as the vessel can contain a quarter-log, one may use it even if it does not currently have a quarter-log in it.

קלאוד על הדף:

Two rulings of Rava seem to conflict. In one he requires that the vessel actually contain a revi’it of water; in the other he requires only that the vessel be capable of holding a revi’it, which implies that a lesser quantity currently in it would suffice. The Gemara’s practice of setting an amora’s statements against each other is not an attack on his consistency but a method for discovering the unstated case-distinction that reconciles them.

Key Terms:

  • רְבִיעִית = a quarter-log, the minimum measure of water for netilat yadayim
  • מַחְזִיק = holds, i.e., has the capacity to contain — as distinct from actually containing

Segment 5

TYPE: תירוץ וברייתא

The resolution: one washer requires a full revi’it, a second may use the remainder

Hebrew/Aramaic:

לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא לְחַד, הָא לִתְרֵי, דְּתַנְיָא: מֵי רְבִיעִית נוֹטְלִין לַיָּדַיִם לְאֶחָד, וַאֲפִילּוּ לִשְׁנַיִם.

English Translation:

The Gemara answers: This is not difficult; this former statement, requiring a quarter-log of actual water, is referring to washing for one person, whereas that latter statement, requiring only that the vessel have a capacity of a quarter-log, is referring to washing for two people. If a vessel originally contained a quarter-log of water, then even if less than that amount remains after one person has washed his hands, a second individual may use the remainder, which is considered fit based on the water’s original volume. As it is taught in a baraita: With a quarter-log of water, one may wash the hands of one individual, and even those of two.

קלאוד על הדף:

The two statements address different cases. The first person to wash needs a genuine revi’it of water present. Once he has washed, whatever remains — now less than a revi’it — is still valid for a second person, because it descends from an originally sufficient measure. A baraita is adduced in support: with a revi’it one may wash the hands of one, and even of two. The underlying idea is that halachic sufficiency, once established, carries forward to what remains.

Key Terms:

  • הָא לְחַד הָא לִתְרֵי = this for one, that for two — the distinction that reconciles the two rulings
  • מֵי רְבִיעִית = a quarter-log of water, sufficient for one washer and, by way of the remainder, for a second

Segment 6

TYPE: מעשה

Rav Sheshet questions Ameimar on three points of stringency

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב שֵׁשֶׁת לְאַמֵּימָר: קָפְדִיתוּ אַמָּנָא? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִין. אַחֲזוּתָא? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִין. אַשִּׁיעוּרָא? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִין.

English Translation:

Rav Sheshet said to Ameimar: Are you particular about the vessel used for washing hands, that it be wholly intact? Ameimar said to him: Yes. Rav Sheshet further inquired: Are you also particular about the appearance of the water, that it be normal? Ameimar again said to him: Yes. Rav Sheshet further asked: Are you particular about the measure of water, that it be no less than one quarter-log? Ameimar said to him: Yes.

קלאוד על הדף:

Rav Sheshet interrogates Ameimar about which aspects of netilat yadayim the practice of his locale treats as indispensable: the integrity of the vessel, the normal appearance of the water, and the minimum measure. Ameimar answers yes to all three. The exchange is a compact survey of the three independent variables the sugya has been developing — keli, chazuta, and shiur — and its question-and-answer form records living practice rather than abstract ruling.

Key Terms:

  • קָפְדִיתוּ = are you particular — an inquiry into which stringencies a community actually observes
  • חֲזוּתָא = appearance — the requirement that the water’s color not be altered, one of the four disqualifications of water

Segment 7

TYPE: לישנא אחרינא

An alternative version: Ameimar was not particular about the measure

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, הָכִי אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אַמָּנָא וְאַחֲזוּתָא – קָפְדִינַן, אַשִּׁיעוּרָא – לָא קָפְדִינַן, דְּתַנְיָא: מֵי רְבִיעִית נוֹטְלִין לַיָּדַיִם לְאֶחָד, וַאֲפִילּוּ לִשְׁנַיִם.

English Translation:

Some say that this is what Ameimar said to him: We are particular about the wholeness of the vessel and about the water’s appearance, but we are not particular about the water’s measure, as it is taught in a baraita: With a quarter-log of water one may wash the hands of one individual, and even those of two. The baraita indicates that there is no need for a quarter-log for each individual.

קלאוד על הדף:

A second transmission reverses one of Ameimar’s three answers. In this version he was particular about the vessel and the water’s appearance but not about the measure, citing the same baraita that permits washing two people with a single revi’it. On this reading the baraita is understood as showing that the revi’it is not a strict per-person requirement at all. The Gemara records the variant faithfully before proceeding to reject its reasoning.

Key Terms:

  • אַשִּׁיעוּרָא לָא קָפְדִינַן = we are not particular about the measure — the position this variant attributes to Ameimar

Segment 8

TYPE: דחייה

The Gemara rejects that inference: the baraita speaks of a remainder of purity

Hebrew/Aramaic:

וְלָא הִיא, שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, מִשּׁוּם דְּקָאָתוּ מִשְּׁיָרֵי טׇהֳרָה.

English Translation:

The Gemara notes: And it is not so, i.e., one cannot derive from the baraita that the measure of water is immaterial. It is different there because there the water comes from the remainder of a measure initially sufficient for purity. If there was not initially a quarter-log, the water is unfit for even one person.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara refuses the inference. The baraita’s leniency operates only because the second person’s water is a shirayei tohora, the residue of a quantity that was fully valid to begin with. Where no revi’it was present at the outset, the water is invalid even for a single washer. The distinction preserves the revi’it as a genuine threshold while explaining why a lesser residual quantity can still work.

Key Terms:

  • שְׁיָרֵי טׇהֳרָה = the remainder of a measure of purity — water left over from an originally valid revi’it, which retains its validity

Segment 9

TYPE: מעשה

Rav Ya’akov and Rav Ashi each prepared a vessel of exactly a revi’it

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אַתְקֵין רַב יַעֲקֹב מִנְּהַר פְּקוֹד נַטְלָא בַּת רְבִיעֵתָא, אַתְקֵין רַב אָשֵׁי בְּהוּצָל כּוּזָא בַּת רְבִיעֵתָא.

English Translation:

The Gemara relates: Rav Ya’akov from Nehar Pekod prepared a glass vessel that could contain a quarter-log of water for washing his hands. Rav Ashi in Huzal likewise prepared an earthenware vessel that could contain a quarter-log.

קלאוד על הדף:

Two amoraim in different locations had vessels made to hold precisely a revi’it — Rav Ya’akov of Nehar Pekod a glass one, Rav Ashi in Huzal an earthenware one. The report functions as practical endorsement of the stringent view just defended: rather than estimating, these Sages built the measure into a purpose-made utensil. It is also the earliest ancestor of the dedicated washing cup still in use.

Key Terms:

  • נַטְלָא = a washing vessel, here of glass
  • כּוּזָא = an earthenware jug
  • הוּצָל = Huzal, a Babylonian town, seat of Rav Ashi’s activity in this report

Segment 10

TYPE: מימרא וברייתא

Which containers qualify as vessels: the barrel stopper, wineskins, sack and basket

Hebrew/Aramaic:

וְאָמַר רָבָא: מְגוּפַת חָבִית שֶׁתִּקְּנָהּ – נוֹטְלִין מִמֶּנָּה לַיָּדַיִם. תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: מְגוּפַת חָבִית שֶׁתִּקְּנָהּ – נוֹטְלִין מִמֶּנָּה לַיָּדַיִם. חֵמֶת וּכְפִישָׁה שֶׁתִּקְּנָן – נוֹטְלִין מֵהֶם לַיָּדַיִם. שַׂק וְקוּפָּה, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁמְּקַבְּלִים – אֵין נוֹטְלִין מֵהֶם לַיָּדַיִם.

English Translation:

And Rava says: If one prepared the stopper of a barrel for use as a vessel by hollowing it out until it contained a quarter-log, one may wash his hands with it, even though it was not originally designated for this function. This ruling is also taught in a baraita: If one prepared the stopper of a barrel for this purpose, one may wash his hands with it. Likewise, with regard to a ḥemet and a kefisha, types of leather wineskins, that one prepared for this purpose, one may wash his hands with them, as they were initially designed to hold liquids. But with regard to a sack and a basket, even if they can contain water, one may not wash his hands with them, as no sack or basket is designed to hold water, and most cannot.

קלאוד על הדף:

Rava rules that a barrel stopper hollowed out to hold a revi’it becomes a valid vessel, and a baraita confirms it and extends the principle. Leather wineskins qualify because they were designed to hold liquid; a sack or basket does not, even where it happens to retain water, because such objects are not made for liquid at all. The operative criterion is the object’s design category rather than its performance in the individual case — a characteristically halachic preference for type over instance.

Key Terms:

  • מְגוּפַת חָבִית = the stopper of a barrel, which can be repurposed as a vessel if hollowed to hold a revi’it
  • חֵמֶת וּכְפִישָׁה = types of leather wineskins, valid because designed to contain liquid
  • שַׂק וְקוּפָּה = a sack and a basket, invalid because their type is not made to hold water

Segment 11

TYPE: בעיא

May one eat with a cloth on the hands instead of washing?

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: מַהוּ לֶאֱכוֹל בְּמַפָּה? מִי חָיְישִׁינַן דִּלְמָא נָגַע, אוֹ לָא?

English Translation:

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the halakha with regard to eating with a cloth [mappa] on one’s hands, rather than washing them to purify them? Are we concerned that perhaps he will touch the food with his hands, or not?

קלאוד על הדף:

A new question opens: can wrapping the hands in a cloth substitute for netilat yadayim? The concern is not whether the cloth is a barrier in principle but whether it is reliable in practice — a person handling food may forget and touch it directly. The question will occupy the rest of the amud and the opening of 107b, and the Gemara will resolve it not by principle but by identifying who can be trusted to maintain the separation.

Key Terms:

  • מַפָּה = a cloth used to hold food so that the bare hands do not touch it
  • דִּלְמָא נָגַע = lest he touch — the practical worry that undermines the cloth as a substitute for washing

Segment 12

TYPE: ראיה

A proffered proof from the mishna about Rabbi Tzadok in the sukka

Hebrew/Aramaic:

תָּא שְׁמַע, וּכְשֶׁנָּתְנוּ לוֹ לְרַבִּי צָדוֹק אוֹכֶל פָּחוֹת מִכְּבֵיצָה, נוֹטְלוֹ בְּמַפָּה וְאוֹכְלוֹ חוּץ לַסּוּכָּה, וְאֵין מְבָרֵךְ אַחֲרָיו. מַאי לָאו – הָא כְּבֵיצָה בָּעֵי נְטִילַת יָדַיִם?

English Translation:

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a mishna (Sukka 26b): And when they gave Rabbi Tzadok on the festival of Sukkot less than an egg-bulk of food, he took the food in a cloth, and he ate it outside the sukka, as he held one is not obligated to eat food of this amount in a sukka. And he did not recite a blessing after eating it, since less than an egg-bulk does not satisfy the verse: “And you shall eat and be satisfied and bless the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 8:10). What, is it not to be inferred that consequently, if one eats an egg-bulk, it requires washing of the hands, even if one uses a cloth?

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara tries to resolve the question from a mishna in Sukka: Rabbi Tzadok, given less than an egg-bulk of food, took it in a cloth and ate it outside the sukka without a subsequent blessing. The proposed inference is that with an egg-bulk he would have needed to wash — implying that a cloth does not substitute for washing. The proof depends on reading the mishna’s implicit contrast as covering handwashing along with sukka and blessing.

Key Terms:

  • כְּבֵיצָה = an egg-bulk, the volume threshold that triggers obligations of sukka and of the after-blessing
  • תָּא שְׁמַע = come and hear — the formula introducing an attempted proof from an earlier source

Segment 13

TYPE: דחייה

The proof is rejected: the mishna’s contrast concerns sukka and blessing only

Hebrew/Aramaic:

דִּלְמָא הָא כְּבֵיצָה – בָּעֵי סוּכָּה, וּבָעֵי בְּרָכָה.

English Translation:

The Gemara rejects this: Perhaps one can conclude from that mishna only that consequently, if one eats an egg-bulk he needs to do so in a sukka and needs to recite a blessing after eating; but he can still use a cloth instead of washing his hands.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara declines the inference. The mishna’s implied contrast may extend only to the two obligations it actually mentions — that an egg-bulk requires eating in the sukka and requires a blessing afterward — without saying anything about handwashing. Rabbi Tzadok’s cloth may have been perfectly adequate. This is a standard corrective against over-reading an implicit contrast beyond the terms the source itself supplies.

Key Terms:

  • דִּלְמָא = perhaps — introducing an alternative reading that defeats the proposed inference

Segment 14

TYPE: מעשה

Shmuel finds Rav eating with a cloth (the exchange concludes on 107b)

Hebrew/Aramaic:

תָּא שְׁמַע: דִּשְׁמוּאֵל אַשְׁכְּחֵיהּ לְרַב דְּקָאָכֵיל בְּמַפָּה, אֲמַר לֵיהּ:

English Translation:

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from an incident where Shmuel found Rav eating with a cloth rather than washing his hands, and Shmuel said to him:

קלאוד על הדף:

A second attempted proof begins: Shmuel came upon Rav eating with a cloth rather than with washed hands, and challenged him. The amud breaks mid-exchange, with Shmuel’s question posed and Rav’s reply supplied at the top of 107b — a page division that leaves the daf’s central dilemma suspended precisely at its sharpest moment.

Key Terms:

  • אַשְׁכְּחֵיהּ = he found him — the narrative formula introducing an incident observed between Sages

Amud Bet (107b)

Segment 1

TYPE: מעשה

Rav’s reply: he had washed, and used the cloth only out of fastidiousness

Hebrew/Aramaic:

עָבְדִין כְּדֵין? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: דַּעְתִּי קְצָרָה עָלַי.

English Translation:

Do we act in this manner? Rav said to Shmuel: I did wash my hands, but as I am delicate I do not wish to hold food in my bare hands; therefore I covered them with a cloth.

קלאוד על הדף:

Rav’s answer dissolves the apparent proof. He had in fact washed his hands; the cloth was not a substitute but a matter of personal delicacy, since he preferred not to hold food in his bare hands. The incident therefore says nothing about whether a cloth can replace washing, and the dilemma remains open. The exchange also preserves a rare glimpse of a Sage’s private habits and Shmuel’s readiness to challenge what he saw.

Key Terms:

  • דַּעְתִּי קְצָרָה עָלַי = I am delicate — literally my mind is short upon me, an expression of fastidiousness about handling food directly

Segment 2

TYPE: מעשה

Rabbi Zeira rebukes Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi for eating with wineskin scraps

Hebrew/Aramaic:

כִּי סְלֵיק רַבִּי זֵירָא, אַשְׁכְּחִינְהוּ לְרַבִּי אַמֵּי וְרַבִּי אַסִּי דְּקָאָכְלִי בִּבְלָאֵי חֲמָתוֹת. אֲמַר: תְּרֵי גַּבְרֵי רַבְרְבֵי כְּוָותַיְיכוּ, לִיטְעוֹ בִּדְרַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל? הָא ״דַּעְתִּי קְצָרָה״ קָאָמַר!

English Translation:

The Gemara further relates: When Rabbi Zeira left Babylonia for Eretz Yisrael, he found Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi eating bread while covering their hands with worn pieces of wineskins, rather than washing them. Rabbi Zeira said to them: Could two great men such as yourselves err with regard to the incident of Rav and Shmuel related above? After all, Rav said to Shmuel: I am using a cloth because I am delicate; he did wash his hands beforehand.

קלאוד על הדף:

Arriving in Eretz Yisrael, Rabbi Zeira found Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi eating bread with their hands covered by worn pieces of wineskin, and objected that they had misread the Rav-and-Shmuel episode: Rav’s cloth was a fastidiousness on top of washing, not a replacement for it. Rabbi Zeira’s confidence in correcting two established Sages of Eretz Yisrael sets up the Gemara’s own correction of him in the next segment.

Key Terms:

  • בְּלָאֵי חֲמָתוֹת = worn pieces of wineskins, used here as hand coverings while eating
  • סְלֵיק = he went up — the standard term for emigrating from Bavel to Eretz Yisrael

Segment 3

TYPE: תירוץ

Shmuel’s ruling: the cloth was permitted to kohanim eating teruma, and they were kohanim

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אִשְׁתְּמִיטְתֵּיהּ הָא דְּאָמַר רַב תַּחְלִיפָא בַּר אֲבִימִי אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הִתִּירוּ מַפָּה לְאוֹכְלֵי תְרוּמָה, וְלֹא הִתִּירוּ מַפָּה לְאוֹכְלֵי טְהָרוֹת, וְרַבִּי אַמֵּי וְרַבִּי אַסִּי כֹּהֲנִים הֲווֹ.

English Translation:

The Gemara notes: It escaped Rabbi Zeira’s mind that Rav Taḥlifa bar Avimi said that Shmuel said: The Sages permitted the consumption of bread while the hands are wrapped with a cloth rather than washed, specifically to priests who partake of teruma, as they are careful not to touch the bread with their hands. But they did not permit the use of a cloth in this manner to non-priests, even those who are particular to eat non-sacred food in a state of ritual purity, as they do not maintain the same level of diligence as priests. And since Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi were priests, it was permitted for them to eat with a cloth.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara supplies what Rabbi Zeira had overlooked. Rav Tachlifa bar Avimi transmitted in Shmuel’s name that the cloth was permitted specifically to kohanim eating teruma, who can be relied upon not to let their hands touch the bread, and not to others — not even to those who voluntarily eat chullin in purity. Since Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi were kohanim, their practice was correct and Rabbi Zeira’s rebuke misplaced. The resolution answers the amud’s dilemma by making the answer depend on the trustworthiness of the eater rather than on the cloth.

Key Terms:

  • אוֹכְלֵי תְרוּמָה = those who eat teruma, i.e., kohanim, held to be reliably careful
  • אוֹכְלֵי טְהָרוֹת = those who eat ordinary food in ritual purity — a voluntary stringency that does not confer the same presumption of care
  • אִשְׁתְּמִיטְתֵּיהּ = it escaped him — the Gemara’s formula for a Sage overlooking a known tradition

Segment 4

TYPE: בעיא ומעשה

A new dilemma: does one being fed by another need to wash? Rav Hamnuna’s case

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: אוֹכֵל מֵחֲמַת מַאֲכִיל, צָרִיךְ נְטִילַת יָדַיִם אוֹ לָא? תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּרַב הוּנָא בַּר סְחוֹרָה הֲוָה קָאֵי קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב הַמְנוּנָא, בְּלַם לֵיהּ אוּמְצָא וְאָכֵיל. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִי לָאו דְּרַב הַמְנוּנָא אַתְּ, לָא סָפֵינָא לָךְ.

English Translation:

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If one eats by means of another feeding him, without himself touching the food, does he need to wash hands before eating or not? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from the following incident where Rav Huna bar Seḥora was standing before Rav Hamnuna and serving him. Rav Huna bar Seḥora cut a slice of meat for Rav Hamnuna and placed it in his mouth, and he ate it. Rav Huna bar Seḥora said to Rav Hamnuna: Were you not Rav Hamnuna, I would not feed you in this fashion.

קלאוד על הדף:

The sugya turns to a related question: if a person never touches the food because someone else places it in his mouth, must he still wash? A first proof is offered from Rav Huna bar Sechora, who fed Rav Hamnuna a slice of meat directly and remarked that he would not do so for anyone less. The apparent implication is that Rav Hamnuna, being scrupulous, could eat without washing because he would not touch the food.

Key Terms:

  • אוֹכֵל מֵחֲמַת מַאֲכִיל = one who eats by means of another feeding him — the case under discussion
  • אוּמְצָא = a slice or morsel of meat

Segment 5

TYPE: דחייה

The proof is rejected: Rav Hamnuna may simply have washed beforehand

Hebrew/Aramaic:

מַאי טַעְמָא, לָאו מִשּׁוּם דִּזְהִיר וְלָא נָגַע? לָא, דִּזְרִיז קָדֵים וּמָשֵׁי יְדֵיהּ מֵעִיקָּרָא.

English Translation:

The Gemara infers from this episode: What is the reason that it was permitted for Rav Hamnuna to eat in such a manner? Is it not because he was careful not to touch the food with his hands? This indicates that someone may be fed even without washing his hands. The Gemara rejects this: No, one can say that he was vigilant and went ahead and washed his hands at the outset.

קלאוד על הדף:

The inference fails. Rav Hamnuna’s exemption from touching the food does not establish that he had not washed; a scrupulous person may well have washed at the outset regardless. The Gemara’s reading — dizriz kadim umashi yedei me’ikara — reflects a general principle that the conduct of the careful cannot be used to prove a leniency, since their care is precisely what makes their behavior ambiguous.

Key Terms:

  • זָרִיז = vigilant, scrupulous — one who acts promptly and carefully
  • מֵעִיקָּרָא = at the outset, from the beginning

Segment 6

TYPE: ראיה ומימרא

Rav on the attendant: no bread into his mouth unless one knows he washed; plus the blessing dispute

Hebrew/Aramaic:

תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא אָמַר רַב: לֹא יִתֵּן אָדָם פְּרוּסָה לְתוֹךְ פִּיו שֶׁל שַׁמָּשׁ, אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן יוֹדֵעַ בּוֹ שֶׁנָּטַל יָדָיו. וְהַשַּׁמָּשׁ מְבָרֵךְ עַל כׇּל כּוֹס וָכוֹס, וְאֵינוֹ מְבָרֵךְ עַל כׇּל פְּרוּסָה וּפְרוּסָה. וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: מְבָרֵךְ עַל כׇּל פְּרוּסָה וּפְרוּסָה.

English Translation:

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from that which Rabbi Zeira said that Rav said: A person may not place a slice of bread into the mouth of the attendant serving at a meal unless he knows that he has washed his hands. And it was also stated that the attendant recites a blessing over each and every cup of wine presented to him at a meal. This is because he never knows if he will receive another cup, and he cannot intend that his initial blessing apply to a cup he does not know he will receive. But he does not recite a blessing over each and every slice of bread given to him. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says that he must recite a blessing over each and every slice he receives.

קלאוד על הדף:

A further proof is drawn from Rav’s ruling that one may not place bread into the mouth of a shamash, the meal attendant, without knowing he has washed — which suggests that being fed does require washing. The same passage attaches a second, distinct ruling about the shamash’s blessings: he blesses over each cup of wine but, per Rav, not over each slice of bread, while Rabbi Yochanan requires a blessing over each slice. Two independent issues about the attendant are transmitted together and will be untangled in the following segments.

Key Terms:

  • שַׁמָּשׁ = the attendant who serves at a meal
  • פְּרוּסָה = a slice of bread

Segment 7

TYPE: תירוץ

Rav Pappa reconciles Rav and Rabbi Yochanan by whether an important person is present

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: בִּשְׁלָמָא דְּרַב וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לָא קַשְׁיָא, הָא דְּאִיכָּא אָדָם חָשׁוּב, הָא דְּלֵיכָּא אָדָם חָשׁוּב.

English Translation:

Rav Pappa said: Granted, the apparent contradiction between the opinions of Rav and Rabbi Yoḥanan is not difficult; one can resolve it by saying that this statement of Rav, that the attendant need not recite a blessing for every slice of bread, is referring to a case where there is an important person at the meal. Since the attendant is confident that the important person will ensure the attendant receives enough to eat, his initial blessing applies to each slice he receives. And that statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan is referring to a meal where there is no important person. Since the attendant is not confident that he will receive another slice, he must recite a new blessing whenever he does receive one.

קלאוד על הדף:

Rav Pappa resolves the blessing dispute. Where an adam chashuv is at the meal, the attendant is confident that more food will come his way, so his original blessing covers each subsequent slice; where no such person is present, he has no such expectation and must bless anew each time. The resolution turns entirely on the attendant’s state of mind, which is the operative factor in whether an initial blessing can extend to later portions.

Key Terms:

  • אָדָם חָשׁוּב = an important person, whose presence assures the attendant that he will be provided for
  • בִּשְׁלָמָא = granted — introducing the portion of a difficulty that is readily resolved

Segment 8

TYPE: חזרה לקושיא

The original question returns: why must the attendant have washed?

Hebrew/Aramaic:

מִכׇּל מָקוֹם, הָא קָאָמַר: אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁנָּטַל יָדָיו! שָׁאנֵי שַׁמָּשׁ, דִּטְרִיד.

English Translation:

In any case, Rav first says that one should not place a slice into the attendant’s mouth unless he knows that he has washed his hands. This indicates that one who is fed by another must wash his hands. The Gemara responds: The case of an attendant is different, as he is occupied with his duties and may touch the food inadvertently. Therefore, he specifically may not eat without washing his hands.

קלאוד על הדף:

Having settled the blessing dispute, the Gemara returns to what the proof was actually about. Rav did say that one may not feed the attendant unless he knows he washed — so does that not prove that one who is fed must wash? The answer distinguishes the attendant as a special case: he is tarid, preoccupied with serving, and therefore liable to touch food inadvertently. His obligation stems from his distraction, not from the general law of one being fed.

Key Terms:

  • טְרִיד = preoccupied, distracted — the attendant’s condition, which makes inadvertent contact likely
  • שָׁאנֵי = it is different — the formula isolating a case from the general rule

Segment 9

TYPE: ברייתא

A baraita on not giving bread to the attendant, and the prohibition where he has not washed

Hebrew/Aramaic:

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: לֹא יִתֵּן אָדָם פְּרוּסָה לַשַּׁמָּשׁ, בֵּין שֶׁהַכּוֹס בְּיָדוֹ בֵּין שֶׁהַכּוֹס בְּיָדוֹ שֶׁל בַּעַל הַבַּיִת, שֶׁמָּא יֶאֱרַע דְּבַר קַלְקָלָה בַּסְּעוּדָה. וְהַשַּׁמָּשׁ שֶׁלֹּא נָטַל יָדָיו – אָסוּר לִיתֵּן פְּרוּסָה לְתוֹךְ פִּיו.

English Translation:

§ The Sages taught in a baraita: A person who is a guest may not give a slice of bread from the meal in front of him to the attendant serving, whether a cup is in the attendant’s hand or a cup is in the host’s hand, lest a mishap occur at the meal. The host might become angry or distracted by the concern that there will not remain enough food for his guests, and the cup will fall from his hand. If the cup is in the attendant’s hand, he might drop it while accepting food from the guest. And with regard to an attendant who has not washed his hands, it is prohibited to place a slice of bread into his mouth.

קלאוד על הדף:

The baraita adds an unrelated concern about the same figure. A guest should not hand bread to the attendant while a cup is in anyone’s hand, lest a mishap follow — the host may take offense or become distracted and drop the cup, or the attendant may drop his own while receiving. The baraita then restates the rule already cited: where the attendant has not washed, one may not put bread in his mouth. The passage shows the Sages legislating around the social awkwardness of a meal as carefully as around its ritual requirements.

Key Terms:

  • דְּבַר קַלְקָלָה = a mishap or spoiling — here, the social and physical accidents that giving bread to the attendant might cause

Segment 10

TYPE: בעיא

The converse dilemma: does one who feeds another need to wash?

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: מַאֲכִיל, צָרִיךְ נְטִילַת יָדַיִם, אוֹ אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ?

English Translation:

§ A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Does one who feeds another need to wash his hands, since his hands are touching the food? Or perhaps he does not need to wash his hands, as he himself is not eating.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara now inverts the question. The person being fed does not touch the food but does eat it; the person feeding does touch the food but does not eat. Does the obligation to wash attach to eating or to contact with food? Posing the two halves of the pair in sequence lets the Gemara isolate which of the two factors actually generates the requirement.

Key Terms:

  • מַאֲכִיל = one who feeds another — the case now under examination

Segment 11

TYPE: ראיה

A proposed proof from Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and Shammai the Elder on Yom Kippur

Hebrew/Aramaic:

תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּתָנֵי דְּבֵי מְנַשֶּׁה: רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: אִשָּׁה מְדִיחָה אֶת יָדָהּ אַחַת בַּמַּיִם, וְנוֹתֶנֶת פַּת לִבְנָהּ קָטָן. אָמְרוּ עָלָיו עַל שַׁמַּאי הַזָּקֵן שֶׁלֹּא רָצָה לְהַאֲכִיל בְּיָדוֹ אַחַת, וְגָזְרוּ עָלָיו שֶׁיַּאֲכִיל בִּשְׁתֵּי יָדָיו.

English Translation:

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution to the dilemma from that which the school of Menashe taught that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: A woman may rinse one hand in water on Yom Kippur, so that she does not touch food before she has washed her hands in the morning, and give bread to her minor son, without concern about violating the prohibition against bathing on Yom Kippur. They said about Shammai the Elder that he did not want to feed his children with even one hand on Yom Kippur, to avoid having to wash it. But due to concerns about the health and well-being of his children, they decreed that he must feed them with two hands, forcing him to wash both. Apparently one who feeds another must wash his hands, even though he himself is not eating.

קלאוד על הדף:

The school of Menashe taught that a woman may rinse one hand on Yom Kippur in order to give bread to her small child, notwithstanding the day’s prohibition on washing. It is further reported that Shammai the Elder refused to feed his children even with one hand, and the Sages decreed that he must feed them with two — compelling him to wash both. That washing appears to be required of the feeder rather than the eater, which would settle the dilemma affirmatively.

Key Terms:

  • שַׁמַּאי הַזָּקֵן = Shammai the Elder, the tanna whose personal stringency the Sages here override
  • מְדִיחָה אֶת יָדָהּ אַחַת = she rinses one hand — the minimal washing permitted on Yom Kippur for this purpose

Segment 12

TYPE: תירוץ

Abaye: that washing is on account of Shivta, not the law of feeding

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הָתָם מִשּׁוּם שִׁיבְתָּא.

English Translation:

Abaye said: The reason for the washing there is not on account of the food specifically. Rather, it is due to an evil spirit named Shivta, who contaminates hands that have not been washed in the morning. As long as one washes his hands in the morning, perhaps he need not wash them again to feed another.

קלאוד על הדף:

Abaye deflects the proof. The Yom Kippur washing there is not about the food at all but about Shivta, an evil spirit understood to rest on hands not washed in the morning. If the rationale is protection from that danger rather than the halakha of handling food, the case proves nothing about whether a feeder must wash. Reassigning a practice to a different rationale in order to neutralize a proof is a recurring Talmudic maneuver.

Key Terms:

  • שִׁיבְתָּא = Shivta, an evil spirit said to rest upon hands not washed in the morning — a danger-based rather than purity-based rationale

Segment 13

TYPE: מעשה

The young Shmuel is struck by his teacher for feeding without washing

Hebrew/Aramaic:

תָּא שְׁמַע, דַּאֲבוּהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל אַשְׁכְּחֵיהּ לִשְׁמוּאֵל דְּקָא בָכֵי. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אַמַּאי קָא בָכֵית? דְּמַחְיַין רַבַּאי. אַמַּאי? דְּאָמַר לִי: קָא סָפֵית לִבְרַאי וְלָא מְשֵׁית יְדָיךְ. וְאַמַּאי לָא מְשֵׁית? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הוּא אָכֵיל וַאֲנָא מָשֵׁינָא?!

English Translation:

The Gemara further suggests: Come and hear a resolution to the dilemma from the following incident, as Shmuel’s father found the young Shmuel crying, and said to him: Why are you crying? Shmuel replied: Because my teacher struck me. His father asked: Why did he strike you? Shmuel responded: My teacher said to me: You are feeding my son, but you did not wash your hands. His father asked: And why did you not wash your hands? Shmuel said to him: Only he, the teacher’s son, is eating, and I must wash my hands?

קלאוד על הדף:

The dilemma is finally settled by a domestic scene. Shmuel’s father found the boy crying, struck by his teacher for having fed the teacher’s son without washing his hands. Shmuel’s own retort — he is the one eating, and I must wash? — shows the child had already grasped the correct distinction. The Gemara resolves a legal question through the reported reasoning of a child, which is itself a comment on where the truth of the matter lay.

Key Terms:

  • קָא סָפֵית = you are feeding — the teacher’s accusation
  • אֲבוּהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל = Shmuel’s father, an amora in his own right, here vindicating his son against the teacher

Segment 14

TYPE: הלכתא

The ruling: one who is fed must wash; one who feeds need not

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לָא מִיסָּתְיֵיהּ דְּלָא גְּמִיר, מִימְחָא נָמֵי מָחֵי! וְהִלְכְתָא: אוֹכֵל מֵחֲמַת מַאֲכִיל – צָרִיךְ נְטִילַת יָדַיִם, מַאֲכִיל – אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ נְטִילַת יָדַיִם.

English Translation:

Shmuel’s father said to him: Is it not enough that your teacher did not learn the halakha properly, that he even strikes you on account of his error? One who feeds another need not wash his hands if he himself is not eating. The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is that one who eats by means of another feeding him needs to wash his hands, even though he does not touch the food. But one who feeds another does not need to wash his hands.

קלאוד על הדף:

Shmuel’s father declares the teacher doubly at fault — ignorant of the halakha and violent about his error — and the Gemara states the settled law. The obligation follows eating, not contact: one who eats by another’s hand must wash even though he never touches the food, while one who feeds another need not wash even though he does. The formal hilcheta marker signals that both dilemmas raised above are now closed.

Key Terms:

  • וְהִלְכְתָא = and the halakha is — the formula announcing a settled ruling that concludes a discussion
  • לָא מִיסָּתְיֵיהּ דְּלָא גְּמִיר = it is not enough that he did not learn — the rebuke of a teacher who errs and then punishes for his own error

Segment 15

TYPE: משנה

Meat and cheese in one cloth, and two guests at one table

Hebrew/Aramaic:

מַתְנִי׳ צוֹרֵר אָדָם בָּשָׂר וּגְבִינָה בְּמִטְפַּחַת אַחַת, וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יְהוּ נוֹגְעִין זֶה בָּזֶה. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: שְׁנֵי אַכְסְנָאִין אוֹכְלִין עַל שֻׁלְחָן אֶחָד, זֶה בָּשָׂר וְזֶה גְּבִינָה, וְאֵין חוֹשְׁשִׁין.

English Translation:

MISHNA: A person may bind meat and cheese in one cloth, provided that they do not come into contact with each other. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Two unacquainted guests [akhsena’in] may eat together on one table, this one eating meat and that one eating cheese, and they need not be concerned lest they come to violate the prohibition of eating meat and milk by partaking of the food of the other.

קלאוד על הדף:

A new mishna opens the final topic of the perek. One may wrap meat and cheese in a single cloth so long as they do not touch. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel adds that two unacquainted guests may eat at one table, one meat and one cheese, without concern. The mishna moves the treatment of basar bechalav from the substances themselves to the social settings in which they might come together — the cloth and the shared table.

Key Terms:

  • צוֹרֵר = binds or wraps together in a single cloth
  • אַכְסְנָאִין = guests or lodgers, here strangers sharing an inn’s table
  • מִטְפַּחַת = a cloth or wrapper

Segment 16

TYPE: גמרא ותירוץ

Abaye explains why contact matters even between cold foods

Hebrew/Aramaic:

גְּמָ׳ וְכִי נוֹגֵעַ זֶה בָּזֶה, מַאי הָוֵי? צוֹנֵן בְּצוֹנֵן הוּא! אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: נְהִי דִּקְלִיפָה לָא בָּעֵי, הַדָּחָה מִי לָא בָּעֵי?

English Translation:

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that one may bind meat and cheese together in one cloth, provided that they do not come into contact with each other. The Gemara asks: And if they come into contact with each other, what of it? It is a case of one cold food in contact with another cold food, and they would not absorb substances from one another. Abaye said: Granted that cold foods do not require the peeling of the place where they came into contact, as they do not absorb substances from one another. Nevertheless, don’t they require rinsing in water? The Sages therefore decreed against the contact of even cold meat and cheese, lest one come to eat them without rinsing them first.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara objects that cold meat touching cold cheese should be harmless, since neither absorbs from the other. Abaye concedes that no kelipa, peeling away of the surface, is required — but rinsing is. Since contact generates at least that much obligation, the Sages forbade the contact itself lest the foods be eaten without rinsing. The reasoning shows a decree built not on a prohibition but on the risk that a minor requirement will be neglected.

Key Terms:

  • צוֹנֵן בְּצוֹנֵן = cold in contact with cold — a case where no absorption of flavor occurs
  • קְלִיפָה = peeling — removal of the surface layer where absorption has occurred
  • הַדָּחָה = rinsing — the lesser remedy required after mere cold contact

Segment 17

TYPE: מימרא

Shmuel limits the leniency to guests who do not know one another

Hebrew/Aramaic:

רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: שְׁנֵי אַכְסְנָאִין אוֹכְלִין עַל שׁוּלְחָן וְכוּ׳. אָמַר רַב חָנָן בַּר אַמֵּי אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁאֵין מַכִּירִין זֶה אֶת זֶה, אֲבָל מַכִּירִין זֶה אֶת זֶה – אָסוּר.

English Translation:

§ The mishna teaches that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Two guests may eat together on one table, this one eating meat and that one eating cheese. Rav Ḥanan bar Ami says that Shmuel says: They taught this halakha only in a case where the guests do not know each other, as they will not eat of each other’s food. But in a situation where they know each other, it is prohibited for them to eat together at the same table.

קלאוד על הדף:

Rav Chanan bar Ami reports in Shmuel’s name that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s permission applies only to strangers. Acquaintances may not share a table with meat and cheese, because familiarity makes it likely that one will help himself to the other’s food. The line is drawn by social relationship rather than by physical arrangement, which is the distinctive feature of this whole section.

Key Terms:

  • מַכִּירִין זֶה אֶת זֶה = they know one another — the condition under which sharing a table becomes prohibited

Segment 18

TYPE: ברייתא

A baraita corroborates: two travelers from opposite directions at one inn

Hebrew/Aramaic:

תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: שְׁנֵי אַכְסְנָאִים שֶׁנִּתְאָרְחוּ לְפוּנְדָּק אֶחָד, זֶה בָּא מִן הַצָּפוֹן וְזֶה בָּא מִן הַדָּרוֹם, זֶה בָּא בַּחֲתִיכָתוֹ וְזֶה בָּא בִּגְבִינָתוֹ, אוֹכְלִין עַל שֻׁלְחָן אֶחָד, זֶה בָּשָׂר וְזֶה גְּבִינָה, וְאֵין חוֹשְׁשִׁין.

English Translation:

That opinion is also taught in a baraita: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If two guests roomed in one inn, this one coming from the north and that one coming from the south, this one coming with his piece of meat and that one coming with his cheese, they may eat together on one table, this one eating meat and that one cheese, and they need not be concerned.

קלאוד על הדף:

The baraita supplies the paradigm case with vivid particulars — one guest arriving from the north and one from the south, each with his own provisions, meeting at a single inn. Strangers with separately owned food and no social claim on one another may eat at one table without concern. The concrete detail makes plain exactly what kind of separation the leniency presupposes.

Key Terms:

  • פּוּנְדָּק = an inn or wayside lodging
  • חֲתִיכָתוֹ = his piece of meat — emphasizing that each traveler’s food is separately his

Segment 19

TYPE: ברייתא וגמרא

The baraita’s qualification: prohibited in a case resembling one parcel

Hebrew/Aramaic:

וְלֹא אָסְרוּ אֶלָּא בִּתְפִיסָה אַחַת. תְּפִיסָה אַחַת סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ? אֶלָּא כְּעֵין תְּפִיסָה אַחַת.

English Translation:

The baraita adds: And the Sages prohibited this practice only if they both eat from one parcel. The Gemara adds: Can it enter your mind that the baraita is actually referring to a case where they eat from one parcel? This is obviously prohibited. Rather, it prohibits eating even in a manner as though they were eating from one parcel, i.e., when the diners are somewhat acquainted with each other, since neither would mind if the other ate from his food.

קלאוד על הדף:

The baraita’s closing clause forbids the arrangement bitfisa achat, in one holding. The Gemara refuses the literal reading — eating from a single shared parcel is obviously forbidden and would not need stating — and construes it as ke’ein tefisa achat, resembling a single holding: diners familiar enough that neither would object to the other taking his food. Familiarity effectively merges the two portions into one, which is precisely what the mishna’s leniency required be kept apart.

Key Terms:

  • תְּפִיסָה אַחַת = one holding or parcel — here understood as the functional merging of two portions through familiarity
  • סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ = could it enter your mind — the formula rejecting an untenably literal reading

Segment 20

TYPE: בעיא

Rav Yeimar’s question: two brothers who are particular about each other’s food

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב יֵימַר בַּר שֶׁלֶמְיָא לְאַבָּיֵי: שְׁנֵי אַחִין, וּמַקְפִּידִין זֶה עַל זֶה, מַהוּ?

English Translation:

§ It was stated above that if two diners are acquainted with each other they may not eat meat and cheese on the same table. Rav Yeimar bar Shelemya said to Abaye: If these diners are two brothers, but they are each particular not to let one another eat of his food, what is the halakha? May they eat separate dishes of meat and cheese at a single table?

קלאוד על הדף:

Rav Yeimar bar Shelemya presses the edge case. Brothers are the paradigm of familiarity, yet these two are makpidin — each unwilling to let the other take his food. If the operative factor is the absence of sharing rather than the absence of acquaintance, they should be permitted. The question tests whether Shmuel’s criterion is a proxy for the real concern or a rule in its own right.

Key Terms:

  • מַקְפִּידִין זֶה עַל זֶה = they are particular with one another — each objects to the other taking his food

Segment 21

TYPE: תשובה

Abaye answers with the precedent of the Syrian cakes of Baitos

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: יֹאמְרוּ כׇּל הַסְּרִיקִין אֲסוּרִין, וּסְרִיקֵי בַיְיתּוֹס מוּתָּרִין?!

English Translation:

Abaye said to him: Your question evokes that of Baitos ben Zunin. The Sages prohibited the baking of elaborately decorated Syrian cakes for Passover, lest people tarry in their preparation and the cakes become leavened. Baitos wished to prepare the cakes in a way that would not lead to a violation of any prohibition, and yet the Sages prohibited it, because people will say: All the decorated Syrian cakes are forbidden, but the Syrian cakes of Baitos are permitted? Here too, to avoid confusion, we will not allow exceptions to the rule.

קלאוד על הדף:

Abaye refuses the exception by invoking Baitos ben Zunin, who wanted permission to bake decorated Passover cakes in a manner that avoided any risk of leavening. The Sages refused, because people would say: all decorated cakes are forbidden but the cakes of Baitos are permitted. A rule that admits individually justified exceptions ceases to function as a rule, since observers cannot see the justification — only the exception.

Key Terms:

  • סְרִיקִין = decorated Syrian cakes, forbidden before Passover lest their preparation delay and the dough leaven
  • בַּיְיתּוֹס בֶּן זוּנִין = Baitos ben Zunin, whose request for a personal exemption became the standard precedent against case-by-case exceptions

Segment 22

TYPE: קושיא

Rav Yeimar counters with the one-shirt laundering leniency (continues on 108a)

Hebrew/Aramaic:

וּלְטַעְמָיךְ, הָא דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אַסִּי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מִי שֶׁאֵין לוֹ אֶלָּא חָלוּק אֶחָד מוּתָּר לְכַבְּסוֹ בְּחוּלּוֹ שֶׁל מוֹעֵד. יֹאמְרוּ:

English Translation:

Rav Yeimar responded: But according to your reasoning, one may refute that which Rabbi Asi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Although the Sages prohibited laundering on the intermediate days of a Festival, one who has only one shirt is permitted to launder it on the intermediate days of a Festival. Here too, one can claim: People will say metaphorically:

קלאוד על הדף:

Rav Yeimar turns Abaye’s own logic against him. Rabbi Yochanan permitted a man with only one shirt to launder it on chol hamo’ed, despite the general prohibition — an exception granted precisely on individual circumstances, where by Abaye’s reasoning people would equally say that all laundering is forbidden but this man’s is permitted. The daf breaks off with the objection posed and the word yomru left hanging, the reply supplied on 108a.

Key Terms:

  • חוּלּוֹ שֶׁל מוֹעֵד = the intermediate days of a Festival, when laundering is generally prohibited
  • וּלְטַעְמָיךְ = and according to your reasoning — the formula turning an opponent’s own logic against his position


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