Bechorot Daf 35 (בכורות דף ל״ה)

📖 Breakdown

Amud Aleph (35a)

Segment 1

TYPE: גמרא (סוף)

Abaye’s tradition: one who defiled another’s pure food and died — his son is not fined, since the fine was personal

Hebrew/Aramaic:

טִימֵּא טְהָרוֹת וָמֵת — לֹא קָנְסוּ בְּנוֹ אַחֲרָיו. מַאי טַעְמָא? הֶיזֵּק שֶׁאֵינוֹ נִיכָּר לָא שְׁמֵיהּ הֶיזֵּק, קְנָסָא דְּרַבָּנַן — לְדִידֵיהּ קְנַסוּ רַבָּנַן, לִבְרֵיהּ לָא קְנַסוּ רַבָּנַן.

English Translation:

that if one rendered impure the ritually pure items of another and died before paying, the Sages did not penalize his son after his death and require him to pay for the damage. What is the reason for this? The reason is that damage that is not evident, i.e., which does not involve any visible change, is not considered damage by Torah law. There is a penalty imposed by rabbinic law, as the injured party suffered a loss, but the Sages penalized only him; the Sages did not penalize his son.

קלאוד על הדף:

This segment completes the tradition Abaye introduced at the bottom of 34b, offered as a further answer to Rabbi Yirmeya’s question whether a fine imposed on a father passes to his heir. Rendering another’s taharot impure causes no visible physical change, so by Torah law it is not damage at all (heizek she’eino nikar); the obligation to pay is a rabbinic fine. Since the Sages fined the wrongdoer himself, the penalty dies with him and does not fall on his son. By analogy, the prohibition on a firstborn whose ear the father deliberately slit should likewise not bind the son — the fine was aimed at the person, not at his property.

Key Terms:

• טִימֵּא טְהָרוֹת = rendered ritually pure food (of another) impure
• הֶיזֵּק שֶׁאֵינוֹ נִיכָּר = damage that is not evident — no visible physical change; not considered damage by Torah law
• קְנָסָא דְּרַבָּנַן = a rabbinic fine or penalty
• לְדִידֵיהּ קְנַסוּ … לִבְרֵיהּ לָא קְנַסוּ = the Sages fined him personally, they did not fine his son

Segment 2

TYPE: משנה (מעשה)

The Roman quaestor who slit the ear of an old firstborn ram: the first animal permitted, later ones forbidden

Hebrew/Aramaic:

מַתְנִי׳ מַעֲשֶׂה בְּזָכָר שֶׁל רְחֵלִים זָקֵן, וּשְׂעָרוֹ מְדוּלְדָּל, וְרָאָהוּ קַסְטוֹר אֶחָד וְאָמַר: מָה טִיבוֹ שֶׁל זֶה? אָמְרוּ לוֹ: בְּכוֹר הוּא, וְאֵינוֹ נִשְׁחָט אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן הָיָה בּוֹ מוּם. נָטַל (פיגום) [פִּיגְיוֹם] וְצָרַם אׇזְנוֹ, וּבָא מַעֲשֶׂה לִפְנֵי חֲכָמִים וְהִתִּירוּ, וְאַחַר שֶׁהִתִּירוּ הָלַךְ וְצֵירֵם בְּאׇזְנֵי בְכוֹרוֹת אֲחֵרִים וְאָסְרוּ.

English Translation:

MISHNA: There was an incident involving an old ram whose hair was long and dangling, because it was a firstborn offering. And one Roman quaestor [kastor] saw it and said to its owner: What is the status [tivo] of this animal that you allowed it to grow old and you did not slaughter it? They said to him: It is a firstborn offering, and therefore it may be slaughtered only if it has a blemish. The quaestor took a dagger [pigom] and slit its ear. And the incident came before the Sages for a ruling, and they deemed its slaughter permitted. And after the Sages deemed its slaughter permitted, the quaestor went and slit the ears of other firstborn offerings, but in these cases the Sages deemed their slaughter prohibited, despite the fact that they were now blemished.

קלאוד על הדף:

A new mishna illustrates the principle of the previous mishna (34a) that a deliberately inflicted blemish does not permit a firstborn. An old ram with long, matted wool caught the eye of a Roman official, who learned that it could only be slaughtered once blemished and promptly slit its ear with a dagger. The Sages permitted that animal, since the owners had not intended or requested the blemish. But when the quaestor went on to blemish other firstborns, the Sages forbade them — once his habit was known, any blemish he inflicted could no longer be regarded as unintended from the owners’ point of view, and they might come to rely on him.

Key Terms:

• קַסְטוֹר = quaestor, a Roman official
• מָה טִיבוֹ = what is its nature/status?
• פִּיגְיוֹם = a dagger
• צָרַם אׇזְנוֹ = slit its ear — a recognised blemish that permits a firstborn to be slaughtered
• מְדוּלְדָּל = hanging loose, dangling

Segment 3

TYPE: משנה (מעשה וכלל)

Children tie lambs’ tails together and one tail is severed: permitted once, forbidden when imitated; the governing rule

Hebrew/Aramaic:

פַּעַם אַחַת הָיוּ תִּינוֹקוֹת מְשַׂחֲקִין בַּשָּׂדֶה, וְקָשְׁרוּ זַנְבֵי טְלָאִים זֶה בָּזֶה, וְנִפְסְקָה זְנָבוֹ שֶׁל אֶחָד מֵהֶם, וַהֲרֵי הוּא בְּכוֹר, וּבָא מַעֲשֶׂה לִפְנֵי חֲכָמִים וְהִתִּירוּ. רָאוּ שֶׁהִתִּירוּ, הָלְכוּ וְקָשְׁרוּ זַנְבוֹת בְּכוֹרוֹת אֲחֵרִים, וְאָסְרוּ. זֶה הַכְּלָל: כֹּל שֶׁהוּא לְדַעְתּוֹ — אָסוּר, שֶׁלֹּא לְדַעְתּוֹ — מוּתָּר.

English Translation:

One time children were playing in the field and they tied the tails of lambs to each other, and the tail of one of them was severed, and it was a firstborn offering. And the incident came before the Sages for a ruling and they deemed its slaughter permitted. The people who saw that they deemed its slaughter permitted went and tied the tails of other firstborn offerings, and the Sages deemed their slaughter prohibited. This is the principle: With regard to any blemish that is caused intentionally, the animal’s slaughter is prohibited; if the blemish is caused unintentionally, the animal’s slaughter is permitted.

קלאוד על הדף:

The mishna adds a second incident with the same structure: children at play tied lambs’ tails together, one tail tore off, and the lamb turned out to be a firstborn. The Sages permitted it, but when people copied the ‘accident’ deliberately with other firstborns, the Sages forbade those. The mishna then states the general rule: a blemish brought about with the owner’s intent renders the firstborn forbidden, while one that came about without his intent leaves it permitted. The rule focuses on the intent behind the blemish, not on who physically caused it.

Key Terms:

• תִּינוֹקוֹת = children, minors
• זַנְבֵי טְלָאִים = the tails of lambs
• זֶה הַכְּלָל = this is the general principle
• לְדַעְתּוֹ / שֶׁלֹּא לְדַעְתּוֹ = with his intent / without his intent

Segment 4

TYPE: גמרא (צריכותא)

Why both incidents are needed: a gentile will not develop a habit, but a Jewish child might

Hebrew/Aramaic:

גְּמָ׳ פַּעַם אַחֶרֶת הָיָה כּוּ׳. וּצְרִיכָא, דְּאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן גּוֹי — דְּלָא אָתֵי לְמִיסְרַךְ, אֲבָל קָטָן דְּאָתֵי לְמִיסְרַךְ — אֵימָא לָא.

English Translation:

GEMARA: The mishna mentions that one time children were involved in a case in which they unintentionally blemished a firstborn offering whose subsequent slaughter the Sages deemed permitted. The Gemara notes: And although the first clause of the mishna mentions a similar occurrence, the incident involving the children is necessary. As, had the tanna taught us only the incident involving the gentile, it might have been thought that the Sages permitted the slaughter of the firstborn offering only there, as it is not a problem if the gentile will acquire the habit of causing blemishes, because that prohibition does not apply to gentiles. But with regard to a Jewish minor, it is a concern that he is likely to acquire the habit of causing blemishes in firstborn offerings, and therefore one might say that even the first, unintentional time should not be permitted.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara asks why the mishna records two incidents that teach the same rule, and begins its ‘tzerichuta’ (demonstration of necessity). Had we heard only of the gentile quaestor, we might have thought the first animal was permitted because the prohibition of blemishing does not apply to a gentile, so there is no worry about him forming a habit. A Jewish child, however, will grow up bound by the prohibition, and permitting even his first, accidental blemish might teach him that blemishing pays — so we might have forbidden it.

Key Terms:

• וּצְרִיכָא = and it is necessary (to state both cases)
• לְמִיסְרַךְ = to become habituated, to develop a habit
• קָטָן = a minor

Segment 5

TYPE: גמרא (צריכותא)

And the child’s case alone would not suffice: no one confuses a child with an adult, but a gentile adult might be confused with a Jew

Hebrew/Aramaic:

וְאִי אַשְׁמוֹעִינַן קָטָן, מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא אָתֵי לְאִיחַלּוֹפֵי בְּגָדוֹל, אֲבָל גּוֹי דְּאָתֵי לְאִיחַלּוֹפֵי בְּגָדוֹל — אֵימָא לָא. צְרִיכָא.

English Translation:

And had the tanna taught us only the incident involving a minor, it might have been thought that the Sages deemed the firstborn offering permitted only there, since there is no concern that people will come to confuse a minor with an adult. People would not erroneously conclude that it is permitted to cause a blemish on a firstborn offering intentionally merely due to an incident involving a minor. But in the case of a gentile adult, where this is a concern that people would come to confuse him with a Jewish adult, one might say that even the first, unintentional time should not be permitted. It is therefore necessary for the mishna to teach both cases.

קלאוד על הדף:

The second half of the tzerichuta shows the reverse. Had the mishna taught only the children, we might have permitted their accident because nobody would infer from a minor’s act that an adult may blemish a firstborn. A gentile, however, is an adult, and onlookers might confuse his act with that of a Jewish adult and conclude that deliberate blemishing is acceptable. Each case carries a distinct risk, so the mishna needs both to establish that an unintended blemish permits the animal regardless.

Key Terms:

• לְאִיחַלּוֹפֵי = to be confused, mistaken for
• גָּדוֹל = an adult
• צְרִיכָא = it is necessary

Segment 6

TYPE: גמרא (אוקימתא)

Rav Ketina: the quaestor’s first animal is permitted only if the owners said ‘unless it has a blemish’, not ‘unless a blemish is made’

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר רַב קַטִּינָא: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא דַּאֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ ״אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן הָיָה בּוֹ מוּם״, אֲבָל אִם אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ ״אִם נַעֲשָׂה בּוֹ מוּם״ — כְּמַאן דַּאֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ ״זִיל עֲבֵיד בֵּיהּ מוּמָא״ דָּמֵי.

English Translation:

§ The Gemara analyzes the incident involving the Roman quaestor. Rav Ḥisda says that Rav Ketina says: They taught that the firstborn offering is permitted only in a case where the bystanders said to the quaestor: A firstborn offering may not be slaughtered unless it has a blemish, as this is referring to a blemish that develops naturally. But if they said to him that a firstborn offering may be slaughtered only if a blemish was caused to form upon it, which indicates human intervention, it is considered as though they explicitly told him: Go and cause a blemish on it, in which case the animal is prohibited.

קלאוד על הדף:

Rav Chisda in the name of Rav Ketina qualifies the quaestor story according to the precise words the owners used. Saying the firstborn may be slaughtered only ‘if it has a blemish’ describes a natural state, so the quaestor’s act was his own initiative. But saying ‘if a blemish is made in it’ invites human action and is tantamount to telling him to go and blemish it — in which case the blemish is considered to have been brought about with the owners’ intent and the animal is forbidden.

Key Terms:

• אִם הָיָה בּוֹ מוּם = if it had a blemish (a passive, natural description)
• אִם נַעֲשָׂה בּוֹ מוּם = if a blemish was made in it (implying an agent)
• זִיל עֲבֵיד בֵּיהּ מוּמָא = go and make a blemish in it

Segment 7

TYPE: מחלוקת (דחייה)

Rava: both phrasings are passive — ‘was made’ also means it happened by itself; there is no difference

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אָמַר רָבָא: מִכְּדֵי מִמֵּילָא הוּא, מָה לִי ״הָיָה״, מָה לִי ״נַעֲשָׂה״? אֶלָּא ״נַעֲשָׂה״ נָמֵי מִמֵּילָא הוּא, וְלָא שְׁנָא.

English Translation:

The Gemara cites a dissenting opinion. Rava said: Now consider, both expressions in fact indicate that the blemish occurred by itself, as both statements are in the passive. Accordingly, what difference is it to me whether the bystanders used the expression: If it had a blemish, or the expression: A blemish was caused in it? Rather, the expression: Was caused, also indicates that it occurred by itself, and there is no difference between the expressions. In both instances the firstborn offering would be permitted.

קלאוד על הדף:

Rava rejects the distinction. Both ‘had a blemish’ and ‘a blemish was made’ are passive expressions that describe what happened to the animal without implying that anyone should act. Since the owners did not ask anyone to blemish it, either wording leaves the quaestor’s act as his own initiative, and the animal is permitted. The dispute turns on how much linguistic suggestion counts as ‘intent’ — Rav Ketina is sensitive to implicature, while Rava requires something closer to an actual request.

Key Terms:

• מִכְּדֵי = now consider, after all
• מִמֵּילָא = by itself, of its own accord
• וְלָא שְׁנָא = and there is no difference

Segment 8

TYPE: גמרא (ריבוי)

‘This is the rule — anything with intent is forbidden’ comes to include an indirect cause (gerama)

Hebrew/Aramaic:

זֶה הַכְּלָל: כֹּל שֶׁהוּא לְדַעַת — אָסוּר. לְאֵיתוֹיֵי מַאי? לְאֵיתוֹיֵי גְּרָמָא.

English Translation:

The mishna teaches that this is the principle: In the case of any blemish that is caused with his intent, the animal’s slaughter is prohibited. The Gemara explains: What does this principle serve to add? It serves to add an indirect action, i.e., a blemish caused in this manner is also considered an intentional act and the animal may not be slaughtered on its account.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara asks what the mishna’s general rule adds beyond the two stories, since a ‘zeh haklal’ is understood to include further cases. The first clause includes a blemish caused indirectly — for example, placing food where the animal will injure itself reaching for it. Even though the person did not strike the animal directly, an indirect act done in order to cause a blemish counts as intentional and forbids the firstborn. This links back to the discussion of gerama on 34a.

Key Terms:

• לְאֵיתוֹיֵי מַאי = what does it come to include?
• גְּרָמָא = an indirect cause — an act that leads to damage without directly inflicting it

Segment 9

TYPE: גמרא (ריבוי)

‘Without intent — permitted’ comes to include a gentile who learned of the firstborn from someone speaking offhandedly

Hebrew/Aramaic:

שֶׁלֹּא לְדַעַת — לְאֵיתוֹיֵי מֵסִיחַ לְפִי תוּמּוֹ.

English Translation:

The Gemara further inquires: What is added by the phrase in the second part of the principle: If the blemish was caused without his intent, the animal’s slaughter is permitted? This serves to add an instance where a gentile did not inquire about the nature of the firstborn offering, but rather discovered it from one who speaks offhandedly. Although the gentile intentionally caused a blemish in the animal, since the Jew did not intentionally prompt him to cause it, the animal is permitted.

קלאוד על הדף:

The second clause of the rule also adds a case: a gentile who blemished a firstborn after hearing about it from a Jew who was speaking innocently, without any intent to prompt him. Although the gentile acted on purpose, the Jew had no design, so the blemish is ‘without intent’ from the owner’s side and the animal is permitted. The rule is defined throughout by the intent of the Jewish party, not that of the person who physically inflicts the blemish.

Key Terms:

• מֵסִיחַ לְפִי תוּמּוֹ = one who speaks offhandedly, innocently, without ulterior intent
• שֶׁלֹּא לְדַעַת = without (the owner’s) intent

Segment 10

TYPE: משנה

A firstborn that chased its owner and was kicked and blemished may be slaughtered

Hebrew/Aramaic:

מַתְנִי׳ הָיָה בְּכוֹר רֹדְפוֹ, בְּעָטוֹ, וְעָשָׂה בּוֹ מוּם — הֲרֵי זֶה שׁוֹחֲטִין עָלָיו.

English Translation:

MISHNA: If one’s firstborn offering was pursuing him, and he kicked the animal and caused a blemish in it, he may slaughter the animal on account of that blemish.

קלאוד על הדף:

A short mishna applies the principle of intent to self-defence. If a firstborn was chasing a person and he kicked it, injuring it, the blemish may serve as grounds for slaughter. The kick was meant to repel the animal, not to blemish it, so the injury counts as an unintended blemish even though the person acted deliberately.

Key Terms:

• רֹדְפוֹ = pursuing him
• בְּעָטוֹ = he kicked it
• שׁוֹחֲטִין עָלָיו = one may slaughter (the firstborn) on account of it (the blemish)

Segment 11

TYPE: גמרא (אוקימתא וקושיא)

Rav Pappa: only a kick during the chase; afterwards it is forbidden — but that is obvious!

Hebrew/Aramaic:

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁבְּעָטוֹ בִּשְׁעַת רְדִיפָה, אֲבָל לְאַחַר רְדִיפָה — לָא. פְּשִׁיטָא!

English Translation:

GEMARA: Rav Pappa says: They taught that the firstborn offering may be slaughtered only in an instance where he kicked it at the time of its pursuit. But if the individual kicked the animal after its pursuit, it may not be slaughtered, as he intended to cause a blemish in order to render it permitted to be slaughtered. The Gemara raises a difficulty: It is obvious that it is not permitted to slaughter the animal in such a case.

קלאוד על הדף:

Rav Pappa limits the mishna to a kick delivered while the animal was still chasing him. A kick after the chase has ended is no longer self-defence and is presumed to be aimed at producing a blemish, so the animal is forbidden. The Gemara objects that this seems obvious: once the danger has passed, there is no reason for the kick other than the blemish.

Key Terms:

• בִּשְׁעַת רְדִיפָה = at the time of the pursuit
• לְאַחַר רְדִיפָה = after the pursuit
• פְּשִׁיטָא = it is obvious!

Segment 12

TYPE: תירוץ

The ruling is needed lest we think the later kick was an outburst of lingering anger

Hebrew/Aramaic:

מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: צַעְרֵיהּ הוּא דְּמִדְּכַר, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

English Translation:

The Gemara explains: Rav Pappa’s statement is necessary, lest you say that it is in fact permitted to slaughter the firstborn offering since he kicked it after its pursuit only out of anger, as he recalls his distress caused by its pursuit of him, and not in order to render the animal permitted to be slaughtered. Rav Pappa therefore teaches us that it is assumed that he kicked the animal with the express intention of causing a blemish in it, not merely out of anger, and therefore it may not be slaughtered.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara explains what Rav Pappa adds. One might have thought that a kick after the chase is still an emotional reaction — the man remembers the fright the animal gave him and lashes out in anger, with no thought of a blemish. Rav Pappa teaches that we do not assume this; once the pursuit is over, the kick is presumed to have been meant to blemish, and the firstborn is forbidden.

Key Terms:

• צַעְרֵיהּ הוּא דְּמִדְּכַר = he is recalling his distress (and kicks out of anger)
• קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן = it teaches us

Segment 13

TYPE: לישנא אחרינא

Another version of Rav Pappa: even a kick after the chase is permitted, because he is venting his distress

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: לָא תֵּימָא בִּשְׁעַת רְדִיפָה — אִין, אֲבָל שֶׁלֹּא בִּשְׁעַת רְדִיפָה — לָא, אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ לְאַחַר רְדִיפָה נָמֵי. מַאי טַעְמָא? צַעֲרֵיהּ [הוּא] דְּמִדְּכַר.

English Translation:

There are those who say the opposite version of this discussion. Rav Pappa says: Do not say that if the individual kicked the firstborn offering at the time of the pursuit, then yes, it is permitted to slaughter it, but if he kicked it not at the time of the pursuit, it is not permitted to slaughter it. Rather, even if he kicked it after its pursuit of him, it is also permitted. What is the reason? It is assumed that he kicked it after the pursuit not with the intention of causing a blemish, but because he recalls his distress caused by its pursuit of him.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara records a reverse version of Rav Pappa’s statement. In this version he rules that even a kick after the chase is permitted, precisely because we assume the person was venting his anger at what the animal had just done to him. The two versions differ on how to read the man’s state of mind — whether a later kick is presumed calculated or emotional — and the Gemara leaves both versions on record without deciding between them.

Key Terms:

• אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי = there are those who say (an alternative version)
• לָא תֵּימָא = do not say
• אֲפִילּוּ לְאַחַר רְדִיפָה = even after the pursuit

Segment 14

TYPE: מימרא

Rav Yehuda: one may blemish a firstborn before it emerges into the world; Rava on where — kid’s ear, lamb’s lip, or lamb’s ear too

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: מוּתָּר לְהַטִּיל מוּם בִּבְכוֹר קוֹדֶם שֶׁיָּצָא לַאֲוִיר הָעוֹלָם. אָמַר רָבָא: גַּדְיָא בְּאוּדְנֵיהּ, אִימְּרָא בְּשִׂפְוָותֵיהּ. אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: אִימְּרָא נָמֵי בְּאוּדְנֵיהּ, אֵימוֹר דֶּרֶךְ צְדָעָיו נְפַק.

English Translation:

§ Rav Yehuda says: It is permitted to cause a blemish in a firstborn fetus before it emerges into the air of the world, as it obtains its sacred status only when it is born. Applying this ruling, Rava said: In the case of a kid, it is practical to cause a blemish on its ear. Since a kid’s ears are long they emerge from the birth canal prior to the head. With regard to a lamb, whose ears are short and do not appear before the head, it is practical to cause a blemish only on its lip. There are those who say that there is a different version of this statement: In the case of a lamb as well, it is practical to cause a blemish on its ear, as one can say that it emerges from the birth canal through its temples, in which case its ears are visible first.

קלאוד על הדף:

Rav Yehuda rules that one may inflict a blemish on a firstborn before it emerges, because its firstborn sanctity takes effect only at birth. Rava gives the practical application: a kid’s long ears emerge before its head, so one can nick its ear, while a lamb’s short ears do not appear first, so one must blemish its lip. A second version holds that a lamb too can be marked on the ear, since it may emerge temple-first, exposing the ears. The ruling turns the timing of kedushat bechor into a legitimate way to avoid the problem of an unblemished firstborn that can neither be offered nor eaten.

Key Terms:

• קוֹדֶם שֶׁיָּצָא לַאֲוִיר הָעוֹלָם = before it has emerged into the air of the world, i.e., before birth
• גַּדְיָא בְּאוּדְנֵיהּ = a kid — on its ear
• אִימְּרָא בְּשִׂפְוָותֵיהּ = a lamb — on its lips
• צְדָעָיו = its temples (sides of the head)

Segment 15

TYPE: מימרא וקושיא

Rava: a mouth blemish visible only when the animal opens wide to cry out is a blemish — but the mishna already implies it

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אָמַר רָבָא: אָכֵל וְלָא מִיחֲזֵי, פָּעֵי וּמִיחֲזֵי — הָוֵי מוּמָא. מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן? תְּנֵינָא: הַחוּטִין הַחִיצוֹנוֹת — שֶׁנִּפְגְּמוּ וְשֶׁנִּגְמְמוּ, הַפְּנִימִיּוֹת — שֶׁנֶּעֶקְרוּ. מַאי טַעְמָא? לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּכִי פָּעֵי מִיחְזֵי?!

English Translation:

Rava says: In a case where a firstborn has a blemish in its mouth, if, when it eats, the blemish is not visible, but when it opens its mouth wide and cries out, it is visible, this is considered a blemish, rendering the animal fit for slaughter. The Gemara asks: What is this teaching us? We learn this in the mishna (39a) with regard to blemishes that render a firstborn offering fit for slaughter: The external gums that were damaged and lacking or that were scratched, and likewise, the internal gums that were entirely extracted, are considered blemished. What is the reason that if the internal gums were extracted it is considered a blemish? Is it not because when the animal opens its mouth wide and cries out, it is visible? If so, what is the novelty of Rava’s statement?

קלאוד על הדף:

Rava rules that a blemish in the mouth counts even if it is hidden while the animal eats and visible only when it opens its mouth wide to bleat. The Gemara asks what this adds, since the mishna on 39a already lists extracted inner gums as a blemish, and the only reason those could count is that they are visible when the animal opens its mouth. Rava’s ruling would then seem to be implied by the mishna already.

Key Terms:

• פָּעֵי = bleats, cries out (opening its mouth wide)
• מִיחֲזֵי = is visible
• הַחוּטִין הַחִיצוֹנוֹת / הַפְּנִימִיּוֹת = the outer / inner gums
• נִפְגְּמוּ / נִגְמְמוּ / נֶעֶקְרוּ = damaged / scratched or worn down / uprooted

Segment 16

TYPE: תירוץ

Rav Pappa: Rava was explaining the reason behind the mishna, not adding a new law

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: רָבָא נָמֵי טַעְמָא דְמַתְנִיתִין מְפָרֵשׁ, מַאי טַעְמָא נֶעְקְרוּ הָוֵי מוּמָא — מִשּׁוּם דְּכִי פָּעֵי מִיחְזֵי.

English Translation:

Rav Pappa says in response: Rava is not in fact teaching a novel halakha. Rather, he is explaining the reason for the ruling of the mishna: What is the reason that if the internal gums were extracted it is considered a blemish? It is that when the animal opens its mouth wide and cries out, the blemish is visible.

קלאוד על הדף:

Rav Pappa answers that Rava did not claim to add a new law. He was stating the reason behind the mishna’s ruling on the inner gums: they count because they show when the animal opens its mouth. The Gemara often handles an apparently redundant amoraic statement this way, treating it as a commentary on the mishna rather than an independent ruling.

Key Terms:

• טַעְמָא דְמַתְנִיתִין מְפָרֵשׁ = he explains the reason of the mishna

Segment 17

TYPE: משנה

Credibility on blemishes that could be man-made: Israelite shepherds believed, priest-shepherds not; Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and Rabbi Meir

Hebrew/Aramaic:

מַתְנִי׳ כׇּל הַמּוּמִין הָרְאוּיִין לָבֹא בִּידֵי אָדָם, רוֹעֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל נֶאֱמָנִין, רוֹעִים כֹּהֲנִים אֵינָן נֶאֱמָנִין. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: נֶאֱמָן הוּא עַל שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ, וְאֵין נֶאֱמָן עַל שֶׁל עַצְמוֹ. רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: הֶחָשׁוּד עַל הַדֶּבֶר, לֹא דָּנוֹ וְלֹא מְעִידוֹ.

English Translation:

MISHNA: With regard to all the blemishes that are capable of being brought about by a person, Israelite shepherds are deemed credible to testify that the blemishes were not caused intentionally. But priest-shepherds are not deemed credible, as they are the beneficiaries if the firstborn is blemished. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: A priest is deemed credible to testify about the firstborn of another, but is not deemed credible to testify about the firstborn belonging to him. Rabbi Meir says: A priest who is suspect about the matter of causing a blemish may neither adjudicate nor testify in cases involving that matter, even on behalf of another.

קלאוד על הדף:

A new mishna turns from how a blemish arose to who may testify about it. For blemishes that a person could have inflicted, Israelite shepherds are believed when they say it occurred naturally, but priest-shepherds are not, since a blemished firstborn is theirs to eat. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel allows a priest to testify about another priest’s firstborn but not his own. Rabbi Meir extends the principle of the mishna on 30a: one suspect in a matter may neither judge nor testify about it, even for others.

Key Terms:

• הָרְאוּיִין לָבֹא בִּידֵי אָדָם = capable of being brought about by a person (as opposed to blemishes that could only be natural)
• רוֹעֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל / רוֹעִים כֹּהֲנִים = Israelite shepherds / priest-shepherds
• נֶאֱמָנִין = deemed credible
• הֶחָשׁוּד עַל הַדָּבָר לֹא דָּנוֹ וְלֹא מְעִידוֹ = one who is suspect regarding a matter may neither judge it nor testify about it

Segment 18

TYPE: מחלוקת אמוראים

Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar: the first view — ‘Israelite shepherds’ means Israelites employed by a priest; no fear of a mouthful

Hebrew/Aramaic:

גְּמָ׳ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר, חַד אָמַר: ״רוֹעֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל״ בֵּי כֹהֲנִים — נֶאֱמָנִין, לִלְגִימָא לָא חָיְישִׁינַן.

English Translation:

GEMARA: Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Elazar disagree with regard to the meaning of the mishna. One of them says that the case of Israelite shepherds is where the shepherds are in the house of priests, i.e., in the employ of a priest. These shepherds are deemed credible to testify that the blemishes were not caused intentionally, as we are not concerned they are lying for a swallow [lilegima] of the firstborn that their priest employer might give them in exchange.

קלאוד על הדף:

Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar dispute how to read the mishna’s terms, and the Gemara gives the first view in full (the speakers are not identified). On this reading, ‘Israelite shepherds’ are Israelites working for a priest. They are believed, since we do not suspect them of lying about a blemish for the sake of a mouthful of meat their employer might share with them.

Key Terms:

• בֵּי כֹהֲנִים = in the house (employ) of priests
• לְגִימָא = a mouthful, a swallow — a small portion of meat
• לָא חָיְישִׁינַן = we are not concerned

Segment 19

TYPE: גמרא (המשך שיטה א)

Priest-shepherds employed by an Israelite are not believed — he expects the firstborn he tended to be given to him

Hebrew/Aramaic:

רוֹעֵי כֹּהֲנִים בֵּי יִשְׂרָאֵל — אֵין נֶאֱמָנִין, מֵימָר אָמַר: כֵּיוָן דְּקָא טָרַחְנָא בֵּיהּ, לָא שָׁבֵיק לְדִידִי וְיָהֵיב לְאַחֲרִינֵי.

English Translation:

And the case of priest-shepherds is where the shepherds are in the house of an Israelite, i.e., in the latter’s employ. In such a case, the priest-shepherds are not deemed credible to testify that the blemishes were not caused intentionally, as the priest-shepherd can say: Since I have toiled with this firstborn offering, my Israelite employer will not forsake me and give it to another priest. The priest is assumed to be lying, as he has a motive to cause a blemish in the animal.

קלאוד על הדף:

Continuing the first view, ‘priest-shepherds’ are priests working for an Israelite owner. Such a priest is not believed, because he can expect that the owner will give the firstborn he has tended to him rather than to another priest. That gives him a direct motive to blemish the animal so that he can eat it outside the Temple, so his testimony is suspect.

Key Terms:

• טָרַחְנָא בֵּיהּ = I have toiled over it
• לָא שָׁבֵיק לְדִידִי וְיָהֵיב לְאַחֲרִינֵי = he will not pass me over and give it to others

Segment 20

TYPE: גמרא (המשך שיטה א)

And likewise a priest testifying for another priest is not believed, because of reciprocity

Hebrew/Aramaic:

וְהוּא הַדִּין כֹּהֵן לְכֹהֵן, דְּחָיְישִׁינַן לְגוֹמְלִין.

English Translation:

And the same is true in the case of a priest who testifies for the sake of another priest. Although the first priest would not derive benefit from his testimony immediately, he is nevertheless not deemed credible to testify, as we are concerned about reciprocal behavior, i.e., the other priest might later repay the favor and lie on his behalf.

קלאוד על הדף:

The first view adds that the same holds when one priest testifies about another priest’s firstborn. He gains nothing directly, but we fear reciprocity (gomlin): today he vouches for his colleague, and tomorrow the colleague will return the favour. The concern for mutual back-scratching extends the suspicion beyond the priest who personally profits.

Key Terms:

• גּוֹמְלִין = reciprocators — those who return favours to one another
• וְהוּא הַדִּין = and the same law applies

Segment 21

TYPE: גמרא (המשך שיטה א)

On this view, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel dismisses the reciprocity concern; Rabbi Meir comes to state his rule

Hebrew/Aramaic:

וַאֲתָא רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל לְמֵימַר: נֶאֱמָן הוּא עַל שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ, וְאֵינוֹ נֶאֱמָן עַל שֶׁל עַצְמוֹ. וַאֲתָא רַבִּי מֵאִיר לְמֵימַר: הֶחָשׁוּד עַל הַדֶּבֶר לֹא דָּנוֹ וְלֹא מְעִידוֹ.

English Translation:

And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel comes to say that the testimony of a priest in such a case, when he testifies about the firstborn of another priest, is deemed credible, as there is no concern about reciprocal behavior. But he is not deemed credible with regard to his own firstborn. And Rabbi Meir comes to say that a priest, who is suspect about the matter of causing a blemish, may neither adjudicate nor testify in cases involving that matter, even on behalf of another. The difference between the opinion of Rabbi Meir and that of the first tanna will be discussed further on.

קלאוד על הדף:

The first view now places the other two tannaim. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagrees about reciprocity and believes a priest testifying about another priest’s firstborn, though not about his own. Rabbi Meir comes with his broad rule that one suspect in a matter may neither judge nor testify about it. The Gemara notes that what Rabbi Meir adds beyond the first tanna on this reading still needs to be explained — the question taken up on 35b.

Key Terms:

• וַאֲתָא … לְמֵימַר = and (he) comes to say
• עַל שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ / עַל שֶׁל עַצְמוֹ = regarding (the firstborn) of his fellow / regarding his own

Segment 22

TYPE: מחלוקת אמוראים (שיטה ב)

The second view: ‘Israelite shepherds’ means priests working for an Israelite, and they are believed

Hebrew/Aramaic:

וְחַד אָמַר: ״רוֹעֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל״ וְהֵן כֹּהֲנִים — נֶאֱמָנִין,

English Translation:

The Gemara cites the other explanation of the mishna: And the other one of the two amora’im says: The case of Israelite shepherds is where the shepherds are priests in the employ of an Israelite. The mishna is teaching that these shepherds are deemed credible to testify that the blemishes on their employer’s firstborn offering were not caused intentionally, as they are not suspected of lying in order to obtain its meat.

קלאוד על הדף:

The second amora reads the terms the other way: ‘Israelite shepherds’ are shepherds who work for an Israelite, even if they themselves are priests. They are believed, since we do not suspect them of blemishing the animal to obtain its meat. The reason is given at the start of 35b. The segment ends mid-sentence at the amud boundary.

Key Terms:

• וְהֵן כֹּהֲנִים = and they are priests
• רוֹעֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל = shepherds of (i.e., employed by) an Israelite, on this reading

Amud Bet (35b)

Segment 1

TYPE: גמרא (המשך שיטה ב)

The priest-shepherd assumes the owner will give the firstborn to a scholar, not to him; Israelites employed by a priest are not believed

Hebrew/Aramaic:

מֵימָר אָמַר: לָא שָׁבֵיק צוּרְבָּא מֵרַבָּנַן וְיָהֵיב לְדִידִי. ״רוֹעֵי כֹהֲנִים״ וְהֵן יִשְׂרָאֵל — אֵינָן נֶאֱמָנִין, דְּחָיְישִׁינַן לִלְגִימָא.

English Translation:

The reason is that it is assumed that the priest-shepherd would say: My Israelite employer will not forsake a priest who is a Torah scholar and give the blemished animal to me, an unlearned shepherd. The case of priest-shepherds is where the shepherds are Israelites in the employ of a priest. These shepherds are not deemed credible to testify, as we are concerned that they might be lying for a swallow of the firstborn that their priest employer would give them in exchange.

קלאוד על הדף:

This segment completes the second view begun at the end of 35a. A priest working for an Israelite is believed because he does not expect to receive the firstborn: he assumes the owner will give it to a priest who is a Torah scholar rather than to a simple shepherd, so he has no motive to blemish it. ‘Priest-shepherds’ on this reading are Israelites working for a priest, and they are not believed, since we fear they will lie to earn a mouthful of the meat.

Key Terms:

• צוּרְבָּא מֵרַבָּנַן = a young Torah scholar
• לָא שָׁבֵיק … וְיָהֵיב לְדִידִי = he will not pass over (a scholar) and give it to me
• חָיְישִׁינַן לִלְגִימָא = we are concerned about (lying for) a mouthful

Segment 2

TYPE: גמרא (המשך שיטה ב)

All the more so a priest for a priest — both reciprocity and the mouthful; Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and Rabbi Meir on this view

Hebrew/Aramaic:

וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן כֹּהֵן לְכֹהֵן, דְּחָיְישִׁינַן לְגוֹמְלִין, וְחָיְישִׁינַן לִלְגִימָא. וַאֲתָא רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן לְמֵימַר: נֶאֱמָן עַל שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ, וְאֵינוֹ נֶאֱמָן עַל שֶׁל עַצְמוֹ. וַאֲתָא רַבִּי מֵאִיר לְמֵימַר: הֶחָשׁוּד עַל הַדָּבָר, לֹא דָּנוֹ וְלֹא מְעִידוֹ.

English Translation:

And all the more so the testimony of a priest for the sake of another priest is not deemed credible, as we are concerned that the two might engage in reciprocal behavior, and we are concerned that the priest-shepherd might be lying for a swallow of the firstborn offering. And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel comes to say that the priest-shepherd is deemed credible to testify with regard to the firstborn offering of another priest, but is not deemed credible to testify with regard to a firstborn belonging to himself. And Rabbi Meir comes to say that a priest who is suspect about the matter of causing a blemish may neither adjudicate nor testify in cases involving that matter, even on behalf of another.

קלאוד על הדף:

On the second view, a priest who tends another priest’s firstborn is certainly not believed, since both concerns apply: reciprocity between the two priests and the hope of a share of the meat. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel comes to say that a priest is believed about another’s firstborn but not his own, and Rabbi Meir comes to say that one suspect in a matter may neither judge nor testify about it. The structure matches the first view, but the cases to which each tanna responds have been reversed.

Key Terms:

• וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן = and all the more so
• כֹּהֵן לְכֹהֵן = a priest (testifying) for a priest

Segment 3

TYPE: קושיא (פתיחה)

Granted, on the second view Rabbi Meir adds something — even a priest working for an Israelite is not believed

Hebrew/Aramaic:

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: רוֹעֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְהֵן כֹּהֲנִים נֶאֱמָנִין — הַיְינוּ דַּאֲתָא רַבִּי מֵאִיר לְמֵימַר: הֶחָשׁוּד עַל הַדָּבָר לֹא דָּנוֹ וְלֹא מְעִידוֹ.

English Translation:

The Gemara raises a difficulty: Granted, according to the second opinion, i.e., the one who says the first tanna maintains that the case of Israelite shepherds is where the shepherds are priests in the employ of an Israelite, and they are deemed credible to testify, this is the reason that Rabbi Meir comes to disagree and say that a priest who is suspect about the matter of causing a blemish may neither adjudicate nor testify even for the sake of an Israelite employer.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara begins to test both readings against Rabbi Meir’s clause. On the second view, the first tanna believes a priest working for an Israelite, so Rabbi Meir’s statement makes sense as a dissent: a priest is suspect about blemishes and may not testify even in that case. On this reading Rabbi Meir has a clear point of disagreement.

Key Terms:

• בִּשְׁלָמָא = granted, it is understandable
• הַיְינוּ דַּאֲתָא = this is why (he) comes

Segment 4

TYPE: קושיא

But on the first view, the first tanna already disqualifies a priest working for an Israelite — what does Rabbi Meir add?

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: רוֹעֵי כֹהֲנִים בֵּי יִשְׂרָאֵל אֵין נֶאֱמָנִין — מַאי אֲתָא רַבִּי מֵאִיר לְאַשְׁמוֹעִינַן? הַיְינוּ תַּנָּא קַמָּא!

English Translation:

But according to the first opinion, i.e., the one who says that the first tanna maintains that the case of priest-shepherds is where the shepherds are in an Israelite’s house, and they are not deemed credible to testify, what is Rabbi Meir coming to teach us? This is the same opinion as that of the first tanna himself.

קלאוד על הדף:

On the first view, however, the first tanna already disqualifies priests working for an Israelite. Rabbi Meir’s statement would then seem to repeat the first tanna and add nothing. The Gemara must find a practical difference between them on this reading.

Key Terms:

• מַאי אֲתָא … לְאַשְׁמוֹעִינַן = what does he come to teach us?
• הַיְינוּ תַּנָּא קַמָּא = this is (the same as) the first tanna

Segment 5

TYPE: תירוץ (ברייתא)

They differ over Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kefusai: a priest’s firstborn requires two witnesses ‘from the market’

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ דְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קַפּוֹסַאי, דְּתַנְיָא: רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קַפּוֹסַאי אוֹמֵר: בְּכוֹר בֵּי כֹהֵן צָרִיךְ שְׁנַיִם מִן הַשּׁוּק לְהָעִיד עָלָיו.

English Translation:

The Gemara answers: There is a difference between the opinions of the first tanna and Rabbi Meir with regard to a statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kefusai. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kefusai says: If a firstborn animal in the house of a priest developed a blemish, two people from the marketplace, i.e., not from the priest’s household, are required to testify about it that the blemish was not caused deliberately. This unqualified statement indicates that the two people can even be priests, provided that they are not household members.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara answers that the first tanna and Rabbi Meir differ over a baraita of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kefusai: a firstborn in a priest’s house needs two outside witnesses ‘from the market’ to testify that its blemish was not man-made. Since he does not say they must be Israelites, outside witnesses who are priests would qualify. The first tanna agrees with this, while Rabbi Meir, who regards every priest as suspect about blemishes, would disqualify even an unconnected priest.

Key Terms:

• שְׁנַיִם מִן הַשּׁוּק = two (witnesses) from the market — outsiders unconnected to the household
• בְּכוֹר בֵּי כֹהֵן = a firstborn in the house (possession) of a priest
• אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ = there is a (practical) difference between them

Segment 6

TYPE: ברייתא (המשך)

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel: even his son or daughter may testify; Rabbi Yosei: even ten household members may not

Hebrew/Aramaic:

רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: אֲפִילּוּ בְּנוֹ, אֲפִילּוּ בִּתּוֹ. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: אֲפִילּוּ עֲשָׂרָה וְהֵן בְּנֵי בֵיתוֹ אֵין מְעִידִין עָלָיו.

English Translation:

The baraita continues: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even the priest’s son and even his daughter may testify about it. Rabbi Yosei says: Even in a case where there are ten people, if they are members of his household, they may not testify about it. The first tanna of the mishna maintains that only a priest who is a shepherd of the animal in question is not deemed credible to testify, but the testimony of an independent priest is credible. This accords with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kefusai, who allows the testimony of any two independent people, including a priest. Conversely, Rabbi Meir does not deem credible even the testimony of an independent priest, as indicated by his general statement about suspect priests.

קלאוד על הדף:

The baraita continues with two further views on the priest’s household. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that even the priest’s son or daughter may testify, while Rabbi Yosei holds that household members are disqualified even if there are ten of them. The English shows how the baraita resolves the difficulty: the first tanna of the mishna, like Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kefusai, believes any independent priest, whereas Rabbi Meir believes none. The dispute between Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and Rabbi Yosei sets up the halachic ruling later in the daf.

Key Terms:

• אֲפִילּוּ בְּנוֹ, אֲפִילּוּ בִּתּוֹ = even his son, even his daughter
• בְּנֵי בֵיתוֹ = members of his household
• אֲפִילּוּ עֲשָׂרָה = even ten (witnesses)

Segment 7

TYPE: שאלה

Whose view is Rav Ketina’s ruling that a doubtful firstborn in an Israelite’s house needs two outside witnesses?

Hebrew/Aramaic:

כְּמַאן אָזְלָא הָא דְּאָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר רַב קַטִּינָא: סְפֵק בְּכוֹר שֶׁנּוֹלַד בֵּי יִשְׂרָאֵל, צָרִיךְ שְׁנַיִם מִן הַשּׁוּק לְהָעִיד עָלָיו?

English Translation:

The Gemara discusses a related statement: In accordance with whose opinion is that which Rav Ḥisda says that Rav Ketina says: In the case of an animal whose status as a firstborn is uncertain that was born in the house, i.e., in the possession, of an Israelite, e.g., it was uncertain whether the mother had previously given birth, in which case the animal remains in the possession of the Israelite and may be eaten upon developing a blemish, two people from the marketplace are required to testify about it?

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara cites a related ruling of Rav Chisda in the name of Rav Ketina: a safek bechor born in an Israelite’s possession — which stays with the Israelite and may be eaten once blemished — requires two outside witnesses to its blemish. The owner here is an Israelite, not a priest, yet he too gains from a blemish, so the question is which tanna would require outside testimony in this case.

Key Terms:

• סְפֵק בְּכוֹר = an animal of doubtful firstborn status
• כְּמַאן אָזְלָא = in accordance with whom does it go?
• בֵּי יִשְׂרָאֵל = in the house (possession) of an Israelite

Segment 8

TYPE: תשובה

It follows Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kefusai

Hebrew/Aramaic:

כְּמַאן? כְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קַפּוֹסַאי.

English Translation:

In accordance with whose opinion is this statement? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kefusai. Just as he requires two independent people to testify about a firstborn offering in the possession of a priest, as he is suspected of intentionally causing the blemish, so too, he requires two independent people to testify in the case of an uncertain status of a firstborn offering born in the possession of an Israelite.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara answers that the ruling follows Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kefusai. Just as he requires two outside witnesses for a priest’s firstborn because the owner stands to gain from a blemish, Rav Ketina requires the same for a doubtful firstborn in an Israelite’s house, where the Israelite owner likewise gains. The suspicion depends on who benefits, not on priestly status as such.

Key Terms:

• כְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קַפּוֹסַאי = in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kefusai

Segment 9

TYPE: מחלוקת (רב נחמן)

Rav Nachman: the owners themselves may testify — otherwise, on Rabbi Meir’s view, who could testify about maaser beheima?

Hebrew/Aramaic:

רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר: בְּעָלִים מְעִידִין עָלָיו, דְּאִי לָא תֵּימָא הָכִי, מַעֲשֵׂר לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר מִי מֵעִיד עָלָיו?

English Translation:

Rav Naḥman disagrees and says: The Israelite owners themselves may testify about it. As, if you do not say so, but instead maintain that any involved person is suspected of deliberately causing a blemish in his firstborn animal, this poses a difficulty with regard to the halakha of an animal tithe offering, which may also be eaten if it developed a blemish. According to Rabbi Meir, who can testify about it? Rabbi Meir maintains that anyone who is suspect about the matter of causing a blemish on his own behalf may neither adjudicate nor testify in cases involving that matter even on behalf of another. If so, how can anyone, even an Israelite, testify about any blemished animal-tithe offering? It must be that an Israelite is not suspected of deliberately causing blemishes.

קלאוד על הדף:

Rav Nachman disagrees and holds that the Israelite owners may testify about their own doubtful firstborn. He argues that if every interested owner were suspect, then on Rabbi Meir’s view no one could testify about a blemished animal tithe (maaser beheima), which is also eaten by its owner once blemished. Since there must be some way to permit a blemished tithe animal, Israelites cannot be suspected of blemishing their animals.

Key Terms:

• בְּעָלִים מְעִידִין עָלָיו = the owners may testify about it
• מַעֲשֵׂר = here, the animal tithe (maaser beheima), which belongs to the owner and may be eaten when blemished
• מִי מֵעִיד עָלָיו = who can testify about it?

Segment 10

TYPE: דחייה ותיקון

Maaser is different: he could have blemished the whole flock beforehand — rather, the argument is from safek bechor

Hebrew/Aramaic:

מַעֲשֵׂר וַדַּאי מְהֵימַן, דְּאִי בָּעֵי שָׁדֵי בֵּיהּ מוּמָא בְּכוּלֵּיהּ עֶדְרֵיהּ. אֶלָּא סְפֵק בְּכוֹר, לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר מִי מֵעִיד עָלָיו?

English Translation:

The Gemara rejects this claim: With regard to the animal tithe offering, the owner is certainly deemed credible to testify that its blemish occurred naturally, because if he wants, he could legitimately cause a blemish in his entire flock before the obligation to separate tithes came into effect. Rather, this is what Rav Naḥman stated: If an Israelite is not deemed credible to testify about a blemish found on an animal whose status as a firstborn is uncertain, then according to Rabbi Meir, who can testify about it? Both Israelites and priests stand to gain if their animal whose status as a firstborn is uncertain develops a blemish, and therefore no one should be deemed credible to testify about it.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara rejects the proof from maaser. The owner of a tithe animal is believed because he could have legitimately blemished his entire flock before the tithing obligation took effect, so he has no reason to lie now. Rav Nachman’s argument is therefore restated in terms of the doubtful firstborn: on Rabbi Meir’s view, both Israelites and priests gain from its blemish, so who could ever testify about it?

Key Terms:

• מַעֲשֵׂר וַדַּאי מְהֵימַן = regarding maaser, (the owner) is certainly believed
• שָׁדֵי בֵּיהּ מוּמָא בְּכוּלֵּיהּ עֶדְרֵיהּ = he could cast a blemish into his entire flock
• סְפֵק בְּכוֹר = a doubtful firstborn

Segment 11

TYPE: קושיא (מן המשנה)

Could a doubtful firstborn simply have no remedy for Rabbi Meir? No — the mishna (18b) shows Rabbi Meir has it eaten with the priestly gifts

Hebrew/Aramaic:

וְכִי תֵּימָא, הָכִי נָמֵי דְּלֵית לֵיהּ תַּקַּנְתָּא, וְהָתְנַן, שֶׁהָיָה רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: כֹּל שֶׁחֲלִיפָיו בְּיַד כֹּהֵן פָּטוּר מִן הַמַּתָּנוֹת, וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר מְחַיֵּיב!

English Translation:

And if you would say that indeed, according to Rabbi Meir, an animal whose status as a firstborn is uncertain has no remedy that can render it fit for slaughter, as no one is deemed credible to testify about its blemish, this cannot be correct. But didn’t we learn in a mishna (18b) that Rabbi Yosei would say: Any animal whose replacements are in the possession of a priest is exempt from, i.e., not subject to, the mitzva of giving the priestly gifts, and Rabbi Meir deems him obligated to give the gifts? Since Rabbi Meir permits the consumption of an animal whose status as a firstborn is uncertain, evidently he allows testimony about its blemish in such a case.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara rules out the possibility that, on Rabbi Meir’s view, a doubtful firstborn simply has no remedy. The mishna on 18b records a dispute about an animal ‘whose replacement is in the priest’s hands’: Rabbi Yosei exempts it from the priestly gifts and Rabbi Meir requires them. That dispute assumes such a doubtful firstborn is slaughtered and eaten, so even for Rabbi Meir someone must be able to testify to its blemish.

Key Terms:

• כֹּל שֶׁחֲלִיפָיו בְּיַד כֹּהֵן = any (animal) whose replacements are in the priest’s hand
• הַמַּתָּנוֹת = the priestly gifts — the foreleg, jaw and maw given from a slaughtered animal (Devarim 18:3)
• תַּקַּנְתָּא = a remedy, a means of rectification

Segment 12

TYPE: מסקנא

Conclusion: the owners testify — priests are suspect about blemishes, Israelites are not

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אֶלָּא שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: בְּעָלִים מְעִידִין עָלָיו, כֹּהֲנִים הוּא דַּחֲשִׁידִי אַמּוּמֵי, יִשְׂרָאֵל לָא חֲשִׁידִי אַמּוּמֵי.

English Translation:

Rather, learn from this that the Israelite owners may testify about their animals whose status as a firstborn are uncertain, despite the fact that priests may not. The reason is that it is only priests who are suspected of causing blemishes; Israelites are not suspected of causing blemishes.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara concludes in favour of Rav Nachman: Israelite owners may testify about their own doubtful firstborn. The suspicion attaches specifically to priests, who regularly receive firstborns and might be tempted to blemish them; Israelites are not presumed to blemish animals. This reading brings Rabbi Meir’s sweeping rule back within limits and spares the Israelite owner from needing outside witnesses.

Key Terms:

• שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ = learn from this
• חֲשִׁידִי אַמּוּמֵי = suspected of (causing) blemishes

Segment 13

TYPE: מחלוקת אמוראים (פסק)

Rav Nachman: the halacha follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel; Rava: it follows Rabbi Yosei

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אִיתְּמַר: רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, רָבָא אָמַר: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי.

English Translation:

§ It was stated: Rav Naḥman says that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, that a priest is deemed credible to testify about the blemished firstborn animal of another priest, even if he is a household member. Rava says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, that one’s household members are not deemed credible to testify.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara returns to the baraita’s dispute over the priest’s household. Rav Nachman rules like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, that the priest’s children may testify about his firstborn, while Rava rules like Rabbi Yosei, that household members are disqualified however many there are. The rest of the daf tests Rava’s position and then gives the final ruling.

Key Terms:

• אִיתְּמַר = it was stated (an amoraic dispute)
• הֲלָכָה כְּ… = the halacha is in accordance with

Segment 14

TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ

Rava elsewhere accepts household testimony when the owners stood outside — answer: all household members were outside; the shepherd alone testifies

Hebrew/Aramaic:

וּמִי אָמַר רָבָא הָכִי? וְהָאָמַר רָבָא: בְּעָלִים עוֹמְדִים עִמָּנוּ בַּחוּץ, נִכְנַס שָׁלֵם וְיָצָא חָבוּל — מְעִידִין עָלָיו! אֵימָא: כׇּל בְּעָלִים עוֹמְדִים, וְלָא חָיְישִׁינַן.

English Translation:

The Gemara asks: And does Rava actually say this? But doesn’t Rava say: If the priestly owner of a firstborn animal was standing outside with us, and the animal entered the house whole and emerged injured, the household members may testify about it that the blemish was not caused by a person. Evidently, Rava maintains that the members of the priest’s household are deemed credible to testify about the priest’s firstborn. The Gemara answers: One can say that Rava is referring to a case where all the owners, i.e., the household members, are standing outside, while the shepherd alone remains inside. When the firstborn animal emerges injured, the shepherd is deemed credible to testify about the blemish and we are not concerned that he is lying.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara challenges Rava from his own statement elsewhere: if the owners were standing outside with us and the animal went in whole and came out injured, testimony about it is accepted — which seems to accept the household. The Gemara answers that Rava meant that all the household members were outside and only the shepherd remained inside with the animal, so he is the one who testifies. Rava’s ruling therefore says nothing about the household and does not contradict his ruling like Rabbi Yosei.

Key Terms:

• בְּעָלִים עוֹמְדִים עִמָּנוּ בַּחוּץ = the owners are standing outside with us
• נִכְנַס שָׁלֵם וְיָצָא חָבוּל = it entered whole and came out injured
• וְלָא חָיְישִׁינַן = and we are not concerned

Segment 15

TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ; פסק הלכה

Why state it? Lest we suspect the shepherd. Final ruling: like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel — son and daughter, but not the wife

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אִי הָכִי מַאי לְמֵימְרָא? מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: נֵיחוּשׁ לַחֲשָׁדָא, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן. וְהִלְכְתָא כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, וְדַוְקָא בְּנוֹ וּבִתּוֹ, אֲבָל אִשְׁתּוֹ לָא. מַאי טַעְמָא? אִשְׁתּוֹ כְּגוּפוֹ דָּמֵי.

English Translation:

The Gemara asks: If so, that all of the household members were outside, what is the purpose of stating that the shepherd is deemed credible? This ruling is obvious. The Gemara answers: This ruling is necessary lest you say that we should entertain a suspicion that the shepherd himself caused the blemish. Rava therefore teaches us that this is not so, and the shepherd is deemed credible. The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, that a priest’s household members may testify about his blemished firstborn offering. And this applies specifically to his son and daughter, but his wife may not testify. What is the reason? One’s wife is as oneself.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara asks why Rava needed to say this if the owners were all outside, and answers that one might still have suspected the shepherd of injuring the animal for his employer; Rava teaches that he is believed. The Gemara then gives the final ruling: the halacha follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, so a priest’s son and daughter may testify about his firstborn. His wife may not, since ‘a man’s wife is like himself’ (ishto kegufo) — her testimony is treated as his own, and he is disqualified about his own firstborn.

Key Terms:

• נֵיחוּשׁ לַחֲשָׁדָא = let us be concerned about suspicion
• וְהִלְכְתָא = and the halacha is
• אִשְׁתּוֹ כְּגוּפוֹ = his wife is like his own person

Segment 16

TYPE: קושיא

Rav Pappa to Abaye: if, for Rabbi Meir, one suspect in one matter is suspect for the whole Torah, how can priests ever judge? ‘By their word every dispute…’

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא לְאַבָּיֵי: לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר דְּאָמַר הֶחָשׁוּד עַל הַדָּבָר לֹא דָּנוֹ וְלֹא מְעִידוֹ, וְקָאָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר הֶחָשׁוּד לְדָבָר אֶחָד חָשׁוּד לְכׇל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ, כֹּהֲנִים הָכִי נָמֵי דְּלָא דָּיְינִי דִּינָא? וְהָכְתִיב ״וְעַל פִּיהֶם יִהְיֶה כׇּל רִיב וְכׇל נָגַע״!

English Translation:

§ Rav Pappa said to Abaye: According to Rabbi Meir, who says that a priest who is suspect about the matter of causing a blemish may neither adjudicate nor testify in cases involving that matter even on behalf of another, and in addition Rabbi Meir says that one who is suspected of transgressing one matter, i.e., who is known to have committed one transgression, is suspected of transgressing the entire Torah, it should follow that priests should also not be allowed to administer judgment at all. But isn’t it written with regard to the priests: “And according to their word shall every controversy and every stroke be” (Deuteronomy 21:5)?

קלאוד על הדף:

Rav Pappa raises a broader difficulty with Rabbi Meir’s position. Rabbi Meir holds that one suspect in a matter may neither judge nor testify about it, and also (as on 30b) that one suspect in one matter is suspect for the whole Torah. If priests are suspect about blemishes, it would follow that they may not judge at all — yet the Torah says of the priests, ‘and according to their word shall every controversy and every stroke be’ (Devarim 21:5). Abaye’s answer follows on 36a.

Key Terms:

• הֶחָשׁוּד לְדָבָר אֶחָד חָשׁוּד לְכׇל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ = one suspect in one matter is suspect regarding the entire Torah
• רִיב = a controversy, a legal dispute
• נָגַע = a stroke, an affliction; here understood as tzara’at and similar matters, judged by priests

📝 Summary

Overview

Bechorot 35 continues Perek 5, כל פסולי המוקדשין, with two linked questions about a blemished firstborn: whose intent makes a blemish forbidden, and whose word is trusted that a blemish came about naturally. The daf opens by finishing Abaye’s tradition from 34b. One who makes another’s pure food impure and dies leaves no fine for his son, because the fine was aimed at him personally. Two mishnaic incidents follow. In one, a Roman quaestor slit the ear of an old firstborn ram. In the other, children tied lambs’ tails together and one tail tore off. Each time the first animal was permitted and later imitations were forbidden, and the mishna sums up: a blemish made with the owner’s intent forbids the animal, and one made without his intent permits it. The Gemara explains why both stories are needed, what the “rule” adds, and how a kick in self-defence and a blemish made before birth fit the principle. Most of amud bet discusses a new mishna on the credibility of Israelite and priestly shepherds. This leads to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kefusai’s requirement of two outside witnesses, the doubtful firstborn, and the final ruling that a priest’s son and daughter, but not his wife, may testify. The daf ends with Rav Pappa’s challenge to Rabbi Meir, which is answered on 36a.

Amud Aleph Highlights

• The fine is personal: Abaye’s tradition concludes. Damage that is not evident (היזק שאינו ניכר) is not damage by Torah law, so payment for defiling taharot is a rabbinic fine (קנסא דרבנן). The Sages fined the wrongdoer, not his son. This is offered as a further answer to Rabbi Yirmeya’s question on 34b about the son of a man who deliberately slit his firstborn’s ear.
• The quaestor (קסטור): a Roman official admired an old firstborn ram with long, matted wool. He was told that it could be slaughtered only once blemished, so he slit its ear with a dagger (פיגיון). The Sages permitted it. When he went on to blemish other firstborns, they forbade them.
• The children and the lambs’ tails: children tied lambs’ tails together and one tail came off. That lamb, a firstborn, was permitted, but deliberate imitations were forbidden.
• The governing rule (זה הכלל): a blemish made with the owner’s intent (לדעתו) forbids the animal. One made without it (שלא לדעתו) permits it.
• Why both stories are needed (צריכותא): from the quaestor alone we might have said that a gentile, who is not bound by the prohibition on blemishing, will not form a habit (למיסרך), while a Jewish child might. From the children alone we might have said that no one confuses a minor with an adult, while a gentile adult might be confused with a Jew.
• The wording put to the quaestor: Rav Chisda in the name of Rav Ketina permits the animal only if the bystanders said “unless it has a blemish”. “Unless a blemish is made in it” amounts to “go and blemish it”. Rava rejects the distinction: both phrases are passive and describe something that happened by itself (ממילא).
• What the rule adds: the first clause adds an indirect cause (גרמא), which also counts as intentional. The second clause adds a gentile who learned about the firstborn from a Jew speaking offhandedly (מסיח לפי תומו). Because the Jew had no intent, the animal is permitted.
• The kicked firstborn: a mishna permits a firstborn that chased a man and was kicked and blemished. Rav Pappa limits this to a kick during the chase. The Gemara explains why he had to say so: we might have thought a later kick was still anger at the fright. In a second version (איכא דאמרי), Rav Pappa permits even a kick after the chase for exactly that reason. The Gemara records both versions and does not decide between them.
• Blemishing before birth: Rav Yehuda permits blemishing a firstborn before it emerges, since its sanctity begins only at birth. Rava applies this: a kid on its ear, which comes out before the head, and a lamb on its lip. A second version allows the ear of a lamb too, since it may emerge temple first.
• A mouth blemish: Rava rules that a blemish seen only when the animal opens wide to bleat counts as a blemish. The Gemara objects that the mishna on 39a, which counts extracted inner gums, already implies this. Rav Pappa answers that Rava was explaining the reason for the mishna.
• The shepherds mishna: for blemishes that a person could have made, Israelite shepherds are believed and priest-shepherds are not. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel believes a priest about another priest’s firstborn but not his own. Rabbi Meir: one who is suspect in a matter may neither judge nor testify about it.
• Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar: in the first reading, “Israelite shepherds” are Israelites working for a priest. There is no fear that they would lie for a mouthful (לגימא). The priest-shepherds who are not believed are priests working for an Israelite, who expect to be given the animal they tended. A priest testifying for another priest is also suspect, because of reciprocity (גומלין). In the second reading, “Israelite shepherds” are priests working for an Israelite, and they are believed.

Amud Bet Highlights

• The second reading, continued: a priest working for an Israelite assumes that the owner will give the firstborn to a Torah scholar (צורבא מרבנן), not to him. The priest-shepherds who are not believed are Israelites working for a priest, who are suspected of lying for a mouthful. A priest testifying for a priest is suspect on both counts.
• What does Rabbi Meir add? On the second reading his dissent is clear. On the first reading he seems to repeat the first tanna. The answer is that they differ over Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kefusai, who requires two witnesses “from the market” (שנים מן השוק) for a firstborn in a priest’s house. Unrelated priests qualify for him and for the first tanna, but not for Rabbi Meir.
• The baraita continues: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel allows even the priest’s son or daughter to testify. Rabbi Yosei disqualifies household members even if there are ten of them.
• The doubtful firstborn: the ruling of Rav Chisda in the name of Rav Ketina, that a safek bechor in an Israelite’s house needs two outside witnesses, follows Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kefusai. Rav Nachman says the owners themselves may testify. His proof from maaser beheima is rejected, because an owner could have blemished his whole flock before tithing. He restates it from the safek bechor: if Israelites were not believed, then on Rabbi Meir’s view no one could testify about it. Yet the mishna on 18b shows that Rabbi Meir has such an animal eaten. Conclusion: priests are suspect about blemishes (חשידי אמומי) and Israelites are not.
• The halacha on household members: Rav Nachman rules like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, and Rava like Rabbi Yosei. Elsewhere Rava accepts testimony when “the owners stood outside with us”. That case is explained as one where the whole household was outside and the shepherd alone, who is believed, was inside.
• Final ruling: the halacha follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. The priest’s son and daughter may testify, but not his wife, since a man’s wife is like himself (אשתו כגופו).
• Rav Pappa to Abaye: Rabbi Meir holds that one suspect in a matter may not judge it, and that one suspect in one matter is suspect for the whole Torah. If so, how can priests judge at all, when the Torah says “by their word shall every controversy and every stroke be” (Devarim 21:5)? The answer comes on 36a.

Key Disputes

Conclusions

A blemish is judged by the intent of the Jewish owner, not by who physically caused it. Indirect causation with intent forbids the animal. A gentile acting on an offhand remark, a kick in self-defence, and a blemish made before birth are all permitted. The dispute over the bystanders’ wording and the two versions of Rav Pappa on a late kick are left unresolved. On testimony, the Gemara concludes with Rav Nachman that Israelite owners may testify about their own doubtful firstborn, because only priests are suspect about blemishes. The final ruling follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel: a priest’s son and daughter may testify about his firstborn, but his wife may not. Rav Pappa’s challenge from the priests’ judicial role remains open at the end of the amud.

Key Figures

Tannaim: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, Rabbi Meir, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kefusai, Rabbi Yosei, the first tanna

Amoraim: Abaye, Rav Yehuda, Rav Chisda, Rav Ketina, Rava, Rav Pappa, Rabbi Yochanan, Rabbi Elazar, Rav Nachman

One-Line Takeaway

What forbids a blemished firstborn is the owner’s intent, and the suspicion that someone caused the blemish follows whoever stands to gain from it, which is why priests need outside witnesses while Israelite owners may vouch for their own animals.

🎯 ELI5 (Explain Like I’m 5)

The Big Picture 🖼️

Today’s daf is all about blemishes on firstborn animals, and two big questions: Did somebody mean to make that blemish? and Who can we trust to tell us? We meet a Roman official with a dagger, some kids playing a silly game with lambs’ tails, a cow that chases a man, and a whole lot of shepherds whose honesty gets put to the test!

Quick Reminder: Why Blemishes Matter 🐑🔍

The first boy a cow, sheep or goat ever gives birth to is a בכור (bechor, “firstborn”). It belongs to the kohen (the priest). Today, with no Temple, a firstborn can only be eaten if it has a מום (mum, a “blemish,” a real injury like a torn ear or a split lip).

So here’s the temptation: a kohen who gets a firstborn wants it to have a blemish, so he can eat it. And the Sages said: if you deliberately make a blemish on a firstborn, it doesn’t count! You can’t eat it. You’re punished for cheating.

That’s the background for everything on today’s daf.

The Simple Idea 💡: A blemish lets you eat a firstborn, but only if nobody made it on purpose.

Finishing Yesterday’s Question: Does the Punishment Pass to the Son? 👨‍👦

Yesterday’s daf (34b) asked: if a father made a blemish on purpose and got punished, does the punishment pass to his son after the father dies?

Abaye gives a helpful comparison. Imagine someone made his neighbor’s pure food become טמא (tamei, “ritually impure,” so a kohen can’t eat it anymore). The food doesn’t look any different! No crumbs, no stains, nothing. The Torah says damage you can’t see isn’t really “damage.” But the Rabbis made him pay anyway, as a fine.

Now, if that person dies before paying, does his son pay? No! The Rabbis fined him, not his son.

Think of it like… a kid who gets a “no recess” punishment for throwing sand. If he moves to another school, his little brother doesn’t inherit the “no recess”! The punishment was for him.

The Simple Idea 💡: A rabbinic fine sticks to the person who did wrong, not to his children.

The Roman Official and the Old Ram 🗡️🐏

Now a new mishna tells a true story!

There was a very old ram (a boy sheep) with long, shaggy, droopy wool. Why was it so old? Because it was a firstborn, and it had no blemish, so nobody could eat it. It just kept getting older and shaggier!

A Roman official (called a קסטור, quaestor) walked by and asked: “Why didn’t you ever slaughter this animal?”

They told him: “It’s a firstborn. We can only slaughter it if it has a blemish.”

So what did the Roman do? He pulled out a dagger and… slit its ear! Now it had a blemish!

The case came to the Sages. They said: This one is permitted! The owners didn’t ask him to do it. He did it all by himself.

But wait! After that, the Roman went around slitting the ears of other firstborns. And for those, the Sages said: Forbidden! Why? Because now everybody knew what he does. Owners could start “accidentally” telling him about their firstborns!

Think of it like… a friend who surprises you by fixing your broken bike without asking. Great! But if you start leaving your bike broken outside his house every week, it’s not really a “surprise” anymore. You’re using him.

The Simple Idea 💡: The first time was a surprise, so it’s okay. Once everyone knows the Roman’s habit, it’s not a surprise anymore.

The Kids and the Lamb Tails 🧒🐑🐑

The mishna tells a second story, almost the same!

Some children were playing in a field. They thought it would be funny to tie the tails of lambs together. (Not a nice game!) The lambs pulled apart, and one lamb’s tail came off. And that lamb turned out to be a firstborn!

The Sages said: Permitted! The kids didn’t mean to make a firstborn blemish. It was an accident in a game.

But then grown-ups who heard about it went and tied other firstborns’ tails together on purpose, pretending it was the same kind of “accident.” The Sages said: Forbidden!

And then the mishna gives the big rule, called זה הכלל (zeh haklal, “this is the rule”):

The Simple Idea 💡: What matters is whether the owner wanted the blemish to happen.

Why Tell Two Stories? 🤔📖

The Gemara asks a great question: both stories teach the same thing! Why do we need both?

The Gemara explains that each story has a different worry:

• 🗡️ The Roman: He’s not Jewish, so the rule against blemishing firstborns doesn’t apply to him. You might think: “Fine, he won’t make a habit of it in a Jewish way, so let it go.” But a Jewish kid will grow up! If we let his “accident” count, maybe he’ll learn that blemishing works, and do it on purpose when he’s older. So you might have said the kids’ lamb is forbidden. The mishna teaches: No, it’s permitted.
• 🧒 The kids: Nobody watching a little child will think, “Oh, so grown-ups can do that too!” But the Roman is a grown-up. People might mix him up with a Jewish grown-up and think blemishing is allowed. So you might have said the Roman’s ram is forbidden. The mishna teaches: No, it’s permitted too.

Think of it like… a teacher who gives two examples on the board, because each one clears up a different mistake students might make.

The Simple Idea 💡: Each story stops us from making a different mistake, so we need both.

”If It Has a Blemish” vs. “If a Blemish Is Made” 🗣️

Here’s a word puzzle! Rav Ketina says the Roman’s ram was only allowed if the owners said, “We can slaughter it if it has a blemish.” That just describes the animal.

But if they said, “We can slaughter it if a blemish is made in it,” that sounds like a hint: “Hey, somebody go make a blemish!” Then it’s like they asked him to do it, and the ram is forbidden.

Rava disagrees! He says both sentences are just describing things. “A blemish is made” can also mean it just happened by itself. No difference!

Think of it like… saying “It would be nice if the dishes got done” in front of your sister. Is that just a wish, or a sneaky way of asking her to wash them? Rav Ketina says it’s a hint. Rava says it’s just talking.

The Simple Idea 💡: Rav Ketina thinks a hint can count as asking; Rava thinks you have to really ask.

What Else Does “This Is the Rule” Include? ➕

Whenever a mishna says “this is the rule,” the Gemara asks: what extra cases does it add?

• ❌ “On purpose = forbidden” adds an indirect blemish, called גרמא (gerama). For example, putting food somewhere the animal will hurt itself trying to reach it. You didn’t touch the animal, but you set it up. Forbidden!
• ✅ “Not on purpose = permitted” adds a non-Jew who heard about the firstborn from a Jew who was just chatting innocently, with no hidden plan. The non-Jew blemished it, but the Jew didn’t mean for that to happen. Permitted!

Think of it like… knocking over a domino on purpose so it knocks over your brother’s tower. You didn’t touch the tower, but you still did it!

The Simple Idea 💡: Setting up an “accident” counts as on purpose; innocent chatting doesn’t.

The Firstborn That Chased a Man 🐂🏃‍♂️

Another short mishna: a firstborn was chasing a man, and the man kicked it, and it got hurt. Now it has a blemish. Can it be slaughtered?

Yes! The man kicked to protect himself, not to make a blemish.

Rav Pappa adds: that’s only if he kicked it while it was chasing him. If he kicked it after the chase was over? Forbidden! Then it looks like he did it on purpose.

The Gemara asks: isn’t that obvious? It answers: you might have thought he was still angry and remembering how scary it was, so he kicked out of anger. Rav Pappa teaches: no, after the chase, we assume he wanted a blemish.

But wait! There’s another version of what Rav Pappa said. In that version, he says even a kick after the chase is fine, because the man was still upset and just letting out his anger!

Think of it like… a dog jumps on you and you push it away. Totally fair! But if you go back five minutes later and push it again… were you still upset, or were you planning something?

The Simple Idea 💡: Kicking to protect yourself is fine; kicking later is a question of what was in your heart.

A Blemish Before It’s Born?! 🐐👂

Here’s something surprising. Rav Yehuda says you’re allowed to make a blemish on a firstborn before it’s born! Why? Because the animal only becomes holy as a firstborn at the moment it comes out into the world. Before that, it isn’t a “bechor” yet!

So how do you do it? Rava explains:

• 🐐 A baby goat (kid): Its ears are long, so they come out first, even before the head. You can make a little nick in the ear.
• 🐑 A baby sheep (lamb): Its ears are short, so they don’t come out first. You make the mark on its lip instead.

Another version says even a lamb can be marked on the ear, because sometimes it comes out sideways, with the side of its head first, so the ears show.

Think of it like… writing your name on a gift box before you give it away. Once it’s given, it isn’t yours to mark anymore. But beforehand? Go ahead!

The Simple Idea 💡: Before the firstborn is born, it isn’t holy yet, so a blemish made then is allowed.

The Hidden Mouth Blemish 👄

Rava says: if a firstborn has a blemish inside its mouth that you can’t see when it eats, but you can see when it opens wide to bleat (“Baaaa!”), that counts as a blemish.

The Gemara asks: didn’t a mishna already teach that? It says if the inner gums were pulled out, that’s a blemish. And the only way you’d ever see inner gums is when the animal opens wide!

Rav Pappa answers: Rava wasn’t adding a new rule. He was explaining why the mishna’s rule works.

Think of it like… a friend says, “Ice melts because it’s warm out.” He’s not making up a new rule about ice. He’s just explaining the reason!

The Simple Idea 💡: A blemish counts even if you only see it when the animal opens its mouth wide.

Who Can We Trust? The Shepherd Mishna 🧑‍🌾⚖️

Now the big question of the daf: when a firstborn has a blemish that a person could have made, who can tell us, “No, nobody did this, it happened naturally”?

The mishna says:

Think of it like… asking who broke the cookie jar. You’d trust your neighbor’s answer more than the answer of the kid with crumbs on his shirt!

The Simple Idea 💡: If you could gain from the answer, your word isn’t trusted.

Wait, Who Works for Whom? 🔄

Two great teachers, Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar, argue about what the mishna’s words mean.

View 1:

• “Israelite shepherds” = Israelites who work for a kohen. They’re believed. We don’t worry that they’d lie just to get a mouthful of meat (a little share their boss might give them).
• “Kohen shepherds” = kohanim who work for an Israelite. Not believed! The kohen thinks: “I took care of this animal. Surely the owner will give the firstborn to me!” So he has a reason to blemish it.
• And a kohen can’t testify for another kohen either, because of גומלין (gomlin, “returning favors”): today I help you, tomorrow you help me!

View 2: Flip it around!

• “Israelite shepherds” = kohanim who work for an Israelite. They’re believed! Why? The kohen thinks: “The owner will give his firstborn to a kohen who’s a big Torah scholar, not to a plain shepherd like me.” So he has no reason to lie.
• “Kohen shepherds” = Israelites who work for a kohen. Not believed! We do worry they’d lie for a mouthful.
• And a kohen for another kohen? Definitely not, both worries apply!

Think of it like… two kids arguing about what “the team’s helpers” means. Is it the helpers on the team, or the helpers for the team? Same words, different meaning!

The Simple Idea 💡: Both views agree: whoever might get something from a blemish isn’t believed. They just disagree about who that is.

What Does Rabbi Meir Add? 🧐

Uh-oh, a puzzle for View 1! In View 1, the mishna’s first teacher already says kohanim working for Israelites aren’t believed. So what is Rabbi Meir adding?

The Gemara answers with a teaching of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kefusai: a firstborn owned by a kohen needs two witnesses “from the market” (outsiders who have nothing to do with the family) to say the blemish wasn’t made on purpose.

The first teacher says those outside witnesses can be kohanim, as long as they’re strangers. Rabbi Meir says: no kohanim at all! Every kohen is suspected about blemishes.

Then two more opinions about the kohen’s family:

• 👨‍👧 Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel: Even the kohen’s son or daughter can testify!
• 👨‍👩‍👧‍👦 Rabbi Yosei: No one from his house, not even ten of them!

The Simple Idea 💡: Rabbi Meir doesn’t trust any kohen, not even a stranger; others trust a stranger kohen.

The Maybe-Firstborn 🤷🐄

Sometimes we don’t know if an animal is a firstborn. That’s a ספק בכור (safek bechor, “maybe-firstborn”). It stays with its Israelite owner, and if it gets a blemish, he can eat it. So now the Israelite gains from a blemish!

Rav Ketina says: you need two outside witnesses for it, just like Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kefusai said for a kohen’s firstborn.

Rav Nachman says: no! The owners themselves can testify. His proof: if every owner who gains were suspect, then on Rabbi Meir’s view, who could ever testify about a maybe-firstborn? Both kohanim and Israelites would be suspect! And we know from another mishna (on daf 18b) that even Rabbi Meir thinks a maybe-firstborn can be eaten. So somebody must be trusted.

The Gemara concludes: Rav Nachman is right! Kohanim are suspected about blemishes, but regular Israelites are not.

Think of it like… a candy store owner’s kids might sneak candy, because they’re around candy all day. But a regular kid who finds one piece of candy at home? We don’t suspect him of a whole sneaky plan.

The Simple Idea 💡: Kohanim, who get firstborns all the time, are suspected; ordinary Israelites aren’t.

The Final Answer: Son and Daughter, but Not Wife ✅👩

So who wins: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel (family can testify) or Rabbi Yosei (no family at all)?

Rav Nachman says Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. Rava says Rabbi Yosei. The Gemara checks something else Rava said, about owners standing outside while the animal went in healthy and came out hurt. It explains that there, the whole family was outside and only the shepherd was inside, and Rava was teaching that we trust the shepherd.

And the final ruling is: the halacha follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel!

• ✅ The kohen’s son can testify.
• ✅ The kohen’s daughter can testify.
• ❌ The kohen’s wife cannot! Why? אשתו כגופו (ishto kegufo, “his wife is like his own self”). A husband and wife are like one person, and a kohen can’t testify about his own firstborn.

Think of it like… a team captain can’t be the referee for his own team. And his co-captain counts as the same team! But his kids, who play on other teams, can help.

The Simple Idea 💡: A kohen’s children can vouch for his firstborn, but his wife counts as himself.

A Cliffhanger! ⚖️📜

The daf ends with Rav Pappa asking Abaye a tough question. Rabbi Meir says someone suspected in one thing is suspected in everything. So if kohanim are suspected about blemishes, how can kohanim ever be judges? The Torah says about the kohanim: “By their word every argument and every affliction shall be decided” (Devarim 21:5)!

How will Abaye answer? We’ll find out on daf 36!

The Simple Idea 💡: If kohanim are suspect, how can they judge? Stay tuned!

The Super Simple Summary 🎯

• A rabbinic fine belongs to the person who did wrong; it doesn’t pass to his son.
• The Roman official slit a firstborn ram’s ear, and the kids pulled off a lamb’s tail. The first time, it’s permitted (no one meant it). Once people copied it on purpose, it’s forbidden. The rule: on purpose = forbidden, not on purpose = permitted.
• We need both stories, because each one blocks a different mistake. And the rule adds that setting up a blemish (gerama) is forbidden, while a non-Jew who heard from someone chatting innocently is fine.
• Rav Ketina and Rava argue whether “if a blemish is made” is a sneaky hint.
• Kicking a firstborn that’s chasing you is fine. Kicking after the chase: two versions of Rav Pappa.
• You may blemish a firstborn before it’s born: a goat’s ear, a lamb’s lip (or ear).
• A mouth blemish you see only when the animal bleats still counts.
• Who’s believed? Whoever gains from a blemish isn’t. Kohanim are suspected; regular Israelites are not, so they can testify about their own maybe-firstborn.
• Final ruling: like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel: a kohen’s son and daughter may testify about his firstborn, but not his wife, because “his wife is like himself.”

⚖️ Halacha

The Penalty for Blemishing Is Personal: The Son May Slaughter

Source in Daf: 35a, Segment 1 (the end of Abaye’s tradition from 34b: one who renders another’s taharot impure and dies, “his son is not fined,” since the Sages fined him personally; by analogy, a firstborn the father deliberately blemished may be slaughtered by the son on that blemish)

Rambam — Hilchot Bechorot 2:7

Hebrew:

הַמַּטִּיל מוּם בִּבְכוֹר הוֹאִיל וְעָשָׂה עֲבֵרָה קוֹנְסִין אוֹתוֹ וְאֵינוֹ נִשְׁחָט עַל מוּם זֶה עַד שֶׁיִּפּל בּוֹ מוּם אַחֵר מֵאֵלָיו. וְאִם מֵת זֶה הַחוֹטֵא מֻתָּר לִבְנוֹ לְשָׁחֳטוֹ עַל מוּם שֶׁעָשָׂה אָבִיו שֶׁלֹּא קָנְסוּ בְּנוֹ אַחֲרָיו:

English:

When a person imparts a blemish to a firstborn animal, since he performed a transgression, he is penalized. License is not granted to slaughter the firstborn because of this blemish until it contracts another blemish on its own accord. If, however, this transgressor dies, his son may slaughter the animal because of the blemish inflicted by his father, for his son was not penalized after him.

Connection: Rabbi Yirmeya’s question on 34b (“is the son fined?”) is decided here in favour of Abaye’s tradition in Segment 1. The Rambam calls the prohibition a penalty (קונסין אותו), the same category as the Gemara’s “a fine of the Sages” for defiling another’s taharot, and draws the same conclusion: “his son was not penalized after him.” A fine aimed at the sinner does not pass with the property. Note also the cure the Rambam names for the father himself: the animal waits “until it contracts another blemish on its own accord,” and that natural blemish then permits it.

Shulchan Aruch — Yoreh De’ah 313:1

Hebrew:

שלא להטיל מום בבכור. ובו ז’ סעיפים:אסור להטיל מום בבכור אפילו לגרום לו מום כגון ליתן דבילה על גבי אזנו כדי שיטלנה הכלב משם ויקטע אזנו עמה וכיוצא בזה או שאומר לעובד כוכבים להטיל בו מום ואם עשה מום בידים או בגרמתו אין שוחטין אותו על ידו עד שיפול בו מום אחר מעצמו ואם מת אין קונסין בנו אחריו אלא שוחטין אותו על ידו:

English (translation ours; Sefaria has no English for this se’if):

[Siman 313:] Not to inflict a blemish on a firstborn. It contains seven se’ifim. It is forbidden to inflict a blemish on a firstborn, even to cause it a blemish indirectly — for example, to place a cake of pressed figs on its ear so that a dog will take it from there and sever its ear with it, and the like — or to tell a gentile to inflict a blemish on it. If he made a blemish with his own hands or through his indirect causation, we do not slaughter it on account of that blemish until another blemish befalls it of itself. If he died, we do not penalize his son after him; rather, we slaughter it on account of that blemish.

Connection: The Shulchan Aruch places the whole complex of 34a-35a in one se’if: the prohibition itself, its extension to indirect causation (gerama, the subject of Segment 8 below) and to instructing a gentile, the penalty, and Abaye’s ruling for the heir. Because the sanctity of a firstborn kosher animal applies today, in Eretz Yisrael and outside it, this is practical law: an owner who blemishes his firstborn must wait for a second, natural blemish, but his heir need not.

The Quaestor, the Children and the Rule of Intent

Source in Daf: 35a, Segments 2-5 (the mishna: the quaestor who slit the ear of the old ram — the first permitted, the later ones forbidden; the children who tied lambs’ tails — likewise; “this is the rule: anything with his intent is forbidden, without his intent is permitted”; the Gemara’s tzerichuta: a gentile will not form a habit, a child might; a child is not confused with an adult, a gentile might be)

Rambam — Hilchot Bechorot 2:12

Hebrew:

קְטַנִּים שֶׁהִטִּילוּ מוּם בִּבְכוֹר דֶּרֶךְ שְׂחוֹק וְכֵן הַנָּכְרִי שֶׁעָשָׂה לְדַעְתּוֹ הֲרֵי זֶה יִשְׁחֹט עָלָיו. וְאִם עָשׂוּ כְּדֵי לְהַתִּירוֹ לֹא יִשְׁחֹט עָלָיו:

English:

When children caused a firstborn to become blemished through sport and similarly, if a gentile caused a blemish intentionally, the firstborn may be slaughtered because of it. If they did so in order to cause it to be permitted, it may not be slaughtered because of it.

Connection: The Rambam turns the two stories of the mishna into a single rule with two halves. “Children through sport” is the tied tails of Segment 3; “a gentile who did it on his own initiative” (לדעתו — his own mind, not the owner’s) is the quaestor of Segment 2. The phrase “if they did so in order to permit it” explains why the later animals were forbidden: once the quaestor and the imitators knew that the blemish released the animal, their acts were aimed at permitting it, and that intent is attributed to the owners who benefit. By ruling identically for child and gentile, the Rambam reflects the Gemara’s conclusion in Segments 4-5 that each case carries its own risk, and the mishna needed both to show the outcome is the same.

Shulchan Aruch — Yoreh De’ah 313:2

Hebrew:

אם עובד כוכבים או תינוק מטיל בו מום מעצמו אם לא כוון להתירו מותר אפילו אם שאל למה אין שוחטין אותו והשיבו לו לפי תומם שאסור לשחטו עד שיפול בו מום אבל אם כוון להתירו כגון לאחר שרואה שהתירוה ע”י כך עושה כן לאחרים אסור: (ספק אם כוון להתירו או לא אזלינן לקולא) (הגהות מרדכי דחולין) ואם עובד כוכבים מסיח לפי תומו ואומר שהישראל צוהו אסור (ת”ה סי’ קס”ט):

English (translation ours; Sefaria has no English for this se’if):

If a gentile or a child inflicts a blemish on it of his own accord: if he did not intend to permit it, it is permitted — even if he asked why they do not slaughter it and they answered him innocently that it is forbidden to slaughter it until a blemish befalls it. But if he intended to permit it — for example, after he sees that they permitted it by this means, he does the same to others — it is forbidden. (Gloss: In doubt whether he intended to permit it or not, we follow the lenient view [Hagahot Mordechai to Chullin].) And if the gentile, speaking offhandedly, says that the Israelite commanded him, it is forbidden [Terumat HaDeshen 169].

Connection: “After he sees that they permitted it by this means, he does the same to others” is the mishna’s “when they saw that they permitted it, they went and made blemishes in other firstborns” — the quaestor’s second round and the imitators of the children. The Shulchan Aruch also folds in the case the Gemara derives from “without intent — permitted” (Segment 9): the owners answered his question “innocently” (לפי תומם), the very phrase מסיח לפי תומו of the Gemara. The Rema adds two points from later authorities. A genuine doubt about the blemisher’s intent is resolved leniently, since the prohibition is rabbinic. And the Gemara’s tool of the “offhand statement” cuts the other way too: a gentile who mentions, without being questioned, that the Jew told him to do it is believed, and the animal is forbidden.

Shulchan Aruch — Yoreh De’ah 313:3

Hebrew:

אם אמרו לעובדת כוכבים המשרתת בבית יהודי על הבכור שאין לאכלו בלא מום והלכה וחתכה אזנו חשוב לדעת ואין שוחטין אותו עליו מפני שעובדת כוכבים זו כוונה להתירו וגם האומרים לה שאינו נאכל בלא מום כיוונו לכך שתטיל בו מום: הגה מותר ליתן בכור לעובד כוכבים כדי לגדלו ואם הטיל השומר בו מום מותר ולא אמרינן דכוון להתירו אע”פ שיודע שניתר במומו ושהוא בכור (פסקי מהרא”י סי’ קס”ח):

English (translation ours; Sefaria has no English for this se’if):

If they told a gentile woman who serves in a Jew’s house, concerning the firstborn, that it may not be eaten without a blemish, and she went and cut its ear, it is considered “with intent,” and we do not slaughter it on that blemish, because this gentile woman intended to permit it, and those who told her that it is not eaten without a blemish also intended that she should inflict a blemish on it. (Gloss: It is permitted to give a firstborn to a gentile to raise, and if the keeper inflicted a blemish on it, it is permitted, and we do not say that he intended to permit it, even though he knows that it becomes permitted through its blemish and that it is a firstborn [Pesakim of Mahari, 168].)

Connection: This se’if is the practical edge of the debate between Rav Ketina and Rava in Segments 6-7. Rav Ketina held that the owners’ choice of words (“if a blemish is made”) can amount to “go and blemish it”; Rava required something closer to an actual request. The Shulchan Aruch judges by what really happened in the household: telling a servant, unprompted, that the animal cannot be eaten without a blemish is an invitation, and both the servant and the speakers are deemed to have intended the blemish. The Rema’s gloss marks the other boundary: a gentile keeper who knows the law but was not prompted has acted “without the owner’s intent,” like the first act of the quaestor.

Indirect Causation and the Offhand Remark

Source in Daf: 35a, Segments 8-9 (“this is the rule” comes to include: “anything with intent is forbidden” — an indirect cause (gerama); “without intent, permitted” — a gentile who learned of it from someone speaking offhandedly). See also 35a, Segments 6-7 (Rav Ketina and Rava on “if it had a blemish” / “if a blemish was made”)

Rambam — Hilchot Bechorot 2:8

Hebrew:

הִרְגִּיל לַבְּכוֹר שֶׁיִּפּל בּוֹ מוּם כְּגוֹן שֶׁנָּתַן דְּבֵלָה עַל אָזְנוֹ עַד שֶׁבָּא כֶּלֶב וּנְטָלָהּ וְחָתַךְ אָזְנוֹ. אוֹ שֶׁהָלַךְ בֵּין בַּרְזֶל וַעֲשָׁשִׁיּוֹת שֶׁל זְכוּכִית כְּדֵי שֶׁתִּקָּטַע יָדוֹ וְנִקְטְעָה. אוֹ שֶׁאָמַר לְנָכְרִי לְהַטִּיל בּוֹ מוּם. הֲרֵי זֶה לֹא יִשְׁחֹט עָלָיו. זֶה הַכְּלָל כָּל מוּם שֶׁנַּעֲשָׂה לְדַעְתּוֹ אָסוּר לוֹ לִשְׁחֹט עָלָיו וְאִם נַעֲשָׂה שֶׁלֹּא לְדַעְתּוֹ הֲרֵי זֶה שׁוֹחֵט עָלָיו:

English:

If one indirectly caused a firstborn to contract a physical blemish, e.g., one placed a fig on its ear, leaving it there until a dog came and took it and cut off its ear, he caused it to pass through jagged iron and pieces of glass so that its forefoot would be cut off and it was cut off, or he told a gentile to blemish it, the animal should not be slaughtered because of this blemish. This is the general principle: Whenever a blemish was brought about with a person’s knowledge, it is forbidden for him to slaughter it because of this blemish. If it was brought about without his knowledge, it is permitted for him to slaughter it because of this blemish.

Connection: The Rambam places the mishna’s “this is the rule” directly after the cases of gerama, exactly as the Gemara reads it in Segment 8: the first clause of the rule comes “to include an indirect cause.” The fig on the ear and the forced passage through iron and glass are the examples from the baraita on 34a; telling a gentile to blemish it is the opposite of the innocent remark in Segment 9. The Rambam rules that the blemish is forbidden only “for him” (אסור לו) — the penalty is personal, which is why the son may slaughter it (2:7 above).

Rambam — Hilchot Bechorot 2:9

Hebrew:

אָמַר אִלּוּ נָפַל בִּבְכוֹר זֶה מוּם הָיִיתִי שׁוֹחֲטוֹ וְשָׁמַע הַנָּכְרִי וְעָשָׂה בּוֹ מוּם הֲרֵי זֶה שׁוֹחֵט עָלָיו שֶׁהֲרֵי לֹא נַעֲשָׂה בְּדַעְתּוֹ:

English:

If one said: “If this firstborn animal would contract a blemish, I would slaughter it” and a gentile heard and caused it to become blemished, he may slaughter it, because it was not brought about with his knowledge.

Connection: This is the case the Gemara derives from the second clause of the rule (Segment 9): a gentile who acted on an offhand remark. The wording the Rambam puts in the owner’s mouth is telling: “if a blemish would befall (אלו נפל) this firstborn” — a passive description of the animal’s state, the formulation that both Rav Ketina and Rava accept as innocent (Segments 6-7). The Rambam does not record Rav Ketina’s stricter case of “if a blemish were made,” which may reflect Rava’s rejection of the distinction; in any case, the deciding factor is that the owner was talking, not instructing.

Rambam — Hilchot Bechorot 2:10

Hebrew:

רְאִינוּהוּ שֶׁעָשָׂה מַעֲשֶׂה הַמַּרְגִּיל לְהַטִּיל בּוֹ מוּם וְנָפַל בּוֹ מוּם וְאֵין אָנוּ יוֹדְעִין אִם נִתְכַּוֵּן לְמוּם זֶה אוֹ לֹא נִתְכַּוֵּן. הֲרֵי זֶה לֹא יִשְׁחֹט עָלָיו. כֵּיצַד. כְּגוֹן שֶׁנָּתַן לוֹ שְׂעוֹרִים בְּמָקוֹם דָּחוּק מְסֹרָג בְּקוֹצִים וְכֵיוָן שֶׁאָכַל נֶחְלַק שְׂפָתוֹ אֲפִלּוּ הָיָה חָבֵר הֲרֵי זֶה לֹא יִשְׁחֹט עָלָיו. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:

English:

If we saw a person perform a deed that would indirectly cause a firstborn to contract a blemish, it contracted a blemish, but we do not know whether he intended that this blemish be caused, he should not slaughter the firstborn, because of it. What is implied? He placed barley in a narrow place where the walls were studded with thorns, when the firstborn ate the barley, its lip became split. Even if the owner was a Torah sage, he should not slaughter the firstborn because of it. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

Connection: The Breakdown’s example of gerama in Segment 8 — placing food where the animal will injure itself reaching for it — is this case. Where the act itself is the kind that produces a blemish, the Rambam does not inquire into the owner’s private intentions: the act speaks for itself, and “even if he was a chaver” (a scrupulous scholar) he may not slaughter on it. Compare the Rema’s lenient gloss in Yoreh De’ah 313:2 (a doubt about intent is resolved leniently): there the doubt concerns a gentile or a child, and the owner himself did nothing; here the owner himself performed the suspicious act, and the act is treated as evidence of intent.

The Kicked Firstborn: During the Chase and After

Source in Daf: 35a, Segments 10-13 (the mishna: a firstborn that chased a person and was kicked and blemished may be slaughtered; Rav Pappa: only during the chase — “obvious!” — lest you say he recalls his distress; the alternative version: even after the chase, because he recalls his distress)

Rambam — Hilchot Bechorot 2:11

Hebrew:

הָיָה בְּכוֹר רוֹדֵף אֶת הָאָדָם וּבָעֲטוֹ כְּדֵי לְטָרְדוֹ וַאֲפִלּוּ בָּעַט בּוֹ מִפְּנֵי שֶׁרְדָפוֹ מִקֹּדֶם וְנַעֲשָׂה בּוֹ מוּם בִּבְעִיטָה זוֹ הֲרֵי זֶה יִשְׁחַט עָלָיו:

English:

If a firstborn animal was pursuing a person and he kicked it to divert it, or even if he kicked it because it pursued once before, should he have caused a blemish when he kicked it, he may slaughter the firstborn because of it.

Connection: The Gemara left two versions of Rav Pappa’s ruling on record (Segments 11-13). The Rambam rules like the second, lenient version: “even if he kicked it because it had chased him before” — that is, after the pursuit, out of the lingering distress (צעריה הוא דמדכר) that the second version presumes. The choice fits the nature of the prohibition: the penalty for blemishing a firstborn is rabbinic (a קנס), and where the Gemara leaves two versions of a rabbinic ruling, leniency is a natural course. The phrase “to drive it off” (כדי לטרדו) gives the reason for the first case: the kick was aimed at the danger, not at the blemish.

Shulchan Aruch — Yoreh De’ah 313:4

Hebrew:

היה הבכור רודפו ובעט בו ועל ידי כן עשה בו מום מותר לשחטו עליו ואפי’ בעט בו לאחר שניצל ממנו:

English (translation ours; Sefaria has no English for this se’if):

If the firstborn was chasing him and he kicked it, and thereby made a blemish in it, it is permitted to slaughter it on account of that blemish — even if he kicked it after he had escaped from it.

Connection: The Shulchan Aruch states the lenient version even more sharply than the Rambam: “even if he kicked it after he had been saved from it,” the exact case of “after the pursuit” (לאחר רדיפה) in Segment 13. In practice, then, a blemish inflicted in a moment of anger at an animal that had just attacked is treated as unintended, and the firstborn may be slaughtered on it.

Blemishing a Firstborn Before It Emerges

Source in Daf: 35a, Segment 14 (Rav Yehuda: one may inflict a blemish on a firstborn before it emerges into the air of the world; Rava: a kid on its ear, a lamb on its lip; another version: a lamb on its ear too, since it can emerge temple-first)

Rambam — Hilchot Bechorot 2:14

Hebrew:

מֻתָּר לְהַטִּיל מוּם בִּבְכוֹר קֹדֶם שֶׁיֵּצֵא לַאֲוִיר הָעוֹלָם וְיִשְׁחַט עָלָיו. בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים בַּזְּמַן הַזֶּה שֶׁאֵין שָׁם בַּיִת מִפְּנֵי שֶׁסּוֹפוֹ לְהֵאָכֵל בְּמוּמוֹ. אֲבָל בִּזְמַן שֶׁבֵּית הַמִּקְדָּשׁ קַיָּם אָסוּר:

English:

It is permitted to cause a firstborn animal to become blemished before it emerges into the world and the firstborn may be slaughtered as a consequence. When does this apply? When the Temple is not standing. Then leniency is granted, because ultimately the animal will be eaten after it becomes blemished. When, however, the Temple is standing, this is forbidden.

Connection: The opening clause is Rav Yehuda’s statement word for word: “before it emerges into the air of the world” (קודם שיצא לאויר העולם). The Rambam then adds a limit not stated explicitly in Segment 14: the permission applies only “in the present time, when there is no Temple.” The reasoning is the one the Breakdown identifies as the purpose of the ruling: today an unblemished firstborn can neither be offered nor eaten and must wait, sometimes for years, until it is blemished (Hilchot Bechorot 1:10-11), so causing the blemish at the moment of birth only hastens the inevitable. When the Temple stands, an unblemished firstborn is destined for the altar, and blemishing it even before birth would deprive the altar of its offering. The practical details of Rava — kid’s ear, lamb’s lip, or a lamb’s ear if it emerges temple-first — are not codified; they are guidance on how to do it, not separate rulings.

Shulchan Aruch — Yoreh De’ah 313:7

Hebrew:

מותר להטיל מום בבכור בזמן הזה קודם שיצא לאויר העולם:

English (translation ours; Sefaria has no English for this se’if):

It is permitted to inflict a blemish on a firstborn in the present time before it has emerged into the air of the world.

Connection: The Shulchan Aruch codifies Rav Yehuda with the Rambam’s qualifier “in the present time” built into the ruling. This is a live practical option today: since any firstborn kosher animal born to a Jew-owned mother is holy and creates serious difficulties for its owner, the ruling of Segment 14 allows a blemish to be made at the very moment of birth, before kedushat bechor takes hold. (In practice the more common modern solution is to sell a share of the mother to a gentile before the birth, so that no sanctity arises at all; that is a separate topic, rooted in the first perek of the masechet.)

A Mouth Blemish Seen Only When the Animal Cries Out

Source in Daf: 35a, Segments 15-16 (Rava: a blemish in the mouth that is visible only when the animal opens its mouth to bleat is a blemish; the objection from the mishna on 39a, “its inner gums that were uprooted”; Rav Pappa: Rava was explaining the reason of the mishna)

Rambam — Hilchot Issurei Mizbeach 2:3 (excerpt)

Hebrew:

חִטֶּיהָ הַחִיצוֹנוֹת שֶׁנִּקְּבוּ אוֹ שֶׁנִּפְגְּמוּ אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנִּשְׁאַר מִקְצָתָן אוֹ שֶׁנִּגְמְמוּ אִם נֶעֶקְרוּ חִטֶּיהָ הַפְּנִימִיּוֹת שֶׁהֲרֵי בְּעֵת שֶׁפּוֹתַחַת פִּיהָ וְצוֹוַחַת הֵן נִרְאִין חֲסֵרִין:

English (Touger; translator’s notes omitted):

f) If its outer tonsils were perforated; g) their substance was reduced, even though a portion of them remained; h) they shriveled; i) its inner tonsils were removed; [this is considered a blemish], because when it opens its mouths and shriek, it will be seen that they are missing.

Connection: This is Rava’s ruling as Rav Pappa understood it in Segment 16: not a new law but the reason behind the mishna. The Rambam lists the uprooted inner gums (Touger renders חטין as “tonsils”) among the blemishes of a sacrifice and gives exactly Rava’s explanation: “for when it opens its mouth and cries out, they are seen to be missing.” A blemish need not be visible at every moment; it is enough that it shows when the animal behaves naturally. Since the blemishes of a firstborn are the blemishes of any consecrated animal (Hilchot Bechorot 2:1), this ruling applies equally to the firstborn of our daf.

Who Is Believed About a Blemish That Could Be Man-Made

Source in Daf: 35a, Segments 17-22, and 35b, Segments 1-6 (the mishna: for blemishes that could have been made by a person, Israelite shepherds are believed and priest-shepherds are not; Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel: a priest is believed about another’s firstborn but not his own; Rabbi Meir: one suspect in a matter neither judges nor testifies about it; Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar on who the “Israelite” and “priest” shepherds are; the reciprocity concern; Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kefusai’s two witnesses “from the market”)

Rambam — Hilchot Bechorot 2:16

Hebrew:

כָּל הַמּוּמִין הָרְאוּיִין לָבוֹא בִּידֵי אָדָם נֶאֱמָן הָרוֹעֶה עֲלֵיהֶן לוֹמַר מֵאֲלֵיהֶן נָפְלוּ וְלֹא נַעֲשׂוּ בְּכַוָּנָה וְיִשְׁחַט עֲלֵיהֶן. בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים כְּשֶׁהָיָה הָרוֹעֶה יִשְׂרָאֵל וְהַבְּכוֹר בְּיַד הַכֹּהֵן. אֲבָל אִם הָיָה הָרוֹעֶה כֹּהֵן וְהַבְּכוֹר עֲדַיִן הוּא בְּיַד בְּעָלָיו הַיִּשְׂרְאֵלִי. הֲרֵי זֶה אֵינוֹ נֶאֱמָן וְחוֹשְׁדִין אוֹתוֹ שֶׁמָּא הוּא הִטִּיל בּוֹ מוּם כְּדֵי שֶׁיִּתְּנֶנּוּ לוֹ:

English:

A shepherd’s word is accepted when he states that any blemish that could have been caused by human activity came about on its own accord. The animal may be slaughtered because of such blemishes. When does the above apply? When the shepherd was an Israelite and the firstborn animal is in the possession of a priest. If, however, the shepherd was a priest and the firstborn was still in the possession of its Israelite owner, the shepherd’s word is not accepted and we suspect that perhaps he caused it to become blemished so that it would be given to him.

Connection: The Rambam opens with the mishna’s own category, “all blemishes that could come about through a person” (Segment 17), and then adopts the first reading in the dispute of Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar (Segments 18-19). “An Israelite shepherd and the firstborn in the priest’s hand” is the Israelite working for a priest, who is believed because “we are not concerned about a mouthful.” “A priest-shepherd and the firstborn still with its Israelite owner” is the priest who thinks “I have toiled over it, he will not pass me over,” and the Rambam gives the Gemara’s reason almost verbatim: “lest he blemished it so that he would give it to him.” The second reading (35a, Segment 22 and 35b, Segment 1), that the priest-shepherd assumes the owner will prefer a scholar, is not followed.

Rambam — Hilchot Bechorot 2:17

Hebrew:

כֹּהֵן שֶׁהֵעִיד לְכֹהֵן אַחֵר שֶׁמּוּם זֶה מֵאֵלָיו נָפַל נֶאֱמָן וְאֵין חוֹשְׁשִׁין לָהֶן שֶׁמָּא הֵם גּוֹמְלִים זֶה אֶת זֶה. שֶׁכָּל הַכֹּהֲנִים חֲשׁוּדִין לְהַטִּיל מוּם בִּבְכוֹר כְּדֵי לְאָכְלוֹ בַּחוּץ וּלְפִיכָךְ אֵין נֶאֱמָנִין עַל יְדֵי עַצְמָן. אֲבָל חֲבֵרוֹ מֵעִיד לוֹ, שֶׁאֵין אָדָם חוֹטֵא לְאַחֵר. אֲפִלּוּ בָּנָיו וּבְנֵי בֵּיתוֹ שֶׁל כֹּהֵן מְעִידִין לוֹ עַל הַבְּכוֹר אֲבָל לֹא אִשְׁתּוֹ מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהִיא כְּגוּפוֹ:

English:

The word of a priest who testifies on behalf of another priest that a firstborn became blemished on its own accord is accepted. We do not suspect that they are acting in collusion with each other. The rationale is that all of the priests are suspect to cause a blemish to a firstborn so that they can partake of it outside the Temple Courtyard. Therefore their own word is not accepted with regard to their own concerns. A colleague may, however, testify on his behalf, because a person will not transgress on behalf of another. Even a priest’s children and the members of his household may testify with regard to a firstborn on his behalf. His wife may not, however, because she is considered as his own person.

Connection: This single halakha decides every dispute in the second half of the daf. “We do not suspect that they reciprocate” (גומלים זה את זה) rejects the reciprocity concern of the first tanna (35a, Segment 20) and follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel of the mishna (Segment 21). “A colleague testifies for him, for a person does not sin for another” rejects Rabbi Meir and, with him, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kefusai’s demand for two witnesses “from the market” (35b, Segment 5). Finally, “even his sons and the members of his household testify for him, but not his wife, because she is like his own person” is the Gemara’s final ruling in 35b, Segment 15 — “the halacha follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel … his son and daughter, but not his wife” — against Rabbi Yosei and Rava. The Rambam’s “all priests are suspect” preserves the starting premise of the conclusion in 35b, Segment 12: the suspicion is real, but it attaches to a priest’s own firstborn only.

Shulchan Aruch — Yoreh De’ah 314:1

Hebrew:

מי נאמן על הטלת מום בבכור. ובו י”א סעיפים:הכהנים חשודים להטיל מום בבכור אפי’ אם הוא חכם ויושב בישיבה אם עשה דבר שנראה כמערים כגון שנתן לבכור שעורים בסל בענין שכשיבא לאכלם יפגם שפתו או כיוצא בזה אין לשחטו על אותו המום. (ולפיכך כל מום שראוי לבא בידי אדם אין שוחטין אותו עליו עד שיעידו שמעצמו נפל בו) (טור):

English (translation ours; Sefaria has no English for this se’if):

[Siman 314:] Who is believed regarding the inflicting of a blemish on a firstborn. It contains eleven se’ifim. Priests are suspect of inflicting a blemish on a firstborn. Even if he is a scholar who sits in the yeshiva, if he did something that looks like a ruse — for example, he gave the firstborn barley in a basket in such a way that when it comes to eat them its lip will be split, or the like — one may not slaughter it on that blemish. (Gloss: Therefore, for any blemish that could come about through a person, we do not slaughter it on that blemish until they testify that it befell it of itself [Tur].)

Connection: The opening words, “priests are suspect,” are the conclusion of 35b, Segment 12. The gloss from the Tur sets up the whole system of the mishna in Segment 17: a blemish that could be man-made is not relied upon without testimony that it occurred naturally, which is why the question of who may testify matters at all. The barley case is the gerama of Segment 8, here used to show that even a scholar’s suspicious act is not excused.

Shulchan Aruch — Yoreh De’ah 314:2

Hebrew:

כל המומין הראוים לבא בידי אדם נאמן הרועה עליהם לומר מאליהם נפלו ולא נעשו בכונה וישחט עליהם במה דברים אמורים כשהיה הרועה ישראל והבכור ביד הכהן אבל אם היה הרועה כהן והבכור עדיין הוא ביד בעליו הישראל הרי זה אינו נאמן וחושדין אותו שמא הוא הטיל בו כדי שיתננו לו (וי”א דרועה כהן נאמן על בכור של ישראל ויש להקל) (טור בשם הרא”ש והרמב”ן):

English (translation ours; Sefaria has no English for this se’if):

For all blemishes that could come about through a person, the shepherd is believed to say that they befell of themselves and were not made deliberately, and one may slaughter on them. When does this apply? When the shepherd was an Israelite and the firstborn was in the priest’s hand. But if the shepherd was a priest and the firstborn was still in the hand of its Israelite owner, he is not believed, and we suspect him lest he inflicted it so that he [the owner] would give it to him. (Gloss: And some say that a priest-shepherd is believed about an Israelite’s firstborn, and one may be lenient [Tur in the name of the Rosh and the Ramban].)

Connection: The Shulchan Aruch copies the Rambam’s ruling, the first reading of Segments 18-19. The Rema, however, records the opposite opinion of the Rosh and Ramban and rules leniently: a priest working for an Israelite is believed. That is the second reading of the Gemara (35a, Segment 22; 35b, Segment 1) — the priest-shepherd does not expect the animal, since the owner will give it to a priest who is a Torah scholar. The dispute among the Rishonim thus reproduces the dispute of Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar, which the Gemara itself never decides; Ashkenazi practice, following the Rema, adopts the lenient reading.

Shulchan Aruch — Yoreh De’ah 314:3-4

Hebrew:

כהן שהעיד לכהן אחר שמום זה מאליו נפל נאמן ואין חוששין להם שמא הם גומלים זה את זה:

אפי’ בניו ובני ביתו של כהן מעידין לו על הבכור אבל לא אשתו מפני שהיא כגופו:

English (translation ours; Sefaria has no English for these se’ifim):

A priest who testified for another priest that this blemish befell of itself is believed, and we do not suspect them lest they reciprocate with one another.

Even his sons and the members of the household of a priest may testify for him regarding the firstborn, but not his wife, because she is like his own person.

Connection: The Shulchan Aruch splits Rambam 2:17 into two se’ifim and keeps both rulings: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel of the mishna, against the reciprocity concern of 35a, Segment 20; and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel of the baraita, as decided in 35b, Segment 15 — son and daughter, not wife (ishto kegufo). This is the halacha in practice whenever a priest today owns a blemished firstborn and the blemish could have been man-made.

”One Suspect in a Matter Neither Judges Nor Testifies” — Rejected

Source in Daf: 35a, Segment 17 and 35b, Segments 3-5 and 16 (Rabbi Meir: “one who is suspect regarding a matter may neither judge it nor testify about it”; what Rabbi Meir adds; Rav Pappa’s challenge: how can priests ever judge?)

Rambam — Hilchot Edut 11:7-8

Hebrew:

עֵד אֶחָד נֶאֱמָן בְּאִסּוּרִין אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהוּא פָּסוּל לִשְׁאָר עֵדוּיוֹת. שֶׁהֲרֵי רָשָׁע בַּעֲבֵרָה שֶׁשָּׁחַט שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה וְנֶאֱמָן לוֹמַר כַּהֲלָכָה שָׁחַטְתִּי. אֲבָל הֶחָשׁוּד עַל דָּבָר אֵינוֹ נֶאֱמָן עַל שֶׁלּוֹ אֲבָל נֶאֱמָן הוּא עַל אֲחֵרִים:

לְפִיכָךְ הֶחָשׁוּד עַל דָּבָר יֵשׁ לוֹ לָדוּן בּוֹ וּלְהָעִיד בּוֹ לַאֲחֵרִים. חֲזָקָה אֵין אָדָם חוֹטֵא כְּדֵי שֶׁיֵּהָנוּ אֲחֵרִים. כֵּיצַד. נֶאֱמָן עַם הָאָרֶץ לוֹמַר פֵּרוֹת פְּלוֹנִי מְתֻקָּנִים הֵם. וְנֶאֱמָן הַנֶּחְשָׁד לִמְכֹּר בְּשַׂר בְּכוֹר לוֹמַר בָּשָׂר זֶה שֶׁמּוֹכֵר פְּלוֹנִי חֻלִּין הוּא. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה מִשְּׁאָר הָאִסּוּרִין. לְפִי שֶׁאֵימַת הָאִסּוּרִים עַל הָרְשָׁעִים וְאֵין אֵימַת הַמָּמוֹן עֲלֵיהֶן:

English:

The testimony of one witness is acceptable with regard to the Torah’s prohibitions, even though his testimony is not accepted with regard to other matters. This is evident from the fact that when a wicked person known to transgress slaughters an animal, his slaughter is acceptable. We accept his word when he says: “I slaughtered it according to law.” When, however, a person is suspected of violating a particular prohibition frequently, his word is not accepted with regard to his own matters. His word is accepted, however, with regard to others.

For this reason, a person suspected of violating a particular prohibition may serve as a judge and as a witness for others. We operate under the assumption that a person will not transgress so that others will benefit. What is implied? The word of an unlearned person is accepted if he states: “The produce of so-and-so has been tithed.” Similarly, the word of a person who is suspected of selling the meat of a firstborn is accepted if he states: “The meat which so-and-so is selling is ordinary meat.” Similar principles apply with regard to other prohibitions. For the wicked fear the Torah’s prohibitions, but they do not fear causing others monetary loss.

Connection: “The one suspect in a matter may judge it and testify about it for others” is the exact negation of Rabbi Meir’s “לא דנו ולא מעידו” in the mishna of Segment 17 (and of 30a). The Rambam rules with the Sages and gives the same reason he gives for priests in Hilchot Bechorot 2:17: “a person does not sin so that others will benefit.” His own example — one suspected of selling firstborn meat may vouch for another’s meat — is drawn from the world of our perek. This also removes Rav Pappa’s difficulty in 35b, Segment 16: the problem of priests serving as judges arises only on Rabbi Meir’s view, which the halacha does not follow.

A Doubtful Firstborn in an Israelite’s Hands: The Owner Is Believed

Source in Daf: 35b, Segments 7-12 (Rav Ketina: a safek bechor in an Israelite’s house needs two outside witnesses, following Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kefusai; Rav Nachman: the owners testify — otherwise who could testify on maaser, or on a safek bechor, for Rabbi Meir?; the conclusion: priests are suspect about blemishes, Israelites are not)

Rambam — Hilchot Bechorot 5:7

Hebrew:

לֹא נֶחְשְׁדוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל עַל הַבְּכוֹרוֹת לְפִיכָךְ נֶאֱמָן הַיִּשְׂרָאֵל לוֹמַר זֶה סְפֵק בְּכוֹר הוּא וְרוֹאִין לוֹ מוּמוֹ וְאוֹכֵל אוֹתוֹ בְּמוּמוֹ:

English:

Israelites are not suspect to cause blemishes to firstborn animals. Therefore the word of an Israelite is accepted if he states: “This is a firstborn of doubtful status.” We inspect the blemish and permit him to partake of the animal if it is blemished.

Connection: The opening words, “Israelites were not suspected regarding firstborns” (לא נחשדו ישראל על הבכורות), are the Gemara’s conclusion in Segment 12 nearly verbatim. The Rambam follows Rav Nachman against Rav Ketina: the Israelite owner of a safek bechor, which stays with him and is eaten once blemished, needs no outside witnesses. He is examined by an expert for the blemish itself, but his account of how it occurred is believed.

Shulchan Aruch — Yoreh De’ah 314:10

Hebrew:

ישראל לא נחשדו על הבכורות אפילו שלהם לפיכך ישראל שיש לו ספק בכור שנאכל במומו לבעלים נאמן לומר שנפל בו מום מעצמו:

English (translation ours; Sefaria has no English for this se’if):

Israelites were not suspected regarding firstborns, even their own. Therefore an Israelite who has a doubtful firstborn, which is eaten in its blemished state by its owners, is believed to say that a blemish befell it of itself.

Connection: The Shulchan Aruch makes explicit what the Rambam implies: “even their own” — the case of Segments 7-12, where the Israelite owner himself benefits from the blemish. It also states the precise content of his credibility: he is believed “to say that a blemish befell it of itself,” the question on which Rav Ketina required two witnesses from the market. The Gemara’s argument from the mishna on 18b — that a safek bechor must be eatable even for Rabbi Meir — is the background to the ruling, and practice follows Rav Nachman.

Summary of Rulings

The firstborn of a kosher animal is still holy today, so the rulings of Yoreh De’ah 313-314 above are practical law, in Eretz Yisrael and in the Diaspora alike. The one point where the Rambam ties a ruling of our daf to the absence of the Temple — the permission to blemish a firstborn before birth — is exactly where Temple-era law would differ.