Bechorot Daf 34 (בכורות דף ל״ד)
Daf: 34 | Amudim: 34a – 34b | Date: Loading...
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (34a)
Segment 1
TYPE: ברייתא (סוף)
The prohibition of blemishing a sacrificial animal extends to indirect causation — one may not lure a dog to bite its ear
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא שֶׁלֹּא יִתֵּן בּוֹ מוּם, מִנַּיִן שֶׁלֹּא יָבִיא דְּבֵילָה וּבָצֵק וְיַנִּיחֶנָּה עַל הָאוֹזֶן כְּדֵי שֶׁיָּבֹא כֶּלֶב וְיֹאכְלֶנָּה? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״כׇּל מוּם״ — אֶחָד מוּם וְאֶחָד כׇּל מוּם.
English Translation:
only the prohibition that one may not directly cause a blemish. From where is it derived that one may not bring pressed figs or dough and place it on the animal’s ear so that a dog will come and eat it, thereby biting off part of the animal’s ear and leaving it blemished? The verse states: “There shall not be any blemish in it” (Leviticus 22:21), indicating that the same prohibition applies both when the blemish is caused directly and when it is any blemish, even one caused indirectly.
קלאוד על הדף:
This segment completes the baraita quoted at the end of 33b, which the Gemara brought to explain how the Rabbis use the phrase ‘there shall not be any blemish in it’ (Leviticus 22:21). Since the Rabbis already limit the prohibition to an unblemished animal through the phrase ‘it shall be perfect to be accepted’, the extra word ‘any’ (כׇּל) is free to teach a new rule: causing a blemish indirectly (גְּרָמָא) is also forbidden. Placing pressed figs or dough on the animal’s ear so that a dog will bite it off is the classic example — the owner never touches the animal, yet he engineered the blemish. The derivation ‘אֶחָד מוּם וְאֶחָד כׇּל מוּם’ turns a single word into a whole category, closing the loophole an owner of a firstborn would be most tempted to use.
Key Terms:
- דְּבֵילָה = a cake of pressed dried figs
- בָּצֵק = dough
- כׇּל מוּם = ‘any blemish’ — the inclusive word that extends the prohibition to an indirectly caused blemish
- גְּרָמָא = indirect causation — bringing about a result without performing the act directly
Segment 2
TYPE: גמרא (מחלוקת בקראי)
The dispute over the doubtful-teruma barrel is also exegetical: it turns on the plural ‘terumotai’ in Numbers 18:8
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָכָא בִּקְרָאֵי פְּלִיגִי, דְּאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל, וְכֵן אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, וְכֵן אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ: ״וַאֲנִי הִנֵּה נָתַתִּי לְךָ אֶת מִשְׁמֶרֶת תְּרוּמֹתָי״.
English Translation:
After demonstrating that the tanna’im in the baraita discussing the firstborn offering disagree with regard to the exposition of certain verses, the Gemara clarifies that the tanna’im here, in the baraita discussing teruma whose status concerning impurity is uncertain, also disagree with regard to the exposition of verses. As Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says, and Reish Lakish likewise says, and Rav Naḥman likewise says that Rabba bar Avuh says: It is stated in a verse addressed to Aaron and his sons: “And I, behold, I have given you the charge of My terumot [terumotai]” (Numbers 18:8), with “terumotai” written in plural.
קלאוד על הדף:
Having shown that the tannaim of the bloodletting baraita disagree about how to read verses, the Gemara now returns to the parallel dispute cited on 33b: Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua on a barrel of teruma whose purity is in doubt (תְּלוּיָה). It claims that here too the argument is rooted in Scripture, not in policy. A chain of four Amoraim — Shmuel, Reish Lakish, and Rabba bar Avuh via Rav Nachman — all point to the same verse, in which God gives Aaron ‘the charge of My terumot’. The word מִשְׁמֶרֶת (charge, safekeeping) is the source of the obligation to guard teruma from impurity, and the question will be how far that obligation reaches.
Key Terms:
- מִשְׁמֶרֶת תְּרוּמֹתָי = ‘the charge of My terumot’ (Numbers 18:8) — the source of the duty to safeguard teruma from impurity
- בִּקְרָאֵי פְּלִיגִי = they disagree about the interpretation of verses
- תְּרוּמָה תְּלוּיָה = teruma ‘in abeyance’ — whose ritual purity is uncertain, so it may neither be eaten nor burned
Segment 3
TYPE: גמרא (מחלוקת)
Rabbi Eliezer reads the plural as covering pure and doubtful teruma; Rabbi Yehoshua reads the singular ‘terumati’
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר סָבַר: בִּשְׁתֵּי תְּרוּמוֹת הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר, אַחַת תְּרוּמָה טְהוֹרָה וְאַחַת תְּרוּמָה תְּלוּיָה, וְאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא: עֲבֵיד לַהּ שִׁימּוּר. וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: ״תְּרוּמָתִי״ כְּתִיב.
English Translation:
Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that the barrel of teruma must be safeguarded from ritual impurity, holds that the verse is speaking of two terumot: Both teruma that is definitely ritually pure and teruma that is in abeyance, i.e., teruma whose status with regard to impurity is uncertain. And based on the plural “My terumot,” it is understood that the Merciful One states: Make a protection for it, i.e., safeguard even teruma whose status concerning impurity is uncertain. And Rabbi Yehoshua, who holds that one may expose to ritual impurity the teruma contents in the barrel, holds that the term terumotai is written so that it can be read as terumati, meaning: My teruma, in the singular. Therefore, the requirement to safeguard teruma applies only to that teruma whose status is definitely pure.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Eliezer follows the plural vocalization (terumotai): two kinds of teruma are entrusted to the priest’s safekeeping, definitely pure teruma and doubtful teruma, and both must be guarded. Rabbi Yehoshua notes that the word is written defectively (תרומתי, without a vav before the yod), so it can be read as the singular ‘My teruma’ — only one kind, the certainly pure, must be guarded. On this reading, the doubtful barrel may be exposed to impurity, which is why on 33b Rabbi Yehoshua allows the owner to let it become impure rather than let it be lost. The dispute thus becomes a question of whether the written form or the read form of the word governs.
Key Terms:
- שִׁימּוּר = safeguarding — protecting teruma from contact with impurity
- תְּרוּמָה טְהוֹרָה = teruma of certain purity
- תְּרוּמָתִי = ‘My teruma’ (singular) — the reading Rabbi Yehoshua derives from the defective spelling
Segment 4
TYPE: קושיא
Does Rabbi Eliezer follow the vocalization? A contradiction from the Hebrew maidservant, where he follows the spelling
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לְמֵימְרָא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר סָבַר יֵשׁ אֵם לַמִּקְרָא? וּרְמִינְהִי: ״בְּבִגְדוֹ בָּהּ״ — כֵּיוָן שֶׁפֵּירַשׂ טַלִּיתוֹ עָלֶיהָ, שׁוּב אֵינוֹ רַשַּׁאי לְמוֹכְרָהּ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: Is this to say that Rabbi Eliezer holds that the vocalization of the Torah is authoritative, i.e., one derives halakhot based on the pronunciation of the words, although it diverges from the spelling? And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a baraita discussing a Hebrew maidservant’s return to her father’s house. The verse states, with regard to her master: “He shall have no power to sell her to a foreign people, seeing that he has dealt deceitfully with her [bevigdo bah]” (Exodus 21:8). The term “bevigdo” shares a root with a word for garment, beged. Therefore, the verse indicates that once the master has spread his garment over her, thereby designating her as his wife, if the maidservant is subsequently divorced or widowed, her father may no longer sell her. This is the statement of Rabbi Akiva, who maintains that the vocalization of the Torah is authoritative, and he interprets bevigdo as related to bigdo, his garment.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara now tests the proposed explanation against the hermeneutic principles each tanna holds elsewhere. If Rabbi Eliezer derives a law from the plural sound of ‘terumotai’ although the word is spelled as a singular, he seems to hold יֵשׁ אֵם לַמִּקְרָא — the vocalized reading is authoritative. But a baraita on Exodus 21:8 shows Rabbi Akiva as the one who expounds the vocalization: he reads ‘bevigdo’ as ‘with his garment’, so once the master has spread his cloak over the maidservant (designating her as his wife), her father may no longer sell her. The stage is set for Rabbi Eliezer’s contrasting view in the next segment.
Key Terms:
- יֵשׁ אֵם לַמִּקְרָא = ‘the reading is the source’ — the principle that halakha is derived from the vocalized pronunciation of a word
- וּרְמִינְהִי = and they raised a contradiction
- בְּבִגְדוֹ בָהּ = ‘seeing he has dealt deceitfully with her’ (Exodus 21:8) — read by Rabbi Akiva as related to בֶּגֶד, garment
- פֵּירַשׂ טַלִּיתוֹ = spread his cloak over her — a figure for taking her in marriage
Segment 5
TYPE: קושיא (המשך)
Rabbi Eliezer expounds the spelling ‘bagad’ — so he holds yesh em lamasoret, contradicting his reading of terumotai
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: כֵּיוָן שֶׁבָּגַד בָּהּ, שׁוּב אֵינוֹ רַשַּׁאי לְמוֹכְרָהּ!
English Translation:
Rabbi Eliezer says: The word bevigdo is written without a yod and therefore is written in a manner that it can be read: Bevagdo. Accordingly, bevigdo bah means that since the father dealt deceitfully [bagad] with her by selling her once, he may not sell her again. Evidently, Rabbi Eliezer maintains that the manner in which the verses in the Torah are written is authoritative, and one derives halakhot based on the spelling of the words. This contradicts his derivation with regard to teruma, which is based on the pronunciation of the words.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Eliezer reads the same word by its consonants: בבגדו can be read ‘when he betrayed her’ (בָּגַד), teaching that a father who has sold his daughter once may not sell her again. That is an exposition of the written text (יֵשׁ אֵם לַמָּסוֹרֶת), the opposite of what the Gemara has just attributed to him regarding ‘terumotai’. The contradiction is sharp because both rulings concern how a single defectively written word is to be interpreted, and Rabbi Eliezer seems to switch methods. The Gemara will have to abandon its initial explanation of the teruma dispute.
Key Terms:
- כֵּיוָן שֶׁבָּגַד בָּהּ = since he dealt deceitfully with her — Rabbi Eliezer’s reading, referring to the first sale by the father
- יֵשׁ אֵם לַמָּסוֹרֶת = ‘the tradition (spelling) is the source’ — halakha is derived from the written consonantal text
- אָמָה הָעִבְרִיָּה = the Hebrew maidservant — a minor girl sold by her father, the subject of Exodus 21:7-11
Segment 6
TYPE: תירוץ
Rather, the dispute is about ‘lekha’ — is doubtful teruma ‘fit for you’? Rabbi Eliezer: perhaps Elijah will come and declare it pure
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא, הָכָא בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי: רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ סָבַר: הָרְאוּיָה לָךְ שְׁמוֹר, וְשֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה לָךְ לָא תִּשְׁמוֹר, וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: הָא נָמֵי רְאוּיָה הִיא, שֶׁמָּא יָבוֹא אֵלִיָּהוּ וִיטַהֲרֶנָּה.
English Translation:
Rather, here, the tanna’im disagree with regard to this: The verse states: “And I, behold, I have given you the charge of My terumot” (Numbers 18:8). Rabbi Yehoshua holds that the term “you” teaches that only teruma that is fit for you to eat, i.e., teruma that is definitely ritually pure, you must safeguard. But teruma that is not fit for you, i.e., teruma whose status with regard to impurity is uncertain, you do not need to safeguard. And Rabbi Eliezer holds that this teruma, whose status with regard to impurity is uncertain, is also considered fit for you, because perhaps Elijah will come and deem it ritually pure.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara retracts and locates the dispute in a different word of the same verse: ‘I have given you (לְךָ) the charge’. Rabbi Yehoshua reads this as limiting the duty to teruma that is fit for you — teruma the priest may eat — which excludes doubtful teruma, since it can never be eaten. Rabbi Eliezer counters that doubtful teruma is also potentially fit, because Elijah the prophet may yet come and clarify that it is pure. The resolution keeps both tannaim consistent with their known positions on spelling and vocalization, and turns the argument into a conceptual one: does a doubt that may one day be resolved count as present fitness?
Key Terms:
- הָרְאוּיָה לָךְ = that which is fit for you — i.e., teruma the priest is permitted to eat
- שֶׁמָּא יָבוֹא אֵלִיָּהוּ וִיטַהֲרֶנָּה = perhaps Elijah will come and declare it pure — the possibility that an unresolvable doubt will someday be clarified
- קָמִיפַּלְגִי = they disagree
Segment 7
TYPE: גמרא (פסק הלכה וקושיא)
Shmuel rules like Rabbi Shimon; Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak asks which Rabbi Shimon is meant
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן. מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: הֵי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן? אִילֵימָא רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן דְּמַתְנִיתִין, עַד הַשְׁתָּא לָא אַשְׁמְעִינַן שְׁמוּאֵל דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּוֵּין מוּתָּר?
English Translation:
§ The Gemara again discusses letting the blood of a firstborn offering. Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak objects to this: To which opinion of Rabbi Shimon is Shmuel referring? If we say he is referring to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in the mishna, that the blood may be let despite the resulting blemish, because the purpose of the treatment is solely medical, that cannot be correct. After all, hasn’t Shmuel taught us until now that an unintentional act, i.e., a permitted action from which a prohibited result inadvertently ensues, is permitted?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara returns to the bloodletting of the firstborn discussed on 33b, where the mishna’s Rabbi Shimon permits letting blood even though a blemish results. Rav Yehuda reports Shmuel ruling like Rabbi Shimon, and Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak challenges the ruling’s purpose. If Shmuel means the Rabbi Shimon of the mishna, the ruling is redundant: Shmuel is already on record as holding that an unintended consequence (דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּוֵּין) of a permitted act is permitted, and the mishna’s Rabbi Shimon applies exactly that principle. A ruling by an Amora is presumed to teach something new.
Key Terms:
- הֲלָכָה כְּ… = the halakha follows…
- מַתְקֵיף לַהּ = he objected to it
- דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּוֵּין מוּתָּר = an unintended act is permitted — Rabbi Shimon’s principle that a permitted action is not forbidden because of a prohibited result one did not intend
- רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן דְּמַתְנִיתִין = Rabbi Shimon as cited in our mishna
Segment 8
TYPE: קושיא (המשך)
Shmuel’s general ruling that the halakha follows Rabbi Shimon on unintended acts is already well attested
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהָא רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אָשֵׁי אָמַר רַב: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, וְרַב חָנִין בַּר אָשֵׁי אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, וְרַב חִיָּיא בַּר אָבִין מַתְנֵי בְּלָא גַּבְרֵי — רַב אָמַר: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן!
English Translation:
But doesn’t Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi say that Rav says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who maintains that an unintentional act is prohibited, and Rav Ḥanin bar Ashi says that Shmuel says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, that an unintentional act is permitted. And Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin teaches these rulings directly, without citing additional men in their transmission. He simply states that Rav says that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and Shmuel says that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. Evidently, Shmuel could not be referring to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in the mishna, as if so, he would be repeating himself.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak supports his challenge by citing the established tradition: Rav rules like Rabbi Yehuda, who forbids an unintended act, and Shmuel rules like Rabbi Shimon, who permits it. The tradition is attested through two transmitters (Rav Chiyya bar Ashi and Rav Chanin bar Ashi) and also cited directly by Rav Chiyya bar Avin without a chain of tradents. Since Shmuel’s view on unintended acts is so firmly documented, it would be pointless for him to repeat it about the firstborn. The ruling in our segment must therefore concern a different statement of Rabbi Shimon.
Key Terms:
- מַתְנֵי בְּלָא גַּבְרֵי = teaches it without the men — transmits a ruling directly, without the chain of tradents
- רַבִּי יְהוּדָה = Rabbi Yehuda — who holds that an unintended act (דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּוֵּין) is forbidden
Segment 9
TYPE: תירוץ
Shmuel means Rabbi Shimon of the baraita — the firstborn may even be slaughtered on the blemish caused by the bloodletting
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן דְּבָרַיְיתָא, וְרַב שִׁישָׁא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִידִי מַתְנֵי לַהּ בְּהֶדְיָא: אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן דְּבָרַיְיתָא.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: Rather, Shmuel is referring to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in the baraita (33b), that not only may one let the blood of the dying firstborn animal despite the resulting blemish, but it is even permitted to eat the animal’s meat on account of the blemish. And the Gemara notes that Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, teaches this explicitly: Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon as stated in the baraita.
קלאוד על הדף:
The answer: Shmuel refers to the Rabbi Shimon of the baraita on 33b, who goes further than the mishna and allows the firstborn to be slaughtered on account of the blemish that the bloodletting caused. This is a genuine novelty, because one might have thought that even if the act of bloodletting is allowed, the owner should not profit from the blemish it produced. Rav Sheisha son of Rav Idi confirms that Shmuel’s ruling was explicitly transmitted with the words ‘Rabbi Shimon of the baraita’. The practical result is lenient: a firstborn blemished in the course of legitimate medical treatment is permitted through that blemish.
Key Terms:
- רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן דְּבָרַיְיתָא = Rabbi Shimon as cited in the baraita — who permits slaughtering the firstborn on the blemish caused by bloodletting
- בְּהֶדְיָא = explicitly
- הַקָּזַת דָּם = bloodletting — here, a medical treatment for a firstborn suffering from congestion of blood
Segment 10
TYPE: משנה
One who slits the ear of a firstborn: Rabbi Eliezer — may never slaughter it; the Rabbis — may slaughter it if another blemish develops
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְנִי׳ הַצּוֹרֵם אוֹזֶן בַּבְּכוֹר — הֲרֵי זֶה לֹא יִשְׁחוֹט עוֹלָמִית, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: נוֹלַד בּוֹ מוּם אַחֵר — יִשְׁחוֹט עָלָיו.
English Translation:
MISHNA: In the case of one who slits [hatzorem] the ear of a firstborn offering, that person may never slaughter that animal. This is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. And the Rabbis say: If another blemish later develops in the firstborn, he may slaughter the animal on account of that second blemish.
קלאוד על הדף:
A new mishna addresses the owner who deliberately blemishes his firstborn by slitting its ear, an act forbidden by the prohibition of causing a blemish. Both opinions agree that the owner may not benefit from the blemish he created. Rabbi Eliezer imposes the strictest penalty: the animal may never be slaughtered, even if it later develops a natural blemish, and it must be left to die. The Rabbis limit the penalty to the illegitimate blemish itself; if a new blemish arises naturally, the animal may be slaughtered on that basis. The Gemara will now explore whether Rabbi Eliezer’s permanent penalty fits his rulings elsewhere.
Key Terms:
- הַצּוֹרֵם = one who slits or notches (the ear) — a classic disqualifying blemish
- לֹא יִשְׁחוֹט עוֹלָמִית = he may never slaughter it
- נוֹלַד בּוֹ מוּם אַחֵר = another blemish developed in it (naturally)
- קְנָס = a rabbinic penalty imposed on a transgressor
Segment 11
TYPE: גמרא (קושיא)
Does Rabbi Eliezer penalize permanently? A contradiction from the mishna in Nega’im about an excised baheret
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גְּמָ׳ וּמִי קָנֵיס רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר לְעוֹלָם? וּרְמִינְהִי: מִי שֶׁהָיְתָה לוֹ בַּהֶרֶת
English Translation:
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: But does Rabbi Eliezer penalize for a transgression forever? And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a mishna (Nega’im 7:5): In the case of one who had a snow-white leprous mark [baheret] on his body,
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara asks whether Rabbi Eliezer really imposes a penalty that lasts forever. It cites a mishna from Nega’im (7:5) dealing with a person who has a baheret, a bright white leprous mark that renders him impure. The quotation breaks off at the end of the amud and continues on 34b, where the cases of accidental and deliberate removal of the mark will be distinguished. The structure of the challenge is already clear: Rabbi Eliezer will turn out to set a time limit to the leper’s penalty, in contrast to his permanent penalty on the firstborn.
Key Terms:
- וּמִי קָנֵיס = and does he penalize?
- בַּהֶרֶת = a bright white spot on the skin — one of the forms of tzara’at (Leviticus 13)
- נְגָעִים = Nega’im — the tractate of Mishna dealing with the laws of tzara’at
Amud Bet (34b)
Segment 1
TYPE: משנה (המשך) — נגעים
If the baheret was cut off by accident he is pure; if deliberately, Rabbi Eliezer: he becomes pure when another mark appears and is purified
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְנִקְצְצָה — טָהוֹר, קְצָצָה מִתְכַּוֵּין — רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: לִכְשֶׁיִּוָּלֵד לוֹ נֶגַע אַחֵר יִטְהַר הֵימֶנּוּ.
English Translation:
and it inadvertently got excised, that individual is ritually pure. If he excised it intentionally, in an attempt to render himself ritually pure, the Sages impose a punitive impurity upon him. The tanna’im disagree with regard to the extent of the penalty: Rabbi Eliezer says: When he will develop another leprous mark, his status of ritual purity is assessed based on this new mark. When that mark is ruled ritually pure, he will become ritually pure from the ritual impurity generated by the mark he excised.
קלאוד על הדף:
This continues the mishna from Nega’im quoted at the end of 34a. If the leprous mark was cut away inadvertently, the man is pure, since the sign of impurity is gone. If he cut it away deliberately in order to become pure, the Sages penalize him with continued impurity, and the tanna’im dispute how long that lasts. Rabbi Eliezer allows the penalty to end when another mark develops: once that new mark is examined and declared pure, he is pure from the first as well.
Key Terms:
- וְנִקְצְצָה = and it was cut off (accidentally)
- קְצָצָה מִתְכַּוֵּין = he cut it off deliberately
- נֶגַע אַחֵר = another leprous mark
- יִטְהַר הֵימֶנּוּ = he will become pure from it
Segment 2
TYPE: משנה (סוף) וקושיא
The Rabbis: he remains impure until the leprosy covers his whole body or unless the mark had shrunk below a bean’s size — so Rabbi Eliezer’s penalty is limited
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: עַד שֶׁתִּפְרַח בְּכוּלּוֹ, אוֹ עַד שֶׁתִּמְעַט בַּהַרְתּוֹ מִכִּגְרִיס!
English Translation:
And the Rabbis say: The development of a new leprous mark is insufficient. Rather, he must wait either until the leprosy of the new mark spreads over his entire body, a sign of ritual purity (see Leviticus 13:12), or unless his old baheret had shrunk to a size smaller than that of a split beanbefore he excised it. Otherwise, he remains ritually impure. In any event, it is clear from this mishna that Rabbi Eliezer does not impose an indefinite penalty on one who transgresses. If so, why does he impose an indefinite penalty in the mishna discussing one who causes a blemish on the ear of a firstborn offering?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Rabbis are stricter in Nega’im: a new mark alone does not lift the penalty. He remains impure until tzara’at spreads over his entire skin, which paradoxically is a sign of purity (Leviticus 13:12-13), or unless the original baheret was already smaller than a split bean (גְּרִיס), the minimum size for impurity, before he cut it. The contradiction now lies in full view: in Nega’im Rabbi Eliezer gives the transgressor a way out, while in our mishna he forbids the firstborn forever. Why should he be more lenient in one case than the other?
Key Terms:
- עַד שֶׁתִּפְרַח בְּכוּלּוֹ = until it spreads over his whole body — a condition in which the leper is declared pure
- גְּרִיס = a split bean (Cilician bean) — the minimum size of a leprous mark that can render one impure
- בַּהַרְתּוֹ = his baheret (leprous mark)
Segment 3
TYPE: תירוץ
Rabba and Rav Yosef: Rabbi Eliezer penalizes permanently with regard to property, but not with regard to one’s body
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבָּה וְרַב יוֹסֵף דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַויְיהוּ: כִּי קָנֵיס רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בְּמָמוֹנוֹ, בְּגוּפוֹ לָא קָנֵיס.
English Translation:
Rabba and Rav Yosef both say, in answer to this question, that when Rabbi Eliezer penalizes one who transgresses, that is only in a case which involves his property, e.g., a firstborn offering. But in a case which affects his body, e.g., leprosy, he does not penalize him to such an extent.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabba and Rav Yosef jointly resolve the contradiction by distinguishing the object of the penalty. When the transgression concerns property, such as a firstborn animal, Rabbi Eliezer imposes a permanent penalty. When it concerns one’s own body, such as the impurity of tzara’at, he does not. The next segment explains why the distinction is principled rather than arbitrary.
Key Terms:
- מָמוֹנוֹ = his property, monetary matters
- גּוּפוֹ = his body, his personal status
- תַּרְוַויְיהוּ = both of them
Segment 4
TYPE: גמרא (טעם)
Why the difference: a man is tempted to blemish his animal, but is he likely to cut his own flesh?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מָמוֹנוֹ — אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר דְּאָתֵי לְמֶיעְבַּד, גּוּפוֹ — מִי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר דְּאָתֵי לְמֶיעְבַּד?
English Translation:
The Gemara elaborates: With regard to his property, i.e., the firstborn offering, if he would not be penalized indefinitely, there is reason to say that he might come to perform an action which would cause a blemish. Since the firstborn offering is anyway prohibited for personal use until it is blemished, he suffers no risk in blemishing it. A greater deterrent than usual is therefore needed to prevent such action. By contrast, in the case of leprosy on his body, is there a basis to say that he will come to perform an action and remove the white spot? In this case, the limited penalty of having to wait for purification from another leprous mark serves as a sufficient deterrent, as there is no guarantee that another mark will ever appear.
קלאוד על הדף:
The penalty is calibrated to the likelihood of the offense. An owner of a firstborn loses nothing by blemishing it — the animal is useless to him until it is blemished anyway — so the temptation is strong and only a severe penalty will deter him. Cutting a mark out of one’s own skin, on the other hand, is painful and unusual, so there is little need to deter it heavily. This reflects a general Talmudic principle that rabbinic decrees are proportioned to the realistic risk of transgression.
Key Terms:
- אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר דְּאָתֵי לְמֶיעְבַּד = there is reason to say that he will come to do it — i.e., there is a real risk of the transgression
- מִי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר = is there reason to say? — a rhetorical question implying no
Segment 5
TYPE: קושיא
Rava: the Rabbis also contradict themselves — limited penalty on the firstborn, open-ended penalty on the leper
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רָבָא: דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אַדְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר קַשְׁיָא, דְּרַבָּנַן אַדְּרַבָּנַן לָא קַשְׁיָא?
English Translation:
Rava said: Is this to say that the statement of Rabbi Eliezer in the mishna here is difficult in light of the other statement of Rabbi Eliezer in the mishna in Nega’im, whereas the statement of the Rabbis in the mishna is not difficult in light of the other statement of the Rabbis in Nega’im? In the mishna here, the Rabbis impose a limited penalty on the transgressor, whereas in the mishna in Nega’im they impose an indefinite one. This contradiction also requires resolution.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava points out that the answer of Rabba and Rav Yosef is incomplete. The Rabbis also seem inconsistent, but in the reverse direction: in our mishna they are lenient, allowing the firstborn to be slaughtered once another blemish appears, while in Nega’im they are strict, refusing to let a new mark end the penalty. If the property/body distinction were the explanation, the Rabbis would be expected to be stricter with the firstborn, not with the leper. A satisfactory resolution must account for both sides of the dispute.
Key Terms:
- קַשְׁיָא = is difficult
- דְּרַבָּנַן אַדְּרַבָּנַן = of the Rabbis against the Rabbis — a contradiction between two statements of the same authority
Segment 6
TYPE: תירוץ
Rava: both contradictions are resolved — the Rabbis penalize a person precisely in the matter in which he sinned
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא, דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אַדְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר לָא קַשְׁיָא, כִּדְשַׁנִּינַן. רַבָּנַן אַדְּרַבָּנַן נָמֵי לָא קַשְׁיָא, הָכָא בְּמַאי דַּעֲבַד קַנְסוּהּ, הָכָא בְּמַאי דַּעֲבַד קַנְסוּהּ.
English Translation:
Rather, say: The statement of Rabbi Eliezer in the mishna here is not difficult in light of the statement of Rabbi Eliezer in Nega’im, as we answered. Likewise, the statement of the Rabbis in the mishna is not difficult in light of the statement of the Rabbis in Nega’im, as both rulings follow the same logic. Here, the Rabbis penalized him for what he did, and there, the Rabbis penalized him for what he did.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava accepts the resolution of Rabba and Rav Yosef for Rabbi Eliezer and proposes a parallel principle for the Rabbis. In each case the Rabbis penalize the transgressor ‘in what he did’ (בְּמַאי דַּעֲבַד). The penalty is not measured by its severity but by its precise target: it neutralizes the very act by which the transgressor tried to gain his goal. The next segment applies this to each case.
Key Terms:
- בְּמַאי דַּעֲבַד קַנְסוּהּ = they penalized him in that which he did — the penalty targets the specific illicit act
- כִּדְשַׁנִּינַן = as we answered
Segment 7
TYPE: גמרא (ביאור)
The firstborn cannot be permitted through the blemish he caused; the leper cannot become pure through the excision he performed
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בְּמַאי אִיכַּוֵּין לְמִישְׁרְיֵיהּ בְּהַאי מוּמָא? בְּהַאי מוּמָא קַנְסוּהּ רַבָּנַן, דִּבְהַאי מוּמָא לָא לִישְׁתְּרֵי לֵיהּ. וְהָכָא, בְּמַאי דַּעֲבַד קַנְסוּהּ — אִיכַּוֵּין לְטַהוֹרֵי נַפְשֵׁיהּ בְּהַאי קְצִיצָה, בְּהַאי קְצִיצָה קַנְסוּהּ רַבָּנַן.
English Translation:
The Gemara elaborates: In the case of causing a blemish in a firstborn offering, by what means did he intend to permit it? By means of this blemish. Therefore, the Rabbis penalized him only with regard to this blemish, i.e., that the animal will not become permitted to him by means of this blemish that he himself caused. The firstborn offering retains its status as unblemished and will become permitted only if it develops another blemish. And similarly, here, with regard to the removal of the leprous mark, the Rabbis penalize him for what he did. He intended to render himself ritually pure by means of this act of excising the mark. Therefore, the Rabbis penalized him with regard to this act of excision. It is considered as though he did not excise the mark, and as a result, he remains impure permanently.
קלאוד על הדף:
The firstborn owner sought permission through the blemish he created, so the Rabbis disqualify that blemish, but the animal can still be permitted through a different, natural blemish. The leper sought purity through the act of excision, so the Rabbis treat the excision as if it never happened: the original mark is legally still there, and a new mark (which says nothing about the old one) cannot purify him. Only a natural sign of purity — the spreading over the whole body — or the fact that the mark was below the minimum size anyway, ends the impurity. The ‘measure for measure’ logic unites the two rulings of the Rabbis.
Key Terms:
- לְמִישְׁרְיֵיהּ = to permit it (for slaughter)
- לְטַהוֹרֵי נַפְשֵׁיהּ = to purify himself
- קְצִיצָה = excision — cutting away the leprous mark
Segment 8
TYPE: בעיא
Rav Pappa: did the mishna say ‘yit’har’ (he is purified) or ‘veyit’har’ (and he is purified)?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בָּעֵי רַב פָּפָּא: ״יִטְהַר״ תְּנַן, אוֹ ״וְיִטְהָר״ תְּנַן?
English Translation:
§ The Gemara analyzes Rabbi Eliezer’s statement: When he will develop another leprous mark, he will become ritually pure [yit’har] from the first. Rav Pappa asks: What is the correct version of Rabbi Eliezer’s statement? Did we learn: Yit’har, or did we learn: Veyit’har, and he will become ritually pure? Yit’har indicates that he will immediately be rendered ritually pure from the first leprous mark upon the appearance of the second mark. Veyit’har, by contrast, indicates that the punitive ritual impurity by rabbinic law imparted by the first mark remains until the second mark is deemed ritually pure.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Pappa now examines the precise wording of Rabbi Eliezer’s statement in Nega’im. The reading יִטְהַר implies that he is purified from the first mark as soon as the new mark appears. The reading וְיִטְהַר implies a sequence: the new mark appears, is examined, and only when it is declared pure is he pure from the first as well. The question shows how a single letter vav in a mishna can carry halakhic weight.
Key Terms:
- בָּעֵי = asked, raised a dilemma
- תְּנַן = we learned (in a mishna)
- יִטְהַר / וְיִטְהַר = ‘he shall be pure’ / ‘and he shall be pure’ — the two possible readings of Rabbi Eliezer’s statement
Segment 9
TYPE: גמרא (נפקא מינה)
What difference does it make? The case of a bridegroom on whom a leprous mark appears
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לְמַאי נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ? לְחָתָן שֶׁנִּרְאָה בּוֹ נֶגַע.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between the two versions? After all, he is in any case ritually impure due to the second mark until that mark is deemed pure. The Gemara explains that there is a difference in the case of a bridegroom who had removed a leprous mark upon whom a new leprous mark appeared during the seven days of his wedding celebrations.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara first asks why the difference matters, since he will in any case be impure from the new mark until it is examined. The answer is the bridegroom, who enjoys a special exemption from examination during his wedding week. This is the one setting in which a new mark does not immediately impose impurity, so the question of whether the first mark’s penalty lifts on appearance or on purification becomes meaningful.
Key Terms:
- לְמַאי נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ = what practical difference does it make?
- חָתָן = bridegroom
Segment 10
TYPE: משנה (מקור)
A bridegroom gets seven days before examination; a person during a festival gets the whole festival
Hebrew/Aramaic:
דִּתְנַן: חָתָן שֶׁנִּרְאָה בּוֹ נֶגַע — נוֹתְנִין לוֹ שִׁבְעָה יָמִים, לוֹ וּלְאִצְטְלִיתוֹ וְלִכְסוּתוֹ, וְכֵן בָּרֶגֶל — נוֹתְנִין לוֹ כׇּל יְמֵי הָרֶגֶל.
English Translation:
As we learned in a mishna (Nega’im 3:2): In the case of a bridegroom upon whom a leprous mark appeared, the court grants him seven days of his wedding celebrations before the mark is examined by a priest. This grace period is granted to him whether the mark appeared on him, i.e., his body, or on his cloak, or on any other garment of his. And similarly, with regard to any individual upon whom a leprous mark appeared during a pilgrimage Festival, the court grants him all the days of the pilgrimage Festival as a grace period, during which the mark is not examined by a priest.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara cites the mishna from Nega’im (3:2) that grants a grace period to a bridegroom. A leprous mark that appears on a bridegroom, his cloak, or his other garments is not examined by a priest during the seven days of feasting, and likewise during a pilgrimage festival the examination is deferred until after the festival. Because the mark is not examined, it does not yet render him impure. The Gemara in Moed Katan derives this deferral from the verse ‘and on the day it is seen in him’ (Leviticus 13:14) — there is a day when it is examined and a day when it is not.
Key Terms:
- נוֹתְנִין לוֹ שִׁבְעָה יָמִים = they give him seven days — the examination is postponed for the seven days of the wedding feast
- אִצְטְלִיתוֹ = his cloak
- כְּסוּתוֹ = his garment
- רֶגֶל = pilgrimage festival
Segment 11
TYPE: גמרא (נפקא מינה)
If ‘yit’har’, the bridegroom is pure from the first mark immediately and the new mark awaits the seven days
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִי אָמְרַתְּ ״יִטְהַר״ תְּנַן — מִקַּמַּיְיתָא טְהַר לֵיהּ, לְבָתְרָיְיתָא נָטְרִין לֵיהּ שִׁבְעָה יְמֵי מִשְׁתֶּה.
English Translation:
The Gemara continues: If you say that we learned that the correct reading of Rabbi Eliezer’s statement is yit’har, i.e., the individual is rendered ritually pure upon the development of the new mark, this means that he is ritually pure during the seven-day period, as he has already become ritually pure of the punitive impurity from the first mark. As for the latter mark, we wait the seven days of feasting for him, before the mark is examined by a priest. He is therefore ritually pure in all regards.
קלאוד על הדף:
Under the reading יִטְהַר, the appearance of the new mark itself lifts the penalty of the first mark. Since the new mark is not examined until after the wedding week, it does not render him impure in the meantime. The result is that the bridegroom is pure throughout his celebration, which is exactly what the grace period was designed to achieve.
Key Terms:
- מִקַּמַּיְיתָא טְהַר לֵיהּ = from the first (mark) he is purified
- לְבָתְרָיְיתָא נָטְרִין לֵיהּ = for the latter (mark) they wait for him
- שִׁבְעָה יְמֵי מִשְׁתֶּה = the seven days of the wedding feast
Segment 12
TYPE: תיקו
If ‘veyit’har’, he remains impure from the first mark during the seven days — the question is left unresolved
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ: ״וְיִטְהַר״ תְּנַן — סוֹף סוֹף, כִּי לָא מְטַמֵּית לְבָתְרָיְיתָא, הָא מִיטַּמֵּא וְקָאֵי מִקַּמַּיְיתָא. מַאי? תֵּיקוּ.
English Translation:
But if you say that we learned that the correct reading of Rabbi Eliezer’s statement is veyit’har, and the punitive impurity of the first mark remains intact until the ritual purity of the second mark has been confirmed, the grace period has no effect. The reason is that ultimately, even if the individual does not yet contract ritual impurity from the latter mark, he remains ritually impure on account of the first mark until the purification of the latter mark. The Gemara asks: What is the resolution to Rav Pappa’s query? Since there is no clear resolution, the Gemara concludes that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.
קלאוד על הדף:
Under the reading וְיִטְהַר, the first mark’s impurity remains until the new mark has been examined and found pure. The grace period then gives him no practical benefit: the new mark does not render him impure, but the old one still does. The Gemara cannot determine which reading is correct and concludes תֵּיקוּ, leaving the dilemma standing.
Key Terms:
- סוֹף סוֹף = in the end, ultimately
- מִיטַּמֵּא וְקָאֵי = he is already impure and stands so
- תֵּיקוּ = ‘let it stand’ — the question remains unresolved
Segment 13
TYPE: בעיא
Rabbi Yirmeya to Rabbi Zeira: if one slits the ear of a firstborn and dies, is his son penalized?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בָּעֵי מִינֵּיהּ רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה מֵרַבִּי זֵירָא: צוֹרֵם אוֹזֶן בַּבְּכוֹר וָמֵת, מַהוּ לִקְנוֹס בְּנוֹ אַחֲרָיו?
English Translation:
§ The mishna teaches that one who slits the ear of a firstborn offering is prohibited indefinitely from slaughtering the animal on account of that blemish. Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma before Rabbi Zeira: In the case of one who slits the ear of a firstborn offering and subsequently dies, what is the halakha with regard to penalizing his son after the father’s death? Does the penalty prohibiting consumption of the firstborn offering extend to the son?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara returns to our mishna about the ear-slitter, now from the angle of inheritance. If the owner dies, the firstborn passes to his son: does the rabbinic penalty that bars slaughtering it on this blemish pass with it? The question probes the nature of a rabbinic fine (קְנָס) — is it a personal punishment of the sinner, or a legal disability attached to the object? The next segments compare two known cases.
Key Terms:
- לִקְנוֹס בְּנוֹ אַחֲרָיו = to penalize his son after him
- צוֹרֵם אוֹזֶן = slitting the ear
Segment 14
TYPE: גמרא (צד אחד)
The precedent of one who sells his slave to gentiles — his son is penalized — is not decisive
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִם תִּימְצֵי לוֹמַר: מוֹכֵר עַבְדּוֹ לַגּוֹיִם וָמֵת — קָנְסוּ בְּנוֹ אַחֲרָיו, דְּכֹל יוֹמָא וְיוֹמָא מַפְקַע לֵיהּ מִמִּצְוֹת.
English Translation:
The Gemara compares this dilemma to two similar cases. If you say the halakha should be derived from the case of one who sells his Canaanite slave to gentiles and the seller subsequently dies, where the Sages penalized his son after the father’s death and required him to redeem the slave, this is not a direct parallel. The Gemara explains: It is possible that the penalty is extended to the son only there, as each day that the slave is in the servitude of the gentile master, that master prevents the slave from performing mitzvot. A Canaanite slave is obligated to perform the same mitzvot as a Jewish woman, and he is unable to fulfill the mitzvot when in the possession of a gentile. Since this reason does not apply in a case of a firstborn offering, the case of the Canaanite slave cannot be cited as a source to resolve this dilemma.
קלאוד על הדף:
The first comparison is the case of one who sells his Canaanite slave to a gentile, where the Sages require him to redeem the slave even at a high price, and this penalty passes to his son. But the Gemara rejects the comparison: there the harm is ongoing, since every day the slave is under a gentile master he is kept from the mitzvot he is obligated to keep. Since the firstborn involves no such continuing loss, the case does not prove that the son inherits the penalty.
Key Terms:
- מוֹכֵר עַבְדּוֹ לַגּוֹיִם = one who sells his (Canaanite) slave to gentiles — forbidden, and penalized by a requirement to redeem him
- מַפְקַע לֵיהּ מִמִּצְוֹת = removes him from mitzvot
- אִם תִּימְצֵי לוֹמַר = if you were to say
Segment 15
TYPE: גמרא (צד שני)
The precedent of one who plans work for Chol HaMoed and dies — his son is not penalized — is also not decisive
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִם תִּימְצֵי לוֹמַר: כִּוֵּון מְלַאכְתּוֹ בַּמּוֹעֵד וָמֵת — לֹא קָנְסוּ בְּנוֹ אַחֲרָיו, מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא עַבְדֵהּ לְאִיסּוּרָא.
English Translation:
And if you say the halakha should be derived from the case of one who planned from the outset to perform his labor on the intermediate days of a Festival, by placing himself in a situation in which the labor should in theory be permitted, i.e., that a significant monetary loss would otherwise be incurred, that comparison is also inaccurate. The Gemara elaborates: In such a case the Sages penalized him by deeming it prohibited for him to perform the labor and by removing his rights to any of the finished products, but if he died before the start of the Festival, they did not penalize his son after the father’s death. This case is not a direct parallel either, as it is possible that it is only there that the penalty is not extended to the son, since the father did not yet perform a prohibited act, as he did not carry out any action on the Festival before he died.
קלאוד על הדף:
The second comparison runs the other way. One who deliberately leaves his work for Chol HaMoed, so that he can claim the exemption for preventing loss, is penalized by having the work forbidden to him; yet if he died, his son is not penalized. But here the father never committed a forbidden act, having died before doing the work. The ear-slitter, by contrast, has already sinned. Neither precedent maps neatly onto the firstborn, so the question remains open.
Key Terms:
- כִּוֵּון מְלַאכְתּוֹ בַּמּוֹעֵד = one who intentionally scheduled his work for Chol HaMoed
- לָא עַבְדֵהּ לְאִיסּוּרָא = he did not perform the forbidden act
- חוֹל הַמּוֹעֵד = the intermediate days of the festival
Segment 16
TYPE: בעיא (ניסוח)
Was the penalty imposed on the man, who is gone, or on his property, which remains?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָכָא מַאי? לְדִידֵיהּ קְנַסוּ רַבָּנַן, וְהָא לֵיתֵיהּ, אוֹ דִלְמָא לְמָמוֹנֵיהּ קְנַסוּ רַבָּנַן, וְהָא אִיתֵיהּ?
English Translation:
If so, here, in the case of mutilating the ear of a firstborn offering, what is the halakha? Should one say that the Sages penalized only him, i.e., the father, and he is no longer alive? Or perhaps the Sages imposed the penalty upon his property, i.e., that no benefit may be derived from the animal, and that animal still exists in the possession of his heirs.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara sharpens the dilemma into a conceptual choice. If the Sages fined the person, the fine lapses with his death. If they fined the property — the animal itself — the animal still exists and the disability passes to the heir. This distinction between a penalty on the person and a penalty on the object recurs throughout the laws of rabbinic fines.
Key Terms:
- לְדִידֵיהּ קְנַסוּ רַבָּנַן = the Sages penalized him (personally)
- לְמָמוֹנֵיהּ קְנַסוּ רַבָּנַן = the Sages penalized his property
- לֵיתֵיהּ / אִיתֵיהּ = he is not here / it is here
Segment 17
TYPE: תירוץ
Rabbi Zeira: from the Shevi’it field improved illegally — the son may sow it, so the penalty is personal
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: תְּנֵיתוּהָ, שָׂדֶה שֶׁנִּתְקַוְּוצָה בִּשְׁבִיעִית — תִּזָּרַע לְמוֹצָאֵי שְׁבִיעִית, נִיטַּיְּיבָה נִידַּיְּירָה — לֹא תִּזָּרַע לְמוֹצָאֵי שְׁבִיעִית. וְאָמַר רַב אַסִּי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא: נָקְטִינַן, הֱטִיבָהּ וָמֵת — בְּנוֹ זוֹרְעָהּ. אַלְמָא לְדִידֵיהּ קְנַסוּ רַבָּנַן, לִבְרֵיהּ לָא קְנַסוּ רַבָּנַן.
English Translation:
Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Yirmeya: You learned the resolution to your dilemma in a mishna (Shevi’it 4:2). A field whose thorns were removed during the Sabbatical Year may be sown at the conclusion of the Sabbatical Year, as removing thorns is not full-fledged labor that renders the field prohibited. But if it had been improved with fertilizer, or if it had been enclosed so that the animals inside would fertilize it with their manure, it may not be sown at the conclusion of the Sabbatical Year, as both these acts cause significant improvements to the field. The Sages imposed a penalty that one may not derive benefit from prohibited labor. And Rav Asi, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: We have a tradition that if one improved his field in a prohibited manner and then died, his son may sow it. Apparently, the Sages penalized only him, i.e., the father, but the Sages did not penalize his son.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Zeira answers from a mishna in Shevi’it (4:2): a field whose thorns were cleared in the Sabbatical Year may be sown afterward, but one that was fertilized or penned to enrich it may not. Rav Asi son of Rabbi Chanina reports a tradition that if the offender dies, his son may sow it. The conclusion is that the penalty was imposed on the transgressor personally, not on his property; by the same logic, the son of one who slit a firstborn’s ear may slaughter it on that blemish.
Key Terms:
- נִתְקַוְּוצָה = had its thorns removed
- נִיטַּיְּיבָה = was improved (by fertilizing)
- נִידַּיְּירָה = was penned — animals were kept on it to fertilize it with their dung
- מוֹצָאֵי שְׁבִיעִית = the year after the Sabbatical Year
- נָקְטִינַן = we have a tradition
Segment 18
TYPE: גמרא (המשך בדף הבא)
Abaye brings a further tradition — continued on 35a
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: נָקְטִינַן
English Translation:
Abaye says: We have a tradition
קלאוד על הדף:
Abaye adds a supporting tradition, whose content is completed at the top of 35a: one who renders another’s pure items impure and dies is not penalized through his son, because the damage is not visible and the fine is purely rabbinic. The point is the same as in the Shevi’it case — rabbinic penalties fall on the person who sinned, not on his heirs. The amud ends mid-sentence, with the full statement on the next daf.
Key Terms:
- נָקְטִינַן = we have a tradition (we hold)
- אַבָּיֵי = Abaye — leading Amora of the fourth generation, head of the academy at Pumbedita