Bechorot Daf 36 (בכורות דף ל״ו)
Daf: 36 | Amudim: 36a – 36b | Date: Loading...
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (36a)
Segment 1
TYPE: תירוץ
Abaye’s answer: Rabbi Meir treats priests as subject to a concern about blemishing, not as established blemishers
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֵימַר דְּאָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר לַחֲשָׁשָׁא, לְאַחְזוֹקִינְהוּ מִי אָמַר?
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: One can say that Rabbi Meir says that priests are suspect with regard to causing blemishes only to the extent that there is a concern that they might have caused a blemish. But did he say this ruling to establish them as those who definitely cause blemishes? Certainly not.
קלאוד על הדף:
This completes the exchange that closed 35b, where Rav Pappa asked Abaye how, if Rabbi Meir holds priests suspect about blemishing firstborns and also holds that one suspect in one matter is suspect for the whole Torah, priests could ever serve as judges. The answer distinguishes two levels of suspicion. Rabbi Meir only says that priests are subject to a concern (chashasha) that they might have blemished the animal, which is enough to bar them from testifying about their own firstborns. He never said that priests are established (muchzakim) as people who actually blemish firstborns, and the principle that one suspect in one matter is suspect for the whole Torah applies only to someone established as a transgressor. Priests therefore remain fit to judge.
Key Terms:
- לַחֲשָׁשָׁא = as a mere concern, a possibility to be guarded against
- לְאַחְזוֹקִינְהוּ = to establish them (as definite transgressors) — a presumption of actual wrongdoing
- חֲזָקָה = a legal presumption; here, that a person is a known violator
- הֶחָשׁוּד לְדָבָר אֶחָד = one suspected regarding one matter (the background principle from 35b)
Segment 2
TYPE: בעיא ומחלוקת אמוראים
Is hearsay testimony (ed mipi ed) accepted for a firstborn’s blemish? Rav Asi forbids, Rav Ashi permits; Rav Asi cites the school of Menashe
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: עֵד מִפִּי עֵד, מַהוּ לְעֵדוּת בְּכוֹר? רַב אַסִּי אָסַר, וְרַב אָשֵׁי שָׁרֵי. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַסִּי לְרַב אָשֵׁי: וְהָא תָּנָא דְבֵי מְנַשֶּׁה: אֵין עֵד מִפִּי עֵד כָּשֵׁר אֶלָּא לְעֵדוּת הָאִשָּׁה!
English Translation:
§ A dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to testimony based on hearsay, where one repeats the testimony of another witness, what is the halakha in a case of such testimony about a blemished firstborn animal? Rav Asi deems prohibited the slaughter of the animal based on such testimony, and Rav Ashi deems it permitted. Rav Asi said to Rav Ashi: But isn’t it taught in a baraita in the school of Menashe that hearsay testimony is valid only for the testimony of a woman, where one testifies that her husband is dead? This indicates that such testimony is not accepted in all other instances.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara opens a new question: can a witness who did not see the matter himself, but heard it from another witness, testify that a firstborn’s blemish is genuine and not deliberately inflicted? Rav Asi forbids slaughter on such testimony and Rav Ashi permits it. Rav Asi supports his view from a baraita of the school of Menashe, which states that hearsay testimony is valid only for the testimony of a woman — that is, testimony that a woman’s husband has died, where the Sages relaxed the rules of evidence so that she would not remain an aguna. The plain reading implies that hearsay is excluded everywhere else, including firstborns.
Key Terms:
- עֵד מִפִּי עֵד = a witness testifying from the mouth of another witness — hearsay testimony
- עֵדוּת בְּכוֹר = testimony concerning a firstborn animal, i.e., that its blemish arose without human intent
- תָּנָא דְבֵי מְנַשֶּׁה = a baraita taught in the study house of Menashe
- עֵדוּת הָאִשָּׁה = testimony enabling a woman to remarry, i.e., that her husband has died
- אָסַר / שָׁרֵי = deems prohibited / deems permitted
Segment 3
TYPE: תירוץ (הגהה בברייתא)
Rav Ashi emends the baraita: hearsay is valid wherever a woman’s testimony is valid — which includes firstborns
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תְּנִי: אֶלָּא לְעֵדוּת שֶׁהָאִשָּׁה כְּשֵׁרָה לָהּ בִּלְבָד.
English Translation:
Rav Ashi responded: Emend the baraita and teach it like this: Testimony based on hearsay is valid only for that testimony for which the testimony of a woman is valid. According to Rav Ashi, the baraita is teaching that any case where the testimony of a woman is valid, hearsay testimony is valid as well, and this includes testimony concerning a blemished firstborn animal.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Ashi responds by rereading the baraita. It does not mean that hearsay is valid only for testimony about a woman, but rather that hearsay is valid only in those areas where a woman herself is a valid witness. The logic is that both a woman and a hearsay witness are ordinarily disqualified from formal testimony, so wherever the law relaxes its requirements enough to accept the one, it also accepts the other. Since testimony about a firstborn’s blemish is accepted from a woman, it is also accepted from a hearsay witness, and Rav Ashi’s lenient ruling stands.
Key Terms:
- תְּנִי = teach it (thus) — the standard formula for emending the wording of a baraita
- שֶׁהָאִשָּׁה כְּשֵׁרָה לָהּ = for which a woman is a valid witness
- בִּלְבָד = only, exclusively
- כָּשֵׁר = valid, fit (for testimony)
Segment 4
TYPE: מעשה ופסק הלכה
Rav Yeimar accepts hearsay for a firstborn; Mareimar mocks him as ‘Yeimar who permits firstborns’; the halacha follows Rav Yeimar
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַב יֵימַר אַכְשַׁר עֵד מִפִּי עֵד בִּבְכוֹר, קָרֵי עֲלֵיהּ מָרִימָר: ״יֵימַר שָׁרֵי בּוּכְרָא״. וְהִלְכְתָא: עֵד מִפִּי עֵד כָּשֵׁר לְעֵדוּת בְּכוֹר.
English Translation:
The Gemara relates that Rav Yeimar deemed fit testimony based on hearsay with regard to a blemished firstborn animal. Mareimar condescendingly called him: Yeimar who permits firstborn animals. The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is that testimony based on hearsay is valid in the case of a firstborn animal.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara records a practical case: Rav Yeimar accepted hearsay testimony for a firstborn, and Mareimar disparagingly nicknamed him ‘Yeimar who permits firstborns,’ implying that he was too quick to release consecrated animals. Despite the jibe, the Gemara rules that the halacha is that hearsay testimony is valid for a firstborn. This accords with Rav Ashi’s emended reading of the baraita: testimony about a firstborn’s blemish belongs to the relaxed category in which a single witness, a woman, or a hearsay witness may be relied upon.
Key Terms:
- אַכְשַׁר = deemed valid, accepted
- קָרֵי עֲלֵיהּ = called him, applied the epithet to him
- יֵימַר שָׁרֵי בּוּכְרָא = ‘Yeimar who permits firstborns’ — a mocking nickname
- וְהִלְכְתָא = and the halacha is
- בּוּכְרָא = Aramaic for a firstborn animal
Segment 5
TYPE: מימרא (רבי אילעא)
Rabbi Ile’a: a priest who reveals that an unknown animal is a firstborn and that it has its blemish is believed
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַבִּי אִילְעָא: לֹא הָיוּ מוּחְזָקִין בּוֹ שֶׁהוּא בְּכוֹר, וּבָא אֶחָד וְאָמַר שֶׁהוּא בְּכוֹר וּמוּמוֹ עִמּוֹ — נֶאֱמָן.
English Translation:
§ The Gemara discusses a related matter. Rabbi Ile’a says: In a case where a blemished animal was not established as being a firstborn, and one priest came to an expert and said that it is a firstborn animal and yet its blemish is with it, i.e., it was unintentionally blemished, he is deemed credible, and the expert may deem the animal fit for slaughter based on the priest’s testimony.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Ile’a addresses a case where nobody knew that a blemished animal was a firstborn, and a priest presents it to an expert, saying that it is a firstborn and that its blemish arose on its own. Ordinarily a priest is suspected of blemishing firstborns and would not be believed that the blemish was unintentional. Here, however, the only reason anyone knows the animal is a firstborn at all is the priest’s own statement, so he is believed in full. The expert may then rule on the blemish and permit the animal to be slaughtered.
Key Terms:
- מוּחְזָקִין = established, known (as having a certain status)
- מוּמוֹ עִמּוֹ = its blemish is with it — the blemish arose naturally, not by human hand
- נֶאֱמָן = believed, deemed credible
- בְּכוֹר = a firstborn male kosher animal, holy from birth and given to a priest
Segment 6
TYPE: קושיא
Isn’t this simply ‘the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted,’ already taught in the mishna of the woman who says she was married and divorced?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן, שֶׁהַפֶּה שֶׁאָסַר הוּא הַפֶּה שֶׁהִתִּיר? תְּנֵינָא: הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁאָמְרָה ״אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ הָיִיתִי וּגְרוּשָׁה אֲנִי״ נֶאֱמֶנֶת, שֶׁהַפֶּה שֶׁאָסַר הוּא הַפֶּה שֶׁהִתִּיר!
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: What is Rabbi Ile’a teaching us? Is he teaching us the principle that the mouth that prohibited it is the mouth that permitted it, i.e., when the only source that an item was prohibited is the statement of one who says that it is now permitted, his claim is accepted? But we learn this in a mishna (Ketubot 22a): With regard to a woman who said: I was a married woman and now I am a divorcée, she is deemed credible and permitted to remarry, as the mouth that prohibited her by establishing that she was married is the mouth that permitted her by establishing that she was divorced.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara asks what Rabbi Ile’a adds. The principle that the same mouth that created the prohibition can also remove it (ha-peh she’asar hu ha-peh she-hitir) is already taught in the mishna in Ketubot 22a: a woman who says ‘I was married and I am divorced’ is believed and may remarry, since without her own statement no one would have known she was ever married. Rabbi Ile’a’s priest seems to be the same case — his word alone makes the animal a firstborn, so his word should also be enough to establish that its blemish is genuine.
Key Terms:
- הַפֶּה שֶׁאָסַר הוּא הַפֶּה שֶׁהִתִּיר = the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted — one who is the sole source of a prohibition is believed when he also states the permitting fact
- אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ = a married woman
- גְּרוּשָׁה = a divorcée
- מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן = what does he teach us? — the Gemara’s question when a statement seems redundant
Segment 7
TYPE: תירוץ
The cases differ: the woman could have stayed silent, but the priest has no way to eat the firstborn without bringing it to an expert
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: הָתָם הוּא דְּאִי בָּעֲיָא לָא אָמְרָה. אֲבָל הָכָא, דְּלָא סַגִּיא דְּלָא אָמְרָה, דְּקָדָשִׁים בְּחוּץ לָא אָכֵיל,
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: Rabbi Ile’a’s statement is necessary, lest you say it is only there, in the case of the mishna, that the woman’s testimony is accepted, as, if she wants to remarry illegally, she does not need to say anything at all about previously being married. But here, with regard to the firstborn animal, it is different, as, if the priest wishes to eat the meat of the animal, it not sufficient for him not to bring the animal to an expert, i.e., he has no recourse other than to say that it is a firstborn animal which has a blemish requiring examination, as he cannot determine on his own whether this blemish permanently disqualifies the firstborn animal from sacrifice, and he would not eat sacrificial meat outside the Temple courtyard, which is punishable by karet.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara begins to explain why Rabbi Ile’a’s ruling is needed. In the woman’s case she had no need to say anything; had she wished to deceive, she could simply have remarried without mentioning a prior marriage, so her disclosure is clearly voluntary. The priest is different. He cannot judge for himself whether the blemish is a permanent one that permits slaughter, and he would not risk eating consecrated meat outside the Temple, which carries the penalty of karet. He therefore has no choice but to bring the animal to an expert and reveal that it is a firstborn, so his disclosure is not a free choice. The thought continues in the next segment.
Key Terms:
- דְּאִי בָּעֲיָא לָא אָמְרָה = for had she wished, she would not have said it — her statement was voluntary
- לָא סַגִּיא דְּלָא אָמְרָה = it is impossible for him not to say it — he has no choice but to disclose
- קָדָשִׁים בְּחוּץ = consecrated meat eaten outside its permitted place, a transgression punishable by karet
- מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא = lest you say — introducing a mistaken assumption that a ruling comes to reject
Segment 8
TYPE: תירוץ (מיגו)
Rabbi Ile’a teaches that the priest is still believed: had he wanted to cheat, he could have made an obvious blemish and eaten the animal without asking
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֵימָא: לָא הַפֶּה שֶׁאָסַר הוּא, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן, דְּאִי מִשּׁוּם הָכִי — הֲוָה שָׁדֵי בֵּיהּ מוּמָא דְּנִיכָּר וְאָכֵיל לֵיהּ.
English Translation:
Since the priest must admit that this is a firstborn animal, I might say that this is not a case of: The mouth that prohibited it is the mouth that permitted it, and therefore the priest is not deemed credible. To dispel this possibility, Rabbi Ile’a teaches us that he is deemed credible, because if it due to that reason, that the priest is suspected of causing the blemish, he would have caused a blemish that is obvious to all. In such a case, he would violate a mere prohibition, not one that is punishable by karet, since he would not be eating sacrificial meat outside the Temple courtyard, as the animal is blemished.
קלאוד על הדף:
One might therefore have thought that this is not a true case of ‘the mouth that forbade,’ since the priest was forced to disclose the animal’s status, and he should not be believed about the blemish. Rabbi Ile’a teaches otherwise, using what amounts to a migo argument. Had the priest wanted to blemish the animal deliberately, he would have inflicted an obvious blemish (mum de-nikar) that needs no expert ruling and eaten the animal privately, violating only the prohibition of blemishing and not the karet-level sin of eating consecrated meat outside. The fact that he chose to present a subtle blemish to an expert shows that he is acting in good faith.
Key Terms:
- מוּמָא דְּנִיכָּר = an obvious, unmistakable blemish that clearly permits the firstborn
- שָׁדֵי בֵּיהּ מוּמָא = he inflicts a blemish on it
- אִי מִשּׁוּם הָכִי = if it were for that reason (i.e., if he intended to cheat)
- מִיגּוֹ = ‘since’ — a claim is believed since the claimant could have made a more advantageous claim
Segment 9
TYPE: קושיא (מעשה)
Mar bar Rav Ashi objects from the rented donkey that died on the forbidden Nehar Pekod road
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ מָר בַּר רַב אָשֵׁי: מַאי שְׁנָא מֵהָהוּא גַּבְרָא דְּאוֹגַר לֵיהּ חֲמָרָא לְחַבְרֵיהּ, וַאֲמַר לֵיהּ: לָא תֵּיזִיל בְּאוֹרְחָא דִּנְהַר פְּקוֹד דְּאִיכָּא מַיָּא, זִיל בְּאוֹרְחָא דְּנַרֶשׁ דְּלֵיכָּא מַיָּא. אֲזַל בְּאוֹרְחָא דִּנְהַר פְּקוֹד וּמִית חֲמָרָא, וַאֲתָא וַאֲמַר לֵיהּ: בְּאוֹרְחָא דִּנְהַר פְּקוֹד אָזְלִי, וּמִיהוּ מַיָּא לָא הֲווֹ.
English Translation:
Mar bar Rav Ashi objects to this: What is different between this case and that incident involving a certain man who rented a donkey to another? The owner said to the renter: Look, do not go on the path of Nehar Pekod, where there is water and the donkey is likely to drown. Instead, go on the path of Neresh, where there is no water. The renter went on the path of Nehar Pekod and the donkey died. When he came back, he said: Yes, I went on the path of Nehar Pekod, but there was no water there, and therefore the donkey’s death was caused by other factors.
קלאוד על הדף:
Mar bar Rav Ashi challenges Rabbi Ile’a’s reasoning by comparing it to a case of a rented donkey. The owner told the renter not to take the road of Nehar Pekod, where there was water and the donkey might drown, but to take the dry road of Neresh. The renter took the Nehar Pekod road anyway, the donkey died, and he admitted where he had gone but claimed that there was no water on the road at the time. The case will test whether a migo can protect a claim that runs against a known reality.
Key Terms:
- אוֹגַר לֵיהּ חֲמָרָא = he rented a donkey to him
- אוֹרְחָא = a road, a path
- נְהַר פְּקוֹד = Nehar Pekod, a place in Babylonia on a route with water
- נַרֶשׁ = Neresh, a Babylonian town on a dry route
- מַתְקֵיף לַהּ = he objects to it — an Amora’s challenge to a ruling
Segment 10
TYPE: מחלוקת (רבא ואביי)
Rava: believe the renter, since he could have claimed he took the other road; Abaye: no ‘why would he lie’ where witnesses can be brought
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וַאֲמַר רָבָא: מָה לוֹ לְשַׁקֵּר, אִי בָּעֵי אָמַר: בְּאוֹרְחָא דְּנַרֶשׁ אֲזַלִי. וַאֲמַר אַבָּיֵי: ״מָה לוֹ לְשַׁקֵּר״ בִּמְקוֹם עֵדִים לָא אָמְרִינַן.
English Translation:
And Rava said: The renter’s claim is accepted, due to the reasoning of: Why would he lie and state this claim? In other words, if this man wanted to lie, he could have told the donkey’s owner: I went on the path of Neresh, as the owner instructed. And Abaye said to Rava: We do not say the principle of: Why would he lie, in a place where there are witnesses. Since witnesses can be summoned to establish conclusively whether there was water along the path of Nehar Pekod, the reasoning that the renter could have stated a different claim is not employed. Similarly, the priest’s contention that the blemish occurred inadvertently should not be deemed credible, as it is known that priests are suspected of causing blemishes.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava believed the renter on the strength of mah lo leshaker — why would he lie? Had he wanted to lie, he could simply have said that he took the permitted road of Neresh, so his admission that he took Nehar Pekod lends credibility to his claim that there was no water. Abaye countered that this reasoning does not apply where witnesses are available (bi-mkom edim): it is well known that there is water on the Nehar Pekod road, and that can be established. Mar bar Rav Ashi’s point is that the priest is similar: it is known that priests are suspected of blemishing, which should defeat any migo in his favor.
Key Terms:
- מָה לוֹ לְשַׁקֵּר = why would he lie? — he could have made a better claim, so his actual claim is believed
- בִּמְקוֹם עֵדִים = where witnesses exist or the facts are established
- לָא אָמְרִינַן = we do not say (apply) this principle
- אִי בָּעֵי אָמַר = had he wished, he could have said
Segment 11
TYPE: דחייה; מעשה
The cases differ: on the road there is certainly water, while the priest’s blemishing is only a concern; Rava Zuti attributes the ruling to Rabbi Ile’a
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא?! הָתָם וַדַּאי אִיכָּא מַיָּא, הָכָא וַדַּאי שָׁדֵי בֵּיהּ מוּמָא — חֲשָׁשָׁא הוּא, וּבִמְקוֹם חֲשָׁשָׁא אָמְרִינַן ״מָה לוֹ לְשַׁקֵּר״. יָתֵיב רָבִינָא וְקָאָמַר לְהַאי שְׁמַעְתָּא בְּלָא גַּבְרָא, אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא זוּטֵי לְרָבִינָא: אֲנַן מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי אִילְעָא מַתְנִינַן לַהּ.
English Translation:
The Gemara rejects this suggestion: How can these cases be compared? There, with regard to the path of Nehar Pekod, there is certainly water there, but here, the possibility that the priest caused a blemish in the firstborn animal is only a concern, and in a place of mere concern we do say the reasoning of: Why would he lie? The Gemara relates that Ravina was sitting and saying this halakha of Rabbi Ile’a anonymously. Rava Zuti said to Ravina: We learned this halakha in the name of Rabbi Ile’a.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara rejects the comparison. On the Nehar Pekod road there certainly is water, so the renter’s claim contradicts a known fact and Abaye’s rule applies. With the priest there is no certainty that he blemished the animal, only a general concern (chashasha) about priests, and where there is only a concern the reasoning of ‘why would he lie’ still holds. This echoes the distinction at the top of the daf between a mere concern and an established presumption. The Gemara closes with a note on transmission: Ravina taught this halacha without attribution, and Rava Zuti told him that it was taught in the name of Rabbi Ile’a.
Key Terms:
- הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא = how can you compare? — rejecting an analogy
- וַדַּאי = certain, definite
- בִּמְקוֹם חֲשָׁשָׁא = where there is only a concern, not a certainty
- בְּלָא גַּבְרָא = without a man — stated anonymously, without naming its author
- מַתְנִינַן לַהּ = we teach it, we learned it
Segment 12
TYPE: מעשה (רבי צדוק)
Rabbi Tzadok’s firstborn split its lip on a wicker basket; Rabbi Yehoshua rules that a learned priest (chaver) is believed
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי צָדוֹק הֲוָה לֵיהּ בּוּכְרָא, רְמָא לֵיהּ שְׂעָרֵי בְּסַלֵּי, בַּהֲדֵי דְּקָאָכֵיל אִיבְּזַע שִׂיפְתֵּיהּ. אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ, אָמַר לוֹ: כְּלוּם חִילַּקְנוּ בֵּין חָבֵר לְעַם הָאָרֶץ? אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: הֵן.
English Translation:
§ The Gemara relates: Rabbi Tzadok, an erudite priest, had a firstborn animal. He placed barley in wicker baskets for it, and while it was eating, its lip split, rendering the animal blemished. Rabbi Tzadok came before Rabbi Yehoshua, to ask whether or not he is suspected of intentionally causing a blemish in his firstborn animal offering. Rabbi Tzadok said to him: Didn’t we differentiate between a priest who is a ḥaver, i.e., learned, and a priest who is an ignoramus, with regard to their credibility about blemishes found on a firstborn animal? Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: Yes, we did. Since you are a learned priest, you are deemed credible to testify that this blemish was caused inadvertently.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara now tells a famous story. Rabbi Tzadok, a priest and a Torah scholar, put barley in wicker baskets for his firstborn, and while eating it the animal split its lip, which is a blemish. Since priests are suspected of blemishing their firstborns, he asked Rabbi Yehoshua whether a distinction was made between a chaver and an am ha’aretz. Rabbi Yehoshua answered yes, implying that Rabbi Tzadok as a learned priest is believed that the blemish was accidental. The question of whether such a distinction exists sets up the confrontation that follows.
Key Terms:
- סַלֵּי = wicker baskets
- אִיבְּזַע שִׂיפְתֵּיהּ = its lip split — a recognised blemish in a firstborn
- חָבֵר = a chaver, a learned and trustworthy person who keeps the laws carefully
- עַם הָאָרֶץ = an ignoramus, one not careful about observance
- כְּלוּם חִילַּקְנוּ = did we make any distinction?
Segment 13
TYPE: מעשה (רבן גמליאל)
Rabban Gamliel says no distinction was made; told of Rabbi Yehoshua’s view, he defers until the scholars (‘masters of shields’) assemble
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, אָמַר לוֹ: חִילַּקְנוּ בֵּין חָבֵר לְעַם הָאָרֶץ? אָמַר לוֹ רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: לָא. אָמַר לוֹ: (והא) [וַהֲלֹא] רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אָמַר לִי הֵן! אָמַר לוֹ: הַמְתֵּן עַד שֶׁיַּעֲלוּ בַּעֲלֵי תְרִיסִין לְבֵית הַמִּדְרָשׁ.
English Translation:
Rabbi Tzadok then came before Rabban Gamliel, the Nasi and head of the academy of Yavne at the time. Rabbi Tzadok said to him: Didn’t we differentiate between a priest who is a ḥaver and a priest who is an ignoramus with regard to credibility about blemishes found on a firstborn animal? Rabban Gamliel said to him: No, we did not. Rabbi Tzadok said to him: But Rabbi Yehoshua said to me that yes, we did differentiate in this manner. Rabban Gamliel said to Rabbi Tzadok: Wait until the masters of the shields [ba’alei terisin], a reference to the Torah scholars who battle in the war of Torah, enter the study hall, at which point we will discuss this issue.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Tzadok put the same question to Rabban Gamliel, the Nasi in Yavne, who answered that no such distinction was made: every priest is suspect about blemishing his own firstborn. When Rabbi Tzadok reported that Rabbi Yehoshua had told him otherwise, Rabban Gamliel asked him to wait until the ba’alei terisin, the ‘masters of the shields,’ entered the study hall. The image of scholars as warriors bearing shields in the battle of Torah sets the stage for a public clarification of the law.
Key Terms:
- בַּעֲלֵי תְרִיסִין = ‘masters of the shields’ — the Torah scholars who do battle in halachic debate
- הַמְתֵּן = wait
- בֵּית הַמִּדְרָשׁ = the study hall
- רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל = Rabban Gamliel of Yavne, the Nasi
Segment 14
TYPE: מעשה
In the study hall Rabbi Yehoshua answers ‘no’; Rabban Gamliel confronts him with the report that he had said ‘yes’
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כֵּיוָן שֶׁנִּכְנְסוּ לְבֵית הַמִּדְרָשׁ, עָמַד הַשּׁוֹאֵל וְשָׁאַל: כְּלוּם חִילַּקְנוּ בֵּין חָבֵר לְעַם הָאָרֶץ? אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: לָאו. אָמַר לוֹ רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: וַהֲלֹא מִשִּׁמְךָ אָמְרוּ לִי הֵן!
English Translation:
When the Torah scholars entered the study hall, the questioner stood before everyone present and asked: With regard to blemishes found on a firstborn animal, didn’t we differentiate between a priest who is a ḥaver and a priest who is an ignoramus? Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: No, we did not. Rabban Gamliel said to him: But they said to me in your name that yes, we did differentiate.
קלאוד על הדף:
When the scholars assembled, Rabbi Tzadok stood and asked his question publicly. Rabbi Yehoshua now answered that no distinction was made, deferring to the Nasi’s view in the public forum. Rabban Gamliel immediately confronted him: ‘But they told me in your name that the answer is yes.’ The stage is set for a public challenge to Rabbi Yehoshua’s consistency and authority.
Key Terms:
- הַשּׁוֹאֵל = the questioner
- לָאו = no
- מִשִּׁמְךָ = in your name
- עָמַד = stood up
Segment 15
TYPE: מעשה
‘Yehoshua, stand on your feet’: Rabbi Yehoshua admits that the living cannot contradict the living
Hebrew/Aramaic:
יְהוֹשֻׁעַ, עֲמוֹד עַל רַגְלֶיךָ, וְיָעִידוּ בְּךָ. עָמַד רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ עַל רַגְלָיו וְאָמַר: הֵיאַךְ אֶעֱשֶׂה? אִילְמָלֵי אֲנִי חַי וְהוּא מֵת — יָכוֹל הַחַי לְהַכְחִישׁ אֶת הַמֵּת, עַכְשָׁיו שֶׁאֲנִי חַי וְהוּא חַי — הֵיאַךְ חַי יָכוֹל לְהַכְחִישׁ אֶת הַחַי?
English Translation:
Rabban Gamliel continued: Yehoshua, stand on your feet and they will testify against you that you did, in fact, say that we differentiated in such a case. Rabbi Yehoshua stood on his feet and said: How should I act in this situation? If I were alive and Rabbi Tzadok were dead, the living can contradict the dead, and I could deny issuing that ruling. Now that I am alive and he is alive, how can the living contradict the living? I have no choice but to admit that I said it.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabban Gamliel ordered Rabbi Yehoshua to stand so that witnesses could testify against him. Rabbi Yehoshua stood and explained his dilemma: had Rabbi Tzadok been dead, he could have denied the earlier statement, but with the questioner alive and present, one living person cannot deny another. In effect he admits having said it. A parallel episode in Berachot 27b, about whether the evening prayer is obligatory, uses the same phrase ‘Yehoshua, stand on your feet’ and also shows the tension between Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua.
Key Terms:
- עֲמוֹד עַל רַגְלֶיךָ = stand on your feet
- וְיָעִידוּ בְּךָ = and they will testify against you
- לְהַכְחִישׁ = to contradict, deny
- הַחַי וְהַמֵּת = the living and the dead
Segment 16
TYPE: מעשה (סוף)
Rabban Gamliel lectures while Rabbi Yehoshua stands, until the people murmur and tell Chutzpit the meturgeman to stop
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהָיָה רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל עוֹמֵד וְדוֹרֵשׁ, וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ עוֹמֵד עַל רַגְלָיו, עַד שֶׁרִינְּנוּ כׇּל הָעָם וְאָמְרוּ לְחוּצְפִּית הַמְתוּרְגְּמָן: עֲמוֹד! וְעָמַד.
English Translation:
In the meantime, Rabban Gamliel was standing and lecturing, and Rabbi Yehoshua all the while was standing on his feet, as Rabban Gamliel did not instruct him to sit. He remained standing in deference to the Nasi. This continued for some time, until it aroused great resentment against Rabban Gamliel, and all of the people assembled began murmuring and said to Ḥutzpit the disseminator: Stop conveying Rabban Gamliel’s lecture, and he stopped.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabban Gamliel went on lecturing and left Rabbi Yehoshua standing the whole time, which publicly humiliated a great scholar. Eventually the people murmured in protest and told Chutzpit the meturgeman, who repeated the Nasi’s words aloud to the assembly, to stop, and he stopped. Halting the meturgeman effectively ended the lecture, a striking public rebuke of the Nasi. The account here ends at that point, without stating how the halachic question was settled.
Key Terms:
- עוֹמֵד וְדוֹרֵשׁ = standing and expounding (lecturing)
- רִינְּנוּ = they murmured, grumbled in protest
- חוּצְפִּית הַמְתוּרְגְּמָן = Chutzpit the meturgeman, who announced the lecturer’s words to the audience
- מְתוּרְגְּמָן = the interpreter who repeats the Sage’s lecture aloud to the crowd
Segment 17
TYPE: משנה
A priest is believed to say: I showed this firstborn to an expert, and it is blemished
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְנִי׳ נֶאֱמָן הַכֹּהֵן לוֹמַר: הֶרְאֵיתִי בְּכוֹר זֶה וּבַעַל מוּם הוּא.
English Translation:
MISHNA: A priest is deemed credible to say: I showed this firstborn animal to an expert and he ruled that it is blemished.
קלאוד על הדף:
A new mishna rules that a priest is believed when he says that he has already shown a firstborn to an expert, who found it blemished and permitted it. Despite the general suspicion that priests blemish firstborns, he is trusted about the expert’s ruling. The Gemara will discuss the reason: either because a claim that is likely to be checked is not a lie people tell, or because a priest would never risk eating consecrated meat outside the Temple without a valid ruling.
Key Terms:
- הֶרְאֵיתִי = I showed (it to an expert)
- בַּעַל מוּם = blemished, possessing a disqualifying blemish
- נֶאֱמָן הַכֹּהֵן = the priest is believed
- מוּמְחֶה = an expert authorised to rule on blemishes
Segment 18
TYPE: מימרא וסיוע
Rav: a priest is believed that an Israelite gave him the firstborn already blemished, since people do not lie about what will be revealed; Rav Ashi cites the mishna in support
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: נֶאֱמָן הַכֹּהֵן לוֹמַר ״בְּכוֹר זֶה נָתַן לִי יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּמוּמוֹ״. מַאי טַעְמָא? כֹּל מִילְּתָא דַּעֲבִידָא לְאִיגַּלּוֹיֵי לָא מְשַׁקְּרִי בַּהּ אִינָשֵׁי. אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: אַף אֲנַן נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא, נֶאֱמָן הַכֹּהֵן לוֹמַר ״הֶרְאֵיתִי בְּכוֹר זֶה וּבַעַל מוּם הוּא״. מַאי טַעְמָא? לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמְרִינַן כֹּל מִילְּתָא דַּעֲבִידָא לְאִיגַּלּוֹיֵי לָא מְשַׁקְּרִי בַּהּ אִינָשֵׁי?
English Translation:
GEMARA: Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: A priest is deemed credible to say: An Israelite gave me this firstborn animal with its blemish already inflicted upon it. What is the reason? With regard to any matter that is likely to be revealed, people do not lie about it. Since the Israelite can be questioned with regard to the veracity of the priest’s claim, it is assumed that the priest will not risk lying. Rav Ashi said: We learn a similar principle in the mishna as well: A priest is deemed credible to say: I showed this firstborn animal to an expert and he ruled that it is blemished. What is the reason the priest’s claim is deemed credible? Is it not because we say that with regard to any matter that is likely to be revealed, people do not lie about it?
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Yehuda reports Rav’s ruling that a priest is believed to say that an Israelite gave him the firstborn with its blemish already present. The reason is milta de-avida le-igluyei: people do not lie about something that is likely to be revealed, and the Israelite could easily be asked. Rav Ashi suggests that the mishna already teaches this, since the priest’s claim that he showed the animal to an expert is also easily checked. The Gemara will test whether the mishna really rests on this principle.
Key Terms:
- מִילְּתָא דַּעֲבִידָא לְאִיגַּלּוֹיֵי = a matter that is likely to be revealed
- לָא מְשַׁקְּרִי בַּהּ אִינָשֵׁי = people do not lie about it
- בְּמוּמוֹ = with its blemish (already present)
- אַף אֲנַן נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא = we also learned this (in a mishna)
Segment 19
TYPE: דחייה
The mishna rests on another reason: the priest would not eat consecrated meat outside; but in Rav’s case, suspect priests remain suspect
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָתָם הוּא דְּקָדָשִׁים בְּחוּץ לָא אָכֵיל, אֲבָל הָכָא, כֵּיוָן דַּחֲשִׁידִי — חֲשִׁידִי.
English Translation:
The Gemara rejects the claim that the mishna’s ruling is based on the principle that people do not lie about a matter that is likely to be revealed: Perhaps there, in the case of the mishna, the reason the priest’s claim is accepted is that he would not eat sacrificial meat outside the Temple courtyard. If an expert had not permitted the meat, the priest would not eat it. But here, in Rav’s case, where the priest claims an Israelite gave him an already blemished animal, since priests are suspected of causing blemishes and claiming that it was inadvertent, they are also suspected of causing a blemish and claiming it was given to them in that state by an Israelite.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara rejects Rav Ashi’s proof. In the mishna the priest may be believed for a different reason: he would not eat consecrated meat outside the Temple, a karet offence, unless an expert had truly permitted it. In Rav’s case that reasoning does not help, since the blemish is admittedly present and the only question is who caused it. Since priests are suspected of blemishing firstborns, they may equally be suspected of blaming an Israelite, so the mishna gives no support to Rav.
Key Terms:
- כֵּיוָן דַּחֲשִׁידִי — חֲשִׁידִי = since they are suspected, they are suspected — the suspicion extends to this false claim as well
- קָדָשִׁים בְּחוּץ לָא אָכֵיל = he would not eat consecrated meat outside
- הָתָם / הָכָא = there (in the mishna) / here (in Rav’s case)
- חֲשִׁיד = suspected
Segment 20
TYPE: קושיא (ממשנה בדמאי)
Rav Sheizevi objects from Demai 4:5: an untrustworthy agent is not believed that he bought from a reliable tither
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מֵתִיב רַב שֵׁיזְבִי: הָאוֹמֵר לְמִי שֶׁאֵין נֶאֱמָן עַל הַמַּעֲשֵׂר ״קַח לִי מִמִּי שֶׁהוּא נֶאֱמָן״ אוֹ ״מִמִּי שֶׁהוּא מְעַשֵּׂר״ — אֵינוֹ נֶאֱמָן. אַמַּאי? נֵימָא: כֹּל מִילְּתָא דַּעֲבִידָא לְאִיגַּלּוֹיֵי לָא מְשַׁקְּרִי בַּהּ אִינָשֵׁי!
English Translation:
Rav Sheizevi raises an objection to Rav’s ruling from a mishna (Demai 4:5): In the case of one who says to someone who is not trusted with regard to tithe: Purchase produce for me from someone who is trusted with regard to tithes, i.e., one who does not purchase produce from an ignoramus, who generally does not separate tithes; or if he says: Purchase produce for me from someone who tithes, i.e., even from one who purchases produce from an ignoramus but is careful to set aside tithes upon purchasing the produce, the agent is not deemed credible to claim that he fulfilled the condition of the one who appointed him. According to Rav, why isn’t the agent deemed credible? Say the principle that with regard to any matter that is likely to be revealed, people do not lie about it.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Sheizevi challenges Rav from a mishna in Demai 4:5. If someone tells a person who is not trusted about tithes to buy produce for him from a trustworthy person, or from one who tithes, the agent is not believed when he says that he did so. According to Rav this is puzzling: the agent’s claim could easily be checked, so by the principle that people do not lie about what is likely to be revealed he ought to be believed.
Key Terms:
- מֵתִיב = he raises an objection (from a tannaitic source)
- נֶאֱמָן עַל הַמַּעֲשֵׂר = trusted regarding tithes
- מְעַשֵּׂר = one who separates tithes
- דְּמַאי = produce bought from an am ha’aretz, about which it is uncertain whether tithes were separated
Segment 21
TYPE: תירוץ (תחילתו)
The Gemara begins its answer: ‘It is different there…’ (continued on 36b)
Hebrew/Aramaic:
שָׁאנֵי הָתָם,
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: It is different there,
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara starts to distinguish the Demai mishna from Rav’s case, saying ‘it is different there.’ The sentence breaks off at the end of the amud and finishes at the top of 36b, where the reason is given: the agent has an easy way to excuse himself if challenged. The distinction will show that the principle of a matter likely to be revealed works only where a lie can actually be exposed.
Key Terms:
- שָׁאנֵי הָתָם = it is different there
- הָתָם = there, in the other case under discussion
- שָׁאנֵי = different, distinguished
- מִילְּתָא דַּעֲבִידָא לְאִיגַּלּוֹיֵי = a matter likely to be revealed — the principle being tested
Amud Bet (36b)
Segment 1
TYPE: תירוץ (סופו)
…because the agent can excuse himself: ‘I thought that seller was trustworthy’
Hebrew/Aramaic:
דְּאִית לֵיהּ לְאִשְׁתְּמוֹטֵי.
English Translation:
as he has the easy option of extricating himself from the accusation that he did not fulfill the condition of the one who appointed him, by claiming that in his opinion the individual from whom he purchased the produce was to be trusted. Since the issue of the third party’s trustworthiness is subjective, the agent is not afraid to lie.
קלאוד על הדף:
This completes the answer begun at the end of 36a. In the Demai case the agent has an easy way out (ishtemutei): if challenged, he can say that in his judgement the seller was trustworthy. Since trustworthiness is a matter of opinion, his lie cannot really be exposed, and so he is not afraid to lie. Rav’s priest, by contrast, names a concrete fact — that a particular Israelite gave him an already blemished animal — which can be checked and would expose a liar.
Key Terms:
- לְאִשְׁתְּמוֹטֵי = to slip out, to excuse himself (with a plausible explanation)
- אִית לֵיהּ = he has (an option)
- דְּאִית לֵיהּ לְאִשְׁתְּמוֹטֵי = since he has a way to extricate himself
- נֶאֱמָן = trustworthy, believed
Segment 2
TYPE: סיוע
The latter clause of the Demai mishna supports Rav: if told to buy from a named person, the agent is believed
Hebrew/Aramaic:
סֵיפָא וַדַּאי מְסַיְּיעָא לֵיהּ: מֵאִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי — הֲרֵי זֶה נֶאֱמָן.
English Translation:
The Gemara suggests: The latter clause of this mishna certainly supports the ruling of Rav, that people do not lie with regard to any matter that will be revealed. How so? The latter clause states that if the one instructed the agent to purchase produce specifically from so-and-so, who is reliable with regard to tithes, then this agent is deemed credible to claim that he adhered to the instructions. Since the one who appointed him mentioned a specific individual, the agent is not suspected of lying, as that individual can be subsequently questioned.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara now suggests that the latter clause of the same mishna clearly supports Rav. If the sender told the agent to buy from a specific named person, the agent is believed when he says that he did so. Here the agent has no way to wriggle out, since the named seller can simply be asked, and so the principle that people do not lie about something likely to be revealed seems to be at work.
Key Terms:
- סֵיפָא = the latter clause (of a mishna or baraita)
- מְסַיְּיעָא לֵיהּ = supports him
- אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי = so-and-so, a specific named person
- וַדַּאי = certainly
Segment 3
TYPE: דחייה
Rejected: there the sender is a claimant who will check, so the agent is afraid; in Rav’s case no one is pressing the priest
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָתָם, כֵּיוָן דְּאִית לֵיהּ תּוֹבֵעַ, מִירְתַת.
English Translation:
The Gemara rejects this proof: There, in the mishna, since the agent has a claimant, he is afraid to lie. In other words, since the one who appointed him specified an individual, the agent presumes that he intends to verify the matter, and therefore he will not risk lying. By contrast, in Rav’s case, since it was the priest who volunteered the information that a specific Israelite gave him an already blemished firstborn animal, he is not concerned that the examiner might seek out the Israelite to confirm the actual facts.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara rejects the proof. In the latter clause of the mishna the sender himself named the seller, so he is a claimant (to’ea) who can be expected to check, and the agent is afraid (mirtat) to lie. In Rav’s case it is the priest who volunteers the name of the Israelite, and no one has a particular reason to investigate. The proof from the mishna therefore does not hold, and Rav’s ruling stands without support.
Key Terms:
- תּוֹבֵעַ = a claimant, an interested party who will pursue the matter
- מִירְתַת = he is afraid, he trembles (to lie)
- כֵּיוָן דְּ… = since…
- הָתָם = there
Segment 4
TYPE: גירסא אחרת (רבי ירמיה בר אבא)
Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba: Rav Yehuda had it wrong via Giddul — the ruling was that an Israelite is believed to say he gave it to a priest blemished
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה בַּר אַבָּא: מְנָא לֵיהּ לִיהוּדָה הָא? אֲנָא בְּגִידּוּל קְבַעְתָּיהּ, וְגִידּוּל קְבַע בְּדִידֵיהּ. וְהָכִי אָמְרִי לֵיהּ: נֶאֱמָן יִשְׂרָאֵל לוֹמַר ״בְּכוֹר זֶה נָתַתִּי לְכֹהֵן בְּמוּמוֹ״.
English Translation:
Upon hearing Rav Yehuda’s statement in the name of Rav, Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba said: From where does Yehuda know this halakha? Actually, I taught this halakha to Giddul in Rav’s name and Giddul, in turn, taught it to Rabbi Yehuda. But Giddul corrupted my statement, as this is how I said it to him: An Israelite is deemed credible to say: I gave this firstborn animal to a priest with its blemish already inflicted upon it, and it may be slaughtered and eaten.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba questions where Rav Yehuda got his version of Rav’s ruling. He says that he himself taught it to Giddul, and Giddul passed it on to Rav Yehuda in a garbled form. What he actually taught was the reverse: an Israelite is believed to say that he gave the firstborn to a priest already blemished. This turns the ruling from a leniency about the suspected priest into one about the Israelite giver, who has no stake in the matter.
Key Terms:
- מְנָא לֵיהּ = from where does he have (this)?
- קְבַעְתָּיהּ = I fixed it, established it (taught it)
- קְבַע בְּדִידֵיהּ = he fixed it in his own way, he distorted it
- נָתַתִּי לְכֹהֵן = I gave it to a priest
Segment 5
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Obvious that the Israelite is believed? Needed for an animal given young that has since grown
Hebrew/Aramaic:
יִשְׂרָאֵל? פְּשִׁיטָא! לָא צְרִיכָא בְּקָטָן וְהִגְדִּיל, מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: לָא קִים לֵיהּ? קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: An Israelite? It is obvious that he is deemed credible to issue this claim, as he has no use for the firstborn animal. The Gemara answers: No, this ruling is necessary, as it is referring to an animal that was young when the Israelite gave it to the priest and it grew older by the time of his testimony. This ruling is necessary, lest you say that as the animal grew older in the interim, perhaps the Israelite does not recognize it and mistakenly assumes that it was the animal he gave the priest, when in fact it is a different firstborn animal upon which the priest intentionally caused a blemish. Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba therefore teaches us that the Israelite is trusted to recognize the animal he gave the priest.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara asks why this version needs to be stated, since the Israelite has nothing to gain and is obviously believed. The answer is that it refers to an animal that was young (katan) when given and has grown (higdil) by the time of the testimony. One might think that the Israelite cannot reliably recognise the grown animal and might be mistaking it for another firstborn the priest blemished himself. Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba teaches that he is believed to identify it.
Key Terms:
- פְּשִׁיטָא = it is obvious
- קָטָן וְהִגְדִּיל = it was small and has grown
- לָא קִים לֵיהּ = he is not sure of it, he does not clearly recognise it
- קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן = he teaches us
Segment 6
TYPE: פסק הלכה
Sura teaches the second version, Pumbedita the first; the halacha follows even the first version
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בְּסוּרָא מַתְנוּ כְּלִשָּׁנָא בָתְרָא, בְּפוּמְבְּדִיתָא כְּלִשָּׁנָא קַמָּא, וְהִלְכְתָא אֲפִילּוּ כְּלִשָּׁנָא קַמָּא.
English Translation:
The Gemara notes: In Sura, they teach the halakha in accordance with the latter version, as stated by Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba, that an Israelite is deemed credible to testify. In Pumbedita, they teach the halakha in accordance with the first version, as taught by Rav Yehuda, citing Rav, that even a priest is deemed credible if he claims that an Israelite gave him an already blemished firstborn animal. The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is in accordance with even the first version.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara records that the two great Babylonian academies preserved different versions. In Sura they taught Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba’s later version, that the Israelite is believed; in Pumbedita they taught Rav Yehuda’s first version, that the priest himself is believed. The final ruling is that the halacha follows even the first version, so a priest is believed to say that an Israelite gave him the firstborn already blemished, and an Israelite is certainly believed.
Key Terms:
- סוּרָא = Sura, a leading Babylonian academy
- פּוּמְבְּדִיתָא = Pumbedita, the other leading Babylonian academy
- לִשָּׁנָא קַמָּא / בָתְרָא = the first version / the latter version
- אֲפִילּוּ = even
Segment 7
TYPE: מעשה (רפרם)
Rafram’s own firstborn, given unblemished, is brought back to him blemished by the priest claiming an Israelite gave it so
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַפְרָם בְּפוּמְבְּדִיתָא הֲוָה לֵיהּ בּוּכְרָא, וְיַהֲבֵיהּ לֵיהּ לְכֹהֵן בְּלָא מוּמָא. אֲזַל שְׁדָא בֵּיהּ מוּמָא. יוֹמָא חַד חֲלַשׁ בְּעֵינֵיהּ, אַיְיתְיֵהּ לְקַמֵּיהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: בְּכוֹר זֶה נָתַן לִי יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּמוּמוֹ. אַרְפְּסִינֵיהּ לְעֵינֵיהּ, חַזְיֵיהּ בְּשִׁקְרֵיהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לָאו אֲנָא דִּיהֵיבְתֵּיהּ לָךְ?
English Translation:
In this regard, the Gemara relates that Rafram, who resided in Pumbedita, had a firstborn animal and he gave it to a priest in an unblemished state. The priest went and caused a blemish in it. One day, Rafram had an affliction in his eyes, which rendered it difficult for him to open them. The priest to whom Rafram had given the firstborn animal brought it before him, as an expert examiner, for him to deem the animal permitted. The priest said to him: An Israelite gave me this firstborn animal with its blemish upon it. Rafram forced his eyes open and saw the animal and recognized it [bashkerei] as the one he himself had given the priest. Rafram said to the priest: Is it not I who gave this firstborn animal to you?
קלאוד על הדף:
Rafram of Pumbedita gave a firstborn to a priest unblemished, and the priest went and blemished it. One day, when Rafram’s eyes were troubling him, the priest brought the animal before him for a ruling, claiming that an Israelite had given it to him already blemished — the very claim the Pumbedita version believes. Rafram forced his eyes open, recognised the animal, and exposed the lie: ‘Wasn’t it I who gave it to you?’
Key Terms:
- חֲלַשׁ בְּעֵינֵיהּ = he was weak in his eyes, his eyes were ailing
- אַרְפְּסִינֵיהּ לְעֵינֵיהּ = he forced his eyes open
- חַזְיֵיהּ בְּשִׁקְרֵיהּ = he saw it and recognised it as the very animal he had given
- לָאו אֲנָא דִּיהֵיבְתֵּיהּ לָךְ = is it not I who gave it to you?
Segment 8
TYPE: מסקנת המעשה
Even so, Rafram did not change the law: only this priest is brazen; priests in general are not
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וַאֲפִילּוּ הָכִי לָא חַשׁ לַהּ לְמִילְּתָא, הַאי הוּא דַּחֲצִיף, כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא חֲצִיפִי.
English Translation:
The Gemara notes: And even so, Rafram was unconcerned by the matter of the priest’s attempted chicanery, as he maintained that it is only this priest who is impudent, but all other priests are not impudent. This scenario did not cause Rafram to discredit any other priest’s claim that he received a blemished firstborn animal from an Israelite, as this was an exceptional case. This priest demonstrated extreme impudence by bringing it to be examined by Rafram himself, and therefore one cannot draw conclusions about the behavior of other priests from this incident.
קלאוד על הדף:
Even after catching a priest in a direct lie, Rafram did not abandon the ruling of the Pumbedita version. He reasoned that this priest was exceptionally brazen (chatzif), having brought the animal to the very man who had given it to him. Ordinary priests are not so brazen, and the presumption that people do not lie about what can be easily revealed remains valid. A single bad actor does not overturn a general rule.
Key Terms:
- לָא חַשׁ לַהּ לְמִילְּתָא = he did not take the matter into account (as a precedent)
- חֲצִיף = brazen, impudent
- כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא = everyone, people in general
- וַאֲפִילּוּ הָכִי = and even so
Segment 9
TYPE: מעשה (רב אשי)
A saru’a (one eye larger than the other) is brought to Rav Ashi: priest or Israelite, it is a firstborn with its blemish from birth
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָהוּא שָׂרוּעַ דַּאֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב אָשֵׁי, אָמַר: לְמַאי נֵיחוּשׁ לֵיהּ? אִי כֹּהֵן הוּא, אִי יִשְׂרָאֵל הוּא — הֲרֵי בְּכוֹר וּמוּמוֹ עִמּוֹ.
English Translation:
§ The Gemara relates that there was a certain firstborn animal, one of whose eyes was larger than the other, whose owner came before Rav Ashi to have it deemed fit for slaughter on account of its blemish. Uncertain as to who brought the animal for examination, Rav Ashi said: For what should we be concerned with regard to this animal? In a case of such a blemish, whether it is a priest who brought it for examination, or whether it is an Israelite, there is no concern that the blemish might have been intentionally caused, as this is clearly a firstborn animal whose blemish was already with it naturally.
קלאוד על הדף:
A firstborn with one eye larger than the other (saru’a) was brought to Rav Ashi, and it was not clear whether its owner was a priest or an Israelite. Rav Ashi ruled that it makes no difference. This blemish is congenital and cannot be inflicted, so there is no concern that anyone caused it; the animal is clearly ‘a firstborn with its blemish with it,’ and he permitted it.
Key Terms:
- שָׂרוּעַ = a disproportionate limb; here, one eye larger than the other
- לְמַאי נֵיחוּשׁ לֵיהּ = about what should we be concerned?
- בְּכוֹר וּמוּמוֹ עִמּוֹ = a firstborn whose blemish is with it (from birth)
- אִי … אִי = whether … or
Segment 10
TYPE: קושיא
Ravina: but Rav Yehuda says a Yisrael’s firstborn may not be examined unless a priest is present
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: וְדִלְמָא יִשְׂרָאֵל הוּא, וְאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: אֵין רוֹאִין בְּכוֹר יִשְׂרָאֵל אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן כֹּהֵן עִמּוֹ!
English Translation:
Ravina said to Rav Ashi: But perhaps it is an Israelite who brought the firstborn animal, and Rav Yehuda says that one may not examine the firstborn animal of an Israelite unless a priest is present with him in order to receive the animal if it is established as fit for slaughter. Rav Yehuda is concerned that if the Israelite’s firstborn animal is deemed fit for slaughter when no priest is present, the Israelite might improperly use the animal for his own purposes. If so, how can you, Rav Ashi, say that there is no problem if this animal was brought by an Israelite?
קלאוד על הדף:
Ravina objects that if the owner is an Israelite, Rav Yehuda has ruled that one may not examine an Israelite’s firstborn unless a priest is present with him. The concern is that once the animal is permitted, the Israelite might keep it for himself instead of giving it to a priest. Rav Ashi should therefore have checked who brought the animal before ruling.
Key Terms:
- אֵין רוֹאִין = one does not examine (a firstborn for blemishes)
- כֹּהֵן עִמּוֹ = a priest with him (present at the examination)
- וְדִלְמָא = but perhaps
- בְּכוֹר יִשְׂרָאֵל = a firstborn born in an Israelite’s flock
Segment 11
TYPE: תירוץ
Rav Ashi: Rav Yehuda’s case concerns a doubtful blemish; the Israelite won’t eat it outside, but he is suspect about the priest’s money
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא?! הָתָם, נְהִי דְּקָדָשִׁים בְּחוּץ לָא אָכֵיל, אַמָּמוֹנֵיהּ דְּכֹהֵן חֲשִׁיד.
English Translation:
Rav Ashi said to Ravina in response: How can these cases be compared? There, where the presence of a priest is required, it is referring to a case where the halakhic status of the blemish has yet to be determined. Now, granted an Israelite will not risk eating sacrificial meat outside the Temple courtyard, as that incurs a penalty of karet, and he therefore would have the blemish’s status determined by an expert. But he is suspected with regard to the property of a priest. Although the Israelite will have the status of the animal confirmed before risking a prohibition that entails karet, he might steal the firstborn offering if it is established as fit for consumption.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Ashi answers that the cases are not comparable. Rav Yehuda’s rule addresses a blemish whose status is uncertain. An Israelite would not risk eating consecrated meat outside the Temple, so he brings the animal to an expert, but once it is permitted he may be suspected of keeping the priest’s property. The priest’s presence ensures that the animal reaches him.
Key Terms:
- הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא = how can you compare?
- נְהִי דְּ… = granted that…
- אַמָּמוֹנֵיהּ דְּכֹהֵן = regarding the priest’s money (property)
- חֲשִׁיד = suspected
Segment 12
TYPE: תירוץ (המשך)
Here the blemish is plainly valid; the Israelite came only to honour the Sage — one who honours the Sage will not steal
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָכָא, מִכְּדֵי יָדַע דְּהַאי מוּם מוּבְהָק הוּא, מַאי טַעְמָא אַתְיוּהּ קַמֵּיהּ רַבָּנַן? מִשּׁוּם כְּבוֹדוֹ דְּחָכָם; עַל כְּבוֹדוֹ דְּחָכָם לָא עָבֵיד, אִיסּוּרָא עָבֵד?!
English Translation:
Conversely, here, in the case of the animal that had one eye larger than the other, since even an Israelite knows that this is a clear-cut blemish and the animal is clearly fit for slaughter, what is the reason he brought the animal before the Sages for examination? He brought it out of respect for the Sage. Now, if this Israelite does not neglect the respect due a Sage, would he commit a transgression and steal the possession of the priest? Certainly not. Therefore, in our case an Israelite would be trustworthy, and the presence of a priest is unnecessary.
קלאוד על הדף:
In the case of the saru’a, by contrast, even an Israelite knows that the blemish is clear-cut (muvhak), so he did not really need a ruling. He came only out of respect for the Sage. Someone who is so careful about the Sage’s honour can be trusted not to commit the transgression of stealing the priest’s firstborn, so no priest needs to be present.
Key Terms:
- מוּם מוּבְהָק = a clear-cut, obvious blemish
- כְּבוֹדוֹ דְּחָכָם = the honour of the Sage
- מִכְּדֵי = since, after all
- אִיסּוּרָא עָבֵד = would he commit a prohibition?
Segment 13
TYPE: משנה
All are believed about the blemishes of a tithe animal, even the owner
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְנִי׳ הַכֹּל נֶאֱמָנִין עַל מוּמֵי מַעֲשֵׂר.
English Translation:
MISHNA: Everyone is deemed credible to testify about the blemishes of an animal tithe offering, even the owner who is the beneficiary of a ruling that it is blemished.
קלאוד על הדף:
A new mishna rules that everyone, including the owner, is believed about blemishes on an animal tithe (ma’aser behema). Unlike a firstborn, which belongs to a priest, the tithe animal is eaten by its owner, yet he is still trusted. The Gemara explains why there is no suspicion here.
Key Terms:
- מוּמֵי מַעֲשֵׂר = blemishes of the animal tithe
- מַעֲשֵׂר בְּהֵמָה = the animal tithe — every tenth animal passing under the rod is consecrated
- הַכֹּל נֶאֱמָנִין = all are believed
- נֶאֱמָן = believed
Segment 14
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Why believed? He could have blemished it beforehand. Difficulty: he does not know which animal will come out tenth
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גְּמָ׳ מַאי טַעְמָא? דְּאִי בָּעֵי שָׁדֵי בֵּיהּ מוּמָא מֵעִיקָּרָא! מִי יָדַע הֵי נָפֵיק?
English Translation:
GEMARA: What is the reason that even the owner is deemed credible to testify? The reason is that had he wanted, he could have caused a blemish in it initially, in a permitted manner, before tithing his animals. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But when he leads his animals out of the gate in order to tithe them, does he know which of them will emerge as the tenth, that you say he could have initially blemished that specific animal before it assumed the tithe status?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara explains that the owner could have blemished the animal before tithing, when doing so was permitted, so there was no reason to blemish it afterward. It immediately asks how that can be: when the animals pass through the gate, the owner does not know which one will come out tenth, so he could not have blemished that specific animal in advance.
Key Terms:
- שָׁדֵי בֵּיהּ מוּמָא מֵעִיקָּרָא = he could have blemished it from the start
- הֵי נָפֵיק = which one will come out
- מִי יָדַע = does he know?
- מַאי טַעְמָא = what is the reason?
Segment 15
TYPE: תירוץ (דרשה)
He may not choose the tenth (‘he shall not search whether good or bad’); rather, he could have blemished his whole flock beforehand
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְכִי תֵּימָא מַפֵּיק לֵיהּ בְּרֵישׁ עַשְׂרָה, ״לֹא יְבַקֵּר בֵּין טוֹב לָרַע״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא! אֶלָּא דְּאִי בָּעֵי שָׁדֵי בֵּיהּ מוּמָא (בכולי) [בְּכוּלֵּיהּ] עֶדְרֵיהּ.
English Translation:
And if you would say that he intentionally leads an animal out as the head of the ten, i.e., so that it is the last of ten to emerge, one may not do so, as the Merciful One states: “He shall not search whether it be good or bad” (Leviticus 27:33), which teaches that the animal tithe may not be led out intentionally but must exit of its own accord. Rather, this is the meaning of the Gemara’s initial answer: The reason is that had he wanted, he could have caused a blemish in his entire flock, in a permitted manner, before leading them through the gate in order to tithe them.
קלאוד על הדף:
One might suggest that the owner could deliberately send a particular animal out tenth. The Gemara rejects this, since the Torah says ‘he shall not search whether it be good or bad’ (Vayikra 27:33): the tithe animal must emerge on its own. The real answer is that he could have blemished his entire flock before tithing, which was permitted at that stage. Since he had that option, there is no reason to suspect him of blemishing the tenth animal afterward.
Key Terms:
- לֹא יְבַקֵּר בֵּין טוֹב לָרַע = ‘he shall not search whether it be good or bad’ (Vayikra 27:33)
- רֵישׁ עַשְׂרָה = head of ten (the tenth to pass)
- עֶדְרֵיהּ = his flock
- אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא = the Merciful One (the Torah) said
Segment 16
TYPE: משנה (מחלוקת)
A firstborn with a blinded eye, severed foreleg or broken hind leg may be slaughtered on the word of three ordinary Jews; Rabbi Yosei requires an expert
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְנִי׳ בְּכוֹר שֶׁנִּסְמֵית עֵינוֹ, וְשֶׁנִּקְטְעָה יָדוֹ, וְשֶׁנִּשְׁבְּרָה רַגְלוֹ — הֲרֵי זֶה יִשָּׁחֵט עַל פִּי שְׁלֹשָׁה בְּנֵי הַכְּנֶסֶת. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: אֲפִילּוּ יֵשׁ שָׁם עֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה, אֵינוֹ נִשְׁחָט אֶלָּא עַל פִּי מוּמְחֶה.
English Translation:
MISHNA: With regard to a firstborn animal whose eye was blinded or whose foreleg was severed or whose hind leg was broken, all of which obviously render the animal permanently blemished, that animal may be slaughtered on the basis of the ruling of three regular Jews who attend the synagogue, and it does not require a ruling by one of the Sages. Rabbi Yosei disagrees and says: Even if there is a court of twenty-three Sages there, it may be slaughtered only on the basis of the ruling of an expert in judging blemishes.
קלאוד על הדף:
The mishna rules that a firstborn with a blinded eye, a severed foreleg, or a broken hind leg — blemishes that anyone can recognise — may be slaughtered on the ruling of three ordinary members of the community (benei ha-keneset). Rabbi Yosei disagrees: even a court of twenty-three Sages may not permit it; only an expert in blemishes may do so.
Key Terms:
- שְׁלֹשָׁה בְּנֵי הַכְּנֶסֶת = three members of the synagogue — ordinary Jews, not experts
- נִסְמֵית עֵינוֹ = its eye was blinded
- נִקְטְעָה יָדוֹ = its foreleg was severed
- עֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה = twenty-three, the number of judges on a Sanhedrin Ketana
Segment 17
TYPE: מימרא
Permitting a firstborn outside Eretz Yisrael may be done by three ordinary Jews; Rava: only for clear-cut blemishes
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גְּמָ׳ רַבִּי שִׂמְלַאי וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה נְשִׂיאָה תַּרְוַיְיהוּ מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי אָמְרִי, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ: רַבִּי שִׂמְלַאי וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי יְהוּדָה נְשִׂיאָה אָמְרִי: הַתָּרַת בְּכוֹר בְּחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ עַל פִּי שְׁלֹשָׁה בְּנֵי הַכְּנֶסֶת. אָמַר רָבָא: וּבְמוּמִין מוּבְהָקִין.
English Translation:
GEMARA: The Gemara relates that Rabbi Simlai and Rabbi Yehuda Nesia both say in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, and some say that Rabbi Simlai and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi both say in the name of Rabbi Yehuda Nesia: The permitting of the slaughter of a firstborn animal outside of Eretz Yisrael, where a firstborn offering is unfit for sacrifice even when the Temple is standing, may be performed on the basis of the ruling of three regular Jews who attend the synagogue. Rava said: And this ruling applies specifically in a case of clear-cut blemishes, i.e., those blemishes which clearly permit the slaughter of the firstborn animal.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara cites a ruling in the name of Rabbi Simlai, Rabbi Yehuda Nesia and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, with two versions of who said it in whose name: a firstborn outside Eretz Yisrael may be permitted by three ordinary Jews. Rava adds that this applies only to clear-cut blemishes (mumin muvhakin), meaning those that anyone can identify.
Key Terms:
- חוּצָה לָאָרֶץ = outside Eretz Yisrael
- הַתָּרַת בְּכוֹר = permitting a firstborn for slaughter
- מוּמִין מוּבְהָקִין = clear-cut blemishes
- וְאָמְרִי לַהּ = and some say (an alternative attribution)
Segment 18
TYPE: קושיא
What does Rava add? The mishna already lists only clear-cut blemishes
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן? תְּנֵינָא: בְּכוֹר שֶׁנִּסְמֵית עֵינוֹ, וְשֶׁנִּקְטְעָה יָדוֹ, וְשֶׁנִּשְׁתַּבְּרָה רַגְלוֹ — הֲרֵי זֶה יִשָּׁחֵט עַל פִּי שְׁלֹשָׁה בְּנֵי הַכְּנֶסֶת!
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: What is Rava teaching us by this statement? We already learn this in the mishna: With regard to a firstborn animal whose eye was blinded or whose foreleg was severed or whose hind leg was broken, that animal may be slaughtered on the basis of the ruling of three regular Jews who attend the synagogue. The mishna is referring to clear-cut blemishes in contemporary times, in the absence of the Temple, when a firstborn animal is unfit to be brought as an offering. What, then, is the novelty of Rava’s statement?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara asks what Rava adds, since the mishna itself lists only obvious blemishes — a blinded eye, a severed foreleg, a broken hind leg — for which three ordinary Jews suffice. It appears that Rava’s limitation is already built into the mishna.
Key Terms:
- תְּנֵינָא = we already learned it
- מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן = what does he teach us?
- נִשְׁתַּבְּרָה רַגְלוֹ = its hind leg was broken
- יִשָּׁחֵט = it may be slaughtered
Segment 19
TYPE: תירוץ
Without Rava one might think the mishna’s clear-cut cases were chosen only to show the strength of Rabbi Yosei’s view
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִי מִמַּתְנִיתִין הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: בְּחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ אֲפִילּוּ מוּמִין שֶׁאֵין מוּבְהָקִין, וְהַאי דְּקָתָנֵי מוּבְהָקִין — לְהוֹדִיעֲךָ כֹּחוֹ דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: If the halakha that three regular Jews may permit the slaughter of a firstborn animal is learned from the mishna alone, I would say that according to the mishna, the power invested in three regular Jews to permit the slaughter of a firstborn animal in the absence of the Temple nowadays, or outside of Eretz Yisrael during Temple times, applies even to a firstborn animal that has blemishes that are not clear-cut. And the reason that the mishna specifically teaches a case of clear-cut blemishes is to convey the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who requires the examination of an expert even in such a case. Rava therefore teaches us that this is not so; rather, the mishna’s ruling is referring specifically to a case of clear-cut blemishes.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara answers that from the mishna alone one might have thought that outside Eretz Yisrael, three ordinary Jews may permit even blemishes that are not obvious. On that reading the mishna mentions clear-cut blemishes only to show how far Rabbi Yosei goes in requiring an expert even for them. Rava teaches that the mishna is precise: the leniency of three ordinary Jews applies only to clear-cut blemishes.
Key Terms:
- הֲוָה אָמֵינָא = I would have thought
- לְהוֹדִיעֲךָ כֹּחוֹ דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי = to inform you of the strength (extent) of Rabbi Yosei’s view
- מוּמִין שֶׁאֵין מוּבְהָקִין = blemishes that are not clear-cut
- אִי מִמַּתְנִיתִין = if it were from the mishna (alone)
Segment 20
TYPE: מימרא וקושיא
Rav Yehuda, quoting Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba (citing Rav or Shmuel): three may permit a firstborn where there is no expert. Isn’t this the mishna?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה בַּר אַבָּא, סָפֵק מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב, סָפֵק מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל: שְׁלֹשָׁה מַתִּירִין אֶת הַבְּכוֹר בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין מוּמְחֶה. מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן? תְּנֵינָא: הֲרֵי זֶה יִשָּׁחֵט עַל פִּי שְׁלֹשָׁה בְּנֵי הַכְּנֶסֶת!
English Translation:
§ Rav Yehuda says that Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba says the following halakha, but he was uncertain whether Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba said it in the name of Rav and uncertain whether he said it in the name of Shmuel: Three regular Jews may permit a firstborn animal with clear-cut blemishes in a place where there is no expert. The Gemara asks: What is Rav Yehuda teaching us by this statement? We already learn this in the mishna: That animal may be slaughtered on the basis of the ruling of three regular Jews who attend the synagogue.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Yehuda cites Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba, who was unsure whether he had the teaching from Rav or from Shmuel: three ordinary people may permit a firstborn in a place where there is no expert. The Gemara asks what this adds, since the mishna already says that the animal may be slaughtered on the word of three ordinary Jews.
Key Terms:
- סָפֵק מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב = possibly in the name of Rav
- בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין מוּמְחֶה = in a place where there is no expert
- מַתִּירִין = permit
- שְׁלֹשָׁה = three
Segment 21
TYPE: תירוץ
From the mishna one might allow three even where an expert is available; Rav Yehuda limits it to where there is none
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִי מִמַּתְנִיתִין הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: בִּמְקוֹם מוּמְחֶה, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין מוּמְחֶה — אִין, בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁיֵּשׁ מוּמְחֶה — לָא.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: If the halakha is learned from the mishna alone, I would say that three laymen may permit a firstborn animal with clear-cut blemishes even in a place where there is an expert. Rav Yehuda therefore teaches us that in a place where there is no expert, yes, three laymen may permit it. But in a place where there is an expert, three laymen are not invested with this power.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara answers that from the mishna one might have thought that three ordinary Jews may permit the animal even where an expert is available. Rav Yehuda’s teaching makes clear that they may do so only where no expert is available; where an expert is present, the three ordinary Jews have no authority.
Key Terms:
- אִין = yes
- לָא = no
- בִּמְקוֹם מוּמְחֶה = where an expert is available
- קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן = he teaches us
Segment 22
TYPE: מימרא (רב חייא בר עמרם)
Rav Chiyya bar Amram: three permit a firstborn where there is no expert, and three annul a vow where there is no Sage (explanation continues on 37a)
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב חִיָּיא בַּר עַמְרָם: שְׁלֹשָׁה מַתִּירִין אֶת הַבְּכוֹר בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין מוּמְחֶה, שְׁלֹשָׁה מַתִּירִין אֶת הַנֶּדֶר בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין חָכָם. שְׁלֹשָׁה מַתִּירִין אֶת הַבְּכוֹר בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין מוּמְחֶה
English Translation:
Rav Ḥiyya bar Amram says: A group of three laymen may permit a blemished firstborn animal in a place where there is no expert to consult, and likewise a group of three laymen may dissolve a vow in a place where there is no Sage. The Gemara explains: The ruling that a group of three laymen may permit a blemished firstborn animal in a place where there is no expert to consult
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Chiyya bar Amram states two parallel rulings: three ordinary people may permit a firstborn where there is no expert, and three may annul a vow where there is no Sage. The Gemara begins to explain the first ruling, and the explanation continues on 37a. The pairing suggests that in both areas the law normally relies on an expert, but three ordinary people may take that role when no expert is available.
Key Terms:
- הַתָּרַת נְדָרִים = annulment of vows
- נֶדֶר = a vow
- בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין חָכָם = where there is no Sage
- מוּמְחֶה = an expert in blemishes