Bechorot Daf 46 (בכורות דף מ״ו)

📖 Breakdown

Amud Aleph (46a)

Segment 1

TYPE: תירוץ (המשך מדף מה:)

Conclusion of 45b’s answer: the priest’s vow is administered ‘al da’at rabbim’, which no Sage can dissolve

Hebrew/Aramaic:

לֵיהּ אַדַּעַת רַבִּים.

English Translation:

to the priest based on the consent of the public, making it a type of vow that cannot be dissolved without their consent.

קלאוד על הדף:

This fragment completes the last answer on 45b. The Gemara had asked how a priest who married a woman forbidden to him can be trusted with a vow to divorce her, if a vow taken in public can be dissolved by a Sage. The answer is that the vow is administered ‘on the consent of the public’ (al da’at rabbim): he vows not merely before many people, but on the explicit stipulation that the vow rests on their understanding. Since dissolution would require the consent of everyone whose understanding it rests on, which can never be gathered, such a vow is beyond the reach of hatarat nedarim. The priest’s commitment is therefore permanent, and he may return to the avodah.

Key Terms:

• אַדַּעַת רַבִּים = on the consent of the public — a vow made conditional on the understanding of many people, which cannot be dissolved
• מַדְּרִינַן לֵיהּ = we administer a vow to him (the opening words of this clause, on 45b)
• הֲפָרָה / הַתָּרָה = dissolution of a vow by a Sage

Segment 2

TYPE: מימרא ומעשה

Ameimar’s ruling: a vow ‘al da’at rabbim’ is irrevocable — unless dissolving it serves a mitzva, as with the reinstated teacher

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אָמַר אַמֵּימָר: הִלְכְתָא, אֲפִילּוּ לְמַאן דְּאָמַר נֶדֶר שֶׁהוּדַּר בָּרַבִּים יֵשׁ לוֹ הֲפָרָה, עַל דַּעַת הָרַבִּים אֵין לוֹ הֲפָרָה. וְהָנֵי מִילֵּי לִדְבַר הָרְשׁוּת, אֲבָל לִדְבַר מִצְוָה יֵשׁ לוֹ הֲפָרָה. כִּי הָהוּא דְּמַקְרֵי דַרְדְּקֵי, אַדְּרֵיהּ רַב אַחָא דְּקָא פָשַׁע בְּיָנוֹקֵי, וְאַהְדְּרֵיהּ רָבִינָא, דְּלָא אַשְׁכַּח דַּהֲוָה דָּיֵיק כְּוָותֵיהּ.

English Translation:

Ameimar says: The halakha is as follows: Even according to the one who says a vow that was taken in public has the option of nullification, if it was taken based on the consent of the public it has no option of nullification. The Gemara comments: And this matter applies only to when the nullification of a vow is in order to enable one to perform an optional matter, but to enable one to perform a matter of a mitzva it has the option of nullification. As in the incident involving a certain teacher of children,upon whom Rav Aḥa administered a vow to cease teaching based on the consent of the public, as he was negligent with regard to the children by hitting them too much; and Ravina had his vow nullified and reinstated him, as they did not find another teacher who was as meticulous as he was.

קלאוד על הדף:

Ameimar fixes the halakha in three steps. First, even the view that a vow taken before many people can be dissolved concedes that a vow taken ‘on the consent of the public’ cannot. Second, the Gemara limits this: the rule applies to a vow concerning an optional matter (devar reshut), but where releasing the vow enables a mitzva, it may be dissolved. Third, a story illustrates the limit. Rav Acha made a schoolteacher vow, on the consent of the public, to stop teaching because he struck the children excessively; Ravina later released the vow and reinstated him, because no other teacher could be found who was as precise in teaching as he was. Teaching Torah to children is a mitzva of the highest order, and it overrode the public vow.

Key Terms:

• אַמֵּימָר = Ameimar, a later Babylonian Amora
• לִדְבַר הָרְשׁוּת = for an optional matter, not a mitzva
• לִדְבַר מִצְוָה = for the sake of a mitzva
• מַקְרֵי דַרְדְּקֵי = a teacher of young children (lit. one who teaches small ones to read)
• פָשַׁע בְּיָנוֹקֵי = was negligent with the children — here, by hitting them too much
• דָּיֵיק = precise, meticulous (in teaching)

Segment 3

TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ

Why does a priest who became tamei to the dead need only to accept a commitment, while one who married a forbidden woman must vow? ‘His inclination overpowers him’

Hebrew/Aramaic:

וְהַמִּטַּמֵּא לְמֵתִים כּוּ׳. מַאי שְׁנָא הָכָא דְּסַגִּי לֵיהּ בְּקַבָּלָה, וּמַאי שְׁנָא הָתָם דְּמַדְּרִינַן לֵיהּ? הָתָם יִצְרוֹ תְּקָפוֹ.

English Translation:

§ The mishna teaches that a priest who becomes impure through exposure to corpses is disqualified from performing the Temple service until he accepts upon himself that he will no longer become impure in that manner. The Gemara asks: What is different here that it is sufficient for him merely to accept upon himself a commitment in order to continue serving in the Temple, and what is different there, where the priest marries by a transgression, that we administer a vow to him? The Gemara responds: There his desire seizes him, and it is therefore necessary for the priest to take a vow.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara returns to the 45b mishna’s final clause: a priest who became impure through contact with the dead is disqualified from the service until he accepts upon himself (kabbalah) that he will not do so again. Why is a simple acceptance enough here, when the priest who married a forbidden woman must take a formal vow of benefit? The answer is psychological: in the case of marriage, ‘his inclination seizes him’ (yitzro tekafo). Desire for a wife already in his home is a constant pull, so a firmer, binding safeguard is needed. Contact with the dead carries no comparable ongoing temptation, so a sincere commitment suffices.

Key Terms:

• קַבָּלָה = acceptance — a personal commitment, less formal than a vow
• מַדְּרִינַן לֵיהּ = we make him take a vow
• יִצְרוֹ תְּקָפוֹ = his (evil) inclination overpowers him
• הַמִּטַּמֵּא לְמֵתִים = a priest who contracts impurity from a corpse, forbidden to him by Leviticus 21:1

Segment 4

TYPE: הדרן

Hadran: the conclusion of the seventh perek, Mumin Elu

Hebrew/Aramaic:

הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ מוּמִין אֵלּוּ.

English Translation:

HADRAN: We shall return to you, Perek Mumin Elu — the seventh chapter of Bechorot concludes here.

קלאוד על הדף:

With this the seventh perek of Bechorot, Mumin Elu, comes to a close. The perek opened on 43a with the blemishes that disqualify a priest from the Temple service, and moved systematically through the body: the shape of the head, the eyebrows and eyes, the ears and nose, the lips, the limbs, the skin and the stature. It distinguished blemishes that disqualify both a person and an animal from those that disqualify only a person, and it closed on 45b with priests who are unfit for reasons other than a bodily blemish: one who married a forbidden woman and one who became impure from the dead. The traditional hadran declares the learner’s intention to return to the perek. The masechet continues with the eighth perek, and Bechorot has nine perakim in all.

Key Terms:

• הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ = we shall return to you — the formula said on completing a perek
• מוּמִין אֵלּוּ = these blemishes — the opening words and title of the seventh perek
• פֶּרֶק = a chapter of the Mishna and Talmud

Segment 5

TYPE: משנה (פרק שמיני)

Opening mishna of Perek 8 (Yesh Bechor LaNachala): the four combinations of firstborn for inheritance and firstborn for the priest

Hebrew/Aramaic:

מַתְנִי׳ יֵשׁ בְּכוֹר לַנַּחֲלָה, וְאֵינוֹ בְּכוֹר לַכֹּהֵן; בְּכוֹר לִכְהֵן, וְאֵינוֹ בְּכוֹר לַנַּחֲלָה; בְּכוֹר לַנַּחֲלָה וְלַכֹּהֵן, וְיֵשׁ שֶׁאֵינוֹ בְּכוֹר לֹא לַנַּחֲלָה וְלֹא לַכֹּהֵן.

English Translation:

MISHNA: There is a son who is a firstborn with regard to inheritance but is not a firstborn with regard to the requirement of redemption from a priest. There is another who is a firstborn with regard to redemption from a priest but is not a firstborn with regard to inheritance. There is another who is a firstborn with regard to inheritance and with regard to redemption from a priest. And there is another who is not a firstborn at all, neither with regard to inheritance nor with regard to redemption from a priest.

קלאוד על הדף:

The eighth perek turns from animal firstborns and priestly blemishes to the human firstborn, who has two separate halakhic identities. ‘Firstborn for inheritance’ (bechor lenachala) receives a double portion of his father’s estate, based on Deuteronomy 21:17, and depends on being the first viable son of the father (‘reishit ono’, the first of his strength). ‘Firstborn for the priest’ (bechor lakohen) must be redeemed with five shekalim (pidyon haben), based on Exodus 13:2 and Numbers 18:15-16, and depends on being the first to open the mother’s womb (‘peter rechem’). Because one status follows the father and the other the mother, they can diverge, and the mishna sets out all four possibilities before illustrating each.

Key Terms:

• יֵשׁ בְּכוֹר לַנַּחֲלָה = there is a firstborn for inheritance — the opening words and title of the eighth perek
• בְּכוֹר לַנַּחֲלָה = a firstborn with regard to inheritance, entitled to a double portion
• בְּכוֹר לַכֹּהֵן = a firstborn who must be redeemed from a priest (pidyon haben)
• פֶּטֶר רֶחֶם = the opener of the womb — the basis of the redemption obligation, following the mother
• רֵאשִׁית אוֹנוֹ = the first of his strength — the basis of the inheritance right, following the father

Segment 6

TYPE: משנה

Firstborn for inheritance but not for the priest (1): after a miscarriage, a stillborn nine-month fetus, or, for Rabbi Meir, a non-human-shaped miscarriage

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אֵיזֶהוּ בְּכוֹר לַנַּחֲלָה וְאֵינוֹ בְּכוֹר לַכֹּהֵן? הַבָּא אַחַר נְפָלִים, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁיָּצָא אֶת רֹאשׁוֹ חַי, וּבֶן תִּשְׁעָה שֶׁיָּצָא רֹאשׁוֹ מֵת, הַמַּפֶּלֶת כְּמִין בְּהֵמָה חַיָּה וָעוֹף — דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.

English Translation:

Which is the son who is a firstborn with regard to inheritance but is not a firstborn with regard to redemption from a priest? It is a son who came after miscarriage of an underdeveloped fetus, even where the head of the underdeveloped fetus emerged alive; or after a fully developed nine-month-old fetus whose head emerged dead. The same applies to a son born to a woman who had previously miscarried a fetus that had the appearance of a type of domesticated animal, undomesticated animal, or bird, as that is considered the opening of the womb. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

קלאוד על הדף:

The mishna’s first illustrations are cases where the mother’s womb was already opened by an earlier birth that does not count for the father. A nonviable fetus (nefel), even if its head emerged alive, and a full-term fetus whose head emerged dead, both ‘open the womb’, so the son born after them is exempt from redemption. Yet neither was a living, viable son of the father, so the next son is still ‘the first of his strength’ and receives the double portion. Rabbi Meir extends the rule to a miscarried fetus that had the form of a domesticated animal, a wild animal or a bird: in his view even this opens the womb and exempts the following son from pidyon haben.

Key Terms:

• נְפָלִים = nonviable fetuses, miscarriages
• יָצָא אֶת רֹאשׁוֹ = its head emerged — the Gemara will discuss whether the head alone constitutes birth
• בֶּן תִּשְׁעָה = a full-term (nine-month) fetus
• הַמַּפֶּלֶת כְּמִין בְּהֵמָה חַיָּה וָעוֹף = a woman who miscarries something shaped like an animal, beast or bird
• רַבִּי מֵאִיר = Rabbi Meir, Tanna of the fourth generation

Segment 7

TYPE: משנה (מחלוקת)

The Rabbis require human form to open the womb; a sandal, afterbirth, formed sac or a fetus removed in pieces also exempt the next son from redemption

Hebrew/Aramaic:

וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: עַד שֶׁיְּהֵא בּוֹ מִצּוּרַת אָדָם. הַמַּפֶּלֶת סַנְדָּל, אוֹ שִׁלְיָא, אוֹ שַׁפִּיר מְרוּקָּם, וְהַיּוֹצֵא מְחוּתָּךְ — הַבָּא אַחֲרֵיהֶם בְּכוֹר לַנַּחֲלָה, וְאֵין בְּכוֹר לַכֹּהֵן.

English Translation:

And the Rabbis say: The son is not exempted from the requirement of redemption from a priest unless his birth follows the birth of an animal that takes the form of a person. In the case of a woman who miscarries a fetus in the form of a sandal fish or from whom an afterbirth or a gestational sac in which tissue developed emerged, or who delivered a fetus that emerged in pieces, the son who follows these is a firstborn with regard to inheritance but is not a firstborn with regard to redemption from a priest.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Meir: an animal-shaped miscarriage does not count as opening the womb unless it has some element of human form, so the son born after it must still be redeemed. They agree, however, that several other cases do open the womb: a ‘sandal’ (a flat, misshapen fetus resembling the sandal fish), an afterbirth (shilya, which presumes a fetus was present), a gestational sac in which tissue had formed, and a fetus that emerged in pieces. In each of these the son who follows is exempt from the priest’s redemption, but he is still the father’s firstborn for inheritance, since none of them was a viable son.

Key Terms:

• צוּרַת אָדָם = human form
• סַנְדָּל = a sandal — a flat, misshapen fetus resembling the sandal fish
• שִׁלְיָא = the afterbirth (placenta)
• שַׁפִּיר מְרוּקָּם = a gestational sac in which tissue had formed
• הַיּוֹצֵא מְחוּתָּךְ = a fetus that emerged in pieces

Segment 8

TYPE: משנה

Firstborn for inheritance but not for the priest (2): the man’s first son from a woman who already gave birth, even as a maidservant or a gentile

Hebrew/Aramaic:

מִי שֶׁלֹּא הָיוּ לוֹ בָּנִים, וְנָשָׂא אִשָּׁה שֶׁכְּבָר יָלְדָה, עוֹדָהּ שִׁפְחָה וְנִשְׁתַּחְרְרָה, עוֹדָהּ נׇכְרִית וְנִתְגַּיְּירָה, מִשֶּׁבָּאת לְיִשְׂרָאֵל יָלְדָה — בְּכוֹר לַנַּחֲלָה וְאֵין בְּכוֹר לַכֹּהֵן.

English Translation:

In the case of a son born to one who did not have sons and he married a woman who had already given birth; or if he married a woman who gave birth when she was still a Canaanite maidservant and she was then emancipated; or one who gave birth when she was still a gentile and she then converted, and when the maidservant or the gentile came to join the Jewish people she gave birth to a male, that son is a firstborn with regard to inheritance but is not a firstborn with regard to redemption from a priest.

קלאוד על הדף:

Here the divergence comes from the mother’s history. A man with no sons marries a woman who has already given birth: his son is his firstborn for inheritance, but not ‘the opener of the womb’, so there is no pidyon haben. The first Tanna applies the same rule where the woman’s earlier birth took place while she was still a Canaanite maidservant or still a gentile: that birth opened her womb, even though it happened before she entered the Jewish people, so the son born after her emancipation or conversion is not redeemed.

Key Terms:

• שִׁפְחָה = a Canaanite maidservant
• נִשְׁתַּחְרְרָה = she was emancipated
• נׇכְרִית = a gentile woman
• נִתְגַּיְּירָה = she converted
• מִשֶּׁבָּאת לְיִשְׂרָאֵל = once she joined the Jewish people

Segment 9

TYPE: משנה (מחלוקת)

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: ‘peter rechem beYisrael’ — only opening the womb as a Jewish woman counts

Hebrew/Aramaic:

רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי אוֹמֵר: בְּכוֹר לַנַּחֲלָה וְלַכֹּהֵן, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״פֶּטֶר רֶחֶם בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל״ — עַד שֶׁיִּפְטְרוּ רֶחֶם מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל.

English Translation:

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: That son is a firstborn with regard to inheritance and with regard to redemption from a priest, as it is stated: “Whatever opens the womb among the children of Israel” (Exodus 13:2). This indicates that the halakhic status of a child born to the mother is not that of one who opens the womb unless it opens the womb of a woman from the Jewish people.

קלאוד על הדף:

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili disputes the last two cases. The verse says ‘whatever opens the womb among the children of Israel’ (Exodus 13:2), which he reads as requiring that the womb be opened in Israel, that is, while the mother is Jewish. A birth she had as a maidservant or gentile does not count, so the first son she bears after joining the Jewish people is the firstborn for both inheritance and redemption. The dispute is whether opening the womb is a purely physical fact, as the first Tanna holds, or a status defined by the Torah’s address to Israel.

Key Terms:

• רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי = Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, Tanna of the third generation
• פֶּטֶר רֶחֶם בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל = opening the womb among Israel (Exodus 13:2)
• שֶׁיִּפְטְרוּ רֶחֶם מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל = until they open the womb of a Jewish woman

Segment 10

TYPE: משנה

Firstborn for the priest but not for inheritance (1): a woman’s first child whose father already has sons, or who has no halakhic father

Hebrew/Aramaic:

מִי שֶׁהָיוּ לוֹ בָּנִים וְנָשָׂא אִשָּׁה שֶׁלֹּא יָלְדָה, נִתְגַּיְּירָה מְעוּבֶּרֶת, נִשְׁתַּחְרְרָה מְעוּבֶּרֶת.

English Translation:

In the case of one who had sons and married a woman who had not given birth; or if he married a woman who converted while she was pregnant, or a Canaanite maidservant who was emancipated while she was pregnant and she gave birth to a son, he is a firstborn with regard to redemption from a priest, as he opened his mother’s womb, but he is not a firstborn with regard to inheritance, because he is not the firstborn of his father or because halakhically he has no father.

קלאוד על הדף:

Now the mishna reverses the pattern. A man who already has sons marries a woman who has never given birth: her son opens her womb and must be redeemed, but he is not the father’s first son and does not take the double portion. The same is true of a woman who converts while pregnant, or a maidservant who is emancipated while pregnant. Her son opens her womb as a Jewish woman, so he is redeemed, but the man who fathered him was a gentile or a slave, and halakhically such a child has no father from whom to inherit as a firstborn.

Key Terms:

• שֶׁהָיוּ לוֹ בָּנִים = who already had sons
• שֶׁלֹּא יָלְדָה = who had not yet given birth
• נִתְגַּיְּירָה מְעוּבֶּרֶת = she converted while pregnant
• נִשְׁתַּחְרְרָה מְעוּבֶּרֶת = she was emancipated while pregnant

Segment 11

TYPE: משנה

Firstborn for the priest but not for inheritance (2): babies who were mixed up, and a child of uncertain paternity because the mother remarried within three months

Hebrew/Aramaic:

וְיָלְדָה הִיא וְכֹהֶנֶת הִיא, וּלְוִיָּה הִיא, וְאִשָּׁה שֶׁכְּבָר יָלְדָה, וְכֵן מִי שֶׁלֹּא שָׁהֲתָה לְאַחַר בַּעְלָהּ שְׁלֹשָׁה חֳדָשִׁים וְנִשֵּׂאת וְיָלְדָה, וְאֵינוֹ יָדוּעַ אִם בֶּן תִּשְׁעָה לָרִאשׁוֹן אִם בִּן שִׁבְעָה לָאַחֲרוֹן — בְּכוֹר לַכֹּהֵן וְאֵינוֹ בְּכוֹר לַנַּחֲלָה.

English Translation:

And likewise, if an Israelite woman and the daughter or wife of a priest, neither of whom had given birth yet, or an Israelite woman and the daughter or wife of a Levite, or an Israelite woman and a woman who had already given birth, all women whose sons do not require redemption from the priest, gave birth in the same place and it is uncertain which son was born to which mother; and likewise a woman who did not wait three months after the death of her husband and she married and gave birth, and it is unknown whether the child was born after a pregnancy of nine months and is the son of the first husband, or whether he was born after a pregnancy of seven months and is the son of the latter husband, in all these cases the child is a firstborn with regard to redemption from a priest but is not a firstborn with regard to inheritance. Due to the uncertainty, he is unable to prove he is the firstborn of either father, and therefore he is not entitled to the double portion of the firstborn.

קלאוד על הדף:

The final cases are ones of doubt. An Israelite woman giving birth for the first time and a woman whose son is not redeemed (the daughter or wife of a priest, the daughter or wife of a Levite, or a woman who had given birth before) deliver in the same place, and the babies are mixed up. The second case is a widow who remarried within three months, so it is unknown whether her son is a nine-month child of the first husband or a seven-month child of the second. The mishna rules that there is an obligation to redeem the child as a firstborn for the priest, while the Gemara will discuss the details of who pays. But no son can prove whose firstborn he is, so none receives a firstborn’s double portion. The heir who claims the extra share must prove his status, which here is impossible.

Key Terms:

• כֹּהֶנֶת = a priest’s daughter or wife, whose son is exempt from redemption
• לְוִיָּה = a Levite’s daughter or wife, whose son is likewise exempt
• שְׁלֹשָׁה חֳדָשִׁים = three months — the waiting period before a widow or divorcee may remarry, to establish paternity
• בֶּן תִּשְׁעָה לָרִאשׁוֹן = a nine-month child of the first husband
• בֶּן שִׁבְעָה לָאַחֲרוֹן = a seven-month child of the second husband

Amud Bet (46b)

Segment 1

TYPE: מימרא

Shmuel: the head alone does not count as birth for a miscarriage

Hebrew/Aramaic:

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: אֵין הָרֹאשׁ פּוֹטֵר בִּנְפָלִים.

English Translation:

GEMARA: Shmuel says: In a case where the head of a fetus emerged and then went back into the womb, the offspring is not considered to have been born and does not exempt the next fetus from the obligation of redemption of the firstborn, e.g., if its twin brother was born first. Shmuel says this halakha specifically in a case of miscarriage, i.e., where the fetus whose head emerged was a stillborn and the one that was eventually born first is a viable offspring. But in a case where both are viable offspring, the emergence of the head is considered birth.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara opens with a statement of Shmuel. If a fetus put out its head and drew it back, and its twin was then born, does the first count as ‘born’ and exempt the second? Shmuel rules that in the case of a nonviable fetus (nefel), the emergence of the head is not considered birth. The implication, as the English explains, is that for a viable child the head is significant and does count as birth. Shmuel’s ruling appears to conflict with the mishna, which spoke of a nefel ‘whose head emerged alive’, and the next segments will test it.

Key Terms:

• שְׁמוּאֵל = Shmuel, first-generation Babylonian Amora
• אֵין הָרֹאשׁ פּוֹטֵר = the head does not exempt — its emergence does not count as the birth of a firstborn
• בִּנְפָלִים = in the case of nonviable fetuses

Segment 2

TYPE: טעמא

Shmuel’s source: ‘all in whose nostrils is the breath of life’ — the head matters only where there is life

Hebrew/Aramaic:

מַאי טַעְמָא? ״כֹּל אֲשֶׁר נִשְׁמַת רוּחַ חַיִּים בְּאַפָּיו״ — כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּנִשְׁמַת רוּחַ חַיִּים בְּאַפָּיו הוּא דַּחֲשִׁיב רֵישֵׁיהּ, אִידַּךְ לָא חֲשִׁיב רֵישֵׁיהּ.

English Translation:

The Gemara asks: What is the reason for Shmuel’s ruling? The verse states: “All in whose nostrils was the breath of the spirit of life” (Genesis 7:22), from which it is derived: Anywhere that one has the breath of the spirit of life, i.e., if it is viable, one goes by its nostrils, i.e., its head is considered significant. But with regard to another offspring, one that is not viable, its head is not considered significant.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara gives Shmuel’s reasoning from the Flood narrative: ‘all in whose nostrils was the breath of the spirit of life’ (Genesis 7:22). The verse links life with the face and nostrils. Where a creature has the breath of life, its head is the defining part and its emergence counts as birth. A nonviable fetus lacks the breath of life, so its head has no special significance, and only the emergence of most of its body would count.

Key Terms:

• נִשְׁמַת רוּחַ חַיִּים בְּאַפָּיו = the breath of the spirit of life in its nostrils (Genesis 7:22)
• חֲשִׁיב רֵישֵׁיהּ = its head is considered significant
• אִידַּךְ = the other — here, the nonviable fetus

Segment 3

TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ

From the mishna: ‘after nefalim, whose head emerged alive’ — answer: ‘its head’ means most of it

Hebrew/Aramaic:

תְּנַן: הַבָּא אַחַר נְפָלִים, שֶׁיָּצָא רֹאשׁוֹ חַי, וּבֶן תִּשְׁעָה שֶׁיָּצָא רֹאשׁוֹ מֵת. קָתָנֵי מִיהָא ״רֹאשׁוֹ!״ מַאי ״רֹאשׁוֹ?״ רוּבּוֹ.

English Translation:

The Gemara raises a difficulty: We learned in the mishna: What is a firstborn with regard to inheritance but not with regard to redemption from a priest? It is a son who came after the miscarriage of an underdeveloped fetus, even where the head of the underdeveloped fetus emerged alive; and a fully developed nine-month-old fetus whose head emerged dead. Although the mishna addresses a nine-month-old fetus as well, in any event it teaches with regard to a miscarriage that its head exempts the offspring born after it. The Gemara responds: What is the meaning of the term: Its head? It means its head and most of the body.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara challenges Shmuel from the mishna, which listed a son born after a nefel ‘even though its head emerged alive’ as exempt from redemption. That suggests the head of a nefel does count. The Gemara answers by reinterpreting the word: ‘its head’ (rosho) here means ‘most of it’ (rubo), the head together with most of the body. On this reading, the mishna speaks of a nefel that emerged in its majority, which everyone agrees counts as birth.

Key Terms:

• תְּנַן = we learned (in a mishna)
• קָתָנֵי מִיהָא = in any event it teaches
• רוּבּוֹ = most of it — the greater part of the body

Segment 4

TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ

Then let the mishna say ‘most of it’! — It said ‘head’ to match its next clause about a nine-month fetus

Hebrew/Aramaic:

וְלִיתְנֵי ״רוּבּוֹ״! בְּדִין הוּא דְּאִיבְּעִי לֵיהּ לְמִיתְנֵי רוּבּוֹ, וְאַיְּידֵי דְּקָא בָעֵי לְמִיתְנֵי סֵיפָא בֶּן תִּשְׁעָה שֶׁיָּצָא רֹאשׁוֹ מֵת — טַעְמָא דְּרֹאשׁוֹ מֵת, הָא רֹאשׁוֹ חַי — הַבָּא אַחֲרָיו בְּכוֹר לַנַּחֲלָה נָמֵי לָא הָוֵי, תְּנָא רֵישָׁא נָמֵי רֹאשׁוֹ.

English Translation:

The Gemara asks: But if so, let the mishna teach: Most of it. The Gemara answers: By right, the mishna should have taught: Most of it, but it did not do so, since in the latter clause of the mishna it needs to teach: A fully developed nine-month-old fetus whose head emerged dead. It is inferred from there that the reason the subsequent son is the firstborn with regard to inheritance is that the head of this fetus emerged dead, but if it was a nine-month-old fetus whose head emerged alive, then the fetus that comes after it is not a firstborn with regard to inheritance either. Therefore, the tanna of the mishna taught in the first clause also that the head of a miscarriage exempts the subsequent son, to maintain stylistic uniformity.

קלאוד על הדף:

If the mishna meant ‘most of it’, why didn’t it say so? The Gemara admits that by right it should have. But the next clause speaks of a full-term fetus ‘whose head emerged dead’, and there the head is meant literally: a full-term fetus whose head emerged alive would itself be the firstborn, so the son after it would not be the firstborn even for inheritance. Since the head is the decisive term in that clause, the tanna used the same wording in the first clause too, for the sake of uniform language. This is a familiar Talmudic move: a word is used loosely in one clause because the parallel clause needs it.

Key Terms:

• בְּדִין הוּא = by right, it should have
• אַיְּידֵי = since (it needed to teach the other clause) — the stylistic-parallel argument
• סֵיפָא = the latter clause
• רֵישָׁא = the first clause

Segment 5

TYPE: קושיא

On that reading, what does the mishna add? Chullin already teaches that a fetus that put out its head counts as born

Hebrew/Aramaic:

וּמַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן, דְּכֵיוָן דְּמַפֵּיק לֵיהּ רֵישֵׁיהּ הָוֵה [לֵיהּ] לֵידָה? תְּנֵינָא: הוֹצִיא רֹאשׁוֹ, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהֶחְזִירוֹ — הֲרֵי זֶה כְּיָלוּד!

English Translation:

The Gemara asks: And according to this interpretation, what is the mishna teaching us? Is it that once the offspring reached out its head from the womb it is considered a birth? We learn this in a mishna with regard to the fetus of an animal (Ḥullin 68a): If a fetus reached out its head, although it returned the head, the halakhic status of that fetus is like that of a newborn, whose consumption is permitted only by its own slaughter.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara pushes further. If the mishna’s point about the full-term fetus is that the emergence of its head counts as birth, that is already known from the mishna in Chullin (68a): an animal fetus that put out its head, even if it drew it back, is considered born, and it requires its own slaughter rather than being permitted by its mother’s. So the mishna here seems to teach nothing new.

Key Terms:

• מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן = what does it teach us?
• תְּנֵינָא = we have already learned it
• הוֹצִיא רֹאשׁוֹ = it put out its head
• כְּיָלוּד = like one already born

Segment 6

TYPE: שקלא וטריא

A possible reply: humans cannot be learned from animals, since a woman’s birth canal is concealed

Hebrew/Aramaic:

וְכִי תֵּימָא: אַשְׁמוֹעִינַן בְּהֵמָה, וְקָא מַשְׁמַע לַן בְּאָדָם, דְּאָדָם מִבְּהֵמָה לָא יָלֵיף — דְּלֵית לַהּ פְּרוֹזְדוֹר.

English Translation:

And if you would say that the mishna there teaches us this halakha with regard to animals, and the mishna here teaches us that the same halakha applies to a human, this does not resolve the difficulty. The Gemara first explains why two rulings might be necessary with regard to people and animals: The reason is that the halakha of a human cannot be derived from that of an animal, as the animal has no concealed opening, i.e., the opening of an animal’s womb is not hidden. Consequently, one might have thought that only in the case of an animal is the emergence of the head considered a birth. By contrast, in humans, where the woman’s thighs conceal the opening of the womb and the emergence of the head alone is not noticeable, perhaps the emergence of the head is not considered a full-fledged birth.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara considers a reply: perhaps Chullin teaches the rule for animals and our mishna adds it for humans, because the human case cannot be derived from animals. An animal has no ‘prozdor’, an enclosed passage concealing the opening of the womb, so its head is visibly outside once it emerges. In a woman the opening is concealed and the head’s emergence is less visible, so one might think it is not yet a full birth. This reply is examined in the next two segments, which show why each case needs its own source.

Key Terms:

• וְכִי תֵּימָא = and if you would say
• אָדָם מִבְּהֵמָה לָא יָלֵיף = a human cannot be derived from an animal
• פְּרוֹזְדוֹר = a corridor, an enclosed passage — here, the concealed passage of the birth canal

Segment 7

TYPE: שקלא וטריא

And animals cannot be learned from humans, since a person’s face is significant

Hebrew/Aramaic:

בְּהֵמָה מֵאָדָם לָא יָלְפָא — מִשּׁוּם דַּחֲשִׁיב פַּרְצוּף פָּנִים דִּידֵיהּ.

English Translation:

Conversely, had this ruling been taught only with regard to humans, one would have said that the halakha of animals cannot be derived from that of a human because the countenance of a person’s face is significant, as people are created in the image of God. This is not so with regard to animals.

קלאוד על הדף:

The converse is also true: had the rule been taught only for humans, one could not apply it to animals. A human face is uniquely significant, since man is created in the image of God, so a human head might count as birth where an animal’s would not. Each case therefore needs its own source, and teaching the rule for both animals and humans would not be redundant.

Key Terms:

• בְּהֵמָה מֵאָדָם לָא יָלְפָא = an animal cannot be derived from a human
• פַּרְצוּף פָּנִים = the countenance of the face

Segment 8

TYPE: תיובתא

But the human case is already taught in Nidda — so the mishna’s ‘head’ must refer to the nefel: Shmuel is refuted

Hebrew/Aramaic:

הָא נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא: יָצָא כְּדַרְכּוֹ — מִשֶּׁיָּצָא רוֹב רֹאשׁוֹ, וְאֵיזֶהוּ רוֹב רֹאשׁוֹ? מִשֶּׁתֵּצֵא פַּדַּחְתּוֹ. תְּיוּבְתָּא דִשְׁמוּאֵל, תְּיוּבְתָּא!

English Translation:

After clarifying why both rulings are necessary, the Gemara explains why this does not resolve the difficulty: We learn that ruling with regard to people also, in a mishna (Nidda 28a): If the fetus emerged in the usual manner, head first, it is considered born only when most of its head emerges. And what is considered most of its head? It is from when its forehead emerges. Accordingly, there was no need for the mishna here to state the halakha with regard to the head of a nine-month-old fetus, and the mention of a head with regard to a miscarriage contradicts the opinion of Shmuel. The Gemara comments: The refutation of the opinion of Shmuel is indeed a conclusive refutation.

קלאוד על הדף:

The reply fails, because the rule for humans is also taught elsewhere. The mishna in Nidda (28a) says a child emerging in the normal way counts as born once most of its head emerges, defined as the moment its forehead comes out. Since the head rule for a viable child is known, the mishna’s mention of the head must be teaching something new about the nefel: that its head alone counts as birth and exempts the next son from redemption. That directly contradicts Shmuel, and the Gemara declares a conclusive refutation (teyuvta).

Key Terms:

• יָצָא כְּדַרְכּוֹ = it emerged in its usual manner, head first
• רוֹב רֹאשׁוֹ = most of its head
• פַּדַּחְתּוֹ = its forehead
• תְּיוּבְתָּא = a conclusive refutation of an Amora’s statement

Segment 9

TYPE: מחלוקת אמוראים

Reish Lakish: the forehead counts as birth everywhere except for inheritance (‘yakir’); Rabbi Yochanan: even for inheritance

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ: פַּדַּחַת פּוֹטֶרֶת בְּכׇל מָקוֹם, חוּץ מִן הַנַּחֲלָה. מַאי טַעְמָא? ״יַכִּיר״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא, וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ לַנַּחֲלָה.

English Translation:

§ Concerning this matter, Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: The emergence of a forehead alone in the case of a person exempts, i.e., is considered a birth, in all cases, except with regard to inheritance. If a son reached out his head alone and then brought it back, after which his twin brother was born, the second brother is the firstborn with regard to inheritance. What is the reason? The Merciful One states: “For he shall recognize the firstborn, the son of the hated, by giving him a double portion of all that he has” (Deuteronomy 21:17), and recognition is not attained by emergence of the forehead alone. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Even with regard to inheritance the emergence of a forehead is sufficient.

קלאוד על הדף:

Building on the Nidda definition of birth as the emergence of the forehead, Reish Lakish draws a limit. For every purpose the forehead counts as birth, except inheritance. The Torah says the father ‘shall recognize’ (yakir) the firstborn (Deuteronomy 21:17), and a child is not recognizable from the forehead alone. So if one twin put out its forehead and drew it back, and the other was then born fully, the second is the firstborn for inheritance. Rabbi Yochanan disagrees: the forehead is decisive even for inheritance, so the first twin keeps the birthright. The Gemara will test Rabbi Yochanan’s view against sources about recognizing a face.

Key Terms:

• רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ = Reish Lakish, Amora of the Land of Israel and colleague of Rabbi Yochanan
• פַּדַּחַת פּוֹטֶרֶת = the forehead exempts — its emergence counts as birth
• יַכִּיר = he shall recognize (Deuteronomy 21:17)
• רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן = Rabbi Yochanan, leading Amora of the Land of Israel

Segment 10

TYPE: שאלה ותשובה

What does ‘everywhere’ include? A convert whose baby’s forehead emerged before her conversion

Hebrew/Aramaic:

בְּכׇל מָקוֹם, לְאֵיתוֹיֵי מַאי? לְאֵיתוֹיֵי הָא דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: גִּיּוֹרֶת שֶׁיָּצְאָה פַּדַּחַת וְלָדָהּ בְּגַיּוּתָהּ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִתְגַּיְּירָה — אֵין נוֹתְנִין לָהּ יְמֵי טוּמְאָה וִימֵי טׇהֳרָה, וְאֵינָהּ מְבִיאָה קׇרְבַּן לֵידָה.

English Translation:

The Gemara asks: When Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says the emergence of a forehead alone in the case of a person exempts in all cases, what does this comprehensive phrase serve to include? The Gemara answers that it serves to include that which the Sages taught: With regard to a female convert whose offspring reached out its forehead alone in her gentile state, and then she converted and gave birth to the entire child, one does not assign to her the days of ritual impurity and the days of ritual purity of a Jewish woman who gave birth. And likewise she does not bring the offering that a woman is obligated to sacrifice after giving birth, as the child is considered to have been born while the mother was still a gentile.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara asks what Reish Lakish’s ‘everywhere’ adds, and cites a baraita. If a pregnant gentile was in labor, the baby’s forehead emerged, and only then did she convert and complete the birth, the baby counts as born before her conversion. She therefore does not observe the days of impurity and purity of a Jewish woman after childbirth (Leviticus 12), and she brings no childbirth offering. The emergence of the forehead fixes the moment of birth for these laws as well.

Key Terms:

• גִּיּוֹרֶת = a female convert
• יְמֵי טוּמְאָה וִימֵי טׇהֳרָה = the days of impurity and the days of purity after childbirth (Leviticus 12:2-5)
• קׇרְבַּן לֵידָה = the offering a woman brings after childbirth

Segment 11

TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ

Objections to Rabbi Yochanan: ‘recognition’ requires the face with the nose — answer: read ‘up to the nose’

Hebrew/Aramaic:

מֵיתִיבִי: ״יַכִּיר״ — זוֹ הַכָּרַת פָּנִים, וְאֵיזוֹ הִיא הַכָּרַת פָּנִים? פַּרְצוּף פָּנִים עִם הַחוֹטֶם. תָּנֵי: ״עַד הַחוֹטֶם״. תָּא שְׁמַע: אֵין מְעִידִים אֶלָּא עַל פַּרְצוּף פָּנִים עִם הַחוֹטֶם. תְּנִי: ״עַד הַחוֹטֶם״.

English Translation:

The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan from a baraita: When the verse states: “He shall recognize” (Deuteronomy 21:17), this is referring to the recognition of the face. And what exactly is the recognition of the face? It is recognizing the countenance of the face with the nose. This indicates that the forehead alone is insufficient. The Gemara answers: Teach the baraita as saying: Up to, but not including, the nose. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a mishna (Yevamot 120a): One can testify that a man died, in order to permit his wife to remarry, only if he can attest to seeing the countenance of the face with the nose, as this allows one to identify the individual definitively. Once again, the Gemara answers that one should teach: Up to, but not including, the nose.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara challenges Rabbi Yochanan from a baraita that defines the ‘recognition’ of Deuteronomy 21:17 as recognizing the face together with the nose, which suggests the forehead alone is not enough. The answer emends the reading to ‘up to the nose’, meaning the face above the nose, which can include the forehead. A second challenge comes from the mishna in Yevamot (120a), which allows testimony identifying a dead man, so that his wife may remarry, only if the witnesses saw his face with the nose. The Gemara gives the same answer: read ‘up to the nose’.

Key Terms:

• מֵיתִיבִי = they raised an objection (from a Tannaitic source)
• הַכָּרַת פָּנִים = recognition of the face
• עִם הַחוֹטֶם = with the nose
• עַד הַחוֹטֶם = up to (but not including) the nose
• אֵין מְעִידִים = one may not testify (that a man died)

Segment 12

TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ

A baraita requiring forehead, face and nose together, based on Isaiah 3:9 — answer: testimony allowing a woman to remarry is stricter

Hebrew/Aramaic:

תָּא שְׁמַע: פַּדַּחַת בְּלֹא פַּרְצוּף פָּנִים, פַּרְצוּף פָּנִים בְּלֹא פַּדַּחַת — אֵין מְעִידִין עַד שֶׁיְּהוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם עִם הַחוֹטֶם. וְאָמַר אַבָּיֵי, וְאִיתֵּימָא רַב כָּהֲנָא: מַאי קְרָאָה? ״הַכָּרַת פְּנֵיהֶם עָנְתָה בָּם״! שָׁאנֵי עֵדוּת אִשָּׁה, דְּאַחְמִירוּ בַּהּ רַבָּנַן.

English Translation:

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof: If people saw the forehead of a dead person without the countenance of the face, or the countenance of the face without the forehead, they cannot testify that he died and render his wife permitted to remarry until they see both the countenance of the face and the forehead, with the nose. And Abaye says, and some say it was Rav Kahana who says: What is the verse from which it is derived? “The recognition of their countenance does witness against them” (Isaiah 3:9), and there is no recognition of a face without the nose. The Gemara answers: Testimony enabling a woman to remarry is different, as the Sages were stringent with regard to it. Therefore, they required greater proof than with regard to the halakhot of a firstborn.

קלאוד על הדף:

A further baraita leaves no room for emendation: neither the forehead without the face nor the face without the forehead is enough for testimony; both are required together with the nose. Abaye, or some say Rav Kahana, cites the source: ‘the recognition of their countenance witnesses against them’ (Isaiah 3:9). The Gemara answers that this cannot refute Rabbi Yochanan, because testimony allowing a woman to remarry is a special case where the Sages were stringent. A mistaken identification could lead to a forbidden marriage, so they required more than is needed to identify a firstborn.

Key Terms:

• פַּדַּחַת בְּלֹא פַּרְצוּף פָּנִים = a forehead without the face
• הַכָּרַת פְּנֵיהֶם עָנְתָה בָּם = the recognition of their countenance witnesses against them (Isaiah 3:9)
• אַבָּיֵי = Abaye, fourth-generation Babylonian Amora
• עֵדוּת אִשָּׁה = testimony concerning a woman — that her husband died, permitting her to remarry
• אַחְמִירוּ בַּהּ רַבָּנַן = the Sages were stringent with it

Segment 13

TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ

But the Sages were lenient here, accepting hearsay and testimony of women and slaves! — Lenient at the end, not at the beginning

Hebrew/Aramaic:

וּמִי אַחְמִירוּ? וְהָא תְּנַן: הוּחְזְקוּ לִהְיוֹת מַשִּׂיאִים עֵד מִפִּי עֵד, מִפִּי אִשָּׁה, מִפִּי עֶבֶד, מִפִּי שִׁפְחָה! כִּי אַקִּילוּ רַבָּנַן בְּסוֹפָהּ, בִּתְחִלָּתָהּ לָא אַקִּילוּ רַבָּנַן.

English Translation:

The Gemara asks: And were the Sages stringent with regard to this testimony? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Yevamot 122a): The Sages established that they would allow a woman to marry again based on testimony that is generally not accepted, such as testimony based on hearsay, i.e., the testimony of one man which was heard from another man who saw her husband die, from a woman’s testimony, from a Canaanite slave’s testimony, or from a Canaanite maidservant’s testimony? The Gemara answers that when the Sages were lenient it was with regard to the end of the testimony, i.e., to accept testimony that a husband had died even from individuals just mentioned. But the Sages were not lenient with regard to its beginning, i.e., the basic clarification of whether the witnesses properly identified the dead person when they saw him.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara questions the claim of stringency, since the mishna in Yevamot (122a) shows the Sages being notably lenient in this very area. To free a woman from being an aguna they accepted testimony that is normally invalid: hearsay, a woman, a Canaanite slave or maidservant. The answer distinguishes two stages. The Sages relaxed the rules about who may report the death (the ‘end’ of the testimony), but not the requirement that the dead man was properly identified (the ‘beginning’). Identification must still be certain, which is why they required both forehead and face with the nose.

Key Terms:

• הוּחְזְקוּ לִהְיוֹת מַשִּׂיאִים = the practice was established to permit (a woman) to remarry
• עֵד מִפִּי עֵד = a witness reporting from another witness — hearsay
• בְּסוֹפָהּ = at its end — the reporting of the death
• בִּתְחִלָּתָהּ = at its beginning — the identification of the body

Segment 14

TYPE: תירוץ (ממשיך בדף מז.)

‘And if you wish, say’ — a second answer for Rabbi Yochanan, continued on 47a

Hebrew/Aramaic:

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא:

English Translation:

And if you wish, say instead that Rabbi Yoḥanan can resolve the difficulty as follows:

קלאוד על הדף:

The amud ends as the Gemara starts a second way to defend Rabbi Yochanan against the baraita that required forehead and face together. The phrase ‘ve’iba’it eima’ (and if you wish, say) introduces an alternative answer, which the Gemara gives at the start of 47a. The discussion of how much of a face must be seen to establish identity, whether for a firstborn’s birth or for testimony about a death, continues on the next daf.

Key Terms:

• וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא = and if you wish, say — introducing an alternative answer

📝 Summary

Overview

Bechorot 46 crosses a perek boundary. Amud aleph first finishes Perek 7, מומין אלו, which dealt with priests unfit for the avodah. It settles how a priest who married a woman forbidden to him can be trusted to divorce her: he takes a vow “on the consent of the public” (על דעת רבים), which no Sage can dissolve. Ameimar adds that such a vow can still be released for the sake of a mitzva, and the story of Ravina reinstating a schoolteacher shows how. The Gemara then explains why a priest who became impure from the dead needs only a commitment, while the forbidden marriage requires a vow: “his inclination overpowers him”. The hadran closes the seventh perek. Perek 8, יש בכור לנחלה, then turns to the human firstborn, who has two separate statuses. The firstborn for inheritance (בכור לנחלה) follows the father and receives a double portion. The firstborn for the priest (בכור לכהן) follows the mother and must be redeemed through pidyon haben. The opening mishna sets out how the two can diverge, with disputes between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis and between the first tanna and Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. Amud bet asks what counts as “birth”. Shmuel’s ruling that the head of a nonviable fetus (nefel) does not count is refuted from the mishna. Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan then dispute whether the emergence of the forehead fixes the birthright for inheritance. That leads to a discussion of how much of a face witnesses must see to identify a dead man, which continues on 47a.

Amud Aleph Highlights

• Vow on the consent of the public: a priest who married a forbidden woman returns to the avodah only after a vow to divorce her. The vow is administered al da’at rabbim, so it cannot be dissolved by hatarat nedarim.
• Ameimar’s limit: even the view that a vow made before many people can be dissolved agrees that a vow on the consent of the public cannot. This applies only to an optional matter (devar reshut). If releasing the vow serves a mitzva, it may be dissolved.
• The schoolteacher: Rav Acha made a teacher of children vow, on the consent of the public, to stop teaching because he hit the children too much. Ravina released the vow and reinstated him, since no other teacher was as precise.
• Vow vs. commitment: a priest who became impure from the dead needs only a commitment (kabbalah) not to do it again. The forbidden marriage needs a vow because “his inclination overpowers him” (יצרו תקפו): a wife in his home is a constant temptation.
• Hadran: Perek Mumin Elu concludes. The masechet continues with Perek 8 and ends with Perek 9.
• Four combinations: the new mishna teaches that a son may be a firstborn for inheritance and for the priest, for inheritance only, for the priest only, or for neither.
• Inheritance but not the priest, after a miscarriage: a son born after a nefel, even if its head emerged alive, or after a full-term fetus whose head emerged dead, is not redeemed, because the womb was already opened. He still takes the double portion as the father’s first viable son.
• Rabbi Meir vs. the Rabbis: Rabbi Meir counts even a miscarriage shaped like an animal, beast or bird as opening the womb. The Rabbis require some human form. All agree that a sandal, an afterbirth (shilya), a formed sac and a fetus that emerged in pieces open the womb.
• A mother who already gave birth: a man’s first son from such a woman is his firstborn for inheritance but is not redeemed. The first tanna says the same if her earlier birth was while she was a maidservant or a gentile.
• Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: “whatever opens the womb among the children of Israel” (Shemot 13:2) means the womb must be opened while she is Jewish. Her first son after conversion or emancipation is a firstborn for both purposes.
• The priest but not inheritance: this applies to a woman’s first son when the father already has sons, and to a son born to a woman who converted or was freed while pregnant, who halakhically has no father to inherit from.
• Cases of doubt: this includes babies mixed up between a first-time mother and a mother whose son is not redeemed, and a widow who remarried within three months, so it is unclear whose son the child is. The child is redeemed as a firstborn for the priest, but no one takes a firstborn’s double portion, since the claimant must prove his status.

Amud Bet Highlights

• Shmuel: for a nefel, the head alone is not birth. The source is “all in whose nostrils was the breath of the spirit of life” (Bereishit 7:22): the head matters only where there is life.
• The challenge: the mishna says “a nefel whose head emerged alive”. The Gemara first answers that “head” means “most of it”, worded to match the next clause about a full-term fetus.
• What is new? The head rule for a full-term fetus is already known for animals (Chullin 68a). Humans and animals cannot be derived from each other, because a woman’s birth canal is concealed (prozdor) and a human face is uniquely significant. But the human rule is also taught in Nidda 28a, where the forehead marks birth. So the mishna’s mention of the head must teach that a nefel’s head counts. Teyuvta: Shmuel is refuted.
• Reish Lakish: the forehead counts as birth for every law except inheritance, because the father “shall recognize” (יכיר, Devarim 21:17) the firstborn, and a forehead alone is not recognizable. The “every law” includes a convert whose baby’s forehead emerged before her conversion: she does not observe the days of impurity and purity, and brings no childbirth offering.
• Rabbi Yochanan: the forehead counts even for inheritance.
• Challenges from recognizing a face: baraitot require “the face with the nose”, both for yakir and for testimony that a man died (Yevamot 120a). The Gemara emends this to “up to the nose”.
• Forehead and face together: a baraita requires both forehead and face with the nose, citing “the recognition of their countenance witnesses against them” (Yeshayahu 3:9; Abaye or Rav Kahana). The answer is that testimony freeing a woman to remarry is a special stringency.
• Lenient at the end, strict at the beginning: the Sages accepted hearsay and the testimony of women and slaves for an aguna. That leniency concerns who reports the death. The identification of the body was never relaxed. A second answer begins and continues on 47a.

Key Disputes

Conclusions

A vow on the consent of the public is irrevocable except for a mitzva. A forbidden marriage requires a vow, while impurity from the dead requires only a commitment. Perek Mumin Elu ends. In Perek 8, the two firstborn statuses are independent: redemption follows the opening of the mother’s womb, and the double portion follows the father’s first viable son. In cases of doubt there is a redemption obligation but no double portion. Shmuel is refuted: the head of a nefel counts as its birth. Rabbi Yochanan’s view, that the forehead counts even for inheritance, survives the challenges by emending “with the nose” to “up to the nose” and by treating testimony for a woman’s remarriage as a special stringency. A second answer continues on 47a.

Key Figures

Tannaim: Rabbi Meir, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, the Rabbis

Amoraim: Ameimar, Rav Acha, Ravina, Shmuel, Reish Lakish, Rabbi Yochanan, Abaye (or Rav Kahana)

One-Line Takeaway

A firstborn is defined twice, by the mother’s womb for the priest and by the father’s strength for the inheritance, and the moment of “birth” that decides each depends on how much of a face has come into the world.

🎯 ELI5 (Explain Like I’m 5)

The Big Picture 🖼️

Today’s daf is a daf of endings and beginnings! First we finish the seventh perek, all about kohanim (priests) and what can keep them from serving in the Temple. Then we start a brand-new perek about a firstborn baby boy, and discover that being “the firstborn” can mean two different things, depending on whether you’re asking about the father or the mother.

A Promise Nobody Can Undo 🤝🔒

Yesterday’s daf ended with a kohen who married a woman the Torah says a kohen may not marry. He can’t serve in the Temple until he promises (makes a נדר, neder, a “vow”) to send her away.

But wait! Usually, if someone makes a vow and regrets it, a wise Rabbi can undo it. This is called התרת נדרים (hatarat nedarim, “untying a vow”). So what stops this kohen from going to a Rabbi tomorrow and getting out of his promise?

The answer: we make him vow על דעת רבים (al da’at rabbim, “on the understanding of the public”). That means his promise is tied to what everyone else understands it to mean. To untie it, you’d need all those people to agree, and you could never gather them all. So the promise sticks!

Think of it like… a promise you make to your whole class, where you say, “I promise this, and it counts the way all of you understand it.” You can’t sneak out of it by asking just one friend. You’d need the entire class to say okay!

The Simple Idea 💡: A vow made “on the understanding of the public” can’t be undone, so the kohen’s promise is really final.

The Teacher Who Got His Job Back 🍎👨‍🏫

Ameimar (a later Rabbi from Bavel) says that’s the halacha: a vow “on the understanding of the public” can’t be undone. Then the Gemara adds an important exception. That rule is only for ordinary matters. If undoing the vow helps someone do a mitzva, it can be undone!

And here’s a story to show it. There was a teacher of little children who was too strict. He hit the kids more than he should have. So Rav Acha made him vow, “on the understanding of the public,” to stop teaching.

But later, Ravina undid the vow and gave him his job back. Why? Because nobody else could be found who taught the children as carefully and accurately as he did! Teaching little children Torah is one of the most important mitzvot there is.

Think of it like… a soccer coach who was benched for yelling too much. But when the team couldn’t find anyone else who taught the game so well, they invited him back (and surely reminded him to be gentler with the kids!).

The Simple Idea 💡: Even an “unbreakable” public vow can be undone when it’s needed for a mitzva, like teaching children Torah.

Why Does One Kohen Need a Vow, and the Other Just a Promise? 🧠⚖️

The same mishna mentioned a second kohen: one who became tamei (ritually impure) by touching or being near someone who passed away, which the Torah tells kohanim not to do. To serve again, he only needs קבלה (kabbalah, “accepting it upon himself”), a sincere commitment, not a formal vow.

So why the difference? Why does the married kohen need a strong vow, and this one just a commitment?

The Gemara answers: יצרו תקפו (yitzro tekafo), “his desire grabs hold of him.” The married kohen lives with his wife every day. It’s very hard to walk away from someone you care about! He needs an extra-strong lock on his promise. But nobody feels a daily pull to become impure, so a plain promise is enough.

Think of it like… two kids trying to stop doing something. One says, “I’ll stop jumping in puddles.” Easy enough, a promise will do! The other says, “I’ll stop eating the cookies in the cookie jar right next to my bed.” That kid might need the jar locked up!

The Simple Idea 💡: The harder something is to resist, the stronger the safeguard we need.

Goodbye, Perek Seven! 👋📖

Now comes the הדרן (hadran), the little goodbye we say when we finish a perek: “We shall return to you, Perek Mumin Elu!”

This perek went all over the body, from head to toe, listing what makes a kohen unable to serve in the Temple: the shape of his head, his eyes, ears, nose, lips, arms and legs, his skin, his height. It ended with two kohanim whose problem wasn’t their body at all, but something they did.

Remember: a hadran ends a perek, not the whole masechet. Bechorot has nine perakim, and we’re heading into perek eight!

The Simple Idea 💡: We finish a perek by promising to come back and learn it again.

Two Kinds of Firstborn 👨‍👦👩‍👦

The new perek is called יש בכור לנחלה (Yesh Bechor LaNachala, “There is a firstborn for inheritance”). Now we’re talking about people, not animals!

A firstborn boy can be special in two different ways:

Since one depends on Dad and the other on Mom, they don’t always match! So the mishna gives four possibilities:

• ✅✅ Firstborn for both
• ✅❌ Firstborn for inheritance, not for the kohen
• ❌✅ Firstborn for the kohen, not for inheritance
• ❌❌ Firstborn for neither

Think of it like… being “the first kid in your family to go to this school” versus “the first kid in your class to lose a tooth.” Two different “firsts,” and you can be one without the other!

The Simple Idea 💡: A boy can be his father’s firstborn, his mother’s firstborn, both, or neither, and each brings different rules.

When the Mother’s “First” Didn’t Count for the Father 🌱🕊️

Here’s a tender topic, so let’s go gently. Sometimes, sadly, a mother is expecting a baby, but the baby isn’t able to live and be born healthy. This is called a נפל (nefel), a pregnancy that ended too early. It’s very sad for a family, and the Torah treats it with care.

The mishna says: if a baby boy is born after that, then:

• He is not a firstborn for the kohen, because his mother’s body already had a birth before him, so he isn’t the very first “opener.”
• But he is his father’s firstborn for inheritance, because he’s the father’s first son who lived.

The same applies after a baby who was full-term but, sadly, wasn’t alive when he was born.

Rabbi Meir says even a very early pregnancy that didn’t look like a human baby yet still counts as the mother’s “first.” The Sages disagree: it has to have at least some human form. But they agree about a few other very early pregnancies that also count as the mother’s “first,” so the son after them doesn’t need pidyon haben either.

The Simple Idea 💡: If the mother already had an earlier birth, even one that sadly didn’t survive, the next son is the father’s firstborn but not the mother’s.

Mom Already Has Kids, or Dad Already Has Kids 👪🔄

More cases from the mishna:

Case A: A man with no sons marries a woman who already had a baby before. Their son is Dad’s first, so he gets the double inheritance. But he’s not Mom’s first, so no pidyon haben.

The first tanna says this is true even if Mom’s earlier baby was born before she became Jewish. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili disagrees! The Torah says “whatever opens the womb among the children of Israel” (Shemot 13:2). So for him, only a birth while Mom was Jewish counts. Her first son after becoming Jewish is a firstborn for both!

Case B: The opposite. A man who already has sons marries a woman who never had a baby. Their son is Mom’s first, so he needs pidyon haben. But he’s not Dad’s first son, so no double inheritance.

Think of it like… two lists of “firsts” kept in two different notebooks: Mom’s notebook and Dad’s notebook. A new baby might be number one in one notebook and number three in the other!

The Simple Idea 💡: Mom’s history decides pidyon haben, Dad’s history decides the double inheritance, and Rabbi Yosei HaGelili counts Mom’s “first” only from when she was Jewish.

The Baby Mix-Up 👶🔀👶

Now a puzzle! Two women have babies in the same place, and the babies get mixed up. One mother is having her very first baby, and the other is a mother whose son wouldn’t need pidyon haben anyway (for example, she’s from a family of kohanim or Leviim, or she already had a child before).

So which baby is which? Nobody knows! The mishna says:

• There is a pidyon haben obligation, because one of these boys really does need it.
• But neither boy gets the double inheritance. To get a bigger share, you have to prove you deserve it, and neither boy can.

The same is true when we aren’t sure which husband is the father. (The Torah has a woman wait three months before remarrying, exactly to prevent this kind of confusion. If she didn’t wait, nobody can be sure.)

Think of it like… two identical backpacks at school, and one has a prize inside. We know someone has the prize, but neither kid can prove which backpack is theirs, so neither can claim it!

The Simple Idea 💡: When we can’t tell whose firstborn a boy is, he can’t claim the double inheritance, because you have to prove a claim to take extra.

When Does a Birth “Count”? 🤔⏱️

Now the Gemara starts. A big question: if a baby’s head comes out first, is that already “being born”? This matters for twins! Whoever is “born” first is the firstborn.

Shmuel says: for a baby who wasn’t able to live (a nefel), just the head coming out does not count. Why? He brings a verse from the story of Noach’s Flood (Bereishit 7:22): “all in whose nostrils was the breath of life.” For someone who has the breath of life, the head, with its nose and face, is the most important part. But for a baby who wasn’t able to live, the head isn’t special.

But wait! The mishna said “a nefel whose head came out.” Doesn’t that mean the head does count?

The Gemara tries an answer: “head” here really means “most of the body.” It just used the word “head” to match the next line of the mishna, where “head” really does mean the head.

But wait again! If so, what is the mishna teaching? We already know a head counts for a healthy baby, from the mishna in Chullin (about animals) and the mishna in Nidda (about people), which says a baby counts as born once most of his forehead comes out. So the mishna must be teaching something new: that even for a nefel, the head counts!

That disagrees with Shmuel, and the Gemara says תיובתא (teyuvta), “Shmuel’s view is refuted!” It’s like a referee blowing the whistle: that idea doesn’t stand.

Think of it like… a race where the rule is “you’ve crossed the finish line when your head crosses it.” The Gemara is figuring out exactly where that line is.

The Simple Idea 💡: A baby counts as “born” once his forehead comes out, and Shmuel’s idea that this doesn’t apply to a nefel is rejected.

Can Dad “Recognize” Him Yet? 👀👶

Reish Lakish says: the forehead counts as birth for everything, except one thing: the double inheritance. Why? Because the Torah says the father “shall recognize” (יכיר, yakir) his firstborn (Devarim 21:17). You can’t recognize a baby from just his forehead!

So imagine twins. The first one’s forehead peeks out and goes back in, and then his brother is fully born first. For Reish Lakish, the second twin gets the double inheritance.

Rabbi Yochanan disagrees: the forehead counts even for inheritance.

Reish Lakish’s “for everything” also includes a special case: a woman becoming Jewish right in the middle of giving birth. If the baby’s forehead came out before she became Jewish, the baby counts as born before, so the special Torah laws for a Jewish mother after a birth don’t apply to her.

Think of it like… saying “you’re officially at the party once you step through the door.” But to get your name tag, the host has to see your face and recognize you!

The Simple Idea 💡: Reish Lakish says the forehead counts as birth everywhere except inheritance, where Dad needs to “recognize” his son; Rabbi Yochanan says it counts there too.

How Much of a Face Do You Need? 🧐👃

The Gemara now challenges Rabbi Yochanan with sources that say “recognizing a face” means seeing the face with the nose. If the nose is needed, the forehead alone isn’t enough!

Rabbi Yochanan answers: read it as “up to the nose,” meaning the top part of the face, which includes the forehead.

Then comes a harder source. It’s about a very serious situation: when witnesses come to court to say a man has passed away, so that his wife may remarry. They must have clearly seen his forehead, his face and his nose, all together. The verse is “the look of their faces testifies about them” (Yeshayahu 3:9).

The answer: in that case, the Sages were extra careful. If the witnesses made a mistake, she might remarry while her husband is still alive! So they asked for more than usual.

But wait! In that same case, the Sages were actually very lenient. They let a woman, or a servant, or even someone who only heard it from somebody else, be the witness. That’s because they wanted to help a woman who would otherwise be stuck, never able to remarry.

The Gemara’s clever answer: the Sages were lenient about who tells us the news (the end of the story). But they were never lenient about making sure it was really him (the beginning of the story). That part must be certain!

Think of it like… a lost dog found by a neighbor. Anyone can call you to say, “We found your dog!” But you still want a clear photo of its face, to be sure it’s your dog and not a lookalike.

The Simple Idea 💡: The Sages made it easy to deliver the news, but the identification itself must always be certain.

To Be Continued… ⏳➡️

The daf ends with “ואיבעית אימא” (ve’iba’it eima, “and if you want, say…”), the start of a second answer for Rabbi Yochanan. We’ll hear it on the next daf!

The Simple Idea 💡: The Gemara has another way to defend Rabbi Yochanan, coming up tomorrow.

The Super Simple Summary 🎯

• A kohen’s vow made “on the understanding of the public” can’t be undone, unless undoing it helps a mitzva, like the excellent teacher who got his job back.
• The kohen who married a woman forbidden to him needs a strong vow, because his desire pulls at him every day; the kohen who became impure only needs a sincere commitment.
• We say hadran and finish Perek Seven, Mumin Elu, and start Perek Eight, Yesh Bechor LaNachala.
• A son can be a firstborn for inheritance (Dad’s first son, gets a double share), for the kohen (Mom’s first baby, needs pidyon haben), both, or neither.
• If Mom had an earlier birth, even one that sadly didn’t survive, the next son is Dad’s firstborn but not Mom’s. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili counts Mom’s “first” only from when she was Jewish.
• When babies get mixed up, or we don’t know who the father is, there’s still pidyon haben, but no one can prove a claim to the double inheritance.
• A baby counts as born once his forehead comes out, and Shmuel’s view about a nefel is refuted.
• Reish Lakish: the forehead counts for everything except inheritance, where Dad must “recognize” his son. Rabbi Yochanan: it counts even for inheritance. The Sages are lenient about who reports a death but strict about identifying the person, and the debate continues on the next daf.

⚖️ Halacha

A Vow “On the Consent of the Public” and Its Release for a Mitzva

Source in Daf: 46a, Segments 1-2 (the priest who married a forbidden woman is made to vow “on the consent of the public” so that no Sage can dissolve it; Ameimar’s ruling that such a vow is irrevocable for an optional matter but may be released for a mitzva; Ravina’s reinstatement of the teacher whom Rav Acha had made to vow)

Rambam — Hilchot Shevuot 6:8

Hebrew:

אֶחָד הַנִּשְׁבָּע בֵּינוֹ לְבֵין עַצְמוֹ וְאֶחָד הַנִּשְׁבָּע בָּרַבִּים. וַאֲפִלּוּ נִשְׁבַּע בַּשֵּׁם הַמְיֻחָד בַּה’ אֱלֹהֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְנִחַם הֲרֵי זֶה נִשְׁאָל עַל שְׁבוּעָתוֹ וּמַתִּירִין לוֹ. נִשְׁבַּע עַל דַּעַת רַבִּים אוֹ שֶׁנָּדַר עַל דַּעַת רַבִּים אֵין מַתִּירִין לוֹ לְעוֹלָם אֶלָּא לִדְבַר מִצְוָה:

English:

Both a person who took an oath in private and one who took one in public - even one who took an oath in God’s ineffable name, [swearing] by God, the Lord of Israel - may appeal for a release of his oath if he changes his mind. If, however, one took an oath or a vow based on the understanding of many others, it may not be released except for a purpose associated with a mitzvah.

Connection: This is Ameimar’s ruling almost word for word. The Rambam first sets out the general rule that any oath or vow, even one taken in public and even one sworn by the Divine Name, can be released by a Sage if the person sincerely regrets it. That is the view the Gemara attributes to those who hold that “a vow taken in public can be dissolved.” He then states the exception that Ameimar says even that view accepts: a vow made “on the consent of the public” (עַל דַּעַת רַבִּים) is never released, and he adds in the same breath the Gemara’s qualification, “except for a purpose associated with a mitzva” (אֶלָּא לִדְבַר מִצְוָה).

Rambam — Hilchot Shevuot 6:9

Hebrew:

כֵּיצַד. נִשְׁבַּע וְתָלָה שְׁבוּעָתוֹ בְּדַעַת רַבִּים שֶׁלֹּא יֵהָנֶה בִּפְלוֹנִי לְעוֹלָם וְהֻצְרְכוּ בְּנֵי אוֹתָהּ הָעִיר לִלְמֹד תּוֹרָה אוֹ לְמִי שֶׁיָּמוּל אֶת בְּנֵיהֶם אוֹ שֶׁיִּזְבַּח לָהֶם וְלֹא נִמְצָא אֶלָּא זֶה בִּלְבַד הֲרֵי זֶה נִשְׁאַל לְחָכָם אוֹ לִשְׁלֹשָׁה הֶדְיוֹטוֹת וּמַתִּירִין לוֹ שְׁבוּעָתוֹ וְעוֹשֶׂה לָהֶם מִצְוֹת אֵלּוּ וְנוֹטֵל שְׂכָרוֹ מֵאוֹתָן הָאֲנָשִׁים שֶׁנִּשְׁבַּע שֶׁלֹּא יֵהָנֶה מֵהֶם:

English:

What is implied? One took an oath and made his oath dependent on the understanding of others that he would not benefit from so-and-so at all and the people of that city needed someone to teach them the Torah, to circumcise their sons, or to perform ritual slaughter on their behalf and they only found this person, he may ask a sage or three ordinary persons [to release him from his oath]. We release his oath. He may perform these mitzvot on their behalf and he may receive his wage from the people concerning whom he had taken an oath that he would not benefit from them.

Connection: The Rambam illustrates “a purpose associated with a mitzva” with a case that is a near twin of the story of Rav Acha and Ravina. A man swore on the consent of the public never to benefit from a certain town, and the town then needed someone to teach Torah, to circumcise or to slaughter, and he alone was available. The vow is released so that he can serve, and he may even accept payment from the very people he swore not to benefit from. The schoolteacher of Segment 2 fits this pattern exactly: his vow to stop teaching was “on the consent of the public,” yet Ravina released it because no other teacher as precise could be found. The Rambam’s condition, “they only found this person,” matches the Gemara’s reason, “since no other was found who was as meticulous as he.”

Shulchan Aruch — Yoreh De’ah 228:21

Hebrew:

נדר שעל דעת רבים אין לו התרה בלא דעתם: הגה ויש מחמירין דאפילו עם דעתם אין להתיר לדבר הרשות (ב”י בשם תשובת הרמב”ן והרשב”א וסמ”ג וריב”ש) וכן נכון להחמיר לכתחלה אלא אם כן יש מצוה בהתרתו:

English (our translation; Sefaria has no English for this se’if):

A vow made on the consent of the public cannot be released without their consent. Rema: And some are stringent that even with their consent one may not release it for an optional matter, and it is proper to be stringent in the first instance, unless there is a mitzva in releasing it.

Connection: The Shulchan Aruch frames the rule a little differently from the Rambam: a vow on the consent of the public cannot be released without the consent of the public, which implies that with their consent it can. The Rema records the stricter view, which follows Ameimar’s limitation closely: even with their consent such a vow is not released for an optional matter, only where releasing it serves a mitzva. The Rema goes on in the same gloss to list cases that count as a mitzva (letting a person into one’s home to pray with the congregation, making peace between husband and wife, communal needs, a person’s livelihood), all on condition that the mitzva cannot be done without releasing the vow. This is the practical heir of Ravina’s ruling: the release is a last resort, justified only because no other teacher could do the job as well.

The Teacher Who Struck the Children

Source in Daf: 46a, Segment 2 (Rav Acha made a schoolteacher vow to stop teaching because “he was negligent with the children,” striking them excessively; Ravina reinstated him because no other teacher was as precise)

Rambam — Hilchot Talmud Torah 2:2

Hebrew:

מַכְנִיסִין אֶת הַתִּינוֹקוֹת לְהִתְלַמֵּד כְּבֶן שֵׁשׁ כְּבֶן שֶׁבַע לְפִי כֹּחַ הַבֵּן וּבִנְיַן גּוּפוֹ. וּפָחוֹת מִבֶּן שֵׁשׁ אֵין מַכְנִיסִים אוֹתוֹ. וּמַכֶּה אוֹתָן הַמְלַמֵּד לְהַטִּיל עֲלֵיהֶם אֵימָה. וְאֵינוֹ מַכֶּה אוֹתָם מַכַּת אוֹיֵב מַכַּת אַכְזָרִי. לְפִיכָךְ לֹא יַכֶּה אוֹתָם בְּשׁוֹטִים וְלֹא בְּמַקְלוֹת אֶלָּא בִּרְצוּעָה קְטַנָּה. וְיוֹשֵׁב וּמְלַמְּדָן כָּל הַיּוֹם כֻּלּוֹ וּמִקְצָת מִן הַלַּיְלָה כְּדֵי לְחַנְּכָן לִלְמֹד בַּיּוֹם וּבַלַּיְלָה. וְלֹא יִבָּטְלוּ הַתִּינוֹקוֹת כְּלָל חוּץ מֵעַרְבֵי שַׁבָּתוֹת וְיָמִים טוֹבִים בְּסוֹף הַיָּמִים וּבְיָמִים טוֹבִים. אֲבָל בְּשַׁבָּת אֵין קוֹרִין בַּתְּחִלָּה אֲבָל שׁוֹנִין בָּרִאשׁוֹן. וְאֵין מְבַטְּלִין הַתִּינוֹקוֹת וַאֲפִלּוּ לְבִנְיַן בֵּית הַמִּקְדָּשׁ:

English:

Children should be brought to study [under a teacher’s instruction] at the age of six or seven, according to the child’s health and build. Below the age of six, he should not be brought [to a teacher]. A teacher may employ corporal punishment to cast fear upon [the students]. However, he should not beat them cruelly, like an enemy. Therefore, he should not beat them with a rod or a staff, but rather with a small strap. [The teacher] should sit and instruct them the entire day and for a portion of the night, to train them to study during the day and night. The children should not neglect [their studies] at all, except at the end of the day on the eve of the Sabbaths and festivals and on the festivals themselves. On the Sabbath, they should not begin new material. However, they should review what was learned already. The children should never be interrupted from their studies, even for the building of the Temple.

Connection: The story on our daf presupposes a line between permitted discipline and the kind that is a real wrong. The Rambam draws that line (codified in Shulchan Aruch Yoreh De’ah 245:10): the teacher may not strike “like an enemy, cruelly” (מַכַּת אוֹיֵב מַכַּת אַכְזָרִי), and he lists the implements that cross it. The schoolteacher whom Rav Acha removed had crossed that line. The same halacha also explains why Ravina reinstated him: the Rambam’s picture of children learning all day, never interrupted “even for the building of the Temple,” shows how central the teaching of children is. That is what made the release of the vow a “devar mitzva.”

Shulchan Aruch — Yoreh De’ah 245:19

Hebrew:

אם יש כאן שני מלמדים האחד קורא הרבה ואין מדקדק עמהם להבינם על נכון ואחד אינו קורא כל כך אלא שמדקדק עמהם להבינם לוקחין אותו שמדקדק יותר:

English:

If there are two teachers here, one reads a lot and is not precise with them to make them understand properly, and one does not read so much, but is precise with them to make them understand, they take the one who is more precise.

Connection: Ravina’s reason for reinstating the teacher was that no other was found “who was as meticulous” (דָּיֵיק) as he. The Shulchan Aruch makes precision the deciding quality in choosing a teacher: one who teaches less material but makes sure the children truly understand is preferred over one who covers more ground carelessly. That is why the loss of a precise teacher was a loss the community could not absorb, and why his release counted as serving a mitzva.

The Priest Who Married a Forbidden Woman or Became Impure from the Dead

Source in Daf: 46a, Segments 1 and 3 (the 45b mishna: such priests are disqualified from the service until they vow or accept upon themselves not to repeat the act; the Gemara’s explanation that marriage requires a formal vow because “his inclination overpowers him,” while impurity from the dead needs only an acceptance)

Rambam — Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 6:9

Hebrew:

כֹּהֵן שֶׁהָיָה נוֹשֵׂא נָשִׁים בַּעֲבֵרָה אֵינוֹ עוֹבֵד עַד שֶׁיַּדִּירוּהוּ בֵּית דִּין עַל דַּעַת רַבִּים כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יִהְיֶה לוֹ הֲפָרָה שֶׁלֹּא יוֹסִיף לַחֲטֹא וְעוֹבֵד וְיוֹרֵד וּמְגָרֵשׁ. וְכֵן אִם הָיָה מִטַּמֵּא לְמֵתִים פָּסוּל עַד שֶׁיְּקַבֵּל עָלָיו בְּבֵית דִּין שֶׁלֹּא יִטַּמֵּא. וְאִם עָבַר וְעָבַד קֹדֶם שֶׁיַּדִּיר אוֹ שֶׁיְּקַבֵּל אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהוּא נָשׂוּי בַּעֲבֵרָה לֹא חִלֵּל עֲבוֹדָה:

English:

A priest who married women sinfully may not serve until he is compelled by the court to take a vow dependent on the discretion of other people so that it cannot be nullified that he will not continue to sin. He may then perform the service, descend [from the altar], and divorce her. Similarly, if he would become impure due to contact with a human corpse, he is disqualified until he makes a resolution in court not to contract such impurity. If he transgressed and performed service before taking such a vow or making such a resolution, he does not disqualify his service even though he remains married in sin.

Connection: The Rambam rules on every element of the sugya. The priest married in transgression is made to vow by the court “on the consent of the public” (עַל דַּעַת רַבִּים), and the Rambam states the reason from Segment 1: “so that it cannot be nullified” (כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יִהְיֶה לוֹ הֲפָרָה). The priest who became impure from the dead needs only “to accept upon himself in court” (שֶׁיְּקַבֵּל עָלָיו בְּבֵית דִּין), the lesser commitment of Segment 3. The Rambam does not repeat the Gemara’s reason, that desire for a wife at home is a constant pull while impurity from the dead is not, but the difference in the safeguards he requires reflects it. He adds two points the Gemara here does not discuss: the priest may serve and only then “descend and divorce,” and service performed before the vow is not disqualified after the fact. These Temple-era laws are preserved in the Rambam for when the Temple is rebuilt.

Two Kinds of Firstborn: “The First of His Strength” and “The Opener of the Womb”

Source in Daf: 46a, Segment 5 (the opening mishna of Perek Yesh Bechor LaNachala: there is a firstborn for inheritance who is not a firstborn for the priest, a firstborn for the priest who is not one for inheritance, one who is both, and one who is neither)

Rambam — Hilchot Nachalot 2:9

Hebrew:

בְּכוֹר לְנַחֲלָה הוּא הַנּוֹלָד לָאָב רִאשׁוֹן שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים כא יז) “כִּי הוּא רֵאשִׁית אֹנוֹ”. וְאֵין מַשְׁגִּיחִין עַל הָאֵם אֲפִלּוּ יָלְדָה כַּמָּה בָּנִים הוֹאִיל וְזֶה רִאשׁוֹן לְאָבִיו יוֹרֵשׁ פִּי שְׁנַיִם:

English:

The firstborn with regard to the laws of inheritance is the first child born to the father, as ibid.:17 states: “Because he is the first manifestation of his strength.” We do not pay attention to the child’s status vis-a-vis his mother. Even if she gave birth to several sons previously, since this was the first son born to the father, he receives a double portion of the inheritance.

Connection: The Rambam states the father’s half of the mishna’s distinction: the firstborn for inheritance is defined by “the first of his strength” (רֵאשִׁית אֹנוֹ), so “we do not pay attention to the mother.” This is the principle behind the mishna’s first category, the son of a man who marries a woman who has already given birth (Segment 8): he is his father’s first, and he takes the double portion even though he did not open his mother’s womb.

Shulchan Aruch — Yoreh De’ah 305:17

Hebrew:

אין פדיון הבכור תלוי אלא בפטר רחם שאם אינו בכור לאם אע”פ שהוא בכור לאב אינו חייב בפדיון ואם יש לו כמה נשים ויש לו בכור מכל אחת ואחת חייב לפדות את כולם:

English:

The Redemption of the firstborn depends solely on being the first issue of the womb. If he’s not first born to the mother, even though he’s first born to the father, he’s not obligated to be redeemed. And if (the father) has many wives, and he has a firstborn with each one, he must redeem all of them.

Connection: This is the other half, the mother’s side. Pidyon haben “depends solely” on opening the womb, so the son who is first to his father but not to his mother is not redeemed, and a man with several wives must redeem the first son of each. Together with Choshen Mishpat 277:8, which repeats the Rambam’s definition of the firstborn for inheritance, these two se’ifim give the mishna’s whole framework in practical law: one status follows the father, the other the mother, and they can fall apart in exactly the four ways the mishna lists. Both laws apply today, since pidyon haben is practised and the firstborn’s double portion is part of Torah inheritance law.

A Son Born After Nefalim and Other Births That “Open the Womb”

Source in Daf: 46a, Segments 6-7 (a son born after nefalim, even if a nefel’s head emerged alive, or after a full-term fetus whose head emerged dead, is a firstborn for inheritance but not for the priest; Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis on a miscarriage shaped like an animal; the sandal, afterbirth, formed sac and a fetus removed in pieces); 46b, Segments 1-8 (Shmuel on the head of a nefel and his refutation)

Rambam — Hilchot Nachalot 2:10

Hebrew:

הַבָּא אַחַר נְפָלִים אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁיָּצָא רֹאשׁ הַנֵּפֶל כְּשֶׁהוּא חַי הַבָּא אַחֲרָיו בְּכוֹר לְנַחֲלָה. וְכֵן בֶּן תִּשְׁעָה שֶׁיָּצָא רֹאשׁוֹ מֵת הַבָּא אַחֲרָיו בְּכוֹר לְנַחֲלָה שֶׁזֶּה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים כא יז) “רֵאשִׁית אֹנוֹ” הוּא שֶׁלֹּא נוֹלַד לוֹ קֹדֶם לָזֶה וָלָד שֶׁיָּצָא חַי לַאֲוִיר הָעוֹלָם. לְפִיכָךְ בֶּן תִּשְׁעָה שֶׁהוֹצִיא רֹב רֹאשׁוֹ חַי הַבָּא אַחֲרָיו אֵינוֹ בְּכוֹר:

English:

A son who is born after stillborn babies, even if the stillborn baby was alive when its head emerged from the womb, is considered the firstborn with regard to the laws of inheritance. Similarly, when a fetus was born after a full-term pregnancy, but was not alive when its head emerged, the son who follows is considered the firstborn with regard to the laws of inheritance. The term “the first of his strength,” Deuteronomy 21:17, used with regard to the firstborn implies that no child before him emerged alive into the world. Hence, when a fetus was alive after its head emerged after a full-term pregnancy, a son born afterwards in not a firstborn even the first baby died immediately thereafter.

Connection: The Rambam rules on the inheritance side of the mishna exactly as written, “even if the head of the nefel emerged while it was alive” (אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁיָּצָא רֹאשׁ הַנֵּפֶל כְּשֶׁהוּא חַי). Neither a nefel nor a stillborn full-term baby is a living child of the father, so the son who follows is still “the first of his strength.” The last line is the clause the Gemara discusses in Segment 4: a full-term baby that put out most of its head alive is itself the firstborn, even if it died at once, so the son after it is not. Shulchan Aruch Choshen Mishpat 277:6 repeats the Rambam’s wording.

Rambam — Hilchot Bikkurim 11:14

Hebrew:

הַכּוּתִית וְהַשִּׁפְחָה שֶׁיָּלְדוּ וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִתְגַּיְּרוּ וְנִשְׁתַּחְרְרוּ וְיָלְדוּ וָלָד אַחֵר הֲרֵי זֶה פָּטוּר שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (במדבר ג יב) (במדבר יח טו) “פֶּטֶר רֶחֶם” וְאֵין זֶה פֶּטֶר רֶחֶם. וְכֵן הַבָּא אַחַר הַנְּפָלִים כָּל נֵפֶל שֶׁאִמּוֹ טְמֵאָה לֵדָה הַבָּא אַחֲרָיו אֵינוֹ פֶּטֶר רֶחֶם. וְכָל נֵפֶל שֶׁאֵין אִמּוֹ טְמֵאָה לֵדָה כְּמוֹ הַמַּפֶּלֶת כְּמִין דָּגִים וַחֲגָבִים אוֹ הַמַּפֶּלֶת יוֹם אַרְבָּעִים וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶן הַבָּא אַחֲרָיו בְּכוֹר לַכֹּהֵן וְחַיָּב לִפְדּוֹת:

English:

When a gentile woman or a maidservant gave birth and then converted or was freed and then gave birth again, [the second child] is exempt, as [indicated by] the phrase “the first issue of the womb,” and this is not [the woman’s] first issue of the womb. Similar concepts apply when a son is born after a nefal. Whenever the mother is ritually impure due to birth because of a nefal, a son born afterwards is not considered the first issue of the womb. Whenever a nefal does not cause the mother to be ritually impure due to birth, e.g., a woman who miscarries and the issue resembles a fish or a grasshopper, a woman who miscarries on the fortieth day [after conception], or the like, a son born afterwards is [under obligation] to the priesthood and must be redeemed.

Connection: For pidyon haben the Rambam gives a single test for which miscarriages “open the womb”: any nefel that makes the mother impure as a woman who gave birth (טְמֵאָה לֵדָה) exempts the son after it, and one that does not, such as a miscarriage shaped like a fish or a locust, or one on the fortieth day, does not. This places the Rabbis’ requirement of human form (Segment 7) inside the broader laws of childbirth impurity. The first half of the halacha rules on Segments 8-9, as discussed below.

Rambam — Hilchot Bikkurim 11:15

Hebrew:

חָתַךְ הָעֻבָּר בְּמֵעֶיהָ וְהוֹצִיאוֹ אֵיבָר אֵיבָר הַבָּא אַחֲרָיו אֵינוֹ פֶּטֶר רֶחֶם. בֶּן שְׁמוֹנָה חֳדָשִׁים שֶׁהוֹצִיא רֹאשׁוֹ וְהוּא חַי וְהֶחֱזִירוֹ וָמֵת. וְכֵן בֶּן תִּשְׁעָה שֶׁמֵּת וְיָצָא רֹאשׁוֹ וְהֶחֱזִירוֹ וְאַחַר כָּךְ יָצָא אָחִיו וְיָלְדָה. זֶה שֶׁיָּלְדָה אֵינוֹ פֶּטֶר רֶחֶם. שֶׁהֲרֵי נִפְטַר בְּרֹאשׁוֹ שֶׁל רִאשׁוֹן. וּמִשֶּׁתֵּצֵא פַּדַּחְתּוֹ פּוֹטֵר הַבָּא אַחֲרָיו:

English:

When a fetus in a woman’s womb was cut up and removed limb by limb, a son born afterwards is not considered to be “the first issue of her womb.” When the head of a fetus that was carried for eight months emerged alive and then was withdrawn back to the womb where it died - or the head of a stillborn fetus that was carried for nine moths emerged and then was withdrawn - and afterwards the [twin] brother [of the fetus] emerged as [a viable] birth, the viable birth is not considered the first issue of the womb, for [all subsequent births] became exempt with the [emergence of] the head of the first [fetus]. As soon as its forehead emerged, it exempted those born afterwards.

Connection: Three points of our daf meet in this halacha. A fetus removed in pieces opens the womb (Segment 7, הַיּוֹצֵא מְחוּתָּךְ). A fetus whose head emerged and was drawn back opens the womb, so the twin born after it is not redeemed, which is the case the Gemara built on Shmuel in Segment 1 of 46b. And the Rambam does not limit this to a viable child: he speaks of an eight-month baby (which in the Gemara’s categories is not viable) whose head emerged alive, and of a stillborn nine-month baby whose head emerged. That is the conclusion of Segment 8, where Shmuel’s view that “the head does not exempt in the case of nefalim” was refuted. The last line, “as soon as its forehead emerged, it exempted those born afterwards,” is the Nidda definition of birth that the Gemara quotes in that segment.

Shulchan Aruch — Yoreh De’ah 305:22

Hebrew:

בן ח’ חדשים שהוציא ראשו והוא חי והחזירו ומת או בן ט’ שהוציא ראשו אפילו אחר שמת והוחזר ואח”כ יצא אחיו וילדה ולד קיימא אינו פטר רחם שהרי נפטר בראשו של ראשון ומשתצא פדחתו פוטר הבא אחריו וכן המפלת כמין בהמה חיה ועוף שחצי פרצוף פניהם דומה לצורת אדם או סנדל או שליא או שפיר מרוקם (פי’ חתיכה של בשר כצורת סנדל. ופי’ שליא הכיס שהעובר מונח בתוכו. ופי’ שפיר מרוקם חתיכה של בשר ויש בה צורת אדם. ערוך) או שיצא הולד מחותך איברים איברים הנולד אחר כל אחד מאלו אינו פטר רחם: (לשון טור):

English (our translation; Sefaria has no English for this se’if):

An eight-month baby that put out its head while alive, drew it back and died, or a nine-month baby that put out its head, even after it had died, and it was drawn back, and afterwards its brother came out and she bore a viable child: this one is not the opener of the womb, since the womb was already opened by the head of the first, and once its forehead emerges it exempts the one born after it. So too a woman who miscarries something shaped like a domesticated animal, a wild animal or a bird, half of whose face resembles human form, or a sandal, or an afterbirth, or a formed sac (explanation: a sandal is a piece of flesh shaped like a sandal; the afterbirth is the sac in which the fetus lies; a formed sac is a piece of flesh in which there is human form; Arukh), or the child came out cut limb by limb: one born after any of these is not the opener of the womb (in the language of the Tur).

Connection: The Shulchan Aruch puts the whole list of our mishna into one se’if, and it rules like the Rabbis against Rabbi Meir: an animal-shaped miscarriage opens the womb only if “half of its face resembles human form.” The sandal, afterbirth, formed sac and the fetus that emerged in pieces follow, just as in Segment 7. In practice this means that a family whose first pregnancy ended in a late miscarriage, or a pregnancy loss in which the fetus was already formed, does not redeem the son born afterwards.

Shulchan Aruch — Yoreh De’ah 305:23

Hebrew:

בן ח’ חדשים שהוציא ראשו מת והמפלת שפיר מלא דם או מלא מים או מלא גוונים והמפלת כמין דגים וחגבים שקצים ורמשים והמפלת ליום ארבעים הנולד אחר כל אלו בכור לפדיון. (וכל זמן שאין איבריו מרוקמים אין פוטר הבא אחריו ואפילו בזמן הזה סומכין על זה) (מהרי”ק שורש קמ”ג):

English (our translation; Sefaria has no English for this se’if):

An eight-month baby that put out its head dead, and a woman who miscarries a sac full of blood, full of water or full of colours, and a woman who miscarries something like fish, locusts, creeping things or crawling things, and a woman who miscarries on the fortieth day: one born after any of these is a firstborn for redemption. (And as long as its limbs are not formed, it does not exempt the one born after it, and even in our time we rely on this) (Mahari Kolon, Shoresh 143).

Connection: This is the other side of the line drawn in the mishna. Where there was no formed human fetus, the womb has not been “opened” for the purposes of pidyon haben, and the son born afterwards must be redeemed. The Rema’s gloss makes the practical rule explicit: the deciding question is whether the limbs had formed (שַׁפִּיר מְרוּקָּם in the mishna’s language), and “even in our time we rely on this.” Since an early miscarriage is common, this is one of the most frequent questions a rabbi is asked before a pidyon haben; families are generally told to raise any earlier pregnancy loss with their rabbi before the ceremony.

The Convert and the Freed Maidservant

Source in Daf: 46a, Segments 8-10 (a woman who gave birth as a maidservant or gentile and then gave birth after joining the Jewish people: the son is a firstborn for inheritance but not for the priest, against Rabbi Yosei HaGelili; a woman who converted or was freed while pregnant: her son is a firstborn for the priest but not for inheritance)

Rambam — Hilchot Bikkurim 11:13

Hebrew:

הַשִּׁפְחָה שֶׁנִּשְׁתַּחְרְרָה וְכוּתִית שֶׁנִּתְגַּיְּרָה כְּשֶׁהֵן מְעֻבָּרוֹת וְיָלְדוּ. אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהוֹרָתוֹ שֶׁלֹּא בִּקְדֻשָּׁה הוֹאִיל וְנוֹלַד בִּקְדֻשָּׁה חַיָּב. שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר פֶּטֶר רֶחֶם בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל וַהֲרֵי פֶּטֶר וְרֶחֶם בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל. אֵין יָדוּעַ אִם קֹדֶם שֶׁנִּתְגַּיְּרָה יָלְדָה אוֹ אַחַר שֶׁנִּתְגַּיְּרָה יָלְדָה הַמּוֹצִיא מֵחֲבֵרוֹ עָלָיו הָרְאָיָה:

English:

If a maidservant was freed - or a gentile woman converted - while she was pregnant and then she gave birth, since he was born in holiness, [the child] is obligated [to redeem himself] even though he was not conceived in holiness, as [indicated by] the phrase: “the first issue of the womb in Israel.” For this child is the first issue of a womb in Israel. If it is not known whether the woman gave birth before she converted or afterwards, [we follow the principle:] When one desires to expropriate property from a colleague, the burden of proof is on him.

Connection: This is the case of Segment 10. The child was conceived before his mother’s conversion but born after it, so he opened a Jewish womb, “the first issue of the womb in Israel,” and must be redeemed. Since his father was a gentile or a slave, there is no Jewish father obligated to redeem him, and the obligation falls on the son himself. The Rambam adds a case of doubt the mishna does not mention: if it is not known whether the birth was before or after the conversion, the priest cannot collect, because “the burden of proof is on the one who wishes to take money from another.”

Shulchan Aruch — Yoreh De’ah 305:20-21

Hebrew (305:20):

השפחה שנשתחררה וכותית שנתגיירה כשהן מעוברות וילדו אע”פ שהורתו שלא בקדושה הואיל ונולד בקדושה חייב שנאמר פטר רחם בישראל והרי פטרו רחם בישראל אין ידוע אם קודם שנתגיירה או אחר שנתגיירה המע”ה:

Hebrew (305:21):

הכותית והשפחה שילדו ואח”כ נתגיירו ונשתחררו וילדו אחר כך פטור שאין זה פטר רחם:

English (our translation; Sefaria has no English for these se’ifim):

(20) A maidservant who was freed or a Cuthean woman who converted while they were pregnant and gave birth: even though his conception was not in holiness, since he was born in holiness he is obligated, as it says “the opener of the womb in Israel,” and they have opened the womb in Israel. If it is not known whether she gave birth before she converted or after she converted, the burden of proof is on the one who wishes to take money from another. (21) A Cuthean woman or a maidservant who gave birth, and afterwards converted or was freed, and afterwards gave birth: he is exempt, for this is not the opener of the womb.

Connection: The Shulchan Aruch takes over both halves of the Rambam’s ruling (Bikkurim 11:13 and the opening of 11:14) and so rules with the first Tanna against Rabbi Yosei HaGelili (Segment 9). For Rabbi Yosei HaGelili a birth before conversion did not count, since the verse speaks of opening the womb “in Israel.” The codes read the verse the opposite way, as the first Tanna does: the earlier birth physically opened the womb, so the son born after the conversion is not redeemed. The words “in Israel” are applied only to the child himself, who must be born when his mother is already Jewish. These cases are practical today wherever a woman who converts has children from before her conversion.

Rambam — Hilchot Nachalot 2:12

Hebrew:

הָיוּ לוֹ בָּנִים כְּשֶׁהָיָה עַכּוּ”ם וְנִתְגַּיֵּר אֵין לוֹ בְּכוֹר לְנַחֲלָה. אֲבָל יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁהָיָה לוֹ בֵּן מִן הַשִּׁפְחָה וּמִן הָעַכּוּ”ם הוֹאִיל וְאֵינוֹ קָרוּי בְּנוֹ הַבָּא לוֹ אַחֲרָיו מִן הַיִּשְׂרְאֵלִית בְּכוֹר לְנַחֲלָה וְנוֹטֵל פִּי שְׁנַיִם:

English:

When a person had sons as a gentile and then converted, he does not have a firstborn with regard to the rights of inheritance. If, however, a Jewish man fathered sons from a maid-servant or from a gentile woman, since they are not considered his sons, a son he fathers afterwards from a Jewish woman is considered his firstborn with regard to the laws of inheritance, and he receives a double portion of his father’s estate.

Connection: This is the inheritance side of the same cases. Halachically, a man’s child from a maidservant or a gentile woman is not called his son, so the first son he has later from a Jewish wife is his firstborn for inheritance. The first half applies the same principle from the father’s side: a man who had sons while still a gentile has no firstborn for inheritance after he converts. That is also the logic of Segment 10, where the son conceived by a gentile or a slave is redeemed but has no halachic father from whom to take a double portion. Shulchan Aruch Choshen Mishpat 277:9 repeats this ruling.

Mixed-Up Babies and the Child of Doubtful Paternity

Source in Daf: 46a, Segment 11 (an Israelite woman giving birth for the first time and a woman whose son is exempt, a priest’s or Levite’s wife or one who has given birth before, whose babies were mixed up; a woman who remarried within three months, so that it is unknown whether the child is a nine-month child of the first husband or a seven-month child of the second: the child is a firstborn for the priest but not for inheritance)

Rambam — Hilchot Bikkurim 11:29

Hebrew:

שְׁתֵּי נָשִׁים שֶׁל שְׁנֵי אֲנָשִׁים אַחַת בִּכְּרָה וְאַחַת לֹא בִּכְּרָה וְיָלְדוּ שְׁנֵי זְכָרִים. זֶה שֶׁלֹּא בִּכְּרָה אִשְׁתּוֹ נוֹתֵן חָמֵשׁ סְלָעִים לַכֹּהֵן. יָלְדוּ זָכָר וּנְקֵבָה אֵין כָּאן לַכֹּהֵן כְּלוּם:

English:

[The following laws apply when] there are two wives of two men and one gave birth previously and one did not [and they gave birth and the infants became mixed together]. If they gave birth to two males, the father whose wife had not given birth previously must give five selaim to a priest. If they gave birth to a male and a female, the priest does not receive anything.

Connection: The mishna’s first doubt is two births in one place, one by a woman whose son must be redeemed and one by a woman whose son is exempt (in our mishna the second woman is a priest’s or Levite’s wife or one who has given birth before). The Rambam rules on the version where the second woman has already given birth: if both babies are boys, the father whose wife had not given birth before must pay the five sela’im, because one of the two boys is certainly his firstborn. If one is a girl, the priest gets nothing, since the boy may be the son of the woman who had given birth before.

Rambam — Hilchot Bikkurim 11:27

Hebrew:

יָלְדוּ זָכָר וּנְקֵבָה וְנִתְעָרְבוּ הָאָבוֹת פְּטוּרִין וְהַבֵּן חַיָּב לִפְדּוֹת אֶת עַצְמוֹ. וְכֵן מְבַכֶּרֶת שֶׁלֹּא שָׁהֲתָה אַחַר בַּעְלָהּ שְׁלֹשָׁה חֳדָשִׁים וְיָלְדָה וְאֵין יָדוּעַ אִם בֶּן תִּשְׁעָה לָרִאשׁוֹן אוֹ בֶּן שִׁבְעָה לָאַחֲרוֹן שְׁנֵיהֶן פְּטוּרִין. וְהַבֵּן חַיָּב לִפְדּוֹת אֶת עַצְמוֹ:

English:

[In the above situation, if the women] gave birth to a male and a female and they became mixed together, the fathers are exempt and the son is obligated to redeem himself. Similar [laws apply when] a woman who has not given birth previously does not wait after [being divorced from] her [first] husband three months [before marrying] and gives birth [to a child, whose lineage is doubtful]. It is not known whether he is the first [husband’s] son having been born after nine months or the last husband’s son, having been born after seven. Both fathers are exempt and the son is obligated to redeem himself.

Connection: The Rambam joins the mishna’s second doubt, the woman who did not wait three months, to the case of mixed-up babies, and gives one ruling for both: “both fathers are exempt, and the son is obligated to redeem himself.” Each possible father can tell the priest to prove that the child is his, so neither can be made to pay. The son, however, is certainly a firstborn of his mother, whoever his father is, so the obligation falls on him once he is grown. This is how the codes apply the mishna’s statement that such a child is “a firstborn for the priest.”

Shulchan Aruch — Yoreh De’ah 305:30

Hebrew:

וכן מבכרת שלא שהתה אחר בעלה ג’ חדשים ונשאה וילדה זכר ספק בן ט’ לראשון או בן ז’ לאחרון האבות פטורין והבן חייב לפדות את עצמו ואם ילדו שתי נקבות וזכר או שני זכרים ושתי נקבות אין כאן לכהן כלום:

English (our translation; Sefaria has no English for this se’if):

And so too a woman giving birth for the first time who did not wait three months after her husband, married, and gave birth to a male of doubtful status, a nine-month child of the first or a seven-month child of the last: the fathers are exempt and the son is obligated to redeem himself. And if they gave birth to two females and a male, or two males and two females, the priest has nothing here.

Connection: The Shulchan Aruch adopts the Rambam’s ruling as practical law. Since the Sages require a widow or divorcee to wait before remarrying precisely to avoid this doubt (see the next source), the case is rare, but the ruling also covers any situation in which the father is unknown and only the mother’s status is certain.

Shulchan Aruch — Even HaEzer 13:1

Hebrew:

כל אשה שנתגרשה או שנתאלמנה הרי זו לא תינשא ולא תתארס לאחר עד שתמתין צ’ יום חוץ מיום שנתגרשה או שמת בעלה בו וחוץ מיום שנתארסה בו כדי שיודע אם היא מעוברת או אינה מעוברת להבחין בין זרעו של ראשון לזרעו של אחרון

English:

Any woman who is divorced or widowed may not get married or engaged to another until she waits 90 days, excluding the day she was divorced or on which her husband died and the day on which she becomes engaged, so that it be known if she is pregnant or not pregnant, to distinguish between the seed of the former and the seed of the latter.

Connection: The Shulchan Aruch states the reason for the waiting period in the language of the Gemara, “to distinguish between the seed of the former and the seed of the latter.” The mishna’s case, a woman who “did not wait three months,” is exactly what this decree is meant to prevent. When it happens anyway, the result is the doubt of our mishna: a son who must be redeemed but cannot claim a firstborn’s inheritance from either man.

Rambam — Hilchot Nachalot 2:6

Hebrew:

בֵּן שֶׁנִּסְתַּפֵּק לָנוּ אִם הוּא בְּכוֹר אוֹ פָּשׁוּט כְּגוֹן שֶׁנִּתְעָרֵב עִם אַחֵר אֵינוֹ נוֹטֵל פִּי שְׁנַיִם. וְכֵיצַד עוֹשִׂין. אִם הֻכְּרוּ וּלְבַסּוֹף נִתְעָרְבוּ כּוֹתְבִין הַרְשָׁאָה זֶה לָזֶה וְנוֹטְלִין חֵלֶק בְּכוֹרָה עִם אֲחֵיהֶם. וְאִם לֹא הֻכְּרוּ כְּגוֹן שֶׁיְּלָדוֹ בְּמַחֲבוֹאָה אַחַת אֵין כּוֹתְבִין הַרְשָׁאָה וְאֵין כָּאן חֵלֶק בְּכוֹרָה:

English:

When there is a question if a son is a firstborn or an ordinary son - e.g., the firstborn became mixed together with another - he does not receive a double portion. What is done? If at first, the babies were distinct and then they became mixed together,” they may compose a document granting power of attorney to each other, and on that basis take the portion of the firstborn with their brothers. If the identity of the firstborn was never known - e.g., the two wives gave birth in one hiding place, - they should not compose a document granting power of attorney to each other, for there is no extra portion for the firstborn.

Connection: This is the inheritance side of Segment 11: a son whose firstborn status is in doubt does not take the double portion, because the heir who claims the extra share must prove it. The Rambam then adds the Gemara’s distinction (discussed on 47a-b) between babies who were identified and only later mixed up, who can give each other power of attorney and jointly claim the firstborn’s share, and babies who were never identified, like those born “in one hiding place,” where there is no firstborn’s share at all. The mishna’s case, two women giving birth in one place, is the second kind.

Shulchan Aruch — Choshen Mishpat 277:11

Hebrew:

מי שנסתפק לנו אם הוא בכור או פשוט כגון שנתערב עם אחר אינו נוטל פי שנים וכיצד עושין אם הוכרו ולבסוף נתערבו כותבים הרשאה זה לזה ונוטלים חלק בכורה ואם לא הוכרו כגון שילדו במחבואה אחת אין נוטלין חלק בכורה : הגה ספק בן ט’ לראשון או בן שבעה לאחרון אינו יורש אחד מהן והבא אחריו אינו נוטל חלק בכורה אפי’ בהרשאה מן הספק (טור):

English (our translation; Sefaria has no English for this se’if):

One about whom we are in doubt whether he is a firstborn or an ordinary son, for example he was mixed up with another, does not take a double portion. What is done? If they were identified and only later mixed up, they write power of attorney to each other and take the firstborn’s share with their brothers. If they were never identified, for example they were born in one hiding place, they do not take the firstborn’s share. Rema: A child who is possibly a nine-month child of the first or a seven-month child of the last does not inherit from either of them, and the one born after him does not take the firstborn’s share, even with power of attorney from the doubtful one (Tur).

Connection: The Shulchan Aruch repeats the Rambam, and the Rema adds the mishna’s second case explicitly: the child of the woman who remarried within three months does not inherit from either possible father. The Rema also adds that the brother born after him cannot claim the firstborn’s share either, since perhaps the doubtful child is the firstborn of the same father, which completes the logic of “a firstborn for the priest but not for inheritance.”

When Is a Child “Born”? The Forehead and the Firstborn’s Inheritance

Source in Daf: 46b, Segments 8-11 (the Nidda definition: a child emerging normally is born when most of its forehead emerges; Reish Lakish: the forehead counts everywhere except for inheritance, because of “he shall recognize”; Rabbi Yochanan: even for inheritance; the baraita about a convert whose child’s forehead emerged before her conversion)

Rambam — Hilchot Nachalot 2:2

Hebrew:

בְּכוֹר שֶׁנּוֹלַד אַחַר מִיתַת אָבִיו אֵינוֹ נוֹטֵל פִּי שְׁנַיִם. שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים כא טז) “וְהָיָה בְּיוֹם הַנְחִילוֹ אֶת בָּנָיו” וְגוֹ’ (דברים כא יז) “כִּי אֶת הַבְּכֹר בֶּן הַשְּׂנוּאָה יַכִּיר”. וְאִם יָצָאת פַּדַּחְתּוֹ בְּחַיֵּי אָבִיו אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא יָצָא כָּל רֹאשׁוֹ לַאֲוִיר הָעוֹלָם אֶלָּא לְאַחַר מִיתַת אָבִיו הֲרֵי זֶה נוֹטֵל פִּי שְׁנַיִם:

English:

When a firstborn is born after his father’s death, he does not receive a double portion. This is derived from ibid.: 16-17: “On the day when he transfers his inheritance to his sons… he shall recognize the firstborn, the son of the hated one.” If his forehead emerged during the lifetime of his father, even though his entire head did not emerge until after his father’s death, he receives a double portion.

Connection: The Rambam rules like Rabbi Yochanan against Reish Lakish. A firstborn born after his father’s death does not take the double portion, because the verse “he shall recognize” (יַכִּיר) requires a father who can recognize him. But if the forehead emerged while the father was alive, even though the rest of the head came out only after his death, the son takes the double portion. So the forehead counts as birth even for inheritance, and “recognition” does not require that the whole face have been seen. This follows the usual rule that the halacha follows Rabbi Yochanan in his disputes with Reish Lakish.

Shulchan Aruch — Choshen Mishpat 277:3

Hebrew:

בכור שנולד אחר מיתת אביו אינו נוטל פי שנים ואם יצאה פדחתו בחיי אביו אע”פ שלא יצא כל ראשו לאויר העולם אלא לאחר מיתת אביו ה”ז נוטל פי שנים (י”א דאם נולד כשהוא גוסס אינו נוטל פי שנים) (נ”י בשם התוספות וראב”ד):

English (our translation; Sefaria has no English for this se’if):

A firstborn who was born after the death of his father does not take a double portion. If his forehead emerged during his father’s lifetime, even though his whole head did not emerge into the air of the world until after his father’s death, he takes a double portion. (Some say that if he was born in a dying state he does not take a double portion) (Nimukei Yosef in the name of Tosafot and Ra’avad).

Connection: The Shulchan Aruch adopts the Rambam’s wording and with it Rabbi Yochanan’s view. The Rema’s addition, about a child born in a dying state, applies the same idea of “recognition” from the other direction: the verse speaks of a son whom the father can acknowledge as his heir.

Rambam — Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 10:6

Hebrew:

נֶחְתַּךְ הַוָּלָד בְּמֵעֶיהָ וְיָצָא אֵיבָר אֵיבָר. בֵּין שֶׁיָּצָא עַל סֵדֶר הָאֵיבָרִים כְּגוֹן שֶׁיָּצְאָה הָרֶגֶל וְאַחֲרֶיהָ הַשּׁוֹק וְאַחֲרֶיהָ הַיָּרֵךְ. בֵּין שֶׁיָּצָא שֶׁלֹּא עַל הַסֵּדֶר אֵינָהּ טְמֵאָה לֵדָה עַד שֶׁיֵּצֵא רֻבּוֹ. וְאִם יָצָא רֹאשׁוֹ כֻּלּוֹ כְּאֶחָד הֲרֵי זֶה כְּרֻבּוֹ. וְאִם לֹא נֶחְתַּךְ וְיָצָא כְּדַרְכּוֹ מִשֶּׁתֵּצֵא רֹב פַּדַּחְתּוֹ הֲרֵי זֶה כְּיָלוּד אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנֶּחְתַּךְ אַחַר כָּךְ:

English:

When a fetus is cut up inside a woman’s womb, whether it emerged according to the order of the limbs, e.g., first a foot emerged, then a calf, and then a thigh, or it emerged in an abnormal order, the woman is not considered impure until the majority of the body emerges. If its entire head comes out intact, it is as if the majority [of the body] emerged. If it was not cut up and it emerged in the ordinary manner, it is considered as having been born when its forehead emerges, even though it was cut up afterwards.

Connection: This halacha codifies the mishna in Nidda that the Gemara quotes in Segment 8: a child that emerges normally is “born” once most of its forehead has emerged (מִשֶּׁתֵּצֵא רֹב פַּדַּחְתּוֹ), while a child that emerges in pieces counts only when most of it emerges, or when the whole head emerges at once. This is Reish Lakish’s “everywhere,” which Segment 10 illustrates with the convert: the moment of birth for the mother’s impurity and purity after childbirth is fixed by the forehead. Taken together with Nachalot 2:2 and Bikkurim 11:15, the Rambam applies the forehead rule to all three areas, impurity after childbirth, pidyon haben and inheritance, so for him there is no exception for inheritance.

Identifying a Dead Man: Forehead, Face and Nose

Source in Daf: 46b, Segments 11-13 (the mishna in Yevamot: one may testify about a dead man only if his face with the nose was seen; the baraita requiring forehead, face and nose together, from “the recognition of their countenance witnesses against them”; the Sages were lenient about who may testify, but not about the identification itself)

Rambam — Hilchot Gerushin 13:21

Hebrew:

מְצָאוּהוּ הָרוּג אוֹ מֵת. אִם פַּדַּחְתּוֹ וְחָטְמוֹ וּפַרְצוּף פָּנָיו קַיָּמִין וְהִכִּירוּהוּ בָּהֶן שֶׁהוּא פְּלוֹנִי מְעִידִין עָלָיו. וְאִם נִטַּל אֶחָד מֵאֵלּוּ אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהֶם סִימָנִין בְּגוּפוֹ וּבְכֵלָיו וַאֲפִלּוּ שׁוּמָא אֵין מְעִידִין עָלָיו שֶׁמָּא אַחֵר הוּא. בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים בְּשֶׁרָאוּהוּ בְּתוֹךְ שְׁלֹשָׁה יָמִים אַחַר הֲרִיגָתוֹ אוֹ אַחַר מִיתָתוֹ. אֲבָל אַחַר שְׁלֹשָׁה אֵין מְעִידִין עָלָיו מִפְּנֵי שֶׁפַּרְצוּף פָּנָיו מִשְׁתַּנֶּה:

English:

[The following rules apply when the body of a man who was] slain or died of natural causes is discovered. If his forehead, his nose and his facial features are intact, and his identity can be established based on them, testimony concerning his death may be offered. If, however, any of these identifying factors is missing, even if there are signs [through which he can be identified] on his body and on his personal artifacts, even if one of those signs is a mole, testimony concerning his death should not be offered. When does [the leniency mentioned in the first clause] apply? When the corpse was seen within three days of his murder or death. After three days have passed, testimony concerning his death should not be offered, because his facial features [may have] become distorted.

Connection: The Rambam rules like the baraita of Segment 12: forehead, nose and facial features must all be intact, and if any one is missing the witnesses may not testify, even if they recognize marks on the body or the man’s belongings. He does not adopt the emended reading “up to the nose” for this purpose, which fits the Gemara’s answer that testimony allowing a woman to remarry is a special case of stringency, and it is no contradiction to his ruling for the firstborn (Nachalot 2:2), where the forehead alone is enough. The Rambam also adds a time limit, three days, after which the face may have changed.

Shulchan Aruch — Even HaEzer 17:24

Hebrew:

מצאוהו הרוג או מת אם פדחתו וחוטמו ופרצוף פניו קיימים והכירוהו בהם שהוא פלוני מעידין עליו ואם ניטל א’ מאלו אע”פ שיש להם סימנים מובהקים ביותר בכליו אינם כלום דחיישינן לשאלה אפילו היה להם סימנים בגופו ואפי’ שומא אין מעידין עליו אבל היו להם בגופו סימנים מובהקים ביותר מעידין עליו:

English:

If they found him murdered or dead, if his forehead, nose, and facial features are extant, and they recognized him as ploni (e.g. John Doe), they testify about him. If one of these identifying features was missing, even if they have extremely reliable signs in his clothing, these do not count because we are concerned about loans. Even if they had signs in his body, even a mole, they may not testify about him. But if they identified extremely reliable signs on his body, they may testify to his death.

Connection: The Shulchan Aruch keeps the requirement of forehead, nose and face, and it shows the distinction of Segment 13 in practice. On the “end” of the testimony, who may report the death, the Sages were lenient (in the following se’ifim the Shulchan Aruch accepts a single witness, hearsay, a woman, and a non-Jew speaking innocently). On the “beginning,” whether the body is truly this man, they were strict: ordinary signs on his clothing are not enough, “because we are concerned about loans,” that is, someone else may have been wearing borrowed clothes. The Shulchan Aruch does add one leniency the Gemara here does not discuss: highly distinctive signs on the body itself are acceptable. The Rema gives examples, such as an extra or missing limb, and stresses that ordinary features like height or complexion do not count. These laws are still practised today in freeing an aguna whose husband was killed in war, a disaster or an accident.

Summary of Rulings