Bechorot Daf 26 (בכורות דף כ״ו)
Daf: 26 | Amudim: 26a – 26b | Date: Loading...
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (26a)
Segment 1
TYPE: קושיא (המשך)
The objection completes: a blemished firstborn’s wool is permitted without an expert — answered by a broader use of ‘unblemished’
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָא בַּעַל מוּם שְׁרֵי, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא הִתִּירוּ מוּמְחֶה! תַּנָּא: כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּלֹא הִתִּירוֹ מוּמְחֶה — תָּם קָרֵי לֵיהּ.
English Translation:
But in the case of a blemished firstborn, use of its wool is permitted, even though an expert did not deem the animal permitted for slaughter. This contradicts the statement of Rabbi Asi. The Gemara answers: It is possible that the tanna of that baraita calls the animal unblemished wherever an expert did not yet deem the firstborn permitted for slaughter, even if it was physically blemished.
קלאוד על הדף:
This segment completes the objection begun at the end of 25b. Rabbi Asi had reported in Reish Lakish’s name that even Akavya ben Mahalalel permits shed wool only if an expert had already declared the blemished firstborn fit for slaughter. The baraita, by contrasting an unblemished firstborn (prohibited) with a blemished one, implies that any blemished animal’s wool is permitted, expert or no expert. The Gemara answers that the baraita’s ‘unblemished’ is a technical term: any firstborn not yet released by an expert is called tam, even if it physically carries a blemish, so the baraita fits Reish Lakish after all.
Key Terms:
- תָּם = unblemished — here extended to any firstborn not yet released by an expert
- הִתִּירוֹ מוּמְחֶה = an expert deemed it permitted — an expert examined the blemish and declared it permanent, permitting slaughter
- בַּעַל מוּם = a blemished animal
Segment 2
TYPE: ברייתא
Is Reish Lakish’s view a tannaitic dispute? A baraita records three versions of Akavya and the Rabbis
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לֵימָא כְּתַנָּאֵי: הַתּוֹלֵשׁ צֶמֶר מִבְּכוֹר תָּם, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנּוֹלַד בּוֹ מוּם וּשְׁחָטוֹ — אָסוּר. בְּכוֹר בַּעַל מוּם שֶׁתָּלַשׁ מִמֶּנּוּ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ מֵת — עֲקַבְיָא בֶּן מַהֲלַלְאֵל מַתִּיר, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹסְרִים. אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: לֹא בָּזֶה הִתִּיר עֲקַבְיָא בֶּן מַהֲלַלְאֵל, אֶלָּא בִּשְׂעַר בְּכוֹר בַּעַל מוּם שֶׁנָּשַׁר וְהִנִּיחוֹ בַּחַלּוֹן, וְאַחַר כָּךְ שְׁחָטוֹ — בָּזֶה עֲקַבְיָא בֶּן מַהֲלַלְאֵל מַתִּיר, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹסְרִין.
English Translation:
The Gemara remarks: Let us say that the interpretation of Reish Lakish is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im, as the baraita states: With regard to one who plucks the wool from an unblemished firstborn, even though it later developed a blemish and the owner slaughtered it, use of the wool is prohibited. In the case of a blemished firstborn from which one plucked wool, and it subsequently died, Akavya ben Mahalalel deems the wool permitted and the Rabbis deem it prohibited. Rabbi Yehuda said: It was not with regard to that case that Akavya ben Mahalalel deemed use of the wool permitted. Rather, it was in a case of the hair of a blemished firstborn animal that shed from the animal and one placed the hair in a compartment, and thereafter one slaughtered the animal. In that case Akavya ben Mahalalel deems use of the wool permitted, and the Rabbis deem its use prohibited.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara proposes that Reish Lakish’s requirement of an expert is itself debated by tannaim, and cites a baraita. Its first tanna places the dispute between Akavya ben Mahalalel (permits) and the Rabbis (prohibit) in the case of wool plucked from a blemished firstborn that then died. Rabbi Yehuda corrects this: Akavya was lenient only for hair that shed by itself and was set aside in a compartment, after which the animal was slaughtered, and it is there that the Rabbis prohibit. This is the same case as the mishna on 25a.
Key Terms:
- לֵימָא כְּתַנָּאֵי = let us say it is a dispute between tannaim
- הַתּוֹלֵשׁ = one who plucks — removes wool by hand
- נָשַׁר = shed — fell out on its own
- חַלּוֹן = a window or wall niche — a compartment where the hair is stored until its status is clear
- עֲקַבְיָא בֶּן מַהֲלַלְאֵל = a tanna of the Second Temple period, known for holding to his rulings against the majority
Segment 3
TYPE: ברייתא (המשך)
Rabbi Yosei reports his father Halafta’s view: after slaughter all agree it is permitted; the dispute is when the animal died
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: מוֹדֶה אַבָּא חֲלַפְתָּא בְּזֶה שֶׁהוּא מוּתָּר, אֲבָל בְּיִיחוּד אָמְרוּ חֲכָמִים: יַנִּיחֶנּוּ בַּחַלּוֹן, שֶׁמָּא יֵשׁ תִּקְוָה. שְׁחָטוֹ — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל מוּתָּר, מֵת — עֲקַבְיָא בֶּן מַהֲלַלְאֵל מַתִּיר וַחֲכָמִים אוֹסְרִים.
English Translation:
The baraita continues: Rabbi Yosei says: My father, Ḥalafta, concedes to Akavya ben Mahalalel in this case of a slaughtered firstborn that use of the wool is permitted. Indeed [aval], the Rabbis said explicitly: One places it in a compartment, as perhaps there is a hope that use of the wool will ultimately be permitted, since if he slaughters the animal all agree that use of the wool is permitted. But if the animal dies by other means, Akavya ben Mahalalel deems use of the wool permitted and the Rabbis deem it prohibited.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yosei adds a third version in the name of his father, Abba Halafta. All agree that if the firstborn was slaughtered the stored hair is permitted, which is precisely why the Rabbis advised setting it aside in a compartment: there is hope it will become usable. Akavya and the Rabbis disagree only where the animal died by other means. So the baraita now holds three positions on where the machloket lies: a died case (first tanna), a slaughtered case (Rabbi Yehuda) and a died case with slaughter undisputed (Rabbi Yosei).
Key Terms:
- אַבָּא חֲלַפְתָּא = my father Halafta — Rabbi Yosei’s father, a tanna of the generation after the Destruction
- שֶׁמָּא יֵשׁ תִּקְוָה = perhaps there is hope — that the hair will become permitted once the animal is slaughtered
- שְׁחָטוֹ / מֵת = he slaughtered it / it died — the two endings that decide the hair’s status
Segment 4
TYPE: קושיא
Rabbi Yosei seems to repeat the first tanna; so they must differ on the need for an expert
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי יוֹסֵי — הַיְינוּ תַּנָּא קַמָּא! אֶלָּא לָאו הִתִּירוֹ מוּמְחֶה אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ?
English Translation:
The Gemara raises a difficulty: If that is the explanation of their dispute, the opinion of Rabbi Yosei is identical to the opinion of the first tanna in the baraita, as both hold that use of the wool of a slaughtered blemished firstborn is permitted and the dispute between Akavya ben Mahalalel and the Rabbis applies to a case where the animal dies by other means. Rather, is it not correct to say the dispute between them concerns the requirement that an expert deem the animal permitted for slaughter?
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara objects: as the first tanna also locates the dispute in the case of death, and implies that after slaughter all permit, Rabbi Yosei seems to say nothing new. A baraita does not record a separate view that adds nothing. The Gemara therefore suggests that the real difference between them concerns Reish Lakish’s issue, the requirement that an expert release the animal before the hair was shed.
Key Terms:
- הַיְינוּ תַּנָּא קַמָּא = that is the same as the first tanna — a challenge that a view is redundant
- אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ = there is a difference between them
Segment 5
TYPE: הסבר
The proposed difference: the first tanna requires an expert’s release, Rabbi Yosei does not
Hebrew/Aramaic:
דְּתַנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: הִתִּירוֹ מוּמְחֶה — אִין, וְאִי לָא — לָא, וַאֲתָא רַבִּי יוֹסֵי לְמֵימַר: אַף עַל גַּב דְּלֹא הִתִּירוֹ מוּמְחֶה!
English Translation:
The Gemara elaborates: As the first tanna holds: If an expert deemed the animal permitted before its wool was shed, then yes, use of the wool is permitted after the animal has been slaughtered; but if not, then use of the wool is not permitted. And Rabbi Yosei comes to say that even in a case where an expert did not deem the firstborn permitted for slaughter before its wool was shed, use of the wool is still permitted. If so, the interpretation of Reish Lakish is the subject of the dispute between the first tanna and Rabbi Yosei: The first tanna agrees with that opinion and Rabbi Yosei rejects it.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara spells out the suggested difference. The first tanna permits the hair of a slaughtered blemished firstborn only if an expert released the animal before the hair fell, exactly as Reish Lakish said. Rabbi Yosei permits it even without prior release. If so, Reish Lakish’s position is one side of a tannaitic dispute, and the objection on 25b from the baraita would rest only on Rabbi Yosei’s view.
Key Terms:
- אִין / לָא = yes / no — Aramaic shorthand for permitted / not permitted
- אַף עַל גַּב = even though
Segment 6
TYPE: דחייה
Rava: all require an expert; the baraita holds three disputes about where Akavya and the Rabbis disagree
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רָבָא: לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אִי הִתִּירוֹ מוּמְחֶה — אִין, אִי לֹא הִתִּירוֹ — לָא, וְשָׁלֹשׁ מַחְלוֹקוֹת בַּדָּבָר, דְּתַנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: פְּלִיגִי בְּמֵת, וְהוּא הַדִּין לִשְׁחָטוֹ, וְהַאי דְּקָמִיפַּלְגִי בְּמֵת — לְהוֹדִיעֲךָ כֹּחוֹ דַּעֲקַבְיָא.
English Translation:
Rava said: No, the interpretation of Reish Lakish is not the subject of their dispute, as everyone agrees that if an expert deemed the animal permitted before its wool was shed, then yes, use of the wool is permitted, but if an expert did not deem the animal permitted beforehand then the use of its wool is not permitted. And there are three disputes concerning this matter, as the first tanna holds: Akavya ben Mahalalel and the Rabbis disagree with regard to a case where the firstborn died, and the same is true, i.e., they disagree, in a case where he slaughtered it. And the reason that the first tanna states they disagree specifically in a case where it died is to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Akavya, i.e., that he deems use of the wool permitted even if the animal was not slaughtered.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava rejects the suggestion. Every tanna in the baraita agrees with Reish Lakish that without an expert’s release the hair is prohibited. The three opinions differ only on which case the Akavya-Rabbis machloket covers. According to the first tanna they disagree whether the animal died or was slaughtered, and he chose the case of death to show how far Akavya’s leniency reaches: he permits even when the animal was never slaughtered.
Key Terms:
- שָׁלֹשׁ מַחְלוֹקוֹת בַּדָּבָר = there are three disputes in the matter — three tannaim who differ on the scope of the machloket
- וְהוּא הַדִּין = and the same applies
- לְהוֹדִיעֲךָ כֹּחוֹ = to inform you of the strength of his view — a case chosen to show how far a position extends
Segment 7
TYPE: דחייה (המשך)
Rava completes the map: Rabbi Yehuda puts the dispute in slaughter, Rabbi Yosei in death
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה סָבַר: בְּמֵת — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל אָסוּר, כִּי פְּלִיגִי — בִּשְׁחָטוֹ, וַאֲתָא רַבִּי יוֹסֵי לְמֵימַר: בִּשְׁחָטוֹ — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל מוּתָּר, כִּי פְּלִיגִי — בְּמֵת.
English Translation:
And Rabbi Yehuda holds: With regard to a firstborn that died, all, i.e., Akavya ben Mahalalel and the Rabbis, agree that use of the wool is prohibited, and when they disagree it is with regard to a case where the owner slaughtered the animal. And Rabbi Yosei comes to say: Where he slaughtered it, all agree that use of the wool is permitted, and when they disagree it is with regard to a case where the animal died.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava finishes the three positions. Rabbi Yehuda holds that if the animal died everyone prohibits the hair, and the dispute concerns only a slaughtered animal. Rabbi Yosei holds the reverse: after slaughter everyone permits, and the dispute concerns only an animal that died. This answers the charge of redundancy: Rabbi Yosei differs from the first tanna, who held that the dispute applies to slaughter as well.
Key Terms:
- דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל = the statement of all — a point on which all disputants agree
- כִּי פְּלִיגִי = when they disagree
Segment 8
TYPE: הלכה
Rav Nahman: the halakha follows Rabbi Yehuda, since Eduyyot is taught in line with him
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, הוֹאִיל וּתְנַן בִּבְחִירָתָא כְּוָותֵיהּ, דִּתְנַן: שְׂעַר בְּכוֹר בַּעַל מוּם שֶׁנָּשַׁר וְהִנִּיחוֹ בַּחַלּוֹן, וְאַחַר כָּךְ שְׁחָטוֹ — עֲקַבְיָא בֶּן מַהֲלַלְאֵל מַתִּיר, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹסְרִין.
English Translation:
Rav Naḥman says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, since we learned a mishna in our preferred tractate in accordance with his opinion. As we learned in a mishna (Eduyyot 5:6): In the case of the hair of a blemished firstborn animal that shed from the animal and one placed the hair in a compartment, and thereafter he slaughtered the animal, Akavya ben Mahalalel deems use of the wool permitted and the Rabbis deem its use prohibited even after the animal’s death.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Nahman rules that Rabbi Yehuda’s framing is correct: Akavya and the Rabbis disagree about a slaughtered animal. His reason is that the mishna in Eduyyot 5:6, which is also our mishna on 25a, states the case exactly as Rabbi Yehuda framed it: hair that shed, was placed in a compartment, and then the animal was slaughtered. Eduyyot is called ‘our preferred tractate’ because it was taught on the day Rabban Gamliel was removed and Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya was appointed, and the halakha follows it.
Key Terms:
- בְּחִירָתָא = the chosen tractate — a name for Eduyyot, whose rulings are authoritative
- עֵדֻיּוֹת = Eduyyot — the tractate of testimonies on earlier rulings, in Seder Nezikin
- הֲלָכָה כְּ… = the halakha follows…
Segment 9
TYPE: ראיה
Rav Nahman bar Yitzhak: the dangling-wool clause of our mishna also supports Rabbi Yehuda
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: מַתְנִיתִין נָמֵי דַּיְקָא, דִּתְנַן: צֶמֶר הַמְדוּלְדָּל בַּבְּכוֹר, אֶת שֶׁנִּרְאֶה עִם הַגִּיזָּה — מוּתָּר, וְאֶת שֶׁאֵינוֹ נִרְאֶה — אָסוּר.
English Translation:
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: The mishna is also precisely formulated so that this conclusion can be inferred, as we learned in the latter clause of the mishna: With regard to wool that was not completely shed which is dangling from a firstborn animal, that which appears to be part of the fleece is permitted when the animal is shorn after its death, and that which does not appear to be part of the fleece is prohibited.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Nahman bar Yitzhak adds a proof from the last clause of our mishna on 25a. Wool still dangling from a firstborn when it is shorn after its death is permitted if it looks like part of the fleece, and prohibited if it does not. The next segments show that this ruling makes sense only within Rabbi Yehuda’s framework.
Key Terms:
- מַתְנִיתִין נָמֵי דַּיְקָא = our mishna is also precise — its wording supports the conclusion
- צֶמֶר הַמְדוּלְדָּל = dangling wool — partly detached but still hanging on the animal
- גִּיזָּה = fleece — the wool sheared from the animal
Segment 10
TYPE: ראיה (המשך)
The clause cannot follow Rabbi Yosei in a slaughtered animal, as then all would permit
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַנִּי? אִילֵּימָא רַבִּי יוֹסֵי; וּבְמַאי? אִילֵימָא בִּשְׁחָטוֹ — בֵּין עֲקַבְיָא בֵּין רַבָּנַן, אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי מִשְׁרָא שָׁרֵי!
English Translation:
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak explains the proof: In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? If we say it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, that is difficult: But in what case did he issue this ruling? If we say it was in a case where he slaughtered it that cannot be correct, as whether the halakha follows the opinion of Akavya or whether it follows the opinion of the Rabbis, in both this case of wool that appears to be part of the fleece and that case where it does not, the use of the wool is permitted.
קלאוד על הדף:
The proof works by elimination. Suppose the clause follows Rabbi Yosei. If it deals with a slaughtered animal, Rabbi Yosei holds that everyone permits even fully shed hair, so dangling hair would surely be permitted whether or not it looks like part of the fleece. The distinction the mishna draws would be pointless.
Key Terms:
- מַנִּי = whose view is it
- אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי = both this and that
- מִשְׁרָא שָׁרֵי = they certainly permit
Segment 11
TYPE: ראיה (המשך)
Nor can it follow Rabbi Yosei in an animal that died: the Rabbis would forbid all, and Akavya would rule the reverse
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאֶלָּא בְּמֵת? וְאִי רַבָּנַן — אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי מֵיסָר אָסְרִי, וְאִי עֲקַבְיָא — אִיפְּכָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ: נִרְאֶה עִם הַגִּיזָּה — אָסוּר, דְּמִיתָה קָאָסְרָה לֵיהּ; אֵינוֹ נִרְאֶה עִם הַגִּיזָּה — מוּתָּר, דְּמֵעִיקָּרָא תְּלִישׁ!
English Translation:
Rather, if one says this is referring to a case where the animal died, that too is difficult. But that cannot be correct either, since if the halakha is in accordance with the Rabbis, then both this wool and that wool are prohibited. And if the halakha is in accordance with Akavya, then the mishna should have stated the opposite ruling: If the dangling wool appears to be part of the fleece it is prohibited, as the death of the animal renders it prohibited because it is considered attached to the animal; if it does not appear to be part of the fleece it is permitted, as it was considered detached from the beginning, before the animal died.
קלאוד על הדף:
If the clause follows Rabbi Yosei and deals with an animal that died, it fits neither side. The Rabbis would prohibit all the wool. Akavya permits wool already detached before death, so for him the logic would run the other way: wool that looks like part of the fleece counts as attached and is prohibited by the death, while wool that does not was effectively detached beforehand and is permitted. The mishna rules the opposite, so Rabbi Yosei is excluded.
Key Terms:
- אִיפְּכָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ = the reverse should have been stated
- מֵיסָר אָסְרִי = they certainly prohibit
- דְּמֵעִיקָּרָא תְּלִישׁ = for it was detached from the start
Segment 12
TYPE: ראיה (המשך)
So it follows Rabbi Yehuda; but not in an animal that died, where all prohibit
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, וּבְמַאי? אִילֵימָא בְּמֵת — בֵּין לַעֲקַבְיָא בֵּין לְרַבָּנַן, אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי מֵיסָר אָסְרִי!
English Translation:
Rather, it is obvious that this clause of the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. And in what case does the mishna’s ruling apply? If we say it is referring to a case where the animal died, then whether the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Akavya or whether it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, in both this case of wool that appears to be part of the fleece and that case where it does not, the use of the wool is prohibited.
קלאוד על הדף:
It must then follow Rabbi Yehuda. According to him, if the animal died both Akavya and the Rabbis prohibit all the wool, so again the mishna’s distinction between kinds of dangling wool would make no sense in that case.
Key Terms:
- פְּשִׁיטָא = it is obvious
- וּבְמַאי = and in what case
Segment 13
TYPE: מסקנא
The clause follows the Rabbis in a slaughtered animal, which proves the dispute is about slaughter
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא לָאו בִּשְׁחָטוֹ? וְאִי עֲקַבְיָא — אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי מִשְׁרָא שָׁרֵי! אֶלָּא לָאו רַבָּנַן הִיא? וּשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: בִּשְׁחָטוֹ פְּלִיגִי. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
English Translation:
Rather, is it not referring to a case where he slaughtered the animal? And consequently, if the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Akavya, then in both this case of wool that appears to be part of the fleece and that case where it does not, use of the wool is permitted. Rather, is it not correct to say the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis? And accordingly, one may conclude from it that Akavya and the Rabbis disagree in a case where he slaughtered the animal? The Gemara affirms: Indeed, conclude from it that this is so.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yehuda’s view in a slaughtered animal is the only possibility. Akavya would permit all the wool there, so the clause must be the Rabbis’ view: they forbid the hair shed earlier, yet allow dangling wool that looks like part of the fleece and is shorn with it. That presupposes Akavya and the Rabbis disagree about a slaughtered animal, as Rabbi Yehuda said, and the Gemara confirms the proof: ‘conclude from it.’
Key Terms:
- שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ = conclude from it — the Gemara accepts the inference
- רַבָּנַן = the Rabbis — the majority view against Akavya
Segment 14
TYPE: בעיא
Rabbi Yannai: what of wool that came away from an unblemished burnt offering?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
בָּעֵי רַבִּי יַנַּאי: הַתּוֹלֵשׁ צֶמֶר מֵעוֹלָה תְּמִימָה, מַהוּ? תּוֹלֵשׁ? מִי אִיכָּא מַאן דְּשָׁרֵי? אֶלָּא, צֶמֶר שֶׁנִּתְלַשׁ מֵעוֹלָה תְּמִימָה, מַהוּ?
English Translation:
§ Rabbi Yannai raises a dilemma: With regard to one who plucks wool from an unblemished burnt offering which was later slaughtered, what is the halakha? The Gemara expresses surprise: If one intentionally violates a prohibition and plucks the wool from an unblemished consecrated animal, is there anyone who deems it permitted? All agree that use of the wool is prohibited in such a case. Rather, Rabbi Yannai’s question was: With regard to wool that was torn out by itself from an unblemished burnt offering, what is the halakha?
קלאוד על הדף:
A new sugya begins. Rabbi Yannai asks about wool from an unblemished burnt offering. The Gemara notes that deliberate plucking cannot be the question, as no one would permit using wool torn from a consecrated animal in breach of the prohibition. The question is about wool that came out by itself.
Key Terms:
- עוֹלָה תְּמִימָה = an unblemished burnt offering — an offering burned whole on the altar
- נִתְלַשׁ = was torn out — came away without human action
- מִי אִיכָּא מַאן דְּשָׁרֵי = is there anyone who permits
Segment 15
TYPE: בעיא (המשך)
Sin and guilt offerings are brought quickly, firstborn and tithe are kept; what of a burnt offering?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
דְּחַטָּאת וְאָשָׁם לָא תִּיבְּעֵי לָךְ, דְּכֵיוָן דִּלְכַפָּרָה אָתוּ — לָא מְשַׁהוּ לְהוּ. דִּבְכוֹר וּמַעֲשֵׂר נָמֵי, דְּכֵיוָן דְּלָאו לְכַפָּרָה אָתוּ — מְשַׁהוּ לְהוּ. כִּי תִּיבְּעֵי לָךְ דְּעוֹלָה, מַאי? כֵּיוָן
English Translation:
The Gemara elaborates: Do not raise the dilemma concerning the wool of a sin offering and a guilt offering. Since these offerings come for atonement the owner does not keep them longer than necessary, and therefore there is no reason to deem the wool prohibited. Likewise, with regard to the wool of a firstborn and an animal tithe offering there is also no dilemma. Since they do not come for atonement one might keep them longer than necessary, and therefore the wool is prohibited in order to prevent one from violating the prohibition against shearing the animal or using it for labor. Rather, when you raise the dilemma, it is with regard to the wool of a burnt offering. What is the halakha? Does one say that since
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara narrows the question by considering why shed hair would be prohibited at all: the concern is that an owner who could use the wool might keep the animal longer to profit from it. A sin offering or guilt offering comes for atonement, so its owner hurries to bring it and there is no such concern. A firstborn or animal tithe does not atone, so the concern applies and the wool is prohibited. The question is the burnt offering, which falls between the two, and the sentence continues on 26b.
Key Terms:
- חַטָּאת וְאָשָׁם = sin offering and guilt offering — offerings that atone for specific sins
- מַעֲשֵׂר = animal tithe — every tenth animal, consecrated and eaten by its owner in Jerusalem
- כַּפָּרָה = atonement
- מְשַׁהוּ לְהוּ = they keep them — delay bringing the animal
Amud Bet (26b)
Segment 1
TYPE: בעיא (המשך)
Does a burnt offering count as non-atoning, or does its atonement for positive mitzvot mean it is brought quickly?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
דְּעִיקַּר לָאו לְכַפָּרָה אָתֵי — מְשַׁהֵי לַהּ, אוֹ דִלְמָא, כֵּיוָן דְּעוֹלָה נָמֵי מְכַפְּרָא אַעֲשֵׂה — לָא מְשַׁהֵי לַהּ?
English Translation:
being brought for atonement is not its primary function, there is a concern that one might keep it? Or perhaps, since a burnt offering also effects atonement for neglecting to perform a positive mitzva, one does not keep the animal longer than necessary.
קלאוד על הדף:
The dilemma, begun on 26a, is completed. On one side, atonement is not the main purpose of a burnt offering, so its owner might delay and the wool should be forbidden. On the other, a burnt offering does atone for neglecting a positive commandment, so the owner may want to bring it promptly, and the shed wool need not be forbidden.
Key Terms:
- מְכַפְּרָא אַעֲשֵׂה = it atones for a positive mitzva — the burnt offering atones for neglecting a positive commandment
- אוֹ דִלְמָא = or perhaps
Segment 2
TYPE: ראיה
An attempted proof: the baraita forbids only plucked wool of a firstborn, so fallen wool of a burnt offering is surely permitted
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תָּא שְׁמַע: הַתּוֹלֵשׁ צֶמֶר מִבְּכוֹר תָּם, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנּוֹלַד בּוֹ מוּם, שְׁחָטוֹ — אָסוּר. טַעְמָא דְּתוֹלֵשׁ, הָא נִתְלַשׁ — שָׁרֵי, וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן עוֹלָה דְּלָא מְשַׁהֵי לַהּ!
English Translation:
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution from a baraita: With regard to one who plucks the wool from an unblemished firstborn, even though it later developed a blemish and the owner then slaughtered it, use of the wool is prohibited. The Gemara infers: The reason use of the wool is prohibited is because he plucks it. But if it was torn out not by human intervention it is permitted. And this is correct all the more so with regard to a burnt offering, where one does not keep the animal any longer than necessary.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara tries to resolve the question from the baraita cited on 25b and 26a. It forbids wool plucked from an unblemished firstborn, which implies that wool that fell out by itself is permitted even from a firstborn, which the owner might keep. If so, a burnt offering, which is less likely to be kept, is all the more permitted.
Key Terms:
- תָּא שְׁמַע = come and hear — introduces a proof
- וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן = and all the more so — a kal vachomer argument
Segment 3
TYPE: דחייה
The baraita said ‘plucks’ only to match its second clause and show the reach of Akavya’s view
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הוּא הַדִּין אֲפִילּוּ נִתְלַשׁ נָמֵי אָסוּר, וְהַאי דְּקָתָנֵי ״תּוֹלֵשׁ״ לְהוֹדִיעֲךָ כֹּחוֹ דַּעֲקַבְיָא, דִּבְבַעַל מוּם אֲפִילּוּ בְּתוֹלֵשׁ נָמֵי שָׁרֵי.
English Translation:
The Gemara rejects this proof: Actually, the same is true even if the wool of an unblemished firstborn animal was torn out by some other means; it is also prohibited. And the reason that the baraita teaches the halakha using the term: One who plucks, is to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Akavya ben Mahalalel, as he maintains that in the case of a blemished animal, discussed in the latter clause of the baraita, even if one plucks the wool it is permitted. Since the latter clause discusses a case where one plucked the wool himself, it is inferred that the former clause discusses the same situation.
קלאוד על הדף:
The proof is rejected. Fallen wool of an unblemished firstborn is also forbidden. The baraita spoke of plucking because its second clause, about a blemished firstborn, shows the reach of Akavya’s leniency: he permits even plucked wool. The first clause simply follows the wording of the second, and no inference about fallen wool can be drawn from it.
Key Terms:
- הוּא הַדִּין = the same applies
- כֹּחוֹ דַּעֲקַבְיָא = the reach of Akavya’s view
Segment 4
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
But the mishna speaks of shed hair; each source picks the case that shows its side’s strength
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהָאֲנַן ״נָשַׁר״ תְּנַן! תְּנָא ״נָשַׁר״ לְהוֹדִיעֲךָ כֹּחָן דְּרַבָּנַן, תְּנָא ״תּוֹלֵשׁ״ לְהוֹדִיעֲךָ כֹּחוֹ דַּעֲקַבְיָא.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: But didn’t we learn in the mishna that the hair was shed rather than plucked? The Gemara explains that the mishna taught a case where the hair of the blemished animal was shed in order to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of the Rabbis, who deem the wool prohibited even in such a case. Conversely, the baraita taught a case where one plucks the hair in order to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Akavya.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara asks: the mishna on 25a speaks of hair that was shed, not plucked, so how can the baraita be read as dealing with plucking? It answers that each source chose the case that best shows one side’s reach. The mishna uses shed hair to show how strict the Rabbis are, prohibiting even hair that fell out by itself, and the baraita uses plucked hair to show how lenient Akavya is. Rabbi Yannai’s dilemma is left unresolved.
Key Terms:
- וְהָאֲנַן … תְּנַן = but we learned… — an objection from a mishna
- כֹּחָן דְּרַבָּנַן = the strength of the Rabbis’ view — here, how far their stringency goes
Segment 5
TYPE: גמרא
On the mishna’s dangling wool: what does ‘not appear with the fleece’ mean? Two definitions
Hebrew/Aramaic:
צֶמֶר הַמְדוּלְדָּל כּוּ׳. הֵיכִי דָּמֵי ״אֵינוֹ נִרְאֶה עִם הַגִּיזָּה״? אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: כֹּל שֶׁעִיקָּרוֹ הָפוּךְ כְּלַפֵּי רֹאשׁוֹ. רַב נָתָן בַּר אוֹשַׁעְיָא אָמַר: כֹּל שֶׁאֵינוֹ מִתְמַעֵךְ עִם הַגִּיזָּה.
English Translation:
§ The mishna teaches that it is permitted to derive benefit from wool that is dangling from a firstborn but was not completely shed if it appears to be part of the fleece when the animal is shorn after death, but otherwise it is prohibited. The Gemara inquires: What is considered: That which does not appear to be part of the fleece? Rabbi Elazar says that Reish Lakish says: This includes any strand of wool whose root is overturned and is facing toward the top, i.e., outward. Rav Natan bar Oshaya says: This includes any strand of wool that is not compressed together with the rest of the fleece, i.e., it sticks out when the fleece is pressed down.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara returns to the last clause of the mishna on 25a. Rabbi Elazar, in the name of Reish Lakish, says that wool not seen as part of the fleece is wool whose root is turned toward the tip, meaning it has come so far out that it is effectively detached. Rav Natan bar Oshaya says it is any wool that does not press down with the rest of the fleece, but sticks out above it.
Key Terms:
- הֵיכִי דָּמֵי = what are the circumstances
- עִיקָּרוֹ הָפוּךְ כְּלַפֵּי רֹאשׁוֹ = its root is turned toward its top — the strand has flipped and is nearly detached
- מִתְמַעֵךְ = is pressed down — compressed together with the rest of the fleece
Segment 6
TYPE: שאלה ותירוץ
Why Reish Lakish rejects the simpler reading: every fleece has dangling hairs
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, מַאי טַעְמָא לָא אָמַר כְּרַב נָתָן בַּר אוֹשַׁעְיָא? אָמַר רַבִּי אִילְעָא: קָסָבַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, לְפִי שֶׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר לַגִּיזָּה בְּלֹא נִימִין הַמְדוּלְדָּלוֹת.
English Translation:
And what is the reason Reish Lakish did not state his explanation in accordance with the opinion of Rav Natan bar Oshaya, whose explanation is the more straightforward meaning of the phrase: That which does not appear to be part of the fleece? Rabbi Ile’a says: Reish Lakish holds that the Sages did not deem strands of wool that are not compressed together with the rest of the fleece prohibited, because it is impossible for there to be fleece without dangling hairs. If Rav Natan bar Oshaya’s explanation were accepted, it would never be permitted to use such fleece of a dead firstborn animal. Consequently, Reish Lakish explains the statement of the mishna in a more lenient manner.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara asks why Reish Lakish did not take Rav Natan bar Oshaya’s simpler reading. Rabbi Ile’a explains that every fleece has some strands that stick out. If they were forbidden, the fleece of a firstborn shorn after slaughter could never be used. Reish Lakish therefore limits the prohibition to strands that are truly detached, so the rest of the fleece stays usable.
Key Terms:
- נִימִין = strands of hair
- אִי אֶפְשָׁר = it is impossible
Segment 7
TYPE: סיום פרק
Hadran: the end of Perek 3, HaLokeach Behema
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ הַלּוֹקֵחַ בְּהֵמָה.
English Translation:
HADRAN: We shall return to you, Perek HaLokeach Behema — the third chapter of Bechorot concludes here.
קלאוד על הדף:
This is the traditional formula said at the end of a perek: ‘We will return to you, HaLokeach Behema.’ The third perek of Bechorot, which began on 19b and dealt with animals bought from a gentile, the first birth after which a mother is exempt, and the laws of a firstborn’s wool, ends here. It is not the end of the masechet: Bechorot has nine perakim, and the fourth begins at once.
Key Terms:
- הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ = we will return to you — said on completing a perek
- הַלּוֹקֵחַ בְּהֵמָה = one who buys an animal — the name of the third perek
Segment 8
TYPE: משנה
Perek 4 opens: how long the owner must tend a firstborn before giving it to the kohen
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְנִי׳ עַד כַּמָּה יִשְׂרָאֵל חַיָּיבִין לִיטַּפֵּל בִּבְכוֹר? בַּדַּקָּה — שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם, וּבַגַּסָּה — חֲמִשִּׁים יוֹם. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: בַּדַּקָּה — שְׁלֹשָׁה חֳדָשִׁים. אָמַר לוֹ הַכֹּהֵן בְּתוֹךְ הַזְּמַן: ״תְּנֵהוּ לִי״ — הֲרֵי זֶה לֹא יִתְּנֶנּוּ לוֹ. וְאִם בַּעַל מוּם הוּא, וְאָמַר לוֹ: ״תְּנֵהוּ לִי שֶׁאוֹכְלֶנּוּ״ — מוּתָּר. וּבִשְׁעַת הַמִּקְדָּשׁ, אִם הָיָה תָּמִים, אָמַר לוֹ: ״תֵּן [לִי] וְאַקְרִיבֶנּוּ״ — מוּתָּר.
English Translation:
MISHNA: Until when must an Israelite tend to and raise a firstborn animal before giving it to the priest? With regard to a small animal, e.g., a sheep or goat, it is thirty days, and with regard to a large animal, e.g., cattle, it is fifty days. Rabbi Yosei says: With regard to a small animal, it is three months. If the priest said to the owner within that period: Give it to me, that owner may not give it to him. And if it is a blemished firstborn and the priest said to him: Give it to me so I may eat it, it is permitted for the owner to give it to him. And at the time that the Temple is standing, if it is unblemished and the priest said to him: Give it to me and I will sacrifice it, it is permitted for the owner to give it to him.
קלאוד על הדף:
The fourth perek, עד כמה, begins. An Israelite must care for a firstborn for thirty days if it is a small animal and fifty days if it is a large animal; Rabbi Yosei says three months for a small animal. Within that period he may not hand it to a kohen who asks for it. There are two exceptions: a blemished firstborn the kohen wishes to eat now, and, when the Temple stands, an unblemished one he wishes to offer now.
Key Terms:
- לִיטַּפֵּל = to tend — to care for and raise the animal
- דַּקָּה / גַּסָּה = small animals — sheep and goats / large animals — cattle
- בִּשְׁעַת הַמִּקְדָּשׁ = when the Temple stands
- עַד כַּמָּה = until when — the name of the fourth perek
Segment 9
TYPE: משנה (המשך)
The firstborn is eaten within its year; how long a blemished firstborn may be kept
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הַבְּכוֹר נֶאֱכָל שָׁנָה בְּשָׁנָה, בֵּין תָּם בֵּין בַּעַל מוּם, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״לִפְנֵי ה׳ אֱלֹהֶיךָ תֹאכְלֶנּוּ שָׁנָה בְשָׁנָה״. נוֹלַד לוֹ מוּם בְּתוֹךְ שְׁנָתוֹ — רַשַּׁאי לְקַיְּימוֹ כׇּל שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ. לְאַחַר שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ — אֵינוֹ רַשַּׁאי לְקַיְּימוֹ אֶלָּא שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם.
English Translation:
The firstborn animal is eaten year by year, i.e., within its first year, whether it is blemished or whether it is unblemished, as it is stated: “You shall eat it before the Lord your God year by year” (Deuteronomy 15:20). If a blemish developed within its first year, it is permitted for the owner to maintain the animal for the entire twelve months. If a blemish developed after twelve months have passed, it is permitted for the owner to maintain the animal for only thirty days.
קלאוד על הדף:
The mishna continues: a firstborn must be eaten within its first year, whether it is unblemished (offered) or blemished (slaughtered and eaten outside the Temple), as the verse says ‘year by year’ (Deuteronomy 15:20). If a blemish developed within the first year, the owner may keep it for the rest of the twelve months. If the blemish appeared after the year, he has only thirty days.
Key Terms:
- שָׁנָה בְּשָׁנָה = year by year — within its first year
- לְקַיְּימוֹ = to keep it — to maintain it before slaughter
- שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ = twelve months
Segment 10
TYPE: גמרא (מקור)
Rav Kahana: the thirty days for small animals come from setting the firstborn sheep beside the firstborn son
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גְּמָ׳ מְנָהָנֵי מִילֵּי? אָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא: דְּאָמַר קְרָא ״בְּכוֹר בָּנֶיךָ תִּתֶּן לִּי״, ״כֵּן תַּעֲשֶׂה לְצֹאנֶךָ״.
English Translation:
GEMARA: The mishna teaches that an Israelite must raise a firstborn animal for thirty or fifty days, depending on the type of animal, before giving it to a priest. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rav Kahana said: They are derived from a verse, as the verse states: “You shall not delay to offer of the fullness of your harvest, and of the outflow of your presses; you shall give to Me your firstborn sons. So you shall do with your oxen, and with your sheep; seven days it shall be with its mother, on the eighth day you shall give it to Me” (Exodus 22:28–29). The second part of verse 28 is juxtaposed to the second animal mentioned in verse 29. This juxtaposition teaches that just as a firstborn son is redeemed when he is thirty days old (Numbers 18:16), so too a sheep is given to the priest only when it is thirty days old.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara asks for the source of the thirty and fifty days. Rav Kahana sets the phrases of Exodus 22:28 against the animals of 22:29. ‘The firstborn of your sons you shall give to Me’ sits beside ‘So you shall do with your sheep,’ so the sheep follows the son. A son is redeemed at thirty days (Numbers 18:16), so a firstborn sheep is given at thirty days.
Key Terms:
- מְנָהָנֵי מִילֵּי = from where are these matters derived
- פִּדְיוֹן הַבֵּן = redemption of the firstborn son — at thirty days old
- הֶקֵּשׁ = juxtaposition — deriving one law from another set beside it in the verse
Segment 11
TYPE: גמרא (מקור, המשך)
The fifty days for cattle: the ox is matched with first fruits, brought at Shavuot
Hebrew/Aramaic:
״מְלֵאָתְךָ וְדִמְעֲךָ לֹא תְאַחֵר״, ״כֵּן תַּעֲשֶׂה לְשׁוֹרְךָ״.
English Translation:
The verses also state: “You shall not delay the fullness of your harvest, and of the outflow of your presses…So you shall do with your oxen” (Exodus 22:28–29). Just as the first fruits are brought on the festival of Shavuot, fifty days after Passover, so too the firstborn oxen are given to a priest when they are fifty days old. Here, the first part of verse 28 is juxtaposed with the first animal mentioned in verse 29.
קלאוד על הדף:
The other half of Rav Kahana’s derivation pairs the first phrase of verse 28, ‘You shall not delay your fullness and your outflow,’ about first fruits, with the first animal of verse 29, ‘your ox.’ First fruits begin to be brought at Shavuot, fifty days after Pesach, so a firstborn ox is given at fifty days.
Key Terms:
- מְלֵאָתְךָ וְדִמְעֲךָ = your fullness and your outflow — first fruits and teruma
- בִּכּוּרִים = first fruits — brought from Shavuot onward
Segment 12
TYPE: קושיא
Why not reverse the pairing? Each pairing has its own logic
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֵיפוֹךְ אֲנָא! מִסְתַּבְּרָא דְּמַקְדַּם לְמַקְדַּם, דִּמְאַחַר לְדִמְאַחַר. אַדְּרַבָּה, דִּסְמִיךְ לֵיהּ לְדִסְמִיךְ לֵיהּ!
English Translation:
The Gemara challenges: If these verses are the source, one can reverse the cases and derive that a firstborn ox must be given to the priest after thirty days, and a firstborn sheep after fifty days. The Gemara explains: It stands to reason that the time period that is alluded to earlier in the first verse corresponds to the animal that is mentioned earlier in the second verse, while the time period that is alluded to later in the first verse corresponds to the animal that is mentioned later in the second verse. The Gemara rejects this: On the contrary, it stands to reason that the time period that is alluded to closer to the mention of an animal should correspond to the animal, i.e., oxen, that is closest to it.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara challenges: why not pair the other way, giving the ox thirty days and the sheep fifty? It first answers that it is reasonable to pair first with first and later with later. It then rejects this answer: one could just as well say that the phrase nearer to each animal belongs with it, which would reverse the pairing. With Rav Kahana’s derivation in doubt, a new source is needed.
Key Terms:
- אֵיפוֹךְ אֲנָא = I will reverse it — a challenge that the opposite derivation is just as good
- מִסְתַּבְּרָא = it stands to reason
- אַדְּרַבָּה = on the contrary
- דִּסְמִיךְ לֵיהּ = that which is next to it
Segment 13
TYPE: תירוץ
Rava: both animals follow the son’s thirty days, and ‘you shall do’ adds time for the ox
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: אָמַר קְרָא ״תַּעֲשֶׂה״, הוֹסִיף לְךָ הַכָּתוּב עֲשִׂיָּיה אַחֶרֶת בְּשׁוֹרְךָ.
English Translation:
Rather, Rava says that the halakha of both a firstborn sheep and a firstborn ox are juxtaposed with the halakha of a firstborn child, which teaches that both require at least thirty days. But since the verse states: “So you shall do with your oxen” (Exodus 22:29), the verse adds an extra act of doing for you in the case of your oxen. In other words, the verse requires that the owner take care of an ox for additional time before giving it to the priest.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava offers a new derivation. Both the ox and the sheep are set beside the firstborn son, so each needs at least thirty days. The word ‘you shall do’ in the clause about the ox adds a further act of care for it, so the ox needs more time than the sheep.
Key Terms:
- עֲשִׂיָּיה אַחֶרֶת = another act of doing — additional care required for the ox
- הוֹסִיף לְךָ הַכָּתוּב = the verse added for you
Segment 14
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Why not sixty days? The amount was left to the Sages
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאֵימָא: שִׁיתִּין! לֹא מְסָרְךָ הַכָּתוּב אֶלָּא לַחֲכָמִים.
English Translation:
The Gemara challenges: But if so, one can say that the owner must care for the ox an additional thirty days, making a total of sixty days. From where is the total of fifty days derived? The Gemara answers: The interpretation of the verse with regard to the exact amount of time was given only to the Sages, and they determined that the owner must take care of his ox for fifty days.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara asks why the extra period is not another thirty days, for a total of sixty. It answers that the verse gives the amount to the Sages, and they set fifty days. The Torah indicates that more time is needed, and the Sages fix how much.
Key Terms:
- וְאֵימָא שִׁיתִּין = but say sixty
- לֹא מְסָרְךָ הַכָּתוּב אֶלָּא לַחֲכָמִים = the verse entrusted it only to the Sages — the exact measure was left to them
Segment 15
TYPE: ברייתא
A baraita supports Rava’s derivation
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: ״בְּכוֹר בָּנֶיךָ תִּתֶּן לִי״, ״כֵּן תַּעֲשֶׂה לְצֹאנֶךָ״ — יָכוֹל אַף לְשׁוֹרְךָ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״תַּעֲשֶׂה״ — הוֹסִיף לְךָ הַכָּתוּב עֲשִׂיָּיה אַחֶרֶת בְּשׁוֹרְךָ, לֹא מְסָרְךָ הַכָּתוּב אֶלָּא לַחֲכָמִים.
English Translation:
This is also taught in a baraita: “You shall not delay to offer of the fullness of your harvest, and of the outflow of your presses; you shall give to Me your firstborn sons. So you shall do with your oxen, and with your sheep; seven days it shall be with its mother; on the eighth day you shall give it to Me” (Exodus 22:28–29). One might have thought that this time period, i.e., thirty days, applies also to your oxen. Therefore, the verse states: “You shall do.” The verse adds an extra act of doing for you in the case of your oxen, and the interpretation of the verse was given only to the Sages.
קלאוד על הדף:
A baraita teaches Rava’s derivation. The sheep follows the firstborn son’s thirty days, and one might think the ox does too. The word ‘you shall do’ adds another act for the ox, and the Sages determine how much it is. This confirms Rava against the reversible pairing of Rav Kahana.
Key Terms:
- תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי = it is also taught so in a baraita
- יָכוֹל = one might have thought
- תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר = the verse teaches
Segment 16
TYPE: ברייתא (המשך)
The baraita repeats the mishna’s periods; Rabbi Yosei’s three months for small animals, because their tending is harder
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מִכָּאן אָמְרוּ: עַד כַּמָּה יִשְׂרָאֵל חַיָּיבִין לְהִטַּפֵּל בִּבְכוֹר? בִּבְהֵמָה דַּקָּה — שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם, בְּגַסָּה — חֲמִשִּׁים יוֹם. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: בַּדַּקָּה — שְׁלֹשָׁה חֳדָשִׁים, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁטִּפּוּלָהּ מְרוּבָּה. תָּנָא: מִפְּנֵי שֶׁשִּׁינֶּיהָ דַּקּוֹת.
English Translation:
From here the Sages stated: Until when must an Israelite tend to and raise a firstborn animal before handing it to the priest? With regard to a small animal, e.g., a sheep or goat, it is thirty days, and with regard to a large animal, e.g., cattle, it is fifty days. Rabbi Yosei says: With regard to a small animal, it is three months, because its tending is extensive, i.e., a great deal of work and effort are required in order to raise it before it can be given to a priest. A tanna taught that so much effort is required to raise a sheep because its teeth are small and it cannot eat most foods.
קלאוד על הדף:
The baraita concludes by stating the law of the mishna: thirty days for a small animal and fifty for a large one. Rabbi Yosei requires three months for small animals because they need more care. Another tanna explains why: their teeth are small, so they cannot yet eat most foods and must be fed carefully.
Key Terms:
- מִכָּאן אָמְרוּ = from here they said
- טִפּוּלָהּ מְרוּבָּה = its care is extensive
- שִׁינֶּיהָ דַּקּוֹת = its teeth are small
Segment 17
TYPE: גמרא
Why the owner may not give it early: Rav Sheshet compares it to a kohen who helps at the threshing floor
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִם אָמַר לוֹ הַכֹּהֵן בְּתוֹךְ הַזְּמַן ״תְּנֵהוּ לִי״, הֲרֵי זֶה לֹא יִתֵּן לוֹ. מַאי טַעְמָא? אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: מִפְּנֵי שֶׁנִּרְאֶה כְּכֹהֵן הַמְסַיֵּיעַ בְּבֵית הַגֳּרָנוֹת.
English Translation:
§ The mishna teaches: If the priest said to the owner within that period: Give it to me, that owner may not give it to him. The Gemara asks: What is the reason? Rav Sheshet says: Because such a priest appears like a priest who assists at the threshing floor so that he can be given teruma. Since this arrangement benefits the owner of the firstborn, as he is spared the effort of taking care of the animal throughout this period, it is as though this priest has paid for the right to receive the firstborn, which is prohibited.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara turns to the mishna’s ruling that the owner may not give the firstborn to a kohen who asks within the period. Rav Sheshet explains that taking it early relieves the owner of the work of caring for it, so the kohen looks like one who helps at the threshing floor in order to receive teruma. That is a form of paying for the gift, which is forbidden.
Key Terms:
- בֵּית הַגֳּרָנוֹת = threshing floors — where grain is processed and teruma is separated
- מְסַיֵּיעַ = assists
- תְּרוּמָה = teruma — the portion of produce given to a kohen
Segment 18
TYPE: ברייתא
Kohanim, Levites and the poor who help may not receive teruma or tithes as wages; doing so desecrates them
Hebrew/Aramaic:
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הַכֹּהֲנִים וְהַלְוִיִּם וְהָעֲנִיִּים הַמְסַיְּיעִים בְּבֵית הָרוֹעִים, וּבְבֵית הַגֳּרָנוֹת, וּבְבֵית הַמִּטְבָּחַיִם — אֵין נוֹתְנִין לָהֶם תְּרוּמָה וּמַעֲשֵׂר בִּשְׂכָרָן, וְאִם עוֹשִׂין כֵּן חִילֵּלוּ, וַעֲלֵיהֶן הַכָּתוּב אוֹמֵר: ״שִׁחַתֶּם בְּרִית הַלֵּוִי״, וְאוֹמֵר: ״וְאֶת קׇדְשֵׁי בְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לֹא תְחַלְּלוּ וְלֹא תָמוּתוּ״.
English Translation:
The Sages taught in a baraita: With regard to the priests, the Levites, and the poor people who assist in the home of the shepherd, or at the threshing floor, or in the slaughterhouse, one may not give them teruma or tithe as their wages. And if one did so, he desecrated the sanctity of the item. And with regard to them the verse states: “But you are turned aside out of the way; you have caused many to stumble in the law; you have corrupted the covenant of Levi, says the Lord of hosts” (Malachi 2:8). And another verse states: “And you shall bear no sin by it, seeing that you have set apart the best from it; and you shall not desecrate the sacred items of the children of Israel, that you shall not die” (Numbers 18:32).
קלאוד על הדף:
The baraita forbids giving teruma or tithes as wages to kohanim, Levites or poor people who help at the shepherd’s house, the threshing floor or the slaughterhouse. One who does so desecrates the sacred gifts. Two verses are cited against it: Malachi 2:8, ‘you have corrupted the covenant of Levi,’ and Numbers 18:32, ‘you shall not desecrate the sacred items of the children of Israel, that you shall not die.’
Key Terms:
- מַעֲשֵׂר = tithe — the first tithe for Levites or the poor man’s tithe
- חִילֵּלוּ = they desecrated — treated the sacred gifts as ordinary payment
- בְּרִית הַלֵּוִי = the covenant of Levi — the priestly and Levite duty to the Torah
- בֵּית הַמִּטְבָּחַיִם = the slaughterhouse — where the kohen’s gifts of meat are given
Segment 19
TYPE: גמרא
Why a second verse: to teach that the sin is punishable by death at the hands of Heaven
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַאי ״וְאוֹמֵר״? וְכִי תֵּימָא: מִיתָה לָא — תָּא שְׁמַע: ״וְאֶת קׇדְשֵׁי בְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לֹא תְחַלְּלוּ וְלֹא תָמוּתוּ״.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: What is the reason that the Gemara cites the second verse introduced with the phrase: And another verse states? The Gemara answers: And if you would say that the first verse indicates merely that teruma and tithe become desecrated, but one who does this is not punished by death, come and hear the second verse cited by the Gemara: “And you shall not desecrate the sacred items of the children of Israel, that you shall not die” (Numbers 18:32).
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara asks why the baraita cites a second verse. It answers that one might think Malachi’s rebuke only shows that the gifts are desecrated, with no penalty. Numbers 18:32 adds ‘that you shall not die,’ which shows the offence carries death at the hands of Heaven.
Key Terms:
- מַאי וְאוֹמֵר = why ‘and it says’ — why a second verse is needed
- מִיתָה = death — here, death at the hands of Heaven
Segment 20
TYPE: ברייתא (המשך)
The Sages wanted to fine the owners but held back, lest they tithe from exempt produce for obligated produce
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּבִקְּשׁוּ חֲכָמִים לְקוֹנְסָן, וְלִהְיוֹת מַפְרִישִׁין עֲלֵיהֶן תְּרוּמָה מִשָּׁלֵם, וּמִפְּנֵי מָה לֹא קְנָסוּם? דִּלְמָא אָתֵי לְאַפְרוֹשֵׁי מִן הַפְּטוּר עַל הַחִיּוּב.
English Translation:
The baraita continues: And the Sages wished to penalize those who gave teruma or tithe to the priests, Levites, or poor people who helped them, and to require them to separate in their place complete teruma, so that the owners of the produce would not benefit from their improper actions. And for what reason did the Sages not penalize them? Perhaps they would mistakenly think that the produce has not yet been tithed at all, and they would come to separate teruma and tithes from it when it is actually exempt produce, as by Torah law it has already had its tithes removed. They might then separate teruma and tithes from it on behalf of produce to which the obligation of separating tithes still applies, i.e., regular untithed produce.
קלאוד על הדף:
The baraita continues: the Sages wished to penalize those who pay helpers with teruma by making them separate teruma again from their own produce. They held back for fear that people would then think that already-tithed produce was still untithed, and would separate teruma from it for other untithed produce. That would be separating from exempt produce for obligated produce, and the obligated produce would remain untithed.
Key Terms:
- לְקוֹנְסָן = to penalize them — impose a rabbinic fine
- תְּרוּמָה מִשָּׁלֵם = teruma from their own — a replacement portion at their expense
- מִן הַפְּטוּר עַל הַחִיּוּב = from the exempt on the obligated — separating from tithed produce for untithed, which is invalid
Segment 21
TYPE: ברייתא (המשך)
The baraita adds that in all these cases the gifts still have their sacred status — the sentence continues on 27a
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּבְכוּלָּן יֵשׁ בָּהֶן
English Translation:
The baraita adds: And in all of these cases, although it is prohibited to give the teruma and tithe to a priest or Levite as his wages, nevertheless there is
קלאוד על הדף:
The baraita adds a point about all these cases. Although it is forbidden to give teruma or tithes as wages, the sentence that begins here, ‘and in all of them there is…’, continues on 27a, which explains what holds even when the gift was improperly given.
Key Terms:
- וּבְכוּלָּן = and in all of them — in each case listed in the baraita
- יֵשׁ בָּהֶן = there is in them