Bechorot Daf 24 (בכורות דף כ״ד)

📖 Breakdown

Amud Aleph (24a)

Segment 1

TYPE: קושיא (המשך)

Why did Rav also need to rule specifically like Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam?

Hebrew/Aramaic:

הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן הַמְשׁוּלָּם לְמָה לִי?

English Translation:

why do I need him to state that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam?

קלאוד על הדף:

This completes the question that broke off at the end of 23b. Rav was quoted as saying that the halakha follows the mishnayot of the whole chapter except where there is a dispute, and the Gemara has just concluded that his ruling refers to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. If so, his separate statement that the halakha follows Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam (in the mishna on 24b) seems redundant, since that mishna is undisputed and already covered by the general rule.

Key Terms:

• הֲלָכָה כְּ = the halakha is in accordance with
• לְמָה לִי = why do I need it? — a challenge that a statement is superfluous

Segment 2

TYPE: תירוץ

Without the explicit ruling, we might have read Rav’s general rule as referring to Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam alone

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אִי אָמַר הִלְכְתָא דְּכוּלֵּיהּ פִּירְקִין, וְלָא אָמַר הִלְכְתָא כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן הַמְשׁוּלָּם, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: אַדְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן הַמְשׁוּלָּם קָאֵי, וּמַאי ״בְּכוּלֵּיהּ פִּירְקִין״? דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי תַּרְתֵּי אָמַר, וּפְלוּגְתָּא דְּבָרַיְיתָא פְּלוּגְתָּא הִיא.

English Translation:

The Gemara explains: Had Rav said only that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the anonymous tanna in the mishnayot throughout the whole chapter, but did not say explicitly that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam, I would say: Rav is referring specifically to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam. And what is the meaning of the phrase: Throughout the whole chapter, which indicates he is speaking of more than one case? This is referring to the fact that Rabbi Yosei said two separate statements in the chapter. And this would indicate with regard to Rav’s statement that if a mishna is contradicted by a dissenting opinion cited in a baraita, that is considered a dispute.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara answers that each statement prevents a misreading of the other. Had Rav made only the general statement, one could have attached it to Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam, explaining the plural ‘whole chapter’ by the fact that he makes two rulings in the chapter (clearing hair for slaughter and plucking to inspect a blemish). On that reading, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel would be excluded, because a baraita disagreeing with a mishna would count as a dispute.

Key Terms:

• הִלְכְתָא דְּכוּלֵּיהּ פִּירְקִין = the halakha follows the whole chapter
• קָאֵי = refers to, stands on
• תַּרְתֵּי = two — here, two rulings
• פְּלוּגְתָּא דְּבָרַיְיתָא = a dissent recorded in a baraita

Segment 3

TYPE: תירוץ (המשך)

The explicit ruling frees the general rule to refer to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אַשְׁמְעִינַן הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי — לְאַשְׁמוֹעִינַן דְּאַדְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל קָאֵי, וּפְלוּגְתָּא דְּבָרַיְיתָא לָאו פְּלוּגְתָּא הִיא.

English Translation:

Rav taught that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei in order to teach us that his statement with regard to the whole chapter is referring to the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, and with regard to Rav’s statement, if a mishna is contradicted by a dissenting opinion cited in a baraita, that is not considered a dispute.

קלאוד על הדף:

Since Rav ruled on Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam separately, his general statement must refer to someone else, namely Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. That in turn teaches the methodological point the Gemara reached on 23b: a dissent preserved only in a baraita does not count as a dispute against an anonymous mishna. Rav’s two statements together therefore convey two distinct rulings.

Key Terms:

• אַשְׁמְעִינַן = he taught us
• לָאו פְּלוּגְתָּא הִיא = it is not considered a dispute

Segment 4

TYPE: ברייתא

The baraita: the Rabbis worry that a nursing animal may be nursing another’s young; Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel does not

Hebrew/Aramaic:

מַאי בָּרַיְיתָא? דְּתַנְיָא: הַלּוֹקֵחַ בְּהֵמָה מְנִיקָה מִן הַגּוֹי, הַבָּא אַחֲרָיו בְּכוֹר מִסָּפֵק, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁמְּרַחֶמֶת אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינָהּ יוֹלֶדֶת. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: דָּבָר בְּחֶזְקָתוֹ.

English Translation:

What is the baraita mentioned previously? As it is taught in a baraita: In the case of one who purchases a nursing female animal from a gentile, the young that is born after the offspring currently being nursed is treated as a firstborn due to the uncertainty whether it is the animal’s offspring, because an animal might be merciful and nurse another animal even though it has not given birth at all. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The matter stands in its presumptive status, i.e., the nursing animal is assumed to be the mother of the nursing offspring.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara now quotes the baraita that disagrees with the mishna. The anonymous tanna holds that an animal can be merciful and nurse young that is not its own even without having given birth, so a nursing animal bought from a gentile may not yet have given birth, and its next offspring is a doubtful firstborn. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that the matter stays in its presumptive status: the young it nurses is its own, and its next offspring is not a firstborn.

Key Terms:

• מְנִיקָה = nursing
• בְּכוֹר מִסָּפֵק = a doubtful firstborn
• מְרַחֶמֶת = shows mercy — here, adopts and nurses a young animal
• דָּבָר בְּחֶזְקָתוֹ = the matter stands in its presumptive status

Segment 5

TYPE: ברייתא (המשך)

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel: in a flock, each mother is presumed to nurse its own young

Hebrew/Aramaic:

וְכֵן הָיָה רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: הַנִּכְנָס לְתוֹךְ עֶדְרוֹ בַּלַּיְלָה וְרָאָה כְּעֶשֶׂר כַּחֲמֵשׁ עֶשְׂרֵה, מַבְכִּירוֹת וְשֶׁאֵינָן מַבְכִּירוֹת, יוֹלְדוֹת, לְמָחָר הִשְׁכִּים וּמָצָא זְכָרִים (תְּלוּיוֹת) [תְּלוּיִין] בְּשֶׁאֵין מַבְכִּירוֹת, וּנְקֵבוֹת תְּלוּיוֹת בְּמַבְכִּירוֹת — אֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ שֶׁמָּא בְּנָהּ שֶׁל זוֹ בָּא לוֹ אֵצֶל זוֹ.

English Translation:

The baraita continues: And similarly, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel would say: One who enters amid his flock at night and sees about ten or about fifteen animals, some of whose offspring is a firstborn and others whose offspring is not a firstborn, and all were giving birth, and on the next day he arose and found that the male young were nursing from the mothers whose offspring is not a firstborn, and the female young were nursing from the mothers whose offspring is a firstborn, he does not need to be concerned that perhaps the young of this mother came to nurse from that mother. Rather, he may assume that each animal is nursing its own offspring.

קלאוד על הדף:

The baraita continues with a parallel ruling of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. If an owner saw many animals giving birth at night, some for the first time and some not, and in the morning found the males nursing from the non-firstborn mothers and the females from the first-time mothers, he need not suspect that the young switched mothers. The practical result is lenient: every male is the second offspring of its mother, so none is a firstborn.

Key Terms:

• עֶדְרוֹ = his flock
• מַבְכִּירוֹת = animals giving birth for the first time
• תְּלוּיִין = hanging on — nursing from
• אֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ = he need not be concerned

Segment 6

TYPE: בעיא

What exactly does Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s presumption mean?

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: דָּבָר בְּחֶזְקָתוֹ דְּקָאָמַר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, דְּאֵינָהּ מְרַחֶמֶת אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן יוֹלֶדֶת — הָא הֵיכָא דְּאוֹלִיד חָיְישִׁינַן לְרַחוֹמֵי, אוֹ דִלְמָא: דִּידַהּ מְרַחֲמָא, דְּלָא דִּידַהּ לָא מְרַחֲמָא לֵיהּ?

English Translation:

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the precise meaning of the phrase: The matter stands in its presumptive status, which Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel stated? Does this mean that an animal does not show mercy unless it has given birth, and consequently, in a case where the animal has given birth we are concerned for the possibility that it might be merciful and nurse an offspring that is not its own? Or perhaps it means that an animal might be merciful only toward its own offspring, but it does not show mercy to an animal that is not its own?

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara asks what Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s ‘presumptive status’ means. One option is that an animal is merciful only if it has itself given birth, but once it has given birth it may nurse another’s young. The other is that an animal nurses only its own young and never adopts a stranger. Both readings yield the same result for the firstborn question, so the Gemara will have to find a different practical difference.

Key Terms:

• אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ = a dilemma was raised before them
• יוֹלֶדֶת = an animal that has given birth
• דִּידַהּ = its own

Segment 7

TYPE: שאלה ותשובה

The practical difference: flogging for slaughtering a mother and its young on one day

Hebrew/Aramaic:

לְמַאי נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ? לְמִלְקֵא עֲלַהּ מִשּׁוּם ״אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ״. אִי אָמְרַתְּ דִּידַהּ מְרַחֲמָא, דְּלָא דִּידַהּ לָא מְרַחֲמָא — לָקֵי, וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ דְּלָא דִּידַהּ נָמֵי מְרַחֲמָא — לָא לָקֵי.

English Translation:

The Gemara asks: What difference is there in practice based on this distinction? Either way the nursing animal is assumed to have given birth and its future offspring will not be considered a firstborn. The Gemara answers that there is a difference with regard to whether or not one is flogged for slaughtering it due to violating the prohibition against slaughtering a mother and its offspring on the same day. If you say an animal is merciful only toward its own offspring but is not merciful toward an animal that is not its own, then one is flogged if he deliberately slaughters an animal and the offspring that it is nursing. But if you say it is also merciful toward an animal that is not its own, then one is not flogged in such a case.

קלאוד על הדף:

The difference is the prohibition of ‘it and its young’ (Leviticus 22:28), which forbids slaughtering a mother and its offspring on the same day. If an animal nurses only its own young, the nursing pair is certainly mother and offspring, and one who slaughters both on one day is flogged. If an animal that has given birth may also nurse a stranger, the relationship is only doubtful, and there is no flogging for a doubtful transgression.

Key Terms:

• לְמַאי נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ = what is the practical difference?
• לְמִלְקֵא = to be flogged — lashes for a Torah prohibition
• אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ = it and its young — the prohibition against slaughtering an animal and its offspring on one day

Segment 8

TYPE: ראיה ודחייה

A proof from the mishna’s wording is rejected: it says ‘was’, not ‘is’

Hebrew/Aramaic:

מַאי? תָּא שְׁמַע, רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: הַלּוֹקֵחַ בְּהֵמָה מִן הַגּוֹי — אֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ שֶׁמָּא בְּנָהּ שֶׁל אַחֶרֶת הָיָה. מִי קָתָנֵי ״הוּא״? ״הָיָה״ קָתָנֵי! הָכִי קָאָמַר: אֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ שֶׁמָּא בְּנָהּ שֶׁל אַחֶרֶת, אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן הָיָה לָהּ וָלָד מֵעִיקָּרָא.

English Translation:

The Gemara returns to its initial inquiry. What is the precise meaning of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s statement? Come and hear a proof from the mishna, as Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: In the case of one who purchases a nursing female animal from a gentile, he does not need to be concerned lest the offspring currently being nursed was the offspring of another animal. Evidently, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that an animal nurses only its own offspring. The Gemara rejects this proof: Does the mishna teach that one does not need to be concerned that perhaps it is the offspring of another animal? No, it teaches that one does not need to be concerned that perhaps it was the offspring of another animal, and this is what it is saying: Whichever way you look at it, the next offspring is not a firstborn, as one does not need to be concerned that perhaps it was the offspring of another animal that it is nursing, as it would not nurse unless it already had an offspring initially.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara tries to prove from the mishna that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds an animal nurses only its own young. It rejects the proof on the precise wording: the mishna says one need not worry that the young ‘was’ another’s, not that it ‘is’. The point is that either way the mother has already given birth, since she would not be nursing unless she ‘had’ a young of her own at the start, and so her next offspring is not a firstborn.

Key Terms:

• תָּא שְׁמַע = come and hear — introduces a proof
• מִי קָתָנֵי = does it teach?
• הָיָה = was
• מֵעִיקָּרָא = at the outset, previously

Segment 9

TYPE: ראיה

A second proof: in the flock, there is no worry that the young switched mothers

Hebrew/Aramaic:

תָּא שְׁמַע: נִכְנַס בְּתוֹךְ עֶדְרוֹ וְרָאָה אֶת הַמַּבְכִּירוֹת מְנִיקוֹת, וְאֶת שֶׁאֵינָן מַבְכִּירוֹת מְנִיקוֹת — אֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ שֶׁמָּא בְּנָהּ שֶׁל זוֹ בָּא לוֹ אֵצֶל זוֹ, אוֹ שֶׁמָּא בְּנָהּ שֶׁל זוֹ בָּא לוֹ אֵצֶל זוֹ.

English Translation:

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the continuation of the mishna: In the case of one who enters amid his flock and sees mother animals that gave birth for the first time that were nursing, and also sees mother animals that gave birth not for the first time that were also nursing, he does not need to be concerned that perhaps the offspring of this animal came to that animal to be nursed, or that perhaps the offspring of that animal came to this animal to be nursed.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara now cites the next clause, the case of the owner who enters his flock and sees first-time and experienced mothers all nursing. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel rules that one need not suspect the young have switched. This seems to show that a mother which has given birth still nurses only its own young.

Key Terms:

• נִכְנַס בְּתוֹךְ עֶדְרוֹ = he entered amid his flock
• שֶׁאֵינָן מַבְכִּירוֹת = animals that have already given birth before

Segment 10

TYPE: דחייה

When its own young is present, a mother does not abandon it to nurse another

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אַמַּאי? לֵיחוּשׁ דִּלְמָא רַחוֹמֵי רַחֵים! בִּמְקוֹם דִּידַהּ, לָא שָׁבְקָא דִּידַהּ וּמְרַחֲמָא דְּלָא דִּידַהּ.

English Translation:

The Gemara explains the proof: But why not? Let us be concerned that perhaps the nursing animal is merciful toward an offspring that is not its own. Evidently, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that an animal nurses only its own offspring, even if it had previously given birth. The Gemara rejects this proof: Even if an animal does show mercy toward offspring that is not its own, in a place where it has its own offspring, it does not set aside its own offspring and show mercy toward offspring that is not its own.

קלאוד על הדף:

The proof is rejected. Even if a mother that has given birth can adopt a stranger, it does not do so when its own young is right there. In the flock case every mother has its own newborn present, so there is no reason to suspect an exchange, and the case says nothing about a mother whose own young is absent.

Key Terms:

• אַמַּאי = why?
• לֵיחוּשׁ = let us be concerned
• בִּמְקוֹם דִּידַהּ = where its own [young] is present
• לָא שָׁבְקָא = it does not abandon

Segment 11

TYPE: ראיה

A third proof: ‘and similarly’ links the purchase case to the flock case

Hebrew/Aramaic:

תָּא שְׁמַע: דָּבָר בְּחֶזְקָתוֹ כּוּ׳. מַאי לָאו רֵישָׁא דּוּמְיָא דְּסֵיפָא? מָה סֵיפָא וַדַּאי דִּידַהּ, אַף רֵישָׁא וַדַּאי דִּידַהּ.

English Translation:

The Gemara further suggests: Come and hear a proof from Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s statement in the baraita: If one purchases a nursing animal from a gentile, the matter stands in its presumptive status. From the phrase: And similarly, in the continuation of the baraita, the Gemara infers: What, is it not so that the first clause is similar to the latter clause? Just as in the latter clause the nursing young is certainly considered to be the nursing animal’s own offspring, so too, in the first clause it is certainly considered to be the nursing animal’s own offspring, despite the fact that the animal mother might have given birth previously.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara tries again, from the baraita’s phrase ‘and similarly’. If the purchase case is similar to the flock case, then just as in the flock each young is certainly its mother’s own, so in the purchase case the nursing young would be the animal’s own. That would show that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that an animal nurses only its own young, even after giving birth.

Key Terms:

• רֵישָׁא = the first clause
• סֵיפָא = the latter clause
• דּוּמְיָא = similar to
• וַדַּאי = certainly

Segment 12

TYPE: דחייה

The two clauses differ; ‘and similarly’ refers only to the exemption from the firstborn

Hebrew/Aramaic:

מִידֵּי אִירְיָא? הַאי כִּדְאִיתֵאּ, וְהַאי כִּדְאִיתֵאּ. וּמַאי ״וְכֵן״? אַפְּטוּרָה דִּבְכוֹרָה.

English Translation:

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Are the cases comparable? This first clause of the baraita stands as it is and that second clause of the baraita stands as it is, i.e., they are referring to different cases. In the second clause, where all the offspring are standing before their mothers, it is certain that each mother will nurse only its own child. Conversely, in the first clause it is uncertain whether that child is its own. But if so, what is the meaning of the phrase: And similarly? It means both clauses state that the nursing animal is exempt from having its future offspring counted a firstborn, since even if that offspring is not the mother’s, the mother would not nurse it unless it had previously given birth.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara rejects the comparison. Each clause stands on its own terms: in the flock, with all the young present, each mother certainly nurses its own, but in the purchase case the young may not be hers. The word ‘similarly’ only means that both cases share the same ruling, that the mother’s next offspring is exempt from firstborn status. The dilemma therefore remains open for now.

Key Terms:

• מִידֵּי אִירְיָא = are the cases comparable? — rejecting a comparison
• הַאי כִּדְאִיתֵאּ = this one as it is — each case stands alone
• פְּטוּרָה דִּבְכוֹרָה = exemption from the firstborn

Segment 13

TYPE: מימרא

Rabbi Yochanan: a pig-like creature trailing a ewe; the ewe is exempt, the creature forbidden until Elijah comes

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: רָאָה חֲזִיר שֶׁכָּרוּךְ אַחַר רָחֵל, פְּטוּרָה מִן הַבְּכוֹרָה, וְאָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה ״עַד יָבֹא וְיוֹרֶה צֶדֶק לָכֶם״.

English Translation:

The Gemara analyzes a similar case. Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one saw a young animal resembling a pig that was trailing after a ewe, the ewe is exempt from having its future offspring counted a firstborn. And the pig-like animal is forbidden for consumption “until he comes and instructs righteousness to you” (Hosea 10:12), i.e., until Elijah the prophet arrives and determines the halakha.

קלאוד על הדף:

Rabba bar bar Chana reports a ruling of Rabbi Yochanan. A creature that looks like a pig was seen following a ewe as if it were her young. The ewe is exempt from the firstborn, presumably because she has given birth, yet the creature may not be eaten ‘until he comes and instructs righteousness to you’ (Hosea 10:12), meaning until Elijah resolves the question. The ruling looks internally inconsistent, and the Gemara will analyze it.

Key Terms:

• כָּרוּךְ אַחַר = trailing after, attached to
• רָחֵל = a ewe
• פְּטוּרָה מִן הַבְּכוֹרָה = exempt from the firstborn — her next offspring is not a firstborn
• עַד יָבֹא וְיוֹרֶה צֶדֶק לָכֶם = until he comes and instructs righteousness to you — until Elijah decides

Segment 14

TYPE: קושיא

The ruling seems to follow Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and the Rabbis at once

Hebrew/Aramaic:

פָּטוּר מִן הַבְּכוֹרָה — כְּמַאן? כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, וְאָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה — כְּרַבָּנַן.

English Translation:

The Gemara raises a difficulty with regard to Rabba bar bar Ḥana’s statement: On the one hand, the ewe is exempt from having its future offspring counted a firstborn, which is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel that an animal that nurses from another is presumed to be its offspring. But on the other hand, the pig-like animal is forbidden for consumption, which is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis that an animal might nurse the young of another.

קלאוד על הדף:

The first half, exempting the ewe, assumes with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel that a nursing animal is presumed to be the mother. The second half, forbidding the creature, worries with the Rabbis that the ewe may be nursing a stranger, in which case the creature could truly be a pig. A single ruling cannot follow both positions.

Key Terms:

• כְּמַאן = in accordance with whom?
• רַבָּנַן = the Rabbis — here, the anonymous tanna of the baraita

Segment 15

TYPE: קושיא (המשך)

If it followed the Rabbis, the doubt would be factual, and Elijah would not be needed

Hebrew/Aramaic:

וְתוּ, אִי כְּרַבָּנַן, מַאי ״עַד יָבֹא וְיוֹרֶה צֶדֶק לָכֶם״? ״עַד שֶׁיִּוָּדַע לְךָ דָּבָר״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!

English Translation:

And furthermore, if the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and there is a concern with regard to the identity of the mother of the offspring, what is the reason for citing the verse: “Until he comes and instructs righteousness to you”? By citing it, the baraita is indicating that the status of the pig-like animal is a halakhic uncertainty that can be resolved only by Elijah the prophet. Instead, it should have stated: Until the matter becomes known to you, in reference to the empirical uncertainty as to whether the pig-like animal is the offspring of the ewe.

קלאוד על הדף:

There is a second problem. If the concern is the Rabbis’ one, it is a factual doubt about who the creature’s mother is, so the ruling should have said ‘until the matter becomes known to you’. The verse about Elijah implies a doubt in halakha, something only a prophet’s ruling could settle.

Key Terms:

• וְתוּ = and furthermore
• עַד שֶׁיִּוָּדַע לְךָ דָּבָר = until the matter becomes known to you — a factual doubt
• מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ = he should have said

Segment 16

TYPE: קושיא (המשך)

Rabbi Yochanan has no doubt about the halakha: it follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel except in three cases

Hebrew/Aramaic:

וְכִי תֵּימָא: מְסַפְּקָא לֵיהּ אִי הֲלָכָה כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אִי כְּרַבָּנַן, אִי מְסַפְּקָא לֵיהּ — אַמַּאי פְּטוּרָה מִן הַבְּכוֹרָה? וְתוּ: מִי מְסַפְּקָא לֵיהּ? וְהָאָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁשָּׁנָה רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל בְּמִשְׁנָתֵינוּ — הֲלָכָה כְּמוֹתוֹ, חוּץ מֵעָרֵב, וְצַיְדָן, וּרְאָיָה אַחֲרוֹנָה!

English Translation:

And if you would say that it is uncertain whether the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel or in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, that cannot be correct: If that matter is uncertain, then why is the ewe exempt from having its future offspring counted a firstborn? And furthermore, is this question of whose opinion is accepted as the halakha an uncertainty at all? But doesn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Wherever Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel taught a halakha in the corpus of our Mishna the halakha is in accordance with his opinion, except for the following three cases: The responsibility of the guarantor (see Bava Batra 174a), and the incident that occurred in the city of Tzaidan (see Gittin 74a), and the dispute with regard to evidence in the final disagreement (see Sanhedrin 31a)?

קלאוד על הדף:

One might suggest the doubt is halakhic, whether the law follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel or the Rabbis. That fails twice. If it were doubtful, the ewe should not be exempt from the firstborn. And Rabbi Yochanan himself holds a fixed rule that the halakha follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel wherever he appears in the Mishna, except for three cases: the guarantor, the incident in Tzaidan and the final evidence.

Key Terms:

• וְכִי תֵּימָא = and if you would say
• מְסַפְּקָא לֵיהּ = he is uncertain
• עָרֵב = guarantor — Bava Batra 174a
• צַיְדָן = Tzaidan — the incident in Gittin 74a
• רְאָיָה אַחֲרוֹנָה = final evidence — Sanhedrin 31a

Segment 17

TYPE: תירוץ ודחייה

The doubt is what Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds; but then the case should have been a lamb

Hebrew/Aramaic:

לְעוֹלָם פְּשִׁיטָא לֵיהּ הֲלָכָה כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, מִיהוּ מְסַפְּקָא לֵיהּ אִי סָבַר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל יוֹלֶדֶת מְרַחֶמֶת, אוֹ אֵינָהּ מְרַחֶמֶת. אִי הָכִי, עַד דְּאַשְׁמְעִינַן חֲזִיר, לַישְׁמְעִינַן טָלֶה, וּלְמִילְקֵי עֲלֵיהּ מִשּׁוּם ״אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ״!

English Translation:

The Gemara answers: Actually, it is obvious to Rabba bar bar Ḥana that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. But it is uncertain if Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that an animal that has given birth might be merciful toward offspring that is not its own, or if he holds that it is not merciful toward the offspring of another. The Gemara rejects this claim: If that is so, instead of teaching a case involving an animal with the appearance of a pig, he should have taught the more common case of a mother ewe nursing a baby lamb. And accordingly, rather than inquiring with regard to the prohibition against eating a non-kosher animal, he should have inquired as to whether or not one is flogged for it due to violating the prohibition against slaughtering a mother and its offspring on the same day.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara answers that the halakha clearly follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, but it is unclear what his view is: whether a mother that has given birth can adopt another’s young. This is the dilemma raised earlier on the daf. The Gemara objects: if that is the question, the natural case is a ewe nursing a lamb, and the practical issue would be flogging for ‘it and its young’, not a strange pig-like creature.

Key Terms:

• לְעוֹלָם = actually, in truth
• פְּשִׁיטָא לֵיהּ = it is obvious to him
• עַד דְּאַשְׁמְעִינַן = rather than teaching us
• טָלֶה = a lamb

Segment 18

TYPE: תירוץ

The pig case adds that adoption may extend even to another species

Hebrew/Aramaic:

חֲזִיר אִיצְטְרִיכָא לֵיהּ, דְּאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן טָלֶה, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: אִם תִּמְצָא לוֹמַר דְּסָבַר יוֹלֶדֶת מְרַחֲמָא — דְּמִינַהּ, דְּלָא מִינַהּ — לָא. אַשְׁמְעִינַן חֲזִיר, דִּמְרַחֶמֶת, וַאֲפִילּוּ דְּלָאו מִינַהּ נָמֵי, דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר דִּלְמָא מְרַחֲמָא.

English Translation:

The Gemara explains: It was necessary for Rabba bar bar Ḥana to teach the case of a pig, as, had he taught a case involving a lamb, I would say: Even if you say that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that an animal that has given birth might be merciful toward the offspring of another, this is so only with regard to its own species, but with regard to an animal that is not of its own species, it would not show mercy and would not nurse the offspring. Therefore, Rabba bar bar Ḥana teaches us the case of a pig, to convey that an animal might be merciful, and this is also true even where the offspring is not of its own species, as it could be said that perhaps the animal was merciful in such a case as well.

קלאוד על הדף:

The pig case teaches more than a lamb case would. From a lamb one could conclude only that a mother adopts young of its own species. The pig case shows that, if Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds a mother that has given birth can adopt, she might adopt even a creature of another species. So the doubt is real and halakhic, and the creature is forbidden until Elijah comes.

Key Terms:

• אִיצְטְרִיכָא לֵיהּ = it was necessary for him
• אִם תִּמְצָא לוֹמַר = if you will say
• דְּמִינַהּ = of its own species
• דְּלָא מִינַהּ = not of its own species

Segment 19

TYPE: מימרא

This matches a dilemma Rabbi Yochanan reported

Hebrew/Aramaic:

וְהַיְינוּ דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: בָּעֵי

English Translation:

And this is the meaning of that which Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: A dilemma was raised

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara links this reading to a dilemma Rabbi Yochanan reported in the name of Achai beribbi, which continues on the next amud. The daf breaks off in mid-sentence.

Key Terms:

• וְהַיְינוּ = and this is the meaning of
• בָּעֵי = raised a dilemma

Amud Bet (24b)

Segment 1

TYPE: בעיא

Achai beribbi’s dilemma: a pig-like creature trailing a ewe; what is the halakha?

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אַחַאי בְּרִיבִּי: רָאָה חֲזִיר שֶׁכָּרוּךְ אַחַר רָחֵל, מַהוּ? מַאי קָמִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ? אִילֵּימָא לִבְכוֹרָה, וְקָמִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ אִי הִלְכְתָא כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אִי הִלְכְתָא כְּרַבָּנַן, תִּיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ טָלֶה!

English Translation:

by Aḥai the Distinguished [beribbi]: If one saw an animal with the appearance of a pig that was trailing after a ewe, what is the halakha? The Gemara asks: What is the dilemma he is raising? If we say he is inquiring with regard to the firstborn status of the future offspring, and he is therefore essentially asking if the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel or if the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, then let the dilemma be raised with respect to the more common case of a lamb, rather than the irregular case of a pig-like animal.

קלאוד על הדף:

The sentence from 24a continues: Achai beribbi asked about a pig-like creature trailing a ewe. The Gemara asks what exactly he was unsure about. If the question was the firstborn status, that is the general dispute between Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and the Rabbis, and it could have been asked about an ordinary lamb.

Key Terms:

• אַחַאי בְּרִיבִּי = Achai beribbi — a title of distinction
• מַאי קָמִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ = what is his dilemma?
• תִּיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ טָלֶה = let him ask about a lamb

Segment 2

TYPE: תירוץ

He asked two questions: firstborn according to the Rabbis, eating according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel

Hebrew/Aramaic:

כִּי קָמִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ, לִבְכוֹרָה וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבָּנַן, לַאֲכִילָה וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל.

English Translation:

The Gemara answers: Actually, when Aḥai the Distinguished raised the dilemma it was with respect to the ramifications of each opinion: He inquired with regard to the future offspring’s firstborn status, and this aspect of the dilemma was raised under the assumption that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. He also inquired with regard to whether or not the pig-like animal is permitted for consumption, and this aspect of the dilemma was raised under the assumption that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara answers that Achai beribbi asked two separate questions. Each assumes a different halakhic position and is a real question only within that view. The firstborn question assumes the Rabbis’ view, and the eating question assumes Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s.

Key Terms:

• אַלִּיבָּא דְּ = according to the view of
• לַאֲכִילָה = regarding eating

Segment 3

TYPE: בעיא

Firstborn, by the Rabbis: does a mother adopt young of another species?

Hebrew/Aramaic:

לִבְכוֹרָה, וַאֲפִילּוּ לְרַבָּנַן דְאָמְרִי מְרַחֲמָא, כִּי מְרַחֲמָא דְּמִינַהּ, דְּלָא מִינַהּ — לָא, אוֹ דִלְמָא דְּלָא מִינַהּ נָמֵי מְרַחֲמָא?

English Translation:

The Gemara elaborates: He inquired with regard to the offspring’s firstborn status, and this question applies even according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that an animal might be merciful toward other young animals. The Gemara explains the dilemma: One can say that when an animal is merciful this applies only toward an animal that is of its own species, but to a young animal that is not of its own species a mother animal certainly does not show mercy. Therefore, the fact that it nursed proves that it is its offspring. Or perhaps an animal might also be merciful toward an offspring that is not of its own species. If it is merciful only to its own species, the ewe is exempt from having its future offspring counted a firstborn; if its mercy extends to other species then it is not exempt.

קלאוד על הדף:

Even the Rabbis, who hold that a mother may adopt a stranger, may limit this to its own species. If so, a ewe nursing a pig-like creature must have given birth to it, and her next offspring is exempt from the firstborn. If the adoption can extend to another species, nursing proves nothing, and her next offspring remains a doubtful firstborn.

Key Terms:

• וַאֲפִילּוּ לְרַבָּנַן = even according to the Rabbis
• אוֹ דִלְמָא = or perhaps

Segment 4

TYPE: בעיא ותיקו

Eating, by Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel: the same question; it remains unresolved

Hebrew/Aramaic:

לַאֲכִילָה, וַאֲפִילּוּ לְרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל — אִם תִּמְצָא לוֹמַר סָבַר: יוֹלֶדֶת מְרַחֲמָא דְּמִינַהּ, דְּלָאו מִינַהּ — לָא; אוֹ דִלְמָא: דְּלָאו מִינַהּ נָמֵי מְרַחֲמָא? תֵּיקוּ.

English Translation:

And Aḥai the Distinguished also inquired with regard to whether the pig-like animal is permitted for consumption, and this question applies even according to the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel: If you say he holds that an animal that has given birth might be merciful and nurse another mother’s offspring, perhaps that is so only with regard to an animal that is of its own species, but to an animal that is not of its own species it is not merciful, which means the pig-like animal is kosher. Or perhaps a mother might also be merciful toward an offspring that is not of its own species, in which case the pig-like animal might not be kosher and therefore may not be eaten. After explaining the dilemma of Aḥai the Distinguished, the Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

קלאוד על הדף:

Even if Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that a mother that has given birth can adopt, this may apply only to its own species. In that case the creature is truly the ewe’s offspring and may be eaten despite its appearance. If the adoption extends to other species, the creature may be a real pig and is forbidden. The dilemma is left as תיקו, which explains why Rabbi Yochanan forbade the creature ‘until Elijah comes’.

Key Terms:

• תֵּיקוּ = let it stand — the question remains unresolved
• מְרַחֲמָא = shows mercy, adopts

Segment 5

TYPE: משנה

Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam: plucking hair to clear the slaughter site, or to show a blemish

Hebrew/Aramaic:

מַתְנִי׳ רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן הַמְשׁוּלָּם אוֹמֵר: הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַבְּכוֹר, עוֹשֶׂה מָקוֹם בְּקוֹפִיץ מִיכָּן וּמִיכָּן, וְתוֹלֵשׁ אֶת הַשֵּׂעָר, וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יְזִיזֶנּוּ מִמְּקוֹמוֹ, וְכֵן תּוֹלֵשׁ אֶת הַשֵּׂעָר לִרְאוֹת מְקוֹם מוּם.

English Translation:

MISHNA: Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam says: Since it is prohibited by Torah law to shear a firstborn, as it states: “And you shall not shear the firstborn of your flock” (Deuteronomy 15:19), one who is slaughtering a firstborn, and must clear hair or wool from the area of the neck in order to facilitate proper slaughter, clears space by uprooting the hair with a cleaver [bekofitz] from here and from there, on either side of the neck, although he thereby plucks out the hair. He may clear space in this manner provided that he does not move the plucked hair from its place; it must remain intermingled with the rest of the hair so it will appear that he did not shear the animal. And likewise, one plucks the hair to enable one of the Sages to examine the place of a blemish and thereby determine whether it is permitted to slaughter the firstborn outside the Temple.

קלאוד על הדף:

The new mishna deals with the prohibition of shearing a firstborn (Deuteronomy 15:19). Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam permits clearing the place of slaughter by pulling out hair with a cleaver on either side, as long as the plucked hair is left in place among the rest, so that it does not look like shearing. Similarly, one may pluck hair so that a Sage can see a blemish hidden under the wool. This is the mishna Rav ruled on, discussed at the beginning of the daf.

Key Terms:

• מַתְנִי׳ = mishna
• קוֹפִיץ = a cleaver, butcher’s knife
• תּוֹלֵשׁ = plucks, pulls out
• שֶׁלֹּא יְזִיזֶנּוּ מִמְּקוֹמוֹ = that he not move it from its place
• מְקוֹם מוּם = the place of a blemish

Segment 6

TYPE: גמרא ובעיא

Rav rules like Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam; does it apply to slaughter on Yom Tov?

Hebrew/Aramaic:

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן הַמְשׁוּלָּם. בְּעוֹ מִינֵּיהּ מֵרַב הוּנָא: כְּנֶגְדּוֹ בְּיוֹם טוֹב מַהוּ? טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן הַמְשׁוּלָּם מִשּׁוּם דְּקָסָבַר תּוֹלֵשׁ לָאו הַיְינוּ גּוֹזֵז, וּבְיוֹם טוֹב אָסוּר, דְּהָוֵה לֵיהּ עוֹקֵר דָּבָר מִגִּידּוּלוֹ.

English Translation:

GEMARA: Rav says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam. The Sages raised a dilemma before Rav Huna: What is the halakha in the parallel case of one who wishes to slaughter a non-sacred animal on a Festival? The resolution depends on the reason for the ruling of Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam: Does he permit clearing hair with a cleaver because he holds that plucking is not the same as shearing, and as opposed to plucking the hair of a firstborn, it is prohibited to pluck hair on the Festival, as this is considered uprooting an item from its place of growth?

קלאוד על הדף:

Rav rules in favor of Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam. Rav Huna is then asked about slaughtering an ordinary animal on Yom Tov: may one clear the hair in the same way? It depends on Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam’s reasoning. If he permits it because plucking is not shearing, that helps only for the firstborn, while on Yom Tov plucking is still forbidden as uprooting something from where it grows.

Key Terms:

• גְּמָ׳ = Gemara
• כְּנֶגְדּוֹ בְּיוֹם טוֹב = the parallel case on Yom Tov
• גּוֹזֵז = shearing
• עוֹקֵר דָּבָר מִגִּידּוּלוֹ = uprooting something from where it grows — a forbidden labor

Segment 7

TYPE: בעיא (המשך)

Or is plucking shearing, permitted only because it is unintended?

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אוֹ דִלְמָא בְּעָלְמָא סָבַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן הַמְשׁוּלָּם תּוֹלֵשׁ הַיְינוּ גּוֹזֵז, וְהַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דִּשְׁרֵי, דְּהָוֵה לֵיהּ דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּוֵּין, וּבְיוֹם טוֹב דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּוֵּין מוּתָּר?

English Translation:

Or perhaps in general Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam holds that plucking is considered a form of shearing. And this is the reason that it is permitted to clear space with a cleaver in the case of the firstborn, as it is an unintentional act, i.e., an action performed for a permitted purpose from which a prohibited labor may inadvertently ensue, since he does not intend to pluck out the hair; and on a Festival an unintentional act is permitted.

קלאוד על הדף:

Alternatively, Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam may hold that plucking is a form of shearing, and permits it only because the slaughterer does not intend to remove hair, making it an unintended act (דבר שאין מתכוין). On that reasoning the leniency carries over to Yom Tov, where an unintended act is also permitted.

Key Terms:

• אוֹ דִלְמָא = or perhaps
• דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּוֵּין = an unintended act — a permitted act that might incidentally cause a forbidden result
• מוּתָּר = permitted

Segment 8

TYPE: מעשה ופשיטה

Rav Chananel confirms Rav’s ruling; Rav Huna permits it on Yom Tov

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אֲמַר לְהוּ: זִילוּ שַׁיְילוּהּ לְרַב חֲנַנְאֵל, אִי אָמַר הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן הַמְשׁוּלָּם, אֶיפְשׁוֹט לְכוּ. אֲתוֹ שַׁיְילוּהּ, אֲמַר לְהוּ: הָכִי אָמַר רַב: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן הַמְשׁוּלָּם. אֲתוֹ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב הוּנָא, אֲמַר לְהוּ: כְּנֶגְדּוֹ בְּיוֹם טוֹב מוּתָּר. אִיתְּמַר נָמֵי, אָמַר רַב חֲנַנְיָה בַּר שֶׁלֶמְיָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב: כְּנֶגְדּוֹ בְּיוֹם טוֹב

English Translation:

Rav Huna said to them: Go and ask Rav’s disciple, Rav Ḥananel, and if Rav in fact said the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam, I will explain to you the resolution of your dilemma. They went and asked Rav Ḥananel, and he said to them that this is what Rav says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam. They came before Rav Huna, and he said to them: In the parallel case of one who wishes to slaughter a non-sacred animal on a Festival, it is permitted to pluck the hair in order to facilitate proper slaughter. It was also stated that Rav Ḥananya bar Shelamya says in the name of Rav: In the parallel case of one who wishes to slaughter a non-sacred animal on a Festival,

קלאוד על הדף:

Rav Huna first wants to confirm that Rav really ruled like Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam, and sends the questioners to Rav’s student Rav Chananel, who confirms it. Rav Huna then rules that clearing the hair on Yom Tov is permitted, which means he takes Rav’s ruling to rest on the unintended-act reasoning, since that reasoning also covers Yom Tov. A parallel report from Rav Chananya bar Shelamya in Rav’s name begins and continues on daf 25.

Key Terms:

• זִילוּ שַׁיְילוּהּ = go and ask him
• אֶיפְשׁוֹט לְכוּ = I will resolve it for you
• אִיתְּמַר נָמֵי = it was also stated

📝 Summary

Overview

Bechorot 24 finishes the Gemara’s analysis of Rav’s two rulings and then turns to the question of how far a nursing animal can be trusted as evidence of motherhood. It opens by completing the question left open on 23b. If Rav’s statement that the halakha follows “the whole chapter” refers to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, why did he also rule separately like Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam? The answer is that each ruling blocks a misreading of the other. The Gemara then quotes the baraita in which the Rabbis disagree with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel about a nursing animal bought from a gentile. This leads to a dilemma about what his “presumptive status” (דבר בחזקתו) really means. Three attempted proofs are rejected, and the discussion moves to Rabbi Yochanan’s strange ruling about a pig-like creature trailing a ewe, which is forbidden “until Elijah comes.” That ruling is explained through Achai beribbi’s two-part dilemma, which ends in תיקו. The daf closes with the mishna of Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam on plucking hair from a firstborn. Rav rules like him, and Rav Huna extends the ruling to slaughtering an ordinary animal on Yom Tov. A parallel report in Rav’s name breaks off and continues on daf 25.

Amud Aleph Highlights

• Why both of Rav’s rulings are needed: had Rav said only “the halakha follows the whole chapter,” one could have applied it to Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam, reading the plural as his two rulings in the chapter. On that reading a dissent in a baraita would count as a dispute. The separate ruling on Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam shows that the general rule refers to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, so “פלוגתא דברייתא לאו פלוגתא היא”: a dissent preserved only in a baraita is not a dispute against an anonymous mishna.
• The baraita: the Rabbis hold that the next offspring of a nursing animal bought from a gentile is a doubtful firstborn, because an animal may be merciful (מרחמת) and nurse a young that is not its own even without having given birth. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says “דבר בחזקתו”: the young is presumed to be its own.
• The flock at night: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel adds that if an owner saw many animals giving birth at night and in the morning found the males nursing from the experienced mothers and the females from the first-time mothers, he need not suspect that the young switched mothers. No male is a firstborn.
• The dilemma: does Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel mean that an animal adopts only after it has given birth, or that it never adopts a stranger at all? Both readings exempt the next offspring from the firstborn. The practical difference is flogging for “אותו ואת בנו” (Leviticus 22:28). If an animal nurses only its own young, slaughtering the nursing pair on one day earns lashes. If it may nurse a stranger, the relationship is doubtful and there are no lashes.
• Three rejected proofs: (1) The mishna says the young “was” (היה) another’s, not “is.” Either way the mother “had” a young of her own at the start, so the wording proves nothing about adoption. (2) In the flock case each mother’s own newborn is present, and “במקום דידה לא שבקא דידה”: a mother does not abandon its own young to nurse a stranger. (3) The baraita’s “וכן” (and similarly) does not make the purchase case identical to the flock case. “האי כדאיתא והאי כדאיתא”: each stands on its own, and “similarly” refers only to the shared exemption from the firstborn.
• Rabbi Yochanan’s pig-like creature: Rabba bar bar Chana reports that a ewe followed by a creature resembling a pig is exempt from the firstborn, yet the creature is forbidden “עד יבא ויורה צדק לכם” (Hosea 10:12), until Elijah decides.
• The difficulty: the exemption follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, while the prohibition seems to follow the Rabbis. A factual doubt should have said “until the matter becomes known to you,” not cited Elijah. A doubt over whose view is halakha would not exempt the ewe. Besides, Rabbi Yochanan holds that the halakha follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in the Mishna except in three cases: the guarantor, Tzaidan and the final evidence.
• The answer: the halakha clearly follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, but it is unclear whether he holds that a mother that has given birth can adopt. A lamb case would teach only adoption within the species. The pig case shows that adoption might extend even to another species, so the creature may truly be a pig. The Gemara links this to a dilemma Rabbi Yochanan reported, and the sentence breaks off.

Amud Bet Highlights

• Achai beribbi’s dilemma: a pig-like creature trails a ewe, so what is the halakha? If he were asking only whether the halakha follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel or the Rabbis, he could have asked about a lamb.
• Two questions, two views: the firstborn question is asked according to the Rabbis. Even if a mother adopts strangers, perhaps she adopts only her own species, so a ewe nursing a pig-like creature must have borne it and her next offspring is exempt. The eating question is asked according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. Even if a mother that has given birth can adopt, perhaps only within its species, in which case the creature is the ewe’s own and kosher. If adoption crosses species, it may be a real pig. The dilemma is left as תיקו, which explains Rabbi Yochanan’s “until Elijah comes.”
• The mishna: Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam says that one slaughtering a firstborn, which may not be sheared (Deuteronomy 15:19), may clear the slaughter site by pulling out hair with a cleaver (קופיץ) on both sides. He must leave the plucked hair in place among the rest. Likewise, one may pluck hair so that a Sage can see a hidden blemish.
• Rav’s ruling and Yom Tov: Rav rules like Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam. Rav Huna is asked whether one may do the same when slaughtering an ordinary animal on Yom Tov. If plucking is not shearing (תולש לאו היינו גוזז), the leniency helps only the firstborn, since on Yom Tov plucking is still uprooting something from where it grows. If plucking is shearing but permitted as an unintended act (דבר שאין מתכוין), it applies on Yom Tov as well.
• The resolution: Rav Huna sends the questioners to Rav’s student Rav Chananel, who confirms Rav’s ruling. Rav Huna then permits the parallel case on Yom Tov, which means he takes the ruling to rest on the unintended-act reasoning. Rav Chananya bar Shelamya begins a parallel report in Rav’s name about Yom Tov, which continues on 25a.

Key Disputes

Conclusions

Rav’s two rulings are both necessary, and together they teach that a dissent recorded only in a baraita does not count as a dispute against an anonymous mishna. The dilemma over Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s presumption is not resolved: none of the three proofs succeeds. Rabbi Yochanan’s ruling on the pig-like creature is explained as following Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel while leaving open whether a mother adopts young of another species. Achai beribbi’s question on that point ends in תיקו, so the creature remains forbidden “until Elijah comes” while the ewe is exempt. Rav’s ruling for Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam is confirmed through Rav Chananel. Rav Huna extends it to slaughter on Yom Tov, implying that the plucking is permitted as an unintended act. Rav Chananya bar Shelamya’s parallel report is unfinished at the end of the daf.

Key Figures

Tannaim: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, the Rabbis of the baraita, Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam

Amoraim: Rav, Rabbi Yochanan, Rabba bar bar Chana, Achai beribbi, Rav Huna, Rav Chananel, Rav Chananya bar Shelamya

One-Line Takeaway

A mother’s nursing is strong evidence of motherhood but not proof, and where nature leaves the question open, as with a ewe nursing a creature of another species, the halakha waits for Elijah rather than guess.

🎯 ELI5 (Explain Like I’m 5)

The Big Picture 🖼️

Today’s daf starts by finishing a puzzle about Rav’s rules: why did he say two things that sound like the same thing? Then we meet a mother sheep that’s nursing a baby (feeding it milk), and we ask a big question: does a mother animal ever feed a baby that isn’t hers? That question leads to one of the strangest scenes in the whole masechet: a little creature that looks like a pig, following a sheep around like she’s its mommy! Finally, a new mishna teaches how to get the hair out of the way before slaughtering a firstborn animal, without “giving it a haircut.”

Quick Recap: Rav’s Big Rule 📏

Remember the end of daf 23? Rav (a great teacher in Babylonia) said: “In this whole perek (chapter), the halakha follows the mishna, except where there’s an argument in it.”

Rav Sheshet joked that Rav must have been dozing when he said it, because he couldn’t find a single mishna the rule would help with! He went through the options one by one, and every one seemed to fail.

The Gemara’s answer: Rav meant Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s ruling about a nursing animal. Yes, a baraita (a teaching from the time of the Mishna that didn’t make it into the Mishna) has a Sage who disagrees with him. But Rav was teaching us something new: an argument in a baraita doesn’t count as an argument against the Mishna. The Mishna wins.

And then the page ended in the middle of a question…

The Simple Idea 💡: Rav’s rule was about Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, and it teaches that a baraita’s disagreement doesn’t knock out a mishna.

Why Say It Twice? 🔁

Here’s the question that got cut off. Rav also said, separately: “The halakha follows Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam” (he’s in the mishna at the end of today’s daf). But that mishna has no argument in it! So the big rule already covers it. Why say it again?

The Gemara answers: each statement protects the other one from being misunderstood.

• If Rav had only given the big rule, we might think it was all about Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam. “But Rav said ‘the whole chapter’!” Sure, because Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam makes two rulings in the chapter. And then we’d think Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel isn’t included, because a baraita disagrees with him.
• So Rav said Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam’s name separately. Now the big rule is “free” to mean someone else: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. And that teaches us the bonus lesson: a baraita’s argument isn’t really an argument.

Think of it like… a parent who says, “Everyone in this house goes to bed at 8!” and also, “Sammy goes to bed at 8.” Why mention Sammy? Because otherwise you might think “everyone” just meant Sammy and his twin! By naming Sammy on his own, the parent makes it clear that “everyone” means everybody else, too.

The Simple Idea 💡: Rav said two things so we’d know both rulings are real: Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam’s, and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s.

The Nursing Mother Sheep 🐑🍼

Now let’s meet the baraita Rav was talking about.

Someone buys a mother animal from a non-Jew, and she’s nursing a baby. Here’s why that matters: the first boy an animal ever gives birth to is a בכור (bechor, “firstborn”), and it belongs to the kohen (the priest). So the buyer wants to know: has this mother already had a baby? If she has, her next baby isn’t a firstborn. If she hasn’t, her next baby might be!

She’s nursing a baby. So she’s a mom already, right? Not so fast!

Think of it like… seeing a lady pushing a stroller in the park. Is she the baby’s mom? One person says: “Could be the babysitter!” The other says: “Come on, she’s pushing the stroller. She’s the mom.”

The Simple Idea 💡: The first tanna worries that a nursing animal might be “babysitting”; Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says if she’s nursing, she’s the mom.

The Night-Time Flock 🌙🐑🐑🐑

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel adds another case. A farmer walks into his flock at night. About ten or fifteen sheep are giving birth all at once. Some are first-time moms (their boy babies would be firstborns). Some have had babies before (their boy babies are ordinary).

In the morning, he sees:

• The boy lambs are drinking from the experienced moms.
• The girl lambs are drinking from the first-time moms.

Could the babies have switched moms in the dark? Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: don’t worry about it! Every baby is drinking from its own mom. So every boy came from an experienced mom, and none of them is a firstborn.

Think of it like… a school pickup line. Every kid runs to a grown-up’s car. You don’t worry that the kids got swapped. Each kid goes to their own family!

The Simple Idea 💡: In a flock, each baby drinks from its own mother, so we trust who’s feeding whom.

What Does “Stays As It Looks” Mean? 🤔

The Gemara asks: what exactly does Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel mean? There are two ways to read him:

1. Only a real mom gets kind-hearted. A sheep that never had a baby won’t nurse anybody. But a sheep that has had a baby might nurse a stranger’s baby too.
2. A mom only ever feeds her own baby. Never a stranger’s. Period.

“Who cares?” asks the Gemara. Either way, a nursing sheep has definitely given birth, so her next baby isn’t a firstborn. Same answer!

But there is a difference. There’s a mitzva called אותו ואת בנו (oto ve’et beno, “it and its young,” Vayikra 22:28): you may not slaughter a mother animal and her baby on the same day. If someone does it on purpose, he gets lashes (a punishment from the court).

The Simple Idea 💡: The two readings agree about firstborns, but they disagree about whether you get lashes for slaughtering a “mom and baby” on the same day.

Three Tries, Three Misses 🎯❌

The Gemara tries to prove which reading is right. Three tries, three misses.

Try #1: the mishna’s wording. The mishna says the buyer “doesn’t need to worry that the baby was someone else’s.” Doesn’t that mean “it’s definitely her own baby”?

Nope! Look closely: it says “was,” not “is.” The mishna means: either way, you don’t need to worry. Even if this baby is a stranger’s, she once had a baby of her own, because she wouldn’t be nursing otherwise. So her next baby isn’t a firstborn. That works with both readings.

Try #2: the night-time flock. The babies all drink from their own moms, even the experienced moms. Doesn’t that prove a mom never feeds a stranger?

Nope! In the flock, every mom’s own baby is right there. A mom with her own baby next to her won’t ignore it to feed someone else’s. But a mom whose own baby is gone? She might adopt. So the flock case proves nothing about her.

Think of it like… a mom at a birthday party. She hands the juice box to her own kid first, not a stranger’s. But if her kid went home already, she might happily give it to another kid.

Try #3: the word “similarly.” The baraita says “and similarly, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel would say…” So the nursing case must be just like the flock case: the baby is definitely hers!

Nope! The two cases are different. “Similarly” only means they have the same ruling: the mother’s next baby is not a firstborn. It doesn’t mean the facts are the same.

The Simple Idea 💡: None of the three proofs works, so we still don’t know if Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel thinks an experienced mom might adopt a stranger’s baby.

The Pig-Looking Baby! 🐷🐑

Now comes the strangest case of the day. Rabba bar bar Chana tells us that Rabbi Yochanan said:

Someone saw a little creature that looks like a pig, trailing after a ewe (a mother sheep) like it’s her baby. What’s the halakha?

• The ewe: she’s exempt from firstborn. Her next baby is not a firstborn (she must have given birth already).
• The pig-looking baby: it’s forbidden to eat “until he comes and teaches you righteousness” (Hoshea 10:12). That means: until Eliyahu HaNavi (Elijah the prophet) comes and tells us the answer!

Why would that matter? A pig is not kosher. But a baby born from a kosher sheep is kosher, even if it looks weird! So if this creature really came out of the ewe, it’s kosher. If it’s a real pig that just follows her around, it’s not.

The Simple Idea 💡: Rabbi Yochanan says the ewe has surely had a baby, but the pig-looking creature can’t be eaten until Eliyahu comes and settles it.

Wait, That Doesn’t Fit Together! 🧩

The Gemara is puzzled. Rabbi Yochanan’s ruling has two halves that seem to belong to two different teams:

• “The ewe is exempt” sounds like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel: if she’s nursing it, she’s its mom.
• “The creature is forbidden” sounds like the first tanna: maybe she’s just being kind to a stranger, and this could be a real pig!

You can’t be on both teams at once!

And another problem: if the worry is just “whose baby is this?”, that’s a question about facts. Rabbi Yochanan should have said “forbidden until we find out.” Why bring in Eliyahu HaNavi? Eliyahu is needed for questions about halakha (what the law is), not for checking facts.

Maybe Rabbi Yochanan wasn’t sure whose side the halakha follows? That doesn’t work either. First, if he wasn’t sure, he wouldn’t exempt the ewe. Second, Rabbi Yochanan has a famous rule: the halakha always follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in the Mishna, except in three cases (one about a guarantor, one about a story in the town of Tzaidan, and one about “final evidence” in court). So he’s sure the halakha follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel!

Think of it like… a referee who says, “That goal counts!” and in the same breath, “That goal doesn’t count until the head ref arrives next year!” Huh? Which is it?

The Simple Idea 💡: Rabbi Yochanan’s ruling seemed to mix two opinions, and the “wait for Eliyahu” part seemed out of place.

The Solution: Can a Sheep Adopt a Pig? 🐑❤️🐷

Here’s the Gemara’s answer. Rabbi Yochanan knows the halakha follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. What he doesn’t know is what Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel really thinks. That’s the open question from before: can a mom who already gave birth adopt a stranger’s baby?

So:

• The ewe is exempt: either way, a nursing ewe has given birth. ✅
• The creature is forbidden: if experienced moms can adopt, this might be a real pig she adopted. ❌

And this is a question about what the law is, so we need Eliyahu!

“But then,” asks the Gemara, “why talk about a pig? Use a normal lamb! Ask whether there are lashes for slaughtering the ewe and the lamb on the same day.”

Answer: the pig case teaches more. With a lamb, you might think: “Fine, a sheep might adopt another sheep’s lamb, but never a different kind of animal!” The pig case says: if a mom can adopt, maybe she’d adopt even a different species!

Think of it like… those videos of a mother dog taking care of baby kittens. Would you have guessed a dog would mother a kitten? That’s exactly the question here!

The Simple Idea 💡: The question is whether a mother animal might adopt a baby of a totally different kind, and that’s a law question only Eliyahu can settle.

Achai’s Two Questions 🧐🧐

The Gemara says this matches a question asked by Achai beribbi (a respected Sage; “beribbi” is a title of honor). He asked about the very same thing: a pig-looking creature following a ewe. What’s the halakha?

“What exactly was he asking?” says the Gemara. “If he just wanted to know whose side the law follows, he could have asked about a lamb.”

Answer: he was asking two questions, each on a different team’s terms.

And the answer? תיקו (teiku): “let it stand.” Nobody solved it! That’s exactly why Rabbi Yochanan said the creature is forbidden until Eliyahu comes.

Fun fact: people sometimes say “teiku” stands for the first letters of a Hebrew phrase meaning “Eliyahu the Tishbi will answer questions and problems.” On our daf, the question really is left waiting for Eliyahu!

The Simple Idea 💡: Achai’s question about the pig-looking baby has two parts, and both are left as “teiku,” waiting for Eliyahu.

New Mishna: Moving Hair Without a Haircut ✂️🚫

Now a new mishna. The Torah says (Devarim 15:19): “You shall not shear the firstborn of your flock.” You can’t cut a firstborn’s wool or hair. Not even a little!

But a blemished firstborn (one with a permanent injury) can be slaughtered and eaten, and to slaughter an animal properly you need to see the skin of its neck. Its hair or wool is in the way. What do you do?

Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam says:

• Take a קופיץ (kofitz, a butcher’s cleaver) and pull out some hair on this side and that side of the spot where you’ll cut.
• But don’t move the pulled-out hair away! Leave it sitting there, mixed in with the rest. That way it doesn’t look like you gave the animal a haircut.
• The same goes for a blemish: you can pluck some hair so a Sage can see the injury and decide if the animal may be slaughtered.

Think of it like… a nurse who needs to put a bandage on your arm. She gently pushes the hair aside to see the spot. She isn’t giving you a haircut!

The Simple Idea 💡: You may clear a little hair from a firstborn’s neck or from a blemish, as long as you leave the hair right there so it doesn’t look like shearing.

And What About Yom Tov? 🎉🔪

Rav rules: the halakha follows Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam (that’s the statement we talked about at the start of the daf!).

Then people asked Rav Huna: what about slaughtering a regular animal on Yom Tov (a festival day)? On Yom Tov you’re allowed to slaughter for food, but many kinds of work are forbidden. Can you clear the hair the same way?

It depends on why Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam allowed it:

Rav Huna said: “First, go check that Rav really said this. Ask his student, Rav Chananel.” They asked, and Rav Chananel said: “Yes, Rav said the halakha follows Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam.”

So Rav Huna ruled: on Yom Tov, it’s allowed! That shows he thought the reason was “you don’t mean to do it,” and that reason works on Yom Tov too.

The Gemara then starts another report, from Rav Chananya bar Shelamya in Rav’s name, about the same Yom Tov case… and we’ll hear the rest on daf 25!

Think of it like… a school rule: “No running in the hall.” You hurry to catch a falling vase and take a few quick steps. Did you break the rule? You weren’t trying to run. You were trying to save the vase!

The Simple Idea 💡: Rav Huna says that pulling hair aside to slaughter is allowed even on Yom Tov, because you don’t really mean to pull out hair.

The Super Simple Summary 🎯

• Rav said two things on purpose: the “whole chapter” rule means Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, and a baraita’s disagreement doesn’t knock out a mishna. His separate ruling names Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam.
• A nursing mother sheep bought from a non-Jew: the first tanna says she might be “babysitting” and never gave birth, so her next baby is a maybe-firstborn. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says she’s the mom, so it’s not a firstborn.
• In a flock at night, each baby drinks from its own mom, so there’s no worry about swaps.
• The open question: can an experienced mom adopt a stranger’s baby? It matters for lashes for slaughtering “it and its young” on one day. Three proofs try and fail.
• The pig-looking creature following a ewe: the ewe is exempt from firstborn, but the creature is forbidden until Eliyahu comes, because maybe a mom will adopt even a different species.
• Achai beribbi asked two questions (firstborn and eating), and both stay teiku.
• New mishna: Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam lets you pluck hair from a firstborn’s neck before slaughter, or to show a blemish, as long as the hair stays in place.
• Yom Tov: Rav Huna checked with Rav Chananel and ruled it’s allowed, because you don’t mean to pull out the hair. More on daf 25!

⚖️ Halacha

A Nursing Animal Bought from a Gentile: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel Prevails

Source in Daf: 24a, Segments 1-4 and 6-12 (Rav’s two rulings and the baraita that disagrees with the mishna; the Rabbis fear the animal “is merciful” to young not its own, while Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds “the matter stays in its presumptive status”; the unresolved question of what that presumption means)

Rambam — Hilchot Bechorot 4:8

Hebrew:

לָקַח בְּהֵמָה מֵינִיקָה מִן הַנָּכְרִי אֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ שֶׁמָּא בְּנָהּ שֶׁל אַחֶרֶת הִיא מֵינִיקָה אֶלָּא הֲרֵי זוֹ בְּחֶזְקַת שֶׁיָּלְדָה. וַאֲפִלּוּ הָיָה זֶה שֶׁמֵּינִיקָה כְּמוֹ מִין אַחֵר וַאֲפִלּוּ כְּמִין חֲזִיר הֲרֵי זוֹ פְּטוּרָה מִן הַבְּכוֹרָה. וְכֵן בְּהֵמָה שֶׁהִיא חוֹלֶבֶת פְּטוּרָה מִן הַבְּכוֹרָה שֶׁרֹב הַבְּהֵמוֹת אֵינָן חוֹלְבוֹת אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן כְּבָר יָלְדוּ:

English:

When a person purchases an animal that is giving suck from a gentile, he need not suspect that it is giving suck to the offspring of another animal. Instead, we operate under the assumption that it has already given birth. Even if the animal to which it is giving suck is like another species, even if it is like a pig, it is exempt from the requirements of the firstborn. Similarly, the offspring of an animal that is providing milk is exempt from the requirements of the firstborn. The rationale is that we rely on the assumption that most animals do not provide milk unless they have given birth previously.

Connection: The Rambam rules with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel against the anonymous Rabbis of the baraita, exactly as Rav’s general ruling (as the Gemara read it in Segments 1-3) and Rabbi Yochanan’s rule in Segment 16 (“the halakha follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel wherever he appears in our Mishna”) require. His phrase “אינו חושש שמא בנה של אחרת היא מיניקה” is the mishna’s own wording. Notably, he extends the exemption even to a nursling that looks like a pig, which is the first half of Rabbi Yochanan’s ruling in Segment 13 (“the ewe is exempt from the firstborn”). The dilemma of Segment 6, whether a mother that has given birth may also nurse a stranger, does not affect this ruling, since on either reading the nursing animal has already given birth.

Shulchan Aruch — Yoreh De’ah 316:2

Hebrew:

לקח בהמה מניקה מהעובד כוכבים אינו חושש שמא בנה של אחרת היא מניקה אלא הרי זו בחזקת שילדה ואפילו היה זה שמניקה כמו מין אחר ואפילו כמין חזיר פטורה מהבכורה:

English (our rendering; Sefaria has no English for this siman):

One who bought a nursing animal from an idolater need not be concerned that it is nursing the young of another animal; rather, it is presumed to have given birth. And even if the one it is nursing resembles another species, even if it resembles a pig, it is exempt from the firstborn.

Connection: The Shulchan Aruch copies the Rambam almost word for word, including the pig-like nursling. The firstborn of a kosher animal still applies today (the animal is given to a kohen and eaten once blemished), so this ruling has practical weight for a Jew who acquires livestock from a non-Jew.

A note on “it and its young”: The Gemara’s practical difference in Segment 7 (whether one who slaughters the nursing animal and its nursling on one day is flogged) is not addressed explicitly in either code. The Rambam’s general rule in Hilchot Shechita 12 applies the prohibition to the mother “שזה בנה ודאי,” which fits the Gemara’s assumption that flogging requires a certain relationship.

The Flock at Night: Each Mother Nurses Its Own

Source in Daf: 24a, Segments 5 and 9-10 (Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel: males found nursing from experienced mothers and females from first-time mothers; “one need not be concerned” that the young switched; a mother does not leave its own young to nurse another)

Shulchan Aruch — Yoreh De’ah 316:5

Hebrew:

מי שיש לו בעדרו מבכירות ושאינן מבכירות וילדו ולא היה שם אדם ומוצא מבכירות מניקות נקבות ושאינן מבכירות מניקות זכרים אינו חושש שמא בנה של זו בא לו אצל זו ושל זו אצל זו אלא הדבר בחזקתו שכל אחת מניקה את בנה:

English (our rendering):

One who has in his flock first-time mothers and mothers that are not first-time, and they gave birth with no one present, and he finds the first-time mothers nursing females and the others nursing males, need not be concerned that the young of this one came to that one and the young of that one to this one. Rather, the matter stands in its presumption that each one nurses its own young.

Connection: This is the second clause of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s baraita (Segment 5), codified in its own phrasing (“הדבר בחזקתו”). The practical result is lenient: every male is the second offspring of its mother, so none is a firstborn. The reasoning matches the Gemara’s rejection in Segment 10: where each mother’s own young is present, there is no reason to suspect an exchange. Hilchot Bechorot ch. 4 does not record this flock case separately; the Shulchan Aruch states it explicitly.

The Pig-Like Creature Trailing a Ewe: Forbidden to Eat

Source in Daf: 24a, Segments 13-18, and 24b, Segments 1-4 (Rabbi Yochanan: the ewe is exempt from the firstborn, but the creature is forbidden “until Elijah comes”; Achai beribbi’s dilemma whether a mother adopts young of another species; תיקו)

Rambam — Hilchot Ma’achalot Asurot 1:4

Hebrew:

בְּהֵמָה טְהוֹרָה שֶׁיָּלְדָה כְּמִין בְּהֵמָה טְמֵאָה אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ מַפְרִיס פַּרְסָה וְלֹא מַעֲלֶה גֵּרָה אֶלָּא כְּמִין סוּס אוֹ חֲמוֹר לְכָל דָּבָר הֲרֵי זֶה מֻתָּר בַּאֲכִילָה. בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים בְּשֶׁיָּלְדָה לְפָנָיו. אֲבָל אִם הִנִּיחַ פָּרָה מְעֻבֶּרֶת בְּעֶדְרוֹ וּבָא וּמָצָא כְּמִין חֲזִיר כָּרוּךְ אַחֲרֶיהָ אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהוּא יוֹנֵק מִמֶּנָּה הֲרֵי זֶה סָפֵק וְאָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה. שֶׁמָּא מִן הַטֻּמְאָה נוֹלָד וְנִכְרָךְ אַחַר הַטְּהוֹרָה:

English:

When a kosher animal gives birth to an offspring resembling a non-kosher animal, it is permitted to be eaten even though it does not have split hoofs or chew the cud, but instead, resembles a horse or a donkey in all matters. When does the above apply? When he sees it give birth. If, however, he left a pregnant cow in his herd and found an animal resembling a pig dependent on it, the matter is doubtful and [the young animal] is forbidden to be eaten. [This applies] even if it nurses from [the cow], for perhaps it was born from a non-kosher species, but became dependent on the kosher animal.

Connection: This is the second half of Rabbi Yochanan’s ruling (“forbidden to eat until Elijah comes”). The words “כרוך אחריה” are the Gemara’s own, and “אף על פי שהוא יונק ממנה” rules out relying on the nursing as proof of birth. Because Achai beribbi’s dilemma (24b, Segment 4) ended in תיקו, the creature remains a doubt, and a doubt about a Torah prohibition is treated stringently. Read together with Hilchot Bechorot 4:8, the Rambam reproduces Rabbi Yochanan’s apparently inconsistent pair exactly as the Gemara resolved it in Segments 17-18: the mother is presumed to have given birth (exempt from the firstborn), yet the nursling itself may have been adopted from another species (forbidden to eat).

Shulchan Aruch — Yoreh De’ah 79:2

Hebrew:

טמאה שילדה כמין טהורה אע”פ שיש לה כל סימני טהרה אסורה וטהורה שילדה כמין טמאה מותרת אע”פ שיש לה כל סימני טומאה ודוקא שילדתו בפנינו אבל אם הניחה מעוברת ואח”כ מצא מין טמא הולך אחריה אף על פי שכרוך אחריה ויונק אותה אסור שמא מן הטמאה נולד ונכרך אחר הטהורה:

English (our rendering; Sefaria has no English for this se’if):

A non-kosher animal that gave birth to something like a kosher species is forbidden, even though it has all the kosher signs; and a kosher animal that gave birth to something like a non-kosher species is permitted, even though it has all the non-kosher signs. This applies only when it gave birth before us. But if he left it pregnant and afterwards found a non-kosher species walking after it, even though it trails after it and nurses from it, it is forbidden, lest it was born from a non-kosher animal and attached itself to the kosher one.

Connection: The Shulchan Aruch follows the Rambam, adding the symmetrical case of a non-kosher mother. The ruling is fully in force today: nursing alone never establishes that an odd-looking animal is the kosher mother’s offspring, which is the practical outcome of the unresolved dilemma on 24b.

Plucking Hair from a Firstborn: Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam

Source in Daf: 24b, Segments 5-6 (the mishna: one slaughtering a firstborn may clear a place “from here and from there” and pluck the hair, “provided that he does not move it from its place,” and may likewise pluck hair to show a blemish; Rav: “the halakha follows Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam”)

Rambam — Hilchot Me’ilah 1:11

Hebrew:

הַשּׁוֹחֵט בְּכוֹר אוֹ שְׁאָר מֻקְדָּשִׁין. תּוֹלֵשׁ אֶת הַשֵּׂעָר מִכָּאן וּמִכָּאן לַעֲשׂוֹת מָקוֹם לַסַּכִּין. וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יְזִיזֶנּוּ מִמְּקוֹמוֹ:

English:

When a person slaughters a firstborn or another consecrated animal, he may pull off the wool from either side to make a place for the knife, provided he does not remove the wool from its place.

Connection: The Rambam rules like Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam, as Rav did, using the mishna’s language (“מיכן ומיכן,” “ובלבד שלא יזיזנו ממקומו”), and extends it from the firstborn to all consecrated animals.

Rambam — Hilchot Me’ilah 1:10

Hebrew:

מֻתָּר לִתְלֹשׁ אֶת הַשֵּׂעָר לְכַתְּחִלָּה מִן הַקָּדָשִׁים כְּדֵי לְהַרְאוֹת הַמּוּם לְמֻמְחֶה. וְאוֹתוֹ הַשֵּׂעָר שֶׁתָּלַשׁ אוֹ שֶׁנָּשַׁר מִן הַבְּהֵמָה אוֹ מִן הַבְּכוֹר וְהַמַּעֲשֵׂר הֲרֵי זֶה אָסוּר בַּהֲנָיָה אֲפִלּוּ לְאַחַר שֶׁיִּשָּׁחֲטוּ מִפְּנֵי מוּמָן. גְּזֵרָה שֶׁמָּא יַשְׁהֶה אוֹתָן הוֹאִיל וְאֵינָן בָּאִין לְכַפָּרָה. אֲבָל צֶמֶר הַנּוֹשֵׁר מִן הַחַטָּאת וְהָאָשָׁם מֻתָּר בַּהֲנָיָה לְאַחַר שְׁחִיטָתָן מִפְּנֵי מוּמָן. הוֹאִיל וּלְכַפָּרָה הֵן בָּאִין אֵינוֹ מַשְׁהֶה אוֹתָן. וְאִם נִתְלַשׁ מִן הָעוֹלָה הֲרֵי זֶה סָפֵק. וְכָל שֶׁיִּתָּלֵשׁ מִכָּל הַקָּדָשִׁים אַחַר שֶׁנָּפַל בָּהֶן מוּם הֲרֵי הוּא מֻתָּר בַּהֲנָיָה שֶׁהֲרֵי לֹא תָּלַשׁ בְּיָדוֹ. חוּץ מִן הַבְּכוֹר וְהַמַּעֲשֵׂר שֶׁאַף הַנִּתְלָשׁ מִמֶּנּוּ אַחַר שֶׁנָּפַל בּוֹ מוּם אָסוּר בַּהֲנָיָה:

English:

It is permitted, even as an initial preference, to pull off hair from a sacrificial animal in order to show a physical blemish to an expert. It is forbidden to benefit from the hair that was pulled off or which fell from a consecrated animal, a firstborn animal, or one designated as the tithes, even after it was redeemed and slaughtered because of its blemish. This is a decree lest the sacrifice of such an animal be delayed, because it does not come to bring about atonement. It is, by contrast, permitted to benefit from wool which fell from an animal designated as a sin-offering or a guilt-offering after it has been redeemed and slaughtered because of a physical blemish. The rationale is that since these offerings come to bring about atonement, the owners will not delay their sacrifice. There is an unresolved doubt if it is permitted to benefit from wool that was pulled off from a burnt-offering. It is permitted to benefit from any wool that becomes pulled off from sacrificial animals after they have contracted a blemish, for it was not pulled off intentionally. The only exception is the wool of a firstborn animal and one designated as a tithe. In those instances, it is forbidden to benefit from wool even if it was pulled off from such an animal after it contracted a blemish.

Connection: The first sentence is the mishna’s second clause (“וכן תולש את השער לראות מקום מום”), permitted “לכתחילה.” The rest adds what the mishna does not say: the plucked hair itself stays forbidden for benefit, which is why the mishna insists it be left in place rather than removed.

Rambam — Hilchot Me’ilah 1:7

Hebrew:

כָּל קָדְשֵׁי מִזְבֵּחַ בֵּין קָדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים בֵּין קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים אֲסוּרִין בְּגִזָּה וַעֲבוֹדָה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים טו יט) “לֹא תַעֲבֹד בִּבְכֹר שׁוֹרֶךָ וְלֹא תָגֹז בְּכוֹר צֹאנֶךָ”. וְהוּא הַדִּין לִשְׁאָר קָדָשִׁים. וְהַגּוֹזֵז אֶת הַשּׁוֹר אוֹ הָעוֹבֵד בַּצֹּאן לוֹקֶה מִן הַתּוֹרָה. וְתוֹלֵשׁ אֵינוֹ כְּגוֹזֵז. וְיֵרָאֶה לִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה עַד שֶׁיִּגְזֹז כְּדֵי רֹחַב הַסִּיט כָּפוּל. לֹא יִהְיֶה זֶה חָמוּר מִשַּׁבָּת:

English:

All of the sacrifices offered on the altar - whether sacrifices of the highest degree of sanctity or sacrifices of a lesser degree of sanctity - are forbidden to be shorn and it is forbidden to perform work with them, as Deuteronomy 15:19 states: “Do not perform work with the firstborn of your oxen and do not shear the firstborn of your sheep.” The same applies to all other sacrificial animals. One who shears an ox or works with a sheep is liable for lashes according to Scriptural Law. One who pulls out hair is not considered as if he shears it. It appears to me that one is not liable unless he shears double the width of a sit. This prohibition should not be more severe than the prohibition against shearing on the Sabbath.

Connection: “ותולש אינו כגוזז” is the first of the two explanations the Gemara offers for Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam in Segment 6: plucking is not the shearing the verse forbids, so clearing the slaughter site does not violate “ולא תגוז בכור צאנך.”

Shulchan Aruch — Yoreh De’ah 308:3

Hebrew:

כשבא לשחטו או לראות מומו (מותר) לתלוש הצמר של מקום שחיטה כדי לעשות מקום לשחיטה (והצמר שתלש אסור בהנאה) (ב”י בשם הרמב”ם) ודוקא ביד אבל לא בכלי כדי שלא יהא נראה כגוזז:

English (our rendering; Sefaria has no English for this siman):

When he comes to slaughter it or to examine its blemish, it is permitted to pluck the wool of the place of slaughter in order to make room for the slaughter (and the wool he plucked is forbidden for benefit) (Beit Yosef in the name of the Rambam), but only by hand and not with an implement, so that it should not look like shearing.

Connection: The Shulchan Aruch codifies Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam for today’s firstborn, folds in the Rambam’s ban on benefiting from the plucked wool, and adds a restriction not stated in the mishna’s wording: plucking only by hand, “so that it should not look like shearing.” That concern parallels the mishna’s own condition that the hair not be moved from its place.

Clearing the Slaughter Site on Yom Tov: Rav Huna and the Codes

Source in Daf: 24b, Segments 6-8 (is plucking “not shearing,” so that on Yom Tov it is forbidden as uprooting, or is it shearing permitted as an unintended act, so that it is also permitted on Yom Tov? Rav Huna, after confirming Rav’s ruling through Rav Chananel: “on Yom Tov it is permitted”)

Rambam — Hilchot Yom Tov 3:3

Hebrew:

הַשּׁוֹחֵט בְּהֵמָה בְּיוֹם טוֹב מֻתָּר לוֹ לִתְלֹשׁ צֶמֶר לִמְקוֹם הַסַּכִּין בְּיָדוֹ. וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יְזִיזֶנּוּ מִמְּקוֹמוֹ אֶלָּא יִשָּׁאֵר שָׁם מְסֻבָּךְ כִּשְׁאָר צֶמֶר הַצַּוָּאר. אֲבָל בְּעוֹף לֹא יִמְרֹט מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא דַּרְכּוֹ וְנִמְצָא תּוֹלֵשׁ בְּיוֹם טוֹב:

English:

A person who slaughters an animal on a holiday is permitted to pull off the wool by hand from the place where he wishes to slaughter it, provided he does not remove it from its place, but rather leaves it there tangled with the remainder of the wool of the animal’s neck. [When slaughtering] a fowl, by contrast, one may not pull out the feathers, for [doing so by hand] is the usual procedure. Thus, one would be performing [the forbidden labor of] pulling out [feathers] on a holiday.

Connection: The Rambam rules like Rav Huna’s “כנגדו ביום טוב מותר,” carrying over the mishna’s condition (“שלא יזיזנו ממקומו”). His distinction for fowl, where plucking by hand is the normal method and therefore a real act of uprooting, shows the boundaries of the leniency.

Shulchan Aruch — Orach Chayim 498:12

Hebrew:

השוחט בהמה בי”ט אינו רשאי לתלוש הצמר לעשות מקום לסכין אלא מפנהו (בידו ב”י) ומושכו אילך ואילך ואם נתלש נתלש:

English:

One who slaughters an animal on Yom Tov may not pull out the wool to make room for the knife, but moves it aside (by hand) and draws it this way and that — and if it comes out, it comes out.

Connection: The Shulchan Aruch is stricter than the Rambam: one may not deliberately pluck on Yom Tov, only part the wool by hand, and if some comes out in the process, it does not matter. “ואם נתלש נתלש” is the logic of the unintended act (דבר שאין מתכוין) from Segment 7, but applied to parting rather than plucking. The Gemara’s discussion continues on daf 25 with Rav Chananya bar Shelamya’s report in Rav’s name.

Summary of Rulings